Ulysses on the Liffey by Richard Ellmann (1972)

The book as image demands these glosses as registers of their meaning.
(Richard Ellmann justifying his high-level, abstract, structural analysis, page 60)

Almost everything is coupled.
(Ellmann’s habit of defining binaries and dichotomies on every page, p.72)

Joyce liked to work his prose into patterns as intricate and individualised as the initial letters in the Book of Kells.
(Pretty analogy if not, ultimately, very useful, p.73)

A quick reminder of the chapter numbers and names in James Joyce’s epic modernist novel, ‘Ulysses’. Pretty much all discussions of the book refer to them but note that none of the Greek chapter titles are indicated in the actual text of ‘Ulysses’; they were given by Joyce to early commentators who published them in books and articles about the novel, and have been used by critics and commentators, including me, ever since – but none of them actually appear in hard copies or online versions of the text, which only indicate the chapters with numbers.

Part 1. The Telemachiad or the odyssey of Telemachus

  1. Telemachus
  2. Nestor
  3. Proteus

Part 2. The Odyssey

  1. Calypso
  2. Lotus Eaters
  3. Hades
  4. Aeolus
  5. Lestrygonians
  6. Scylla and Charybdis
  7. Wandering Rocks
  8. Sirens
  9. Cyclops
  10. Nausicaa
  11. Oxen of the Sun
  12. Circe

Part 3. The Nostos or Return

  1. Eumaeus
  2. Ithaca
  3. Penelope

Ulysses on the Liffey

This is an old book, written in the late 1960s and early ’70s, before the deluge of modern critical theory transformed the discipline of literary criticism. Back then American scholar and academic Richard Ellman (1918 to 1987) was famous as the man who wrote the huge and definitive biography of James Joyce (published in 1959) which single-handedly transformed Joyce studies. And yet this book, published just 13 years later, is deeply disappointing. I wouldn’t recommend it. Read the Hugh Kenner primer about ‘Ulysses’, but don’t bother with this one.

This is because Ellmann goes very heavy indeed on the schemata, on the high-level diagrams of organs, and colours, and symbols and tones that Joyce drew up for the book – and to which Ellmann adds further levels and frameworks of his own. On every page he adds structural analyses, building platforms upon platforms – for example his suggestion in the first chapter that ‘Ulysses’ needs to be interpreted on four levels: literal, ethical aesthetic and anagogic.

The trouble with his relentless focus on the (pretty simple-minded) structures he finds everywhere in the book is that they continually take us away from the actual text and make us dwell in the bloodless world of tables and blueprints. This book not only reproduces the detailed schema which Joyce sent to the Italian critic Linati, it is punctuated by three schemas of Ellman’s own creation summarising the first, middle and final six chapters.

And they’re not one-page wonders, they’re very detailed, each one extending over six pages. Possibly they’re considered the USP and backbone of this volume, maybe this book exists not to help the reader read ‘Ulysses’ better but as a scholarly presentation of Ellmann’s structural and thematic theories but I found them unreadable. Like reading a PowerPoint presentation about ‘Midsummer Night’s Dream’. Buzzkill. Way to drain all the joy out of a subject.

His chapter on Molly Bloom is disappointing

But not only is Ellmann’s approach boring, it’s often disappointingly banal.

I read his chapter ‘Why Molly Bloom menstruates’ immediately after reading the Molly Bloom chapter of ‘Ulysses’ and was immensely disappointed. First he wastes time summarising the theories of William Empson and Edmund Wilson (from the 1930s) and then disappears off into more schemas. He tells us that, according to Joyce’s notes, in the previous chapter Leopold Bloom had headed off into Deep Night while Stephen headed for Alba, the dawn. Is this useful? Sort of, kind of, mildly interesting – but it doesn’t really illuminate your reading of the actual words.

He says that after the dry officialese of ‘Ithaca’, Molly’s soliloquy offers ‘a joyful efflorescence’. Except it doesn’t, does it? It’s a long rambling repetitive tissue of memories about neighbours and soldiers and relatives and boyfriends and shopping and childhood games and biscuits and lots of graphic sexual descriptions. Until the last page which, for sure, leads us up to the famous great lyrical climax. But it’s not an ‘efflorescence’ before that. It’s a rambling character sketch. Ellmann’s characterisation is, in my opinion, flat wrong.

Ellmann compares Molly to the Wife of Bath (p.163) and Moll Flanders (p.165), which struck me as bleeding obvious, but missed what to me is the even more obvious point that all three of these famous fictional women were created by men. What does that tell us? But Ellmann doesn’t notice.

He asserts that if Stephen represents genuine philosophy, and Bloom represents half-educated magazine philosophising, then Molly represents all flesh. But isn’t that a very patronising and (as usual) over-schematic way of thinking about her? Instead of considering what she actually says, Ellmann is more concerned to fit her into his high-level patterns and plans.

I couldn’t believe it when he writes:

Molly’s nature [is] so much more earthy, trivial, sexualised and lyrical than Aristotle’s or Hume’s… (p.163)

Er, yes. This isn’t in doubt, the question is what makes you want to compare Molly Bloom to Aristotle in the first place? I well understand that Stephen expounds Aristotelian ideas in ‘Proteus’ and ‘Scylla and Charybdis’ and that Molly, in her semi-literate physicality, could be said to embody anti-philosophy. This would make her having Stephen to stay and her fantasies of having sex with him a real meeting of opposites. But directly comparing Molly the character with Aristotle or Hume seems to me ludicrous.

Ellman’s endless thirst for binaries and dichotomies is typified when he says:

Basically she is earth to Bloom’s sun, modifying his light by her own movements. (p.166)

This may or may not be ‘true’ but I think it misses the point by being so abstract. It feels like any moment he’s going to tell us that men are from Mars and women are from Venus. Or, in Ellmannese:

The ‘Ithaca’ episode had offered a heliocentric view of Bloom, Molly offers a geocentric one, the two together forming the angle of parallax… (p.167)

I know that one of the guiding principles of ‘Ulysses’ is the notion of parallax which the dictionary defines as ‘the displacement or difference in the apparent position of an object viewed along two different lines of sight’ (basically seeing the same thing from two points of view) and I certainly know that Molly’s character can be described as ‘earthy’ – but I don’t really see why Bloom should be considered as especially ‘heliocentric’ and I don’t see that it helps my close reading of specific passages, or of the text as a whole.

I just don’t like thinking about ‘Ulysses’ like this. It seems pointless and boring to me. It takes us light years away from the actual text in all its wonderful detail and difficulty and comedy and makes the thing sound like a lecture in comparative religion or structuralist anthropology. But this dry colourless theoretical level is the only level Ellmann operates at.

Despite disliking it more and more as I read on, I persisted and here’s the best summary I can manage. I try to give credit where credit’s due for Ellmann’s insights and ideas.

Learnings, sort of

Threes Joyce liked threes, so Ellmann suggests that the chapters proceed in triads: three in the opening section, four sets of three in the middle, three in the final section. Each trio contains internal contrasts and Ellmann has his own schema to impose:

I shall propose that in every group of three chapters the first defers to space, the second has time in the ascendant, and the third blends (or expunges) the two. (p.19)

Thus:

  • chapter one (space) opens in the extremely solid tower, with plump Buck Mulligan, the serving of food, and looking out over the big sea
  • chapter two (time) opens with a history lesson and contains Stephen’s famous outburst about history being a nightmare from which he’s trying to awake. Within this chapter Ellmann divides time into two types, secular and spiritual time, Caesar’s and Christ’s
  • chapter three synthesises the first two as Stephen crackles his way through the bladderwrack testing Aristotelian reality by closing then reopening his eyes, to see if the world is still there. (Oddly enough, it is)

Layers As a freethinker Bloom is post-Christian. As a Christian convert, he is post-Judaic. As a Judeo-Christian he is post-Homeric. So his character represents historical layer upon layer.

Dedalus If you think about it, Dedalus is a bad name for the young male protagonist in this novel. Stephen Dedalus perfectly suits the character in ‘Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man’ because he is (like Saint Stephen) the ‘martyr’ of the new religion (in Joyce’s case, of the new literature) which, like the legendary Greek Daedelus, he has fathered, a labyrinth of artistic artifice. But in ‘Ulysses‘ Stephen is no longer a father (as Daedelus was father to Icarus), he is a son. If you think about it, there’s a real confusion here, which Joyce just outfaces and all his critics accept.

Loose fits Similarly, none of the many literary correspondences the text invokes – namely to the ‘Odyssey’ and ‘Hamlet’, with occasional nods to Dante’s ‘Divine Comedy’ and Goethe’s ‘Faust’ – fully fit.

  • In ‘The Odyssey’ Telemachus goes looking for his actual father but in the novel, Bloom is not Stephen’s father and Stephen isn’t consciously looking for him.
  • Hamlet is in mourning but for a dead father whose wife has quickly had sex with/married his uncle, whereas Stephen is in mourning for a dead mother, and there’s not a shred of unfaithfulness about either Simon or May Dedalus.
  • In chapter 4 Molly stands for Calypso, the sensual enchantress, and yet in chapter 18 the same Molly stands for the devoted wife Penelope. Not only that, but Penelope is famously chaste while Molly is famously promiscuous.

In other words, the classic literary texts hover in the background like ghostly amplifiers or underpinnings of the narrative, but they only loosely inform the main characters. To put it another way, Joyce plays fast and loose with all the correspondences, making them close when they can be, but quietly ignoring them altogether when they don’t fit.

Antisemitism Ellmann tells us that antisemitism is Joyce’s touchstone for ‘cravenheartedness’. I’ll second that. Both the Englishman Haines, the Unionist Deasy, and the Irish nationalist citizen are guilty of it. For me antisemitism is not only bigoted racism but, just as bad, it’s stupid. It indicates someone who can’t cope with the complexity of the modern world and so resorts to medieval simplifications.

Two types Haines represents a British empire reduced to having nightmares and shooting in the dark, combined with embarrassing sentimentalism about the locals i.e. the milkwoman, while Mulligan is flashily hollow, ‘Ireland’s gay betrayer’, betrayer of his own culture. They represent antitheses with Stephen in the middle.

Refuser At the Forty Foot bathing hole Stephen refuses to bathe with the other two. This is because he is the great refuser; he refused to kneel at his mother’s bedside, he has refused Roman Catholicism, he refused the suggestion of becoming a priest in ‘A Portrait’, he refuses the Italian music teacher’s kindly suggestion to become a professional singer, he refuses the Irish nationalism of the peasant student Davin and the drunken bigot the citizen. All leading up to the climactic moment in the brothel where he smashes the chandelier as he declares he will not serve. He is Mr No.

Just regarding the refusal to bathe, it’s noteworthy that Stephen is a hydrophobe. We are told he hasn’t had a bath for months. He must have stunk. It’s typical of Ellmann that he instantly spots the structural element of the Forty Foot rejection scene, neatly pointing out how Stephen’s refusing to pray and refusing to swim amount symbolise his rejecting spiritual and physical purification, but isn’t interested in its practical consequences (p.11).

Chapter 3. Proteus

Aristotle Joyce worshipped Aristotle. He thought him the greatest thinker who ever lived. What he chiefly liked was he was against Plato’s idealism.

What he liked about Aristotle was he had demoted Plato’s Ideas, had denied that universals could be detached from particulars, and in short had set himself against mysticism. (p.13)

Just as Joyce set himself against the Celtic Revival, the fairies and twilight and legends of Olde Irelande, against aestheticism and the yellow nineties, occultism and spiritualism. As dramatised in the confrontation with A.E. in the National Library in ‘Scylla and Charybdis’.

(I agree, which is why I try to stick as closely as possible to the actual text and narrative of the books I review. The further away you get, the more it becomes something else. So it’s ironic that Ellmann fully understands Joyce’s liking for Aristotle while himself demonstrating precisely the flight from the (messy, confusing) details of the text into (overneat and tidy) literary archetypes and symbols, which sound more like Plato and his timeless Forms.)

The now, the here This is the point of Stephen’s dismissal of William Blake’s followers (although he himself liked Blake and lectured on him) for wittering on about the void and eternity, whereas Stephen wants to concentrate on the exact present. Stephen thinks:

Through spaces smaller than red globules of man’s blood they creepycrawl after Blake’s buttocks into eternity of which this vegetable world is but a shadow. [Whereas we should] Hold to the now, the here, through which all future plunges to the past.

Crunching Hence Joyce is so careful to describe the sound of Stephen’s boots crunching through the bladderwrack on the beach and then tries to depict the sound of the waves with made-up words. ‘Ulysses’ is about these vivid sensual details. Almost all of which are overlooked in Ellmann’s quest for structures and schemas.

The Holy Office In his poem The Holy Office, Joyce mocks female coyness as much as male idealism because they are both denials of the mucky reality of love and sex – they are part of what Ellmann summarises in a powerful phrase as ‘the general self-deception’ and refusal to face reality. Joyce is about facing reality. People are not what you want them to be. The world is not what you want it to be. You are not what you want to be. Face it.

Ellmann says Joyce’s message is ‘Accept the universe’. It is what it is and ‘Ulysses’ is an encyclopedic transcription of its itness. This, of course, is highly debatable, because the book presents a polemically dirty, messy, squalid often very sordid view of human nature. Now wonder Virginia Woolf loathed it. For her it missed vast realms of beauty and art. My point is that Ellmann’s description of the book is not really adequate. Like many fans and commentators he takes Joyce’s own opinion of it at face value.

Caesuras Ellmann points out something I hadn’t noticed which is that most if not all the chapters have a break or caesura in the middle. I can see that in the ‘Nausicaa’ chapter (first half ladies’ romance, second half reverting to the initial style) but less so the others. In the first half of chapter 3 Ellmann says Stephen is thinking about creation, fathers, mothers, fertilisation and giving birth; but half-way through he changes the direction of his walk and this triggers a change in his thoughts, which become about death and decomposition, starting with the carcass of a dog he sees on the beach. So two parts: birth and death, growth and corruption. Maybe. But I’m suspicious of this because Ellmann quickly turns everything into binaries and opposites. And it feels so easy just throwing out these grand pairs of synonyms and antonyms: Expansion and collapse. Addition and subtraction. Creation and destruction. I could go on all night.

Pee Meanwhile, in the actual text, Stephen has a pee (‘Better get this job over quick’) then picks his nose: ‘He laid the dry snot picked from his nostril on a ledge of rock, carefully’. You can see how very aggressively non-spiritual, how aggressively, vulgarly materialistic this deliberately is.

More antitheses Ellmann spots that the chapter opens with Stephen reading (the signature of all things) and ends with him writing (a poem). The poem he wrote in ‘Portrait’ is a portrait of attraction (‘Lure of the fallen seraphim’), here it is a poem about death, and so of repulsion.

Rosevean Stephen looks over his ship and sees a ship, the Rosevean, but for Ellmann, this ship also:

seals the marriage of form and matter, of body and soul, of space and time, at which Aristotle officiated. (p.26)

Yes I know Joyce packed the book full of structures and correspondences, so no doubt the ship is part of his elaborate symbology because everything is, I’m not denying that. I’m just suggesting that Ellmann’s focus exclusively on these structures a) excludes the riot and fun of the language and b) often feels stretched and contrived.

Chapter 4. Calypso

Ellmann prioritises abstract over concrete Language is diffusive, fissiparous, uncontainable, whereas Ellmann continually locks everything down to really boring binaries. This chapter covers the introduction of Leopold Bloom in chapter 4 of ‘Ulysses’ and embarks on another set of binaries comparing him and Stephen. Father versus son. Married versus single. Intellectual versus middle-brow. Solipsist versus realist. Inbound versus outbound. I could go on for hours trotting out the same slightly interesting but ultimately tedious dichotomies. Stephen is edgy, Bloom is placid. Stephen is a loner while Bloom is convivial. Stephen gets drunk while Bloom stays sober. Bloom has a job while Stephen is unemployed. Stephen thinks about the soul, Bloom about the body (specially sex). Stephen ponders the nature of the Trinity; to Bloom, such questions are pointless. Stephen is haunted, Bloom is not. Stephen’s lost a mother, Bloom’s lost a father. I could go on…

These facts are not untrue, and they are sort of interesting, and it’s probably as well to know them but, in my opinion, they are just the starting point for engaging with the difficult and cornucopian text itself, whereas for Ellmann, stating these very obvious binaries and dichotomies is where he ends, is the end result.

Disembodied/embodied If Stephen in chapter 3 is a disembodied intellect, Bloom in chapter 4 is an aggressively embodied material man, what with buying and cooking and eating the pork kidney, admiring his wife’s plumpness, feeding the cat, going for a poo and so on.

Both In something like a joke, discussing the not perfect fit of Molly with either Calypso or Penelope, Ellmann cracks that:

Whenever confronted by a choice between two possible things to include, Joyce chose both. (p.34)

Bloomism Ellmann coins the term ‘bloomism’ which he defines as an effort to recall an important fact and getting it wrong. Like when Bloom thinks the elegy in a country churchyard was written by Wordsworth (rather than the correct author, Thomas Gray).

Reject/accept Stephen opens the novel with a series of rejections; Molly closes it with her famous acceptance, Yes.

Zionism versus beddism But Bloom is a rejecter too. In the butcher Moses Dlugacz’s he picks up a leaflet for Zionist settlement in Palestine and has a strangely negative image of it, triggered by vague ideas about the Dead Sea, of a barren volcanic ash land, ‘a barren land, bare waste’. Out in the street a wizened old hag crosses his path. All this dried-up deathness makes him want to hurry back to plump warm Molly in bed, ‘Warm beds; warm fullblooded life’ (p.51). Bed, warmth, life.

Chapter 6. Hades

Life and death The same fundamental (and pretty obvious) dichotomy between life and death underpins chapter 6, ‘Hades’, set in the funeral carriage going to Glasnevin Cemetery. Ellmann’s entry-level binaries make it all sound very boring, which it isn’t to actually read, not least because like most of the rest of the book, it’s full of gags and gossip and character studies. But Ellmann isn’t interested in any of that, misses out everything that makes ‘Ulysses’ fun to read, just cherrypicks the details which help his structural analyses and comparisons with Homer.

Chapter 7. Aeolus

Sufficient for the day is the newspaper thereof.

Three types of diffusion Ellmann usefully points out the schematic nature of the opening of chapter 7, ‘Aeolus’, describing three modes of diffusion: in quick succession we see 1) a fleet of trams setting out from their base in the heart of Dublin; 2) His Majesty’s mail cars setting out from the post office; 3) and draymen rolling barrels of stout to be loaded onto carts and distributed to the city’s pubs. Ellmann neatly summarises these as exemplars of 1) physical, 2) written and (insofar as booze loosens tongues) 3) oral communication – appropriate for a chapter referencing the Greek god of wind’s far-reaching influence, and its modern incarnation in the power of the press.

Keys… Ellmann embarks on the idea that Bloom and Stephen (who both appear in this chapter, separately visiting the newspaper office of the Evening Telegraph) are in some sense seeking the keys which will unlock the city. I’ve no idea what he means and it only becomes more obscure when he goes on to suggest that they themselves are the keys which unlock the gates to Dante’s purgatory, with the claim that these central, post-hell chapters, are purgatorial.

and Keyes The keys theme is more obvious in Bloom’s mission to get an ad into the newspaper for The House of Keyes, owned by Alexander Keyes (‘tea, wine and spirit merchant’) who’s devised his own logo. Ellmann acutely points out that both Bloom and Stephen are keyless, Stephen having had the key to the Martello tower taken off him by Mulligan, and Bloom (though he doesn’t know it yet) will find out in penultimate chapter, ‘Ithaca’, that he’s left his front door keys in his other pair of trousers. And in the closing portion of the chapter the newspaper editor Crawford turns out to have mislaid the keys to his office. OK. We have to be key-sensitive.

Three speeches Ellmann points out that, in line with the theme of windy communication, the ‘Aeolus’ chapter contains three speeches which can be compared and contrasted. Less understandable is his claim that the speeches represent ‘three sorties’ ‘sent out’ by the city of Dublin ‘against’ Bloom and Stephen. Ellmann claims that in these central chapters the two men are ‘in league against the powers of this world and the next’, albeit ‘unconsciously’. This high-level interpretation may or may not ring your bell. I found his focus on the specific speeches more useful.

1. Bloom enters the office as Ned Lambert is reading out an amazingly flowery speech given by Dawson, a baker, to the city council about the importance of Ireland’s forests, as reported in the paper and mockingly read out by Lambert. This speech is deliberative.

2. The speech of the barrister Seymour Bush in the Childs murder case, which is praised in the newspaper office by the lawyer J.J. O’Molloy. This speech is forensic.

3. A speech given in 1903 by John F. Taylor in defence of the Irish language revival and published as a pamphlet, declaimed by Professor MacHugh in the newspaper office (not without interruptions). This speech is a public oration.

This is all true, but it’s also important and funny that Simon Dedalus comments on the first speech:

—Agonising Christ, wouldn’t it give you a heartburn on your arse?

And begs Ned to stop reading it:

Shite and onions! That’ll do, Ned. Life is too short.

The structures are no doubt there, and noticing them is part of the pleasure. But so is the texture of the prose.

Wind Types of wind are referenced throughout, as when Bloom thinks about how newspapermen change jobs.

Funny the way those newspaper men veer about when they get wind of a new opening. Weathercocks. Hot and cold in the same breath. Wouldn’t know which to believe. One story good till you hear the next. Go for one another baldheaded in the papers and then all blows over.

Or Professor MacHugh calls Dawson an ‘inflated windbag’.

The tissues rustled up in the draught, floated softly in the air blue scrawls and under the table came to earth.
—It wasn’t me, sir. It was the big fellow shoved me, sir.
—Throw him out and shut the door, the editor said. There’s a hurricane blowing.

The highfalutin proverbial description for poetic inspiration, ‘the divine afflatus’, simply means breath, wind. And one of Homer’s stock descriptions for Troy is ‘windy Troy’. In other words, as with so much Joyce, once you’re tipped off to start looking for a particular theme, you find more and more of it hidden in plain sight.

Lungs One interesting thing Ellmann says is that the organ Joyce himself assigned to ‘Aeolus’ in his schema was the lungs and this explains why so many phrases are paired and follow the rhythm of breathing, in and out, in a process of ‘pulmonary give and take’. Doors open and close, people enter and leave (although you could say the same of every play ever written).

The door of Ruttledge’s office whispered: ee: cree. They always build one door opposite another for the wind to. Way in. Way out.

Caesura Ellmann identifies the caesura in this chapter as coming when the three speeches have been discussed, and Stephen proposes that everyone shifts location to the nearest pub, Mooney’s – so they severally exit the office and make their way confusedly down the stairs and into the street.

Nelson On this walk to the pub Stephen tells the Professor his rather stupid story about two old ladies who buy some fruit and go on a holiday excursion to the top of Nelson’s column where, puffed out, they eat fresh plums, spit the pips out through the railings, and look up at ‘the one-handled adulterer’.

Mockery There are two ideas at work here. 1) The characters have just heard detailed descriptions of three types of grand Irish speech; Stephen’s story is intended to deflate all three and mock all grand rhetoric. 2) More specifically, the Taylor speech contained a description of Moses climbing to the top of Mount Sinai. Stephen’s story is a parody and a mockery in that, instead of Moses, it’s two old biddies who are granted a ‘vision’ out over ‘the unpromised land’ of Ireland.

Clever, very, but no matter how many times I’ve had this story explained, I’ve never found it funny.

Pretentious It sometimes feels as if Ellmann’s writing becomes steadily more pretentious as he has steadily less to say:

Here in ‘Aeolus’ Joyce is less threnodic though equally clamant. (p.65)

The episode proceeds by magnification and parvification. (p.71)

By the latter he means that certain figures (Taylor, Moses) are bigged up in the first half of the chapter and then satirised in the second. Ellmann finds the same pattern in the famous newspaper headlines which litter the chapter, which start out genuinely impressive but become steadily diminished. Here’s on from the start of the chapter:

IN THE HEART OF THE HIBERNIAN METROPOLIS

Whereas see how an example from towards the end of the chapter has become longer but cruder:

SOPHIST WALLOPS HAUGHTY HELEN SQUARE ON PROBOSCIS. SPARTANS GNASH MOLARS. ITHACANS VOW PEN IS CHAMP.

Chapter 8. Lestrygonians

This is the very worst hour of the day. Vitality. Dull, gloomy: hate this hour. Feel as if I had been eaten and spewed.
(Bloom’s internal monologue)

‘Lestrygonians’ is all about food and is packed to the hilt with food references, similes and metaphors. Bloom feeling hungry, seeing people eating in the street, fantasising about food, looking into Burton’s restaurant which is so packed with diners he backs out and instead drops into Davy Byrne’s pub for a cheese sandwich.

Church versus state Ellmann spots one of the book’s recurring binaries at the start, between State and Church. If you recall, this is encoded in the very first sentence of the book which starts with the word state and ends with a cross.

Stately, plump Buck Mulligan came from the stairhead, bearing a bowl of lather on which a mirror and a razor lay crossed.

Similarly, here at the start of ‘Lestrygonians’ Bloom 1) sees ‘A sugarsticky girl shovelling scoopfuls of creams for a christian brother’ and then 2) notices a lozenge and comfit manufacturer to His Majesty the King, and imagines King Edward VII sitting on his throne sucking boiled sweets. Christian / king. Church / state.

Up and down Quickly Ellmann is quick to find in this chapter the kinds of binary opposition he loves. Bloom’s thoughts always start on the ground, Stephen’s in the air. Stephen is racked with guilt, which is a sort of intellectual bad feeling; Bloom’s more earthy equivalent is disgust.

Comparisons Meaning is generated by a whole series of binary contrasts:

  • Molly versus Josie Bloom bumps into Mrs (Josie) Breen. She was at one point Bloom’s girlfriend but Molly won him off her. She has aged badly compared to Molly.
  • Josie versus Denis Breen This is because she married a man with severe mental problems, Breen, who she tells Bloom received an obscure insulting postcard reading U.P. up this morning.
  • Two madmen: Breen cf Cashel Boyle O’Connor Fitzmaurice Tisdall Farrell.
  • Mina Purefoy versus Molly Josie tells Bloom Mina Purefoy is having a terrible time giving birth at the maternity hospital; Bloom compares this with Molly’s easy deliveries.
  • Large versus small families Bloom sees poverty-stricken Dilly Dedalus and marvels that May Dedalus bore 15 children, Mina is bearing her ninth, while Molly only had two.
  • Sandwich men versus blind Bloom sees the five men wearing sandwich boards spelling HELYS pass by, but has to help the blind stripling across the road.
  • A.E. and Lizzy Up behind walk the noted Dublin poet and mystic A.E. accompanied by a lady poet. Bloom can’t help despising their airy-fairy artiness, the opposite of his own earthiness.
  • Meat versus vegetarian A.E. and lady friend have just exited a vegetarian restaurant while Bloom’s thoughts are stuck on all types of meat, butchery and cooking.
  • Molly versus Martha Molly is obviously a real woman of flesh and blood, versus Martha Clifford who only exists in her rather pathetic letters.
  • Fertility versus disease For a bad moment Bloom panics that Blazes Boylan may give Molly a venereal disease – their diseased and infertile sexual act contrasts strongly with the ‘healthy’ philoprogenitive sex of May Dedalus and Mina Purefoy.
  • Love versus sex Contrasted with the implied animality of Boylan tupping Molly, Bloom has a lyrical memory of their tender first kissing and touching on Howth Hill (the scene which Molly will vividly remember at the end of her soliloquy in chapter 18).

In the same spirit, Ellmann neatly points out that Boylan is as thoughtlessly sensual as the men stuffing their faces in Burton’s restaurant, because womanising is like gourmandising, both are about objectifying and consuming inanimate objects. Whereas love, which is what Bloom has for Molly, animates its object, brings it to life.

Chapter 9. Scylla and Charybdis

The aesthetic debate In this chapter Stephen Dedalus tries and fails to make an impression on representatives of Dublin’s literary elite by making an informal presentation of his theory about Shakespeare’s Hamlet to the (real-life) author and mystic A.E., and author, editor and librarian John Eglinton. From his materialist Aristotelian point of view, Stephen seeks to refute the kind of gassy aesthetic idealism which places Shakespeare among the gods or says he’s great because he embodies spiritual ideals. A.E. expresses this high-minded aesthetic thus:

—Art has to reveal to us ideas, formless spiritual essences. The supreme question about a work of art is out of how deep a life does it spring… The deepest poetry of Shelley, the words of Hamlet bring our minds into contact with the eternal wisdom, Plato’s world of ideas.

Stephen refutes this with a thumping return to earth, insisting that what powers the great plays is Shakespeare’s life, his biography. Thus he thinks ‘Hamlet’ is so much more than another Jacobean tragedy because it is powered by Shakespeare’s rage and humiliation at being cuckolded, that one of his brothers had an affair with his older wife, Anne Hathaway, who he abandoned back in Stratford for twenty long years while he made his career in London (the length of time that Odysseus was absent from Ithaca).

Ellmann the biographer Now Ellmann was, of course, himself a famous biographer, having written monumental biographies of Joyce and Oscar Wilde. In a chapter about biographies, then, Ellmann can be forgiven for letting down his schematic guard for a moment and sharing some biographical facts about Joyce. These are that Joyce himself delivered a set of no fewer than 13 public lectures, in 1912 to ’13, solely on the subject of Shakespeare’s ‘Hamlet’. In addition, we know he had read the recent biographies of Shakespeare by Dowden, Lee, Harris and Wilde, as well as following the latest scholarship about newly discovered manuscripts. Sort of interesting to know, but then what…? If anything, the fact that Joyce did so much reading about Shakespeare makes the thinness of his presentation in the Library scene all the more disappointing.

Caesura Remember how Ellmann thinks every chapter is divided in two by a caesura? In this chapter he neatly suggests the caesura is marked by the arrival of Buck Mulligan halfway through Stephen’s presentation.

Mulligan mocks Up to this point in the narrative, there’d been an easy binary, between the young materialist Stephen set against the high-minded idealist, old A.E. Mulligan’s arrival introduces a third element because he is as irreverent as Stephen, he is as much a materialist as Stephen, but unlike Stephen he doesn’t care about the subject. Mulligan immediately jumps to the sexual interpretation of everyone, including Bloom who he later implies is gay – but done in a frivolous, superficial crowd-pleasing way.

Stephen’s theory is serious and hard-won, but Mulligan merely exaggerates and mocks it for effect, producing with a flourish a parody he’s written named ‘Everyman His Own Wife or A Honeymoon in the Hand (a national immorality in three orgasms)’ in which the artistic productivity of Stephen’s theory is reduced to a crude farce about masturbation.

Envy So Stephen is furious when it is Mulligan who is invited to a literary soirée at the author George Moore’s house that evening.

As Ellmann puts it, for A.E. the things of this world are illusory; for Mulligan they are inconsequential; only for Stephen are they real, as he repeatedly tells himself throughout the book.

Vico I’m translating this into my own phraseology, which I continually try to make comprehensible and practical. Not so Ellmann, who is ever-ready to rope in not only Homer and Shakespeare, Aristotle and Hume, Dante and Goethe but, in this instance, the Italian philosopher, rhetorician, historian and jurist, Giambattista Vico (1668 to 1744).

Stephen is propounding here not subjectivism, but Vico’s notion that the human world is made by man, and that we can only encounter it in what is already implicit in ourselves. Put another way, Shakespeare’s plays are a record of what was possible for him, and so are his experiences. Life coexists with art as a representation of self. (p.84)

Is that helpful to you? We know that Joyce read and admired Vico for his huge vision of the eternal recurrence of human history but:

  1. it’s not true
  2. Ellmann’s summary of it isn’t very useful (‘the human world is made by man’, duh, who did you think the human world was made by, dolphins?)
  3. it’s a foolishly simplified summary of Shakespeare’s plays to say they were ‘a record of what was possible for him’ – what does that even mean? but mostly it’s hugely misleading and grossly simplistic, they were based on all kinds of sources and written for a complex and fast-changing market

Ellmann’s discussion leads up to a pithy and meaningless summary: ‘Life coexists with art as a representation of self.’ What does that mean? It might just about mean something, but it’s barely worth knowing, is it?

Ellmann then goes on to a series of grand statements about Art which are so witless they made me really cross. Like most literary critics he is obsessed with sex, and suggests that Joyce solves the Scylla and Charybdis problem (what problem?) by having the two monsters have sex with each other. This is because:

The sexual act is the essential act of artistic as of natural creation.

Is it?

This act has to occur within the artist’s brain so that he is mother as well as father of the issuing word. Shakespeare, has, therefore, like all artists, a double nature, is like Bloom, a womanly man, is victim as well as victimiser… God himself must be both father and mother to Christ in the same way. In short, the artist, combining both parents in himself, is an androgyne. (p.86)

Does God have to be both mother and father to Christ? Does the artist have to combine both parents and become an androgyne? Why am I reading this pretentious guff? Was Bach an androgyne? Constable? Van Gogh? It leads into a small orgy of Ellmann’s favourite trope, the dichotomy.

In this two-backed beast are united the various symbols of maleness and femaleness in this episode – ashplant and hat, flag and pit, Prospero’s buried staff and drowned book, and also the categories of space and time… the present and the possible, the now-here and the there-then, Stratford and London, Dublin and Paris, land and sea. (p.87)

Remember how I summarised Ellmann’s claim that it is A.E. and Mulligan who are the real opposites here, well Ellmann takes this to extremes:

Mulligan mocks his ‘conception’ by saying that he is himself his own father, and by offering to parturiate. He also offers his own play, an anti-Hamlet, in which he says his hero is his own wife. Instead of being androgynous, like the true artist, he is only masturbatory, like the false artist…

‘Masturbatory, like the false artist…’ Is there such an easily knowable thing as ‘the false artist’? But there’s more:

Mulligan is all penis while A.E. is all vagina. (p.87)

If you think it helps you understand ‘Ulysses’ to know that ‘Mulligan is all penis while A.E. is all vagina’, then this is the book for you, as it overflows with such high-level and often preposterous generalisations. But I’m more tempted to say, with Simon Dedalus:

—Shite and onions! That’ll do, Dick. Life is too short.

Chapter 10. Wandering rocks

Ellmann is on fire now. At the end of the previous chapter, Stephen emerged into the open air and saw two plumes of smoke mounting heavenward which Ellmann thinks represent Stephen and Bloom. Remember how The Artist (apparently) has to combine both parents in himself? Well, Ellmann now tells us that The Artist also has to fuse with God:

God the creator has fused with man the creator, both androgynous, ostlers and butchers, Iagos and Othellos, both producing, by intercourse of contraries, life from death, generation from corruption, art from dialectic. (p.89)

Of course it has to be an intercourse of contraries as this is more or less the only mental structure Ellmann seems to know. Anyway, all that came at the end of the preceding chapter; at the start of this chapter Ellmann continues in the same high mystical vein, summarising Stephen’s aesthetic thus:

The true parents of the artist are less his real father and mother, who engender his body, than a ghostly pair who, in the spiritual womb of mankind, husband and wive to form the soul.

Put another way [a favourite phrase of Ellmann’s] male and female elements – world without world and world within, agent and reagent – copulate to form by spirit from what once was flesh the word which is fleshed spirit. (p.90)

‘The spiritual womb of mankind’ eh? If, like me, you don’t believe there is a God or a spirit or a soul let alone a ‘spiritual womb of mankind’, then although you have to concede that these words have a kind of gestural, ghostly or psychological meaning (because words always have some meaning) you can be fairly certain they bear no relation to anything in the real world.

Compare and contrast Ellmann’s high diction with just one random sentence from the concrete reality of the text itself.

Blazes Boylan walked here and there in new tan shoes about the fruitsmelling shop, lifting fruits, young juicy crinkled and plump red tomatoes, sniffing smells.

That is more immediate and compelling, more inventive and interesting, more revealing of ‘Ulysses” concerns and processes, than anything in Ellmann’s entire book.

The labyrinth of doubt

But Ellmann soldiers on. In chapter 10, he suggests that in order to be tested, his theory of copulating androgynes must enter ‘the labyrinth of doubt’.

Now I have to concede that Joyce himself very much did deal with this level of abstraction. He was the first to create complex schemas for the novel, in which he attributed to each chapter a presiding subject, tone, organ, colour and so on. In the Linati scheme he actually states that the meaning of chapter 10 is ‘the hostile environment’, so Ellmann is not wrong to pick up on these themes and ideas and to address them systematically.

What I object to is I think he develops them in a particularly fruitless way, travelling further and further from the complexity (and the humour and Irishness) of the text, and deeper into an academic fantasyland, into a mode of discourse where he increasingly relies on big names (Blake, Milton, Goethe, Shakespeare, Homer) in formulations which sound more like they’re devised to impress American college students doing Great Works of Western Literature 101 courses. A lot of the time Ellmann’s theories feel only vestigially attached to the actual text of ‘Ulysses’ the book.

In my opinion, Joyce needed his elaborate schemas in order to create his text; they are quite literally foundations and scaffolds and frameworks upon which he built the multistorey palace of the final text; they were the matrix within which to create evermore complex systems of images, comparisons, metaphors and so on which he packed into every chapter. You only have to notice the scores of words describing different types of wind in ‘Aeolus’ or of food in ‘Lestrygonians’ to see this. But in my reading, these elaborate schemas were an aid to composition not necessarily to understanding.

It is necessary to understanding the book to know that each chapter is based on an episode from Homer, and that each chapter focuses on a particular theme, often accompanied by keywords and images and, in the later chapters, all cast in an appropriate mode or format. And it is fairly important to understand Stephen’s commitment to Aristotelian materialism against Plato’s forms, so that you understand the debate taking place in chapters 3 and 9. But you don’t need to know much more than that. No-one needs to know that:

male and female elements – world without world and world within, agent and reagent – copulate to form by spirit from what once was flesh the word which is fleshed spirit.

That is just Ellmann taking elements from the text and taking them to rarefied and esoteric heights – quite impressive as a virtuoso performance in literary criticism of a certain flashy type, but pretty much irrelevant to an actual reading of the actual novel.

Joyce is far more vivid, immediate, evocative and funny and textually interesting than Ellmann’s colourless abstractions ever suggest. Most of ‘Ulysses’ sounds like this:

He crossed Westmoreland street when apostrophe S had plodded by. Rover cycleshop. Those races are on today. How long ago is that? Year Phil Gilligan died. We were in Lombard street west. Wait: was in Thom’s. Got the job in Wisdom Hely’s year we married. Six years. Ten years ago: ninetyfour he died yes that’s right the big fire at Arnott’s. Val Dillon was lord mayor. The Glencree dinner. Alderman Robert O’Reilly emptying the port into his soup before the flag fell. Bobbob lapping it for the inner alderman. Couldn’t hear what the band played. For what we have already received may the Lord make us. Milly was a kiddy then. Molly had that elephantgrey dress with the braided frogs. Mantailored with selfcovered buttons. She didn’t like it because I sprained my ankle first day she wore choir picnic at the Sugarloaf. As if that. Old Goodwin’s tall hat done up with some sticky stuff. Flies’ picnic too. Never put a dress on her back like it. Fitted her like a glove, shoulders and hips. Just beginning to plump it out well. Rabbitpie we had that day. People looking after her.

It is rich with felt life and textual tricksiness. Ellmann’s discussion of Aristotle and Hume, Vico and Blake are obviously not completely irrelevant, as we know from letters and lectures that Joyce thought deeply about those specific authors, and also their names are mentioned in the text itself. I just think that the way Ellmann discusses them is showy but superficial, and always takes us away from the specificity of the text.

David Hume

He does this big time when he embarks on the claim that the presiding spirit of chapter 10 is no longer Aristotle but the Scottish sceptical philosopher David Hume (1711 to 1776). If Aristotle presided over the first nine books, Ellmann suggests that Hume presides over the final nine.

Now Hume is a hero of mine and I have read several of his books very closely, notably the ‘Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion’, and I think Ellmann’s discussion of him is problematic. Number one, Joyce himself seems to have thought, erroneously, that Hume was in part an idealist, which I understand to be completely wrong. Hume was the sceptic’s sceptic, pushing philosophical scepticism to the limit.

Second objection is I think Ellmann’s discussion of Hume is short and superficial. Here’s an adapted AI summary of Hume’s thought:

Empiricism Hume divided all knowledge into 1) ‘relations of ideas’ (logic/mathematics) which have an internal logic and 2) ‘everything else’, which can be categorised as ‘matters of fact’ i.e. based on experience. Hume argued that we cannot prove anything outside these two categories. Hence all theology, metaphysics and a good deal of what passed for philosophy is literally non-sense and should be rejected.

The Problem of Causation Hume argued that we cannot directly perceive causation. Instead of knowing that A causes B we only observe that A and B appear together, leading us to feel a causal connection based on habit, not reason. None of us can know, for sure, that the sun will rise tomorrow, or that there will even be a tomorrow. Most of our knowledge of the world we live in is based on habit not reason.

Moral sentimentalism Ditto morality. Morality is rooted in feelings, sentiments, and emotions (what the eighteenth century called ‘passions’) not reason. Virtue arises from sympathy, and our reactions to events around us are mostly based on sentiment and emotion not reason or logic.

Scepticism and religion Hume fiercely attacked religion, the belief in God, miracles and so on, advocating for a purely naturalistic understanding of the world.

The self Hume argued that the ‘self’ is just a bundle of perceptions, not a stable, persisting entity.

In a nutshell, Hume dismissed all talk about subjects which aren’t based on either 1) pure maths / logic or 2) on observed phenomena, as rubbish. That’s to say, Hume dismissed all theology and most philosophy, certainly all idealist philosophy which supposes Ideals stored in some high Otherplace, all this he considered ‘sophistry and illusion’. In fact in his ‘Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding’ Hume famously argued that any book containing neither “abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number” nor “experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence” should be “committed to the flames”.

This is not quite my position, I have a more open, tolerant position which is closer to William Blake’s saying that ‘Everything possible to be believed is an image of truth’. Put another way (as Ellmann so often says), theology and metaphysics are interesting 1) as intellectual games to play, like chess and 2) were and are valid creative activities of the human mind. But it doesn’t make them ‘true’ in the sense Hume uses.

When I read ‘Game of Thrones’ I lend Westeros credence in my imagination for as long as I read the books, so why can’t I lend the theology of St Augustine or Don Cupitt just as much credence, and of the same sort, getting thoroughly involved in them as I read them – but pretty obviously separating them from my lived experience of life?

It’s intellectually rewarding to study and follow the lines of thought of the major theologians and philosophers; and it’s also part of the intellectual legacy of humankind. But it’s not ‘true’. There is no God, there is no heaven, there is no soul, there are no angels, there is no Devil, there was no Fall, there is no redemption, there is no salvation, and so on. Just as there is no Hamlet or Jon Snow or Stephen Dedalus.

The way these made-up entities effect our mental lives may be very powerful indeed and in that way – in terms of psychological effects – they can have an awesome reality, as they determine the thoughts and actions of real people in the real world, in fact they can affect entire cultures, they can determine the course of history. But that doesn’t make them ‘true’ in the way this laptop I’m typing these words on is a verifiable fact. They don’t objectively exist outside the human imagination.

So I know these metaphysical imaginings are non-real (like Hume did) but I don’t commit them to the flames as hastily as he did because they are part of the vast imaginarium which we are all heirs to and it would be pointless to deny their enormous influence over people’s lives in former times, and their legacies which live on and underpin a surprising amount of what people still think and believe today. Imaginative truth (Hamlet is a powerful imaginative creation) is different from objective truth (Hamlet does not now and never has existed).

As Wittgenstein put it (and in my mind, Hume and Wittgenstein are closely allied, in their outcomes if not in their methods), ‘The world is all that is the case’. My take on this is that ‘the world’ also includes everything that has ever been believed by everyone.

This is where I differ from liberals and the high-minded who limit their view of human achievement to a handful of Great Achievements of Civilisation by a handful of Great Men, constantly citing Michelangelo or Rembrandt or Shakespeare, narrowly cherrypicking humanity’s positive achievements.

In my version of human history, everything that humans have done is our legacy, and this includes not just all the philosophy and theology, all the literature, poetry, tales and legends — but also the innumerable atrocities, slaughters and genocides. In my view, we have to face the totality of the facts, no matter how disgusting.

Anything less is sentimentalism, denial, self deception. We are what we are and we have done what we have done, no sweeping it under the carpet. I know many people who are so upset by a true understanding of the horror of history that they reject it, deny it, don’t want to know. My view is that, the more unshrinking a view you have of the abattoir that is human history, the more rare and precious become the urges to create and beautify, the more wonderful and beautiful become the relics of culture, from whichever culture, from all cultures.

This face-the-facts-and-accept-everything view is very close to Joyce’s, which is why I not only enjoy but relate to the ‘Ulysses’ so much, with all its farting, belching, masturbating, snot and semen, menses and afterbirths. It embraces the entire human organism and all of human experience as it actually is. And this is why Virginia Woolf – with her high-minded Bloomsbury view that Literature should be about Art and Beauty, so utterly loathed it. I can understand her point of view. But I’m in Joyce’s camp.

Two objections Ellmann suddenly reveals that Hume might be as much of a source for Stephen’s thinking as Aristotle was in chapter 3. This is an unusual and largely unevidenced thing to say and there are two problems with it: 1) why does Joyce only reveal it now half-way through the book? Why was Hume not present from the start? The answer might be that if Joyce had invoked Hume alongside Aristotle his explication would have gotten too complicated. But I think there’s a simpler explanation, which is that Hume isn’t as important to Joyce as Ellmann claims he is.

Ellmann cites some passages from Hume’s masterwork the ‘Treatise of Human Nature’ in which Hume describes closing and opening his eyes to test the concept of space and extension before going on to say that the concept of time is indicated by the succession of our thoughts or perceptions. Ellmann finds places in ‘Ulysses’ where Stephen has similar thoughts about space and time and quotes them to prove that Joyce is here basing Stephen on Hume.

The trouble with this is, which major philosophers have not at some point meditated on the nature of time and space? Not to mention the astronomers and cosmologists? And all the theologians? Thousands of them have. If you put a little effort into it I bet you could compare Stephen’s doodling about space and time with the writings of any number of philosophers and theologians since those are just the kinds of subjects most of them spent a lot of their lives writing about…

The main problem with Ellmann’s presentation is not so much that it might be untrue but that it is only a fraction of the possible sources. They’re just snippets which he has cherry-picked. A full and complete discussion of the concept of time in James Joyce’s ‘Ulysses’ would take an entire book and call on countless philosophers and theologians for detailed comparisons.

But none of these alternative sources are mentioned here and why not? Because Ellmann’s book isn’t a serious presentation of the issues. It’s a snapshot. It’s a summary. It’s a brief overview of some of the philosophical issues raised by the book. It’s not really serious. It’s a brief presentation of snippets and fragments, for students-in-a-hurry to finish their Great Books of Modern Literature modules. It’s a TikTok version, a Twitter treatment of the themes.

So Ellmann’s assertion that if the spirit of Aristotle presided over the first half of ‘Ulysses’, then the spirit of Hume presides over the second half is an example of fun intellectual games critics can play with an epic text like this (if you like these kinds of games). But I don’t think anyone should be fooled into thinking it’s either 1) ‘true’ (whatever that means) but more importantly 2) that it’s necessary for reading and understanding the novel. There are other, faaaar more relevant and practical things to pay attention to first.

Back to ‘Ulysses’ Ellmann is more modest and therefore more useful, when he points out the simple fact that in the ‘Wandering Rocks’ chapter, Joyce begins to play with space and time. All he means by this is that fragments from one of the 18 vignettes are likely to pop up in another vignette, and he usefully refers to them as ‘interpolations’.

Church and State (again) More useful to my practical text-based way of thinking is when Ellmann points out that chapter 10 is, once again, foundationed on the binary of church and state. By this all he means is that the chapter opens with the friendly priest Father Conmee walking through the streets of Dublin and bumping into various acquaintances, popping up in the background of other people’s vignettes; while in the second half of the chapter, we catch steadily more glimpses of the progress of the Viceroy of Dublin riding in his carriage to open a bazaar, glimpses which lead up to its full presentation in the 19th and final vignette.

Thus it’s easy to claim that a representative of Church and a representative of the State establish the physical and conceptual framework of the chapter by topping and tailing it, and it is then fleshed out with appearances from 40 or more other characters in between.

Mocked And the key point here, is that both representatives are mocked, gently but steadily. With Father Conmee, Joyce does it with the butter-wouldn’t-melt-in-his-mouth squeaky cleanness of Conmee’s supposed thoughts. With the Viceroy the mockery is implicit in the generally indifferent reaction to his passing by of the various Dubliners.

Material rebukes The final response to the Viceroy in the chapter is the Italian music teacher Almidano Artifoni going into his house and, in effect, turning the bum of his trousers to the august carriage as it trots by. Father Conmee receives a more obvious rebuke to his values and worldview when he is suddenly confronted by a couple stumbling out of some bushes, flushed because they’ve just had sex. Sex, in comedies, especially farces, is the great puncturer of human pompousness and pretension.

Binaries Both Stephen and Bloom are given one of the 18 vignettes. Both find our protagonists looking at books, according to their intellectual levels: Bloom is buying a popular romance, Sweets of Sin, for Molly; Stephen is looking through Abbot Peter Salanka’s book of charms and spells, specifically ones designed to attract a woman’s love. Love and sex. Highbrow and middlebrow versions.

Heart If you visualise Dublin as a heart (as the first headline in ‘Aeolus’ suggests):

IN THE HEART OF THE HIBERNIAN METROPOLIS

Then the 40 or so characters we meet in chapter 10 can be thought of as blood corpuscles circulating round it and bumping into each other.

Chapter 11. Sirens

Bulging According to Ellmann, in chapter 11 ‘Sirens’, the ear is female, concave and a receptacle whereas in chapter 12 ‘Cyclops’, the eye is male, bulging, invasive.

Music ‘Sirens’ is about sounds and music, it contains countless references to music, sounds and noise, to different instruments up to full orchestra, and also related defects, as in the comic figure of Pat the (almost) deaf waiter and the blind piano tuner.

Singer Joyce had a fine tenor voice and briefly considered a career in singing before rejecting it. Late nineteenth century aestheticism took it for granted that music was the highest art form but Joyce rejected this and claimed literature was.

Fugue ‘Sirens’ is Joyce’s extended attempt at converting musical form into language. It is based on the classical music form of the fugue.

A fugue is a contrapuntal compositional technique based on a main theme (subject) introduced alone, then imitated in succession by other voices. It traditionally follows a three-part structure: Exposition (subject/answer entries), Development (alternating episodes and subject entries in new keys), and Final Entry (return to the tonic).

Key components of fugue structure

  • Subject: The principal, recognizable musical theme that drives the entire piece.
  • Answer: The subject repeated by a second voice, typically transposed to the dominant key.
  • Countersubject: A distinctive contrapuntal melody that accompanies the subject/answer, often returning throughout the piece.
  • Exposition: The opening section where every voice has stated the subject at least once.
  • Episode: Transitional, developmental sections that do not contain the full subject, often using sequences and modulations to create contrast.
  • Middle Entries: Subsequent appearances of the subject after the exposition, often in related keys.
  • Stretto: A device where subject entries overlap, with a voice starting the theme before the previous voice finishes it, increasing tension.
  • Coda/Final Entry: The conclusion, often featuring a strong, final statement of the subject in the original key.

Developmental techniques

Fugues often manipulate the subject through various techniques:

  • Inversion: Playing the melody upside down (intervals reversed).
  • Augmentation: Doubling the note values (making it twice as slow).
  • Diminution: Halving the note values (making it twice as fast).
  • Retrograde: Playing the subject backward.

Once you know all this, the game becomes to apply these rules to the elements in the ‘Sirens’ chapter. Can you find examples of every rule somewhere in the prose? You can be some academic somewhere has written a book about it.

A tale of two barmaids The chapter is set in the Ormond Hotel and the obvious binary at the centre of the chapter is the contrast between the two young attractive barmaids, Miss Kennedy and Miss Douce, the one a redhead, the other dark.

Chapter 12. Cyclops

All the chapters are packed with ingenious references to their leading theme, wind in ‘Aeolus’, food in ‘Lestrygonians’, music in ‘Sirens’, and so it’s eyes in the chapter about the one-eyed cyclops. Which is why its opening sentence is:

I was just passing the time of day with old Troy of the D. M. P. at the corner of Arbour hill there and be damned but a bloody sweep came along and he near drove his gear into my eye.

Exactly as Odysseus and his men drove their stake into the single eye of the cyclops who had imprisoned them (Stuart Gilbert pointed all this out, apparently).

Having sketched out the ubiquity of eye imagery, Ellmann goes beyond it to suggest that the waspishly cynical narrator of ‘Cyclops’ is a modern avatar of mean-minded cynical Thersites, the meanest hero in the original Odyssey, who has a larger part in Shakespeare’s play of the Tale of Troy, ‘Troilus and Cressida’. Ellmann suggests cynicism is a more subtle form of bigotry, the nationalist Citizen’s crime of being one-eyed. In this respect, when Bloom stands up for himself and his ‘race’, the Jews, rejects violence and calls for love, he is showing himself to be two-eyed. Full stereoscopic vision.

Continuing the idea, Ellmann suggests that if the previous chapters had leaned on the influence of (generous) David Hume, this one invokes the spirit of the dry, satirical Voltaire. Maybe. Hardly helps you either read or understand the text, though.

For reasons I couldn’t follow, Ellmann suggests that at the climax of this chapter Bloom is apotheosised i.e. turned into a god, but many of his assertions seem so wilful and contrived as to feel a little demented.

Chapter 13. Nausicaa

In Homer’s Odyssey, Odysseus’s shipwreck is caused because he has offended two gods, Hyperion the sun god for killing his cattle and Poseidon for blinding his son, Cyclops. As is his way, Ellmann immediately sees a binary at work, declaring Hyperion represents idealism and Poseidon materialism, or height and depth (he could have carried on with light and darkness, or dry and wet).

As he stated at the start, Ellmann thinks the 18 chapters are arranged in triads; here he adds the thought they all these triads enact the dialectic i.e. thesis, antithesis, synthesis. And so Ellmann suggests chapters 13, 14 and 15 enact:

  • Nausicaa – sentimentalised idealism
  • Oxen of the Sun- materialistic callousness
  • Circe – both

More practically useful, Ellmann confirms a really basic fact about ‘Ulysses’ which is that, for all its obsessive detail in many places, in others it contains great yawning gaps. For example, we never learn how Bloom made it from running out of Barney Kiernan’s pub as the Citizen threw his biscuit tin at him, to being comfortably leaning against a rock on Sandymount Strand about an hour later. We are never told how he got there or what happened during that hour.

High on Hegelian dialectic, Ellmann claims that, in this setting, Joyce makes Howth promontory male, the bay itself as female, and the voice of the priests praying to the Virgin a combination of both = androgynous.

Back with his more obvious binaries, he tells us that the chapter is a tale of two fantasies or the projecting of imagined mirages: Gerty projects her sentimental romantic fantasies onto Bloom; Bloom projects his narrow sexual fantasies onto Gerty; and both are accompanied by two priests projecting their fantasy of the Mother of God onto the world.

‘Cyclops’ is notable for featuring a narrator who isn’t the omniscient third-person narrator of the ‘initial style’. ‘Nausicaa’ furthers the text’s uncoupling from the novel’s early style in being written in a comic pastiche of sentimental romantic fiction, which is attributed to Gerty. The nauseatingly sentimental style is, it is implied, the tone of Gerty’s half-educated thoughts.

Gerty MacDowell who was seated near her companions, lost in thought, gazing far away into the distance was, in very truth, as fair a specimen of winsome Irish girlhood as one could wish to see.

(Ellmann notes that some critics have thought the entire thing is also a sly dig at the Edwardian author Samuel Butler, who claimed the Odyssey was written by Princess Nausicaa not Homer. That’s entertaining gossip about the aim but doesn’t help much with appreciating the actual text. )

It’s also, of course, a chapter contrasting not only idealism and realism, female fantasy and male earthiness, exhibitionism and voyeurism, but also youth and age. In amid her naive thoughts, Gerty thinks of herself as unique and special, and this is the classic delusion of youth (‘I’m special. I’m different. No-one has ever felt like this before.’) By contrast, after he’s climaxed and slowly come back down to earth, Bloom rather gloomily thinks it’s the just same old thing again, repetition, nothing new under the sun. Youth = the delusion of uniqueness. Age = the disillusion of familiarity.

So it returns. Think you’re escaping and run into yourself. Longest way round is the shortest way home. And just when he and she. Circus horse walking in a ring.

Chapter 14. Oxen of the Sun

Having described sexual ejaculation in chapter 13, the next chapter moves on to its consequences, fertilisation and pregnancy.

Here, in the common room of the National Maternity Hospital, the drunk medical students offend the god by mocking true fertility, by telling all kinds of jokes, bawdy humour, climaxing in Buck Mulligan’s jokey setting up a company whereby he promises to fertilise any woman who asks, for a fee.

There is a tension between the students’ cynical stripping of the act of love down to its heartless physical basics and the way Joyce chose to convey it, in a series of elaborate pastiches of historical English prose styles. If the subject is infertility, the parade of prose styles demonstrates exactly the opposite, humanity’s endless fertility in coming up with new and intricate ways to describe things and tell stories.

Ellmann notes something I hadn’t heard before which is the way the prose goes all to hell after the students leave the hospital and go round to the nearest pub. I’d read that the chaos of voices reflected closing time in a busy city centre pub. Ellmann makes the clever suggestion that it also represents the messy afterbirth, slopping everywhere after Mina Purefoy’s baby has been born.

’Tis, sure. What say? In the speakeasy. Tight. I shee you, shir. Bantam, two days teetee. Bowsing nowt but claretwine. Garn! Have a glint, do. Gum, I’m jiggered.

Chapter 15. Circe

In the morning light at the start of the novel Stephen had descanted on the ineluctable modality i.e. continuity, of the visible. In ‘Circe’ it is far after dark and all such certainties have disappeared, leaving the characters in a place which has no rules of extension or time or logic, but inhabits the inner self of anxieties, lusts, fantasies and hallucinations.

As you might expect, Ellmann finds in this longest and most delirious chapter a cornucopia of his favourite pattern, dichotomies – inside and outside, mind and body, dream and reality, male and female, body and soul, ego and id, England and Ireland (in the form of the soldiers and the Watch), you name it, it’s here. This is what I disliked about this book: it reduces the teeming fecundity of the weirdest, most diverse novel in the Western tradition to a handful of threadbare clichés.

Ellmann equates Bloom’s sudden vision, at the end of the chapter, of his dead son Rudy but now 11 years old, as he would now be, with the visions in Dante. Well, OK, but there are plenty of other works of literature featuring visions. And Dante doesn’t have a son.

He also claims that with the visions of this chapter, Bloom has harrowed hell, as did Odysseus, Jesus and Dante before him. But did he? Metaphorically maybe. Maybe this is a valid, even obvious, suggestion but, as I’m always saying, it takes you away from the wonderful (and often gross) specificity of the text and into a Western Literature 101 seminar room where everyone’s talking about Dante, Vico and Blake, and nobody’s talking about the obscenity of the Croppy Boy scene, because that’s difficult, embarrassing and vulgar. As it’s meant to be. Ellmann’s schematic approach sanitises Joyce, who went out of his way to be as scabrous as he could be (where scabrous means ‘indecent, salacious or scandalous material that is shocking or offensive’).

Chapter 16. Eumaeus

Although Stephen announced the annihilation of space and time in ‘Circe’ when he smashed the chandelier in the brothel, the next chapter reveals the return of time and space, solider than ever.

Addicted to his philosophers, Ellmann says that if (big ‘if’) Hume’s scepticism has guided the chapters of the second half of the novel, then space and time return in the spirit of Immanuel Kant, not as the properties of things, but as the conditions of perception built into the human condition. Maybe. It’s a thought, if you know enough about Kant to really apply it…

Trinities are nearly as addictive to the conspiracy theorist as simple dichotomies, and Ellmann reads into the final three chapters an earthly trinity of Bloom the father, Stephen the son and… well, there is no equivalent of the Holy Ghost, instead the best he can offer is Molly as a blasphemous avatar of the Virgin Mary (just as she is a mocking avatar of the chaste Penelope) (remember what I said at the start about Joyce using all kinds of literary, theological and philosophical patterns when it suited him and when it didn’t… just walking away).

In the Linati schema Joyce described the style of ‘Eumaeus’ as ‘relaxed’, which seems signally inadequate – it’s a ‘tired’ and threadbare in the style of provincial newspapers, made up of journalistic clichés but without any of the vim and vigour of ‘Aeolus’. It’s ‘Aeolus’ with a hangover.

Nowhere in his book does Ellmann address the fact that large chunks of ‘Ulysses’ are so cryptic and chopped-up as to be almost unreadable. His book gives the impression it’s all clear and readable figures of allegory and philosophy which you can understand with a little guidance, as in Dante or Spenser. Nowhere does he engage with the actual text which is often impenetrable.

Hark! Shut your obstropolos. Pflaap! Pflaap! Blaze on. There she goes. Brigade! Bout ship. Mount street way. Cut up! Pflaap! Tally ho. You not come? Run, skelter, race. Pflaaaap!

In the same way, both he (and Hugh Kenner) treat the later chapters as if they’re the same as the earlier ones but they aren’t at all: ‘Nausicaa’, ‘Oxen of the Sun’, ‘Circe’, ‘Eumaeus’ and ‘Ithaca’ are all much, much easier to read and process than the earlier chapters. I once read someone saying ‘Ulysses’ starts out very English and clear and comprehensible but then gets steadily more Irish and radical and impenetrable, whereas in my reading I’ve always found it the other way round. Here’s Stephen’s stream of consciousness from chapter 2:

Proudly walking. Whom were you trying to walk like? Forget: a dispossessed. With mother’s money order, eight shillings, the banging door of the post office slammed in your face by the usher. Hunger toothache. Encore deux minutes. Look clock. Must get. Fermé. Hired dog! Shoot him to bloody bits with a bang shotgun…

It requires quite a lot of effort to tease out the meaning and point of every one of these cryptic references. Whereas:

Nausicaa – pastiche but immediately understandable:

The summer evening had begun to fold the world in its mysterious embrace. Far away in the west the sun was setting and the last glow of all too fleeting day lingered lovingly on sea and strand, on the proud promontory of dear old Howth guarding as ever the waters of the bay, on the weedgrown rocks along Sandymount shore and, last but not least, on the quiet church whence there streamed forth at times upon the stillness the voice of prayer to her who is in her pure radiance a beacon ever to the stormtossed heart of man, Mary, star of the sea.

Oxen of the Sun – the style of some of the parodies might be a little difficult but a) not if you’re used to older English prose, and b) there’s none of the clipped, truncated, cryptic quality which makes the first half so challenging:

And whiles they spake the door of the castle was opened and there nighed them a mickle noise as of many that sat there at meat. And there came against the place as they stood a young learning knight yclept Dixon.

Circe – is delirious and occasionally cryptic but nowhere near as impenetrable as Stephen’s thoughts:

The Mabbot street entrance of nighttown, before which stretches an uncobbled tramsiding set with skeleton tracks, red and green will-o’-the-wisps and danger signals. Rows of grimy houses with gaping doors. Rare lamps with faint rainbow fans. Round Rabaiotti’s halted ice gondola stunted men and women squabble.

Eumaeus – stylised, maybe, but very, very easy to read.

Preparatory to anything else Mr Bloom brushed off the greater bulk of the shavings and handed Stephen the hat and ashplant and bucked him up generally in orthodox Samaritan fashion which he very badly needed. His (Stephen’s) mind was not exactly what you would call wandering but a bit unsteady and on his expressed desire for some beverage to drink Mr Bloom in view of the hour it was and there being no pump of Vartry water available for their ablutions let alone drinking purposes hit upon an expedient by suggesting, off the reel, the propriety of the cabman’s shelter, as it was called, hardly a stonesthrow away near Butt bridge where they might hit upon some drinkables in the shape of a milk and soda or a mineral.

Ithaca – once you’ve got the hang of the question and answer format this, again, is mostly a breeze to read:

What parallel courses did Bloom and Stephen follow returning?

Starting united both at normal walking pace from Beresford place they followed in the order named Lower and Middle Gardiner streets and Mountjoy square, west: then, at reduced pace, each bearing left, Gardiner’s place by an inadvertence as far as the farther corner of Temple street: then, at reduced pace with interruptions of halt, bearing right, Temple street, north, as far as Hardwicke place.

Penelope – and even Molly Bloom’s famous soliloquy, the critics and commentators all make it sound difficult, and in some places the stream of thoughts does jump about a bit, but the thoughts themselves, once you get a handle on her biography and the telegraphic style, are not that hard to understand:

Yes because he never did a thing like that before as ask to get his breakfast in bed with a couple of eggs since the City Arms hotel when he used to be pretending to be laid up with a sick voice doing his highness to make himself interesting for that old faggot Mrs Riordan that he thought he had a great leg of and she never left us a farthing all for masses for herself and her soul greatest miser ever was

Back to ‘Eumaeus’, addicted to binaries, Ellmann decides it is all about duplicity, lies and truth. He bases this on the relevant episode in the Odyssey, where Odysseus wakes up on the shore of his kingdom and cautiously adopts a disguise before making his way to the hut of his old swineherd, Eumaeus. Here he makes up a cock and bull story about who he is while Eumaeus greets him with open-hearted candour and hospitality. Secrets versus honesty. And so Ellmann finds numerous instances of secrets and deceptions in this chapter:

  • the chapter opens with Bloom cautioning Stephen against Mulligan’s deceitfulness
  • although Lynch accompanied him into Nighttown, Stephen calls him Judas for abandoning him
  • the pair get lost and have to double back through the streets
  • Bloom delights in the Italian being spoken by some loiterers round the shelter but Stephen points out they’re arguing over money
  • all the characters they meet are deceitful e.g:
    • Lord John Corley who isn’t a lord
    • the shelter owner may or may not be Skin-the-Goat itself (obviously) a pseudonym
    • the sailor D.B. Murphy tells tall tales which Bloom thinks are probably a pack of lies, purveyor of what Bloom calls ‘genuine forgeries’
  • the conversation takes in all kinds of secrets and lies:
    • Skin’s claim that Parnell isn’t dead, his coffin is full of stones, he’s alive and well in Paris from whence he will return
    • someone claims Francis Bacon wrote Shakespeare’s plays
    • reference to the fraudulent Protocols of Zion
    • cases of forged identity such as the Tichborne Claimant
    • the Evening Telegraph gets details of Paddy Dignam’s funeral wrong, notably Bloom’s name (spelled as Boom)

It’s an impressive list of deceits and errors, in the same way as ‘Lestrygonians’ is packed with references to food and ‘Sirens’ with references to music etc. This kind of specificity, which takes you back to the detail of the text, I like.

Chapter 17. Ithaca

This is the chapter cast in the form of a catechism, questions and answers. (Ellmann likens it to the cold information retrieval systems of a computer, reminding us that this book was published in 1972, over half a century ago – computers have come on a bit since then.)

Ellmann, like Kenner, reacts negatively to this chapter, saying it strips human activity to the skeleton, that ‘the imagination is impoverished’ (p.157) but I’ve always liked this chapter for the same reasons: it is clear and lucid, it tells us exactly what is happening but also, far from being unimaginative, many of the answers depart on wild fantasias of factuality, for example the ones about water or about the stars.

Ellmann zeroes in on the sections which supposedly compare Stephen and Bloom’s contrasting views about the purpose of literature: well, he would say that, being a professor of literature. Personally I find writers writing about writing the most boring subject in the world, whereas the descriptions of the lost key, the evocative objects in Bloom’s drawers, the pondering on the mystery of the stars, the magic qualities of water and so on, I find these fresh and vivifying, enlivening, expanding my understanding of the world. And often very funny.

Ellmann is still banging on about finding the influence of Aristotle wherever he looks. Thus, in the answer about human nature:

He affirmed his significance as a conscious rational animal proceeding syllogistically from the known to the unknown and a conscious rational reagent between a micro and a macrocosm ineluctably constructed upon the incertitude of the void.

Whereas fooey to Aristotle, I love the image of these two so different men sharing an amiable pee in Bloom’s back garden under the twinkling stars.

At Stephen’s suggestion, at Bloom’s instigation both, first Stephen, then Bloom, in penumbra urinated, their sides contiguous, their organs of micturition reciprocally rendered invisible by manual circumposition, their gazes, first Bloom’s, then Stephen’s, elevated to the projected luminous and semiluminous shadow.

Treating an outdoor piss in this pseudo-scientific way is funny. Well, I find it funny. But comedy is difficult if not impossible to convey in literary analysis, whereas detecting binaries and dichotomies everywhere is like falling off a log.

Bloom’s pottering round his house after Stephen leaves, as he intersperses getting undressed with poking around in drawers, finding objects and photos which trigger memories of his family, before climbing into bed next to the slumbering Molly – all this I find warm and homely and moving, all the more so because it is conveyed not with conventional sentimentality, but in the brilliantly hard and clear FAQ format Joyce had invented for this chapter.

Chapter 18. Penelope

Ellmann tells us the conclusion of the book has been much debated. He cites two critics who were still active forces when he wrote, William Empson and Edmund Wilson, who were both concerned about what happened next, after the end of the book. Empson speculates that Stephen did indeed come back the next day, 17 June, to give the first of his Italian lessons to Molly and receive singing lessons in return. Wilson speculated that Bloom’s request to have breakfast served to him in bed symbolised his return to mastery in the marriage with Molly, which would be cemented by them having sex for the first time in 11 years.

Both now seem wildly out of date and irrelevant. What might happen to the characters after the end of the book is a completely different type of conversation, academics at the dinner table conversation, pub conversation, next to nothing to do with the chapter under discussion which, of course, is entirely concerned with Molly’s late-night thoughts.

It is in this chapter that Ellmann compares Molly’s character to Aristotle, Hume and Darwin, which I found ridiculous.

He quotes Joyce writing to his friend Frank Budgen that ‘Penelope’ is ‘more obscene than any preceding episode, which is debatable, seeing as the entire chapter ‘Nausicaa’ is about a middle-aged married man masturbating in public at the sight of a young woman’s knickers, and that ‘Circe’ has some scenes of unparalleled obscenity. But I take the point that Molly’s soliloquy contains more sustained and explicit descriptions of sex than any previous chapter.

Ellmann briskly runs through some of the details in the chapter but without really capturing its spirit and power. He tells us Molly at moments mixes up her various men, calling them all ‘he’. But at other moments she makes a very clear distinction between her lover, Blazes Boylan who is exciting but doesn’t respect her, and her husband Bloom, who is a little odd, a little boring but who does genuinely care for her.

But on the whole Ellmann isn’t happy down among the details. He’s happier when he can find an abstract binary, and so hastens to tell us that Molly is the earth to Bloom’s sun, which is fine and dandy but doesn’t really get us anywhere (p.166). He thinks Molly’s soliloquy:

resolves the questions of belief and incertitude which have dogged Stephen and western philosophy (p.168)

Which is ludicrous because a) she doesn’t – if she had what are all the philosophers in all the Philosophy departments of the universities of the world wasting their time doing? And b) can you see how wildly adrift of the actual content of her soliloquy this is?

Ellmann’s bloodless approach can’t do justice to sex, real mucky flirty dirty sex, any more than it can do justice to Joyce’s many types of comedy and humour, both crucial elements in the book, both overlooked as he struggles to make out Molly Bloom as a thinker on a par with Aristotle or David Hume.

Maybe those elements are there; maybe Joyce himself described them as being there: but they’re not the main part of the book. The book is the text itself and not the neatly cut and dried concepts which Joyce attributed to it and generations of academics have enthusiastically added to.

Obsessed with academic notions of art and artists, Ellmann whips himself up into absurdities:

Joyce said that his episode had no art but his book is consummated by the principle that art is nature’s self. (p.173)

What does this mean and why should I care? Meanwhile, of Molly’s desires and schemes and fantasies and seductions and flirtations and consummations, her friendships, her love of flowers, her fondness of displaying herself in the bedroom window to attract the attention of the handsome young medical student in the house across the road, of everything which makes her such a storming presence in modern literature, nothing, nothing at all.

Dwelling on abstract structures to the bitter end, Ellmann claims that:

The first nine episodes of the book ended with a vision of the act of love as the basic act of nature. The last nine episodes end with a vision of love as the basic act of nature. (p.174)

What Ellmann doesn’t bring out, on his own ground, on his own terms, is that Molly (and, by implication Joyce) in her soliloquy, says it all comes down to sex; that sex is the ultimate truth of human nature, of human life. This I would agree with, and is one way of summarising Darwin: we breed, we rear young, for all sorts of reasons to do with the environment, competition from other families and species, and huge slices of dumb luck, some survive to create the next generation; all organisms do this; the result over billions of years is the beautifully intricate web of natural ecosystems which form the world around us and which humanity is busily destroying and degrading as I write.

But the urge to reproduce is central and this is, of course, contrary to Christian ideology and so completely contrary to Dante (and Plato) who Ellmann is roping in here at the end of his book. In their different ways both Plato and Dante thought sexual love must be rejected, in Plato to achieve the highest form of rational thought, in Dante in order to achieve full love of God.

Molly denies all of that and locates the highest reality in her big breasts and hungry fanny. Oh how she is longing for Monday to come when she will see Boylan again, and he will plook her senseless again with his big willy.

But that’s not how Ellmann sees it. He ends this short but gruellingly wrong-headed book with a slab of characteristically high-minded rhetoric. If you like this kind of thing, you’ll love this book:

On the ethical level Bloom and Stephen have succeeded in taking the city of Dublin by exposing enthusiasm and superstition there, and by disclosing a truer way of goodwill and freedom. Molly’s hardwon approbation confirms their enterprise. On this historical level, the characters have awakened from the Circean nightmare of history by drawing the past into the present (a timeless present) and making it an expression of love instead of hatred, of fondness rather than remorse. Art has been shown to be a part of nature, and in all its processes an imitation of natural ones. These processes have their summit in love, of which the highest form is sexual love. (p.175)

Well, we agree about that much. But what a mealy-mouthed, detail-denying way of getting there.


Credit

‘Ulysses on the Liffey’ by Richard Ellmann was published by Faber and Faber in 1972.

Related links

Joyce reviews

Women in Love by D.H. Lawrence (1920)

‘I do think,’ he said, ‘that the world is only held together by the mystic conjunction, the ultimate unison between people — a bond. And the immediate bond is between man and woman.’
(Rupert Birkin, sounding like his creator, Women in Love, page 169)

‘Instead of chopping yourself down to fit the world, chop the world down to fit yourself.’
(More Birkin wisdom)

‘One must be free, above all, one must be free. One may forfeit everything else, but one must be free.’
(Gudrun, voicing Lawrence’s fundamental position)

‘The Rainbow’ and ‘Women in Love’ are not so much novels as overwhelming, mind-blowing experiences.

Originally Lawrence conceived of ‘The Rainbow’ and ‘Women in Love’ as one massive novel which would have been as long as War and Peace. It was his publisher, Methuen, who persuaded him to break it into two (still very long) works of 500 or so pages each. In the event, what with the negative reviews and then the official banning of ‘The Rainbow’, Methuen chose not to publish the sequel, in fact Lawrence had trouble placing it until the American publisher Martin Secker brought it out, in a privately subscribed edition, in 1920.

‘The Rainbow’ is a masterpiece at least in part because the first half describes the lives of farmers in their part of the West Midlands in a kind of timeless, elemental style, making the figures almost like mythical figures who live close to the land, and this legendary power is carried over into the more modern, mundane life of the final figure in the novel, Ursula Brangwen, who carries echoes and shades of the murky ancestors with her.

‘Women in Love’, by contrast, starts in the recognisable modern world of cars and collieries, trains and trams and work, making its lead figures, the two oldest Brangwen sisters, Ursula and Gudrun, thoroughly modern women, at home in the world of universities, art school, managers, cities, trains, London and Paris. So it lacks the mythical depth and resonance of the first novel.

It starts some years after ‘The Rainbow’ ends because Ursula has been teaching at Willey Green grammar school ‘for some years’ (p.9), whereas she hadn’t started that job at the end of ‘The Rainbow’, and Gudrun is back from three years art school in London, whereas she hadn’t left in ‘The Rainbow’.

Ursula is 26, Gudrun is 25. They are wondering what to do with their lives and the novel opens with them having a half-hearted conversation about marriage.

They decide to visit a wedding they know is taking place that morning. The walk to the church through the ugly industrial town places them class-wise, because they have to walk through working class miners’ areas where the miners’ wives stare at the pair in their bright fashionable clothes, and children shout abuse. They are both a class above their setting.

The wedding introduces us to three more key characters: firstly to the two young men the sisters fancy, being:

Gerald Crich who Gudrun passionately fancies. He is heir to the local mining business, a commanding man and presence – ‘fair, good-looking, healthy, with a great reserve of energy. He was erect and complete, there was a strange stealth glistening through his amiable, almost happy appearance’.

Rupert Birkin who Ursula fancies:

She craved for Rupert Birkin. When he was there, she felt complete, she was sufficient, whole… If only Birkin would form a close and abiding connection with her, she would be safe during this fretful voyage of life. He could make her sound and triumphant, triumphant over the very angels of heaven.

Rupert is one of the school-inspectors of the county.

What’s a little surprising about both these men is we aren’t shown the girls first meeting them, bumping into them again, getting to know them and so on. The novel opens with both girls fully committed to their crushes on both men.

The third character is the dashing, fashionable, tall, slow, reluctant woman with a weight of fair hair and a pale, long face, named Hermione Roddice, a friend of the Criches.

She was the most remarkable woman in the Midlands. Her father was a Derbyshire Baronet of the old school, she was a woman of the new school, full of intellectuality, and heavy, nerve-worn with consciousness. She was passionately interested in reform, her soul was given up to the public cause. But she was a man’s woman, it was the manly world that held her.

And:

a tall queer, frightening figure, with her heavy fair hair slipping to her eyes.

The plot revolves around an apparently endless number of meetings, conversations and debates between these five central characters.

Lawrence’s hyperbole

A terrible storm came over her, as if she were drowning. She was possessed by a devastating hopelessness.

As with ‘The Rainbow’, the characters’ feelings are portrayed as evanescent, ever-changing and, crucially, extreme. They flash from one extreme to another even as we watch:

Birkin’s eyes were at the moment full of anger. But swiftly they became troubled, doubtful, then full of a warm, rich affectionateness and laughter.

Or cohabit in extremes of contradiction.

A wonderful tenderness burned in him, at the sight of her quivering, so sensitive fingers: and at the same time he was full of rage and callousness. (p.346)

She could not believe—she did not believe. Yet she believed, triumphantly (p.372)

Gudrun looked at Ursula with steady, balancing eyes. She admired and despised her sister so much, both! (p.493)

The simplest argument can lead to characters hating each other.

He could feel violent waves of hatred and loathing of all he said, coming out of her. It was dynamic hatred and loathing, coming strong and black out of the unconsciousness. (p.116)

Some event or conversation leaves a character so tortured she wants to die. Hermione listens to Birkin explaining why he’s copying the design of a Chinese vase and her reaction is way over the top:

She suffered the ghastliness of dissolution, broken and gone in a horrible corruption. And he stood and looked at her unmoved. She strayed out, pallid and preyed-upon like a ghost, like one attacked by the tomb-influences which dog us. And she was gone like a corpse… (p.99)

Ursula bursts into tears and doesn’t know whether from joy or misery. Rupert and Gerald sometimes love, sometimes hate, sometimes admire and sometimes despise each other, neither of them, nor the reader, can predict their ever-changing moods.

‘Gerald,’ Birkin said, ‘I rather hate you.’
‘I know you do,’ said Gerald.

Of course he had been loving Gerald all along, and all along denying it. (p.231)

Hermione loves Birkin but at the same time:

She hated him in a despair that shattered her and broke her down, so that she suffered sheer dissolution like a corpse, and was unconscious of everything save the horrible sickness of dissolution that was taking place within her, body and soul.

In fact the Italian Contessa staying with Hermione, explicitly points this out after dinner:

‘Look,’ said the Contessa, in Italian. ‘He is not a man, he is a chameleon, a creature of change.’ (p.103)

Nobody has any control over their feelings. Nobody has the smooth detachment, the stiff upper lip, the gift for under-statement which was supposed to characterise the English. Lawrence’s metier is over-statement. I noticed early on that the most recurring emotion is fear.

If only Birkin would form a close and abiding connection with her, she would be safe during this fretful voyage of life. He could make her sound and triumphant, triumphant over the very angels of heaven. If only he would do it! But she was tortured with fear, with misgiving.

This kind of hyperbole occurs on every page.

Suddenly [Ursula] started. She saw, in the shaft of ruddy, copper-coloured light near her, the face of a man. It was gleaming like fire, watching her, waiting for her to be aware. It startled her terribly. She thought she was going to faint. All her suppressed, subconscious fear sprang into being, with anguish.

Sometimes she [Ursula] had periods of tight horror, when it seemed to her that her life would pass away, and be gone, without having been more than this.

Gudrun went on her way half dazed. If this were human life, if these were human beings, living in a complete world, then what was her own world, outside? She was aware of her grass-green stockings, her large grass-green velour hat, her full soft coat, of a strong blue colour. And she felt as if she were treading in the air, quite unstable, her heart was contracted, as if at any minute she might be precipitated to the ground. She was afraid.

Hermione and Ursula look at some luxury shirts but when Hermione comes near her, Ursula panics:

Hermione came near, and her bosom writhed, and Ursula was for a moment blank with panic. And for a moment Hermione’s haggard eyes saw the fear on the face of the other… overcome with dread… (p.104)

Why? Because this is how all Lawrence’s characters feel, constantly overwhelmed, falling into panics or despairs, tortured by the never-ending intensity of their feelings.

There are other feelings, lots of them, I just noticed how often fear dominated. One of the few criticisms I’d make of Lawrence is I dislike it when this hyperbole makes him use the word ‘insane’. He does mean feeling something to an extent which is almost deranged but use of the word makes me draw up short, and realise how preposterous he’s being.

The result was a nasty and insane scene with Halliday on the fourth evening.

Why not just say ‘The result was a nasty scene with Halliday on the fourth evening’? Most of Lawrence’s hyperbole I can take, but his references to insanity and madness grated.

The book’s worldview

By chapter 4 I began to realise that every chapter (more or less) contains at its core an argument, two or more characters getting into a debate about something or other. Characters in other novels have conversations which move the plot along, but in Lawrence – certainly in this book – very often they start talking purely in order to have a 6th form debate about a Big Issue. The five central characters are all very opinionated and at the drop of a hat start arguing.

The fundamental premise of Lawrence’s worldview seems to be that God is dead and so people have to make their own values, figure out how to live their own lives. The God is dead premise is obviously key but only made explicit once, by Birkin, the Lawrence avatar.

‘And you mean if there isn’t the woman, there’s nothing?’ said Gerald.
‘Pretty well that – seeing there’s no God.’ (p.64)

Part of the statement’s impact is its throwaway nature. In the later nineteenth century hundreds of novels and autobiographies featured Great Debates about the existence of God or the devil, the protagonists’ agonising about their Loss of Faith etc. But here, around 1915, is Lawrence simply dismissing all of that. It’s a non-subject. Junk. Thus freed, we have to get on with living our best lives.

Mind you, Birkin goes quite a long way beyond a sensible atheist humanism. Lawrence gives him extreme views, regularly positing the end of humanity. With characteristically Lawrentian contempt, he wonders if humanity’s time has come? It would be a good thing.

Birkin looked at the land, at the evening, and was thinking: ‘Well, if mankind is destroyed, if our race is destroyed like Sodom, and there is this beautiful evening with the luminous land and trees, I am satisfied. That which informs it all is there, and can never be lost. After all, what is mankind but just one expression of the incomprehensible. And if mankind passes away, it will only mean that this particular expression is completed and done. That which is expressed, and that which is to be expressed, cannot be diminished. There it is, in the shining evening. Let mankind pass away — time it did. The creative utterances will not cease, they will only be there. Humanity doesn’t embody the utterance of the incomprehensible any more. Humanity is a dead letter. There will be a new embodiment, in a new way. Let humanity disappear as quick as possible.’

An opinion which is repeated right at the end of the novel. But this is just one character’s opinion, Birkin, the most negative of the quartet: ‘His dislike of mankind, of the mass of mankind, amounted almost to an illness.’ (p.66)

Gerald’s worldview is less vivid and memorable because he lives it; he is the embodiment of masculinity, virile and in control, a manifesto in action. It’s easy to quote Birkin as if he represents Lawrence’s view, but really the book’s worldview is generated by the dialectic between Birkin the gloomy theoriser and Gerald the confident man of action; and that’s before you bring in Ursula, Gudrun and Hermione, who all contribute to its complex weft of opinions. The difference between a lecture or manifesto, and a work of art, is complexity and ambiguity.

Chapter 1. Sisters

Introducing Ursula and Gudrun Brangwen, sitting chatting about whether they’ll ever get married before they set off walking through their ugly industrial town to see an actual wedding. This features the two men they fancy, coalmine owner Gerald Crich and county school inspector Rupert Birkin. The groom is late and there’s an odd moment when he arrives, sees, his bride on the path to the church, and then makes a mad dash to try and beat her to the door.

Chapter 2. Shortlands

The wedding reception is held at the Criches’ family home, Shortlands, where we see Gerald confidently hosting the party (his father retires ill) and see him and Birkin interacting with guests, notably the breezily confident Hermione Roddice. Gerald, Rupert and Hermione have a three-way argument about race and nationality:

‘Do you think race corresponds with nationality?’ she asked musingly…

Chapter 3. Class-room

Ursula at work teaching children about the structure of catkins. She is startled by the arrival of Birkin and then, unexpectedly, Hermione. Hermione and Birkin have an argument, she saying education makes children too conscious and stops them behaving spontaneously.

‘Isn’t the mind—’ she said, with the convulsed movement of her body, ‘isn’t it our death? Doesn’t it destroy all our spontaneity, all our instincts? Are not the young people growing up today, really dead before they have a chance to live?’
‘Not because they have too much mind, but too little,’ he said brutally.
‘Are you sure?’ she cried. ‘It seems to me the reverse. They are over-conscious, burdened to death with consciousness.’
‘Imprisoned within a limited, false set of concepts,’ he cried.

So far, every chapter has featured a kind of central debate or argument. I wonder if this is the pattern for the book.

Chapter 4. Diver

Ursula and Gudrun go for a walk to the local lake, Willey Water, come to a lake and see a naked man run off a jetty and dive in. It is confident Gerald. They’re both jealous of men’s freedom.

‘God, what it is to be a man!’ [Gudrun] cried.
‘What?’ exclaimed Ursula in surprise.
‘The freedom, the liberty, the mobility!’ cried Gudrun, strangely flushed and brilliant. ‘You’re a man, you want to do a thing, you do it. You haven’t the thousand obstacles a woman has in front of her.’

Ursula tells Gudrun the terrible story of Gerald accidentally shooting his brother dead with a rusty old gun when they were boys. Then they comes across Hermione out for a walk with Laura. After Hermione greets, converses a bit then wanders off, Gudrun says how much she admires her, but Ursula is dead set against her.

The two sisters were like a pair of scissors, snipping off everything that came athwart them; or like a knife and a whetstone, the one sharpened against the other. (p.56)

The sisters jokily tell each other that they are a thousand times more intelligent and beautiful than Hermione, let alone the masses in the street.

‘Strut,’ said Ursula. ‘One wants to strut, to be a swan among geese.’
‘Exactly,’ cried Gudrun, ‘a swan among geese.’

Chapter 5. In the Train

Birkin has to go to London by train. On the platform he bumps into Crich and they’re more or less obliged to travel together. As in every preceding chapter there is a debate. Gerald has been reading a newspaper leader which argues that ‘there must arise a man who will give new values to things, give us new truths, a new attitude to life, or else we shall be a crumbling nothingness in a few years, a country in ruin’. This triggers Birkin to say all such announcing of plans is just playing; what we need to do is tear up society, starting by tearing up ourselves. Lawrence’s characters’ opinions are always vehement but often don’t really make sense:

‘We are such dreary liars. Our one idea is to lie to ourselves. We have an ideal of a perfect world, clean and straight and sufficient. So we cover the earth with foulness; life is a blotch of labour, like insects scurrying in filth, so that your collier can have a pianoforte in his parlour, and you can have a butler and a motor-car in your up-to-date house, and as a nation we can sport the Ritz, or the Empire, Gaby Deslys and the Sunday newspapers.’ (p.60)

Disappointingly this morphs into Birkin asserting that the meaning of life is love, that he wants the finality of a definitive love.

‘The old ideals are dead as nails – nothing there. It seems to me there remains only this perfect union with a woman – sort of ultimate marriage – and there isn’t anything else.’

It’s on this journey that Birkin expresses his dislike of people and his contentment if all of humanity were wiped out, quoted above.

He tells Gerald he stays with a man in Soho, Halliday, and mixes with a Bohemian crowd. Interesting to read how little the profile of this type has changed in the last hundred years:

‘Painters, musicians, writers – hangers-on, models, advanced young people, anybody who is openly at outs with the conventions, and belongs to nowhere particularly. They are often young fellows down from the University, and girls who are living their own lives, as they say.’

The most significant changes would be that nowadays such a crowd would be 1) diverse and multicultural and 2) LGBTQ+ and gender fluid.

Chapter 6. Crème de Menthe

Later the same day Gerald meets Rupert in a Bohemian cafe. The latter is chatting to Minette (Minny) Darrington, small, bobbed hair, with a lisp, nicknamed ‘the Pussum’.

Her ex-boyfriend, Halliday, an old Etonian, turns up. He chucked her and told her to go to the countryside when he learned that she’s pregnant but she refuses. Others join the table, Maxim Libidnikov and Julius who Lawrence has Minette rather unnecessarily tell us is a Jew.

Gerald is more and more attracted to her wanton behaviour and sits pressed up against her in the taxi they get to Halliday’s house (the flat where Birkin bunks down when in London) where they are surprised by the illiterate Arab servant he’s taken in off the streets. Bohemia, darling.

Chapter 7. Totem

Next morning in the same apartment, Gerald wakes up. Going into the main room he is surprised to find Halliday and Maxim naked in front of the fire. Bohemia. Rubert has his bath and, after he’s followed, Gerald adopts the manners of the house and comes out naked. He goes into the bedroom where he obviously slept with Minette. Her eyes are chaotic. She is like ‘a violated slave’ which arouses Gerald all over again but he realises he has to separate himself from her.

They go about their business for the day, and all reassemble to go to a music hall that evening, then back to Halliday’s flat. Gerald hangs on for two more days but the group become more fractious until Halliday provokes Gerald one evening and Gerald is on the verge of punching his face in before he turns and leaves.

Thus Minette achieves her aim, which was to make Halliday jealous and make him love her again and, hopefully, get him to marry her. This she has achieved by the time Gerald leaves.

Chapter 8. Breadalby

Breadalby was a Georgian house with Corinthian pillars, standing among the softer, greener hills of Derbyshire, not far from Cromford. It is Hermione Roddice’s family home, set in landscaped ground. She invites Ursula and Gudrun to stay. Also staying are Birkin, a young Italian Contessa, young athletic-looking Miss Bradley, Sir Joshua, a dry Baronet of fifty, and a woman secretary, a Fräulein März, young and slim and pretty. Later arrive Hermione’s brother, tall debonaire Alexander Roddice, a Liberal MP, who arrives along with Gerald Crich.

Edwardian lunch presented by servants under the lovely old elm tree in the garden while the characters witter about education. Tea and a walk round the grounds. Hermione loves Birkin but realises that he’s come to hate her and a break is coming.

Gorgeous dinner with all the ladies wearing fashionable dress. Followed the staging of an impromptu ballet in the style of the Russian Ballet of Pavlova and Nijinsky, the servants bringing down Hermione’s gorgeous Oriental costumes, Alexander playing the piano.

Next morning they go skinny dipping in the ponds in the grounds, except Ursula and Gudrun and Birkin. Gerald gets his kit off at the drop of a hat. He knows how handsome and male he looks. After lunch a discussion about whether the old social values have collapsed in which case, what news ones are emerging? Gerald thinks people should and will be defined by the role in society, their job. Their private lives will remain private. Birkin objects that there is no social equality. Birkin feels people are as different and self sufficient as stars.

Later, he goes to Hermione’s boudoir, feeling he had been rude. He sits quietly and reads while she writes letters but in fact she is flooded by a vast wave of hatred, suddenly she realises Birkin is standing in her way and only eliminating him can she be free. So she takes a lapis lazuli paperweight and cracks it down on his skull with all her might. Fortunately her fingers get in the way masking a lot of the blow. She raises it again but Birkin ducks under his book and crabs out of the room.

Instead of going looking for medical help he walks out of the house across the grounds and into a wood where he strips naked and rolls in the grass and flowers then walks through a young pine wood deliberately letting the needles sting him, experiencing an epiphany of the post-human world. Is he mad? Who cares.

He climbed out of the valley, wondering if he were mad. But if so, he preferred his own madness, to the regular sanity. He rejoiced in his own madness, he was free. He did not want that old sanity of the world, which was become so repulsive. He rejoiced in the new-found world of his madness. It was so fresh and delicate and so satisfying.

Eventually, dressed again, he staggers to the railway station and catches a train home where he is laid up in bed with concussion.

Chapter 9. Coal-dust

Two scenes. In the first Ursula and Gudrun go for a walk to the coalminers’ town, are delayed at a closed level crossing while a long train shunts by and up rides Gerald Crich on a horse, a beautiful mare, which panics at the very loud noise of the clanging carts and rears and bucks and terrifies the sisters while Gerald enjoys mastering the poor terrified beast.

The second half describes Gudrun’s addiction to walking the working class colliers quarters, especially in Friday night when they get paid and get pissed in the pubs. She pairs off with an electrician named Palmer, a fairly educated man, they promenade, go to the movies, but are never really an item.

Chapter 10. Sketch-book

The sisters go to a remote part of Willey Water to sketch. Who should appear but a rowing boat rowed by Gerald containing Hermione. Domineering Hermione asks to have a look at Gudrun’s sketchbook but bickers with Gerald and the book falls into the lake, Gerald reaching out and into the water to retrieve it. Hermione makes a dramatic show of being sorry, while Gudrun wants the book back, and Gerald a) despises Hermione b) is taken with Gudrun’s pride. And this incident establishes a link between them. it establishes Gudrun’s ascendancy over Gerald.

Chapter 11. An Island

Meanwhile Ursula has wandered along a stream which feeds the lake up to a big mill pond where she finds Birkin trying to fix a punt. Only leaking a little the punt bears him and Ursula out to a muddy little island. Here Birkin lets rip with his nihilistic misanthropy.

‘I abhor humanity, I wish it was swept away. It could go, and there would be no absolute loss, if every human being perished tomorrow. The reality would be untouched. Nay, it would be better. The real tree of life would then be rid of the most ghastly, heavy crop of Dead Sea Fruit, the intolerable burden of myriad simulacra of people, an infinite weight of mortal lies.’
‘So you’d like everybody in the world destroyed?’ said Ursula.
‘I should indeed.’
‘And the world empty of people?’
‘Yes truly.’

Ursula stands up for the importance of love (alas) while Birkin rudely dismisses it as just another human emotion, appropriate in some situations not in others. She starts to dislike and even to hate him, ‘priggish and detestable’.

Birkin says he’s renting rooms at the mill which is empty. If he could he’d chuck in his job (school inspector) and live there by himself like a hermit, away from the mankind he loathes so much. Hermione’s threatened to furnish the rooms for him. He tells Ursula it’s over between him and Hermione, not that there was anything anyway. Ursula tells him she hates Hermione anyway.

Chapter 12. Carpeting

Still at the mill they find Gerald and Hermione in the building itself. Hermione offers to help Birkin measure the rooms and then offers him a valuable carpet which he tries to reject. He hates being dominated and owned by her. Neither of them mention her attacking him with the paperweight.

The landlady of the mill, Mrs Salmon, makes tea for them all. Over tea Ursula brings up Gerald’s beastly behaviour to the mare at the level crossing which triggers a debate about whether animals have lives of their own or exist solely to serve human purposes.

Birkin comes in with the idea that horses have two wills, one which wants to submit utterly to man, another which rebels and wants to be completely free. Not uncontroversially, he goes on to say the same about women.

Hermione and Ursula wander of while the men bicker about horses, and agree that they both dislike Birkin’s anatomising and botanising, he’s always opening and dissecting rather than leave life be.

Chapter 13. Mino

The Mino is Birkin’s cat. Following their ‘clicking’ at the watermill, Ursula goes to visit Birkin at his flat. They almost immediately start arguing. Birkin insists he doesn’t believe in love but in something much deeper, in penetrating to your essential self and making a primeval bond with another essential self.

The argument is interrupted when Birkin’s tom cat goes through the French windows into the garden to confront a wild she-cat and cuffs her. Ursula yells at it to stop being a bully but Birkin sympathises with his cat’s wish to create a stability.

‘It is the desire to bring this female cat into a pure stable equilibrium, a transcendent and abiding rapport with the single male. Whereas without him, as you see, she is a mere stray, a fluffy sporadic bit of chaos.’

Back in their flat, they carry on their argument, Birkin demanding something far beyond love, Ursula unable to see it and saying he’s being obstinate and obtuse. Eventually she wins, beating him down and getting him to say ‘I love you’ in the classic style, embracing and kissing her.

Chapter 14. Water-party

The Criches hold a big midsummer party on the lake, with a motor launch and some rowing boats, all sporting lights and lanterns, the launch letting off fireworks, people laughing aboard the boats or strolling through the grounds or sitting in groups. The water side of things is being hosted by manly Gerald.

Ursula and Gudrun attend, walking there with their mother and father (Will and Anna from The Rainbow). They are intimidated by all these strangers and ask Gerald for a hamper and a canoe and paddle far away from the crowds. They beach it in a hidden spot, strip off and skinny dip, finally emerging, drying themselves. Then Ursula sings while Gudrun performs a eurhythmic dance.

Ursula interrupts this by pointing out some cattle have approached but undaunted Gudrun confronts them, dancing, outfaces them and makes them run off. At this point Gerald and Rupert appear, having tracked them down. Gerald and Gudrun go up the hillside in pursuit of the cattle leaving Ursula and Rupert to fall deeper in love.

Up the hill Gerald tells Gudrun that it’s dangerous to drive the Highland bullocks, she says ‘I suppose you think I’m afraid of you and your cattle, don’t you?’, Gerald asks her ‘why’ and, for answer, she hit him round the face. These passionate Bohemians.

Back at the lakeside the quartet clamber into two dinghies to head back and are laughing and joking when they hear shouts across the water. It’s quite dark now and someone has fallen overboard the launch. Gerald makes Gudrun row fast to the place, the skipper of the launch tells him about where the girl went overboard. She was followed by her young doctor boyfriend who jumped in to save her. Gerald strips down and jumps into the freezing water.

In brief, he dives again and again till he’s exhausted but can’t find them. Birkin pulls him out and rows him to the jetty, where he can barely stand. Gerald apologises to his father who’s appeared, and orders Birkin to drain the lake. So Rupert sets off with Ursula to the lock-keeper’s cottage where he gets the key to the sluices and laboriously opens them, releasing the lakes water into overflow channels. Slowly the levels sink.

Walking back, Birkin explains to Ursula his odd ideas about death, about needing to escape this life, slough it off like an old shell etc.

Unexpectedly in the middle of the road he stops and gives her exquisitely gentle and sensitive bunny kisses. A bit further down the road, not to be outdone, she pulls him towards her and gives him more traditional passionate kisses. They both experience an efflorescence of lust.

Then she goes home and Birkin goes back to the lake to find Gerald still supervising the search and the scouring of the water. He says he can’t sleep till they find the bodies which they eventually do. The young woman, Diana Crich, had panicked and thrown her arms round the boy’s neck so tight it choked him, and so they both drowned.

A page describes how, on that Sunday morning, word spreads throughout the colliery community and all the working class men, women and children are abuzz with the tragedy, imagining the feelings of the people at Shortlands, ‘the high home of the district.’

Chapter 15. Sunday Evening

All that day and into the evening Ursula waits for Birkin to come. She is now fully in love with him. But he doesn’t and as dusk comes she sinks into a deep depression, really deep, page after page thinking about dying and death and what comes after death, thus:

How beautiful, how grand and perfect death was, how good to look forward to. There one would wash off all the lies and ignominy and dirt that had been put upon one here, a perfect bath of cleanness and glad refreshment, and go unknown, unquestioned, unabased. After all, one was rich, if only in the promise of perfect death. It was a gladness above all, that this remained to look forward to, the pure inhuman otherness of death.

Eventually, at the children’s bedtime, he arrives, coming in out of the rain. He helps Ursula get a few of the younger children ready for bed. Then her mum and dad return from church. She is furious with him and gets into an argument about him neglecting his body, making it poorly (i.e. neglecting the battery by Hermione). When he finally leaves she is overcome by hatred of him. See what I mean by Lawrence characters veering from burning love to virulent hatred, from snogging Birkin on Sunday morning to hating his guts by Sunday night.

When he was gone Ursula felt such a poignant hatred of him, that all her brain seemed turned into a sharp crystal of fine hatred. Her whole nature seemed sharpened and intensified into a pure dart of hate. She could not imagine what it was. It merely took hold of her, the most poignant and ultimate hatred, pure and clear and beyond thought. She could not think of it at all, she was translated beyond herself. It was like a possession. She felt she was possessed. And for several days she went about possessed by this exquisite force of hatred against him. It surpassed anything she had ever known before, it seemed to throw her out of the world into some terrible region where nothing of her old life held good. She was quite lost and dazed, really dead to her own life.

Chapter 16. Man to Man

Birkin has a recurrence of illness. He lies in bed which allows Lawrence to give him a great fantasia of wild thoughts. Birkin hates lots of things. He hates the idea of married love, ‘horrible privacy of domestic and connubial satisfaction’. He hates sex because it is so limiting, it makes the sexes dependent on each other. He hates women’s need:

always so horrible and clutching, she had such a lust for possession, a greed of self-importance in love. She wanted to have, to own, to control, to be dominant.

In the ideology of love and sex men and women are considered fragments who can only be made whole by the other. Birkin dreams of a world where men and women are always whole and voluntarily associate as entirely whole.

Gerald comes to visit. The death of the young couple triggers a discussion about death, about the impact on Gerald’s family, then on whether the youngest daughter, Winifred, should be sent away to school.

Both men feel such a closeness that Birkin, bubbling with silly ideas, suggests they swear Blutbruderschaft like the old German knights used to, to swear to love each other all their lives. The novel is titled ‘Women in Love’ but the complicated love between Birkin and Gerald is just as central.

Birkin floats the idea of Gudrun being hired as a private tutor to young Winifred. Aha.

Chapter 17. The Industrial Magnate

After experiencing such closeness, Gerald now fades out of Gudrun’s mind. She dreams of getting away from England. She writes to friends in Munich and Petersburg to see if they could help or put her up.

Ursula and Gudrun visit a working woman who makes honey, ‘Mrs Kirk, a stout, pale, sharp-nosed woman, sly, honied, with something shrewish and cat-like beneath.’

Mrs Kirk was also a wet nurse to the Crich children and remembers what a little devil Gerald was. Any normal person might find this sweet and funny but Gudrun, with Lawrentian melodrama, has a fit, is overcome with rage, and wants the woman ‘ taken out at once and strangled’. Sometimes you feel like telling Lawrence’s characters to calm down, take a breath, count to 10 and everything will be better. But there’s no point. Everything about his world is ramped up to maximum. The spectacular insights into complex human nature, the moments of intense feeling, as well as the staggering nature poetry, all are part of the same package.

Up at Shortlands Mr Crich the patriarch, Thomas Crich, is slowly dying and Lawrence describes his retreat from the world and his own life. He had always treated his workers well, considering them as superior to him, closer to God. But in this had to fight his wife, Christiana, ‘like one of the great demons of hell’. Specifically, he encourages the poor to come and claim charity while Christiana, filled with hatred, drives them away like a witch. Something like hatred and terror exists between them (!)

The dying father’s last thoughts are to secure the wellbeing of Winifred, his youngest, favourite child, several pages on her wilful, anarchistic character. Meanwhile, as his father dies, Gerald feels more and more exposed. He’s managed the business well with his father as mentor and protector. Once he’s gone, Gerald will be fully exposed. We learn what wasn’t obvious up to now, which is that the last few months have changed Gerald: under the influence of 1) the death of Diana 2) Birkin’s visions and 3) Gudrun’s love he’s ceased to be a mechanical old Tory, doors have opened in his mind, he’s become confused.

The chapter goes back to describe Gerald’s boyhood, education, wanderlust, off to uni in Germany, serving in the war, exploring in the Amazon, before returning to take up the family business. He sees the world as instrumental to the will of man. This is the exact opposite of Birkin, who fantasises about nature freed by the complete extermination of man.

Man was the archgod of earth. His mind was obedient to serve his will. Man’s will was the absolute, the only absolute. (p.251)

Lawrence describes industrial strife, the colliers striking for more pay which led to lockouts which led to marches, riots, and soldiers being sent to the most troublesome pit, Whatmore, shots fired, a miner shot dead. This broke old Man Crich’s heart but excited Gerald, who was a boy.

In brief: as Gerald takes over the business he reforms it from top to bottom, sacking all the old managers, bringing in new professionals and equipment from America, scrapping all the perks and charities his father had introduced, overhauling it and making it a modern profitable business.

Lawrence presents it in moralising, general terms, as the triumph of the modern machine ethic over the old organic one. The triumph of Gerald’s heartless Fordian mechanical efficiency over his dying father’s old-fashioned Christian Victorian paternalism.

Chapter 18. Rabbit

Mr Crich agrees for Gudrun to come to Shortlands regularly as an art tutor for Winifred. The latter expects her to be yet another servant but quickly learns they are to be equals. They sketch Einnie’s Pekinese dog, Looloo. Gerald turns up after a few days and they realise they are both in love. The strange incident of them getting out the family’s huge pet rabbit from its hutch. It’s called Bismarck and is a monster, going into a frenzy wherein it badly scratches both Gudrun and Gerald before they get it to a courtyard with grass where it settles down to feed.

Chapter 19. Moony

Birkin goes to recuperate in the South of France leaving Ursula bereft.

She despised and detested the whole show. From the bottom of her heart, from the bottom of her soul, she despised and detested people, adult people.

She takes a walk up to the mill pond as night is falling and sees the big moon reflected in the water. Then it is smashed by someone throwing a stone in, and another, repeatedly breaking the moon into fragments. It is, of course, Birkin, who has come back without telling anyone.

She makes themselves known and they have a hell of an argument because she simply wants him to say I love you while he has a difficult-to-understand, rarefied theory of two people existing together without needy things like ‘I love you’ etc, he wants ‘the paradisal unknowing’. He mocks it as her war cry.

But then she reaches out her hand to his and their bodies take over. They kiss again and again and Birkin gives in and says ‘I love you’.

Next day Birkin has doubts about his entire attitude. It’s connected with a 2-page meditation on the truth revealed by the African sculptures in Halliday’s flat, some truth cold northerners have reached. Suddenly he knows he must propose to Ursula so goes to Beldover. She’s out so he explains his intentions to her father, Will Brangwen.

This goes badly. While they wait, Brangwen and Birkin get into an argument. Brangwen has raised his children Christian like him and doesn’t want to see the girls throw themselves away. Birkin is nettled by all of this. When Ursula arrives from the library it’s her father who tells her Birkin is there to propose, reducing Birkin to inaudible mumbling. This inauspicious manner leads Ursula to bridle and then accuse them both of trying to railroad her, at which Birkin gets up and leaves.

Over the next few days Ursula and Gudrun are very close and dissect Birkin’s character, a preacher. But then there’s a reaction against her sister and she finds herself pondering what kind of love she wants from Birkin.

She wanted unspeakable intimacies. She wanted to have him, utterly, finally to have him as her own, oh, so unspeakably, in intimacy. To drink him down—ah, like a life-draught… But only on condition that he, her lover, loved her absolutely, with complete self-abandon.

This is a central crux so worth lingering on:

She believed that love far surpassed the individual. He said the individual was more than love, or than any relationship. For him, the bright, single soul accepted love as one of its conditions, a condition of its own equilibrium. She believed that love was everything.

Birkin has a model of the self where love is one among many attributes which bring out and complete the self. For Ursula, love is bigger than all individuals and we must submit ourselves to it.

Chapter 20. Gladiatorial

The famous chapter describing Rupert and Gerald wrestling in front of the fire. Straight after walking out of Ursula’s house after the proposal fiasco, Birkin walks up to Shortlands, to find Gerald standing in front of the fire in his drawing room, bored to tears.

They get talking about how to alleviate boredom: there’s work, intoxicants, women or… Birkin suggests fighting. Gerald says he shared a house with a Japanese wrestling expert in Heidelberg and offers to show Birkin jiu-jitsu. So Gerald gets the butler to bring sandwiches and soda, to close the door and leave them undisturbed.

And so they strip naked and wrestle. Modern sensibilities look for the homoerotic in the scene, which may well be there, but Lawrence is primarily concerned with the spiritual or psychological aspects. The actual wrestling lasts just four paragraphs. In the fifth one Gerald lies back on the carpet exhausted, faints and Birkin passes out over his body. When Birkin comes to, he props himself up and his hand accidentally touches Gerald’s, who seizes it. A strong male clasp. Gerald asks if this was the Bruderschaft Birkin wanted. It’s certainly something.

They get dressed (Gerald nips upstairs to dress in a luxury dressing gown) before settling in front of the fire to eat the sandwiches the butler brought. Birkin tells him he came hotfoot from proposing to Ursula. He loves her. Which triggers them to discuss the nature of love and for Gerald to worry that he might never find it.

Chapter 21. Threshold

Gudrun goes to London to attend a show of her artwork. On her return Winifred has a bouquet for her. Gudrun goes to sit with the dying old man. He arranges for a stable to be converted into a studio for Winifred and Gudrun to work in.

Birkin arrives driving his car to collect Winifred, Gudrun and Gerald. The two latter sit in the back and ripely satirise Birkin’s ideas about an association of man and woman which leaves them separate and distinct, as stars. Gudrun and Gerald agree they want passionate love between committed partners. (Gudrun gives her opinion of marriage being a purely social form – ‘Marriage is a social arrangement, I take it, and has nothing to do with the question of love’ – which I imagine was shocking in the late 1910s.)

Chapter 22. Woman to Woman

Only at this point do we learn Birkin was driving Gerald to the railway station, then taking the other two on to his place for tea before disappearing off somewhere. Hermione turns up and she and Ursula have a long dissection of Birkin’s character, Hermione strongly advising Ursula not to marry him.

Like the rabbit in his chapter, the star of this one is Rupert’s cat which Hermione feeds cream and speaks to in Italian. Hermione is of that class of gentlewoman who know Italy, and Florence in particular, so exquisitely well. Her dear mama died in Florence. (Cf A Room with a View.)

Chapter 23. Excurse

Next day is a half holiday at the school so Birkin calls by in his car and takes Ursula for a spin. He hands her a tissue which turns out to be full of rings he’s giving her. But this has the unintended consequence of making her feel like she’s being bought, making her very angry and she launches into pages and pages criticising him, calling him a perverse death-eater (p.346) before getting him to stop the car, throwing the rings at him, getting out and walking off. He stoops to pick the rings out of the mud and acknowledges some of her criticisms are true.

Then she comes back. She asks for the rings again. Everything which made the fight, disappears and now they are both soppily in love and do lots of kissing. Get back in the car and drive to Southwell, home of Southwell Minster and have a grand high tea at The Saracens Head. Here, in a scene which would be easy to over-interpret, she kneels on the hearth

And she was drawn to him strangely, as in a spell. Kneeling on the hearth-rug before him, she put her arms round his loins, and put her face against his thigh. Riches! Riches! She was overwhelmed with a sense of a heavenful of riches.
‘We love each other,’ she said in delight.
‘More than that,’ he answered, looking down at her with his glimmering, easy face.
Unconsciously, with her sensitive fingertips, she was tracing the back of his thighs, following some mysterious life-flow there. She had discovered something, something more than wonderful, more wonderful than life itself. It was the strange mystery of his life-motion, there, at the back of the thighs, down the flanks. It was a strange reality of his being, the very stuff of being, there in the straight downflow of the thighs. It was here she discovered him one of the sons of God such as were in the beginning of the world, not a man, something other, something more.

There’s more than a page of her kneeling and tracing the outline of his loins and feeling his primal power. Very easy to give a sexual interpretation to. Utterly entranced, he decides they must both quit their jobs and travel. In a mad enthusiasm they both write letters to their bosses quitting with immediate notice. Birkin posts hers first so they don’t arrive at the same time. I smell trouble.

Then back into the car and touring the lanes absolutely transformed by total love. He feels like an Egyptian Pharaoh. They end up driving through Sherwood Forest, then stop at a circle of grass near a stream. It is darkest night. He throws down a rug, they strip off and make love, the first sex in the book, described in high mystical magical terms.

She had her desire of him, she touched, she received the maximum of unspeakable communication in touch, dark, subtle, positively silent, a magnificent gift and give again, a perfect acceptance and yielding, a mystery, the reality of that which can never be known, vital, sensual reality that can never be transmuted into mind content, but remains outside, living body of darkness and silence and subtlety, the mystic body of reality. She had her desire fulfilled. He had his desire fulfilled. For she was to him what he was to her, the immemorial magnificence of mystic, palpable, real otherness. (p.361)

Chapter 24. Death and Love

Old Thomas Crich is a long time a-dying. And the impact on his son, Gerald? Characteristically Lawrentian hyperbole.

Day by day he felt more and more like a bubble filled with darkness, round which whirled the iridescence of his consciousness, and upon which the pressure of the outer world, the outer life, roared vastly.

He takes to hanging round the studio watching Gudrun. One day he asks her to stay on into the evening for dinner. As he explains how he is suffering, the void his father’s illness makes him feel, she feels powerfully attracted. A strong soldierly type obviously suffering brings out the mothering instinct.

Interlude when Gerald’s cold mother comes down, tells him not to take it all on himself, then departs. Gerald insists on walking Gudrun down the drive to the gates. He puts his arms round her and draws her near and she melts. Under the railway bridge, where the colliers snog their sweethearts, they kiss:

So she relaxed, and seemed to melt, to flow into him, as if she were some infinitely warm and precious suffusion filling into his veins, like an intoxicant. Her arms were round his neck, he kissed her and held her perfectly suspended, she was all slack and flowing into him, and he was the firm, strong cup that receives the wine of her life…

But then she checks herself, as all women do; you don’t want to be thought ‘too easy of winning’.

How much more of him was there to know? Ah much, much, many days harvesting for her large, yet perfectly subtle and intelligent hands upon the field of his living, radio-active body. Ah, her hands were eager, greedy for knowledge. But for the present it was enough, enough, as much as her soul could bear. (p.375)

Gudrun doesn’t come next day because she has a cold. The day after, Gerald is sitting by his father’s bed when the old man gasps and arches and coughs up a gout of blood and dies. The mother makes a weird speech, telling her children none of them must look so beautiful and young on their deathbeds. Next day Gudrun goes to Winifred and the studio where Gerald pays a meek visit and shares their coffee.

The funeral is barely described. Instead the three horrible days when Gerald feels like a prisoner chained over an abyss of darkness. On the third evening he can’t bear it any more and goes for a vast walk in the darkness, which eventually brings him to the graveyard where his father’s grave is, and then he conceives a mad notion of seeing Gudrun. She is the only one who can save him.

So he asks directions from a drunk miner emerging from the town pub at chucking-out time (10pm) and makes his way to the Brangwen house. In a coincidence he arrives just as Birkin and Ursula step out, and hides from them in the shadows. Then he sneaks into the house – father William is asleep in the living room, his wife is in their bedroom – sneaks on tiptoe upstairs. There’s a comic digression when he figures he has the right room, sneaks over to the bedroom only to find the sleeping form of a boy, one of the brothers and has to tiptoe back out onto the landing.

Long story short, he finds Gudrun’s bedroom, wakes her. At first terrified, she locks her door, makes him take off his wet things and lets him have sex with her. He falls deeply asleep, as men do, while she lays for hours in the dark wondering what has just happened, what it means, remembering all her life up to this point.

She waits till the church bell rings 5 o’clock, then wakes him and urges him to go. In fact she has a nausea of him, needs him to be gone.

Chapter 25. Marriage or Not

Birkin has taken out a marriage licence but Ursula keeps delaying. She is in the third week of notice to the school. Christmas is coming. Gerald jokes that maybe he and Gudrun should hurry up so they can make it a joint wedding. Birkin isn’t sure marriage will suit Gerald.

Gerald and Birkin compare theories of marriage. For Birkin it is a social convention which denotes the partnership of free and equal lovers. Gerald has a more fatal view.

Marriage was not the committing of himself into a relationship with Gudrun. It was a committing of himself in acceptance of the established world, he would accept the established order, in which he did not livingly believe, and then he would retreat to the underworld for his life. (p.398)

Chapter 26. A Chair

Birkin and Ursula go to the flea market. They buy a beautiful old wooden chair but then argue about whether the present is accursed (Birkin) or the past was just as crudely materialistic (Ursula). This triggers Birkin into expressing Lawrence’s dogma of never having a home, of permanent travel.

‘The truth is, we don’t want things at all,’ he replied. ‘The thought of a house and furniture of my own is hateful to me.’
This startled her for a moment. Then she replied:
‘So it is to me. But one must live somewhere.’
‘Not somewhere – anywhere,’ he said. “One should just live anywhere – not have a definite place. I don’t want a definite place. As soon as you get a room, and it is complete, you want to run from it. Now my rooms at the Mill are quite complete, I want them at the bottom of the sea. It is a horrible tyranny of a fixed milieu, where each piece of furniture is a commandment-stone… You must leave your surroundings sketchy, unfinished, so that you are never contained, never confined, never dominated from the outside.’

Ursula had earlier noticed a working class couple, the woman heavily pregnant, sifting through the junk on display. On an impulse she decides to give them the chair they’ve just bought. Lawrence dwells on the pair’s working class appearance, the woman short and stocky, the man thin like a rat. The repeated word is ‘slinking’. In fact this is the longest description of working class people in the book. Gerald takes direction from a drunk miner. Working class women mock Ursula and Gudrun on their way to the wedding. There are the servants, of course. This is the longest description of proles and the key words are ‘slinking’ and ‘rat’.

Our couple find the whole place grim and miserable and low and wretched, ‘cold, somehow small, crowded, and like the end of the world.’ They catch a tram and agree that they need to get away, to wander the world.

‘And we will wander about on the face of the earth,” he said, “and we’ll look at the world beyond just this bit.’ (p.408)

Chapter 27. Flitting

At dinner, Ursula tells her family she’s getting married tomorrow. Her father is furious at not being told, not being given any notice. She says it’s her life, he says she owes her family and her parents the information. She defies him, makes him furious and he smacks her. She leaves the room, goes upstairs, packs her bags, comes downstairs, says goodbye, marches out of the house, down to the station, catches a train to where Birkin is staying, walks past his landlady into his room. (Birkin appears to be living in rented rooms as well as sometimes at the Mill which Hermione so wanted to decorate for him, thus retaining her hold over him.)

Rupert is non-plussed but reckons something like this was inevitable, embraces her and tells her he loves her. That is the reassurance she needs, but she can’t really see how deeply she is rescuing him from the fallen world, from his own doubts and incompleteness. They marry the next day (p.417). The wedding ceremony is not described in the slightest because it doesn’t matter to Rupert, Gudrun or Lawrence.

A few days at the Mill, while Rupert is away, Gerald and Ursula discuss marriage. He says she looks well on it. He asks her whether he should propose to Gudrun. They both have their doubts. Later when Rupert comes home, they agree that Gudrun is more the mistress type than the wife type, and Gerald a born lover rather than faithful husband. But Gerald floats the idea that they should all go away somewhere, somewhere abroad, as a foursome, which Ursula loves.

The Brangwen family have moved out of the house in Beldover. Will Brangwen needed to move to Nottingham for his work. They leave Ursula’s belongings behind for her to collect. She and Ursula walk over one afternoon. They’re both appalled by how bleak the empty house is. Birkin shows up with his car and shares the general horror at the bleak empty rooms.

Birkin drives Ursula back to the Mill with him, dropping Gudrun at the cottage she’s now renting in Willey Green. She watches them go, haunted by their happiness. Next day she goes to the Mill and finds Ursula alone, asks if she doesn’t think Gerald’s suggestion they all go away together is a cheek. Gudrun thinks the menfolk are treating her like a chattel, like a type (French for ‘trollop’).

Chapter 28. Gudrun in the Pompadour

The trip abroad begins. Gudrun and Gerald, being ready first, set off via London and Paris to Innsbruck, where they would meet Ursula and Birkin. In London they stayed one night. They went to the music-hall, and afterwards to the Pompadour Café. Gudrun hates this place because all the tight little groups of artists and bohemians hang out here.

Minette is there, the girl from chapter 6 who was pregnant and slept with Gerald in order to get back her target, Halliday. She comes over from a group of the gang and asks him to join them but he suavely refuses. She says just enough to indicate to Gudrun that she’s one of his mistresses.

The bohemian set (Halliday, Maxim, Julian and Minette) start slagging off Birkin, then Halliday finds a letter to him written by Rupert, full of his ripest pontificating, and reads it out loud to general ridicule. Gudrun is worked into a frenzy by their mockery, gets up, walks over to their table, politely asks if she may read the letter, takes it, turns and walks out of the cafe. The others can’t believe what is happening then start to boo. This makes her walk all the slower and more superior. Outside she hails a cab as Gerald catches up with her, thinking her magnificent. Gudrun thinks they are ‘dogs’ and calls Rupert a fool ‘to give himself away to such canaille.’

(According to Anthony Burgess’s biography of Lawrence, this scene is closely based on fact. The setting was the Café Royal where Lawrence’s enemy Philip Heseltine, started reading out Lawrence’s poems from the volume Amore in a mocking voice, and so infuriated Katherine Mansfield that she snatched the book out of his hands and stormed out, followed by her embarrassed husband, John Middleton Murray, Burgess page 97.)

Chapter 29. Continental

By far the longest chapter, 60 pages long, almost a novella.

Description of Birkin and Ursula’s voyage across the Channel, curled up in the prow of the ship in the absolute darkness. They disembark in Ostend by night. In a dream they take their bags through customs to the railway station, grab a sandwich and horrible coffee (nothing changes) then onto the train which travels through Bruges, Ghent, Brussels, through Luxembourg, through Alsace-Lorraine, through Metz, arriving at Basle. Overnight in a hotel, then another train to Zürich and then their final destination, Innsbruck.

They catch an open sleigh to the hotel where they see Gudrun. Ursula and Gudrun go to her hotel room to gossip, talking about mutual friends in Paris. Then everyone dresses and comes down for dinner where they agree how wonderful it is to be out of England, a country with the damper permanently on.

Next morning they take a small train to Hohenhausen, up in the snow, and then take sledges higher, higher into the snowy mountains, arriving at another, more remote hotel. In the hotel room, Gudrun is overcome, looking out the window at the snowy landscape and mountains she cries and Gerald embraces her.

They go down for coffee and cake, delicious. There are ten other guests, all German. They are introduced to the group who are listening to an odd man-child give a performance of the Cologne accent. When he’s finished Ursula is invited to sing the song, Annie Lowrie, with Gudrun accompanying her on the piano.

After dinner Ursula wants to go out into the darkness. She is intoxicated by the wonderful cold and the primal scenery. When they return to the hotel lounge, the Reunionsaal, they discover the other guests dancing the Schuhplatteln, the Tyrolese dance of the clapping hands and tossing the partner in the air at the crisis, with jumping and clapping, to the music of three zithers.

To no-one’s surprise, Gerald quickly learns the steps and becomes a demon. He dances with the Professor’s youngest daughter who is incandescent with awe at this Real Man holding and twirling her. Gudrun is lusted after by one of the young men who is to shy to ask to dance with her. Twas ever thus.

In their bedroom, Gudrun has a panic attack about Gerald, is completely alienated from him. Luckily he doesn’t notice. She mocks his dancing with the young girl, he doesn’t understand her. They sleep separately and she wakes superior to him. Looking at him asleep, she realises he can solve any practical problem, all challenges fall before his will. She imagines marrying him, supporting him as he becomes a Conservative MP, goes into politics, becomes Prime Minister.

But then she mocks her own girlish dreams. Who cares about politics? It’s all so old. And somehow, through this interior monologue, she becomes convinced to marry him. She wakes him with kisses, telling him he’s convinced her and he doesn’t know what she’s talking about.

The first days passed in an ecstasy of physical motion, sleighing, skiing, skating, moving in an intensity of speed and white light that surpassed life itself, and carried the souls of the human beings beyond into an inhuman abstraction of velocity and weight and eternal, frozen snow. (p.473)

Loerke

One day they’re snowed in. Gudrun and Ursula get to know Loerke, the puny little sculptor, who tells them his backstory, a broken home and deprived background, hitching to Italy, learning to sculpt the hard way. Now he is a professional with well-paid commissions and is working on a frieze in granite for a new factory in Germany. He gives an impassioned defence of art beautifying new industrial buildings that has a Bauhaus ring. Anyway, it puts Gudrun’s funny little clay models in the shade.

Lawrence’s antisemitism

Gerald and Rupert both dislike Loerke and the girls’ interest in him. Birkin, as always the most virulent and malicious, gives an extended slagging of Loerke which ends up with an unexpected, unnecessary and dismaying antisemitism. I could leave it at that but I’ll quote the entire passage so you can see for yourself the vehemence of Lawrence’s dislike and racism.

‘What do the women find so impressive in that little brat?’ Gerald asked.
‘God alone knows,’ replied Birkin, ‘unless it’s some sort of appeal he makes to them, which flatters them and has such a power over them.’
Gerald looked up in surprise.
‘Does he make an appeal to them?’ he asked.
‘Oh yes,’ replied Birkin. ‘He is the perfectly subjected being, existing almost like a criminal. And the women rush towards that, like a current of air towards a vacuum.’
‘Funny they should rush to that,’ said Gerald.
‘Makes one mad, too,’ said Birkin. ‘But he has the fascination of pity and repulsion for them, a little obscene monster of the darkness that he is.’
Gerald stood still, suspended in thought.
‘What do women want, at the bottom?’ he asked.
Birkin shrugged his shoulders.
‘God knows,’ he said. ‘Some satisfaction in basic repulsion, it seems to me. They seem to creep down some ghastly tunnel of darkness, and will never be satisfied till they’ve come to the end.’
Gerald looked out into the mist of fine snow that was blowing by. Everywhere was blind today, horribly blind.
‘And what is the end?’ he asked.
Birkin shook his head.
‘I’ve not got there yet, so I don’t know. Ask Loerke, he’s pretty near. He is a good many stages further than either you or I can go.’
‘Yes, but stages further in what?’ cried Gerald, irritated.
Birkin sighed, and gathered his brows into a knot of anger.
‘Stages further in social hatred,’ he said. ‘He lives like a rat, in the river of corruption, just where it falls over into the bottomless pit. He’s further on than we are. He hates the ideal more acutely. He hates the ideal utterly, yet it still dominates him. I expect he is a Jew—or part Jewish.’
‘Probably,’ said Gerald.
‘He is a gnawing little negation, gnawing at the roots of life.’
‘But why does anybody care about him?’ cried Gerald.
‘Because they hate the ideal also, in their souls. They want to explore the sewers, and he’s the wizard rat that swims ahead.’ (p.481)

Not a good look, as the Yanks say.

So Loerke is also a sculptor. As she looks at his pieces and hears his stories, Gudrun is beguiled. Loerke shows them a photo of a sculpture of a young girl sitting on a horse. Ursula says the horse is oddly distorted which triggers a little harangue.

‘It is a work of art, it is a picture of nothing, of absolutely nothing. It has nothing to do with anything but itself, it has no relation with the everyday world of this and other, there is no connection between them, absolutely none, they are two different and distinct planes of existence, and to translate one into the other is worse than foolish, it is a darkening of all counsel, a making confusion everywhere. Do you see, you must not confuse the relative work of action, with the absolute world of art. That you must not do.’ (p.484)

They all have different reactions. Gudrun agrees on the difference between the artist and the work, but Ursula insists the horse and the girl are reflections of the artist’s horrible personality. Gerald strolls up, takes a look at the photo and, characteristically, says he likes the look of the girl, Gudrun saying ‘wouldn’t he just’. But in a further development, when Loerke tells them the girl was an art student Gudrun immediately leaps to the conclusion that she was a naive and innocent young girl from a good family exploited and used by her wicked male teacher. #metoo. The sisterhood. As outraged by masculine abuse in 1920 as 2020.

But there’s more. Loerke freely admits he had to regularly smack and hit the girl before she’d sit still in this pose. And then, to make himself even more despicable, says that he only likes his models young:

‘I don’t like them any bigger, any older. Then they are beautiful, at sixteen, seventeen, eighteen – after that, they are no use to me.’

Furious, Ursula goes out into the snowy night and suddenly realises she hates it. Five pages back, they were all snow gods and snow artists, now, with Lawrentian abruptness, she’s shifted to the other extreme. She wants to go south to warmth and olive groves. She goes back into the hotel and finds Birkin in their room, reading and tells him. He laughingly agrees.

Next day they tell the other couple and can tell Gerald and Gudrun are relieved to hear of their departure. The men have been riling each other a bit. The two genders have last meetings. When Ursula explains that she and Birkin want to continue moving on, into new freedoms, Gudrun irritates her by saying that wherever you go you’ll always be with the same person, ‘only to secure oneself in one’s illusions.’

The men chat and Birkin asks Gerald when he’ll leave and Gerald replies maybe never. Maybe he’ll never go back to England. The sledge arrives, picks up Birkin and Ursula and off they go, leaving Gerald and Gudrun dwindling in the snow, waving.

Chapter 30. Snowed Up

The second longest chapter at 38 pages. Taken together, the two ‘abroad’ chapters make about 100 pages.

Left to themselves, Gudrun and Gerald fall into a fierce and bitter war for supremacy. They rage and argue. She moves into a separate bedroom. They fight all the time. She begs him to tell her he loves her. He feels like he has been ripped open. He has fantasies of murdering her. They both go mad.

While Gerald’s off skiing, Gudrun become friendlier with Loerke over their shared aesthetic, particularly the basic principle that the artist and the art exist in different realms.

The suggestion of primitive art was their refuge, and the inner mysteries of sensation their object of worship. Art and Life were to them the Reality and the Unreality.

One time Gerald is bullying Loerke in argument like an arrogant Englishman and when Loerke turns to her for appeal, she angrily tells him to stop calling her Mrs Crich. She is not Mrs Crich. She is not married. A light goes on in Loerke’s eye and Gerald is mortified.

Perversely he is so self contained about this insult that she loves him and goes to his bedroom that night to have sex, gladly. ‘And she had extreme pleasure of him.’ But she withholds her soul. Any couple eventually reach the end of fleshly pleasure and everything is just repetition. Gudrun unconsciously knows that the next step, for her, is alliance with Loerke. Loerke is very patient and encourages long conversations about Mozart and Goethe et al, to win her over.

She and Gerald have a massive argument when Gerald asks her what on earth she sees in Loerke and she bluntly tells him the little German understands women and is not a fool. Stunned, Gerald asks if that is the end of their relationship. She says either of them are free to leave at any time. For some reason the bluntness of all this arouses Gerald, she sees it, is disgusted, and walks out.

And so on. After a long campaign Loerke subtly suggests that she might go with him to his studio in Dresden. Not to be his mistress. But because he admires her company and her intelligence. She is flattered though a little chagrined that he doesn’t flatter her beauty.

Gerald is out all day skiing, feeling king of the mountains up in the high slopes. He doesn’t want to come back to the hotel and people. As soon as he sees Gudrun he fantasises about murdering her, the sheer pleasure of strangling the life out of her. They dine and later, in his room, she says the experiment is over. They gave it a try and it failed. Why, he asks. Because you cannot love, and I could never love you.

At this Gerald feels the pure desire to kill go down his arms and into his hands and turns towards he but, sensing his rage, she nips out the room, across to hers and locks the door. Cue pages of her pondering her whole life and above all the patheticness of men, of Gerald, Birkin, all of them, of the mining business with all its managers. Babies, all of them. And the sheer tedium of doing the same thing day after day. Gerald stays up all night reading, mortally afraid of lying sleepless in the dark.

Next morning over breakfast she announces she’ll be leaving the following day. Gerald says he’ll make the necessary arrangements then goes out for a day’s skiing. Gudrun feels wonderfully empowered. The long vigil and pondering her life situation has clarified everything. She lets Loerke take her out tobogganing even though he looks like a ridiculous pixie. He doesn’t take the tobogganing very seriously which she finds an immense relief from Gerald’s intense seriousness about all activities. Lightness and irony are what she needs.

At the end of the day he crashes them in the snow, laughing, then produces a coffee thermos, some Schnapps and biscuits. They are merrily discussing where Gudrun will go the next day – she doesn’t know and doesn’t care – when Gerald looms whitely up out of the snow.

Crack! Gerald punches Loerke aside, then punches him again. Gudrun brings her fist down on his face and chest which prompts him to turn and, finally, fulfil his deepest wish, to strangle her to death. His hands grip her throat and strangle the life out of her as she thrashes and then starts to go limp which is the moment when Loerke comes to himself and makes one of his sarcastic remarks, in French: ‘Monsieur! Quand vous aurez fini –’ ‘Sir, when you have quite finished…’ and the mockery of it brings Gerald back to his senses.

Not in horror, but futility. What is he doing? Who cares if this silly woman lives or dies? Oh what’s the point? And he drops Gudrun, looks round in a daze, then stumbles off into the snow. He has had enough. He wants to sleep. He wants it to end. He climbs higher and higher into the land of sheer cliffs and rockslides. He slips in a snowslide but that doesn’t wake his daze. Onwards and upwards. He comes across a crucifix almost buried in the snow and is overcome with terror that he is going to be murdered, looking all round him in his fear, raising his arm to ward off the blow. And thus walking he slips over the edge of a deep bowl,

surrounded by sheer slopes and precipices, out of which rose a track that brought one to the top of the mountain. But he wandered unconsciously, till he slipped and fell down, and as he fell something broke in his soul, and immediately he went to sleep. (p.533)

Chapter 31. Exeunt

Gerald died. They bring the body back to the hotel. Next morning they bring the body back to the hotel. A woman comes to tell Gudrun. She is amazed by how cold and unaffected she is. Like Mersault and his mother. She finds Loerke in the main room but he is not pleased to see her. She telegrams to Birkin and Ursula who arrive the next day but she is cold with them. In fact after five minutes the sisters have nothing to say to each other.

The final pages focus on Birkin. He makes all the practical arrangements and deals with the authorities. He visits the frozen corpse then treks up the hill to the snowy bowl where Gerald dies, then comes back to the hotel and confronts the corpse again. This time he breaks down in hysterical tears, and Ursula sees him. Birkin is distraught that Gerald didn’t love him. He says he offered him his love but he didn’t take it. He remembers their hands clutching each other as they came round from the famous wrestling scene. If only that moment had lasted, if only Gerald had loved him, maybe he would still be alive.

Birkin and Ursula and one of Gerald’s brothers accompany the body back to England where the family insists he be buried. Ursula and Birkin remove to the Mill and live very quietly. (Gudrun has gone to Dresden and ‘writes no particulars of herself.’)

On the last pages of this vast book, Ursula and Birkin argue. She says, Aren’t I enough for you and he says, No. You are all women to me but I wanted something more, I wanted a male kind of love, I wanted one true friend, and I had him but he rejected me. Ursula says she doesn’t believe Birkin’s notion of an eternal love between men, ‘It’s an obstinacy, a theory, a perversity’ and he replies ‘I don’t believe that’ and that’s the end of the book.

A war novel?

Lawrence rewrote the novel to achieve its final form, between 1915 and 1917, the central years of the First World War. In his foreword to the American edition, he said he wanted to the timeline of the novel to be unfixed. But critics at the time and ever since have pointed out the tremendous bitterness observable in many of the characters – most extreme in Birkin’s visions of exterminating humanity altogether – radiate the bitterness and anger and disillusionment which Lawrence was hardly the only one to experience during these years. If Birkin repeatedly express this, it is Gerald who in a sense acts it out, overcome with psychopathy at the novel’s bitter end. And the carrying of the body of a young Englishman, killed abroad, back to his home in England was, of course, something experienced by hundreds of thousands of families.

Lawrence at one point considered titling the book Dies Irae, Days of Anger.

Flouting conventional morality

‘The old ideals are dead as nails – nothing there. It seems to me there remains only this perfect union with a woman – sort of ultimate marriage – and there isn’t anything else.’
‘And you mean if there isn’t the woman, there’s nothing?’ said Gerald.
‘Pretty well that – seeing there’s no God.’ (Chapter 5, on the train to London)

Just to note the obvious:

1. None of the characters seem to believe in God, Christian teaching or Christian morality. The girls’ father, William, tells Birkin he expects it of his daughters, but nobody else even mentions it.

2. None of the quartet are bothered by pre-marital sex in the slightest. There’s nothing about sin, hell and damnation, nothing at all. It’s assessed solely on whether it is right for the individual and their relationship i.e. the ‘modern’ view.

3. Even marriage, which they all enter into, none of them really care about much. It’s a purely social convention which cements what has already been agreed between free individuals.

GUDRUN: ‘Marriage is a social arrangement, I take it, and has nothing to do with the question of love.’ (Chapter 21)

BIRKIN: ‘I’m not interested in legal marriage, one way or another. It’s a mere question of convenience.’ (p.396)

In fact Birkin has a violent objection to traditional ideas of marriage.

‘Marriage in the old sense seems to me repulsive. Égoïsme à deux is nothing to it. It’s a sort of tacit hunting in couples: the world all in couples, each couple in its own little house, watching its own little interests, and stewing in its own little privacy—it’s the most repulsive thing on earth.’ (p.397)

In fact, you can easily misread him to be attacking the institution of marriage which, of course, for conservatives then and now, was sacred:

‘You’ve got to take down the love-and-marriage ideal from its pedestal. We want something broader. I believe in the additional perfect relationship between man and man – additional to marriage.’
‘I can never see how they can be the same,’ said Gerald.
‘Not the same – but equally important, equally creative, equally sacred, if you like.’ (p.397)

4. And experimentation. Why not go whole hog? Here’s Gudrun fired up by the wild dancing in the Reunionsaal at the Tyrolese inn:

They might do as they liked – this she realised as she went to sleep. How could anything that gave one satisfaction be excluded? What was degrading? Who cared? Degrading things were real, with a different reality. And he [Birkin] was so unabashed and unrestrained. Wasn’t it rather horrible, a man who could be so soulful and spiritual, now to be so – she balked at her own thoughts and memories: then she added – so bestial? So bestial, they two! – so degraded! She winced. But after all, why not? She exulted as well. Why not be bestial, and go the whole round of experience? She exulted in it. She was bestial. How good it was to be really shameful! There would be no shameful thing she had not experienced. Yet she was unabashed, she was herself. Why not? She was free when she knew everything, and no dark shameful things were denied her. (p.464)

You can see how old-fashioned moralists and social guardians would be outraged. For all these reasons Lawrence couldn’t find a publisher for the book in the UK and when it was, finally, published in the US, in 1920, it was to subscribers only. Such was the threat and illegality of what to us now appear completely harmless, indeed anodyne, opinions.

Summary of people and places

Ursula Brangwen

26, class teacher at Willey Green Grammar School. Always a bit flustered, always rushing in too soon. Greenish eyes. Pairs with Rupert Birkin. Favourite phrase: why not? which drives her father mad.

Gudrun Brangwen

25, artist and model. Dark hair. In London at art school she got to know the extended networks of Bohemia. The more conventionally beautiful of the two. Calm and confident on top, profoundly restless underneath. Ursula’s nickname for her is ‘Prune’. Pairs with Gerald Crich.

Rupert Birkin

‘Instead of chopping yourself down to fit the world, chop the world down to fit yourself.’ (p.230)

School inspector. Tall, thin, tired misanthrope. Wishes all humanity could be exterminated. Prophet of individualism (someone should write a book comparing Wilde and Lawrence as proponents of unflinching absolute individualism.) An inveterate lecturer and preacher:

‘He isn’t sympathetic, he wants to dictate.’ (p.367)

Here’s Maxim slagging him off in chapter 27:

‘He is a megalomaniac, of course, it is a form of religious mania. He thinks he is the Saviour of man.’ (p.433)

An emotional chameleon, ‘he is so changeable and unsure of himself’ or, as Ursula puts it late on:

‘He says he wants me to accept him non-emotionally, and finally – I really don’t know what he means. He says he wants the demon part of himself to be mated – physically – not the human being. You see he says one thing one day, and another the next – and he always contradicts himself – ‘
‘And always thinks about himself, and his own dissatisfaction,’ said Hermione slowly. (p.330)

Rupert is generally agreed to be a self portrait by Lawrence in which case he was painfully aware of his own shortcomings. Here’s Hermione dissecting him:

‘He is so uncertain, so unstable — he wearies, and then reacts. I couldn’t tell you what his reactions are. I couldn’t tell you the agony of them. That which he affirms and loves one day — a little latter he turns on it in a fury of destruction. He is never constant, always this awful, dreadful reaction. Always the quick change from good to bad, bad to good.’ (p.332)

At the start of the novel Birkin is going out with Hermione, under her thumb. Takes a long time to shake her off. The growing attraction between him and Ursula entails prolonged rivalry between Ursula and Hermione. After much arguing they finally surrender to each other and, on page 360, have sex in Sherwood Forest.

Gerald always feels a bit superior and protective towards him, thinks him ‘amazingly clever, but incurably innocent’. They stay in the London Soho flat together. They wrestle naked together (chapter 20).

Gerald Crich

31, coalmine owner, superb physical specimen, fair hair and moustache, blue eyes. His ‘gleaming blondness.’ Imperious, ‘very good-looking and self-contained.’ Former officer in the Army till he resigned his commission. Explored the Amazon so occasionally tells stories about the Indians. Compelled to become head of the family coalmining business as his father falls ill, Gerald clings onto his boyhood dreams of being Odysseus. In his imagination:

The world was really a wilderness where one hunted and swam and rode. He rebelled against all authority. Life was a condition of savage freedom.

Tries to quell the mare he’s riding as the colliery train goes by, to Ursula and Gudrun’s horror. Wrestles naked with Rupert in front of the library fire (chapter 20).

Hermione Roddice

A friend of the Criches, ‘a tall, slow, reluctant woman with a weight of fair hair and a pale, long face.’ Upper class and used to dismissing people when she’s lost interest. Flat bosom. Long, grave, downward-looking face. Heavy, drugged, shadowy eyelids. Grey eyes. Her musing sing-song voice. Needs to dominate men: ‘It was always the same, this joy in power she manifested, peculiarly in power over any male being.’ (p.337)

The book starts with her going out with her partnered with Birkin, who is restless to escape her domination but it takes half the book for him to become free enough to commit to Ursula.

Beldover

The small colliery town in the Midlands where the Brangwen family live. Gudrun, fresh back from living in London, is repelled by its ‘amorphous ugliness’, the high street ‘part shops, part dwelling-houses, utterly formless and sordid,’, ‘the whole sordid gamut of pettiness, the long amorphous, gritty street’, ‘this shapeless, barren ugliness’, ‘the insufferable torture of these ugly, meaningless people, this defaced countryside’. In chapter 9 Lawrence gives a vivid depiction:

This was the world of powerful, underworld men who spent most of their time in the darkness. In their voices she could hear the voluptuous resonance of darkness, the strong, dangerous underworld, mindless, inhuman. They sounded also like strange machines, heavy, oiled. The voluptuousness was like that of machinery, cold and iron.

And the party atmosphere on Friday nights:

It was dark, the market-place was hot with kerosene flares, which threw a ruddy light on the grave faces of the purchasing wives, and on the pale abstract faces of the men. The air was full of the sound of criers and of people talking, thick streams of people moved on the pavements towards the solid crowd of the market. The shops were blazing and packed with women, in the streets were men, mostly men, miners of all ages. Money was spent with almost lavish freedom.

Gudrun perceives Gerald as ‘her escape from the heavy slough of the pale, underworld, automatic colliers.’

Shortlands

Home of the Crich family. ‘It was a long, low old house, a sort of manor farm, that spread along the top of a slope just beyond the narrow little lake of Willey Water. Shortlands looked across a sloping meadow that might be a park, because of the large, solitary trees that stood here and there, across the water of the narrow lake, at the wooded hill that successfully hid the colliery valley beyond, but did not quite hide the rising smoke. Nevertheless, the scene was rural and picturesque, very peaceful…’

‘The panting and rattling of the coal mines could always be heard at Shortlands…’ (p.249) The drive is a mile long. ‘The dark drive that ran between close-cut hedges through sloping meadows’ (p.370).

Willey Water

‘The narrow little lake of Willey Water’, where Diana Crich and her lover drown at the annual water party (Chapter 14).

Based on real people

Publication of ‘Women in Love’ was delayed not only because publishers feared prosecution under the obscenity laws which ‘The Rainbow’ fell foul of, but also because of the threats of libel actions by people who thought they had been included and, generally, mocked in the novel.

1. In the version we read, the young woman Gerald sleeps with in Soho is named Minette. She was originally named ‘the Pussum’. This was because the Lawrence’s friend, Philip Heseltine (who appears as Halliday) had a mistress who was nicknamed the Puma’. Changing her name to Minette, and a payment of £50, staved off a libel case.

(Anthony Burgess’s entertaining biography of Lawrence tells us that Heseltine was very young when he came into Lawrence’s orbit. Under the name Peter Warlock he was to become a noted writer of classical songs. Coincidentally, he died in the same year as Lawrence, 1930.)

2. More important was Lady Ottoline Morrell who was furious that the rather pompous, opinionated and superior character of Hermione Roddice was based on her.

a woman of the new school, full of intellectuality, and heavy, nerve-worn with consciousness. She was passionately interested in reform, her soul was given up to the public cause. But she was a man’s woman, it was the manly world that held her.

Hermione’s country house, Breadalby, is Lady Ottoline’s Oxford house, Garsington Manor, transplanted to Derbyshire. Not only her aloofness and cloying clinging to Birkin, but the scene where she attacks him with a paperweight, intending to kill him… No wonder she threatened to sue.

3. One of her lunch parties features ‘a learned, dry Baronet of fifty, who was always making witticisms and laughing at them heartily in a harsh, horse-laugh’. This is Bertrand Russell.

4. The notion of a quartet of two couples might be based on the attempt by Lawrence and Frieda to live in a joint household in Cornwall with the writers, John Middleton Murray and Katherine Mansfield. Murray is nothing like Gerald but Mansfield does have some similarities with Gudrun, an artist expert at working in miniatures, her loyalty: and also the fact that she was unfaithful to Murray, having an affair with the artist Mark Gertler who was, apparently, partly the basis for Loerke, both being German-Jewish.

5. Thomas Crich, owner and patriarch of the coalmine, is clearly modelled on Thomas Barber of Barber Walker Company in Eastwood, Nottinghamshire, whose mines Lawrence’s father, Arthur, worked in.

Reviews

Anthony Burgess tells us the novel was met with review headlines including ‘A Book The Police Should Ban’ and ‘Loathsome Study of Sex Depravity Leading Youth to Unspeakable Disaster’ (Burgess, page 101). The stupidity, imaginative incapacity, and the obsession with sex in the crudest, most literal sense remain signs of the philistine mind to this day.

The rationale of Lawrence’s travels

At several points Birkin reiterates Lawrence’s own view about ‘settling down’ in a ‘nice little home’, namely that it’s death of the soul.

‘One should avoid this home instinct. It’s not an instinct, it’s a habit of cowardliness. One should never have a home.’ (p.397)

So as soon as the war was over and he was able to leave wretched little England, Lawrence was off!


Credit

‘Women in Love’ by D.H. Lawrence was published in 1921 by Martin Secker. References are to the 1970 reprint of the 1960 Penguin Classics paperback edition.

Related links

Related reviews

Amy Foster by Joseph Conrad (1901)

‘Amy Foster’ is one of Joseph Conrad’s early short stories. It was written in 1901, first published in the Illustrated London News in December 1901, then collected in ‘Typhoon and Other Stories’ (1903). It is 12,334 words long.

The plot

The unnamed first-person narrator returned to England from abroad ‘a good many years ago now’. Soon after he was invited to go and stay with his friend Kennedy, who is a country doctor, living in Colebrook, on the shores of Eastbay in Kent. Kennedy began his career as a surgeon in the Navy before becoming the companion of a famous explorer. He invites the narrator down to stay with him and so the narrator finds himself accompanying the doctor on his rounds.

Amy

In the fifth paragraph they are out riding in the doctor’s gig when they see Amy Foster in her garden, hanging out her washing, ‘her dull face, red, not with a mantling blush, but as if her flat cheeks had been vigorously slapped, and to take in the squat figure, the scanty, dusty brown hair drawn into a tight knot at the back of the head. She looked quite young’ (p.150) and the doctor calls out a friendly greeting to her. Somewhere playing is her little boy, Johnny.

Amy’s biography

He goes on to tell the narrator that Amy is the daughter of one Isaac Foster, who from a small farmer has sunk to be a shepherd. The beginning of his misfortunes dated from his runaway marriage with the cook of his widowed father – ‘a well-to-do, apoplectic grazier, who passionately struck his name off his will, and had been heard to utter threats against his life’ (p.151). The story of her father’s failed marriage anticipates Amy’s own tribulations.

Despite the homely English setting, Conrad almost immediately falls into familiar, hyperbolical and pessimistic ways of thinking, as Kennedy remarks of Amy that you’d think she lacked all imagination:

It’s enough to look at the red hands hanging at the end of those short arms, at those slow, prominent brown eyes, to know the inertness of her mind – an inertness that one would think made it everlastingly safe from all the surprises of imagination. And yet which of us is safe?

This is the moral of ‘Lord Jim’, the nagging fear that none of us live up to our moral values and idealised self images, what Freud would later call the punishing superego. In the same vein, Kennedy continues:

‘There are other tragedies, less scandalous and of a subtler poignancy, arising from irreconcilable differences and from that fear of the Incomprehensible that hangs over all our heads – over all our heads…’

Kennedy now launches into the life story of Amy which makes up the text. At the age of 15 she was put out to service, to the New Barns Farm, tenanted by Mr and Mrs Smith. Mrs Smith was ‘a genteel person with a sharp nose [who] made [Amy] put on a black dress every afternoon. She also owned a grey parrot.

Amy falls in love

Amy lived for four years at the Barns, faithfully serving the Smiths, and never going further than the two mile tramp back to her mother’s house. Then she fell in love, not casually of course, but in a Conradian way, with the maximum of hyperbole.

She fell in love silently, obstinately – perhaps helplessly. It came slowly, but when it came it worked like a powerful spell; it was love as the Ancients understood it: an irresistible and fateful impulse – a possession! Yes, it was in her to become haunted and possessed by a face, by a presence, fatally, as though she had been a pagan worshipper of form under a joyous sky. (p.152)

The immigrant

Who did she fall in love with? Well, thereby hangs the majority of the tale. The man in question is the survivor of a shipwreck, washed up on the Kentish shore, who blunders round the countryside terrifying honest citizens. Because he speaks no English but a harsh East European language, then Kentish country-people think he’s a tramp or even a dangerous madman.

The gift of bread

Until he’s cornered by Mr Smith in one of the outhouses on New Barns Farm. Smith keeps him locked in his wood-lodge while he ponders what to do with him. During this interval Amy shyly offers the scared, exhausted and hungry vagrant some pieces of bread.

‘No wonder that Amy Foster appeared to his eyes with the aureole of an angel of light. The girl had not been able to sleep for thinking of the poor man, and in the morning, before the Smiths were up, she slipped out across the back yard. Holding the door of the wood-lodge ajar, she looked in and extended to him half a loaf of white bread.’ (p.163)

This gesture of compassion and acceptance goes right through the vagrant, staying with him, and is the basis for their eventual relationship and marriage.

The immigrant is taken in by Old Mrs Swaffer

Smith arranges for the vagrant to be taken in by his nearest neighbour, old Mr. Swaffer. Here he is washed and dressed and put to work. In exchange for board and keep, he is employed in the fields and proves a solid worker even if no one can understand a word he says and his progress in English is very slow. Kennedy remarks on his handsomeness:

He was very good-looking, and most graceful in his bearing, with that something wild as of a woodland creature in his aspect.

The immigrant is named Yanko Goorall

And around about this time the community gets to learn his name. It is Yanko, which means ‘little John’, Goorall (p.169).

Yanko saves Swaffer’s grand-daughter

In a crucial event, Yanko looks up from his work in a field and notices that Swaffer’s toddler grand-daughter has fallen into a local horse pond, drops everything, runs over and saves her life (p.167). As you can imagine Swaffer and the entire community upgrade their opinion of him. Swaffer now gives him a regular wage, which the vagrant uses to go to the local pub where he tries to get people interested in the exotic folk songs of his native land. Slowly he learns to speak halting English.

The immigrant’s story

In one of those stories within a story, Kennedy now tells the narrator what he pieced together of Yanko’s story. Yanko was a mountaineer of the eastern range of the Carpathians, brought up in an East European country by his devout peasant parents. He was recruited by an agency which offered young men and women a new life in America. And so he is transported by train (which he finds novel and bewildering) then put up overnight in a tenement house in Berlin, before travelling again by train to the north German coast, at Hamburg.

Then they were loaded aboard a ship, which Kennedy later found out was the Hamburg emigrant-ship Herzogin Sophia-Dorothea, and set off through the Baltic. Kennedy picks up the story when he says he saw the ship anchor off the Kent coast. That night is dark and stormy and in the middle of it another steamer sought shelter in the bay and rammed the emigrant ship, splitting it in half so that it quickly went down with all hands, drowning hundreds of emigrant men, women and children. Yanko alone survived and swam to shore, emerging half dressed, covered in mud and weed, and traumatised. (Over the coming days hundreds of the drowned corpses would wash up ashore and be taken on stretchers to be laid out in a row under the north wall of the Brenzett Church.)

Anyway, it was in this state that he washed up, stumbled about the countryside terrifying everyone till Mr Smith of New Barns managed to lock him in his wood-lodge, where Amy fed him.

Yanko’s marriage proposal

All through the weeks and months as he works for Old Swaffham, Yanko retains the impression of compassion from when Amy gave him his first piece of bread and moonily worships her from afar. Eventually he asks Old Swaffer to intercede with her father (Foster) for her hand.

Foster thinks it’s as good an offer as he’s ever liable to get for his simple daughter and accepts. Old Swaffer makes over a cottage to the couple as reward for saving his grand-daughter.

Marriage and child

And so the couple get married and she bears him a son. But then the tone of the story markedly changes. Quite abruptly Conrad has Dr Kennedy tell the narrator that the village began to hear rumours of discord. Slowly it leaks out that Amy dislikes Yanko talking his language to the baby and reciting the Lord’s Prayer to it, as his father had to him (p.172).

Yanko gets tuberculosis

The reader wonders where this marital discord theme will go when Conrad bottles out with one of the easiest ends to a story like this – he dies. To take it a bit more slowly, Yanko comes down with tuberculosis and lies in a bed in the downstairs room, tended by Amy (p.173). But she is no longer the angel of simple-minded compassion who gave him the bread, but worn down by nerves and anxiety.

The night of terror

Indeed she feels a growing fear which, in classic Conrad style, in the course of just one night, turns into an unreasoning terror. So that when, in his fever, Yanko begs her for water, she’s too genuinely terrified to give him any, but she snatches up the baby, paralysed with fear.

She sat with the table between her and the couch, watching every movement and every sound, with the terror, the unreasonable terror, of that man she could not understand creeping over her. She had drawn the wicker cradle close to her feet. There was nothing in her now but the maternal instinct and that unaccountable fear. (p.174)

In his fever Yanko shouts at her in his guttural language then staggers up out of his bed – at which point terrified Amy seizes the baby, runs out the door and doesn’t stop running till she arrives at her parents’ house.

Yanko dies

Next morning Kennedy finds him lying face downwards outside the house with the door open. He had obviously staggered a few paces after his fleeing wife then collapsed. He’s not quite dead so Kennedy and his servant carry him inside where, exhausted by the fever, he does finally expire. Or, as Conrad puts it:

The fever had left him, taking with it the heat of life. And with his panting breast and lustrous eyes he reminded me again of a wild creature under the net; of a bird caught in a snare. She had left him. She had left him – sick – helpless – thirsty. The spear of the hunter had entered his very soul. ‘Why?’ he cried… (p.175)

And died. Dr Kennedy wrote heart failure caused by fever on his death certificate.

Puzzlement

The story ends with the very Conradian tone of puzzlement as Dr Kennedy wonders how much red-faced peasant woman Amy every thinks about the one great love of her life, the man who was her true love but then became her terror.

‘Is his image as utterly gone from her mind as his lithe and striding figure, his carolling voice are gone from our fields?… It is impossible to say whether this name recalls anything to her. Does she ever think of the past?’

And the very last phrase in the entire story luxuriates in the characteristically Conradian sense of futility and despair:

‘I have seen her hanging over the boy’s cot in a very passion of maternal tenderness. The little fellow was lying on his back, a little frightened at me, but very still, with his big black eyes, with his fluttered air of a bird in a snare. And looking at him I seemed to see again the other one – the father, cast out mysteriously by the sea to perish in the supreme disaster of loneliness and despair.’

Yes Joseph, truly we are all birds snared in the traps of our tragic lives etc.

People smuggling

Critics are always claiming that this or that author or artist was ‘prophetic’ or ‘anticipated’ or ‘predicted’ issues which are still with us but this, in my view, is a profound misunderstanding about society and history. These people didn’t set out to prophecy anything. Instead they are describing issues which were problems in their own day (the only day they knew) and if they appear to us, looking back, to have ‘anticipated’ some of our modern social or political problems, it is, in fact, because we have failed so solve them.

Thus one aspect of the tale is Conrad’s surprising revelation about unscrupulous people smugglers operating in eastern Europe in the 1880s.

‘A few months later we could read in the papers the accounts of the bogus “Emigration Agencies” among the Sclavonian peasantry in the more remote provinces of Austria. The object of these scoundrels was to get hold of the poor ignorant people’s homesteads, and they were in league with the local usurers. They exported their victims through Hamburg mostly.’

One hundred and forty years later the issue is still with us, and has become one of the defining political issues of our time. Conrad didn’t predict anything, he was just reporting a theme of his own time. It is not his fault or to his credit, that the same issue remains a hot button issue 140 years later. All that indicates is our complete failure as a society and international community, to solve it.

Other cast members

No matter how simple the basic plot of a Conrad story, and no matter how much it is focused on a central protagonist, they are always surprisingly densely populated with numerous secondary and tertiary characters. I think this is for two reasons: 1) it damps down the hyperbolic hysteria Conrad is so prone to whereby his protagonist ends up taking on the powers of the universe or representing the futility of human existence. Including a number of other people who are going about their normal business, pushing prams or shopping or chatting down the pub helps ground Conrad’s stories and make them more plausible. 2) But having adopted this approach of numerous extra characters, Conrad is often very sly in making them, their behaviour or their stories compare and contrast with the central narrative, so they are not utterly random, but often part of a carefully wrought pattern.

Miss Swaffer, who keeps house frugally for her father, ‘a broad-shouldered, big-boned woman of forty-five, with the pocket of her dress full of keys, and a grey, steady eye… She dressed severely in black, in memory of one of the innumerable Bradleys of the neighbourhood, to whom she had been engaged some twenty-five years ago, young farmer who broke his neck out hunting on the eve of the wedding day’ (p.166). She is almost completely deaf.

So Miss Swaffham’s story –a tragic love affair leading to her being on her own, is very directly comparable with Amy’s case.

The young ladies from the Rectory who come to visit snooty Miss Swaffer. One of them is reading Goethe with the help of a dictionary and the other ‘had struggled with Dante for years’ (p.164). Their bourgeois education and ambition contrast starkly with Amy’s uneducated simplicity.

In the hours after Yanko is washed up he manages to terrify a range of locals including:

  • Hammond, owner of the pig-pound where Yanko takes shelter after staggering up out of the sea.
  • The Brenzett carrier who takes him for a tramp sleeping under a hedge.
  • The schoolmistress who goes out to remonstrate with the vagabond when he scares her children.
  • The driver of Mr Bradley’s milk-cart who lashes out at Yanko with his whip.
  • Three boys who later admitted to throwing stones at him.
  • Mrs Finn, the wife of Smith’s waggoner, out walking with her baby in a perambulator; outraged by the approach of this muddy phantom she hits him with her umbrella and runs away.
  • Old Lewis hammering away at rocks, who Mrs Finn gets to join her watching the vagabond flee across the fields.

Then there’s the two brothers, who went down to look after their cobble hauled up on the beach, found, a good way from Brenzett, a hencoop from the wrecked ship lying high and dry on the shore, with eleven drowned ducks inside, which they took home to their family and ate.

You can see how all these sometimes comic types help to ground the story, while creating the sense of a wider community that his central protagonists operate in.

Swaffer’s younger daughter, married to Willcox, a solicitor and the Town Clerk of Colebrook. It is her 3-year-old daughter, Bertha, who fell into the horsepond and Yanko saved (p.167).

In the tap-room of the Coach and Horses:

  • Preble, the lame wheelwright
  • Vincent, the fat blacksmith
  • the strange carter who can’t be doing with Yanko performing some weird dance and takes his half-pint outside
  • the landlord who tells Yanko he doesn’t want no ‘acrobatic tricks in the tap-room’ (p.169)

Mystery

Conrad’s fiction is based on the premise that everyone is a mystery to everyone else: Kurtz is a mystery, Jim is a mystery, Falk is a mystery to the puzzled narrators of their stories. And so is the unnamed emigrant, sole survivor of a tragedy at sea, who’s washed up on their shore. The first time Kennedy sees him is described in a phrase which could have come from the stories of Kurz or Jim:

‘It was there that I saw him first…’

Portentous words which inaugurate the long puzzle, the investigation and piecing together which we are familiar with from so many Conrad stories.

It’s in this spirit that, even as he tells her story, Kennedy admits to the narrator that Amy is a mystery to him (just as Kurz and Jim remain, to the bitter end, mysteries to Marlow).

‘How this aptitude came to her, what it did feed upon, is an inscrutable mystery…’

She lives for 4 years at New Barns with the Smith family, never went further than back to her parents’ house. Then she fell in love, which, in Conrad’s hands, is a diabolical business:

‘It came slowly, but when it came it worked like a powerful spell; it was love as the Ancients understood it: an irresistible and fateful impulse – a possession! Yes, it was in her to become haunted and possessed by a face, by a presence, fatally, as though she had been a pagan worshipper of form under a joyous sky – and to be awakened at last from that mysterious forgetfulness of self, from that enchantment, from that transport, by a fear resembling the unaccountable terror of a brute…’

Conradian hyperbole

Conrad can’t help himself from adopting a hyperbolic or cosmic tone, readily resorting to talk about terror, horror, fear or idiot imbecility, or invoking the mighty powers which govern the world and even the universe, at the drop of a hat.

Hyperbole

Conrad’s mind always leaps to extremes. Pondering Yanko’s complete alienation from the people who take him in, Kennedy remarks:

Conceive you the kind of an existence overshadowed, oppressed, by the everyday material appearances, as if by the visions of a nightmare. (p.166)

Dr Kennedy and the narrator are pottering along in his cart and they see some labourers walking home from a day’s work. You can imagine how, in many Edwardian authors, this might prompt nice thoughts of home, hearths, fires, wives and good meals, but not for Conrad. Everything is cranked up to an Edgar Allen Poe level of shrillness:

‘One would think the earth is under a curse, since of all her children these that cling to her the closest are uncouth in body and as leaden of gait as if their very hearts were loaded with chains…’ (p.153)

Later, when Smith first sees the shipwrecked man:

Smith, alone amongst his stacks with this apparition, in the stormy twilight ringing with the infuriated barking of the dog, felt the dread of an inexplicable strangeness.

At the drop of the smallest hat everything in Conrad becomes about lunatic, inexplicable strangeness, weirdness, insanity, rage, despair, horror and agony.

Conrad’s cosmic similes

The Doctor came to the window and looked out at the frigid splendour of the sea, immense in the haze, as if enclosing all the earth with all the hearts lost among the passions of love and fear. (p.172)

And then there is Conrad’s frequent tendency to go cosmic, to invoke the entire universe in his metaphors and comparisons, to such an extent that, to my mind at any rate, he sometimes steps into science fiction territory.

It was as if these had been the faces of people from the other world…

He was different: innocent of heart, and full of good will, which nobody wanted, this castaway, that, like a man transplanted into another planet, was separated by an immense space from his past and by an immense ignorance from his future. (p.168)

But this is not to say this is bad. On the contrary, Conrad has a brazen boldness about talking about life, the universe and everything which his stiff-upper-lipped British contemporaries mostly lacked, and which helps to give all his stories their sense of symbolic depth and resonance, so unusual in English literature.

The hyperbole as it were sets a tone, allows the stories to contain greater allegorical or symbolic force than their straitlaced English contemporaries. Thus it is that, among numerous other themes and images, the story recurs to the image of humans as birds caught in traps.

1) When Dr Kennedy is called in by Smith to examine the vagabond who he’s just locked up in his wood-lodge, Kennedy observes ‘his glittering, restless black eyes reminded me of a wild bird caught in a snare’.

2) Years later when Kennedy is called in to treat Yanko in his final fever, he observes that, ‘with his panting breast and lustrous eyes he reminded me again of a wild creature under the net; of a bird caught in a snare’.

3) A preparation of images which make it all the more haunting and effective when, at the very end of the story, Kennedy leans over the cot of Yanko and Amy’s baby son and observes ‘The little fellow was lying on his back, a little frightened at me, but very still, with his big black eyes, with his fluttered air of a bird in a snare’. (p.175)

The narrator as jigsaw solver

The Conradian storyteller is always a detective, a man who pieces together his narrative from fragments told him by their parties or the protagonist himself, which always require pondering, assessing and carefully stitching together.

‘I have been telling you more or less in my own words what I learned fragmentarily in the course of two or three years, during which I seldom missed an opportunity of a friendly chat with him.’

‘Perhaps it was just that outlandishness of the man which influenced Old Swaffer. Perhaps it was only an inexplicable caprice. All I know is that at the end of three weeks I caught sight of Smith’s lunatic digging in Swaffer’s kitchen garden.’

This is acknowledged at the start of the story, where the narrator tells us that:

‘His papers on the fauna and flora made him known to scientific societies. And now he had come to a country practice – from choice. The penetrating power of his mind, acting like a corrosive fluid, had destroyed his ambition, I fancy. His intelligence is of a scientific order, of an investigating habit, and of that unappeasable curiosity which believes that there is a particle of a general truth in every mystery.’

He is, then, an investigator and puzzle solver by disposition.

The language barrier

‘He could talk to no one, and had no hope of ever understanding anybody. It was as if these had been the faces of people from the other world – dead people – he used to tell me years afterwards.’ (p.166)

Figures at the heart of Conrad stories often, like their author, suffer from a language barrier. Yanko is, among other things, an extreme example of the difficulties with language which so many Conrad protagonists suffer.

‘A sudden burst of rapid, senseless speech persuaded him at once that he had to do with an escaped lunatic. In fact, that impression never wore off completely. Smith has not in his heart given up his secret conviction of the man’s essential insanity to this very day.’

With the profoundly alienating effect that:

‘All these faces that were as closed, as mysterious, and as mute as the faces of the dead who are possessed of a knowledge beyond the comprehension of the living…’

Even when he slowly painfully acquires some grasp of English, it is always marked by his alien origins:

‘He told me this story of his adventure with many flashes of white teeth and lively glances of black eyes, at first in a sort of anxious baby-talk, then, as he acquired the language, with great fluency, but always with that singing, soft, and at the same time vibrating intonation that instilled a strangely penetrating power into the sound of the most familiar English words, as if they had been the words of an unearthly language.’

With the result that:

His foreignness had a peculiar and indelible stamp. (p.168)

Impossible not to read into this the experience of Conrad the exile, the immigrant who obtained a stunning fluency in English but always with an alien flavour.

Thoughts

‘Amy Foster’ is, at first, a convincingly gritty portrait of rural life into which the powerful figure of Yanko stumbles… and yet, by the end, in fact at the very end, it feels forced.

The initial slow sections about Amy’s character are the eclipsed by the colourful piecing together of the account of the man washed ashore, and there is a slow logic to the love between Yanko and Amy, as the doctor tells it… but right at the end the tempo completely changes and the speed with which Conrad has the couple fall out and argue, and then the sudden note of horror which grips her on the night of the storm, all this feels too rushed. Conrad devotes barely a page to describing how Amy is transformed from doting lover to feeling anxious about, then scared of, then terrified by, her husband. It feels forced and rushed.

Notes

Originally Conrad toyed with calling the story ‘The Castaway’ or ‘A Husband’. It’s interesting how he gravitated away from focusing on the handsome mysterious immigrant and came to realise that the story would have more power if told for its impact on the simple, monosyllabic peasant girl.

No specific location has been identified for the story. It’s somewhere on the Kent-Sussex border. The fictional town of Brenzett is based on Dymchurch.

Yanko is a transliteration of the Polish Janko. Goorall corresponds to Góral, the Polish word for ‘highlander’.


Credit

Conrad wrote ‘Amy Foster’ in 1901. It was first published in the Illustrated London News (December 1901) and collected in Typhoon and Other Stories (1903). Page references are to the Oxford World’s Classics paperback edition of ‘Typhoon and Other Stories’, 2008 revised edition.

Related links

Conrad reviews

The Father by August Strindberg (1887)

NURSE: Why do two people have to torture each other to death?

In the English-speaking world August Strindberg (1849 to 1912) is famous for a handful of plays characterised by intense plots and hysterical characters. But in the introduction to the Oxford World’s Classics edition of ‘Miss Julie and Other Plays’, translator Michael Robinson is at pains to point out that this handful of dramas is just a fraction of the output which makes Strindberg such a major literary figure in his native Sweden.

For a start Strindberg wrote what is widely considered the first modern Swedish novel, ‘The Red Room’ (1879) but he also wrote weighty histories, short stories, poems, essays, scientific studies, sociology, books on occultism and more. At some points he dropped writing altogether and devoted himself to painting, creating at least 117 accredited works which push beyond Victorian realism into an early Expressionism, especially his depictions of stormy seascapes.

Back to the plays, Strindberg wrote more than 60 and in a wide variety of styles or genres, starting with plays about Swedish history and moving onto naturalistic tragedy, monodrama and then, in his later pieces, experimental pieces which anticipate expressionist and surrealist techniques.

The Father

Act 1

This is a play about a very unhappy marriage. Adolf is a middle-aged captain in the cavalry. He lives at home but still has authority over a company of soldiers. Twenty years ago he married Laura, the sister of the parson who he enjoys chatting to. But Adolf and Laura are at daggers drawn. They have been married for 20 years and the marriage has degenerated into outright hatred.

The Captain is extremely rude, brusque and controlling towards her, controlling her movements, monitoring every penny she spends. Slowly it emerges the enmity is rooted in a religious divide. Laura, her mother and the Captain’s old maid, Margret, are all devout Christians. The Captain, on the other hand, is a freethinking atheist. More than that he’s a would-be scientist. He is undertaking serious research into the mineralogy of meteorites using a spectroscope. Typically, his wife misinterprets this as a mad claim that he can see life on other planets through a microscope.

Thus, in conversation with the pastor, the Captain gives vent to venomously misogynist sentiments, claiming it’s like living in a cage full of tigers and:

CAPTAIN: It’s man against woman, all day long, without end… (p.8)

What’s brought the situation to a head is the couple’s furious argument about what to do with their daughter, Bertha, aged 17. Laura wants her to stay in the household, subject to the Christian influence of her, her mother and maid. There’s also talk of indulging Bertha’s alleged talent at painting.

The Captain, on the contrary, wants to get his daughter out of this snakepit of superstition, away from ‘a bunch of ignorant and superstitious women’, to send her to lodge with an atheist lawyer in town, and to have her trained as a schoolteacher.

When a new young doctor arrives, Dr Östermark. Laura has engineered his arrival, having forced the old doctor to retire. Now she makes sure to meet him first and brief him about her husband’s ‘madness’ but the doctor in facts acts as a kind of chorus and intermediary. He hears both sides giving their versions of the story. For example he listens to the Captain complaining that his scientific researches are being hampered because the booksellers he’s sent off to for books he needs haven’t replied. Later the doctor finds out from Laura that she has been intercepting the Captain’s mail and destroying these very letters. So when the captain calls Laura his ‘enemy’ it’s not far from the truth. There really is a war between them.

In a big argument the captain, in his rigid legalistic way, insists that a father has complete and utter control over his child, to which Laura malevolently replies, well, what it Bertha isn’t your child, if I was unfaithful? Then all the captain’s high and mighty legal rights evaporate.

Act 2

He’s so infuriated he goes out for an extended sleigh ride. This gives Laura an evening with the new doctor to turn him against her husband. She tells the doctor it was the captain’s paranoid notion that Bertha isn’t really his own child. She tells him the captain has a track record of worrying about his sanity going back years, and the doctor is taken in by all this and takes her side.

When he still doesn’t return, Laura sets the maid Margret to sit up for him and she’s joined by Bertha who can’t sleep. She asks if it’s true that her father is ill and the maid confirms it, ill in the head. Of course the captain isn’t mentally ill he’s just a strict angry man, but the play shows us all the women in his household ganging up on him.

Margret packs Bertha off to bed and the captain returns from his ride. He goes straight to his photography album to look at photos of him and Bertha. He asks Margret if they look related, him and Berth, and questions the maid about the father of her child. Clearly he’s rattled by Laura’s suggestion that Bertha isn’t his daughter.

The doctor had stayed on to wait for the captain’s return and now they have an intense discussion about the nature of paternity. The captain talks about studies into crossbreeding horses and zebras. The doctor quotes Goethe who apparently said that every man must take the paternity of his children on trust to which the captain immediately responds:

CAPTAIN: Trust? Where a woman’s concerned? That’s risky. (p.30)

And then speechifies about the absurdity of paternity, asking the doctor if the very idea of a father walking along the street hand in hand with his children isn’t somehow absurd. He tells two stories about women he’s met who’s turned out to be immoral and seducible.

CAPTAIN: That’s the danger, you see, their instinct for villainy is quite unconscious. (p.31)

The introduction had mentioned Strindberg’s reputation for misogyny but it’s something else to be subjected to a play, and a character, so devoted to expressing an endless list of accusations against woman.

Anyway the scene with the doctor ends oddly, with an unnatural angularity to it. In fact it’s symptomatic of the way the relations between all the characters are oddly unrelaxed, feel like the speeches of puppets.

DOCTOR: Good night, then, Captain. I’m afraid. I can be of no further use in this case.
CAPTAIN: Are we enemies?
DOCTOR: Far from it. It’s just a pity we can’t be friends. Good night. (p.32)

The doctor exists and the captain goes over to the door and calls Laura in, for he realises she was listening just outside. He tells her he’s been to the post office and discovered that she’s been tampering with his outgoing and incoming mail, and also understands she’s been embarked on a campaign to persuade everyone he’s mad. As I say, the dialogue has a kind of programmatic, schematic aspect to it:

CAPTAIN: I won’t appeal to your feelings, for you don’t have any, that’s your strength. I do, however, appeal to your self-interest.

The scene gets odder for the captain lays out the possibility that all her scheming will actually drive him mad. But she must consider. If he goes mad he will lose his position in the army, then where will she be? If he goes mad he might commit suicide in which case she’ll lose his life insurance.

LAURA: Is this a trap?
CAPTAIN. Of course. It’s up to you whether you walk round it or stick your head in it.

The captain proposes an armistice. His terms are that she frees him from his doubts about Bertha’s parentage: is he the father? And. characteristically, Laura doesn’t respond at all like a real person would, but instead enters into the elaborate fencing, the strategising, as if in a game of chess, about which response suits her aims best.

The captain starts to rant. He compares himself to a slave who has slaved away and ruined his health and all for someone else’s child. He’s served 17 years hard labour in this cruel servitude. He works himself into such a state that he starts crying. He describes himself as a child in his helplessness before her scheming. And Laura walks over and strokes the hair of her poor man-baby and he goes into a kind of trance of remembrance, remembering how, when they married, he was a big tough officer on the parade ground but at home completely capitulated to her will ‘as to a higher, more gifted being’ (p.36).

Laura joins the reverie, describing how she felt like the mother of her man-baby but going on to explain how revolted she felt after sex because the pure mother had degraded herself to become the mistress – Ugh! So he tried to regain her by asserting his masculinity. But, Laura points out, that was his mistake. Again it all has the schematicness of a PowerPoint presentation.

LAURA: Yes but that was your mistake. The mother was your friend, you see, but the woman was your enemy; love between the sexes is a battle. Don’t go thinking I gave myself; I didn’t give, I took – what I wanted. (p.37)

Yes, the captain admits she had total power over him, could bend him to her will, could persuade him that a potato was a peach. But he awoke to his shame and sought to reassert his identity through some great act. But there was no war so it couldn’t be a military exploit. And that’s why he turned to science, hoping to make his name with his discoveries. And that is why her cutting off his letters to the booksellers is such a crime against the core of who he wants to be.

He bluntly asks her, Do you hate me? and she replies yes, when he ‘acts the man’, to which he gives another drastically misogynist reply:

CAPTAIN: It’s like racial hatred. If we really are descended from the apes, at least it must have been from two different species. (p.38)

It is a life or death struggle. At which Laura plays her trump card. She has an incriminating letter a copy of which has been sent to the court. She is going to use it to have him committed. What letter? he says. The one he wrote to the old doctor in which he discussed his fears for his own sanity. And now that he has served his function, he can be dispensed with, he’s no longer needed, as she exits through the door and the enraged captain throws the lighted lantern after her.

Act 3

Act 3 opens in the same living room, that evening. The door out of the room is jammed shit with a door wedged against it. Laura and the nurse are rummaging through the captain’s things. They both refer to the noise of pacing, banging, and then sawing, which they can hear from the room overhead. The implication is that the captain has retreated to (or been locked in?) his room.

The pastor arrives and we witness Laura lying to him as she has lied throughout the play, claiming the captain threw a lighted lamp ‘in her face’ whereas we saw with our own eyes him merely throwing it at the door she was closing after her. Violent, but not as precisely cruelly violent as she describes.

Obviously appalled, the pastor asks what she’s doing and she explains she’s informing all and sundry that the captain’s had a breakdown into madness, starting with his commanding officer in the cavalry. the doctor has sent to the local hospital for a straitjacket.

But remember the pastor is the captain’s friend. More importantly, he’s Laura’s brother and knows what a spoilt, cunning, scheming person she’s been since a girl. Now he directly accuses her of manipulating the situation so she can get her husband committed, take charge of the family money and have Bertha raised the way she wants. He calls her marvellously strong-willed and completely untroubled by a conscience but she gives as good as she gets, demanding, ‘Prove it!’ and of course he can’t.

Enter the new doctor who promptly says a) an assault has been carried out and so it’s entirely Laura’s decision, how she wants to proceed, which will decide whether her husband is sent to prison or an asylum. Under the pastor’s beady gaze she hesitates to condemn the captain so the doctor takes the initiative and says the asylum will be best; even a prison sentence will end and the man would be released to present a renewed threat. From the asylum he will never be released.

The doctor has brought a straitjacket with him and shows Laura, the nurse and pastor how to put it on a patient and buckle it to a chair or sofa. Question is, which one of them will jump the captain from behind and quickly wrap it round him? They all demur at which point very conveniently enters the common soldier Nöjd who’s arrived with a message from the colonel. The doctor is in the middle of asking him to straitjacket the captain when the nurse intervenes. She can’t bear some rough soldier to do it so she’ll do it.

At which moment, with the precision of a well-oiled watch, there’s a knock at the internal door and the captain himself enters.

The captain

He isn’t obviously violent. The reverse, he’s in a very bookish mood. He’s brought a load of books with him to prove his point about the fragility of fatherhood and quotes from the Odyssey and the Bible to the effect that a man can never be totally sure that his children are his own.

The captain goes on a ranting monologue that may well indicate he’s mad. He asks the pastor and the doctor if they’re confident their children are indeed their own and reminds them of a music tutor and lodger, respectively, who their wives might have taken a fancy too, and claims he sees them both going pale, and mockingly says he can see the cuckold’s horns growing on their heads.

When he goes on to say that the one big hope he had to be a scientist has been stolen from him and so his life is now empty and meaningless, I realised he is like Hamlet, and with that realisation wondered if the entire play is a sort of ‘modern’ domestic version of Hamlet, not least in its obsession with ‘true’ fathers. His monologue ends with abandonment:

CAPTAIN: Do what you will with me! I no longer exist! (p.47)

Then doctor and the parson sneak out, solely to allow Bertha to enter and for their to be a twisted father-and-daughter scene. This starts off sensible with him saying he doesn’t care about throwing the lamp at her mother but it descends into what sounds like genuine mania when he rants that she has two souls but must only have one, she must love him with all her soul, she must become one with her.

And deepens when he says he is a cannibal and wants to eat her, compares himself to Saturn who ate his own children. He then makes the Hamlet connection explicit by paraphrasing Shakespeare:

CAPTAIN: To eat or be eaten! That is the question. (p.48)

At which point the captain goes over to a wall with guns on it and takes down a pistol. he quickly discovers the women have removed all the bullets from it. At this moment the nurse enters and leads him like a child away from the wall and sits him in a chair. Then she gets the straitjacket.

She now recites memories from his boyhood, reminding him of the time they had to coax him into handing over a kitchen knife he’d got hold of (and she removes the gun from his grasp) and then how they had to coax him into his shirt by pretending it was made of gold – and while she weaves a spell of memories the captain, as in a trance, allows her to put him into the straitjacket.

Moments later he snaps out of it but it is too late, he is bound and straitened and cannot escape. When he asks why, the nurse replies to stop him killing his child to which he replies – genuinely bonkers now – why not kill her, at least that way she would go to heaven.

At his point Nöjd re-enters. The captain orders him to attack the nurse and free him, but Nöjd can’t, making the sexist point that a man just can’t attack a woman, ‘it’s in a man’s blood, like religion’ (p.50)

Laura enters. Am I your enemy? she asks. You’re all my enemy, the captain replies, every woman he’s ever known: his mother who didn’t want to bear him; his sister who bulled him; the first woman he slept with who gave him venereal disease; his daughter who chose her mother over him; and now her, his wife – all enemies. The captain is given a little rant about how modern love has gone to the dogs.

CAPTAIN: In the old days a man married a wife; now he forms a business partner with a career woman or moves in with a friend. – And then he seduces the partner or rapes the friend. Whatever happened to lovely, healthy sensual love? It died somewhere along the way…(p.51)

As you know, I despise all expressions by any author of the idea that the world is going to the dogs, that the world is, specially and uniquely in their time, going to hell, all morals lost, all values abandoned, modern life bankrupt yadda yadda yadda. All authors since the start of writing have expressed the same whining sentiment. All it does is convey an epic failure of imagination, a complete lack of historical awareness.

But Adolf goes beyond this to express a range of physical hallucinations. these may or may not be true of modern mental illness but they reminded me of the clichés of madness which are used in Elizabethan plays. He says he is trying to fight with shadows. He says his thoughts dissolve into thin air. He says his mind is catching fire and next second says he is cold, so terrible cold.

Laura strokes his hair while the madman remembers how they walked in spring woodlands amid flowers when they first courted. Now everything is lost. Who rules our lives? God, the pious Laura replies. He asks the nurse to lay his tunic over him (he’s lying on the sofa in a straitjacket).

He identifies with Hercules who was wrapped in a poisonous shirt by his deceitful wife. He tries to sit up to spit at the women but collapses back. He asks to lay his head on her breast. When she asks if he’d like to see his child he says he has no child, men can have no children, only women can have children which is why the future belongs to them, and he starts to pray like a child before falling backwards with a cry.

In the short last scene Laura calls in the pastor and the doctor to stand over the captain’s body. The doctor says Adolf has had a heart attack. He’s not dead but he may or may not regain consciousness. The nurse claims he was praying to God when it happened which makes the pastor perk up. The last incident in the play is cute and slick, ending it with a bit of pat symbolism like the punchline of a joke. Bertha comes running onstage:

BERTHA: [enters from the left, runs to her mother] Mother, mother!
LAURA: My child! My own child!
PASTOR: Amen.

The End.

Questions

So what just happened? Was the captain genuinely mentally unstable? Was the letter he wrote to the old doctor actually accurate? Was Laura not inventing any of it? Although we saw her explicitly lie, were her lies based on a true perception of the case?

And was he tipped over the edge, as he appeared to say at the end of Act 3, purely by the doubt Laura raised in his mind about his paternity of Bertha? She described it as a strategy of war, so was it just that one thing, the planting of the seed of doubt, which won the war for Laura?

So was the sustained misogyny of the captain’s attitude a reflection of the author’s own beliefs or, on the contrary, was the whole point that they were the hysterical rantings of an already damaged mind? Was there a conspiracy against him? Or was that the typical paranoid delusions of the mentally ill?

Michael Robinson’s introduction

Robinson is a leading Strindberg scholar having, among other achievements, edited a selected letters and selected essay, and it shows. His introduction and notes are extremely focused, erudite and illuminating. It’s worth buying this edition for the clarity and range of his analysis. From his introduction to ‘The Father’ I took the following points:

Not naturalist Although naturalist in appearance, ‘The Father’ lacks what naturalism meant for Zola or Ibsen. Zola’s method required the detailed description of the characters’ heredity and environment, the studied accumulation of biographical facts about each character which supported Zola and his school’s claims to be replacing fictional flummery with scientific objectivity.

Not Ibsen Nor does this play have much in common with Ibsen, whose plays are characterised by 1) immensely detailed description of the stage set and props, and 2) more importantly, the way a present crisis leads to a series of dramatic revelations about the past.

Present battle Instead ‘The Father’ takes place in a basic set and the past is barely referred to (except to say Laura was a stroppy child and Adolf had a difficult childhood). No, the focus is on something else, on the conflict entirely in the present, of ‘two implacable hostile minds’, bound to each other by desire and hatred. And a conflict which represents the deepest primal conflict, that between the two sexes of Homo sapiens:

LAURA: Love between the sexes is a battle… (p.37)

Indeed, on the question of the characters being epitomes or types, representatives of the two sexes, Robinson quotes from a letter Zola wrote to Strindberg explaining that it was precisely this schematic nature of ‘The Father’ which displeased him.

Soul murder In a review of Ibsen’s Romersholm, Strindberg talked about själamord meaning ‘soul murder’, describing the kind of half-conscious struggle to subjugate and defeat the other, within a destructive relationship. This is exactly what ‘The Father’ is, a battle to the death between Laura and Adolf, which requires none of the sociological detail of Zola or the revelations from the past of an Ibsen. It’s a straight fight taking place in the present.

Contemporary psychology This explains why Strindberg was a great reader of the up-to-the-minute psychology of his day, devouring books by English and French psychiatrists. These (especially the work of Jean-Martin Charcot in hypnosis which was to so influence Freud) reinforced Strindberg’s sense of the suggestibility of the human mind (a strange form of auto-hypnosis occurs at the end of his next play, ‘Miss Julie’). And it is this power we have over each other, the psychological effects we have on each other, and the way this power can be used to devastating effect, which ‘The Father’ dramatises.

Laura doesn’t just win the battle of the sexes, she wins it so comprehensively that she persuades the captain that he no longer exists (p.47).

Comments

Mad farrago, isn’t it? Now, in 2024, we are more sensitive than ever before to all aspects of misogynist and women-hating attitudes, with the result that this entire play feels off-the-scale misogynist, beyond the pale in its toxicity. Even the ‘modern’ introduction is written by a man and dates from 1998, a generation before #metoo. Imagine the articles and papers which must have been written about Strindberg by countless feminist academics over the past 30 years…

I suppose there are two or three reasons to be interested in it. 1) One is the simple historical one of understanding the impact Strindberg had at the time and in the generations of playwrights following him. the history of European drama. All I know is what’s in the introduction to this volume which I’ve summarised above.

2) The translator Michael Robinson, describes it as a relatively ‘realistic play’ but it isn’t, is it? The fencing between Adolf and Laura is entirely artificial. In the combination of precise logic and brutal gender enmity it reminded me of (what I remember of) the tragedies of Jean Racine (1639 to 1699), the logical, almost robotic statement of strategies of hatred and power coolly and calmly discussed between opponents who want to destroy each other. For me it all has a kind of weird, metallic flavour.

3) The extremity of the characters’ hatred leads to dialogue which reads like the purest melodrama. Half the dialogue given to the old maid seems designed solely to promote the claustrophobic atmosphere of doom and disaster:

  • Lord preserve us, whatever will be the end of this!
  • Oh, God have mercy on us all! Where will this end!

Lots of punctuation marks!

4) The child imagery. The play is saturated with it. The old nursemaid remembers caring for Adolf as a child. Laura and the captain remember the early days of their relationship when he was a child in her hands. At various moments when he’s angry with either of them, the captain insists he is not a child but, as has already been established, he has been and maybe in his core still is, a kind of helpless child. the extensive use of child-mother-father-parent imagery creates a complex web of dynamics and tensions, but the central one appears to be that the play’s title is deeply ironic. In many ways, the supposedly dominant, powerful Father turns out to be the most helpless and outwitted character of all.

But of course, this entire idea can easily be interpreted as a form of self-pitying male misogyny.

5) But most of all, I am sick to death of literature about the sex wars. As a man in 2024, I am sick beyond words at the saturation coverage of gender issues everywhere I look: in the art exhibitions I go to, in plays and movies, in documentaries, in TV shows, on the radio, on social media, in all newspapers and magazines, in the coverage of the US presidential election, in the coverage of the Olympics or any sport you care to mention, in the gender awareness courses I take at work, in the conversation of my wife and daughter and all their friends, I almost never get a break from the incessant non-stop discussion of gender issues, almost entirely from the point of view of angry, aggrieved feminists.

So I need a play like this – just one more rock in the Himalayan immensity of misogynist, gender-bating European literature – like I need a hole in the head.


Credit

I read The Father in the Oxford World’s Classics edition of ‘Miss Julie and Other Plays’ translated and introduced by Michael Robinson, and first published in 1998.

Related link

Strindberg reviews

  • The Father (1887)
  • Miss Julie (1888)
  • Dance of Death (1900)
  • The Ghost Sonata (1907)
  • Play reviews

Marius the Epicurean: his sensations and ideas by Walter Pater (1885)

To-day, starting from the actual details of the divine service, some very lively surmises, though scarcely distinct enough to be thoughts, were moving backwards and forwards in his mind, as the stirring wind had done all day among the trees, and were like the passing of some mysterious influence over all the elements of his nature and experience.
(Marius the Epicurean, chapter 1)

‘The morning for creation,’ he would say; ‘the afternoon for the perfecting labour of the file; the evening for reception – the reception of matter from without one, of other men’s words and thoughts – matter for our own dreams, or the merely mechanic exercise of the brain, brooding thereon silently, in its dark chambers.’
(Marius’s practice as a mature thinker, chapter 24)

‘I wonder, sometimes, in what way man has cajoled himself into the bearing of his burden thus far, seeing how every step in the capacity of apprehension his labour has won for him, from age to age, must needs increase his dejection. It is as if the increase of knowledge were but an increasing revelation of the radical hopelessness of his position.
(Marius in a particularly gloomy mood, chapter 25, the diary chapter)

Marius the Epicurean: his sensations and ideas is a historical and philosophical novel by Walter Pater, written between 1881 and 1884 and published in 1885. It’s an odd, vaporous, dense and difficult book to read.

Walter Pater

Pater was born in 1839 in the East End of London where his father was a doctor. At the age of 14 he was sent to private school in Canterbury. where he was influenced by the soaring beauty of the cathedral and the stylish art criticism of John Ruskin. Aged 19 he went up to Oxford where he took a degree in Literae Humaniores in 1862. Within a few years he began writing essays about poets and artists, including ground-breaking essays about Leonardo da Vinci (1869), Sandro Botticelli (1870) and Michelangelo (1871). He gathered these in his 1873 volume, Studies in the History of the Renaissance.

The Renaissance had a big impact on the literary world because 1) of the length and thoroughness of the essays, and 2) the exquisitely sensitive prose they were written in, prose which delicately describes the psychological impact of interacting with great works of art. The Leonardo essay contains the famous line that the Mona Lisa is ‘older than the rocks among which she sits’.

An essay on ‘The School of Giorgione’, originally published in 1877 and added to the third edition of The Renaissance (in 1888), features Pater’s much-quoted saying that: ‘All art constantly aspires towards the condition of music.’

And the volume ended with a Conclusion describing the swirl of impressions which make up the conscious mind: a drift of perceptions, feelings, thoughts and memories, ‘the passage and dissolution of impressions…unstable, flickering, inconsistent, which burn and are extinguished with our consciousness of them,’ accompanied by a ‘continual vanishing away, that strange, perpetual weaving and unweaving of ourselves’.

Because all our perceptions are in such a constant state of flux, the cultivated person, in order to get the most from life, must learn to discriminate through ‘sharp and eager observation’ between all these perceptions.

The essay leads up to its famous conclusion that the sole purpose of life is to live for the most intense sensations: ‘To burn always with this hard, gemlike flame, to maintain this ecstasy, is success in life.’ The essay suggests that art has no moral or pedagogic content but its sole purpose is to produce passionately intense moments: ‘such wisdom, the poetic passion, the desire of beauty, the love of art for its own sake.’ Art for art’s sake.

Controversy

The astonishing power of this vision gave Pater a cult following among undergraduates at Oxford and young artistically-minded men in London. But by the same token it aroused strong criticism from traditional critics and churchmen, and from the authorities at Oxford. Quite clearly its promotion of a lifestyle of intense individual perceptions flew in the face of Victorian ideals of stern Christian belief, social responsibility and Duty – to God, to the Queen, to the Empire, and so on. Even so liberal and cultured a critic as George Eliot thought the book ‘quite poisonous in its false principles of criticism and false conceptions of life’ (cited in the Introduction to the Penguin edition of Marius, page 20).

Thus, in the later 1870s and early 1880s, Pater’s diaphanous prose and purely hedonistic approach to art came to be quoted and invoked by the new school of Aesthetic artists and poets, many of whom went beyond Pater in championing a form of self-involved aesthetic appreciation of precious objects and works of art which was openly decadent and dangerously homoerotic. But it also sparked strong criticism from literary commentators, churchmen, the authorities at Oxford and parody and ridicule from the sturdier type of undergraduate.

Pater was so unnerved by the controversy which the Conclusion caused that, in the second edition of The Renaissance, published in 1877, he quietly omitted it. And he decided that he could best address the misinterpretation his art essays were being subjected to by changing direction from art criticism to fiction.

Imaginary portraits

In 1878 he published a semi-autobiographical sketch titled ‘Imaginary Portraits 1. The Child in the House’, describing in subtle, willowy prose some of the formative experiences of his own childhood. It was the first of a dozen or so ‘Imaginary Portraits’ he was to write, a genre and name Pater could be said to have invented and in which he came to specialise.

The ‘Imaginary Portraits’ are not stories. There is little or no plot and no dialogue. Instead, they are more like psychological-cum-philosophical meditations, almost always of characters who lived at turning-points in the history of ideas or sensibility. They often focus on ‘misfits’ or men out of kilter with their own times, a heroic ‘outsider’ pose which Pater cultivated and which the Aesthetes copied.

The ‘Imaginary Portraits’ are psychological and philosophical prose poems. They tend to return again and again to the same set of polarities, exploring the tensions between tradition and innovation, intellect and sensation, asceticism and aestheticism, between social values and individual amorality. Subtle though they are, a consistent line emerges warning against the pursuit of extremes in matters intellectual, aesthetic or sensual.

In fact the hazy, slow-moving curls and eddies of his measured, complex prose militate against extremes of any kind, and Pater was increasingly at pains to distance himself from the cruder, shameless hedonism of the Aesthetes who endlessly, and embarrassingly, invoked his name. For example, Pater pointedly wrote a review of Oscar Wilde’s novel The Picture of Dorian Gray in which he disapproved of Wilde’s distortion of Epicureanism, comparing Wilde’s crude and melodramatic formulations with his (Pater’s) far more subtle depictions:

A true Epicureanism aims at a complete though harmonious development of man’s entire organism. To lose the moral sense therefore, for instance the sense of sin and righteousness, as Mr. Wilde’s heroes are bent on doing so speedily, as completely as they can, is…to become less complex, to pass from a higher to a lower degree of development.

Still, it is noticeable that he is defending morality, not for its moral content as such, but in aesthetic-psychological terms, for simply being more complex and interesting.

Marius the Epicurean

Marius the Epicurean is Pater’s attempt at a novel-length version of an ‘Imaginary Portrait’, as he himself explained in a letter to the author Vernon Lee, where he described it as ‘an Imaginary Portrait of a peculiar type of mind in the time of Marcus Aurelius’.

Marius is an entirely fictional character living in the Italy of the Antonine emperors. The novel opens with him a teenager in 161 AD, as the emperor Antoninus Pius is dying and handing over power to his successor, Marcus Aurelius (reigned 161 to 180 AD). The narrative then follows Marius’s life and thoughts for the next 15 years or so, until his untimely early death – he goes to school, meets an older boy who becomes a kind of hero figure, when the latter dies of plague our hero goes to Rome where he is introduced to the emperor, and so on.

Marius is not a novel in the ordinary sense of the word. There are few characters, hardly any plot and little or no dialogue. Marius does age, move from place to place (from his home estate, to school in Pisa, and then to adulthood in Rome) but otherwise the text gently diaphanous exploration of the impressions and, above all, changing ideas, which form and shape the young Marius over the course of these fifteen or so years.

Pater chose the period of the Antonines because he considered it a pivotal moment in history, when Roman culture had reached a kind of peak:

He was certainly fortunate in the time of his coming to Rome. That old pagan world, of which Rome was the flower, had reached its perfection in the things of poetry and art—a perfection which indicated only too surely the eve of decline. As in some vast intellectual museum, all its manifold products were intact and in their places, and with custodians also still extant, duly qualified to appreciate and explain them. And at no period of history had the material Rome itself been better worth seeing.

It was a moment when the pious certainties of the old state and family pagan religion were slowly decaying, and a sometimes bewildering number of other philosophical and religious schools flourished, some very old (all the Greek schools of philosophy), some new to Rome, such as the worship of the Egyptian goddess Isis (whose rites are described in chapter 6), and the whole text concludes with almost all of book 4, chapters 21 to 28, describing Marius’s enchanted encounter with the new eastern religion of Christianity.

So the meandering narrative amounts to the journey of a sensitive pagan mind slowly becoming aware of, then attracted to, but never fully committing to, Christianity.

Anti-Aestheticism

Contrary to the cult of Aestheticism which was luxuriating in languid lilies and rare jewels and precious moments, Pater was at pains to bring out the ascetic and non-sensuous side of his Epicureanism. In the third edition of The Renaissance (1888), published 4 years after Marius, he felt confident enough to reintroduce the notorious ‘Conclusion’, which he had previously suppressed, because, as he himself explained, Marius presented a counterweight to it. Here’s the note he added to the third edition, in full:

This brief ‘Conclusion’ was omitted in the second edition of this book, as I conceived it might possibly mislead some of those young men into whose hands it might fall. On the whole, I have thought it best to reprint it here, with some slight changes which bring it closer to my original meaning. I have dealt more fully in Marius the Epicurean with the thoughts suggested by it.

The novel can, then, be read as the Anti-Conclusion, designed to rebut and refute the dangerous amorality implied by the notorious Conclusion. Which explains why Pater goes out of his way to emphasise the cerebral, ascetic, restrained and pious aspects of Marius’s character – in countless places going to great lengths to deliberately distance himself from his Art for Art’s Sake fans.

This is all established in the first chapter which dwells at length on what a traditionalist young Marius is, a chaste and restrained follower of traditional Roman religion and values, not at all a self-indulgent hedonist. In its swirling gaseous prose the text is studied with keywords designed to reinforce the point:

After the deification of the emperors, we are told, it was considered impious so much as to use any coarse expression in the presence of their images. To Marius the whole of life seemed full of sacred presences, demanding of him a similar collectedness. The severe and archaic religion of the villa, as he conceived it, begot in him a sort of devout circumspection lest he should fall short at any point of the demand upon him of anything in which deity was concerned.

Chapter 1 shows Marius taking part in a traditional Roman religious ceremony with complete piety and devotion:

With the lad Marius, who, as the head of his house, took a leading part in the ceremonies of the day, there was a devout effort to complete this impressive outward silence by that inward tacitness of mind, esteemed so important by religious Romans in the performance of these sacred functions. To him the sustained stillness without seemed really but to be waiting upon that interior, mental condition of preparation or expectancy, for which he was just then intently striving.

Filial duty, chaste, monastic:

Something pensive, spell-bound, and but half real, something cloistral or monastic, as we should say, united to this exquisite order, made the whole place seem to Marius, as it were, sacellum, the peculiar sanctuary, of his mother, who, still in real widowhood, provided the deceased Marius the elder with that secondary sort of life which we can give to the dead, in our intensely realised memory of them

And much more in the same vein. It feels very deliberately the opposite of the breathless sensationalism of the Conclusion. The very last words of part 2 seem deliberately written to echo and refute lines in the Conclusion. In the Conclusion Pater writes that:

To burn always with this hard, gemlike flame, to maintain this ecstasy, is success in life.

In Marius the same sort of sentiment has been comprehensively reworked and become thoroughly moralised. When he visits the amphitheatre and watches the animals being tortured, he realises he is in the presence of real evil i.e. there is a morality deeper and truer than just sensations, and:

Surely evil was a real thing, and the wise man wanting in the sense of it, where, not to have been, by instinctive election, on the right side, was to have failed in life.

Marius and Dorian

I’m sure it’s been done by academics many times but the more you grasp of Marius’s character and purpose, the more you can see him as a kind of anti-Dorian Gray. Or are led to think of Dorian (a later creation: Marius 1885, Dorian 1891) as the anti-Marius. Certainly there is a striking parallelism between them.

It would hardly have been possible to feel more seriously than did Marius in those grave years of his early life. (Chapter 4)

Avoiding the hackneyed subject of Doubt

There is another way of viewing all this. The second half of the nineteenth century was awash with treatises, novels, autobiographies and whatnot all wrestling with the great subject of Religious Doubt, as writers struggled with their loss of Christian faith or worried about the impact of waning Christian faith on social cohesion (see, for example, the agonising of Tennyson in In Memoriam or Matthew Arnold in his prose and poetry).

Marius pulls off the clever trick of turning all this on its head. It is a novel about a sensitive, thoughtful young man who comes to doubt the ancestral religion of his family and country – but it is not Christianity but the old pagan beliefs which he feels slipping away, and which he seeks to replace by more rational, philosophical alternatives, first Epicureanism, then the Stoicism of Marcus Aurelius.

In the final, Christian, chapters, Christianity is depicted not as ageing and declining, as a dwindling Sea of Faith fading away with the ‘long melancholy, long, withdrawing roar’ described by Arnold in Dover Beach. On the contrary, maybe the most startling aspect of the novel is that Marius comes across it as it is on the way up, as it has passed the first wave of martyrs, as it is developing its extended acts of worship which will lead to the Mass, as it is incorporating aspects of the old Jewish religion as well as bits of pagan philosophy, to produce a New System, a new belief, which offers – in the key word Pater uses again and again – hope. It is young, fresh and virile.

So Pater manages an extended meditation on Christianity which not only manages not to be doleful and melancholy but turns all the familiar tropes of sad Victorians losing their faith on their heads. Pater’s description of Christianity is full of vigour and life!

Intertextuality

Smooth and beguilingly complex as Pater’s style is, from a modern point of view he also subjected the novel form to some interesting experiments. The most noticeable of these is the use of other texts which are inserted into the narrative. These range from adaptations of classical and early Christian writings to Marius’s diary and authorial comments. Thus:

  • chapter 5 contains a translation of the story of Cupid and Psyche from Apuleius’s second century text, The Golden Ass
  • chapter 12 contains an extended tissue of quotations from Marcus Aurelius’s Meditations
  • chapter 20 contains a translation of a short prose piece, in Pater’s day thought to be by the Greek humorist, Lucian
  • chapter 22 an excerpt from the early Christian text, The Shepherd of Hermas
  • the longest chapter, 24, consists of a philosophical dialogue by Lucian
  • chapter 26 contains an extended translation from the Church historian, Eusebius

Quotes

On a smaller scale, the text often strays into the form of an essay by the continual referencing Great Writers and Thinkers, not just from Marius’s time and before (particularly Homer and Horace), but from the full history of Western Civilisation up to the time of writing in the 1880s. Thus, without doing a particularly exhaustive survey, I can point to references to Dante, Montaigne, Pascal, Spenser’s Shepheardes Calendar, Goethe and so on scattered through the text. Or take the surprising moment when he hasn’t got far into his description of ancient Rome before he is comparing it to Paris at the time of Louis XIV, and Hadrian’s extensions to Rome to the revival of Gothic architecture in Pater’s own time (chapter 11). Typically, the title of chapter 12, ‘The divinity that doth hedge a king’, is a quote from Hamlet, and so on.

These references to people who died a thousand years or more after the period the narrative is set in, are obviously anachronistic. I wonder if there’s a literary critical term, if not I’ll invent one: anachro-textuality. It has at least three effects:

  1. to momentarily pull you out of the main narrative, and make you regard it from a distance, from the outside
  2. to expand the meaning and resonance of the narrative by referring to the canon of Great Thinkers

Personally, I don’t think Pater was especially in control of this approach. This kind of showing off, name-dropping tags and fragments from canonic authors, had been part of literary criticism since Coleridge or before. William Hazlitt’s essays amount to mosaics of quotes from famous authors, his texts float on a sea of quotations. So rather than being an innovation, Pater’s name-dropping strikes me as being pretty standard procedure for the art and literary criticism of his day.

The third effect, Pater makes explicit in chapter 16, which is where his character and his philosophical dilemmas, shed light on the present day readers:

That age and our own have much in common – many difficulties and hopes. Let the reader pardon me if here and there I seem to be passing from Marius to his modern representatives – from Rome, to Paris or London.

Tourism

This habit of stepping back and regarding his own narrative is evident in another, fairly obvious way: the tour guide. As Marius travels through the Roman countryside to Rome, and then once he is in Rome, there are passages describing how both (countryside and Rome) appeared centuries later, to visitors in Pater’s day. At these moments the text, again, ceases to be a narrative so much as a scaffold for digressions and anachronistic impressions, momentarily invoking the sights one would have seen in Pater’s day.

Twelve o’clock was come before they left the Forum, waiting in a little crowd to hear the Accensus, according to old custom, proclaim the hour of noonday, at the moment when, from the steps of the Senate-house, the sun could be seen standing between the Rostra and the Græcostasis. He exerted for this function a strength of voice, which confirmed in Marius a judgment the modern visitor may share with him, that Roman throats and Roman chests, namely, must, in some peculiar way, be differently constructed from those of other people.

The plague, as we saw when Marius was on his way to Rome, was not to depart till it had done a large part in the formation of the melancholy picturesque of modern Italy—till it had made, or prepared for the making of the Roman Campagna. (chapter 11)

Like the modern visitor to the Capitoline and some other museums, Fronto had been struck, pleasantly struck, by the family likeness among the Antonines. (chapter 13)

Philosophy

Marius is a much more philosophical novel than I expected, frequently verging on turning into a treatise, albeit not as methodical or logical as a philosophical treatise probably ought to be. The use of the novel format allows Pater to structure the philosophical ponderings not according to logic but according to the very well-established structure of the Bildungsroman i.e. a fiction describing the development of a sensitive thoughtful mind, a genre conventionally dated to the publication of Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship 1795.

In turn the Bildungsroman can be thought of as a translation into the third person of the autobiography, specifically the kind of autobiography which focuses on the moral or philosophical growth and development of the author. As a genre, this is much older and goes back at least as far as the Confessions of St Augustine, written about 400 AD.

In terms of its exposition of philosophy, Marius divides into three parts:

  1. Marius’s original Cyrenaicism and how this is deepened by his friendship with Flavian (books 1 and 2)
  2. Marius’s encounter with different styles of Stoicism among the elite of Rome (the 2 distinct styles of Marcus Aurelius and Fronto) (book 3)
  3. Marius’s encounter with Christianity (book 4)

Christianity

Marcus is intrigued by the up-and-coming new religion of the empire but critics then and now have pointed out that he never really engages with it. For Marius, Christianity’s strongest point is the way it is preserving and enhancing the best of the old pagan religion, its sense of piety towards numinous realities i.e. he perceives it mostly in aesthetic terms. He dies before he gets close to the real core of Christian theology – the belief that all mankind fell in the sin of Adam and needs to be redeemed through the willing sacrifice of God’s only son. The crudity of clarity is not what Pater was about.

Barely a novel

It really is not at all what most people would consider a novel, but rather a beautifully meandering saunter through hazily expressed ideas of religious thought and feeling.

A sense of conscious powers external to ourselves, pleased or displeased by the right or wrong conduct of every circumstance of daily life – that conscience, of which the old Roman religion was a formal, habitual recognition, was become in him a powerful current of feeling and observance

The key unit of the book is the paragraph and these are often a page long and built up through sentences which themselves contain swirls and eddies, heavily qualified by subordinate clauses, so that it is liberating and beguiling to abandon yourself to their flow. It is like being lulled into a completely different place from our usual, hurried, instrumental way of thinking, freed to drift with the drifting thoughts and impressions of the hazy protagonist.

Marius’s character

During adolescence Marius develops into a dreamy idealist, in the strict sense of someone who lives in his head and constructs the world through his imagining rather than interacting with it on a pragmatic level.

Thus the boyhood of Marius passed; on the whole, more given to contemplation than to action. Less prosperous in fortune than at an earlier day there had been reason to expect, and animating his solitude, as he read eagerly and intelligently, with the traditions of the past, already he lived much in the realm of the imagination, and became betimes, as he was to continue all through life, something of an idealist, constructing the world for himself in great measure from within, by the exercise of meditative power. A vein of subjective philosophy, with the individual for its standard of all things, there would be always in his intellectual scheme of the world and of conduct, with a certain incapacity wholly to accept other men’s valuations.

PART THE FIRST

1. ‘The Religion of Numa’

In which we are introduced to Marius, a ‘young lad’, whose father has died and left him the man of the house in a modest rural estate, somewhere near Pisa, in the time of the Emperor Antoninus. He is portrayed as sober and pious and respectful of religious tradition. ‘The religion of Numa’ because Numa Pompilius was the second of the seven kings of Rome and ‘many of Rome’s most important religious and political institutions are attributed to him, such as the Roman calendar, Vestal Virgins, the cult of Mars, the cult of Jupiter, the cult of Romulus, and the office of pontifex maximus‘ (Wikipedia).

2. White-Nights

White Nights is a possible translation of the name of Marius’s estate, Ad Vigilias Albas, so this chapter describes its layout and location, and the ‘ceremonial traditions’ which have come down through the ages, part of the pious old Roman religion whose rites Marius is very conscientious in keeping up.

The devotion of the father then had handed on loyally…a certain tradition of life, which came to mean much for the young Marius.

Worth noting that Pater has his young hero be very sensitive to the suffering of animals:

One important principle, of fruit afterwards in his Roman life, that relish for the country fixed deeply in him; in the winters especially, when the sufferings of the animal world became so palpable even to the least observant. It fixed in him a sympathy for all creatures, for the almost human troubles and sicknesses of the flocks, for instance. It was a feeling which had in it something of religious veneration for life as such…

He becomes an intellectual, an idealist (see quote above).

3. Change of Air

Describes an episode from his adolescence when Marius contracts a fever, ‘some boyish sickness’, and is sent to a temple of Aesculapius among the hills of Etruria. This is, of course, an opportunity to reinforce the mood of chaste restraint which surrounded Roman religion, but for Marius to encounter a young priest with whom he has intellectual conversation about Plato and such, another opportunity to preach restraint:

“If thou wouldst have all about thee like the colours of some fresh picture, in a clear light,” so the discourse recommenced after a pause, “be temperate in thy religious notions, in love, in wine, in all things, and of a peaceful heart with thy fellows.”

The net effect of his stay at the temple is to associate physical and mental health, ‘Mens sana in corpore sano’ as the poet Juvenal wrote: ‘a healthy mind in a healthy body’.

All this served, as he understood afterwards in retrospect, at once to strengthen and to purify a certain vein of character in him. Developing the ideal, pre-existent there, of a religious beauty, associated for the future with the exquisite splendour of the temple of Aesculapius, as it dawned upon him on that morning of his first visit – it developed that ideal in connection with a vivid sense of the value of mental and bodily sanity. And this recognition of the beauty, even for the aesthetic sense, of mere bodily health, now acquired, operated afterwards as an influence morally salutary, counteracting the less desirable or hazardous tendencies of some phases of thought, through which he was to pass.

Giving him a solid moral and imaginative foundation. You can see how all this militates against the amoral hedonism of the aesthetes.

It would hardly have been possible to feel more seriously than did Marius in those grave years of his early life.

4. The Tree of Knowledge

The death of Marius’s mother turns ‘seriousness of feeling into a matter of the intelligence’. Marius goes to the sea port of Pisa, beautifully described, to live in the villa of his guardian and rhetorician, to attend school. Here he is introduced to the intellectual sense of the New, the Modern, which came to feel different from the conservative, backward-looking culture he was raised in.

A great friendship develops with an older boy named Flavian, a freedman’s son being put through school by a rich sponsor. Marius transcribes Flavian’s poems. Flavian is like a breathing embodiment ‘his own Cyrenaic philosophy’ whose watchword is:

Trust the eye: Strive to be right always in regard to the concrete experience: Beware of falsifying your impressions.

Flavian introduces him to the Greek satirist, Lucian. Pater expresses the purpose of education:

the chief function of all higher education [is] to impart, the art, namely, of so relieving the ideal or poetic traits, the elements of distinction, in our everyday life—of so exclusively living in them—that the unadorned remainder of it, the mere drift or débris of our days, comes to be as though it were not.

Not as ringing as the Conclusion, but repeating the same idea that the aim is to savour and soak in the ideal traits and elements of distinction in our lives that the other stuff, work, shopping, chores, fades away. Puzzled that he writes ‘relieving’, is that a typo or Victorian variation of ‘reliving’?

5. The Golden Book

Flavian introduces him to what was then a new book by Apuleius, The Golden Ass. The narrator gives a brief summary of the plot, then, surprisingly, includes an extended translation of the story of Cupid and Psyche as it appeared in The Golden Ass – 14 pages or so of translation from the ancient Latin cut & pasted into this Victorian novel. The translation is in a horrible pseudo-archaic style, for example:

And she, erewhile of no strength, the hard purpose of destiny assisting her, is confirmed in force. With lamp plucked forth, knife in hand, she put by her sex; and lo! as the secrets of the bed became manifest, the sweetest and most gentle of all creatures, Love himself, reclined there, in his own proper loveliness!

6. Euphuism

The boys’ reaction to The Golden Ass. For young Marius it becomes the book, the epitome of literary beauty, probably more than it deserved. In Flavian it inspired the wish to be a great writer who would restore the classic elegance and power of Latin:

Latin literature and the Latin tongue were dying of routine and languor; and what was necessary, first of all, was to re-establish the natural and direct relationship between thought and expression, between the sensation and the term, and restore to words their primitive power.

Dense description of Marius and Flavian’s feel for how literature ought to be, drawing parallels with Plato, Cicero, Lucian, Lucretius and the Pervigilium Veneris.

Marius and Flavian attend a ceremony for the goddess Isis, the Isis navigium, namely the launching of a boat full of spices and votive offerings out into Pisa harbour, lavishly described by Pater. They sail out to a spot on the bay which was once an old Greek colony, now abandoned ruins. By the end of the day Flavian has developed a fever.

7. A Pagan End [i.e. death]

Returning from the Roman-Parthian War (161 to 166) Marcus Aurelius brought the plague which Pater describes as spreading quickly throughout Europe, Italy, and devastating entire neighbourhoods.

From his fever-bed Flavian dictates to Marius new stanzas of his work which is to celebrate Venus and the pairing of animals in the lovely spring. Pater describes the style as moving beyond the syllabics of classical Latin verse and foreshadowing the use of rhyme in medieval Latin.

A record of Flavian’s illness, fever, vomiting, moments of lucidity and final decline as Marius holds his hand. Then stands vigil through the night beside his friend’s corpse. Then accompanies Flavian’s corpse to a funeral, where it is burned, and he brings the urn of still warm ashes home.

PART THE SECOND

8. Animula Vagula

The death of his friend destroys the simple religious faith of Marius’s boyhood. He is saved from slipping into mysticism by a native virility of mind, a preference for ‘vigorous intelligence’. He prefers:

poetic beauty in mere clearness of thought, the actually aesthetic charm of a cold austerity of mind.

For Marius the only possible dilemma lay between that old, ancestral Roman religion, now become so incredible to him and the honest action of his own untroubled, unassisted intelligence.

Marius turns 18 but instead of the dreamy, poetic musings which might be expected of a boy of his age, he undertakes ‘severe intellectual meditation’. Marius worries his friends with his earnestness. He drills back before Lucretius and Epicurus to the thinker who was father to them both, Heraclitus.

A complex wordy summary not only of Heraclitus but of the kinds of ways of thought he gave rise to; in Marius Heraclitus’s scepticism about the fixed nature of reality i.e. his insistence that everything is in flux, gave rise, instead of to despair, to a resolve to savour each passing impression in its fullness.

The kind of hedonism Pater says Marius came to believe in is closer to Aristippus of Cyrene than the later Epicurus.

9. New Cyrenaicism

If he could but count upon the present, if a life brief at best could not certainly be shown to conduct one anywhere beyond itself, if men’s highest curiosity was indeed so persistently baffled—then, with the Cyrenaics of all ages, he would at least fill up the measure of that present with vivid sensations – and such intellectual apprehensions, as, in strength and directness and their immediately realised values at the bar of an actual experience, are most like sensations.

‘Hedonism’ is a crude term used by people who don’t understand. The aim is not crude pleasure. In fact the word Pater repeatedly uses is ‘insight’, suggesting a very intellectual type of pleasure, the pleasure of understanding.

Not pleasure, but a general completeness of life, was the practical ideal to which this anti-metaphysical metaphysic really pointed. And towards such a full or complete life, a life of various yet select sensation, the most direct and effective auxiliary must be, in a word, Insight. Liberty of soul, freedom from all partial and misrepresentative doctrine which does but relieve one element in our experience at the cost of another, freedom from all embarrassment alike of regret for the past and of calculation on the future: this would be but preliminary to the real business of education — insight, insight through culture, into all that the present moment holds in trust for us, as we stand so briefly in its presence.

To the phase of reflection through which Marius was then passing, the charge of ‘hedonism’, whatever its true weight might be, was not properly applicable at all. Not pleasure, but fullness of life, and insight as conducting to that fullness — energy, variety, and choice of experience, including noble pain and sorrow even, loves such as those in the exquisite old story of Apuleius, sincere and strenuous forms of the moral life, such as Seneca and Epictetus – whatever form of human life, in short, might be heroic, impassioned, ideal

In this and countless other passages you can hear Pater doggedly denying that he was the godfather of Aestheticism, refuting the criticism that he promoted fleshly sensuality, and repeating again and again that his notion of Cyrenaicism is noble, moral, strenuous and pure.

The sober discretion of his thoughts, his sustained habit of meditation, the sense of those negative conclusions enabling him to concentrate himself, with an absorption so entire, upon what is immediately here and now, gave him a peculiar manner of intellectual confidence…

And not at all gay:

  • A singularly virile consciousness of the realities of life pronounced itself in him
  • Virile apprehension of the true nature of things, of the true nature of one’s own impression, first of all!

At the age of 19 Marius decides to enrol as a student of rhetoric in Rome.

10. On the Way

A former friend of his (dead) father’s had been following Marius’s progress, his scholarly studies and his fine penmanship, and invited him to Rome to become an amanuensis or secretary. Description of his journey from Pisa to Rome. En route he falls in with a strapping young man, Cornelius of the 12th Legion. Their growing friendship is recorded without a word of dialogue, all summarised in descriptive prose.

11. “The Most Religious City in the World”

Marius awakes in the house of his forefathers on the Caelian Hill in Rome and goes strolling through the city with Cornelius. A long languid description of how Rome had become prey to all kinds of foreign religions, encouraged by the new emperor, Marcus Aurelius (came to power 161 AD) who was not only very philosophical, given to philosophical speeches, but also a devotee of countless foreign cults, of which Pater singles out worship of Isis.

12. “The Divinity that Doth Hedge a King”

Marius is a spectator to the return of Marcus Aurelius into Rome from a victorious war on the Danube border, as the emperor, his partner and countless priests and officials process along the Via Sacra to a sacrifice at the Capitol. A close description of Marcus Aurelius’s appearance which emphasises the austerity of ‘this dainty and high-bred Stoic’. And derogatory profile of his younger co-emperor, Lucius Verus, who had become corrupted by luxury in the East.

The narrator states that Aurelius is 45 years old which dates the year to 166 AD.

After religious rites and a feast, Marius describes the long address Aurelius the Stoic emperor gives to the crowd. According to Michael Levey’s notes, this is a collage of quotes from Aurelius’s well-known publication, the Meditations.

The narrator points to the way that the same philosophical premise from Heraclitus, of the eternal changing of everything – ‘The world, within me and without, flows away like a river’ – you can deduce two diametrically opposite conclusions:

  1. Marius’s Cyrenaic Epicureanism: ‘let me make the most of what is here and now’ and throw myself into a world of sense impressions, sensations, and beautiful thoughts; or
  2. Aurelius’s ascetic Stoic rejection of the world of the senses as obviously fake and misleading: ‘The world and the thinker upon it, are consumed like a flame, therefore will I turn away my eyes from vanity: renounce: withdraw myself alike from all affection’

In addition, a pose of lofty dignified detachment was also, obviously, appropriate for the role of emperor of the greatest empire in the world. Hence Aurelius’s elevated, rather scornful version of Stoicism.

The peculiar character of Aurelius, at once a ceremonious polytheist never forgetful of his pontifical calling, and a philosopher whose mystic speculation encircled him with a sort of saintly halo, had restored to his person, without his intending it, something of that divine prerogative, or prestige.

Once again this long-ish (6 pages) tissue of quotations from the Meditations, like the passage from Apuleius, is rendered in a style notably more affected and archaic and quaint than Pater’s narrative voice. Levey says it is the style of Walter Savage Landor. No likee.

“Art thou in love with men’s praises, get thee into the very soul of them, and see!—see what judges they be, even in those matters which concern themselves. Wouldst thou have their praise after death, bethink thee, that they who shall come hereafter, and with whom thou wouldst survive by thy great name, will be but as these, whom here thou hast found so hard to live with. For of a truth, the soul of him who is aflutter upon renown after death, presents not this aright to itself, that of all whose memory he would have each one will likewise very quickly depart, until memory herself be put out, as she journeys on by means of such as are themselves on the wing but for a while, and are extinguished in their turn…”

Identical to the sentiment of Ecclesiastes in the Bible:

Vanity of vanities, saith the Preacher, vanity of vanities! All is vanity.

The chapter ends rather beautifully with Pater describing how night has fallen, it begins to snow, and the emperor is escorted from the Capitol by a sequence of torch bearing lictors, ‘a long stream of moving lights across the white Forum, up the great stairs, to the palace’.

13. The “Mistress and Mother” of Palaces

The spring day on which Marius is introduced to the emperor Marcus Aurelius in his palace, with a long, lavish and adulatory description of the emperor’s character, of the empress Faustina, the royal children, and their tutor, the 80-year-old Stoic philosopher Marcus Cornelius Fronto, the ‘Orator’.

Continuing the practice of extensive quotation (or intertextuality) the chapter contains passages from the letters exchanged between Aurelius and Fronto (which had only been discovered earlier in the nineteenth century). These lead up to a 2-page translation of a fable about Jupiter’s invention of Sleep, from a work by Fronto.

As usual, although the chapter is long, there manages to be not a word of dialogue between Marius and Marcus; instead the narrative relays Marius’s impressions of the imperial household and, more than that, the swirling divagations of Marius’s thoughts, which are all very lush and flattering: ‘How temperate, how tranquillising! what humanity!’

14. Manly Amusement

Marius sees, from outside, the grand ceremony of the wedding of Aurelius’s co-emperor, Lucius Verus, with his elegant slender daughter, Lucilla. In the crowd he bumps into Cornelius, ‘the clear, cold corrective, which the fever of his present life demanded’. Marius compares and contrasts the appearance and personalities of Flavian and Cornelius, and how they have embodied his changing philosophy.

What struck me is how, in a heterosexual Bildungsroman, the text tends to be dominated by the love life of the hero, from early puppy love through to the Grand Amour. The complete absence of woman-love and, instead, the centrality of two young men who Marius has philosophical crushes on, proclaim the text’s homosexuality. But did contemporary readers and critics pick up on this?

Anyway, suddenly the narrative moves on to a grand gladiatorial show at the amphitheatre, paid for by Lucius Verus, who, on his journey back from the Parthian campaign, had picked up the cult of the great goddess of Ephesus, the goddess of hunters.

‘Manly amusement’ is fairly bitter sarcasm. Pater describes the brutal slaughter of huge numbers of wild animals for the baying audience’s entertainments, all very contrary to his and Marius’s fellow feelings for poor, abused animals. It’s an extended and quite angry passage.

In the middle there’s a satirical swipe at the contemporary (Victorian) habit of novel reading, seen as a crutch for feeble imaginations:

For the long shows of the amphitheatre were, so to speak, the novel-reading of that age—a current help provided for sluggish imaginations, in regard, for instance, to grisly accidents, such as might happen to one’s self; but with every facility for comfortable inspection.

Watching Aurelius sit through the entire gruesome bloody display with a detached expression, often turning aside to read or sign documents, revealed to Marius the profound gap between them. He, Marius, has a conscience and is aware of the big difference between good and evil to which the emperor seems oblivious.

Those cruel amusements were, certainly, the sin of blindness, of deadness and stupidity, in the age of Marius…

And Pater turns away from ancient Rome to wonder whether ‘we’ (his Victorian readers) are any better, in their own time, an age still dogged by the slave trade (in Africa) and religious persecution.

PART THE THIRD

15. Stoicism at Court

A few months later the 80-year-old Fronto delivers a lecture on Stoic morality to the court. The problem Marius now faces is that he has built his entire morality to date on the Cyrenaic basis of seeking a life of fine sensations and thoughts; but the experience of the amphitheatre made him realise that morality is real. It’s dawning on him that old-time morality has a power and a truth. The problem is how to admit rules of morality into his thought without undermining it:

with as little logical inconsistency as may be, to find a place for duty and righteousness in his house of thought.

Fronto’s lecture squares the circle by presenting morality not as a set of leaden laws, but on the contrary as a kind of quintessence of good taste and fine manners. Interpreting morality in aesthetic terms. Morality is more like conforming to the Order of the Universe, more in the nature of dancing to the music of the universe. Thus, out of enjoyment of the beauty of fine sensations and thoughts, an epicurean may end up being more moral than the sternest moralist, exercising a more discriminating and sensitive morality. And avoiding immoral conduct not on a moral basis, but out of good taste.

In much the same way, conforming to traditional morality can be rethought to be defined as conforming with the best thoughts of mankind. Or based on the notion of:

the idea of Humanity – of a universal commonwealth of mind, which becomes explicit, and as if incarnate, in a select communion of just men made perfect.

In other words, Fronto is made to make traditional morality and customary behaviour acceptable to potential rebels and outsiders like Marius, by reframing it as joining a kind of aristocracy of thought, of the best that has been spoken and done. Rather than truckling to humdrum bourgeois morality, one would be joining an invisible aristocracy of righteousness. Elects spirits, elect souls. This seems to me, to be making traditional morality palatable by appealing to intellectual snobbery.

But where can Marius find these elect souls:

But where might Marius search for all this, as more than an intellectual abstraction? Where were those elect souls in whom the claim of Humanity became so amiable, winning, persuasive—whose footsteps through the world were so beautiful in the actual order he saw?

I’m guessing in Christian communities.

16. Second Thoughts

The narrator intrudes into the narrative with reflections: he says that we adults know, what young Marius hasn’t grasped, that Cyrenaicism is a philosophy of young people, fired up by hormones, the feel of then sun on their faces, the exuberance of young healthy bodies. It is the ideology of:

the strong young man in all the freshness of thought and feeling, fascinated by the notion of raising his life to the level of a daring theory, while, in the first genial heat of existence, the beauty of the physical world strikes potently upon his wide-open, unwearied senses.

It is the product of the receptive and not the reflective powers of the mind.

The narrator takes us right away from the narrative by saying all this applies now, in modern London, a place where ‘the fresh imagination of a youth to build its “palace of art”‘. All this appears to be addressing the Aesthetic movement Pater was godfather to and which had made him so lamentably notorious, for he goes on to explain that this is all well and good for excitable young people, BUT is, in the end, it is narrow and blinkered, mistaking one era of vivid perception for the whole of life. What this excited philosophy needs is the corrective of an older, more mature wisdom, a wider worldview.

17. Beata Urbs

Back to narrative: The co-emperor Lucius Verus died in 169, en route to renewed fighting with barbarians on the Danube border. Aurelius brings his body back to Rome and sees his corpse lying in state in the Forum. Marius witnesses the subsequent funeral pyre in the Campus Martius and the rackety contrivance whereby a not-very-young eagle was released from a cage, flying upwards so that various witnesses could testify they saw the soul of the deceased mounting to heaven; which was what was required to allow the senate to declare the deceased had become a god.

Marius is summoned a second time to attend the emperor. Walking through the corridor where Caligula was assassinated, he is momentarily overcome by the history of Rome’s tyrants, their insanity and cruelty.

Marius is struck that the palace rooms are mostly empty because Aurelius is auctioning off all its treasures to pay for the military campaign on the Danube. In his empty rooms Aurelius has, momentarily, attained the clarity and simplicity of the philosopher kings described by Plato. His mind has momentarily conflated the real buzzing city of Rome with the ‘city on high’, the ideal city inhabited by ideal beings, the beata urbs, which recurs in his writings. Aurelius has summoned Marius to sort out the imperial manuscripts but we hear little about this, instead pages of Pater’s description of the mind of the philosopher-emperor. Again, rather magically, Aurelius hands over the manuscripts to Marius without a word of dialogue. Did Pater set himself the challenge of writing a dialogue-free novel?

18. “The Ceremony of the Dart”

In many of its followers Stoicism bred a coldness of heart. Not so in Aurelius who had inherited from his mother a sincere belief in the old pagan gods, which warmed his Stoicism, humanised, gave him great human sympathy.

It is 173 AD, a time of anxiety triggered by the threat of invasion and the plague. For seven days the Romans exposed statues of all their gods in the open air and worshipped them every day. Pater describes the weird cults and insistence on bloodshed, on animal sacrifice, on baths in fresh blood, in flagelation.

Only now did I realise that the manuscripts Aurelius has given Marius are of his own writings. Some are factual and statistical (and maybe found their way into the unreliable Historia Augusta which covers this period); others are letters of instruction to his son, the future emperor Commodus. But what strikes Marius is the many texts where Aurelius carries on an endless dialogue with himself about the philosophical perfection he seeks and is always just over the horizon.

Aurelius is like the modern essayist, repeatedly trying to make sense of his own thoughts. The narrator points out that this is a new, mystical, inwardness of spirit, very unlike the external factual activity of the classical mind. It is about the inner self, above all gaining complete mastery of one’s own moods, emotions and thoughts:

Tis in thy power to think as thou wilt:

Moreover, it implies someone or something to have a dialogue with and it is possible this is the Logos, or spark of Divine Mind within man – ‘that eternal reason, which was also his own proper self, with the divine companion, whose tabernacle was in the intelligence of men’.

Marcus Aurelius is a fundamentally sad man using Stoicism to try and buck himself up, and in so doing, the narrator points out, anticipates the rejection of the world and movement to monasticism, the cultivation of the soul, embodied in early medieval Christianity. And yet his austere Stoicism lacks a proper apprehension of evil. Secondly, Aurelius despises the body, cultivates contempt for it. Again, this is contrasted with Cornelius’s reverence for the human body as the temple of the spirit. Lastly, Aurelius seems at times to recommend suicide, giving the body, the proto-corpse, the slip. Marius finds that unforgivable.

There’s a rare bit of plot: as Marius is reading a manuscript roll a letter falls out of it and Marius, thinking he ought to return it to the emperor, rides out to the town in the Campagna where Aurelius is staying, only to come into the imperial palace as there is much fuss because on of the emperor’s children is dying of a sudden infection and Marius sees him hugging the helpless infant, ‘as if he yearned just then for one thing only, to be united, to be absolutely one with it, in its obscure distress.’

19. The Will as Vision

For Aurelius rule is a great sacrifice. Marius sees Aurelius clothed in armour and helped up onto his warhorse, ready to set off to the German wars and is struck by how defeated he looks.

With the emperor departed, Marius settles down into his study of Aurelius’s manuscripts, broken up by rides out into the country. On one of these he has a vision of the entire world as intellect, a world of thought, of which he intermittently partook. This in fact grows out of a conviction that wherever he has gone, there has always been an invisible other accompanying him, with which he shared his thoughts and feelings. What if this is an intuition of the permanent world of intellect which is the real enduring Reality? Suddenly everything fits into place and he sees that he must spend the rest of his life searching for every evidence, every trace or token of this high Ideal as it displays in the actual world of things.

The experience of that fortunate hour, seeming to gather into one central act of vision all the deeper impressions his mind had ever received, did not leave him quite as he had been.

PART THE FOURTH

20. Two Curious Houses—1. Guests [Apuleius]

Cut to ‘some years later’ when the famous writer Apuleius, author of The Golden Ass which had been Marius’s holy book when he as a teenage friend of Flavian, comes to Rome. Marius is invited to supper at the house of an aristocratic poet ‘who loved every sort of superiorities’, sited at Tusculum some distance from Rome and close to the famous (and now ruined) villa of the great Cicero (died about 210 year before, in 43 BC).

Marius describes the elite, literature-loving elite lazing on divans decorated with flowers. Young men perform a dance (The Death of Paris) in light armour, including Commodus, son of the emperor. Then one of them recites The Halcyon, a short prose piece, in Pater’s day thought to be by the Greek humorist, Lucian, in which Socrates is made to mouth conventional sentiments about human limitations.

As usual Apuleius’s presence and character are conveyed not through anything he says, not through any dialogue, but via Marius’s impressions of his presence and tone of voice, thus:

There was a piquancy in his [Apuleius’s] rococo, very African, and as it were perfumed personality, though he was now well-nigh sixty years old, a mixture there of that sort of Platonic spiritualism which can speak of the soul of man as but a sojourner in the prison of the body

As the party breaks up Marius finds himself alone with the great man for a moment and manages to get some serious talk out of him. His position is Platonic Idealism:

It was the Platonic Idealism, as he conceived it, which for him literally animated, and gave him so lively an interest in, this world of the purely outward aspects of men and things.—Did material things, such things as they had had around them all that evening, really need apology for being there, to interest one, at all? Were not all visible objects—the whole material world indeed, according to the consistent testimony of philosophy in many forms—“full of souls”? embarrassed perhaps, partly imprisoned, but still eloquent souls?

So Apuleius takes Plato seriously and claims to be almost able to hear and feel the True Souls of things straining to burst through their mere appearances to the senses. Put like this, Plato’s theory is at one with the extravagant high fashion, the elaborate wigs and fancy clothes of the 2nd century elite. In fact maybe all this philosophising is the discourse of the pampered and well fed.

What really surprised me is that Apuleius speaks. Not Marius’s mother, his tutor, his boyfriend Flavian, his soldier friend Cornelius nor the emperor himself are given any dialogue at all. So it’s a red letter moment when Apuleius speaks, and his three paragraphs are pure philosophy, insisting that there are ‘divine powers of a middle nature who interceded between the timeless immortals and men who die like flies,

‘Through them, all revelations, miracles, magic processes, are effected.’

This is, of course, appropriate for a man (Apuleius) who was accused of witchcraft and whose most famous book features magic spells and rites of initiation into mystery cults. Marius extends Apuleius’s brief explication of Plato’s idea of interceding spirits towards the notion of a hierarchy of spirits or intellect, from inanimate objects, through animals, to man with his soul, up through various spirits to angels, to God himself, the kind of thing I associate with the Hellenistic philosopher, Plotinus, founder of neo-Platonism who, however, cannot appear in this book because he had not yet been born (205 to 270 AD).

21. Two Curious Houses—2. The Church in Cecilia’s House

En route back to Rome from another country house party, Cornelius takes Marius out of their way, through a locked door in a wall into what turns out to be a Christian cemetery where the dear are, of course, interred, as opposed to being incinerated according to traditional Roman practice.

He realises the tombs represent a new kind of hope which doesn’t exist in the pagan world, where death is final. As he wanders the catacombs and tombs Marius can hear sweet singing as by women or children, unlike anything he’s heard before, bespeaking a new kind of piety.

It turns out to be attached to, in the grounds of, a house belonging to none other than (Saint) Cecilia, patron saint of music. Cornelius, clearly a Christian, knows her. As usual there is no dialogue whatsoever, because what matters is that Marius experiences the clear music and hopeful atmosphere as a break from Rome which he started to find oppressive.

Here, it might be, was, if not the cure, yet the solace or anodyne of his great sorrows – of that constitutional sorrowfulness, not peculiar to himself perhaps, but which had made his life certainly like one long ‘disease of the spirit’.

22. ‘The Minor Peace of the Church’

Here begins the sequence of chapters which praise the sweetness and piety and chastity of the early church which Marius now encounters. The key word is hope, an optimism which sharply contrasts with, say, the heavy depression of the emperor Aurelius.

It was Christianity in its humanity, or even its humanism, in its generous hopes for man, its common sense and alacrity of cheerful service, its sympathy with all creatures, its appreciation of beauty and daylight.

He calls the tenor of the church under the Antonines the minor peace of the Church by contrast with the major peace which began under the Christian emperor Constantine (if we’re in about the year 170 and Constantine was converted in 312, that’s about 140 years in the future).

Pater now switches to full-on, pro-Christian mode. The church is hopeful, urbane, moderate, characterised by ‘a cheerful liberty of heart’ and ‘full, fresh faith’, lovely in ‘its comely order’, ‘the elegance of sanctity’, ‘a bold and confident gladness’, ‘her dignifying convictions about human nature’, which are to be realised centuries later by Dante and Giotto, by the great medieval church-builders, by the great ritualists like Saint Gregory, and the masters of sacred music in the middle age.

It stops being a novel altogether and becomes a sort of history, of a very old-fashioned, bookish, belles-lettres type. It is also relentlessly propagandistic, Pater insisting everything in the church was wonderful and moderate and how it expresses the finer nature of man and gave rise to all good art; how any fanaticism, asceticism, destruction of pagan buildings and statues and so on, were the result of ‘fanaticism’ and not of the mild and civilised Christianity he’s talking about. It is, in other words, bad history, because wishful, naive and superficial.

It is also chauvinistic, in the sense that Pater’s gushing over-praise of Christianity leads him to predict that it will one day become the religion of all mankind:

destined, surely! one day, under the sanction of so many ages of human experience, to take exclusive possession of the religious consciousness.

Er, no. Other religions exist, Walter. Islam. Hinduism.

23. Divine Service

Waking early Marius goes to Cecilia’s house and stumbles upon a whole congregation practising an early Christian service, something he’s never seen before and is dazzled at the beauty, the serenity etc, the devotion of the acolytes, the noble gestures of the pontiff, all carried out on a table created by the tome of a recent martyr. The text overflows with praise for the vigorous new young religion which has incorporated everything that is noble and good in the old pagan religions and lifted them to a new level, centred on the figure of Christ:

It was the image of a young man giving up voluntarily, one by one, for the greatest of ends, the greatest gifts; actually parting with himself, above all, with the serenity, the divine serenity, of his own soul; yet from the midst of his desolation crying out upon the greatness of his success, as if foreseeing this very worship.

As he does everywhere else, Pater feels no reluctance to expand what are supposedly Marius’s perceptions of ideas by relating them to the entire further development of western culture, invoking the influence of Saint Francis of Assisi, St Louis of France, the history of Renaissance painting from Giotto to Raphael.

Some critics claim this wandering feel as prophetic of post-modernist freedom, but I’d have thought it is more like standard pre-modernist lack of discipline which allowed authors to digress from a strict adherence to point of view or immediate subject matter, and wander off on whatever hobby horses they felt like indulging.

With Cornelius, in fact, it was nothing less than the joy which Dante apprehended in the blessed spirits of the perfect, the outward semblance of which, like a reflex of physical light upon human faces from “the land which is very far off,” we may trace from Giotto onward to its consummation in the work of Raphael—the serenity, the durable cheerfulness, of those who have been indeed delivered from death, and of which the utmost degree of that famed “blitheness” of the Greeks had been but a transitory gleam, as in careless and wholly superficial youth.

In other words, Pater is more concerned to show off his fine feelings and sensitive appreciation of the history of western art than to stick to the ‘discipline’ of the novel as a form. You could exaggerate only a little and see Marius as a series of philosophical and art-historical essays masquerading as a novel.

24. A Conversation Not Imaginary [Lucian]

The Greek humorist Lucian visits Rome and Marius is his host. Marius takes him to see a famous Stoic philosopher who is, however, out, so they walk on along the Appian Way. Lucian is 60 and an ‘elegant and self-complacent but far from unamiable scepticism, long since brought to perfection, never failed him’.

Lucian asks who are the up-and-coming young scholars of Rome and, as it happens, the young fellow who Marius recommends, one Hermotimus, at that very moment comes walking towards him. So they stop him, introductions are made, then Lucian questions Hermotimus, which turns into an extended dialogue. According to Michael Levey’s notes, this is an abbreviated version of an actual dialogue of Lucian’s, titled Hermotimus.

It starts as a tissue of clichés describing the supposed journey and hopes of a student of philosophy – art is long and life is short, I have a long way to travel to get to the summit of wisdom, the prize of knowledge is worth devoting your life to etc etc with zero actual argumentation. More reminiscent of the little I know of Eastern philosophy, which is more about cultivating a certain state of mind than about logic and argument. Hermotimus describes what he is devoting his life to seeking in rhetoric and figures of speech, rather than logic and argument. The elect he seeks to join enjoy:

‘Wisdom, the absolute goodness and the absolute beauty, with the sure and certain knowledge of all things—how they are. Riches and glory and pleasure – whatsoever belongs to the body – they have cast from them: stripped bare of all that, they mount up, even as Hercules, consumed in the fire, became a god… They whose initiation is entire are subject no longer to anger, fear, desire, regret. Nay! They scarcely feel at all.’

What I took from this long dialogue is that Hermotimus’s ideology is just another form of snobbery and elitism. He wants to join an elect so they can look down on all the little people who let themselves still be ruled by passion, emotion, ignorance of The Truth. So many religious and philosophical systems boil down to wanting to join a gang, become an insider, able to look down on everyone left on the outside, on ‘the vulgar herd’. If Lucian follows Hermotimus on the path to Wisdom:

‘you will learn in no long time your advantage over all other people. They will seem but as children, so far above them will be your thoughts.’

Anyway, within the narrative the point of this extended set-piece dialogue is that Lucian undermines Hermotimus’s confidence that he is on the right way by pointing out that there are no end of philosophers and rhetoricians and wise men infesting the Roman empire, all claiming that their way and their way alone is the Right Way to Wisdom. How can a learner possibly know which one to choose, unless he was already in possession of a good definition of Wisdom. In which case he wouldn’t have to choose. So, a paradox.

Lucian’s calm unrelenting scepticism wears down Hermotimus who is forced to concede that he cannot, in fact, ever be sure that the Stoic way (which he has adopted) is the True Way. He is reduced to tears. He had started out the day happy and confident in his life path and now he is reduced to utter bewilderment.

‘Ah! Lucian, what have you done to me? You have proved my priceless pearl to be but ashes, and all my past labour to have been in vain.’

As the dialogue progresses, the pair enjoy identifying and trapping each other in logical errors, non-sequiturs, unjustified conclusions and so on. If at moments it reads like one of Plato’s dialogues with the tricksy Socrates outwitting his opponent, at others it sounds like a school debating society, with each picking holes in the other’s arguments; or more like the sophists who were paid to teach just this sort of nitpicking and argufying.

The debate ends as abruptly as it began, his people coming to collect Lucian on horseback, the poor disillusioned youth continuing on his way, while Marius walks some more, then turns and heads back to Rome, along the road lined with gloomy cemeteries, and Pater superimposes the incident from the Acts of the Apostles where Jesus appeared to St Paul on this very road, only 130 or so years previously. He doesn’t name the incident, but alludes to it.

The power of the Lucian dialogue makes this a very powerful, standalone chapter but in doing so emphasises the way the entire text is constructed of defined episodes and, as here, quoted texts.

25. Sunt Lacrimae Rerum [which could be renamed the Diary Chapter]

A famous quote from Virgil, sunt lachrimae rerum literally means ‘there are tears in things’ but is often used to mean ‘the tearfulness or sorrow of the world’.

Marius kept a diary, or a ‘conversation with himself’. This chapter consists of various entries. They read like the self-pitying morbidness of a self-centred adolescent, a Goth, an emo:

‘We are constructed for suffering! What proofs of it does but one day afford, if we care to note them, as we go – a whole long chaplet of sorrowful mysteries!’

Marius is afflicted by the sense of all the suffering around him (he gives examples of labourers drudging away, of the children of the poor, of an old lady being led to a workhouse), suffering which, if he gave in to it, would drive him mad. He feels he has failed in love. He feels the need for a greater love to arise in his heart; the recognition that we need more love than we are individually capable of in order to respond adequately to a world of suffering. This is where Jesus comes in, with his infinite capacity for bearing the suffering of the world, and transcending it by his superhuman love, limitless capacity for love, godlike love.

Even if all humans were made perfect, the world itself declines and falls, flowers fade, trees are cut down: ‘there is a certain grief in things as they are’. He is hinting, I think, at the Christian doctrine of the Fall – ‘some inexplicable shortcoming, or misadventure, on the part of nature itself’. It is not just mankind that needs to be redeemed; it is the entire world.

And in the last paragraph he describes an intimation he has that there is someone else, a hidden power, capable of this great redemption, ‘behind this vain show of things’.

Clearly Pater’s aim is to show Marius as a sensitive thoughtful pagan, trembling on the brink of becoming a Christian, intellectually prepared in every way, but stopping short of the personal conviction, the spiritual ‘conversion’, which would finish the job. This ‘trembling’ aspect gives the book a pleasing tantalising feel, far more subtle and powerful than a thorough-going conversion would have been.

But there is a completely different way of reading all this, a Marxist way. At the same time as Pater was writing Marius, Friedrich Engels was preparing his most influential work, ‘Socialism: Utopian and Scientific’. Seen from this Marxist perspective Marius/Pater is a classic example of bourgeois narcissism. He enjoys all the good things of the world, never has to work, is waited on hand and foot by servants and yet is discontent. Every day he witnesses the suffering of the poor, specifically the labouring working classes and their wretched children, and feels guilty and inadequate. He knows something is terribly wrong with the world but hasn’t a clue what to do about it.

In the framework of the narrative (and Pater’s bourgeois Victorian Oxford milieu) the answer remains a personal, selfish one, namely converting to Christianity, becoming a Christian, sharing the love of the redeemer who will save all the world and, to be fair, maybe engaging in the energetic Christian charity work which characterised the Victorians.

But Engels and the international communist movement offered an alternative and communism wasn’t just a continental import. In 1881, the year Pater began Marius, English artist and designer William Morris joined the Social Democratic Federation (SDF) at its inaugural meeting. In 1884, as Pater was finishing Marius, Morris wrote ‘A Summary of the Principles of Socialism’. Believing the Federation wasn’t radical enough, in 1885, the year Pater published Marius, Morris founded the Socialist League and wrote The Manifesto of the Socialist League calling for a communist revolution in Britain.

I’m not saying that Morris’s communism was right; just pointing out that, even at the time, there were other ways of escaping from the ultimately claustrophobic, narrow, guilty world which Marius gives such a strong sense of.

26. The Martyrs

Marius finds himself drawn back more and more to Cecilia’s house with its poetry, intellectual pleasure, above all a generosity and charity utterly lacking from the tone of Marcus Aurelius’s stern Stoic contempt for one’s own or another person’s pain.

One of her children dies and is buried. The Romans cultivated indifference to the fate of children who, after all, died in their thousands. And Marius had laboured long to maintain a ‘philosophical’ detachment from all emotions so as to cultivate his precious thoughts. And yet now he finds himself deeply moved by a compassion which threatens to destabilise his careful equilibrium.

He attends a Christian service at Cecilia’s house and is transported by it, by the expression of a tremendous hope, to be liberated from the sadness and travails involved in all human existence:

It breathed more than ever the spirit of a wonderful hope – of hopes more daring than poor, labouring humanity had ever seriously entertained before…They [the congregation] were still under the influence of an immense gratitude in thinking, even amid their present distress, of the hour of a great deliverance.

But the second part of the chapter brings bad news of Christians who have been martyred by the Roman authorities, on the ultimate orders of his one-time hero Marcus Aurelius. Pater gives it in the form of a letter from the churches of Lyons and Vienne in distant Gaul, and it is in fact an actual early Christian from Eusebius’s ‘Ecclesiastical History’ (published in 325 AD). The passage describes the martyrdoms of Blandina, who remains seraphic despite the worst the Roman torturers could do to her, along with Alexander, the 90-year-old bishop Pothinus, Sanctus the deacon, tortured by having red hot plates applied to his genitals – all rejoicing in their witness and proving ‘that there is nothing fearful, nothing painful, where the love of the Father overcomes’.

Sanctus and Maturus were then thrown to the beasts in the amphitheatre and torn to pieces; Blandina was tied upon a stake for the beasts to maul but they were all overawed by her holiness and backed away. So Blandina is sent back to prison, only to be brought out the next day, and once again tortured for the crowd, alongside a 15-year-old boy, who she inspired by her bravery, till she eventually died, hastening to her death as to a bridal feast:

the enemy himself confessing that no woman had ever borne pain so manifold and great as hers.

This raises a point I like repeating which is that most modern feminists I’ve ever met excoriate ‘the Church’ and all its doings for its repression of women etc; and yet, back at the beginning, the Christian church represented a massive liberation for women. Ancient Roman like ancient Greek women, lived much as women in Saudi Arabia nowadays, confined to their houses, not allowed to leave without a chaperone, the belongings and chattels of their fathers or husbands. Early Christianity offered women an escape from the home, to take part in religious ceremonies, to perform acts of charity, to achieve a sense of personal identity and agency and, as here, to acquire fame and glory in this entirely new form of heroism, the heroic acceptance of torture and death in the name of God.

27. The Triumph of Marcus Aurelius

Not a metaphor but a literal description of the triumph of Marcus Aurelius returning into Rome from victory against German tribes in the Marcommanic Wars. This would have been 176 AD. In one of his characteristic achronicities, Pater has barely started describing it before he makes a great swoop through time to bring in an entire paragraph about Andrea Mantegna (1431 to 1506), Renaissance painter of just such triumphs.

Anyway, the point is that Marius has grown up and finds all the fanfare and splendour of the triumph trashy and vulgar.

Yes! these Romans were a coarse, a vulgar people; and their vulgarities of soul in full evidence here.

Marius sets out to visit Aurelius at his villa in the country, previously home of the pious emperor Antoninus, with a passage describing the countryside as you leave Rome and travel up towards the Apennines. Marius had hoped to petition the emperor to be more humane though I didn’t understand Pater’s meaning – does he mean Marius was going to ask Aurelius to spare the defeated German tribesmen dragged along in chains in the triumph the day before?

In any case, Aurelius already has visitors, a flock of children now being kept in the orphanage established by his wife, Faustina (who had died two years earlier). Marius hears gales of childish laughter coming from the audience room and decides, on balance, not to interrupt the happy scene nor wait. He has to press on with his journey.

This turns out to be a pilgrimage to the old family estate, White-nights, to the old villa and, above all, to the family tomb where his parents ashes were stored in ashes. He is overcome with sad feelings, not least when he sees the urn of a serving boy who was the same age as him when his mother died, placed next to hers, torn out of the world with so much left to see and feel.

With a rush of characteristic self-pity he realises that ‘he is the last of his race’. Maybe Pater the homosexual felt the same; no marry, no kids, end of the line. Anyway, the fictional Marius on the spur decides that he will be the last to visit his family tomb in this way, and orders his workmen to dismantle it and bury all the urns:

to bury all that, deep below the surface, to be remembered only by him.

28. Anima Naturaliter Christiana

Marius spends eight days at the family estate and feels death reaching up out of the ground towards him. Being the last chapter, he reviews his life and realises it has been an existence with almost zero activity, surprised by:

the unbroken placidity of the contemplation in which it had been passed. His own temper, his early theoretic scheme of things, would have pushed him on to movement and adventure. Actually, as circumstances had determined, all its movement had been inward; movement of observation only, or even of pure meditation…

Cornelius comes to stay and they explore the country and villages thereabouts. They are visiting the site of the martyrdom of Saint Hyacinthus, along with some other Christian pilgrims, when there is an earthquake. The population of the town rush out of their houses and, inflamed with panic, and the return of the plague, which they blame on the rebellious Christians, turn into a mob which attacks the small congregation. Some Christians are lynched there and then, but the others taken captive, including Marius and Cornelius.

Word gets around that one of the prisoners is not actually a Christian and Marius, in a moment of high-minded ‘nerve’, tells the warders it is Cornelius who, helped by a large bribe, they set free. Marius then spends days of anxiety wondering when Cornelius will return to free him, Marius. This reminds me of the ending of A Tale of Two Cities and also the play by Terence, when one prisoner sacrifices his freedom in order to secure his best friend’s liberty.

Instead he is shuffled along with the rest of the prisoners on the march to the nearest major town (for the trial), walking in the rain, sleeping in the open like everyone else. Eventually he becomes so ill his warders dump him at the cottage of some poor country peasants. Here he drifts in and out of fever, remembering much, conscious of having sacrificed himself for his friend.

He remembers, not so much everything he’s done as he hasn’t in fact, done very much, but everything he’s thought and felt, and the people who sparked those thoughts and feelings.

the persons, the places, above all, the touching image of Jesus, apprehended dimly through the expressive faces, the crying of the children, in that mysterious drama, with a sudden sense of peace and satisfaction now, which he could not explain to himself.

He feels there is some companion in h is suffering, that he is prepared for some revelation, for some ampler vision, the house of his mind is ready for a new guest. He feels ‘the great hope, that hope against hope, which, as he conceived, had arisen upon the aged world,’ that future generations will enjoy ampler visions, and yet…

In his last lucid moments he feels the peasants who have tended him, have offered him consecrated bread, have anointed his feet and hands with oil and are kneeling by his bedside praying. And after he dies, they bury him in secret, saying Christian prayers for his soul and considering him to have been a martyr to the faith, and yet…

We know that Marius never actually becomes a Christian. He has, after all, never been educated in Christian doctrine. The word crucifixion occurs only once, and that in the passage from Eusebius. The word resurrection occurs nowhere in the text.

It’s pretty obvious that Pater intends Marius to be the type of sensitive, thoughtful pagan who travels through pagan philosophies, discovers Christians and is attracted to their piety and faith and honour, but never, quite, crosses the threshold to actually become a Christian himself.

The fact that the peasants who nurse him and bury him consider him to have been a martyr is a puzzle. On the face of it it’s a mistake and therefore an ironic comment on the credulousness of uneducated Christians which, by implication, begs the question how many other alleged ‘martyrdoms’ celebrated by a pious church might be similar mistakes. Surely Pater didn’t intend it that way, did he?

Marius the solipsist

It’s really the story of a solipsist. Solipsism is defined as ‘the view or theory that the self is all that can be known to exist.’ Marius doesn’t go that far, he’s more a solipsist in the popular sense of the word, meaning immensely self centred. The vision he has at the end of chapter 19 makes the world seem even further off than before crystallises this interpretation.

It confirms my sense that, although his ostensible philosophical position, which Pater takes hundreds of pages to describe in such gassy detail, changes somewhat, from Cyrenaicism to Epicureanism, encountering Stoicism etc – although there may be a slight change in his stated views – there is no change in his fundamental attitude, which is of an immense, overwhelming, stifling self-centredness.

In truth, he had been so closely bent of late on certain very personal interests that the broad current of the world’s doings seemed to have withdrawn into the distance. (Chapter 27)

Although I mentioned that the book is possibly in the genre of the Bildungsoman, this is questionable because it’s questionable whether Marius’s colossal self-centredness ever changes at all. In a way, this may explain why there is almost no dialogue in the entire book – because what people say to him barely registers, barely dents his bullet-proof self-absorption.

At a tangent to this idea is another fairly obvious thought about ‘philosophy’ as a subject or ‘discipline’, which is that there is so much of it, covering more or less every kind of belief or theory or system man has ever devised, that ‘believing’ any particular philosophy is usually a matter of personality rather than argumentation.

Yes! the reception of theory, of hypothesis, of beliefs, did depend a great deal on temperament. They were, so to speak, mere equivalents of temperament.

‘Philosophy’ obviously refers to a vast set of systems of thought, often worked out to mind-numbing levels of logical detail. But at the same time…people generally believe what they want to. For all its claims to Grand Truth, someone’s philosophy is mostly, in the end, a reflection of their personality.

Quotes

Individual quotes from the work show that Pater is a very good prose stylist but, in my opinion, in the end, not great. He has the sensitivity but he doesn’t, in the end have quite the clarity and fluency of style to carry it off. Nothing in the entire wordy text is as quotable as the famous half dozen sentences from the Conclusion

Books

A book, like a person, has its fortunes with one; is lucky or unlucky in the precise moment of its falling in our way, and often by some happy accident counts with us for something more than its independent value. The Metamorphoses of Apuleius, coming to Marius just then, figured for him as indeed The Golden Book: he felt a sort of personal gratitude to its writer, and saw in it doubtless far more than was really there for any other reader. It occupied always a peculiar place in his remembrance, never quite losing its power in frequent return to it for the revival of that first glowing impression.

Self knowledge the basis of good art

A true understanding of one’s self being ever the first condition of genuine style…The happy phrase or sentence was really modelled upon a cleanly finished structure of scrupulous thought.

Last thought

Having struggled to the end of this endless interweaving fabric of philosophical speculations, many quite knotty and demanding, one big thing strikes me. We are the heirs of Darwin, Marx and Freud. When we theorise we do so in a mental universe vastly expanded by modern science – specifically biology and evolutionary theory, DNA, genes etc – a huge world of medical discoveries. Without being conscious of it most people invoke the ideas of depth psychology and therapy invented by Freud, which has split into a thousand varieties of counselling. And we talk about politics and society by the light of social theories which all start with economics and often have a Marxist materialist root, whether the authors realise it or not.

Pater had absolutely none of these things in his mental world and this explains, I think, why Marius the Epicurean feels so gaseous and often difficult to grasp. In the complete absence of modern thought, all he had was the ancient world and classical thinkers to fall back on, and the endlessly subtle distinctions the narrator makes between slightly different versions of Cyrenaicism, Epicureanism, Stoicism, Platonism (vide chapter 24 in which the clever sceptic Lucian destroys the apprentice Stoic, Hermotimus).

These subtleties, along with his application of them to the imaginative world of the early Christians, are difficult to read, rewarding, clever, sometimes moving – but all the time feel like children playing in a sandpit, compared to the vast and vastly different mental world we all now inhabit.


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Angelica Kauffman @ the Royal Academy

Angelica Kauffman (1741 to 1807) was one of the most celebrated artists of the 18th century. She isn’t an obscure figure from the past who’s been dug up by revisionist feminist curators – she was genuinely a leading artistic and cultural figure of her time, one of the most successful portrait painters in Britain, celebrated here and across Europe, prints of whose works sold in the thousands, described by one of her contemporaries as ‘the most cultivated woman in Europe’.

Self-portrait with Bust of Minerva by Angelica Kauffman (1780 to 1781) Grisons Museum of Fine Arts, on deposit from the Gottfried Keller Foundation, Federal Office of Culture, Bern

This exhibition is not a blockbuster, it isn’t an encyclopedic overview of her career. Instead it’s staged in just three rooms in the Jillian and Arthur M. Sackler Wing of Galleries at the top of the Academy building, and contains just 30 or so works, including 20 or so paintings, 7 or 8 prints, some historical letters and her sales book.

It is, in other words, not an arduous ordeal of an exhibition like the vast ‘Entangled Pasts’ show in the main galleries downstairs – instead it is a light and airy overview, as calm and civilised, as interesting and undemanding as her Enlightenment-era portraits.

Potted biography

Angelica Kauffman was born in the Swiss town of Chur in 1741. She trained with her father, the Austrian painter Joseph Johann Kauffman, and was quickly recognised as a child prodigy.

The family moved between Austria, Switzerland and Italy and Kauffman trained as both a musician and as a painter. She eventually chose to pursue the latter career professionally, a decision she dramatised in one of her most famous paintings, ‘Self-portrait at the Crossroads between the Arts of Music and Painting’ (1794). (Note the three facial poses – half-turned, slightly turned, and profile – something we’ll come back to later.)

Self-portrait at the Crossroads between the Arts of Music and Painting by Angelica Kauffman (1794) National Trust Collections (Nostell Priory, The St. Oswald Collection) Photo: © National Trust Images/John Hammond

It was in Italy that she established a reputation as an artist and was elected a member of the Roman Accademia di San Luca at the age of just 23. Although, as a woman, Kauffman was not able to officially enrol at an art academy, she nevertheless studied the works of the Old Masters and classical sculpture at first hand.

In Italy, she mixed with neoclassical artists and scholars and also met many Britons undertaking the Grand Tour. Her popularity among the community of British visitors and expatriates encouraged her to move to London in 1766.

London

Soon after arriving in London, Kauffman established a close friendship with Joshua Reynolds, the leading portrait painted in Britain, a friendship commemorated in the portraits they painted of each other. Her friendship with Reynolds and other artists, along with Royal approval, helped to ensure that when the Royal Academy of Arts was established in December 1768, Kauffman was among the group of 36 founder members (along with one other woman, the painter Mary Moser).

The founding is commemorated in Johan Zoffany’s famous group portrait of the Royal Academy members, ‘The Academicians of the Royal Academy’ (1772). As women, Kauffman and Moser were not allowed into the Life Room, where the portrait is set (on account of the nude male models). Instead, their presence was signalled by their portraits on the wall on the right (Kauffman on the left, Moser on the right).

The Academicians of the Royal Academy by Johan Zoffany (1771 to 1772) © Royal Collection

For her part, Kauffman portrayed Reynolds in his studio seated at his easel with a desk full of books and a bust of Michelangelo, his artistic hero, by his side. Standing in front of Kauffman’s atmospheric portrait of Reynolds, and reflecting on his role on getting her elected a founder member, I couldn’t help remembering the old proverb, ‘It’s not what you know, it’s who you paint that counts’.

Portrait of Joshua Reynolds by Angelica Kauffman (1767) National Trust Collections, Saltram, The Morley Collection. Photo © National Trust Images/Rob Matheson

Kauffman became one of the most sought-after artists of the period. She was in great demand as a portraitist in London – as one contemporary commented, ‘the whole world is Angelica-mad.’ In London she enjoyed a prosperous career, earning significant fame, fortune and an influential circle of patrons, many of whom were women

Richard Samuel’s Muses

Her success was marked in many ways, not only by membership of the Academy but also inclusion in a painting of eminent women of the day by Richard Samuel.

‘Portraits in the Characters of the Muses in the Temple of Apollo’ by Richard Samuel (1778) National Portrait Gallery

The eminent women are, from left to right:

  • Elizabeth Carter, scholar and writer
  • Anna Letitia Barbauld, poet and writer
  • Angelica Kauffman (seated at the easel)
  • Elizabeth Ann Sheridan, singer and writer (in the middle, singing)
  • (sitting, left to right): Catharine Macaulay, historian and political polemicist
  • Elizabeth Montagu, writer and leader of the Bluestocking Society
  • Elizabeth Griffith, playwright and novelist
  • (standing at the back): Hannah More, religious writer
  • Charlotte Lennox, writer (holding the guitar)

Somerset House commission

In the late 1770s, at the time she was appearing in this painting, Kauffman was commissioned by the Royal Academy to paint a set of four ceiling paintings depicting the ‘Elements of Art’, to be displayed in the Council Room of New Somerset House which opened in 1780.

Again Reynolds was influential because she chose to depict the four stages of composition of a work of art, as described in Reynolds’ hugely influential ‘Discourses on Art’. The four oval paintings she produced represent the four stages of Invention, Composition, Design and Colour, as classically dressed female figures bearing a remarkable resemblance to herself. (The Royal Academy owns these works and all four of them are usually on display in the Front Hall of Burlington House.)

‘Design’ by Angelica Kauffman (1778 to 1780) © Royal Academy of Arts, London. Photo: John Hammond

The exhibition includes two of the four paintings (why only two if the RA owns all of them?) alongside four of her preparatory oil sketches (now owned by the V&A). ‘Design’, in particular, is a deeply impressive work in terms of composition, colour, shade, everything.

Rome

However, despite her success in London, in 1781 Kauffman decided to return to Rome. Returning to Italy at the height of her career, she established an international clientele and a famous salon which attracted celebrated visitors including Goethe and Canova. Her studio near the Spanish Steps became a hub for the cultural elite and her status and reputation continued to prosper. One contemporary described her as ‘the most cultivated woman in Europe.’ She continued to be popular among contemporary women who wanted themselves portrayed, such as:

Portrait of Emma, Lady Hamilton, as Muse of Comedy by Angelica Kauffman (1791) Private collection

Kauffman kept up her connections with her many British friends and patrons, continuing to exhibit at the Royal Academy, sending commissions back to the UK and painting British Grand Tourists visiting Rome. She continued to develop her practice as both a portraitist and a history painter in Rome, demonstrating ever greater confidence and skill in both genres.

Death

When Kauffman died in 1807, her grand funeral in Rome was arranged by the famous sculptor Antonio Canova and a bust of the artist, sculpted by her cousin Johann Peter Kauffmann, was subsequently placed in the Pantheon, beside that of Raphael. Recognition indeed. The funeral itself was described in a letter sent to the Royal Academicians in London and read out in their General Assembly and this, like several other letters from key moments in her career, is on display here.

Self portraits

Throughout her career Kauffman produced a series of self portraits, presenting herself in different costumes and guises. As a woman artist, portraying herself enabled Kauffman to define her identity and take control of how she was seen by others. Her many self portraits shape and cultivated her aesthetic identity and they are clearly among her best works. What comes over to the visitor is how consistent they are, the three or so really great portraits collected here are almost identical in shape and feature.

Self-portrait in all’antica Dress by Angelica Kauffman (1787) © Gallerie degli Uffizi, Florence

Portraits

Royalty

Kauffman painted some of the most influential figures of her day and who more influential than royalty? She started with a commission to paint Princess Augusta, sister of King George III, and subsequently painted Queen Charlotte herself in an allegorical attitude.

Her Majesty Queen Charlotte raising the Genius of the Fine Arts, published 19 May 1772 by Angelica Kauffman

As the curators explain:

Kauffman’s commissions from royal women were an important marker of her success in London and contributed to her inclusion as one of the founding members of the Royal Academy. In 1767 she painted Queen Charlotte with her eldest son, George (later King George IV), in the guise of the ‘Genius of the Fine Arts’. The painting is now lost but its appearance is recorded in this large
mezzotint. Prints after Kauffman’s paintings proved hugely popular and helped to make her famous throughout Europe.

Enlightenment men

There are a few lords and ladies on display but the best portraits on display here are not of royalty or aristocracy – in the true Enlightenment spirit, they are of men of intellect and character, namely Joshua Reynolds, actor David Garrick, architect and theatrical-set designer Michael Novosielski. All these portraits are astonishingly good, vividly conveying the sitter’s character. You feel Garrick is just about to tell a joke, you get a strong feel for Novosielski’s inventiveness and flair. Her portrait of classical scholar Johann Joachim Winckelmann, 1764, painted when she was just 22 years old, was celebrated for its exceptional likeness.

‘Portrait of Johann Joachim Winckelmann’ by Angelica Kauffman (1764) Kunsthaus Zurich © Kunsthaus Zurich

Classical history

And yet, despite her social and financial success as a portraitist, Kauffman identified herself primarily as a history painter, the genre Reynolds placed at the heart of the Royal Academy’s teaching. She exhibited history paintings each year at the Royal Academy’s influential annual exhibitions, displaying her erudition by depicting scenes from a wide range of mythological, literary and historical sources.

According to the curators, Kauffman reinvented the genre of history painting by focusing largely on female protagonists from classical history and mythology, as in:

Apparently, Kauffman regarded these works as the core of her achievement which is a shame because they’re generally the weakest. ‘The Death of Alcestis’ (1790) demonstrates why.

‘Death of Alcestis’ (1790), Angelica Kauffman. Voralberg Museum, Bregenz. Photo: Markus Tretter

Three things:

  1. the poses of the characters are absurdly histrionic, posed and theatrical – I imagine they conformed to theatrical conventions of the day which is why the ‘serious’ plays from this period haven’t survived
  2. as a result, the bodies are bent and contorted into uncomfortable and ungainly positions
  3. somehow, as a result of the first two, the faces are universally unconvincing – they are meant to be conveying extreme emotion and feeling but the faces themselves are curiously void and blank

Now the colour of the cloaks and fabrics and the realistic depiction of folds and shadows, are marvellous. But everything else is too staged and contrived for modern taste.

Bible history

Something else noticeable in the historical paintings is the ramrod straight Roman noses. Look at the woman third from the right in Alcestis. This is particularly obvious in the one Biblical painting in the exhibition, ‘Christ and the Samaritan Woman’, (1796). The curators tells us that this was one of two canvases carried in triumph at the artist’s funeral procession, organised by the sculptor, and her close friend, Antonio Canova, along with other contemporary artists and scholars. Yes, yes, very pious and impressive but…look at Jesus’s nose! The clothes, the fabrics, the colours, the folds, the copper basin all are done very well but…that nose!

Christ and the Samaritan Woman by Angelica Kauffman (1796) Bayerische Staatsgemäldesammlungen Munich – Neue Pinakothek

Alerted to the nose issue, I realised that The Roman Nose is a sort of symbol throughout her works of History and Seriousness. It features in all the history paintings (examine the noses of Odysseus and Cleopatra) and in the famous Crossroads painting, where the figure of Art has another razor-straight, Roman schnozz.

By contrast, compare the noses of the portraits – the noses of, say Reynolds or Novosielski. These are much more realistic i.e. generally soft and nobbly. It’s one of the reasons the portraits are warm, because they have realistic noses. And then I realised the straight noses are so noticeable because the History figures are often portrayed in profile.

In fact I realised there’s a spectrum at work here: at one extreme are the ruler-straight Roman noses of the Stern and Noble History Paintings. In the middle are the realistic noses of accurate portraits such as Reynolds, Garrick and Winckelman. And at the other end of the spectrum, she has a kind of bland and diffuse style where the faces are generic late-18th century, lacking the specificity of the best portraits.

And then I began to obsess about the eyes. In the best portraits and self portraits the eyes have colour and character. In her more perfunctory work, they eyes are just black, which tends to give the faces a generic, almost cartoon quality.

Portraits of Domenica Morghen and Maddalena Volpato as Muses of Tragedy and Comedy by Angelica Kauffman (1791) National Museum in Warsaw MNW. Photo © Collection of National Museum in Warsaw. Photo: Piotr Ligier

Although it’s not a blockbuster in size or ambition, nonetheless this is an interesting exhibition because the curators have assembled a various enough selection to allow to get to know Kauffman’s work, to see her addressing different genres, and to start to get a sense of her strong points and weak points.

Bad

I shouldn’t end before saying she could be actively bad. I disliked the contorted bodies and bad faces of the history paintings but could see their purpose and was impressed by the brightly coloured fabrics in many of them. But two or three paintings on display here are just bad: in ‘Penelope at her Loom’ (admittedly an early work) the folds of curtain on the left and the golden fabric Penelope’s wearing are tremendous – but look at the face! Disaster!

‘Penelope at her Loom’ by Angelica Kauffman (1764), Brighton & Hove Museums

Arguably, Poor Maria (1777) is even worse, one of her typical histrionic poses, a badly done face, but look at the dog in this one, the head far too small for the body.

Nathaniel Dance

The friend I went with really disliked the history paintings, grudgingly admired some the self portraits and the portraits of eminent men – but insisted that the only work she really liked in the whole show was in fact by someone else altogether, a tiny watercolour portrait of Kauffman by Nathaniel Dance. Still very much in the style of its day, this tiny work is a masterpiece of minute detail and, in its way, contains more feeling and precision than anything by Kauffman. A reproduction doesn’t do its shimmering, intricate detail justice.

‘Portrait of Angelica Kauffmann’ by Nathaniel Dance (1764 to 1766) National Galleries of Scotland

To my surprise, and not mentioned in the RA exhibition, the website of the National Galleries of Scotland (who own the painting) tells us that Dance spent a great deal of time in Italy, developing his inventive approach to drawing and painting and that, while in Rome in the 1760s, he had a love affair with fellow painter, Angelica Kauffman. Maybe that explains the extraordinary care and attention to detail which characterises this miniature masterpiece.

Invisible men

This raises a small but pertinent point. Only in the label to the case displaying the register of all her paintings kept by her second husband, Antonio Zucchi, do we learn that she married at all. With this sole exception, the exhibition very studiedly excludes all reference to Kauffman’s husbands, lovers, or children, if there were any. In other words if focuses entirely on her professional and artistic achievement, with no mention of her role as wife or mother or whatever. Which I admired.

Quality of reproductions

And just a note that all the images in this review are poor quality, even the ones supplied by the Royal Academy press office. The portrait of Reynolds and the Nathaniel Dance image are particularly disappointing and don’t convey at all the colour and liveliness of the originals. Without exception all the works I’ve included are much, much more vibrant, gripping and alive in the flesh. That’s why I choose to live in London, despite the expense, pollution and inconveniences – because with very little effort and relatively minimum expense, I get to see beautiful and exquisite, exciting and breath-taking art, on a weekly basis. And all of these art works, all of them, are infinitely better seen in the flesh.


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Orientalism by Edward Said (1978) part 2

Orientalism is the generic term that I have been employing to describe the Western approach to the Orient; Orientalism is the discipline by which the Orient was (and is) approached systematically, as a topic of learning, discovery and practice.
(Orientalism, page 73)

Said’s fundamental premise is that knowledge is power – and so the entire discipline of Orientalism, along with all related types of scholarship such as the sociology and anthropology of the East, the study of Oriental languages, culture, religions, history, customs, economies, geography, ethnic groups and so on, all of them contribute to a vast interlocking system of self-reinforcing ideas about the ineradicable difference between the West and the East, and the ineradicable inferiority of the latter:

The essence of Orientalism is the ineradicable distinction between Western superiority and Oriental inferiority (p.42)

Ideas which, obviously enough, were designed to bolster, justify and explain the inevitability of imperial rule. It all circles back to the fundamental premise that Knowledge is power:

To have knowledge of a thing is to dominate it, to have authority over it. (p.32)

Knowledge of subject races or Orientals is what makes their management easy and profitable; knowledge gives power, more power requires more knowledge, and so on in an increasingly profitable dialectic of information and control. (p.36)

Straightaway you can see how Said’s thesis is premised on a basically Marxist interpretation of the compromised, parti pris nature of bourgeois culture. The naive bourgeois thinks that their culture and their scholarship is objective and truthful, beacons of rationality and self-evident truths. Whereas Marxists from the 1850s onwards developed the idea that bourgeois culture was no such thing, but in every aspect a justification for the political control of their class.

Antonio Gramsci in the 1930s extended the idea that the bourgeoisie held power by extending their values through every aspect of capitalist culture to achieve what he termed hegemony.

Michel Foucault, in a series of studies in the 1960s and 70s, gave really practical examples of how this power or hegemony extended into the furthest recesses of hospitals, lunatic asylums, prisons and other state institutions.

And Said took these ideas, very current and fashionable in the mid-1970s when he was writing, and applied them to the subject closest to his heart, to imperial rule in the Middle East or Arab world.

But the idea that so-called scholarship and academic knowledge is never pure but always tainted by the power structures of the society it is generated by, is a straight Marxist idea.

Chapter 1. The Scope of Orientalism

[Chapter 1] draws a large circle around all the dimensions of the subject, both in terms of historical time and experiences and in terms of philosophical and political themes.

1. Knowing the Oriental

In western discourse the Oriental is an object to be studied, recorded, measured and ruled. He is always in a subordinate position vis-avis the Westerner. All this scholarship doesn’t depict the Oriental as they actually are: it creates an avatar of the Oriental as inferior in every way to the Westerner, and places this image within numerous ‘frameworks of power’. So study of the Orient produces a kind of ‘intellectual power’ (p.41).

Given its enormous impact and reputation it’s a surprise to discover that Orientalism is poorly conceived and poorly written. Said really struggles to develop an argument or present evidence. Instead he asserts the same core idea over and over again. In this section he opens with a speech by Arthur Balfour to the House of Commons in 1910, then goes onto some passages from the writings of Lord Cromer, consul-general in Egypt from 1883 to 1907.

Despite his repeated lists of big categories and ideas Said is decidedly poor at placing either speech in its historical context or at performing even basic practical criticism on them. He says both demonstrate the assumption of Western superiority over the East, but I thought that was the thing he was going to analyse, and whose history and development he was going to explain. Instead he just redescribes it in much the same terms he used in the Introduction. Repetition is going to be a central tactic of the book.

It’s surprising and disappointing that, having not got very far with what ought on the face of it to be two exemplars of the heyday of Orientalising imperialism he then, abruptly, jumps to an essay by Henry Kissinger (!?), ‘Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy’, published in 1966. Said says that when Kissinger, in this essay, discusses foreign policy he divides the nations of the world into the developed world and the developing world and then claims this is the same kind of binary opposition which he, Said, sees as the basis of Orientalism (West superior, East inferior). Kissinger adds the idea that the West is superior because it went through the Newtonian scientific revolution whereas the rest of the world is inferior (less developed politically and economically) because it didn’t. I see what he’s doing but it feels like a thin and predictable interpretation.

Moreover, at this early stage, it confirms the suspicion you have from the Introduction that, in one sense, Said’s deep aim in researching and writing the book is simply to attack American foreign policy, in particular US policy regarding Israel and Palestine. He doesn’t artfully combine his personal situation and history in a subtle way with objective history and scholarship, rather the reverse; his supposed scholarship keeps collapsing to reveal the pretty straightforward political agenda lurking underneath.

Lastly he comes to another contemporary essay, ‘The Arab World’ by one Harold W. Glidden published in the American Journal of Psychiatry in 1972. By now we recognise that the title alone would be enough to get Said’s goat and, sure enough, he extracts from the article a whole load of clichés about ‘the Arab world’ (based on its patriarchy, its ‘shame culture’, the way it’s structured through patron-client relationships,  the importance given to personal honour and revenge) which, predictably enough, set Said’s teeth on edge.

We’re only at part one of the first chapter and the book is in danger of turning into little more than ‘grumpy middle aged Palestinian reads the news and is outraged by anti-Arab stereotypes’.

2. Imaginative Geography and its Representations: Orientalising the Oriental [in fact this section is about historic Western attitudes to Islam]

The academic discipline of Orientalism dates its origin to the decision of the Church Council of Vienne in 1312 to establish a series of university chairs in Arabic, Greek, Hebrew and Syriac (p.50). Until the 18th century Orientalism meant chiefly study of the Biblical languages. Then in the later 18th century the field exploded and by the mid-19th century was vast.

Modern Orientalism can be said to have started with Napoleon’s expedition to Egypt, 1798 to 1801. He took scores of scholars who explored, excavated, measured, sketched and recorded every scrap of ancient Egyptian relics they could find. The result was the vast Description de l’Égypte (‘that great collective appropriation of one country by another’, p.84), the work of 160 scholars and scientists, requiring some 2,000 artists and technicians including 400 engravers. Published in 37 volumes from 1809 to 1829, at the time of its publication it was the largest known published work in the world.

In a way the sudden fashion for all things Oriental was a transposition further East of the great awakening of interest in ancient Greece and Rome which we call the Renaissance (p.51). In 1820 Victor Huge wrote: ‘In the time of Louis XIV one was a Hellenist; now one is an Orientalist.’ There was an explosion of Asiatic and Oriental and Eastern Societies devoted to studying ‘the Orient’.

But whereas the Renaissance was based on plastic relics i.e. buildings and statues, Orientalism, indicating its origins in Bible scholarship, was overwhelmingly textual. It concerned languages and belief systems. Orientalists went to the area looking to bolster and confirm what they had in ancient texts from the region.

Said’s structuring of the material is poor. In one paragraph he says there was an Oriental school of writers i.e. Western writers who were captured by its mystique, from Goethe to Flaubert. This is an interesting idea to explore, but in the very next paragraph he is discussing whether it’s valuable for university departments which study this region to retain the name ‘Oriental’. These feel like completely different topics, each would merit a page or two of thorough investigation. Instead he plonks them haphazardly side by side and doesn’t explore either of them properly. Frustrating.

He cites the anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss on the fundamental human tendency to give ‘poetic’ or emotional meaning to our immediate surroundings and the people who inhabit them, and define them by contrast with the land beyond our ‘borders’ and the strange people who live there. Good. But in my opinion this has always seemed a weak point in Said’s argument, because he admits that ‘othering’ ‘the Other’, far from being some wicked Western vice, is in fact a universal trait and all peoples and cultures do it.

He says he wants to investigate the geographical basis of Orientalism but, characteristically, kicks this off by summarising two classic Greek plays, The Persians by Aeschylus and The Bacchae by Euripides. It’s sort of relevant as the first one is one of the earliest Greek dramas to survive and depicts ‘the East’ as a military threat in the form of the Persian Empire. The second is one of the final ancient Greek plays which has come down to us and is also about ‘the East’ which it associates with frenzied religious cults – but discussing history via literature (and therefore ignoring the evidence of archaeology and history) is always a shaky procedure.

Next thing we know Said is talking about the rise of Islam. His account is inferior to every other account I’ve ever read, lacking detail, interest or insight. Compare it, for example, with the final illuminating chapter of Peter Brown’s wonderful book, ‘The World of Late Antiquity’ (1971).

Said is blinkered by his need to twist every aspect of history to suit his thesis, to make out the West to always be blinkered, limiting, constraining, ignorant, creating the East in its own negative image. Hence he underplays the completely real threat which militant Islam actually posed to Christendom for nearly a thousand years. He refers to the West’s ‘anxiety’ as if it is an over-nervous neurotic, whereas Islamic armies captured and colonised half of Christendom, seizing all of North Africa, Spain and the entire Middle East from what had been Christian rule, then capturing the great Christian city of Constantinople and then pressing on through the Balkans into central Europe until Ottoman conquest was only finally halted just outside Vienna. See the quote from Edward Gibbon, below. Of course the West was terrified of these unstoppably conquering armies. Of course we were scared shitless of these plundering hordes. He himself admits this in a sentence thrown away while he’s discussing something else:

During its political and military heyday from the eighth to the sixteenth century, Islam dominated both East and West. (p.205)

Only someone with a poor grasp of deep history can dismiss eight centuries of Islam’s military, cultural and economic domination as if it’s nothing, a speck, a detail which we can quickly hurry past in order to get to the juicy part, the West’s wicked wicked domination of the Muslim world for, what, all of 300 years.

Having broached the topic of Islam, Said goes on to describe the way medieval authors vilified Mohammed as a kind of failed impersonator of Christ. He emphasises the West’s ‘ignorance’ and ‘narcissism’. On the next page he is claiming that this kind of ignorance created the Orient as a kind of theatre attached to Europe on whose stage were presented a whole series of Oriental types and stereotypes, from Cleopatra onwards. His text moves fast and deals with a confusing variety of topics, all of them very superficially. The only constant is his relentless criticism of every aspect of ‘the West’.

He introduces us to the Bibliothegue oriental of Barthelemy d’Herbelot (1697), which was to remain the standard reference work on the subject for over a hundred years, before going on to explain how this kind of encyclopedic work narrows and constrains its subject matter until readers could only approach this knowledge of the Orient via ‘the learned grids and codes’ provided by the Orientalist.

Said makes this sound like some awful conspiracy, as if the worst thing anybody could ever do would be to write a book on a factual subject, because that would involve imposing ‘grids and codes’ on it and so preventing any reader ever struggling through to a ‘true’ understanding of it.

In fact Said frequently uses these scare tactics, as if he’s letting you in on the shocking truth! The text as a whole has the obsessively repetitive feel of a conspiracy theorist letting you in on a secret which is even worse than the fake moon landings, who killed JFK and what really happened at Roswell, yes, this previously covered-up, hush-hush secret is that…a lot of Western literature and culture stereotypes the so-called ‘Orient’ and ‘the Arab world’ and ‘Islam’.

Next Said has a couple of pages revealing that Dante, in his great masterpiece The Divine Comedy, put Mohamed right in the lowermost pit of hell, next to Satan, for the sin of being a sensualist and religious impostor. He takes this as an epitome of the West’s fundamental Islamophobia.

Said broadens his critique out to describe how conquering Islam came to be seen in Christendom as the vital ‘Other’ against which European Christendom defined itself. Far from being some kind of revelation, this just strikes me as being obvious, really bleeding obvious, particularly to anyone who’s ever read any medieval history. Of course European Christendom defined the Islamic Arab world as ‘the Other’ because it was the Other. India let alone China were just rumours. Nobody had ever been to sub-Saharan Africa. Nobody knew North or South America or Australia existed. To anyone living in medieval Europe, in a society drenched at every single level at every single moment in Christian belief and practice, all there was was Christendom and facing it the enemy at the gates who threatened to overthrow and destroy everything they knew and cared for. Of course the Orient was depicted as alien, because it was alien. Of course it was depicted as threatening, because it had overrun and conquered half of Christendom. Even Said at one point admits this:

From the end of the seventh century until the battle of Lepanto in 1571, Islam in either its Arab, Ottoman or North African and Spanish form dominated or effectively threatened European Christianity. (p.74)

Said goes on to quote Edward Gibbon’s Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire without, apparently, realising the full implications of what he’s citing:

In the ten years of the administration of Omar, the Saracens reduced to his obedience thirty-six thousand cities or castles, destroyed four thousand churches or temples of the unbelievers, and edified fourteen hundred mosques for the exercise of the religion of Mahomet. One hundred years after his flight from Mecca, the arms and the reign of his successors extended from India to the Atlantic Ocean.

‘Destroyed four thousand churches.’ How do you think that struck a society completely dominated by Christian belief? With horror and terror.

3. Projects [turns into a list of French Orientalists]

Starts with more stuff about the rivalry between Christianity and Islam. Yawn. By page 75 I was remembering my impression on first reading this book 40 years ago, that Said just doesn’t have the intellectual chops to manage such a huge subject, with all its vast conceptual ramifications, that he is trying to address. He’s bitten off far more than he can chew and the symptoms of this are his repetitiveness, his superficial analyses, his raising complex issue only to move swiftly on. And his superficial and often wrong versions of history.

The Ottoman Empire had long since settled into a (for Europe) comfortable senescence, to be inscribed in the nineteenth century as the ‘Eastern Question’. (p.76)

1) The Ottoman Empire did not settle into a ‘comfortable senescence’ in the later 18th and 19th centuries. There was a good deal of upheaval and violence in the palace of the Sultan, not to mention endless uprisings and rebellions by national groups around the empire.

2) Said’s tone is unpleasantly patronising, condescending to the both the contemporary politicians who had to deal with and the modern historians who write about the Eastern Question. The use of the modish, pretentious, would-be Parisian intellectual verb ‘inscribed’ tries to hide the fact that Said doesn’t know what he’s talking about. The ‘Eastern Question’ is the term given to the series of geopolitical tensions and international crises brought about by the obvious decline and fall of the Ottoman Empire, crises which included, for example, the Crimean War and a stream of military and diplomatic crises in the Balkans in the 1870s and 1880s which threatened to drag all Europe into war. See my review of Andrew Roberts’s life of Lord SalisburyThat book was extremely well researched, intelligently analytical and beautifully written. Next to Roberts, Said looks like a blustering frog puffing up his throat to try and persuade everyone how important he is.

The next orientalist book of note after Barthelemy d’Herbelot‘s Bibliothegue oriental, was Simon Ockley‘s History of the Saracens (1708). Ockley shocked contemporaries by recording how much of the ancient world only survived because the Muslims saved it.

Next major Orientalist was Abraham Hyacinthe Anquetil-Duperron (1731 to 1805), the first professional French Indologist, whose work on Avestan texts prompted him, unlike previous scholars, to actually go to India. (The Avesta is the primary collection of religious texts of Zoroastrianism, composed in the Avestan language.) Anquetil’s publications (including a translation of the Upanishads), opened up huge new vistas of Indian literature to European readers.

Next major Orientalist was Sir William Jones (1746 to 1794), British philologist, orientalist and scholar of ancient India. It was Jones who first suggested the relationship between European and Indo-Aryan languages which is now widely accepted. Said doesn’t like him. Jones was a polymath who embarked on a deep immersion in the languages and texts of India. He founded the Asiatic Society of Bengal in 1784. According to some he was ‘the undisputed founder of Orientalism’ (p.78).

As Said went on about Jones, and the other Brits who gathered round him, studying and translating Sanskrit texts (e.g. Charles Wilkins, first translator of the Bhagavad-Gita, in 1785), I suddenly realised we had made a huge leap away from Islam, Mohammed and the Arab world to India, a completely different civilisation.

That is the primary problem with Said’s use of the word and concept ‘Oriental’, that it can refer to the Near East, Middle East, Far East, India, China, Japan you name it – and Said doesn’t help. He offers no conceptual or lexical clarification, no way of making the term more geographically or conceptually precise. In fact you realise that it suits his political agenda to keep it as open and slippery as possible. This allows him to jump from one criticism to another of ‘the West’ and its awful Oriental scholars all the more easily, to shift his ground, to continually move the goalposts.

His narrative moves on to Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt which, you will remember, was described just 40 pages ago. He repeats some of the key facts from the earlier passage, but adds new details. This, you feel, is how Said’s mind works, going round in circles, covering the same ground albeit with new wrinkles, making the same points again and again – Western Orientalism was (and is) an artificial construct, a self-referential system, built on self-serving stereotypes of Oriental backwardness, laziness, corruption and sensuality, which paved the way for and justified Western (French and British) imperialism.

The most interesting new bit is a (typically brief) account of Constantin François de Chassebœuf, comte de Volney (1757 to 1820) who wrote an extremely practical record, Voyage en Egypte et en Syrie (1787), which detailed the obstacles an invader would face in conquering Egypt, and was consulted and used by Napoleon. Many of Napoleon’s Orientalist scholars had trained under de Sacy and Said tells us his pupils dominated the field of Orientalism for the next 75 years.

de Sacy was the first Frenchman to attempt to read the Rosetta stone (discovered by some of Napoleon’s soldiers in 1799) and he was a teacher of Jean-François Champollion who went on to play a key role in deciphering it and Egyptian hieroglyphics.

The introduction to the vast Description of Egypt was written by Jean-Baptiste Joseph Fourier (1768 to 1830) known to history as a mathematician but who accompanied Napoleon’s expedition as scientific adviser. Fourier was appointed secretary of the Institut d’Égypte and contributed papers to the Egyptian Institute (also called the Cairo Institute) which Napoleon founded with the aim of weakening British influence in the East.

Said, characteristically, sees these institutes devoted to study of the Orient (and the others founded around Europe at the same time) as ‘agencies of domination and dissemination’ (alliteration is an important element of critical theory; sounds impressive) (p.87).

Said gives a handy half-page list (God, he loves lists) of the aims of Napoleon’s project, as summarised by Fourier himself, which amounts to a shopping list of Orientalism, namely:

  • to restore Egypt from its present fallen state to its former glory
  • to instruct the Orient in the ways of the modern West
  • to promote ‘knowledge’ of the East
  • to define ‘the East’ in such a way as to make it seem a natural appendage or annex of the West
  • to situate European scholars as on control of Oriental history, texts, geography
  • to establish new disciplines with which to control even more ‘knowledge’ about the Orient
  • to convert every observation into a ‘law’ about the eternal unchanging essence of ‘the Orient’
  • to bring ‘the obscurity’ of the Orient into the light and clarity of Western science

Above all, to convert the 3D ‘reality’ of the multivariant Orient into texts, the fundamental sources of power and control in Western ideology, sources written by Westerners, edited by Westerners, updated by Westerners, for the minds and imaginations of Western politicians and public. Fourier goes on to confirm all Said’s ideas when he writes that Egypt will provide ‘a theatre’ for Napoleon’s ‘gloire’ (p.86).

The Orient as stage for Western glory. Out of this matrix of dominating discourses come classics of Orientalising literature such as:

  • François-René de Chateaubriand’s Itinéraire de Paris à Jérusalem (1811)
  • Alphonse de Lamartine’s Voyage en Orient (1835)
  • E.W. Lane’s Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians (1836)
  • Richard Burton’s Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to El-Medinah and Meccah (1856)
  • Gustave Flaubert’s Salammbô (1862)

In the world of scholarship the next milestone was Ernest Renan’s Histoire générale et système comparé des langues sémitiques (1855).

Said’s text progresses not logically and chronologically, but crabwise, digressively, one thing leading to another. It’s fairly well known that the Suez Canal was conceived, designed and supervised by Ferdinand de Lesseps. Less well known that his father Mathieu de Lesseps went to Egypt as part of Napoleon’s huge expedition and stayed on after the Napoleonic forces withdrew in 1801.

It’s a mental tic of Said’s that he often writes a sentence or paragraph or topic about a subject, then shoehorns in a sentence in parentheses because it’s in his notes and it’s relevant but he can’t think of a way of including it in a logical exposition. An example is the way he ends his discussion of the Suez Canal’s symbolic significance (uniting East and West, ‘opening’ Egypt to the modern world etc) with a really throwaway reference to the Suez Crisis of 1956. He should either have given the Suez Crisis a paragraph of its own, where its significance could have been properly developed, or not mentioned it all. A brief throwaway reference is the worst of all worlds, but very typical of his scatter-gun, repetitive and badly structured approach.

For Said the Suez Canal finally dispelled the notion of the Orient as somehow remote and barely reachable. The Suez Canal dragged ‘the Orient’ into the fast-growing global imagination, made it imaginatively reachable (he doesn’t mention the establishment of the first Cook’s tours to Egypt at around the time of the canal’s opening, the 1860s). At the same time made it more of an annex and dependency.

4. Crisis

He repeats one his basic ideas which is that Orientalism amounted to the transformation of messy reality into tidied-up texts.

It seems a common human failing to prefer the schematic authority of a text to the disorientations of direct encounters with the human. (p.93)

He calls this the textual attitude. Travel books are an epitome of this attitude, assuring readers of a kind of Platonic ideal of a place which all-too-often fails to live up to the book’s idealised portrait.

Suddenly he’s giving a page-long quote from Egyptian social scientist Anwar Abdel Malek (1924 to 2012), from his 1963 essay ‘Orientalism in crisis’.

This is a not particularly relevant preliminary to ‘a history of Orientalism’. Said says all the pioneering Orientalists were philologists. Almost all the great discoveries in philology of the nineteenth century were based on study of texts brought back from the Orient. The central idea was that European languages were descended from two great families of Oriental languages, Indo-European and Semitic. Said gives a political interpretation of this, saying it proves 1) the linguistic importance of the Orient (its languages and scripts) to the achievements of Western research/knowledge, and 2) the Western tendency to divide and categorise Oriental materials to suit its own interests.

Orientalism is inextricably bound up with the study of language and texts; and therefore had a huge tendency to look far back into the past, to a golden age when Orientals lived the idealised lives depicted in the Upanishads or the Koran. In other words, a field of study entirely based on romantic images of an ideal past was always going to regard the messy realities of modern life in India or the Middle East as ‘degraded’ and fallen. Orientalists travelled to the East with their heads full of Romantic ideals and were horrified by the poverty and backwardness of what they saw, leading to a universal agreement that inhabitants of the modern Orient were degraded, debased and vulgarised – ‘an upsetting demystification of images culled from texts’ (p.101).

He’s barely told us he’s going to do a history of Orientalism before he tells us he’s not, and instead going to rattle off lists of eminent Orientalists ‘to mention a few famous names almost at random’ (p.99). Scholars, philosophers, imaginative writers, novelists, poets, travel writers, and explorers and archaeologists, they all contributed to the vast hegemony of Orientalism.

Suddenly it’s 1955, the year of the Bandung Conference, by which date all the nations of the former Orient were independent, presenting Orientalists with conceptual problems. This undermined (destroyed) one whole trope about Oriental peoples, of them being passive and fatalistic.

(This itself is obviously a gross simplification since movements for independence began to stir as early as the 1880s [the Indian National Congress was founded in 1885)], were loud and powerful enough to worry Kipling in the 1890s, and gained new momentum after the Great War. I.e. it’s plain wrong to say the trope of passive Orientals was overthrown by 1955, the contrary evidence was highly visible 50 years earlier.)

Suddenly Said is quoting from the first of a series of lectures given by the ‘great’ Oriental scholar H.A.R. Gibb in 1945, ‘Modern Trends in Islam’, a passage which beautifully illustrates the kind of tropes Said is on about, in that Gibb pontificates about ‘the Arab mind’ being utterly different from the Western mind, specifically in its inability to generalise from individual instances out to general laws and so their inability to have the rationalist thought and utilitarian practices which characterise the West.

This slips somehow into critiquing modern-day Orientalists such as Bernard Lewis (1916 to 2018) who set themselves up as experts on ‘Islam’, ‘the Arab mind’ and so on but just repeat the same old slanders about the Orient’s ineradicable backwardness but also – and suddenly the political Said steps forward into the limelight – uses all these tropes and prejudices to defend Israeli policy in Palestine.

And this turns quickly into polemic as he accuses Orientalists of ignoring ‘the revolutionary turmoil’ gripping the Islamic Orient, the ‘anticolonialism’ sweeping the Orient, as the world faces various disasters (nuclear, environmental) Said accuses politicians of ‘exploiting popular caricatures’ of the Orient.

These contemporary Orientalist attitudes flood the press and the popular mind. (p.108)

And his anger at white people:

A white middle-class Westerner believes it is his human prerogative not only to manage the nonwhite world but also to own it. (p,108)

Who’s making sweeping generalisations now? Who’s invoking racial stereotypes now?

You can’t help thinking that the tiger of passionate political polemic is constantly straining at the leash just below the surface of Said’s text, ready at any moment to break free and unleash a torrent of righteous indignation, genuine anger not only at Western Orientalists but the greedy white societies which host them. Pages 105 to 110 display his real anger at the way academic, cultural and political Orientalists deploy a whole armoury of demeaning tropes and stereotypes to maintain the lie of the Oriental as a passive, backward degenerate, even up to the time of writing (1976 to 1977).

It might also explain why the book is so poor as scholarly exposition, why he promises some kind of history of Orientalism on page 96 but a few pages later apologises for giving us only a very superficial sketch, skipping over names and dates, citing essays and speeches almost at random. It’s because what is really motivating him is to get to the Polemical Outburst.

(I got to the end of this section without really understanding why it was titled ‘crisis’.)

Chapter 2. Orientalist Structures and Restructures

[Chapter 2] attempts to trace the development of modern Orientalism by a broadly chronological description, and also by the description of a set of devices common to the work of important poets, artists and scholars.

In this chapter my concern is to show how in the nineteenth century a modern professional terminology and practice were created whose existence dominated discourse about the Orient, whether by Orientalists or non-Orientalists. (p.156)

1. Redrawn Frontiers, Redefined Issues, Secularised Religion

Like the literary critic he started out as, Said opens with a 2-page summary of the plot of Flaubert’s last novel, Bouvard and Pecuchet, two clerks who come into an inheritance, resign, buy a house in the country and proceed to systematically study every subject then known to modern man, with a view to mastering all the arts and crafts. Inevitably, the turn out to bodge every single one. Said’s quoting the novel because in Flaubert’s notes for the ending (he died before completing it) the pair talk about the future and hope for a great regeneration of the West by the East.

Said takes this as his theme and shows how it derived from the Enlightenment achievement of rejecting Christianity but incorporating many of its mental structures, such as a millennial transformation of society, and how, in a central thread of the Romantic tradition, this transformation and redemption was expected to come from the East, or from the reintegration of Eastern and Western thought.

Modern Orientalism derives from secularising elements in eighteenth century European culture (p.120)

This triggers a rash of name-dropping – Schlegel, Novalis, Wordsworth, Chateaubriand, Comte, Schopenhauer.

Said is, of course, sharply critical of this whole way of thinking, saying it’s yet another example of Western intellectuals thinking they own the world and that ‘Asia’ or ‘the Orient’ will be happy to play this redemptive role for the benefit of the West.

During the eighteenth century the way for modern Orientalist structures was laid down in four major developments:

  1. Expansion The East was opened up far beyond the Islamic lands, by a range of explorers he lists
  2. Historical confrontation History benefited from an anthropology which conceived of cultures as self-contained systems and began to think more sympathetically about them e.g. George Sales’s translation of the Koran which also translated Muslim commentators
  3. Sympathy Leading to ‘sympathetic identification’ by which some writers, artists, and Mozart (his opera, ‘The Abduction from the Seraglio’) imaginatively identified with the East, he briefly sketches the rise of the Gothic and exotic in writers like Beckford, Byron, Thomas Moore et al
  4. Classification The Western impulse to categorise everything into types, Linnaeus, Buffon, Kant, Diderot, Johnson, Montesqieu, Blumenbach, Soemmerring, Vico, Rousseau, it’s difficult to make out the scanty ideas through the blizzard of impressive names

In this chapter:

My thesis is that the essential aspects of modern Orientalist theory and praxis (from which present-day Orientalism derives) can be understood, not as a sudden access of objective knowledge about the Orient, but as a set of structures inherited from the past, secularised, redisposed, and reformed by such disciplines as philology, which in turn were naturalised, modernised and laicised substitutes for (or versions of) Christian supernaturalism. (p.122)

2. Silvestre de Sacy and Ernest Renan: Rational Anthropology and Philological Laboratory

An extended discussion of the lives and works of these two founding Orientalists or, as he puts it, Orientalism’s:

inaugural heroes, builders of the field, creators of a tradition, progenitors of the orientalist brotherhood (p.122)

In Said’s usual manner this starts out reasonably clearly but soon gets bogged down in his characteristically elliptical, digressive, list-heavy and oddly expressed style. It is a struggle to read. Sacy was interested in fragments of texts and knowledge (a mindset very typical of the Romantic generation).

Renan is tougher-minded. Said’s passage on Renan brings out the importance of philology, considered as a leading discipline. He brings in Nietzsche, who was also a philologist, to describe how the discipline means bringing to light the meanings latent in words and language. Renan wrote in 1848: ‘the founders of the modern mind are philologists.’ The ‘new’ philology of the start of the nineteenth century was to score major successes:

  • the creation of comparative grammar
  • the reclassification of languages into families
  • the final rejection of the divine origins of language

Prior to this scholars thought that God gave Adam the first language in the Garden of Eden. The systematic discoveries of philologists in Semitic then Sanskrit languages, along with the texts newly discovered and translated from India, was to make the story of one divine origin for language untenable, and also to call into question the previously accepted timelines of the Book of Genesis.

Thus it was his philological studies which led Renan to lose his Christian faith and then to go on to write the secular Life of Jesus, published in 1863, the first account to portray Jesus as a purely human figure, which had a dramatic impact on intellectual life all across Europe.

In my opinion, Said misses a big point here, a massive point, which is that European Christendom (and latterly American Christian churches) have a weird, strange, distorted interest in the Middle East because that is where their religion comes from.

Islam has a kind of geographical integrity, because the key locations of the religion are in the ongoing heartlands of Islamic territory i.e. Saudi Arabia and to a lesser extent Jerusalem. By contrast the faith and ideology on which ‘the West’ based itself until very recently, along with all its holy texts, derive from a geographical location outside itself, completely detached from itself by the Muslim conquests of the 7th and 8th centuries.

This accident of history and geography explains why ‘the West’ has had such an intrusive, interfering interest in the Middle East, from the Crusades to Russia claiming control of the Holy Places which triggered the Crimean War, the mandates over Palestine and Syria between the wars – and always will have, for the region is the ground zero of its religious and ideological underpinnings.

The Orientalists Said describes were so obsessed with the Middle East because they sought, through their philological enquiries, to get closer to the heart of and seek out deeper secrets, of their faith and religion. Hence the recovery of all the texts they could get their hands on, the immense effort put into the archaeology of the region, setting up umpteen Institutes and learned societies.

Said mentions the minuscule number of ‘Orientals’ who came to Europe during the nineteenth century compared to the tidal wave of Europeans who went to the Orient and this is a major reason. Not many Arabs or Indians are interested in visiting, for example, Stonehenge, which has a purely tourist interest for them. But potentially every Christian had a profound vested interest in the stream of archaeological and philological discoveries which poured out the Middle East and Egypt throughout the nineteenth and on into the early twentieth century (for example, the discovery of the tomb of Tutankhamen) because each new discovery shed light on their faith, and the sum total of the discoveries tended to undermine Christian faith altogether, as it did in the high profile case of Renan.

Said brings out how Renan came to prefer the Sanskrit family of languages origin of the idea of an Indo-European language i.e. ancestors of European languages, over the Semitic family, which is the parent of Hebrew and Arabic. His dislike of the latter hardened into an antisemitic attitude which he expressed with growing virulence and became part of the anti-Arab, anti-Islamic discourse of Orientalism.

Said very briefly refers to the post-Prussian haste among the imperial powers to draw up maps, to mark boundaries of power and control over the colonial possessions. Hence (he doesn’t say this) the notorious Berlin Conference of 1885, called to allow all the European powers to peacefully agree who controlled which parts of Africa, through to the post-Great War division of the Middle East between Britain and France and the equally notorious maps of new states drawn up by Mark Sykes and Georges Picot.

The aim of all this map making activity was never the interest of the native inhabitants, but solely the need to avert conflict arising between the powers, above all between France and Britain.

3. Oriental Residence and Scholarship: The Requirements of Lexicography and Imagination

The profession of Orientalist is based on multiple inequalities, of wealth and power and intellectual control (of the West over the East).

This section carries on from the previous section, dwelling on Renan’s contempt for Semitic languages and peoples and asserting that philology, by reducing a language to its roots, has a similar reductive effect on views about its speakers and peoples. He comments on the tendency of Orientalists of the Romantic generation to project grand romantic feelings onto the Orient, then experience an adverse reaction when they learned more about the reality of the actual contemporary Orient, accusing it of being ‘backward’ and ‘barbaric’.

So many Orientalists ended up hating their subject, not just Renan but William Muir, Reinhart Dozy, Alfred Lyall, Caussin de Perceval. Each of these pieced together and constructed versions of ‘the Orient’ from fragments, creating imaginary models for other Orientalists to debate.

Popular stereotypes about the Orient were perpetrated by mainstream authors such as Thomas Carlyle and Lord Macaulay. Orientalist tropes were used by eminent men in unrelated fields as diverse as Cardinal Newman or French naturalist and zoologist Georges Cuvier.

Marx and abstraction

Even Karl Marx, usually friend of the poor and downtrodden, gives in to Orientalist tropes in his 1850s writings about India, where he says that although British rule is harsh and stupid, it may be historically necessary to waken India from its backward, barbaric stupor.

Said quotes a bit of Marx on India where the latter himself quotes Goethe, and this, for Said, shows the origins of Marx’s Orientalism in classic Romantic worldview, wherein peoples and races need redemption from suffering through pain.

The idea of regenerating a fundamentally lifeless Asia is a piece of pure Romantic Orientalism. (p.154)

Said says these are all examples of Western knowledge’s tendency to group everything into high-level categories and groups and ignore the multiplicity, diversity and specificity of individual lives on the ground. He makes the fairly crude accusation that:

Orientalists are neither interested in nor capable of discussing individuals. (p.154)

 I have a big problem with this whole angle of Said’s attack, because the tendency to categorise and group entities under abstract terms is, of course, fundamental to the management of all knowledge and of all modern societies. The field of medicine I work in is only possible by virtue of general categories, starting with the notion of ‘patients’ or ‘cases’. Take epidemiology, ‘the study of the determinants, occurrence, and distribution of health and disease in a defined population’, which played a central role in the management of COVID-19 around the world – this is only possible by converting individual cases into numbers and groups and categories.

Accusing just the one academic discipline of Orientalism of doing this – turning the specificity of individual people into abstract categories and numbers – seems to me 1) factually incorrect; almost all academic or professional specialisms do just this; and 2) this approach is the basis of our entire civilisation, the entirety of Western science, medicine, public health provision and so on rests on this approach.

I take the point that, in his opinion, the conversion of teeming cities full of all kinds of races, religious groups, ethnicities, sexualities and so on into one big dumb category, the Orient, is a kind of abuse of the procedure, and was designed to justify imperial conquest and rule. Yes yes. But to attack the intellectual approach of gathering large numbers of people together under particular headings or categories as somehow inherently wicked and abusive seems to me plain wrong.

Anyway Said spends a page guessing that what happened is Marx’s initial sympathy for suffering individuals in the East met, in his mind, the censorship and ‘the lexicographical police action of Orientalist science’, of the accumulated playbook of orientalist metaphors prevalent in his Romantic sources, and shut down his human sympathies in favour of Orientalist stereotypes.

What Said’s devoting a couple of pages to Marx really indicates is how important Marx still was to his audience in the academy back in 1978, that he has to perform such mental gymnastics to reconcile what he wrote about India with what he takes for granted was ‘Marx’s humanity, his sympathy for the misery of people’ (p.154).

As so often Said is blinkered or partial because the whole point of Marx is that he was a kind of acme of converting individual people into vast historical abstractions; his whole deal was about mentally converting the teeming masses of capitalist countries into vast abstracts named the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. In doing so he notoriously dismissed vast numbers of people who would be trodden on and be victims of the historical process, namely the industrial bourgeoisie which would have to be eliminated in a violent revolution. And all of this needed to be carried out in the cause of the biggest Romantic redemptive project every conceived i.e. the creation of the utopian classless society.

But Said ignores the fact that Marx’s central procedure was to apply huge dehumanising categories to all Western societies, and instead somehow wants imply that he only did it to India; that this was somehow unique to his thought, a uniquely dehumanising and uniquely Orientalising manoeuvre to make, whereas, as I’ve just shown, the very same procedure was of course fundamental to Marx’s entire approach.

Travelling to the Orient

Moving on, Said says you can draw a distinction between Orientalists who stayed in Europe and worked from texts, and those who actually went to the Orient, some of them settling and living there. Here they had the exciting experience of living like kings, the life of the privileged imperial conqueror, waited on hand and foot, free to travel anywhere.

Goes on to say that an interesting process can be observed, which is they start off writing about specific experiences but sooner or later come up against Orientalist tropes, rather like the buffers in a railway station. Some Western writing became official while other texts remained personal, such as tourist and travel writing (Flaubert, Kinglake, Mark Twain). He attempts a little categorisation of motives for travelling to the Orient at this period (mid-nineteenth century):

  1. The writer aiming to gather information for scientific purposes
  2. The writer intending to gain evidence but happy to mix this with personal observation and style – e.g. Richard Burton’s Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to Al-Madinah and Mecca (1857)
  3. The writer who travels to fulfil a personal (often literary) project – e.g. Gérard de Nerval’s Voyage en Orient (1851)

He calls the intentions of the different writers, their ‘author-function’ (p.159). I looked this up and a) it’s a term coined by Foucault who, as we’ve seen, Said is very indebted to throughout; and b) Foucault uses the term author-function as: ‘a concept that replaces the idea of the author as a person, and instead refers to the ‘discourse’ that surrounds an author or body of work’ (Open University)

He cashes this out with an extended discussion of the career of Orientalist Edward Lane (1801 to 1876), showing how the quirky personal asides he included in his monumental 1836 work, ‘Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians’, were expunged in his subsequent works – an entirely functional Arabic-English Lexicon and an ‘uninspired’ translation of the Arabian Nights (p.164).

4. Pilgrims and Pilgrimages, British and French

Pursuing the same line, Said categorises the many writers who went on journeys to the Orient as ‘pilgrims’.

(In my opinion the chapter title and concept just highlight the huge holes in his account, which include a proper discussion of actual Christian pilgrimage, a proper consideration of medieval literature, which would include a proper account of the Crusades and, indeed the vast and generally unread libraries of devotional Christian literature. Seen in this wider perspective, Said’s account pretty much solely focuses on the nineteenth century, taking its start from writers he would have taught in his comparative literature course, such as Victor Hugo, Gérard de Nerval, Flaubert and going a bit beyond them into the actual literature of Orientalists such as Sacy, Renan, Burton, Lane and so on. But of the vast hinterland of medieval and Christian accounts of the Orient, almost nothing [excepting the passage about Dante]. Not his specialism, not his area.)

He compares and contrasts British and French visitors to the region and makes the simple point that the British had strong or defining presence on the ground and the French didn’t: the British beat the French to seize India during the eighteenth century and slowly ramped up their presence in the Middle East till they established an unofficial protectorate over Egypt in 1882.

The Mediterranean echoed with the sounds of French defeats, from the Crusades to Napoleon. What was to become known as ‘la mission civilisatrice’ began in the nineteenth century as a political second-best to Britain’s presence. (p.169)

The (partly) explains why (some) British writing feels practical and administrative while some much French writing is more imaginative, projective, wistful, dwelling in ruins and lost hopes etc.

He spends some time summarising François-René, vicomte de Chateaubriand’s ‘Itinerary from Paris to Jerusalem of 1811’. Said shows how, besides Chateaubriand’s obsessive narcissism the book reeks of Orientalist tropes, despising Islam, regarding the Arab as degraded, saying the whole region needs to be redeemed by the West. Said talks about his ‘Christian vindictiveness’ (p.174).

He moves on to discuss Alphonse de Lamartine’s ‘Voyage en Orient’ of a generation later, 1835. He, too, ends up disliking the reality of the terrain and people (thinking it was painted better by Poussin, p.178) and saying it is ripe for conquest and development by the West.

Then on to Nerval (visited 1842-3) and Flaubert (1849-50). Nerval writes of an eerily empty Orient, disappointing the Romantic fantasies he had learned from (earlier Orientalist) books. He copies large blocs from Edward Lane’s account and passes them off as his own.

Flaubert, much the greater writer, vividly describes what he sees before him in notes and his wonderful letters. The Orient was to bulk large in two of his six novels, Salammbô (1862) and The Temptation of Saint Anthony (1874). Said takes an excerpt from Flaubert’s notes on visiting a hospital to highlight the way morality and revulsion are completely excise; all that matters is the correct rendering of exact detail (p.186).

The most famous episode in Flaubert’s journey to the Orient was the time he spent with Kuchuk Hanem, an Egyptian sex worker. This is a peg for Said to talk a little about the sexual stereotypes of the East and to make the fairly obvious point that not only for nineteenth century writers but for many readers ‘the Orient’ became associated with sensuality, guilt free and available sex, much more available than back in Victorian strictly regimented Europe.

But the main impact this had on me was to realise how little he talks about sex, desire, gender, feminism, themes which massively saturate modern academic studies. In fact he raises the issue, why the Orient then (and now) suggests ‘not only fecundity but sexual promise (and threat), untiring sensuality, unlimited desire, deep generative energies’, before going on to say (in his typically not quite correct English) ‘it is not the province of my analysis here.’ A little later (p.208) he refers to the use of Orientalist stereotypes of ‘exotic’ sex in semi-pornographic novels but, by and large, it’s not his thing, his aim, his subject.

Then he returns to his main theme, ‘the sense of layer upon layer of interests, official learning, institutional pressure, that covered the Orient as a subject matter and as a territory during the second half of the nineteenth century’ (p.192).

British visitors and writers had a harder more realistic sense of what pilgrimages to the Orient entailed. The French didn’t own any territory and so were, in a sense, more imaginatively free. The British were always anchored in the reality by the vast responsibility of India, later on of Egypt, both of which meant that tough questions about administration and Realpolitik lurked behind even the most carefree travelogue. In a word, they are less imaginative. He has harsh words for Alexander Kinglake (1809 to 1891, Eton and Cambridge), English travel writer and historian, whose ‘Eothen’ or Traces of travel brought home from the East’ (1844) was wildly popular. Kinglake didn’t let his ignorance of any Oriental language and poor grasp of its culture stop him from making sweeping xenophobic, antisemitic and racist generalisations about the culture, mentality and society of ‘the Orient’.

This contrasts with the splendid achievements of Richard Burton, always an imperialist at heart, but a rebel against the establishment who took great delight in pointing out to the Orientalists that he knew more languages, had travelled more, seen more and understood more of the Arab mind than they ever would. Of all the writers of the classic Orientalist period Burton is the one who knew most about the actual specificities of Arab and Muslim life which Said values. He is maybe the last compromised of all these writers. And yet throughout his work is the assumption that the Orient is there to be taken, to be ruled by the West, by Britain, leading Said to another restatement of his core theme, that in Burton’s writings:

Orientalism, which is the system of European or Western knowledge about the Orient, thus becomes synonymous with European domination of the Orient… (p.199)

Chapter 3. Orientalism Now

Begins where its predecessor left off at around 1870. This is the period of greatest colonial expansion into the Orient…the very last section characterises the shift from British and French to American hegemony. I attempt to sketch the present intellectual and social realities of Orientalism in the United States.

1. Latent and Manifest Orientalism

The phrase is obviously derived from Freud’s notion, first expressed in The Interpretation of Dreams, that dreams have both a manifest or obvious content, and then a latent or secret meaning (also latent in the sense that it required work by patient and therapist to bring it out). Said applies Freud’s metaphor to his topic of study.

The idea is simple: the details or surface or manifest Orientalism have changed and varied over the past 250 years but the latent or bedrock attitudes behind it remain as fixed as ever, namely that the Orient is backward, poor, lazy, undisciplined and passive, in need of endless help (p.206).

Actually his argument is not helped by the way that he continually shuffles the attributes he claims that Orientalism attributes to the Orient. In the space of a few pages he says there are the Orient’s:

  • sensuality, tendency to despotism, aberrant mentality, habits of inaccuracy, backwardness (p.205)
  • eccentricity, backwardness, silent indifference, female penetrability, supine malleability (p.206)
  • backward, degenerate, uncivilised, retarded (p.207)

I take the point that each list shuffles from a pack of negative stereotypes, but, like his repeated attempts to give a precise definition of Orientalism, none of which really nail it, there’s a constant sense of blurriness and slippage.

Helplessness

I read his criticism of this idea of Oriental ‘helplessness’ on a day (23 September 2023) when, on the radio, I heard that Morocco needs Western help because of the massive earthquake which just struck it, that Libya needs Western help because of the unprecedented floods which have devastated it, that Lebanon still needs help rebuilding itself three years on from the devastating explosion of 4 August 2020, and saw a charity appeal to help the victims of the civil war in Yemen.

It’s all very well to read Said’s repeated claim that seeing the Orient as helplessly needing Western intervention is an Orientalist trope, a demeaning stereotype entirely created by the institutions he describes, and yet…it also appears to be a real-world fact.

SOAS

Anyway, Said continues to describe (yet again) the process whereby a set of intellectual interests and disciplines based in study of the Biblical languages slowly transformed into a series of postulates which justified and enabled the colonial occupation of ‘the Orient’. He quotes Lord Cromer’s paternalistic speeches, specifically the one calling for the establishment of an institute to study the region, which was a trigger point for the establishment of the University of London’s School of Oriental and African Studies.

The importance of geography

If the section about Renan dwelled on the importance of the discipline of philology, this section dwells on the academic discipline of geography for the colonial enterprise. As Said puts it in his foggy, unclear prose:

Geography was essentially the material underpinning for knowledge about the Orient. All the latent and unchanging characteristics of the Orient stood upon, were rooted in, its geography. (p.216)

France bounced back from its humiliating defeat in the Franco-Prussian War (1870 to 71) with a renewed determination to expand its empire and this led, among other things, to ‘a tremendous efflorescence of geographical societies’ (p.217). There was even a thing called the geographical movement.

Scientific geography gave rise to commercial geography and an explosion of utopian schemes to interfere and alter geography. The opening of the Suez Canal had changed the world of commerce and profoundly affected geopolitics. Dreamers dreamed of similar huge projects, including flooding the Sahara to make the desert bloom, and tying together France’s scattered African colonies by ambitious railway networks.

Some French commentators blamed their defeat by Prussia on lack of imperial ambition; falling behind British imperial aggrandisement was blamed for France’s economic woes. The solution to every problem was to more aggressively conquer and control. This lay behind France’s drive to conquer the territories of what became French Indochina (Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam), clinched in a series of battles in 1885.

But the French throughout the period continually lamented coming second best to the British who had secured all the plum territories (India, Egypt). French envy and resentment knew no bounds. Said ties this to the way the British produced remarkable characters who flourished in the Oriental purview, such as Gertrude Bell and TE Lawrence.

2. Style, Expertise, Vision: Orientalism’s Wordliness

Starts with a discussion of the concept of The White Man, the controller at the centre of Orientalism who defined unwhites, blacks, coloureds and Orientals as ‘others’, lacking the attributes of whiteness, who therefore had to be schooled and trained up to ‘our’ standard. To demonstrate he gives (more) quotes from Gertrude Bell and T.E. Lawrence.

In the late nineteenth century bastardised theories of evolution, the survival of the fittest and race theories lent malevolent force to pre-existing Orientalist discourse.

Said introduces us to William Robertson Smith (1846 to 1894) a Scottish orientalist, Old Testament scholar and minister of the Free Church of Scotland, best known for his book ‘Religion of the Semites’ which became a foundational text in the comparative study of religion.

Said moves on to his most extended consideration of T.E. Lawrence who he sees following a recognisable career arc, from Romantic adventurer, to imperial agent (in the Arab Uprising), to disillusioned failure. He quotes passages from the Seven Pillars of Wisdom to show how Lawrence not only identified himself totally with the Arab Uprising but, more typically, identified the Arab Uprising with himself, another white man assuming the natives couldn’t have done it on their own.

I like his idea (maybe pretty obvious) that the mid and late nineteenth century figure of the adventurer-eccentric was replaced around the time of the Great War by the Orientalist-imperial agent, citing Lawrence, Gertrude Bell, St John Philby (a small checklist which he refers to countless times). This marked a shift from an academic to an instrumentalist mode.

Between the wars

Between the wars imperial rule throughout the Orient became problematic for the simple reason that the natives formed more and more strident nationalist movements, flanked by increasing acts of violence, while a growing minority in Western countries began to question or turn against colonialism and in favour of home independence.

Said quotes French Orientalists (Sylvain Lévi) who (like all academics) insist the answer is more study, more research, better understanding etc. He quotes the poet Paul Valéry whose contribution amounts (with comic French intellectualism) to analysing the problem away (p.250). And goes on to cite Valentine Chirol, Elie Faure, Fernand Baldensperger, all of whom reiterated the now crystallised Orientalist lines: ‘they’ are unlike us, lack the ability for rational knowledge, are economically and culturally backward, Islam is an imprisoning limiting religion, all the usual slurs.

At the end of this section he gives yet another summary of what he’s trying to do, to investigate:

the metamorphosis of a relatively innocuous philological subspeciality into a capacity for managing political movements, administering colonies, and making apocalyptic statements about the White Man’s difficult civilising mission (p.254)

3. Modern Anglo-French Orientalism in Fullest Flower

During the 1930s and 40s Orientalism had hardened into an extensive field of knowledge in which, like a spider’s web, reference to the most trivial fact tended to jangle the entire system and immediately invoke a whole gang of presuppositions, biases and bigotries.

There’s a long passage on the development, between the wars, of ‘types’ in the social sciences, which I think he contrasts with the cosmopolitan pluralism of the philological (in the wide sense) approach taken by one of his heroes, Auerbach. Narrowing versus widening.

So this section invokes the profound collapse of European economy and political consensus and in an obscure, round the back kind of way, describes how this impacted on national Orientalisms. For example, Snouck Hutgonje, Dutch scholar of Oriental cultures and languages and advisor on native affairs to the colonial government of the Dutch East Indies.

Then 20 pages contrasting the work of the most eminent Orientalists of their generations in France and Britain, Louis Massignon (1883 to 1962), French Catholic scholar of Islam and a pioneer of Catholic-Muslim mutual understanding, and Sir Hamilton Gibb (1895 to 1971), Scottish historian and Orientalist.

Massignon is depicted as an outsider of great genius and insight who devoted a lot of time to the biography of a Muslim Sufi saint, al-Hallaj. Gibb was the opposite, an insider, an institution man.

Inevitably Said depicts both of them, in subtle and sometimes impenetrable style, while citing Foucault and Barthes, as nonetheless continuers and purveyors of fundamental Orientalist stereotypes. His detailed look at the careers, professional subjects and styles of these two giants takes us from after the Great War up to the early 1960s.

4. The Latest Phase

To date the book has amounted to a brief consideration of the origin of Orientalist tropes and prejudices among the ancient Greeks, a brief sketch of the Middle Ages in the form of Dante, skipping past the Renaissance altogether and then settling down to a detailed examination of Orientalism from the late eighteenth and through the long nineteenth century.

In this last section he finally brings all his findings on home to the colossus which dominated the post-war settlement, culturally, economically and militarily, the US of A. It is completely unlike the rest of the book in that it is clear, accessible, magazine style rage against the unchecked proliferation of anti-Arab and Islamophobic caricatures across American culture.

The traditional Orientalism he has chronicled was broken up in 1960s America into a proliferation of academic subspecies. The European focus on philology, itself deriving from study of the Biblical languages, disappeared and was replaced by an American focus on the social sciences. American academics didn’t study the languages of the Middle East, they studied their ‘societies’ and on this basis set themselves up as experts and advisers.

Part of this was the abandonment of the study of literature. The long philological and literary approach he’s been praising and enjoying came to a grinding halt. In American hands it was all about preparing oil executives for their stints in the Arab world and advising the State Department.

He categorises ways in which ‘the Arab’ or ‘the Arab Muslim’ appear in ‘modern’ (i.e. 1960s and 70s) culture:

  1. Popular images and social science representations
  2. Cultural relations policy
  3. Merely Islam
  4. Orientals Orientals Orientals

Said becomes more and more angry, outraged at the barrage of anti-Arab and Islamophobic imagery to be found all across American culture. Images of humiliatingly defeated Arabs after the 1967 war. Images of hook-nosed Arab sheikhs at petrol pumps after the 1973 war and the oil price hike. These latter have all the Nazi antisemitic stereotypes born again.

He is appalled at the new tone of American Orientalism. He mounts a sustained attack on the 1970 Cambridge History of Islam, spotting stereotypes everywhere and accusing it of being bereft of ‘ideas and methodological intelligence’ (p.302).

He quotes from magazine articles, from Commentary magazine, from scholarly papers, interviews in which academics, politicians, commentators, repeat ad nauseam the same anti-Arab tropes he has enumerated throughout the book, the backwardness of Arabs, the stupidity of Arabs, the bombastic nature of Arabic which prevents Arabs from having rational thought, and so on.

He attacks 3 or 4 essays before alighting on a 1972 volume called ‘Revolution in the Middle East and other case studies’. He attacks the introductory essay by the volume’s editor P.J. Vatikiotis, before making a sustained attack on the essay by notable modern Orientalist, Bernard Lewis, giving numerous quotations in a vitriolic attack on what he takes to be Lewis at the same time setting himself up as an oracle on all things Arab while at the same time comprehensively despising and belittling his subject matter. Sounds weird, sounds counter-intuitive, unless you’ve read Said’s book in which he identifies it as a recurring characteristic of all Orientalists.

It’s in the Lewis passage that Said finally opens up about the Zionist movement and the foundation of the state of Israel, pointing out that Lewis nowhere (apparently) mentions Zionism or the Jewish appropriation of Palestinian land and, at last you feel, the cat is out of the bag. it feels as if the previous 300 pages have been a long, slow, laboursome foreplay leading up to this, the money shot.

What particularly gets his is Lewis’s pride in being an objective historian when Said claims to have shown he is in fact a ludicrously biased, anti-Arab, anti-Islamic bigot.

This is the culmination of Orientalism as a dogma that not only degrades its subject matter but also blinds its practitioners. (p.319)

The final pages describe the way Orientalism has infected the Orient in the sense that students and lecturers from the region come to the United States to train, are inculcated with Orientalism biases against their own people and culture and return to propagate these biases. There were, at the time of writing, hardly any institutes of higher education devoted to studying the Orient in the Orient. Academically, it is backward.

Worse, America has made the entire Middle East, economically, into a client region. America consumes a select number of products from it (mostly oil) but in return exports a huge number of goods, from blue jeans to Coca Cola. And TV and Hollywood movies, which often feature Arabs as the bad guys.

The modern Orient, in short, participates in its own Orientalising. (p.325)

Finally he hopes that his work has made a small contribution to encouraging scholars to critically scrutinise the premises of their disciplines, to be attentive to the realities on the ground and try to avoid the artificial and cramping conventions which constrict so many fields of study in the humanities. And, writing at a time of increasing nationalism in the developing world, he hopes it will help those peoples and movements get free of the mind-forg’d manacles (a quote from William Blake) which their oppressors created to judge, demean and control them.

Critique

Mind opening

Books like this are mostly for students because, if you hadn’t yet come across the notion that academic disciplines are not the clean objective collections of facts you were led to believe at school, then Said’s full frontal demolition of an entire area of academic study, and his association of it with one of modern woke ideology’s great bogeymen, Western imperialism, is liable to have a dynamite impact, opening your mind to whole new ways of thinking about scholarship, the academy, the humanities, history, geography, languages, religion, all of it.

And, given the extent to which Said ties his history of nineteenth century Orientalism directly to the perennial hot button issue of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the impressionable student is likely to have not only their intellectual interests, but their sense of justice fired up. When I used to visit my son at Bristol University I was struck by the number of posters around the town burning with indignation for the cause of oppressed Palestine.

But, unfortunately, it’s nearly 40 years since I read Orientalism, so none of this is new to me although rereading it made me realise I’d forgotten almost all the detail.

Repetitive

And forgotten how bad it is. It really doesn’t read very well. Reread in the cold light of day it feels extremely repetitive and confused. Too often Said asserts his case rather than proving it, in particular repeating the fundamental ideas like the created nature of Orientalist discourse, the premise of an unchangingly inferior Orient and so on, scores and scores of times till I felt like screaming.

Weak definitions

A surprisingly central problem is his failure to really define what his central term i.e. the Orient, actually means. When I began to explain the book to a friend she expected it to be about the Far East, China and Japan, which are the places she associates with the word ‘Orient’. She was very surprised when I told her it focuses almost entirely on the Middle East and Egypt, with some digressions about India. China and Japan are mentioned once or twice in passing, but not part of his hard core message. Here’s one of his not particularly useful definitions of the great subject, Orientalism:

What I shall be calling Orientalism, a way of coming to terms with the Orient that is based on the Orient’s special place in European Western experience. (p.1)

Or:

Orientalism is the habit for dealing with questions, objects, qualities, and regions deemed Oriental. (p.72)

You can see the air of tautology hanging over a sentence like this, as there are so many of his other formulations.

The Orient that appears in Orientalism is a system of representations framed by a whole set of forces that brought the Orient into Western learning, Western consciousness and, later, Western empire. (p.203)

Or this one, that Orientalism:

is an attempt to describe a whole region of the world as an accompaniment to that region’s colonial conquest. (p.343)

It’s peculiar that every time he mentions the concept, he feels the need to redefine it, and every time it comes out slightly different. This adds to the general difficulty of reading the book.

Relation to the contemporary world

The second point is one I made in part 1, which is that so much has happened in the world since it was published – chiefly the collapse of communism, the end of the Cold War, the rise of Islamic terrorism, the Western invasions of Middle Eastern countries, the Arab Spring and its failures – that, to anyone keeping up with events, the book doesn’t feel like a guide to the modern world but a dated dead end.

No doubt Western academics, commentators, ‘experts’ and journalists continue to use Orientalising stereotypes, and for much the same motives Said describes, to define, control and contain the complex realities of this troubled part of the world, to assert Western superiority over ‘barbaric’ Arabs. But this is, in the end, a very easy concept to understand and what would be useful would be a guide to the contemporary forms of Orientalising stereotyping which we in the West, no doubt, still labour under.

Ending the binary

Quite a few times Said says he laments the simplistic binary opposition between East and West which he says is at the heart of Orientalism. Does he? No. In my opinion he reinforces the binary on every page of the book, in fact he deepens and entrenches it by repeating its binary terms – the Orient and the West – on every page.

By not including a single Oriental, Arab or Muslim voice, while featuring scores and scores of European writers, I thought the book has the effect of making ‘the Orient’ even more invisible, disappearing it, while filling the mind to overflowing with Western European ideas. He angrily rejects those ideas. but those are the ideas I’ve just spent a week reading a 350-page book about, and so those are the ideas I remember.

Epistemology

Said’s thesis is based on the idea that knowledge is power, and that the way ‘knowledge’ about ‘the Orient’ was created and curated was always biased, bigoted, negative, critical and disempowering. Fine. But what this boils down to is an argument about epistemology, which is defined as ‘the theory of knowledge, especially with regard to its methods, validity, and scope, and the distinction between justified belief and opinion.’ This is the heart of his book and his thesis. It is an argument about the production of knowledge. And yet Said nowhere explains his own theory of epistemology. Just as he is slippery about what ‘the orient’ actually means, and gives ten or so differing definitions of ‘Orientalism’, in the same way he never gives an adequate definition of the central concept he’s arguing about.

In my opinion it’s this lack of really deep, thought-through clarity and consistency about his key concepts which explains why, instead, he lumps lots of disparate topics together, rarely explores them in any depth, and continually resorts to asserting his thesis instead of proving it.

Fake urgency

Said writes that, when Orientalists codified their knowledge into encyclopedias under alphabetical entries, they modelled and shaped knowledge, created constraints so that readers could only approach this knowledge of the Orient via ‘the learned grids and codes’ provided by the Orientalist, and this is made to sound like some wicked conspiracy. And yet the same is true of any other subject whatsoever. Take woodwork. You want to learn a bit about woodwork so you Google or buy a book on the subject, written by experts.

But in Said’s eyes, this knowledge about woodwork has been modelled and shaped knowledge by so-called ‘woodwork experts’ who have created constraints so that readers can only approach this knowledge of woodwork via ‘the learned grids and codes’ provided by the woodwork expert! Scary, eh? Or utterly banal.

Reading these kinds of scare tactics on every single page gets boring. Again and again and again he makes the same simple point which is a critique of the way knowledge is produced and curated by academics with, he claims, an anti-Eastern, anti-Arab, anti-Muslim prejudice – all so that he can lead the reader, in the Introduction and then in the third section, right back to the modern world and to the iniquity of US policy in the Middle East.

It’s this, Said’s obsession with the Arab-Israeli policy, which really gives the book its energy. The rise of ‘Orientalism’ as an academic discipline would be of solely academic interest, a very niche concern, if it weren’t for the fact that the same kind of anti-Eastern, anti-Arab and anti-Muslim tropes are at work, in the world, today, guiding American’s slavishly pro-Israeli and ruinously anti-Arab policy.

Last word

When we were students a friend of mine, who went on to become a professor of poetry, described it as ‘a bad book in a good cause’.

Practical criticism

See if you can identify the kind of essentialising Orientalist stereotypes about the Middle East, Arabs and Islam which Said describes, in Western (British) coverage of the recent Hamas attack on Israel (I’m just giving the BBC as a starting point):


Credit

Orientalism by Edward Said was first published by Routledge and Kegan Paul in 1978. References are to the 2003 Penguin paperback edition (with new Afterword and Preface).

Related reviews

Freud on art and literature

Note: to avoid misunderstanding, I believe Freud is a figure of huge cultural and historical importance, and I sympathise with his project of trying to devise a completely secular psychology building on Darwinian premises. Many of his ideas about sexuality as a central motive force, about the role of the unconscious in every aspect of mental life, how repressing instinctual drives can lie behind certain types of mental illness, his development of the talking cure, these and numerous other ideas have become part of the culture and underlie the way many people live and think about themselves today. However, I strongly disapprove of Freud’s gender stereotyping of men and women, his systematic sexism, his occasional slurs against gays, lesbian or bisexuals and so on. Despite the revolutionary impact of his thought, Freud carried a lot of Victorian assumptions into his theory. He left a huge and complicated legacy which needs to be examined and picked through with care. My aim in these reviews is not to endorse his opinions but to summarise his writings, adding my own thoughts and comments as they arise.

***

In the realm of fiction we find the plurality of lives which we need.
(Thoughts on War and Death, Pelican Freud Library volume 12, page 79)

Introduction

Volume 14 of the Freud Pelican Library pulls together all of Sigmund Freud’s essays on art and literature.

From my point of view, as a one-time student of literature, one of the most obvious things about all Freud’s writings, even the most ostensibly ‘scientific’, is that he relies far more on forms of literature – novels, folk tales, plays or writers’ lives – than on scientific data, data from studies or experiments, to support and elaborate his theories.

In my day job I do web analytics, cross-referencing quantitative data from various sources, crunching numbers, using formulae in spreadsheets, and assigning numerical values to qualitative data so that it, too, can be analysed in numerical terms, converted into tables of data or graphical representation, analysed for trends, supplying evidence for conclusions, decisions and so on.

So far as I can tell, none of this is present at all in Freud’s writings. A handful of diagrams exist, scattered sparsely through the complete works to indicate the relationship of superego, ego and id, or representing the transformation mechanisms of wishes which take place when they’re converted into dream images, repressed, go on to form the basis of compromise formations, and so on. But most of Freud is void of the kind of data and statistics I associate with scientific writing or analysis.

Instead Freud relies very heavily indeed on works of fiction and literature, folk tales and fairy tales, the myths and legends of Greece and Rome, anecdotes and incidents in the lives of great writers or artists (Goethe, Leonardo).

Right from the start Freud’s writings provided a new model for literary, artistic and biographical interpretation and so it’s no surprise that psychoanalytical theory caught on very quickly in the artistic and literary communities, and then spread to the academic teaching of literature and art where it thrives, through various reversionings and rewritings (Lacan, feminist theory) to this day.

It’s probably too simplistic to say psychoanalysis was never a serious scientific endeavour; but seems fair to say that, in Freud’s hands, it was always an extremely literary one.

What follows is my notes on some, not all, of the essays contained in Volume 14 of the Freud Pelican Library.

1. Delusions and Dreams in Jensen’s ‘Gradiva’ (1907)

It was Jung, a recent convert to psychoanalysis, who brought this novel, Gradiva, by the German novelist Wilhelm Jensen, published 1903, to Freud’s attention. It is the story of an archaeologist, Norbert Hanold, who comes across an ancient bas-relief of a girl who is walking with a distinctive high-footed step. He names her ‘Gradiva’, which is Latin for ‘light-tripping’, and becomes obsessed with the image.

Cast relief of ‘Gradiva’​ (​1908​), which, as a result of Freud’s essay on the novel, he bought and hung on his study wall

It comes into Hanold’s head that the relief is from Pompeii and that he will somehow meet the girl who is the model for it if he goes there. So off to Pompeii he goes and, one summer day, walking among the ruins, comes across an apparition, a hallucination, of the self-same girl!

They talk briefly and then she disappears among the ruins but not before displaying the unique walk depicted in the frieze. A second time he meets her and their talk clears his muddled mind. Over subsequent meetings and conversations it becomes clear that she is the girl who lives across the road from him in Berlin, named Zoe Bertgang, and whom he loved playing with as a boy.

What happened is that, at puberty, Hanold became obsessed with archaeology and, in his pursuit of it, rejected normal social activity, including with the opposite sex. He repressed and forgot his childhood love for Zoe, redirecting his energies, sublimating them, into an abstract love of Science. But, despite the best efforts, the repressed material returned, but in a garbled censored form, as his irrational unaccountable obsession with this carving.

Over the course of their meetings, Zoe slowly pulls him out of what is clearly some kind of nervous breakdown, eliminating all the voodoo and hallucinatory significances which he had accumulated around the relief; makes him realise she is just an ordinary girl, but one he has continued to be in love with.

Through her long and patient conversations, through talking through his odd symptoms and obsessions, he is slowly returned to ‘normality’, ‘reality’, and to a conventional loving relationship with a young woman. And so they get engaged.

This novel could almost have been written expressly to allow Freud to deploy his favourite themes. For a start it contains many of Hanold’s, dreams which Freud elaborately decodes, thus reaffirming the doctrine that dreams are ‘the royal road to the unconscious’. Confirming the theories put forward in The Interpretation of Dreams that during sleep the censorship of feelings and complexes which are rigorously repressed during conscious waking life, is relaxed, allowing deep wishes to enter the mind, albeit displaced and distorted into often fantastical imagery.

It allows Freud to reiterate his theory that the mind is comprised of two equal and opposite forces which are continually in conflict – the Pleasure Principle which wants, wishes and fantasises about our deepest desires coming true, sometimes in dreams, sometimes in daydreams or fantasies, sometimes in neurotic symptoms and mental disturbances – because it is continually struggling to get past the repressing force of the Reality Principle.

Dreams, like the symptoms of the neurotic and obsessive patients Freud had been treating since the 1980s, are compromises between these two forces. Thus the hero of the novel, Norbert Hanold, is a timid man whose profession of archaeologist has cut him off from the flesh and blood world of real men and women.

This division between imagination and intellect destined him to become an artist or a neurotic; he was one of those whose kingdom was not of this world.

But, in Freudian theory, the unconscious wishes often return from the place where they are most repressed, at the point of maximum defence. Hence it was precisely – and only – from the dry-as-dust, academic world of archaeology, where he had fled from the real world, that the repressed feelings could return in the form of a two thousand year-old relief – that Hanold’s real passion for the flesh-and-blood girl who lives across the road, can emerge.

There is a kind of forgetting which is distinguished by the difficulty with which the memory is awakened even by a powerful external summons, as though some internal resistance were struggling against its revival. A forgetting of this type has been given the name of repression in psychopathology.

Norbert seeks for Gradiva in Pompeii, driven there by increasingly delusive fantasies. Freud explains these as the last desperate attempts of the Censor to flee the unconscious wish to sexually possess the girl he has loved since his childhood, but, fearing her sexuality, fearing his own untrammeled sexuality, has blocked, repressed and sublimated into a love for his passionless, ‘scientific’ profession’, archaeology. The repressed always returns. You can run but you can’t hide.

It is an event of daily occurrence for a person – even a healthy person – to deceive himself over the motives for an action and to become conscious of them only after the event…

[Hanold]’s flight to Pompeii was a result of his resistance gathering new strength after the surge forward of his erotic desires in the dreams [Norbert is plagued by obscure passionate dreams which Freud analyses as sex-dreams]. It was an attempt at flight from the physical presence of the girl he loved. In a practical sense, it meant a victory for repression…

Except that it is precisely in Pompeii, with a kind of dreamy, Expressionistic logic, that Hanold runs into the very girl he’s gone all that way to escape, and who initially presents herself as the living incarnation of the 2,000 year-old relief.

Only slowly does the truth dawn on Norbert (and the reader) and his secret desires become revealed to him, even as he slowly realises this is a real flesh-and-blood girl and not some spirit, a girl who reveals her name to be Zoe, Greek for ‘life’.

The entire novel turns, in Freud’s hands, into another one of his case studies: Hanold is an obsessive neurotic suffering from bad dreams and delusions; Zoe is in the unique position of being both his repressed love-object and his psychoanalyst. She practises the ultimate ‘cure through love’ by tenderly returning Hanold to a correct understanding of Reality, of who he is, who she is, and the true nature of his feelings for her.

How was Hanold able to go along in the grip of his powerful delusions for so long?

It is explained by the ease with which our intellect is prepared to accept something absurd provided it satisfies powerful emotional impulses

After all, Freud writes, in one of the many, many comparisons with religious beliefs and ways of thinking which litter his writings:

It must be remembered too that the belief in spirits and ghosts and the return of the dead which finds so much support in the religions to which we have all been attached, at least in our childhood, is far from having disappeared among educated people, and that many who are sensible in other respects find it possible to combine spiritualism with reason.

The Gradiva story allows Freud to elaborate on the link between but contrast between belief and delusion:

If a patient believes in his delusion so firmly, this is not because his faculty of judgement has been overturned and does not arise from what is false in the delusion. On the contrary there is a grain of truth concealed in every delusion, there is something in it which really deserves belief, and this is the source of the patient’s conviction, which is therefore to this extent justified.

This true element, however, has long been repressed. If eventually it is able to penetrate into consciousness, this time in a distorted form, the sense of conviction attaching to it is overintensified as though by way of compensation and is now attached to the distorted substitute for the repressed truth, and protects it from any critical attacks.

The conviction is displaced, as it were, from the unconscious truth on to the conscious error that is linked to it, and remains fixated there precisely as a result of this displacement.

The method described here whereby conviction arises in the case of a delusion does not differ fundamentally from the method by which a conviction is formed in normal cases. We all attach our conviction to thought-contents in which truth is combined with error and let it extend from the former over into the latter. It becomes diffused, as it were, from the original truth over onto the error associated with it, and protects the latter.

So in Gravida the dry, repressed Norbert is awakened from his dream-delusion of worship for a stone relief he has named Gradiva, into the reality of his long-lost childhood love for the flesh-and-blood woman Zoe:

The process of cure is accomplished in a relapse into love, if we combine all the many components of the sexual instinct under the term ‘love’; and such a relapse is indispensable, for the symptoms on account of which the treatment has been undertaken are nothing other than the precipitates of earlier struggles connected with repression or the return of the repressed, and they can only be resolved and washed away by a fresh high tide of the same passions. Every psychoanalytic treatment is an attempt at liberating repressed love which has found a meagre outlet in the compromise of a symptom.

So influential was Freud’s essay on Gradiva as suggesting and exemplifying a whole new way of reading and thinking about literature, that it became a cult, many of the early psychoanalysts carried round small models of the Gradiva relief and Freud had a full-scale replica hanging in his office (still viewable at the Freud Museum).

2. Psychopathic stage characters (1906)

Art allows for the vicarious participation of the spectator. When we read a poem we feel spiritually richer, subtler, nobler than we are. When we watch a play we escape from the confines of our dull cramped lives into a heroic career, defying the gods and doing great deeds. The work of art allows the spectator an increase, a raising of psychic power.

Lyric poetry serves the purpose of giving vent to intense feelings of many sorts – just as was once the case with dancing. Epic poetry aims chiefly at making it possible to feel the enjoyment of a great heroic character in his hour of triumph. But drama seeks to explore emotional possibilities more deeply and to give an enjoyable shape even to forebodings of misfortune; for this reason it depicts the hero in his struggles and, with masochistic satisfaction, in his defeats.

For Freud, crucially, human nature is based on rebellion:

[Drama] appeases, as it were, a rising rebellion against the divine regulation of the universe, which is responsible for the existence of suffering. Heroes are first and foremost rebels against God or against something divine.

We like to watch the hero rise, as a thrilling personification of the resentment we all feel against the limitations of Fate – and then to fall, after a brief heroic career, because their fall restores order and justifies our own craven supineness in relation to the world.

Freud likes the Greek dramatists because they openly understood and acknowledged the power of this: life is a tragic rebellion against Fate. The Greek view of life, essentially tragic – from Homer to Aeschylus – contrasted with the essentially rounded, optimistic view of the theisms, Judaism and Christianity, in which suffering may be pushed to its limit – Job, Jesus – but brings with its new understanding and even salvation.

Christianity takes an essentially comic, non-tragic view of the world; Jesus came to save us, to fulfil the Law, and in his torture, crucifixion and death we partake of a Divine Comedy of despair and renewal. With his resurrection the circle is complete. But there is no renewal in Greek tragedy. Neither Oedipus nor Thebes are renewed or improved.

The two worldviews deal with the same subject matter, and overlap in the middle, but from fundamentally opposed viewpoints.

Freud likes the Greeks because of their acknowledgment of the tragic fate of man: his later writings are loaded with references to Ananke and Logos, the twin gods of Necessity and Reason by which we must lead our lives.

Freud dislikes Christianity because it sets out to conceal this truth, to offer redemption, eternal life, Heaven, the punishment of the guilty and the salvation of the Good. It offers all the infantile compensations and illusions he associates with the weakest of his patients. It is intellectually and emotionally dishonest. It says the greatest strength is in submission to the Will of God, turning the other cheek, loving your neighbour as yourself.

As a good Darwinian Freud acknowledges that these standards may be morally admirable but, alas, unattainable for most, if not all of us mortals. In his view Christianity forced its adherents into guilt-ridden misery or to blatant hypocrisy. (Interestingly, it was actually Jung who, in their correspondence, called the Church ‘the Misery Institute’.)

Freud moves on to outline an interesting declension in the subject matter of drama:

Greek tragedy must be an event involving conflict and it must include an effort of will together with resistance. This precondition finds its first and grandest fulfilment in the struggle against divinity. A tragedy of this sort is one of rebellion, in which the dramatist and the audience takes the side of the rebel.

The less belief there comes to be in divinity, the more important becomes the human regulation of affairs; and it is this which, with increasing insight, comes to be held responsible for suffering. Thus the hero’s next struggle is against human society and here we have the class of social tragedies.

Yet another fulfilment of the necessary precondition is to be found in a struggle between individual men. Such are tragedies of character which display all the excitement of a conflict and are best played out between outstanding characters who have freed themselves from the bond of human institutions….

After religious drama, social drama and the drama of character we can follow the course of drama into the realm of psychological drama. Here the struggle that causes the suffering is fought out in the hero’s mind itself – a struggle between different impulses which have their end not in the extermination of the hero but in the victory of one of the impulses; it must end, that is to say, in renunciation…

For the progression religious drama, social drama, drama of character and psychological drama comes to a conclusion with psychopathological drama, hence the title of the essay. Psychological drama is where the protagonist struggles in his mind with conflicting goals, desires, often his personal love clashing with social values etc. Psychopathological drama is one step further, where the conflict takes place within the hero’s mind, but one side or aspect or impulse is repressed. It is the drama of the repressed motive, in which the protagonist demonstrates the symptoms Freud had written about in neurotic, namely that they are in the grip of fierce compulsions or anxieties but don’t know why.

The first of these modern dramas is Hamlet in which a man who has hitherto been normal becomes neurotic owing to the peculiar nature of the task by which he is faced, a man, that is, in whom an impulse that has been hitherto successfully repressed endeavours to make its way into action [the Oedipus impulse].

The essay repeats the interpretation Freud first gave of Hamlet in The Interpretation of Dreams, namely that the reason for Hamlet’s long delay in carrying out vengeance against his uncle is because his uncle has acted out Hamlet’s Oedipal dream – he has murdered his (Hamlet’s) father and bedded his (Hamlet’s) mother. This is the deep sexual fantasy which Freud posits at the core of the development of small boys and labelled the Oedipus complex, and Claudius has done it for Hamlet; he has lived out Hamlet’s deeply repressed Oedipal fantasy, and this is why Hamlet can’t bring himself to carry out the revenge on his uncle which his conscious mind knows to be just and demanded by social convention: it’s because his uncle has carried out Hamlet’s repressed Oedipal fantasy so completely as to have become Hamlet, on the voodoo level of the unconscious to be Hamlet. To kill his uncle would be to kill the oldest, most deeply felt, most deeply part of his childhood fantasy. And so he can’t do it.

I studied Hamlet at A-level and so know it well and know that Freud’s interpretation, although it initially sounds cranky and quite a bit too simplistic and glib – still, it’s one of the cleverest and most compelling interpretations ever made of the play.

Anyway, in this theoretical category of psychopathological drama, the appeal to the audience is that they, too, understand, if dimly, the unexpressed, repressed material which the protagonist is battling with. If in the tragic drama of the ancients the hero battles against the gods, at this other end of the spectrum, in modern psychopathological drama, the hero fights against the unexpressed, unexpressible, repressed wishes, urges, desires, buried beyond recall in his own unconscious.

3. Creative writers and daydreams (1907)

In this notorious essay Freud tries to psychoanalyse the foundation of creative writing but he’s notably hesitant. It’s a big subject and easy to look foolish next to professional critics and scholars. Hence Freud emphasises that he is only dealing with the writers of romances and thrillers i.e. anything with a simple hero or heroine or, to put it another way, which are simple enough for his psychoanalytical interpretation to be easily applied.

So: A piece of creative writing is a continuation into adulthood of childhood play. (The English reader may be reminded of Coleridge’s comment that the True Poet, as exemplified by his friend Wordsworth, is one who carries the perceptions of childhood into the strength of maturity.)

A piece of creative writing, like a day-dream, is a continuation of, and a substitute for, what was once the play of childhood.

Children play by recombining elements of the outside world into forms and narratives which suit their needs. As we grow up we stop overtly playing but Freud suggests that we never give up a pleasure once experienced and so we replace physically real playing with a non-physical, purely psychical equivalent, namely fantasising.

Childhood play is public and open but most people fantasise in private, in fact they’re more willing to admit to doing wrong than to confessing their fantasies. The child more often than not wants to be ‘grown up’; whereas many adults’ fantasies are childish in content or expression.

Now Freud steps up a gear and begins to treat fantasies as if they were dreams, in that he insists that ‘every single fantasy is the fulfilment of a wish, a correction of unsatisfying reality’. Each fantasy refers back to a childhood wish, attaches it to images or experiences in the present, and projects it into a future where it is fulfilled.

A work of art gathers its creative strength from the power of childhood recollections, for example Gradiva, centred on dreams and delusions powered by childhood erotic experiences.

At about this point it becomes clear that these ‘fantasies’ have a very similar structure to the dreams which Freud devoted such vast effort to interpreting in his book of the same title. Which is why everyday language in its wisdom also calls fantasies ‘day dreams’. So ‘day’ dreams and ‘night’ dreams are very similar in using imagery provide by the events of the day to ‘front up’ unexpressed, often repressed wishes.

Thoughts

The big flaw in this theory is, How do you deal with the fact that most of the literature of the ancients and of the Middle Ages consists of recycled stories, metaphors, even repeated lines i.e. are not the packaging of anyone’s childhood recollections but traditional narratives?

Freud says:

  1. the artist still makes decisions about how to order his material and these decisions are susceptible to psychoanalysis
  2. folk tales and myths i.e. recurrent stories, may themselves be seen as the wishful fantasies or the distorted childhood reminiscences of entire nations and peoples and be psychoanalysed accordingly

(Regarding the origin of myths, in a letter to his confidant Wilhelm Fliess, in 1897, Freud had written: ‘Can you imagine what endopsychic myths are? They are the offspring of my mental labours. The dim inner perception of one’s own psychical apparatus stimulates illusions of thought, which are naturally projected outwards and characteristically onto the future and the world beyond. Immortality, retribution, life after death, are all reflections of our inner psyche… psychomythology.)

The ‘voyeuristic theory’ outlined by Freud in Psychopathic Stage Characters, and this essay, would say the libidinal satisfaction to be achieved through watching or reading the literary work remains the same – the vested interest of the reader\spectator in vicariously rising above their dull every day lives – regardless of formal considerations. But there’s still a substantial objection which is, Why do we prefer some versions of a traditional story over others?

Freud is forced to concede the existence of a ‘purely formal – that is, aesthetic – yield of pleasure’ about which psychoanalysis can say little in itself.

The writer softens the character of his egoistic daydreams by altering and disguising it, and he bribes us by the purely formal – that is, aesthetic – yield of pleasure which he offers us in the presentation of his phantasies. We give the name of fore-pleasure to a yield of pleasure such as this which is offered to us so as to make possible the release of still greater pleasure arising from deeper psychic sources.

In my opinion all the aesthetic pleasure which a creative writer affords us has the character of a fore-pleasure of this kind, and our actual enjoyment of an imaginative work proceeds from a liberation of tensions in our minds.

Thus he has divided literary pleasure into two parts:

  • fore-pleasure ‘of a purely formal kind’, ‘aesthetics’
  • the deeper pleasure of psychic release, the cathartic release of libidinal energy

This is very similar in structure to his theory of jokes (as laid out in the 1905 work ‘Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious’). In this aesthetic, formal fore-pleasure – the structure of a limerick, the shape of a joke – is a pretext for the joke’s real work – the release of frustration, pent-up pressure, libido.

Critics argue that claiming the core purpose of art to be libidinal release – if the basic point of all art is some kind of psychosexual release – fails to acknowledge that the main thing people talk about when they discuss art or plays or books, the plot and characters and language, are secondary ‘aesthetic’ aspects. It is precisely the artfulness, the creative use the writer makes of traditional material, which is of interest to the critic and to the informed reader, upon which we judge the author, and it is this very artfulness which Freud’s theory leaves untouched. Which is to say that Freudianism has little to do with pure literary criticism.

Freudian defenders would reply that psychoanalysis helps the critic to elucidate and clarify the patterns of symbolism and imagery, the obsessions and ideas, which are crafted into the work of art. This clearly applies most to modern artists who think they have a personal psychopathology to clarify (unlike, say, Chaucer or Shakespeare, who focused on reworking their traditional material).

In practice, literary critics, undergraduates and graduate students by the millions have, since the publication of this essay, gone on to apply Freudian interpretations to every work of art or literature ever created, precisely be applying Freudian decoding to the formal elements of narratives which Freud himself, in his own essays, largely overlooked.

4. Leonardo da Vinci and a memory of his childhood (1910)

Leonardo could never finish anything. Freud says this was because he was illegitimate i.e. abandoned by his rich father and left with his peasant mother for years. This prompted two things: a sublime sense of the total possession of his mother without the rivalry of Daddy which is captured in his best art, for example the Mona Lisa; and a restless curiosity about where he came from.

These latter childhood sexual enquiries were sublimated into his scientific work, into his wonderful studies of Nature and its workings. But also explains why ,whenever he tried to do a painting, he ended up trying to solve all the technical problems it raised, and these problems raised others, and so on.

A good example is his trying to devise a way of doing frescoes with oil. It was his botched technical experiments in this medium which means the famous Last Supper has slowly fallen to pieces.

Observation of men’s daily lives shows us that most people succeed in directing very considerable portions of their sexual instinctual forces to their professional activity. The sexual instinct is particularly well-fitted to make contributions of this kind since it is endowed with a capacity for sublimation: that is, it has the power to replace its immediate aim by other aims which may be valued more highly and which are not sexual.

Freud turns Leonardo into a paradigmatic homosexual: a boy abandoned by his father and left too long under the influence of his mother who, in repressing his love for his mother, takes her part, introjects her into his psyche, identifies wholly with her and comes to look upon love-objects as his mother would i.e. looks for young boys whom he can love as his mother loved him. In a sense a return to auto-eroticism or narcissism.

Freud then uses his theory of Leonardo’s homosexuality to interpret the later figures in his paintings (for example, John the Baptist) as triumphs of androgyny, reconciling the male and female principles in a smile of blissful self-satisfaction.

Freud speculates that Mona Lisa re-awakened in Leonardo the memory of his single mother, hence the ineffable mystery of her smile – and Leonardo’s inability to finish the painting, which was never delivered to the patron, Mona’s husband, and so he ended up taking to the French court, where it was bought by King Francis I which is why it ended up hanging in the Louvre.

So Leonardo’s actual artistic technique, the extraordinary skill which produced the Mona Lisa smile, is merely a fore-pleasure, a pretext, a tool to draw us into what Freud sees as the real purpose of art, the libidinal release, in this case drawing us into sharing the same infantile memory of erotic bliss, of total possession of mummy, that Leonardo was expressing.

At the heart of this long essay is a dream Leonardo recorded in a notebook.

Leonardo dreamed that a vulture came into his room when he was a child and stuck its tail into his mouth. Freud says Leonardo would have known that the vulture was the Egyptian hieroglyph for ‘Mother’ and so the dream represents a deep memory of his infantile happiness at the total possession of his Mummy.

The only problem with this, as Peter Gay and the editors of the Freud Library point out, is that the word ‘vulture’ is a mistranslation in the edition of Leonardo’s notebooks which Freud read; the original Italian word means kite, a completely different kind of bird.

So a central plank on which Freud had rested a lot of his argument in this long essay is destroyed in one blow. But Freud never acknowledged the mistake or changed the passage and so it’s hard to avoid the conclusion that this is simple charlatanry, that Freud, here as in many other places, could not change mistakes because they were vital means which enabled him to project the powerful personal obsession which he called psychoanalysis out onto the real world. That, somehow, it was all or nothing. No gaps or retractions were possible lest the entire edifice start to crumble.

Leonardo is important to Freud because he was the first natural scientist since the Greeks. If Authority is the Father and Nature the Mother, then his peculiar fatherless upbringing also helps to explain Leonardo’s refusal to rely on ‘authorities’, and his determination to wrest the mysteries of Nature for himself, a rebellion against father and quest for total possession of mother which has clear Oedipal origins.

His later scientific research with all its boldness and independence presupposed the existence of infantile sexual researches uninhibited by the father…

This is an illuminating insight. But when, a few pages later, Freud says dreams of flying are all connected with having good sex, and Leonardo was obsessed with birds and flying machines because scientific enquiry stems from our infantile sexual researches, you begin to feel Freud is twisting the material to suit his ends.

This is even more the case in Freud’s treatment of Leonardo’s father. First we are told that not having a Dad helped Leonardo develop a scientific wish for investigation; then that having a father was vital to his Oedipal ‘overthrowing’ of Authority and received wisdom; then that Leonardo both overcame his father who was absent in his infancy and became like him insofar as he tended to abandon his artistic creations half-finished, just like Ser Piero (his dad) had abandoned him.

Freud is trying to have it all ways at once. A feeling compounded by moments of plain silliness: for example when Freud claims his friend Oskar Pfister found the outline of a vulture in the painting of St Ann with Jesus, or when Freud points out that a sketch of a pregnant woman from the notebook has wrong-way round feet, thus suggesting… homosexuality! In the notes we are told the feet look odd because they were, in fact, added in by a later artist. The net result of all these errors and distortions is that, by now, Freud is looking like a fool and a charlatan. The whole thing is riddled with errors.

Conclusion

Freud is like a novelist who scatters insights around him concerning the tangles, complexities, repressions and repetitions of human life with which we are all familiar – now that Freud has pointed them out to us. But whenever he tries to get more systematic, more ‘scientific’, he gets more improbable.

The insights into Leonardo’s psychology are just that, scattered insights. But when he tries to get systematic about infantile sexual inquiry or the origins of homosexuality, you feel credulity stretched until it snaps. It comes as no surprise to learn that the whole extended vulture-dream argument, which reeks of false scholarship and cardboard schematicism, has been shown to be completely wrong.

All the same, no less an authority than art historian Kenneth Clark said that, despite its scholarly errors, Freud’s essay was useful in highlighting the difference, the weirdness of Leonardo. This is the eerie thing about Freud: even when he’s talking bollocks, even when he’s caught out lying, his insights and his entire angle of vision, carry such power, ring bells or force you to rethink things from new angles, and shed fresh light.

5. The theme of the three caskets (1913)

This is an odd little essay on the three-choices theme found in many folk-tales, myths and legends. Freud concentrates on its manifestation in the Shakespeare plays, The Merchant of Venice and King Lear.

The Prince in Merchant wisely picks lead, rather than silver or gold, and thus wins the hand of Portia. Lear foolishly picks worldly things – Goneril and Regan’s sycophancy – and rejects Cordelia’s true love.

What Freud can now ‘reveal’ is that Cordelia and Lear really symbolise DEATH! By refusing his own death – i.e. his inevitable fate – Lear wreaks havoc on the natural order: a man must accept his death.

For the three caskets are symbols of the fundamental three sisters, the Norns of Norse, and the Fates of Greek mythology. The third Fate is Atropos or Death and so picking the third, the least attractive of three choices, is, in fact, to pick death.

Hang on, though: what about the classical story of the judgement of Paris? Paris gives the apple to Aphrodite, goddess of Love. Freud raises this objection only to smoothly deal with it: it’s because Man’s imagination, in rebellion against Fate, converts, in the Paris-myth, the goddess of Death into the goddess of Love, unconsciously turning the most hateful thing into the most loveful thing: it is one more example of the unconscious reversing polarities and making opposites meet.

The Fates were created as a result of the discovery that warned man that he too is a part of nature and therefore subject to the immutable law of death. Something in man was bound to struggle against this subjection, for it is only with extreme unwillingness that he gives up his claim to an exceptional position.

Man, as we know, makes use of his imaginative activity in order to satisfy the wishes that reality does not satisfy. So his imagination rebelled against the recognition of the truth embodied in the myth of the Fates and constructed instead, the myth derived from it, in which the goddess of Death is replaced by the goddess of Love.

This essay is a brilliant example of the weird, perverse persuasiveness of Freud’s imagination and a deliberate addition to the variety of strategies psychoanalysis has for literature:

  • to the psychoanalysis of plot: Gradiva
  • the psychoanalysis of artist’s character: Leonardo (above), Dostoyevsky (below)
  • the psychoanalysis of myth-symbolism: the three caskets
  • the psychoanalysis of the act of creation itself, what it does, what it’s for: Creative Writers and Daydreaming
  • the psychoanalysis of the history of a genre: Psychopathic stage characters (above)

When you list them like this you realise the justice of Freud’s self-description as a conquistador. He deliberately set out to conquer all aspects of all the human sciences – art, literature, anthropology, sociology, history – to which his invention could possibly be applied, and he was successful.

6. The Moses of Michelangelo (1914)

It has traditionally been thought that Michelangelo’s imposing statue of Moses in the church of San Pietro in Vincoli depicts the leader of the Israelites having come down from the mountain with the tablets of the commandments only to see the Israelites dancing round the Golden Calf and to be about to leap up in wrath.

Michelangelo’s statue of Moses in the church of St Peter In Chains in Rome

Freud completely reverses this view. Freud turns this Moses into a model of Freud’s idea of self-overcoming or the Mastery of Instinct:

The giant figure with its tremendous physical power becomes only a concrete expression of the highest mental achievement that is possible in a man, that of struggling successfully against an inward passion for the sake of a cause to which he has devoted himself.

This essay was written in 1914 just after the split with Freud’s disciples, Carl Jung and Alfred Adler, leaving Freud feeling bitter and angry. They thought they were rebelling against a stifling father figure who insisted on blind obedience to his theory and diktats. He thought he had given them a world of new insights, as well as personal help and support, only to watch them distort and pervert his findings for their own ends, to further their own careers.

You don’t have to be a qualified psychiatrist to speculate that there might be a teeny-weeny bit of self-portraiture in Freud’s interpretation of Moses: a heroic passionate man, founder of a whole new way of seeing the world, much-wronged by those he cared for, heroically stifling his justifiable feelings of anger and revenge. There is much in Moses for Freud to identify with.

Overcoming, this is Freud’s perennial theme: civilised man’s continual attempt to master his animal nature. It’s at its clearest here in his interpretation of Moses’ superhuman restraint but it runs like a scarlet thread through his work, eventually blossoming into full view in Civilisation and Its Discontents.

On the way to achieving the heroic self-denial which we call ‘civilisation’ the poor human animal takes many wrong turns and false steps: these are the illnesses, the neuroses, the hysterias and perversions which Freud spent the early part of his career discussing (see in particular, Three Essays On Sexuality 1905).

But even when you have achieved self-mastery, even if your development works out well and you rid yourself of your neuroses and arrive at a mature, adult morality, disenchanted from willful illusions like religious belief and personal superstition, all this heroic self-mastery only brings you face-to-face with a bigger problem: Fate and Death. How can you cope with this final insult to the narcissistic self-love which, despite all your conscious better intentions, nonetheless guides your actions?

Freud suggests a variety of strategies:

  1. falling ill: the ‘flight into illness’ identified as early as 1895 in his book on hysteria
  2. killing yourself: the superego’s rage against the failure of the ego to master reality
  3. rebellion against fate: as epitomised by all the heroes of myth and legend, which Freud identifies the core subject of heroic (Greek) tragedy
  4. sublimating unconscious panic-fear into its opposite, exaggerated submission and masochistic greeting of the blows of Fate (as in some types of submissive religious belief)
  5. outstaring Death with a calm rational stoicism (Freud’s view of himself)

But art, too, has a place among these responses. Art either:

  • provides parables and models which help us come to terms with illness and death and Fate (as Gradiva is a model of the psychoanalytic cure; the three caskets are fairy tales which help us, unconsciously, to accept the inevitable)
  • or helps us to rise emotionally above our narrow, cramped lives (as explained in Creative Writers and Psychopathic stage characters)

Or:

  • is the product of compulsions, obsessions and neuroses on the part of the artist (for example, Leonardo) for whom art acts as therapy and whose purely personal solutions to these problems may appeal to our own situation, and in some way reconcile us to our own fate
  • or simply evoke pleasant unconscious memories, for example the blissful mood conveyed by the smiles of the Mona Lisa or St John the Baptist

Art may leave us with a tantalising sense of mystery and transcendence; or it may thrill us with the spectacle of an artist grappling with feelings he barely understands, feelings and struggle which the art work makes us feel and sympathise with.

9. A childhood recollection from Dichtung Und Wahrheit (1917)

Dichtung Und Wahrheit was the title of the autobiography of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, the great German poet, playwright, novelist, scientist, statesman, theatre director, and critic. Goethe was Freud’s lifelong favourite writer and Freud is liable to drop a Goethe quote into any of his essays at the drop of a hat.

One of the first anecdotes in Goethe’s autobiography describes the little poet, aged about three, throwing all the crockery in the house out into the street and chuckling as it smashed.

Freud shows, by citing comparable stories told by his patients, that this was an expression of Goethe’s jealousy and hatred of his new young brother who had just been born and threatened to supplant him in his mother’s affections. The brother later died and Goethe was, unconsciously, happy. So, in Freud’s hands, this inconsequential anecdote turns out to be a vital key to Goethe’s personality:

I raged for sole possession of my mother – and achieved it!

As with Moses, the autobiographical element in Freud is large. As he says in his own autobiography:

A man who has been the indisputable favourite of his mother keeps for life the feeling of a conqueror, that confidence of success which often induces real success.

Compare with the way the ‘secret’ of Leonardo turned out to be the unquenchable if unconscious bliss he kept all his life of having possessed his mother’s love, undiluted by the absent father. The fact that so many of Freud’s insights turn out so nakedly to be repetitions of key aspects of his own personality prompts the $64,000 question: Are Freud’s insights into human nature the revelation of universal laws? Or a mammoth projection onto all mankind of his own idiosyncratic upbringing and personality?

10. The Uncanny (1919)

This is the first of these essays to be written under the influence of Freud’s second, post-Great War, theory of psychoanalysis. The new improved version was a great deal more complicated than earlier efforts.

This essay is an attempt to apply the symbolic mode of interpretation to the E.T.A Hoffman story of ‘Olympia and the Sandman’ in which several ‘doubles’ appear, creating an ‘uncanny’ effect.

For post-war Freud the human psyche is dominated by a compulsion to repeat: this is the secret of the anxiety dreams of shell-shock victims, or of the child’s repetitive games, discussed at such length in Beyond The Pleasure Principle, 1920.

An aspect of this profound human tendency to repeat is the idea of ‘doubles’. Beginning with the notion of the ‘soul’ – the Christian idea that we are made of two things, a body and a soul – doubles in various forms litter human culture.

Freud speculates that the role of doubles is to:

  • stave off death: you have a secret double fighting on your behalf, a good fairy, a good angel etc
  • underpin ideas of free will, of alternative actions which you could, but didn’t take
  • become, by reversal, objects of aggression and fear, doubles which return as harbingers of doom in fairy stories and in neurotic hallucinations

After this little detour Freud gets to the point: the uncanny is the feeling prompted by the return of the childish belief in the omnipotence of thoughts.

For example, you think of someone and the next minute the phone rings and it’s them on the line. You experience an ‘uncanny’ sensation because, for a moment, you are back in the three year old’s narcissistic belief that the universe runs according to your wishes.

And the eruption into your tamed adult conscious of this primitive, long-repressed idea prompts a feeling of being ‘spooked’, unsettled – the Uncanny.

When someone has an ‘uncanny’ knack of doing something it’s the same: it makes us feel weird because their consistent success reminds us of our infantile fantasies of immediate wish-fulfilment and gratification; the powerful wish to be able to do something effortlessly and easily which possessed us as children but which we had to painfully smother and put behind us in order to cope with the crushingly ungratifying nature of reality.

In the broadest sense the uncanny is the return of the repressed: the Oedipus Complex, the omnipotence of thoughts, the obsession with doubles, even return to the womb feelings: they are strange, disturbing, but ultimately not terrifying because we have felt them before.

11. A seventeenth century demonological neurosis (1923)

Freud’s interest in witchcraft, possession and allied phenomena was of longstanding, possibly stimulated by his trip to the Salpetriere Hospital to study under Charcot in 1885.

Freud’s ‘Report’ on his trip mentions that Charcot paid a great deal of attention to the historical aspects of neuroses i.e. to tales of possession and so on.

The series of lectures of Charcot’s which Freud translated into German includes discussion of the hysterical nature of medieval ‘demono-manias’ and an account of a sixteenth century case of demonic possession.

It is recorded that in 1909 Freud spoke at length to the Vienna Society on the History of the Devil and of the psychological composition of belief in the Devil.

In mentioning ‘the compulsion to repeat’ in The Uncanny (a phenomenon dealt with at length in Beyond The Pleasure Principle and vitally important for understanding Freud’s later theory) Freud says:

It is possible to recognise the dominance in the unconscious mind of a ‘compulsion to repeat’ proceeding from the instinctual impulses and probably inherent in the very nature of the instincts – a compulsion powerful enough to overcome the pleasure principle, lending to certain aspects of the mind their demonic character, and still very clearly expressed in the impulses of young children, a compulsion too which is responsible for the course taken by the analyses of neurotic patients.’

Here we have the first glimmerings of the set of ideas which were to crystallise around the new concept of the superego, namely that it is the agent of the death drive, the fundamental wish of all organisms to return to an inorganic state of rest.

The superego channels this drive through the introjection (or internalisation) of the infantile image of our demanding parents, who continue to demand impossible standards all our lives and, when we fail to live up to them, harry us, persecute us, make us feel guilty, anxious, or depressed, filled with self-hatred and self-loathing.

One aspect of this is what earlier ages called ‘possession’, when people heard voices or seemed impelled to do what they didn’t want to. This impelling comes from the id, from our dumb, voiceless instincts – but the self-reproaches for having stepped out of line come from the superego, which, in some circumstances, exaggerates the fairly common guilt at our ‘sinfulness’ into florid ideas of demonic possession.

The essay is a psychoanalysis, using these new concepts, of the historical case of one Christopher Haizmann, a painter in the seventeenth century who fell into a melancholy at the death of his father and then claimed to the authorities that he had signed a pact with the Devil. The historical sequence of events is that he eventually renounced his pact and was looked after for a while by the Christian Brothers.

Freud diagnoses Haizmann as Grade A neurotic. Upon his father’s death he was prompted to review his life and realised he was a failure, a good-for-nothing. The pacts he reports himself as making, bizarrely, ask the Devil to take him as His son. Haizmann is transparently looking for a father-substitute who will punish him for his perceived failure.

More subtly, then, Haizmann is inflating the punitive superego (based on infantile memories of his father) into the grand figure of Devil, the bad or punitive father.

Unfortunately, upon re-entering the world, Haizmann suffered a relapse. He claimed to be the victim of an earlier pact he signed with the Devil and, for some reason, forgot about. Once more he renounced it upon being readmitted to life with the Christian Brothers, but this time he renounced the world also and spent the rest of his life with them.

The devil is the bad side of the father i.e. the child’s projection of his ambivalent feelings onto an ego-ideal. Sociologically speaking, in the history of religion, ‘devils’ were old gods who we have overcome and onto whom we then project all our suppressed lust and violence. So Baal was a perfectly decent Canaanite god until the Israelites overthrew the Canaanites in the name of their god, Yahweh, at which point the Israelites projected onto Baal him all the wickedness and lust in their own hearts. Satan, in Christian doctrine, was originally the brightest and best of God’s angels, before a similar process of overthrow and then being scapegoated with all our worst imaginings. So the devil is the father-figure we have overcome in fantasy, but onto whom we then project all the vilest wickedness in our own rotten hearts.

12. Humour (1927)

By the early 1920s Freud had devised a radical new tripartite picture of the psyche as consisting of the ego, id and superego, and had posited the existence in the psyche of a powerful death drive. He had done this in order to explain the compulsion to repeat which he saw enacted in situations as varied as shell-shocked soldiers obsessively repeating their dreams of war and a young child’s game of repeatedly throwing a toy away and reclaiming it.

Freud was in a position to apply his new structure and psychology to various literary and psychological phenomena.

Different from jokes or wit, ‘humour’ is what we call irony and is endemic among the British. When the condemned man is walking towards the gallows and he looks up at the sunshine and remarks, ‘Well, the week’s certainly getting off to a pleasant start’ it is his superego making light of the dire situation his ego finds itself in.

Like neuroses or drugs, humour is a way of dealing with the harsh reality we find ourselves in. It is like our parents reassuring us how silly and inconsequential is the big sports game we’ve just lost is, so it doesn’t matter anyway.

As you might expect if you’ve read this far and have been noticing the key themes which emerge in Freud, it turns out that humour, like tragedy, like so much else in Freud, is an act of rebellion:

Humour is not resigned; it is rebellious.

Once again the image of rebellion, whether it’s in art, or vis-a-vis the authorities, or against the smothering restrictions of religion, or, most fundamentally, against the dictates of fate and death themselves, God-less Man’s fundamental posture is one of rebellion and revolt. This feels to me close if not identical to the position of the secular humanist, Camus.

In this brief, good-humoured essay the superego appears in a good light for once, as an enlightening and ennobling faculty, instead of the punitive father-imago which he elsewhere claims underlies secular guilt and depression.

13. Dostoyevsky and parricide (1928)

Which is how he appears here. Burdened with an unnaturally powerful, bisexual ambivalence towards his sadistic father, Dostoyevsky never recovered from the crushing sense of guilt when his unconscious hatred and death-wishes against his father were fulfilled when his father was murdered in a street when Fyodor was 18.

Dostoyevsky’s fanatical gambling and spiritual masochism were aspects of his need to punish himself for his suppressed parricidal death-wishes…which came true!

Freud claims that another aspect of Dostoyevsky’s self-punishment were his epileptic attacks. When he managed to get sent to a prison-camp in Siberia i.e. was sufficiently punished by the outside world, his attacks stopped. He had managed to make the father-substitute, the Czar, punish him in reality, and therefore the attacks from inside his own mind, the psychosomatic epilepsy, could cease.

In amongst these psychological speculations comes Freud’s final word on the individual work of literature which, above all others, was crucial to his philosophy:

It can scarcely be owing to chance that three of the masterpieces of literature of all time – the Oedipus Rex of Sophocles, Shakespeare’s Hamlet and Dostoyevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov – should all deal with the same subject, parricide. In all three, moreover, the motive for the deed, sexual rivalry for a woman, is laid bare.

He goes on to say that the essence of this master plot has been attenuated as civilisation has done its repressive work to try and conceal it, i.e. what Oedipus does openly and explicitly (murder his father and sleep with his mother) is later carried out by unconsciously envied representatives (by Claudius in Hamlet). But the continuity is certainly suggestive…

And it is in the course of this essay that Freud makes the key remark that the essence of morality is renunciation, the closest he comes to talk about the content of ‘morality’ in the conventional sense, as opposed to a technical approach to its psychological origins and development.

One conclusion among many

If you’ve read through all of this you’ll maybe agree that Freud’s way of seeing things was so distinctive and powerful that, even though much of his claims and arguments may be factually disproved, even if he can be shown to be actively lying about some things, nonetheless, in a strange, uncanny way, it doesn’t stop you beginning to see the world as he does. It’s a kind of psychological infection; or a process of being moved into an entirely new worldview.

Hence the strong feeling he and his followers generated that the psychoanalytic movement he founded wasn’t just a new branch of psychology but an entirely new way of seeing the world, a worldview which gave rise to ‘disciples’ and ‘followers’ in a sense more associated with a religious movement than a simple scientific ‘school’.

Freud was so obsessed with religions because he was founding a new one, and so obsessed with Moses because he identified with him as a fellow founder of a new belief system.


Credit

The history of the translation of Freud’s many works into English forms a complicated subject in its own right. The works in this review were translated into English between 1959 and 1961 as part of The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. All references in this blog post are to the versions collected into Volume 14 of the Pelican Freud Library, ‘Art and Literature’, published in 1985.

More Freud reviews

Three Essays on Sexuality by Sigmund Freud (1905)

Note: to avoid misunderstanding, I believe Freud is a figure of huge cultural and historical importance, and I sympathise with his project of trying to devise a completely secular psychology building on Darwinian premises. Many of his ideas about sexuality as a central motive force, about the role of the unconscious in every aspect of mental life, how repressing instinctual drives can lie behind certain types of mental illness, his development of the talking cure, these and numerous other ideas have become part of the culture and underlie the way many people live and think about themselves today. However, I strongly disapprove of Freud’s gender stereotyping of men and women, his systematic sexism, his occasional slurs against gays, lesbian or bisexuals and so on. Despite the revolutionary impact of his thought, Freud carried a lot of Victorian assumptions into his theory. He left a huge and complicated legacy which needs to be examined and picked through with care. My aim in these reviews is not to endorse his opinions but to summarise his writings, adding my own thoughts and comments as they arise.

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Introduction and overview

Freud’s aim was to show the ubiquity and the strangeness of sex and use the sex instinct, massively expanded and redefined, as the basis of an entire new theory of human psychology.

According to historian of psychoanalysis Frank Sulloway, Freud found the sex instinct most suitable as the central vehicle or basis for the new and emphatically physiological type of psychology he wanted to devise, because it is a) so strong and b) so flexible.

In these three ground-breaking essays on sexuality, Freud set out to widen the concepts of sexuality, the sex instinct, libido, so as to encompass a much broader sphere of activity than ever previously imagined in order to make them underpin almost every aspect of human nature.

In Freud’s psychology people’s characters are like complicated family trees, all descended from the same one huge fountain of libido which is channelled and rechannelled into ever-smaller rivers and streams.

It is these rechannellings, the repressions and redirections and reaction-formations and sublimations and so on which come to make up your character – a collection of habits based on infantile pleasures, of disgust or shame (reaction-formations) or heroic ambition (sublimation) or guilts and anxieties (the neuroses).

Thus the Three Essays On The Theory of Sexuality (1905) is Freud’s second most important book after The Interpretation of Dreams (1900).

Essay 1 begins with a detailed look at the state of Victorian knowledge about homosexuality and perversions, because they reveal:

  1. the infinite malleability of the sex instinct
  2. how easily the sex instinct can be rerouted away from its ‘proper’ channel of ‘normal’ sexuality
  3. how even ‘normal’ sexuality is in fact built up of a network of pretty weird behaviour (Freud’s most striking example is kissing, which doesn’t make any sense the more you look at it)

In Essay 2 Freud shows that sexuality is not only present but vitally important in the life of infants and children. This idea was the biggest single cause of opposition to Freud’s theories in his lifetime, from Church and State, from commentators and populist politicians, and from decent people everywhere. It still is.

Freud is not very much interested in ‘love’. Love is the psychological effect of the ‘overvaluation of the sexual object common to almost all manifestations of the libido’:

It is only in the rarest instances that the psychical value set on the object as being the goal of the sexual instinct stops short at the genitals. The appreciation extends to the whole body of the sexual object and tends to involve every sensation derived from it. The same overvaluation spills over into the psychological sphere: the subject becomes, as it were, intellectually infatuated (that is, his powers of judgment are weakened) by the mental achievements and perfections of the sexual object and he submits to the latter’s judgments with credulity.

For Freud sex and love are interchangeable terms. He contrasts the overvaluation of the love-object found in the Western tradition with the more relaxed approach of the ancient world:

The most striking distinction between the erotic life of antiquity and our own no doubt lies in the fact that the ancients laid the stress upon the instinct itself, whereas we emphasise its object. The ancients glorified the instinct and were prepared on its account to honour even an inferior object; while we despise the instinctual activity in itself, and find excuses for it only in the merits of the object.

The Greeks held Bacchic orgies and had a god, Priapus, dedicated to the male organ; by contrast we in our time appear to fear the penis more than ever and instead reverence the idealised object of libido, the dream partner of the opposite sex (or the same sex), and the institution of Marriage.

And despite all the rhetoric from feminists and LGBTQ+ activists about interrogating and subverting this, that or the other stereotype and convention, we still appear to be in thrall to the narrow concept of finding ‘love’ in a faithful, monogamous, committed relationship, every bit as much as our Victorian forebears – very narrow and limited compared to the polymorphous, open and pluralistic attitudes of the 30 or so ancient Roman authors I read last year.

THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY (1905)

This long work sets out to show the importance of sexuality in all human achievements, to establish a wider-than-usual definition of sexuality, and to prove the existence of infantile sexuality.

Freud’s recurring tactic is to make the ordinary, the everyday, look strange; to look again without conventional blinkers at things we think we know, and to show that our attitudes are complacent, superficial and contradictory.

1. The sexual aberrations

Popular opinion credits two universal instincts, Hunger and Sexuality. Sex is supposed to set in at the time of puberty and manifest itself in irresistible attractions between adults of the opposite sex with the ultimate end of genital sex, itself with the purpose of reproduction (as taught in Christianity and most of the other world religions).

Let us call the desired one the sexual object, the act towards which the instinct tends, the sexual aim.

(1) Deviations in respect of the sexual object

If popular opinion is true and God made sex solely for reproduction, how do we account for homosexuals?

(A) Inversion

Behaviour of ‘inverts’. For a start there are different types:

  • a) absolute inverts, totally repelled by the opposite sex
  • b) amphigenic inverts i.e. bisexuals
  • c) contingent inverts, depending on circumstances

Some inverts accept their condition as natural; others feel it a torment. Some were gay as far back as they remember; for others, homosexuality cropped up at puberty; others only ‘come out’ as adults, sometimes after they’ve followed a straight career with wife and kids.

Nature of Inversion

The first observers thought inversion the result of nervous degeneracy because it was first found among mental patients studied in asylums.

Degeneracy

But then it was late-Victorian fashion to blame anything you didn’t understand on ‘degeneracy’: criminals are degenerate, the working class is degenerate, Africans are degenerate etc.

Freud defines degeneracy in rigorous Darwinian terms as the actual impairment of an organism’s efficiency and survival probability. In these, practical, terms inversion is not degenerate. Not only is it found in people otherwise perfectly normal, but it is found in people ‘who are indeed distinguished by specially high intellectual development and ethical culture.’

Innate character

Some gays insist homosexuality is absolutely innate. But the existence of the late-developers or of contingent homosexuals argues against this. Far from being innate, much evidence suggests that homosexuality is acquired:

  • the case of many ‘inverts’ in whom an early impression left a permanent gay after-effect
  • later influences and life experiences which have fixed contingent gayness e.g. the army, prison, monastery etc

Almost all ‘inverts’ will be found to have been subjected to some experience like this (for example, public school). But on the other hand, so were many people who went on to be perfectly hetero. So it remains hard to say whether homosexuality is acquired or innate.

Bisexuality

Havelock Ellis says a clue might be that homosexuality is a form of psychical hermaphroditism, a mental equivalent of having the organs of both sexes.

Richard von Kraft-Ebing says that the brain contains female and male brain centres which are activated by a ‘sex gland’. (It wasn’t only Freud who was having batty, speculative ideas at this time.)

Whoever is right, it seems that most authorities accept the idea of an innate bisexuality in everyone, and that ‘inversion’ owes something to early disruption of development.

Later, Freud would write:

It is well known that at all times there have been, as there still are, human beings who can take as their sexual objects persons of either sex without the one trend interfering with the other. We call these people bisexual and accept the fact of their existence without wondering much at it … But we [psychoanalysts] have come to know that all human beings are bisexual in this sense and their libido is distributed between objects of both sexes, either in a manifest or a latent form.

Sexual object of inverts

Popular opinion holds that ‘inverts’ simply desire the qualities of the opposite sex. An inverted man is like a woman in desiring the qualities of the opposite sex, of masculinity, in his sex object.

But what about gays who love pretty boys, boys who demonstrate all the qualities of a girl, being beautiful, hairless, young and coquettish?

What about transvestites who do a good trade dressing up as women for gay clients? In ancient Greece older men regularly looked after shy, young, girlish boys.

So the sex object is a compromise between an impulse that seeks for a man and one for a woman (in the same way that a symptom is a compromise between a wish and reality).

Psychoanalysis’s explanation is thus: in his childhood the future ‘invert’ passes through a brief but intense attachment to a woman (normally his mother). After leaving this behind he identifies himself with this woman and take himself as his sexual object. Invoking infantile narcissism, ‘inverts’ identify themselves with a woman and set out to find a boy whom they can mother and love as their mother loved them.

The situation will be exacerbated by the absence of a strong father. Think of Oscar Wilde and his imperious mother; of W.H. Auden’s father away at the Front while his mother dressed him in girl’s clothing; of the plays of Joe Orton.

So, says Freud, being gay is being in endless flight from women.

But, Freud emphasises, this isn’t weird. Psychoanalysis has established that everyone makes homosexual object choices in their unconscious mind; that the freedom to range wide over male or female objects is found in childhood, in primitive societies, in early history and in the ancient world, and is the original basis of sexuality.

It is only as a result of later, Victorian social restrictions that people are forced into one fixed, standardised and regimented mould, heterosexual or homosexual, or their modern equivalent which demands that people be in monogamous committed couple relationships.

In reality a person’s final sexual orientation is not decided until after puberty, and then only as the result of innumerable obscure influences. That there is a multiplicity of determining factors is indicated by the extraordinary range of sexual practices and attitudes to be found in mankind.

Thus psychoanalysis regards so-called ‘normal’ sexuality as achieved only under intense pressure and great restriction of the original wider options for pleasure. In fact it’s so-called ‘normal’ sexuality, the genital attraction between man and woman, which is historically problematic and just as much in need of explanation as any other form.

Sexual aim of ‘inverts’

No one single aim can be laid down for the sexuality of ‘inverts’, as it can for the ‘normal’ behaviour of straights; there is too great a variety.

Conclusion

We have been in the habit of regarding the link between the sexual aim and the sexual object as more solid than it is. In fact the object appears to be no more than soldered onto the instinct, and which aim takes which object is a great deal more problematical than previously thought, because the sexual instinct is more free-flowing and independent than we previously suspected.

(B) Sexually immature person and animals as sexual objects

Light is thrown on the sexual instinct by the fact that it permits of so much variation in its objects and such a cheapening of them.

That children can be the objects of sex, or even animals, tells us about the vicissitudes of the sex instinct (along with rapes, sexual assaults and perverse murders). It seems as if the sex instinct will do almost anything to achieve satisfaction.

The impulses of sexual life are among those which, even normally, are the least controlled by the higher activities of the mind… In the process of human cultural development, sexuality is the weak spot.

(2) Deviations in respect of the sexual aim i.e. perversions

Popular opinion says the sexual aim is the union of the genitals in copulation which leads to the release of sexual tension. But a moment’s reflection tells you that, even in ‘normal’ sexuality, people kiss – bringing together two parts of the digestive system – for pleasure. And most people linger to some extent over intermediate stages, such as looking and touching. So the seeds of ‘perversity’ are all around us.

Perversions are sexual activities which either:

  • extend in an anatomical sense beyond the parts of the body designed for sexual union
  • linger or halt at the intermediate stages on the path to sexual union

(A) Anatomical extensions

Overvaluation of the sexual object

The first and prime perversion of sex from its object is the overvaluation of the object i.e. ‘love’. For all practical purposes ‘love’, for Freud, is this (potentially pathological) overvaluation of the love object.

It is only in the rarest instances that the psychical value set on the object as being the goal of the sexual instinct stops short at the genitals. The appreciation extends to the whole body of the sexual object and tends to involve every sensation derived from it. The same overvaluation spills over into the psychological sphere: the subject becomes, as it were, intellectually infatuated with (that is, his powers of judgment are weakened) by the mental achievements and perfections of the sexual object and he submits to the latter’s judgments with credulity.

This sexual overvaluation is something that cannot easily be reconciled with [society’s] restriction of the sexual aim to union of the actual genitals and it helps to turn activities connected with other parts of the body into sexual aims.

Once a sexual object has been chosen, the ordinarily effective higher activities of the mind – judgment and civilised restraint – all too often go out of the window. In most people this results in crushes, infatuations, sometimes in grands amours: once the libido sees an opening, it tends to pour forth like a flood.

How the subject (carried away by powerful libido) and the (perhaps reluctant) object cope with the situation is the theme of most of Western literature from Hero and Leander to Madame Bovary.

(I can see an evolutionary explanation for all this which Freud doesn’t mention, which is that: having made a sexual choice, overvaluation follows from a) opening the floodgates of an instinct otherwise fiercely repressed b) to ensure a strong libidinal attachment to the woman who you’re planning to impregnate – so it is a blind Darwinian instinct designed to make the impregnator bond with their mate  and remain to look after their offspring; but, as all of human history tells us, this often clashes with the other biological imperative affecting men which is impregnating as many women as possible, hence the many men who eat, shoot and leave.)

Sexual use of the mucous membrane of the lips and mouth

Freud proceeds with his agenda of making everything about sex and love look strange and uncanny.

The use of the mouth as a sexual organ is regarded as a perversion if the lips (or tongue) of one person are brought into contact with the genitals of another, but not if the mucous membranes of the lips of both of them come together.

Why do people find kissing acceptable and cunnilingus or fellatio disgusting? Freud here points to the purely conventional, culturally-determined nature of our feelings.

Has ‘disgust’ (a powerful reaction-formation) played a large part in forming our cultural conventions – or is it simply a product of the increasing self-repression which characterises us in the West (unlike other contemporary civilisations, primitive cultures and the cultures of the ancient world, which were and are much more liberal in their sexual practices)?

Freud seems to think the ancients were more honest in this, as in so much else.

The most striking distinction between the erotic life of antiquity and our own no doubt lies in the fact that the ancients laid the stress upon the instinct itself, whereas we emphasise its object. The ancients glorified the instinct and were prepared on its account to honour even an inferior object; while we despise the instinctual activity in itself, and find excuses for it only in the merits of the object.

The progress of civilisation seems to require a steadily increasing restriction of the sexual instinct, bought at the price of a growing sense of disgust. Hence the genitals of men and women, worshipped by the Greeks as holy, are now banned as dangerously corrupting.

There is no doubt that the genitals of the opposite sex can in themselves be an object of disgust and that such an attitude is one of the characteristics of all hysterics.

One thinks of John Ruskin (allegedly) driven into paroxysms by the discovery on his wedding night that, unlike the Greek statues which he adored, his wife had pubic hair. Or, more up to date:

Indecent exposure, sometimes known as ‘flashing’, is a serious sexual criminal offence, which carries a custodial sentence of up to 2-years at its most severe. (Old Bailey solicitors)

Does ‘disgust’ drive the repression of sexuality i.e. is disgust natural, a ‘God-given’ reaction of the ‘God-given’ conscience to the spectacle of fallen sexuality? A question related to: is conscience ‘God-given’ and so universal? Or is ‘conscience’ created by culture and therefore morally relative across different cultures? Morality and disgust on the one side, pragmatism and sexual libertarianism on the other.

Or is disgust an entirely material, biological reaction-formation to the compulsory repression of sexuality enforced by a coercive society, no God or morality required?

Sexual use of the anal orifice

People who think sodomy is disgusting because we defecate through the anus are as correct as women who say the penis is disgusting because men urinate through it or men who think the vulva is disgusting because women menstruate through it.

Which is to say, all these opinions are correct in their own terms, but missing the point. These organs can (clearly) be put to various uses. Should they be? Or should they be restricted to their ‘God-given’ purposes? But then who is to say what their correct usage is? A bunch of old men wearing purple dresses in the House of Lords? Imams and rabbis? Agony aunts? TV shows. Gender studies lecturers? Where is the authority for this?

Significance of other regions of the body

What seems to be common to all human sexuality is:

  1. overvaluation of the sexual object
  2. a versatile ability on the part of the sexual aim to use any part of the body as the sexual object for gratification

Unsuitable substitutes for the sexual object: fetishism

In fetishism the sexual instinct replaces the primary object (the genitals) and the overvalued secondary object (the person attached to the genitals) with unlikely tertiary objects – parts of the body, locks of hair, feet – or linked objects, such as underwear or other items of clothing.

A certain amount of fetishism is habitually present in normal love, especially of those stages of it in which the normal sexual aim seems unattainable or its fulfilment prevented.

A lock of your true love’s hair. Or as Goethe put it in Faust:

‘Get me a kerchief from her breast,
A garter that her knee has pressed.’

These objects can justifiably be likened to the fetishes of primitive peoples. Inscribed in fetishes is a primitive symbology, comparable with the symbolism of dreams. For example, the foot is an age-old symbol for the penis. Fur is linked to the hair of the mons Veneris. The shoe or slipper is a symbol of the female genitals (as in Cinderella) into which the male foot neatly slips, and so on.

(B) Fixations of preliminary sexual aims

Appearance of new aims

External factors (danger, unavailability of a sexual object, risk of disease) tend to fix libido at the preparatory activities. Truly, every normal aspect of ‘love’ carries the seeds of a perversion.

Touching and looking

Seeing is an evolutionary derivative of touching. A look can be as exciting as a touch.

Both seeing and touching are ‘ordinary’ parts of ‘normal’ sexual activity – unless lingered over, or unless they become ends in themselves, in which case we have voyeurism/exhibitionism and various types of masturbation.

Freud thought exhibitionism the result of either wishing for a reciprocal showing of the other person’s genitals; or a triumphant assertion against the Castration Complex: ‘Look, I’ve still got my willy!’

He doesn’t seem to take into account the sadistic urge to offend or scare women, a kind of sublimated form of rape, visual rather than physical rape.

The power of vision is shown by just how upset some women can feel, how physically defiled, just because a strange man showed them his penis. I’m not downplaying the offence or upset caused.

The concealment and revelation of the sexual parts of the body go hand in hand with the rise of civilisation and progressive sexual repression. It is unlikely that the Greeks had strip clubs; instead they had orgies, the real thing. We have strip clubs because of the immense repression to which our sexuality has been subjected.

For Freud the concept of ‘beauty’ itself originates in sexual excitement but is sublimated away from the genitals onto the body as a whole, which is perceived as ‘beautiful’, a concept or feeling which can then  be transferred onto other types of object, and then onto objects created and enjoyed for their ‘beauty’ alone i.e. works of art.

This explains why women are more often the object of art than men – even in women painter’s paintings – because men are more sexually predatory than women. And why the sight of the genitals themselves is rarely ‘beautiful’; all pleasure has been sublimated out of them leaving only the reaction-formation of ‘disgust’.

Sadism and masochism

These were given their names by Richard von Kraft-Ebing (Viennese) in the 1890s, after the Marquis de Sade (French) and Leopold von Sacher-Masoch (Viennese) As with the other perversions, a moderate amount of sado-masochism is generally regarded as ‘normal’:

The sexuality of most male human beings contains an element of aggressiveness – a desire to subjugate. The biological significance of it seems to lie in the need for overcoming the resistance of the sexual object by means other than the process of wooing. Thus sadism would correspond to an aggressive component of the sexual instinct which has become independent and exaggerated and, by displacement, has usurped the leading position.

Many types of sexual relationship which are regarded as ‘normal’ contain a high amount of aggression; sadism becomes an actual perversion when pleasure is derived from violence alone.

Masochism is sexual excitement aroused purely by receiving pain or humiliation. Later in his career, after he’d outlined the new theory of the superego, Freud distinguished between purely physical masochism and moral masochism, the desire to be found guilty of sins, to be punished for them and so on, an internal submission of the ego to the overbearing superego which plays such a large part in religious life.

Freud thinks masochism is secondary, a deflection of primary sadism – which the subject is too weak to inflict onto others – back onto the self. Masochism is for weaklings; or for the weakling part of even strong people.

The history of human civilisation shows beyond any doubt that there is an intimate connection between cruelty and the sexual instinct.

But nobody really knows why. Some people think aggression is a development of the primal desire to eat, to master objects by putting them in the mouth – an instinct seen in children and in the holy meals at the centre of many religions. Others think there is some intimate biochemical link between pleasure and pain.

Suggestive for Freud’s bisexual thesis – the mingling of the ‘feminine’ and the ‘masculine’ in all of us – is Havelock Ellis and Kraft-Ebing’s agreement that masochism and sadism are often found in the same person.

(3) The perversions in general

Variation and disease

Medical men first identified perversions in the insane and perversion was blamed (like homosexuality) on ‘degeneracy’. What Freud has shown is that the perversions are implicit in even ‘normal’ love.

No healthy person, it appears, can fail to make some addition that might be called perverse to the normal sexual aim; and the universality of this finding is enough to show how inappropriate it is to use the word ‘perversion’ as a term of reproach. In the sphere of sexual life we are brought up against peculiar and, indeed, insoluble problems as soon as we try to draw a sharp line to distinguish mere variations within the range of what is physiological from pathological symptoms.

On one side the liberal Freud, on the other a vast army of censorious Christians, trying to draw precisely that line, trying to tell people exactly just which type and forms of ‘love’ are permissible and which aren’t, from the Pope to Mary Whitehouse.

For the Moral Majority it is always other people who are degenerate, other people who are the helpless prey of, for example, homosexual men in the homosexual age of consent debate.

Freud is saying, if you only look at the acts themselves you may be tempted to define them as unchristian or degenerate, pathological or perverted etc. But if you look at the instinct which carries so many people to such lengths, it is the same instinct and it is in all of us – it is what our minds are made of.

The mental factor in perversions

Despite the sometimes disgusting ends to which the love instinct is put, all these behaviours are to some extent idealisations of the libido, in the sense of abstractions of it away from its normal role.

The omnipotence of love is perhaps never more strongly proved than in such of its aberrations as these. The highest and the lowest are always closest to each other in the sphere of sexuality.

Two conclusions

Every individual plays a double existential role:

  1. to reproduce, to pass on its genes and preserve the species
  2. to preserve itself while it does this

Sometimes the two purposes clash and this is the basis of Freud’s psychology, the clash between the unconscious libidinal drive to have sex, all the time, with everyone and everything; and the rational ego’s struggle to redirect this blind drive into socially acceptable forms which help the individual survive and help it be at peace with itself. So the origins of any person’s sexuality must be looked for in two places: in the history of the species and the accidents of the individual.

Our study of the perversions has shown us that the sexual instinct has to struggle against certain mental forces which act as resistances, and of which shame and disgust are the most prominent. It is permissible to suppose that these forces play a part in restraining that instinct within the limits that are regarded as normal; and if they develop within the individual before the sexual instinct has reached its full strength, no doubt they then determine the course of its development.

These forces, which act like dams upon sexual development – disgust, shame and morality – must also be regarded as historical precipitates of the external inhibitions to which the sexual instinct has been subjected during the psychogenesis of the human race. We can observe the way in which, in the development of individuals, they arise at the appropriate moment, as though spontaneously, when upbringing and external influence give the signal.

In the second place we have found that some of the perversions are only made intelligible if we assume the convergence of several motive forces. If such perversions admit of analysis, that is, if they can be taken to pieces, then they must be of a composite nature. This gives us a hint that perhaps the sexual instinct itself is no simple thing but put together from components which have come apart again in the perversions.

(4) The sexual instincts in neurotics

Psychoanalysis

Here Freud reiterates his belief that all the psychoneuroses are based on sexual instinctual forces and that the psychoneuroses can only be investigated using the method perfected by Josef Breuer and himself – psychoanalysis. He gives a useful summary of the famous cathartic method:

By this I do not merely mean that the energy of the sexual instinct makes a contribution to the forces that maintain the pathological manifestations (the symptoms). I mean expressly to assert that that contribution is the most important and only constant source of energy of the neurosis and that in consequence the sexual life of the persons in question is expressed in these symptoms. The symptoms constitute the sexual activity of the patient!

The removal of the symptoms of hysterical patients by psychoanalysis proceeds on the supposition that those symptoms are substitutes – transcriptions, as it were – for a number of emotionally cathected mental processes, wishes and desires which, by the operation of a special psychical procedure (repression) have been prevented from obtaining discharge in psychical activity that is admissible to consciousness.

These mental processes, being held back in a state of unconsciousness, strive to obtain an expression that shall be appropriate to their emotional importance – to obtain discharge; and in the case of hysteria they find such an expression (by means of the process called conversion) in somatic or bodily phenomena, that is, in hysterical symptoms [cf Anna O’s inability to drink water, choking sensation etc].

By systematically turning those symptoms back (with the help of psychoanalysis) into emotionally cathected ideas – ideas that can now become conscious – it is possible to obtain the most accurate knowledge of the nature and origin of these formerly unconscious psychical structures.

Findings of psychoanalysis

Psychoanalysis has shown that:

Symptoms represent a substitute for impulses the source of whose strength is derived from the sexual instinct… The character of hysterics shows a degree of sexual repression in excess of the normal quantity, an intensification of resistance against the sexual instinct (which we have already met with in the form of shame, disgust and morality), and what seems like an instinctive aversion on their part to any intellectual consideration of sexual problems.

In the case of someone predisposed to hysteria, the onset of his illness is precipitated when, either as a result of his own progressive maturity or of the external circumstances of his life, he finds himself faced by the demands of a real sexual situations. Between the pressure of the instinct and his antagonism to sexuality, illness offers him a way of escape. It does not solve his conflict but seeks to evade it by transforming his libidinal impulses into symptoms.

(See Jensen’s Gradiva, written two years later, which is a textbook example of hysteria as the self-deluding flight into illness. The archaeologist Norbert’s escape from the reality of an emotionally demanding sexual situation – his awakening love for Zoe – into delusions about the light-tripping woman on the antique frieze whom he names ‘Gradiva’, and then Norbert’s actual fleeing to Italy, to Pompeii, to escape the sexual situation, only to meet Zoe magically transformed into the woman in the frieze –– from the heart of the reaction-formation returns the repressed. In the novel Norbert is then cured through love, by the redirecting of his libido – unhealthily cathected onto the Gradiva-delusion – back to the reality of his flesh-and-blood love, Zoe, by the love object herself.)

Neurosis and perversion

Moreover, neurotics’ symptoms, upon psychoanalysis, often turn out to be conversions not just of ‘normal’ sexuality, but to include what are called the perversions i.e. neurotics’ unconsciousnesses are often raging with perverse wishes deflected into symptoms. Hence Dora’s persistent cough is a (transmuted) wish for oral sex with Herr K.

a) The unconscious life of all neurotics shows inverted impulses, fixation of the libido on persons of their own sex.

b) The unconsciouses of neurotics show tendencies to every kind of anatomical extension of sexual activity, particularly oral and anal.

c) An especially prominent part is played by the fact that the instincts involved are component instincts. Thus the perversions often come in opposing pairs: exhibitionism and voyeurism; the active and passive forms of the instinct for cruelty.

It is through such an opposition, a component tying together of libido and cruelty, that the transformation from love into hate takes place, the transformation from affectionate into hostile impulses.

(You can see here the embryonic shape of Freud’s later division of all the instincts into Sex instincts and Death instincts, Eros and Thanatos which would formulate nearly 20 years late, in Beyond the Pleasure Principle.)

(5) Component instincts and erotogenic zones

If we trace back the positive and negative aspects of the perversions (masochism/sadism, voyeurism/exhibitionism) they appear to derive from component instincts which themselves admit of further analysis.

When sexual excitement derives from a particular organ or area of the body we refer to that as the erotogenic zone.

Thus, under the right circumstances, the anus or the mouth can become an erotogenic zone. Or the surface of the skin in touching. Or the eye itself in voyeurism where, through the eye alone is felt excitement comparable to that of sex in a ‘normal’ person.

(6) Reasons for the apparent preponderance of perverse sexuality in the psychoneuroses

But just because neurotic symptoms often contain a perverse wish doesn’t mean that neurotics are closer to perverts than to ‘normal’ people. Neurotics are normal people whose libido, either because of innate predisposition or due to accident, has been dammed up.

Most psychoneurotics fall ill after the age of puberty as a result of the demands made upon them by normal sexual life. Or else illnesses of this kind set in later, when the libido fails to obtain satisfaction along normal lines. In both these cases the libido behaves like a stream whose main bed has become blocked. It proceeds to fill up collateral channels which may hitherto have been empty.

Where the constitution is predisposed to illness maybe no external factor will be required. On the other hand, a great shock in real life may tip a robust constitution into neurotic illness.

Might there be a link between the perversions wished for by the neurotic’s unconscious, between the erotogenic zone it highlights, and innate constitution?

In a word, can you define personality types by predisposition to a particular perversion/erotogenic zone? (This is what Freud does in the following essay, about childhood sexuality, defining and describing the oral, anal types and so on.)

(7) Intimations of the infantile character of sexuality

“By demonstrating the part played by perverse impulses in the formation of symptoms in the psychoneuroses, we have quite remarkably increased the number of people who might be regarded as perverts. It is not only that neurotics in themselves constitute a very numerous class, but it must also be considered that an unbroken chain bridges the gap between the neuroses in all their manifestations and ‘normality’….

Thus the extraordinarily wide dissemination of the perversions forces us to suppose that the disposition to perversions is itself of no great rarity but must form a part of what passes as the ‘normal’ constitution…

There is indeed something innate lying behind the perversions but it is something innate in everyone, though as a disposition it may vary in its intensity and may be increased by the influences of actual life. What is in question are the innate constitutional roots of the sexual instinct. In one class of cases (the perversions) these roots may grow into the actual vehicles of sexual activity; in others they may be submitted to an insufficient suppression (repression) and thus be able in a roundabout way to attract a considerable portion of sexual energy to themselves as neurotic symptoms; while in the most favourable cases, which lie between these two extremes, they may by means of effective restriction and other kinds of modification bring about what is known as ‘normal’ sexual life.

Thus the germs of our character, the way our sexual instincts will be channelled, are probably laid down in childhood. In the next essay Freud looks at the play of influences which govern the evolution of infantile sexuality until its outcome in perversion, neurosis or normal sexual life.

Essay 2. Infantile sexuality

Neglect of the infantile factor

In Essay 2 Freud sets out to smash the popular opinion that children have no sexual feelings; that sexual feelings only set in with puberty. On the contrary, all the literature, and a chat with any nurse, will tell you that many babies play with their willies or fannies and suck various bits of themselves, but these stories are generally only mentioned as exceptions and monstrosities.

Why do we not remember our sexual feelings from our own childhood years?

Infantile amnesia

We definitely behave lively in every respect during childhood, giving every evidence of feeling joy, love, rage, delight. Why do we forget so much of this? Freud says that under analysis patients often remember events from their earliest years. Therefore the memories are stored somewhere – but are repressed from everyday access. Why? Nobody knows.

(1) The period of sexual latency in childhood and its interruptions

Based on a) scattered reports of the so-called exceptional behaviour of infants in the literature and b) the memories of neurotics revealed by psychoanalysis, Freud will sketch out a theory of infantile sexuality.

Freud thinks of the sex instinct as being innate in the child; that it grows as the child grows; that it is overtaken by suppression at the age of 5 or 6; then it revives and develops further at puberty, developing in a pattern of fits and starts. Childhood sexuality only emerges into the light of observable day in the third or fourth year of life.

Sexual inhibitions

It is during this same period that the mental forces are built up which are later to impede and block the flow of the sexual instinct – feelings of disgust (at an object), feelings of shame (at oneself) and moral and aesthetic ideals (as it were, objective guidelines we build for ourselves).

Reaction formation and sublimation

These are the two methods by which these dams are erected to prevent the return of repressed material into the conscious mind.

Sublimation is a widely reported phenomenon, the diverting of instinctual sexual energies into ‘higher’, more socially acceptable ones.

A reaction formation is:

a defence mechanism in which emotions and impulses which are anxiety-producing or perceived to be unacceptable are mastered by exaggeration of the directly opposing tendency

Freud thinks that reaction formations are the result of a series of unpleasurable experiences, either of internal unpleasure (excessive playing with the genitals leads to unpleasure) or external tellings-off, which create, as it were, a psychological allergic reaction to the erotogenic zone and experiences in question. Told off for touching his winkle enough times and the small boy genuinely come to believe it is dirty and disgusting.

[A digression on Freud’s final theory of sexual development

A lot later, Freud was to elaborate and fine-tune the notion that the human infants evolve through a set number of stages, namely:

  • polymorphous perversity – undifferentiated pleasure in the whole body
  • oral phase (0 to 1 year) – the infant gets most of their pleasure from their mouth, for example eating and thumb-sucking: if an infant’s oral needs aren’t met it can develop an develop oral fixation which continues into adult life
  • anal phase (1 to 3 years) – controlling bladder and bowel movements, potty training, when successfully accomplished leads to praise from parents and a sense of achievement and independence; but if parents take an approach that is too lenient, Freud suggested that an ‘anal-expulsive personality‘ – could develop whereby the adult has a messy, wasteful, or destructive personality, while if parents are too strict, he believed this could lead to an ‘anal-retentive‘ personality which is over-strict, rigid, and obsessive.
  • phallic stage (3 to 5 years) – focus of the libido is on the genitals and children begin to discover the difference between boys and girls
    • in boys this gives rise to the Oedipus complex as boys view their fathers as a rival for the mother’s affections: the Oedipus complex describes these feelings of wanting to possess the mother and replace the father. But at the same time the little boy worries that his father will punish him for having these feelings, a fear Freud termed castration anxiety
    • other Freudians suggested the term Electra complex to describe a similar but mirror set of feelings experienced by small girls, namely the wish to be possessed by their father and rid of their mother, accompanied by parallel feelings of guilt and anxiety
    • Freud, however, believed that instead of the Electra complex, girls experience what he notoriously called penis envy i.e. the wish to be a boy, the lack of a penis forever leaving girls feeling inadequate. Even in Freud’s own day female psychoanalysts deplored this idea, and female followers have denied it and overwritten it ever since]
  • latency phase (6 to puberty) – the superego or conscience gains in power, the libido and memories of all those early physical pleasures are suppressed; instead boys or girls enter school and become more concerned with peer relationships, hobbies, and other interests; a time of exploration in which the sexual energy repressed or dormant, still present but sublimated into other areas such as intellectual pursuits and social interactions
  • genital stage (11, 12, 13 onwards) – at puberty the libido becomes active again and teens develop a strong sexual interest in the opposite sex: if all the previous stages have been successfully navigated, the person becomes a rounded, balanced individual]

Freud therefore thinks that the development through the oral, anal and phallic stages is partly achieved by the erection of these reaction formations which act as ‘dams’ or road blocks saying ‘No Going Back’.

That this may be the origin of feelings of ‘shame’ and ‘disgust’ is an interesting theory to ponder; that this process is the basis of all civilised morality, as Freud claims, was clearly a provocative thing to say, and which sparked much outraged opposition to him and his theories.

Interruptions of the latency period

Not all children’s sexuality goes underground at about five years old. There may be all sorts of exceptions, single strands of sexual pleasure continuing into the latent period.

(2) The manifestations of infantile sexuality

Thumb-sucking

This emerges early and often persists into adolescence. Sometimes accompanied by the rubbing of an erotogenic zone it can act as an introduction to masturbation. Because it is accompanied by pleasurable rubbing, and sometimes even by orgasm-type physical reactions, Freud makes thumb-sucking the prototype of infantile sexuality.

Auto-erotism (coined by Havelock Ellis in 1898)

Infants initially derive pleasure from their own bodies. Sucking thumbs or lips or any other part of the body is a repetition of the initial oral activity, sucking at the breast.

No-one who has seen a baby sinking back satiated from the breast and falling asleep with flushed cheeks and a blissful smile can escape the reflection that this picture persists as the prototype of the expression of sexual satisfaction in later life.

As the child grows it experiments with enacting the sexual pleasure of sucking when the breast is absent: sucking any part of its own body, taking itself as a source of pleasure. In later life the pleasures of lingering kissing re-enact this primal sexual experience. In some children there is a constitutional intensification of the labial region (lips):

If that significance persists, these same children will grow up to become epicures in kissing, will be inclined to perverse kissing or, if males, will have a powerful motive for drinking and smoking. If, however, repression ensues, they will feel disgust at food and will produce hysterical vomiting.

Thus, for Freud, entire character types and types of adult behaviour can be traced right back to earliest childhood behaviour.

(3) The sexual aim of infantile sexuality

Characteristics of erotogenic zones

Erotogenic zones are a moveable feast. Particular parts of the body seem predisposed to resonate with sexual pleasure (the genitals, lips, nipples, anus, the surface of the skin generally) and if an infant, in its auto-erotic stage, chances on one of these to suck or play with, that part easily becomes the model of sexual pleasure, of reassurance etc in later life.

Any part of the body can acquire the same susceptibility to stimulation as is possessed by the genitals and can become an erotogenic zone.

It is hard to think of a view more contrary to the popular, conventional view that a) infants have no sex life and that b) sex appears only at puberty and is exclusively confined to the genitals.

The infantile sexual aim

Although all the body is susceptible to sexualisation, certain zones seem predisposed to be especially erotogenic, generally zones which are physiologically designed for other activities and pleasures which the child can then repeat by auto-erotic stimulation: the lips for eating, the penis for peeing, the anus for defecating can all be co-opted by the libido.

(4) Masturbatory sexual manifestations

Activity of the anal zone

Psychoanalysis of patients has revealed the surprising extent to which the anus is not only a source of pleasure in infancy but retains its pleasurable power throughout life.

Children who are making use of the susceptibility to erotogenic stimulation of the anal zone betray themselves by holding back their stool till its accumulation brings about violent muscular contractions and, as it passes through the anus, is able to produce powerful stimulation of the mucous membrane. In so doing it must no doubt cause not only painful but highly pleasurable sensations.

One of the clearest signs of subsequent eccentricity or nervousness is to be seen when a baby obstinately refuses to empty its bowels when he is put on the pot and holds back that function till he himself chooses to exercise it. He is naturally not concerned with dirtying the bed, he is only anxious not to miss the subsidiary pleasure attached to defecating.

Faeces come to have another important meaning for the child.

They are clearly treated as part of the infant’s own body and represent his first ‘gift’: by producing them he can express his active compliance with his environment and, by withholding them, his disobedience…

The retention of the faecal mass, which is thus carried out by the child intentionally to begin with, in order to serve, as it were, a masturbatory stimulus upon the anal zone or to be employed as a weapon in his relation to the people looking after him, is also one of the roots of the constipation which is so common among neuropaths.

Activity of the genital zone

The glans of the penis in boys and the clitoris in girls:

The anatomical situation of this region, the secretions in which it is bathed, the washing and rubbing to which it is subjected in the course of a child’s toilet, as well as accidental stimulation, make it inevitable that the pleasurable feeling which this part of the body is capable of producing should be noticed by children even during their earliest infancy, and should give rise to a need for its repetition.

Girls often masturbate simply by rubbing their thighs together. Boys tend to use hands.

The preference for the hand which is shown by boys is already evidence of the important contribution which the instinct for mastery is destined to make to masculine sexual activity.

Second phase of infantile masturbation

In this early essay Freud posits three periods of sexual activity: a first phase of infantile sexuality; a second phase flourishing around the fourth year; then the eruptions of puberty.

The second phase of infantile sexual activity may assume a variety of different forms which can only be determined by a precise analysis of individual cases. But all its details leave behind the deepest unconscious impressions in the subject’s memory, determine the development of his later character, if he is to remain healthy, and the symptomatology of his neurosis, if he is to fall ill after puberty.

Return of early infantile masturbation

The return of infantile sexuality at around 4 and 5 years is determined by all sorts of factors, internal and external. But Freud is careful to mention the external factor of infantile seduction (or child abuse, as we would say) as a way many of his patients recall being jolted, as it were, into sexual life, and made aware of the erotogenicity of the genitals.

Polymorphously perverse disposition

In and as a result of sexual abuse, children can be induced to all manner of perversions thus revealing, for Freud, an innate disposition to polymorphous perversion.

The same, he asserts, is true of many women, as witness the large number of prostitutes who can accommodate any type of sexual taste for their clients.

It becomes impossible not to recognise that this same disposition to perversions of every kind is a general and fundamental human characteristic.

[At one and the same time this notion is typical of Freud’s throwaway sexism, but also of the immense tolerance and acceptance of a huge variety of sexual predilections implicit in his theory.]

Component instincts

Exhibitionism, voyeurism and cruelty are all apparent as perversions in potentia in children. Small boys proudly display the thing which gives them so much pleasure and which they pee through, their penis, which thus symbolises at least two types of infantile ‘mastery’.

Looking is the child’s earliest way of relating to the world. Once it has established its own erotogenic zones it is curious to see them in others: voyeurism.

Cruelty comes relatively easily to the childish nature, since the obstacle that brings the instinct for mastery to a halt at other people’s pain – namely a capacity for pity – is developed relatively late…

It may be assumed that the impulse of cruelty arises from the instinct for mastery and appears at a period of sexual life at which the genitals have not yet taken over their later role…

Children who distinguish themselves by special cruelty towards animals and playmates usually give rise to a just suspicion of an intense and precocious sexual activity arising from erotogenic zones…

The absence of the barrier of pity brings with it a danger that the connection between the cruel and the erotogenic instincts, thus established in childhood, may prove unbreakable in later life.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Confessions show that early beating on the buttocks can easily be linked with erotogenic pleasure and form the basis of a fusion of the instincts of sex and cruelty in later life.

(5) The sexual researches of childhood

The instinct for knowledge

At the same time as children reach an early peak of sexuality (3 to 5 years) they display an instinct for knowledge. For Freud this is a sublimated form of the instincts for mastery and of seeing, voyeurism.

Psychoanalysis has shown that the first problem to awaken the childish thirst for knowledge are sexual problems, where do I come from? why does my wee-wee make give me pleasure?

The Riddle of the Sphinx

Freud gave this typically grandiose title to the core question of infancy: where do babies come from?

Sex differences aren’t important at this stage since boys assume all babies have penises.

Castration complex and penis envy [this section was added in 1915]

Only painfully do boys realise there’s a whole category of person who doesn’t have a penis and become petrified that they too might lose their mighty weapon. This he calls the castration complex.

The discovery that girls don’t have one gives many boys an enduringly low opinion of girls. For girls, the discovery that boys have this toy which they can play with induces in them penis envy and an enduring sense of being second-rate. Penis envy culminates in the girl’s wish to be a boy.

[The whole concept of ‘penis envy’ is probably the single most outrageous example of Freud, despite being a revolutionary on one level, nonetheless often reinscribing the sexist prejudices of his Victorian times in a new language.]

Theories of birth

All children speculate about where babies come from, especially if their mother is pregnant again. The central feature of most theories is that the baby is got by eating something (as in many fairy tales) and delivered through the anus.

Sadistic view of sexual intercourse

Many children see or overhear their parents making love. Children feel intense curiosity about it. It seems to have to do with some joint activity involving peeing or defecating. But many children pick up on the apparent violence involved (hard physical movements, screaming) and this is another way in which cruelty may attach itself to a child’s fantasy world and resurface in a person’s adult attitudes to sex.

Typical failure of infantile sexual researches

No matter how subtle the sexual theories of children they are invariably wrong; for how could they know about semen and ovaries? But the whole attempt is important to Freud as a symbol of the growing independence of the child. These researches:

constitute a first step towards taking an independent attitude in the world, and they imply a high degree of alienation of the child from the people in his environment who formerly enjoyed his complete confidence.

(6) The phases of development of the sexual organisation

Infantile sexual pleasure is the opposite in every way of ‘normal’ adult sexuality. It is essentially auto-erotic, and its component instincts are generally disconnected and scattered over all manner of activities: this is the meaning of polymorphous perversity.

Compare and contrast with adult sexuality aims at genital contact with some external object.

Pregenital organisations

I.e. sexual patterns before the instinct settles on the genitals:

1. The oral or cannibalistic phase: the aim is the incorporation of the sexual object, to eat it, to master it by ingesting it and stimulating the mucous membranes of the lips at the same time.

This is the origin of cannibalism in primitive peoples; of the primitive relic of a holy meal found in most religions; and of the higher intellectual activity of identification with a hero figure.

The primitive and intellectual functions are brought together in the Eucharist where we eat the body of Christ at the same time as we acknowledge Him lord and master.

2. The sadistic-anal phase: it is at this early stage that the sex instinct can be seen dividing into the active-passive division which characterises all later sexuality: the masculine drive to mastery, of defecating at our own time and pleasure; and the feminine pleasure derived from the anus; a sadistic and a passive pleasure intermingle.

Ambivalence

This duality is the basis of later ambivalence, a word coined by the Swiss psychiatrist Paul Eugen Bleuler (Bleuler was a prolific coiner of neologisms; he also invented the terms ‘schizophrenia’, ‘schizoid’ and ‘autism’).

Ambivalence became central to Freudian theory. It describes the holding of contradictory feelings, classically love and hate, towards the same object. Thus the child can both love but be terrified by their father.

Phallic phase

Freud distinguishes one last phase of infantile sexuality, where a love-object has emerged but the instinct in both boys and girls focuses on the penis alone, when boys develop pride in their penis and girls develop a painful sense of lack of penis, giving rise to penis envy (see comments above).

Diphasic choice of object

To summarise, Freud can claim that, completely contrary to the popular view, the distinctive thing about human sexuality is:

  • that it is present, in various forms, in infants from the earliest time
  • that it develops through a series of stages
  • that each of these stages carries the risk of arrest or error which deforms the child’s feelings and emotions around libido
  • that infantile sexual choices and activity are progressively repressed by reaction-formations (guilt, shame) by the age of about 5
  • that the entire set of experiences goes underground during the latency period (5 or 6 to puberty), is repressed and forgotten
  • that it resurfaces in a more explicitly sexual mode at puberty but with shapes and flavours conditioned by those earliest experiences

These infantile longings become the basis of later ‘affectionate’ feelings:

Their sexual aims have become mitigated and they now represent what may be described as the ‘affectionate current’ of sexual life. Only psychoanalytic investigation can show that behind this affection, admiration and respect there lie concealed the old sexual longings of the infantile component instincts which have now become unserviceable.

(7) The sources of infantile sexuality

These conclusions have been reached by the psychoanalysis of adult patients and the observation of children. Sexual excitation in children seems to arise from:

a) repetition of satisfaction achieved in normal organic processes (sucking, defecating)
b) through external stimulation of erotogenic zones
c) as the expression of fundamental instincts

Mechanical excitations

Children love swinging and being thrown and caught. Psychoanalysis has shown the recurrence of these sensations in adult dreams i.e. that they lay down patterns of the earliest pleasures, for example, fantasies of flying, air blowing against the skin and genitals.

It is well known that rocking is habitually used to induce sleep in restless children. The shaking produced by driving in carriages and later by railway travel exercises such a fascinating effect upon older children that every boy, at any rate, has at one time or another in his life wanted to be an engine driver.

It is a puzzling fact that boys take such an extraordinarily intense interest in things connected with railways and, at the age at which the production of fantasies is most active (shortly before puberty), use those things as the nucleus of a symbolism that is peculiarly sexual. A compulsive link of this kind between railway travel and sexuality is clearly derived from the pleasurable character of the sensations of movement.

In the event of repression, which turns so many childish preferences into their opposite, these same individuals, when they are adolescents or adults, will react to rocking or swinging with a feeling of nausea, will be terribly exhausted by a railway journey, or will be subject to attacks of anxiety on the journey.

Muscular activity

Many patients report their first memories of sexual excitation when romping, fighting and playing with playmates. Organised games are done at school to keep the body healthy and divert adolescent attention away from sexuality: Freud says what this is doing is channel sexuality back into one of its specific components.

Affective process

Powerful emotions have sexual effects. Terrified or anxious children may touch their genitals for reassurance. The erotic aspect of terror, fright and so on may become intimately associated with sexuality so that adults find fear and terror thrilling; either in real life, in fantasies of rape or masochistic punishment; or in imaginary worlds of books or the cinema.

Pathways of mutual influence

If the taking in of food gives rise to sexual pleasure then the reverse may be true. If healthy sexuality accompanies healthy eating, then disturbance of sexuality may lead to disturbance of nourishment. Thus a sexually disturbed hysteric may cease eating.

We can speculate about a whole network of pathways by which sexual instincts may be channeled both towards basic organic functions (for example, eating) and also rerouted towards higher functions (that is, sublimated, into thinking, planning, deciding).

Essay 3. The transformations of puberty

Infantile sexuality is polymorphously perverse and auto-erotic, finding pleasure as it learns to control and play with its own body.

The latency period sees the repression of sexuality in the name of various reaction-formations and sexuality’s sublimation into all kinds of games and fantasies.

With puberty the genitals become active and the subject actively seeks a love object outside itself. The new sexual aim of genital union appears and all the scattered erotogenic zones with their sex impulses become focused on, and subordinate to, genital union. Hopefully.

‘Normal’ sexuality consists of the uniting of the affectionate current (the sublimated remains of childhood sexuality) and the sensual current (mainstream libido).

So proper human sexual development is the coming together of affection/love and sex/pleasure, focussed on the genitals, to produce the ‘normal’ healthy adult. But, as always, there can be all kinds of hiccups along the way.

(1) The primacy of the genital zones and fore-pleasure

At puberty the sex organs grow and become ready for use. They can be excited in three ways:

  1. excitation of the erotogenic zones from outside
  2. from the organic interior
  3. from mental life, the storehouse of impressions and ideas

Sexual excitement is felt in two ways:

  1. perception of a mental tension of an extremely compelling type
  2. physical preparation: erection of the penis, lubrication of the vagina

Sexual tension

How come sexual excitation is perceived as both pleasurable but also as an unpleasurable tension?

The mechanism of fore-pleasure

Touching or seeing clearly give rise to a) pleasure in themselves b) a perceived raising of sexual tension.

It is as if the fore-pleasure derived from stimulating the erotogenic zones is designed to increase the incentive to move onto the act of sexual union.

Initial pleasure thus disguises increasing tension (unpleasure) so you are led relentlessly on towards copulation, the aim of the entire organism.

The whole pattern leads up to orgasm and the release of the appropriate sexual substances. It would seem that orgasms are designed to extinguish libido, if only temporarily. They are the height of pleasure, the abrupt release of tension by the blood thronging the penis or clitoris rushing back into the body as the scrotum or vagina undergoes a series of muscular contractions perceived as pleasurable.

And this release of tension takes you right the way back to square one i.e. normal bodily function; the overwhelming compulsion towards sex evaporates, the rational mind returns to full control.

Freud divides the two stages into fore-pleasure and end-pleasure.

A distinction similar to the fore-pleasure offered by the telling of jokes which prepare you for the greater release of libidinal pressure (laughing).

[He uses the same division in his essay Creative Writers and Daydreaming to describe the fore-pleasure afforded by aesthetic or formal literary techniques which prepare the way for the deeper pleasure of sharing unconscious fantasies (tales of damnation and salvation, risk and adventure, Ian Fleming and Barbara Cartland).]

Dangers of fore-pleasure

But fore-pleasures are clearly yet another balancing act; the incentive of pleasure must be balanced by an increase of tension which successfully propels you towards sex. If the yield of orgasmic pleasure doesn’t live up to the growth in tension, you may become stuck at the fore-pleasure stage.

Obviously enough, you may be predisposed to this through any number of accidents which emerge in infancy. Extreme attachment to various types of fore-pleasure, to a particular erotogenic zone or to the mental equivalents of them (stimulation of the anus – masochism/inversion) may develop into full-blown perversion.

But these very complex combinations will have some influence over the shape of even the most healthy adult sexuality.

Not only the deviations from normal sexual life but its normal form as well are determined by the infantile manifestations of sexuality.

Again, if this is an accurate account of the growth of sexuality, it shows that it will be very hard to police, to draw a hard and fast line between ‘normal’ and perverse.

Freud is making the controversial claim that ‘the normal’ is built on ‘the perverse’ and most of its activities contain the seeds of perversity.

(2) The problem of sexual excitation

Part played by the sexual substances

Maybe sexual tension is produced, in men, by the accumulation of semen in the testicles? Kraft-Ebing thought so. But if so, how can this account for sexual excitation in children and women?

Importance of the internal sexual organs

Arguing against that theory, observation of castrated men shows that sexual excitement continues to operate with no semen at all.

Chemical theory

Freud speculates that the key role is played by substances released by the sex glands. In his day there was no convincing biological theory of sex.

The discovery of the class of chemicals called ‘hormones’ (at around this time, 1905, in England) paved the way to our present understanding of how sex works.

It’s worth pointing out, though, that even today one of the great mysteries is: Why Sex? And, as Steve Jones says, If Sex, why only two sexes?

(3) The libido theory

Libido is:

a quantitively variable force which serves as a measure of processes and transformations occurring in the field of sexual excitation

A kind of electricity. Freud imagines that libido is distinguished from the other main instinct, hunger, chemically. Libido is a chemically unique force. Psychoanalysis has shown that libido is derived not just from the genitals but from all sorts of organs, including the skin.

We thus reach the idea of a quantity of libido, to the mental representation of which we give the name of ego-libido, and whose production, increase or diminution, distribution and displacement should afford us possibilities for explaining the psychosexual phenomena observed.

Psychoanalysis can only observe ego-libido as it becomes attached to objects i.e. becomes object-libido, as it is attached to, detached from, swapped around various objects (for example, images, fixations, words and ideas) directing the subject’s activity towards sex. For the act of sex, in particular orgasm, results in the temporary extinction of libido.

Psychoanalysis observes the outflowing of libido from the ego and its return thereto.

The ego acts as a psychic reservoir for libido.

In the earliest phases every ego is narcissistic, that is, focusses libido on itself (during the auro-erotic stages of infantile sexuality). Only later does the ego develop the ability to project energy onto external objects and Freud (or his English translators) label these object-cathexes.

The slightest damage to the organism (for example, illness) results in a return to infantile narcissism, as do psychic wounds.

Narcissism is also evoked by particularly self-contained objects, by aloof women, by cats, and by babies (see Freud’s 1914 essay On Narcissism).

In later editions of the Three Essays Freud attacks Jung for watering down libido to make it mean psychical instinctive forces in general.

But the whole point of having a distinct sexual instinct, chemically differentiated from all other instincts, whose special operations can be studied through observation and analysis, in fact all Freud’s efforts and theories, are destroyed if you thus throw out the distinguishing sexual element of libido theory.

(4) The differentiation between men and women

Libido is masculine i.e. active, in character.

In levels of autoerotism and masturbation boys and girls are similar, though girls develop the reaction-formations of shame and disgust more easily than boys (i.e. mental forces which damp down their libido).

Freud suggests three meanings of masculine and feminine:

  • passive versus active personalities
  • biological i.e. defined by sex organs
  • sociological i.e. observing the actual behaviour of men and women

Freud uses masculine and feminine to denote active and passive. To say libido is masculine means it is, in this value system, always active. As to the sociological aspect:

Such observation shows that in human beings pure masculinity or femininity is not to be found either in a psychological or biological sense. Every individual, on the contrary, displays a mixture of the character-traits belonging to their own and to the opposite sex and shows a combination of activity and passivity…

Without the fundamental idea of innate bisexuality I think it would scarcely be possible to arrive at an understanding of the sexual manifestations that are actually to be observed in men and women.

Leading zones in men and women

The clitoris is what little girls masturbate, as boys the penis. Both become erect i.e. engorged with blood during excitation. But Freud thinks that at puberty, whereas boys receive a fresh wave of sexual excitement, girls undergo a profound sexual repression; this takes the form of moving their chief erotogenic zone from the clitoris to the vagina.

The ‘normal’ woman has thus repressed her masculine active organ (the clitoris) in the name of vaginal excitation designed for sex and procreation:

The fact that women change their leading erotogenic zone in this way, together with the wave of repression at puberty which, as it were, puts away their childish masculinity, are the chief determinants of the greater proneness of women to neurosis and especially to hysteria.

[This is, of course, complete rubbish. Women retain their chief sexual excitation through the clitoris. The rediscovery and widespread publicisation of clitoridal sexuality was one of the great achievements of the feminists in the 1960s and 1970s. By the 1980s I was well aware that many women cannot orgasm through vaginal stimulation alone but need clitoral stimulation as well and I think (I hope) this has now become common knowledge. Thus Freud’s theorising away of the clitoris, along with all his theories about the inevitable inferiority of women, are the grossest example of his simply recasting the patriarchal prejudices of his time in a new language.]

(5) The finding of an object

[Expanded in the 1915 essay On Narcissism.]

A person may love:

1. according to the anaclitic (attachment) type:

  • the woman who feeds him
  • the man who protects him

2. according to the narcissistic type:

  • what he himself is
  • what he himself was
  • what he himself would like to be i.e. an idol
  • someone who was once part of themselves i.e. a baby

Suckling at the breast is the prototype of all pleasure and love.

From 1915 Freud introduces the idea of narcissism into his theory. The physical pleasure of suckling at the breast is now accompanied by the psychic pleasure of self-love, the earliest attachment of libido to the ego, the ego to itself, as it grows and comes to consciousness.

After puberty all love objects will partake of these two earliest loves; all love objects will have an element of narcissism and of attachment (cupboard) love.

The finding of a love-object is always a refinding of this original pleasure. A recapturing of what we once had. Falling in love is always a return to lost happiness.

The sexual object during early infancy

Everyone’s first love is for their mother. Freud goes further to say everyone’s first sexual object is their mother. Mothers stroke and kiss and caress babies, thus awaking the erotogenic zones and sex instincts. There is nothing perverse in this. The mother is only fulfilling her task in teaching the child how to love. Later in life, the former baby will itself stroke and kiss and caress a love object. How else does it learn to do this except by unconscious recall of its own childhood caresses?

Infantile anxiety

Infantile anxiety is caused by the loss of the person the infant loves. They are afraid of the dark because in the dark they cannot see the person they love. An infant who turns his love/libido into anxiety when it cannot be satisfied is behaving exactly like an adult neurotic.

The barrier against incest

‘Normal’ development means the transmutation of the early sexual attachment to the mother into ‘affection’ i.e. aim-inhibited libido. One of life’s great tasks is overcoming this love and learning to reattach it to socially acceptable objects.

This happens partly due to internal psychic development but is hugely reinforced by social and moral pressures. In Totem and Taboo (1913) Freud writes about the fundamental taboo against incest which is, in his view, the beginnings of society and morality.

Nonetheless, incest remains a possibility in the unconscious mind, in dreams and fantasies.

Puberty is particularly rich in fantasies as the adolescent tries out various combinations of object and experiments with its new strong feelings obsessively in the mind, before attempting to put them into practice.

Some fantasies are particularly common: the adolescent’s fantasies of overhearing his parents having sex; of having been seduced in infancy; of having been threatened with castration; fantasies of life in the womb; and the so-called Family Romance, the fantasy of being the abandoned child of rich beautiful parents – a rationalisation of infantile perception of parental omnipotence.

In overcoming renewed childhood sexual fantasies about his parents the adolescent also has to make the crucial break with them; to rebel against parental authority, particularly the father.

Some people never make it and remain in thrall to their parents. Many women never properly escape and remain as loving and passive as they were in childhood. Girls have a tendency to rebel against their sexual destiny, against sexuality itself and to flee into exaggerated affection for siblings or parents. To become virgin carers.

It falls to some men to become the complete rebels against authority which are required by the furtherance of the race.

After-effects of infantile object-choice

These powerful loves of childhood cast a pall over the rest of our lives. Women often look for older, more mature, authoritative husbands who are quite obviously father-substitutes. Men, even more often, are looking for the unconditional love of their mothers.

Prevention of inversion

It seems that the presence in our childhood of the same sex parent as a figure of a) resented authority and b) sexual rivalry, contributes to our early love for the opposite sex parent, all of which is motivated by the hormones at puberty.

But if the family unit is disturbed, if one of the parents is lacking, this is a powerful accidental stimulus to homosexuality (innate predispositions aside).

SUMMARY

* Neuroses are the mirror image of perversions: both represent aberrations from normal sexuality. Neurotic symptoms are generally a reinvoking of infantile perversions, at least in fantasy and transferred symptoms, as libido flees an unbearable sexual situation.

* Perversions are the fixation of the libido onto particular components of sexuality at the expense of normal heterosexual genital union.

A disposition to perversions is an original and universal disposition of the human sexual instinct and ‘normal’ sexual behaviour is developed out of it as a result of organic changes and psychical inhibitions occurring in the course of maturation.

* Any departure from established sexuality is therefore an instance of developmental inhibition and infantilism, a regression.

* The sexual instinct is put together from various factors and, in the perversions, these components fall apart.

* ‘Normal’ sexuality integrates these instincts and submits them to socially-condoned genital aims.

* Children bring sexuality into the world with them. After an efflorescence of sexuality from ages 2 to 5 the sex instinct undergoes a repression, entering the latency period. Sexual feelings continue during this period but rerouted:

a) to develop secondary characteristics such as affection and friendship (aim-inhibited libido)
b) into ‘reaction-formations’ to sexual activities, which are now perceived as dirty, shameful, disgusting and so on, into a predisposition to receive moral education. These reaction-formations will be critical in establishing the channels along which libido can flow after puberty; too strong and they will react badly to the arrival of puberty and real sexual situations, causing all sorts of havoc, not least the flight into illness which characterises neurosis.

* Children develop through three phases: oral (breastfeeding), anal-sadistic in which ambivalence emerges, and phallic, part of which is the Oedipus complex. Then it is all buried in the latency period.

* The diphasic onset of sexuality i.e. in two stages, allowing for a latency period during which the socialising process can get going, seems to be a precondition for humanity’s civilised achievements. But, being so long and precarious, the latency period also explains mankind’s predisposition to neurosis and mental illness, and to the various failures and perversions of the sex instinct.

* The perversions of infancy, the finding of pleasure in erotogenic zones, returns with puberty but subordinated, as fore-pleasures, to the great act of copulation itself.

* Children find their first sex object in the opposite sex parent but this lust is repressed and redirected by the primeval psychological taboo against incest.

Factors interfering with development:

Every step on this long path of development can become a point of fixation, every juncture in this involved combination can be an occasion for a dissociation of the sexual instinct.

Constitution and heredity

Nature/nurture, which comes first? Imponderable. Except to say that in families with a predisposition to sexual failure, the men will tend to be perverts, the women, “true to the tendency of their sex to repression”, will become negative perverts i.e. hysterics.

Further modification

Whatever the hereditary predisposition, it is clear the sex instincts undergo further modifications:

Perversion: at puberty the libido may find the genital zone too weak for the tasks asked of it, and so revert to fixation on earlier infantile perverse zones.

Repression: the instincts in question are repressed and travel underground until they can find their expression disguised as hysterical symptoms. They can have perfectly normal sex lives but accompanied by psychological problems.

Sublimation: excessive sexual dispositions can be redirected into socially acceptable fields, thus yielding greater psychic efficiency and providing a strong evolutionary advantage. Maybe this is the reason why sublimation is the basis of much human mental life.

Reaction-formation: the building up during the latency period of strong counter-forces to perverse instincts, abetted by education which is designed to channel sexuality into ‘normal’ ends.

What we describe as a person’s character is built up to a considerable extent from the material of sexual excitations and is composed of instincts that have been fixed since childhood, of constructions achieved by means of sublimation, and of other constructions, employed for effectively holding in check perverse impulses which have been recognised as unutilisable.


Credit

All Freud’s works have complicated histories in translation. The Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality were first translated into English in 1953 as part of The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. References in this blog are to the revised version, published in 1977 as part of ‘On Sexuality’, Volume 7 of the Pelican Freud Library.

More Freud reviews

The Interpretation of Dreams by Sigmund Freud (1900)

Note: to avoid misunderstanding, I believe Freud is a figure of huge cultural and historical importance, and I sympathise with his project of trying to devise a completely secular psychology building on Darwinian premises. Many of his ideas about sexuality as a central motive force, about the role of the unconscious in every aspect of mental life, how repressing instinctual drives can lie behind certain types of mental illness, his development of the talking cure, these and numerous other ideas have become part of the culture and underlie the way many people live and think about themselves today. However, I strongly disapprove of Freud’s gender stereotyping of men and women, his systematic sexism, his occasional slurs against gays, lesbian or bisexuals and so on. Despite the revolutionary impact of his thought, Freud carried a lot of Victorian assumptions into his theory. He left a huge and complicated legacy which needs to be examined and picked through with care. My aim in these reviews is not to endorse his opinions but to summarise his writings, adding my own thoughts and comments as they arise.

***

‘Tell me some of your dreams and I will tell you about your inner self.’
(E. R. Pfaff, quoted on page 134 of The Interpretation of Dreams)

Long

The Interpretation of Dreams may be an epoch-making book but it is far too long, running to 871 pages in the Pelican Freud Library (783 of actual text, 86 of appendix, bibliographies, index of dreams, and general index).

The first quarter or so is a vast review of the many, many theories of dreams held by people throughout Western history (seers and prophets and oneiromancers, historical philosophers and writers, right up to present-day psychologists such as Havelock Ellis), with Freud’s own commentary designed to itemise and categorise all aspects of dreams (their confused illogical nature, how we forget them soon after waking and so on).

Only about page 200 does there come the decisive insight delivered via his own dream about a patient he names Irma, namely that every dream has meaning because every dream is a wish-fulfilment. This is followed from page 200 onwards by an equally extensive series of actual dreams derived from his patients, described in great detail each with a painstaking decipherment.

The literary focus

It isn’t till page 363 that Freud takes the further step of asserting that almost all the dreams of most of his patients ultimately derive from fantasies about their parents. Here he stop for three pages to describe the legend of Oedipus and then to assert that something like Oedipal feelings occur in all his patients.

No sooner has he finished making the shocking claim that all of us, to some extent or other, go through a phase of loving the parent of the opposite sex and hating the parent of the same sex, than he moves on to a similar version of the same story, retold thousands of years later, and culturally rearranged and overlaid, to become Hamlet, then going on to mention other Shakespeare plays, Goethe, German literary critics and so on. (Goethe and Shakespeare are both mentioned about 20 times in the text, along with writers as diverse as Schiller, Heine and Zola, Jonathan Swift and Rider Haggard, the Bible, poetry in general, the music of Wagner 3 times, Mozart 4 times, Offenbach and so on.)

In other words, right from the start Freud’s conceptions of the mind were heavily conditioned and shaped by literature and by cultural forms (myths, legends, religion, folk tales) as much as, or more than, by ‘science’.

It is entirely characteristic of Freud’s focus on culture as source and subject to be investigated that, in the preface to the Third Edition, he speculates that new material for the book will not be generated by, for example, widening the types of patients he treats or the fast-expanding number of analyses being carried out by his followers i.e. scientific evidence based on patient data. No, he says the next edition will have to:

afford a closer contact with the copious material presented in imaginative writing, in myths, in linguistic usage and in folklore.

Autobiographical

Also, it is astonishingly autobiographical. Freud shares with the reader a surprising number of the most important experiences from his life, starting with the place and date of his birth followed by quite a few poignant memories from his childhood and youth. More than that he shares, and analyses at length, upwards of 30 of his own dreams, many of which show him in a less than flattering light, many of which are embarrassingly candid about his ambitions, his delusions of grandeur, his sense of failure, and so on and so on. As Paul Roazen puts it:

The Interpretation of Dreams is one of the great autobiographical studies in the history of mankind; in it Freud drew freely on his inner life in an effort to construct a psychological system relevant for all of us.’ (Freud and His Followers by Paul Roazen, page 35)

For Roazen this over-sharing was a heroic achievement and sacrifice the great man made on our behalves. But many critics have pointed out the weakness of a theory which relies so very heavily on just one person’s life and experiences and feelings, and on his own interpretation of them, and the fragile basis of the claim to extrapolate them into universal principles underpinning all of human nature.

Introduction of key concepts

The book is important because it represents Freud’s first full-length description of the unconscious and the vast role it plays in the mental life of human beings. His theories about the unconscious would be elaborated and developed right up to his death 40 years later, but this is the first, primal statement of its central role.

Freud wrote to his colleague and confidant Wilhelm Fliess, who played a vital role as sounding board for his developing ideas in the 1890s, that the Interpretation of Dreams was substantially finished by 1896. It was published in 1899 but Freud was careful to ensure that it had ‘1900’ on the title page; he was very aware of his image and reputation and that the arrival of a new century heralded the dawn of a new age. All these considerations were in the mind of this very ambitious man.

And yet, after all this careful planning, only 351 copies were sold in the first six years.

Freud began writing this immense book while on holiday in the summer of 1985 at the Schloss BelleVue near Grinzing in Austria. Later he jokingly wrote to Fliess suggesting that a plaque be put on the wall of this castle reading: ‘In this house on July 24 1895 the secret of dreams was revealed to Dr Sigmund Freud’. (Mentioned in a note by the editors on page 199.)

Early days

Personally, I find Freud’s theory of dreams, his confidence that every dream represents a wish and that virtually all dreams can be decoded into various kinds of libidinal fantasy, optimistic and implausible. There feels to be a lot of pseudo-science in it. It feels very dated. For Freud, though, his ‘discovery’ that dreams have meaning, that they were suppressed and distorted wishes, was his big intellectual breakthrough, and the existence of the unconscious was always tied up for him with the breakthrough of dream interpretation.

When I came to Freud it was through the later metapsychological works and the second theory initiated by Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920). By comparison with the sophistication of the second theory, with the greater role it assigns to the Death Drive, the Nirvana Principle, the greater account taken of violence and aggression (prompted by the catastrophe of the First World War), the sociological theorisation of the psychology of groups and crowds – compared with all this, going back to his early dream theory seems a little embarrassing, almost childish.

Nonetheless, the final 50 or 60 pages of the Interpretation take us deep, deep into what is in effect a new theory of human nature and existence, which is visionary and strange. But the hundreds and hundreds of pages of sometimes clunky dream interpretation which precede them are often cringe-inducing. Specially when he makes his stock sexist comments about women and their innate inferiority to men…

Executive summary

The Interpretation is important because it introduces several central ideas of Freud’s theory, namely the unconscious as a reservoir of instinctual wishes and desires which have been repressed from the conscious mind by censorship. These repressed urges try to re-enter the mind when the censorship is relaxed during sleep, but even then can only do so in garbled and distorted form.

So all dreams have two layers or levels which Freud defines as manifest content and latent content (p.381).

The manifest content is the narrative or series of images which we remember on waking, maybe write down or recount to a therapist. The latent content refers to the underlying ‘meaning’ of the dream.

The work of psychotherapy is to dig below the surface or manifest content to try and establish the meaning of the latent content i.e. to discover the wish lying behind the dream.

Freud then categorises the ways in which the ‘censorship’ garbles the latent content of the dream. It does this through distinct processes which he labels as:

  • Condensation – can happen in many ways, for example many ideas or wishes may be represented in one dream, or two or more people or ideas may be combined in one representation
  • Displacement – the fundamental notion that latent content, the expression of the wish underlying all dreams, is distorted and ‘displaced’
  • Representation – a great variety of ways in which images, words, sounds, word and phrases can represent the dream-wish
  • Secondary revision – not part of the process of censorship, this is what happens as the mind returns to consciousness and, half-asleep, tries to ‘make sense’ of the half-remembered dream by rearranging its elements into something closer to a coherent narrative

The comprehensive nature of this rewriting of the repressed wish explains why people can often make no sense at all of their dreams, so completely censored and disguised have they been.

Using the talking cure, free association and dream interpretation, the therapist can analyse a patient’s dreams, uncovering the secret wish which lies behind them and find a way into the reservoir of all our drives and urges and the words and images and behaviours which have become attached to them. Hence Freud’s famous declaration:

The interpretation of dreams is the royal road to a knowledge of the unconscious activities of the mind.

THE INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS

The text is immensely schematic, divided and sub-divided and sub-sub-divided into numbered parts, sections, sub-sections, sub-sub-sections, as if to conceal the relative simplicity of what Freud was proposing under a mountain of academic apparatus. He recognised the work’s unmanageable length and published a much shorter version On Dreams in 1901, revised and expanded in 1911. The fact that the abbreviation is a mere slip of a thing at 53 pages in the English translation strongly hints at the redundancy of most of the material in the longer work. It’s there to bludgeon the reader into submission with the sheer quantity of ‘evidence’.

Part 1. The scientific literature dealing with the problems of dreams

The ancients had two theories: dreams as helpful messages from the supernatural or diabolical fantasy. These were said to emanate from gates of horn and of ivory, respectively.

A) The relation of dreams to waking life

Dreams seem at the same time totally removed from waking life yet continue many of the concerns of waking life.

B) The material of dreams: memory in dreams

Dreams often preserve memories much more clearly than waking life and yet what is remembered is often trivial.

C) The stimuli and sources of dreams

1. External sensory stimuli

For example, alarm clock prompts dreams of church bells etc. But why do the same external source prompts different dream-imagery?

2. Internal (subjective) sensory excitations

3. Internal organic somatic stimuli

News from internal organs, often warning of disease. But how are these messages conveyed?

4. Psychical sources of stimulation

Present definitions of psychical stimulation do not suffice.

D) Why dreams are forgotten after waking

It is natural that the intensity of daytime experiences blots out dreams. More importantly, everyone proceeds to reconstruct partially remembered dreams, stringing together half-memories in usually very misleading ways.

E) The distinguishing psychological characteristics of dreams

Dreams perceived as immediate experience. Lack of critical self-consciousness. In dreams we don’t think, we experience.

Crazy chains of association. Logic and causation which we (mostly) demand in conscious life are conspicuous by their absence.

Regression to earlier impulses. The tremendous virtuoso intensity of dream experiences. Freud reviews a wide range of views about dreams, from total disparagement to hymns to dreams’ poetic intensity.

F) The moral sense in dreams

Some say people lose all moral sense in dreams and behave with shocking amorality; others say you act in dreams according to your character. Dreams often show us insight into our deeper feelings, unknown to our conscious selves. Dreams reveal illicit desires, as in saints’ confessions of being miserable sinners. In dreams our instinctual life is exposed. We acquiesce in desires we spend our waking lives controlling and resisting.

G) Theories of dreaming and its function

The ancients thought dreams are sent from the gods as a guidance to action. More recently three schools have emerged:

  1. Rational. The dream-mind works just like the conscious mind but deprived of the sense-data of consciousness
  2. Mechanistic. Sleep relaxes the conscious control and dreams are responses of different parts of the mind to the passing sensory stimulants of the night. Or dreams are the excrescence of all the semi-cogitated impressions and thoughts of the day.
  3. Dreams are a holiday for the mind. Rest and recuperation.

H) The relations between dreams and mental diseases

Patients sometimes cured during the day continue their pathological behaviour in dreams or while asleep. ‘The madman is a waking dreamer’ etc. Dreams and psychoses are both fulfilment of wishes.

2. The method of interpreting dreams: analysis of a specimen dream

The aim which I have set before myself is to show that dreams are capable of being interpreted. (p.167)

Lay interpretation confined to symbolic reading (for example, pharaoh’s seven fat and seven lean kine; also mentioned p.448) and decoding (treating dream-language as a code).

Outline of the technique of free association.

An extended analysis of Freud’s own dream, the ‘dream of Irma’s injection’ interpreted to show how it conflates evidence to justify Freud’s treatment of her, i.e. a wish to be impregnated (pages 180 to 199).

3. A dream is a fulfilment of a wish

Elaboration of Freud’s fundamental insight, that every dream is the symbolic fulfilment of an unconscious wish. Examples of children’s dreams. The point is dreams may express wishes, but so comprehensibly distorted and garbled as to usually be unrecognisable to the dreamer.

4. Distortions in dreams

If all dreams are wish-fulfilments, why do some present as the opposite – wishing the death of a loved-one, anxiety dreams etc?

Because the wish is distorted. There are thus at least two aspects to a dream, the manifest content (the coherent narrative we make from the dream imagery) and the latent content (the real concern), and there is always an element of repression or censorship. This is the dream-work, which translates latent content into the manifest content we experience and remember.

The similarity of distortion in dreams and the hallucinations or obsessions of neurotics.

5. The material and sources of dreams

A) Recent and indifferent material in dreams

Frequent occurrence of material from the day before, the ‘dream-day’; but radically disguised or itself masking other meanings. Thus the concept of displacement.

B) Infantile material as a source of dreams

The deeper one carries the analysis of a dream, the more often one comes upon the track of experiences from childhood which have played a part among the sources of that dream’s latent content.

C) The somatic sources of dreams

All dreams are in a sense dreams of convenience. They serve the purpose of managing the processing of unconscious content in such a way as to preserve sleep. Dreams are the guardians of sleep.

If dreams are prompted by internal somatic stimulation, why do we not dream continuously of flying (the working of the lungs) etc? Because somatic stimulation is brought into the formation of a dream only when it fits with the ideational content derived from the dream’s psychic sources; only when it’s needed.

D) Typical dreams

He reviews:

1. Embarrassing dreams of being naked

2. Dreams of the death of persons whom the dreamer likes (childhood rivalries)

It is in this section that Freud describes the fierce emotions and rivalries attributable to children, which can spill over into hostility against their parents:

Being in love with the one parent and hating the other are among the essential constituents of the stock of psychical impulses which is formed [n childhood] (p.362)

He starts to invoke the Greek myths and this leads up to page 363 on which he posits the central role of the Oedipus legend.

It is the fate of all of us, perhaps, to direct our first sexual impulse towards our mother and our first hatred and our first murderous wish against our father. (p.364)

3. Other typical dreams

4. Examination dreams

6. The dream-work

Freud reviews the different mental processes he claims are at work in dreams, which collectively he calls the ‘dream-work’:

A) The work of condensation

Seen at its clearest when it handles words and names. In dreams words are often treated like things, chopped up, compressed etc.

B) The work of displacement

A dream is often differently centred from the dream-thought which lies behind it. The work of displacement as well as condensation are the result of the censorship imposed on the unconscious wish material.

The kernel of my theory of dreams lies in my derivation of dream-distortion from the censorship. (p.418)

C) The means of representation in dreams

Dreams do not have any of the methods with which we construct narratives or logical arguments at their disposal.

The most striking example of absence of logic is the absence of the negative, meaning that no means yes, that something can be represented by its exact opposite: the process of reversal (p.429) This can apply to causality where normal cause and effect are reversed.

Or dream images can appear by a process of similarity or consonance of even a tiny part of it with something else (p.431).

The common sensation of running but never getting anywhere.

Dreams are completely egoistic. They deal with the dreamer and only the dreamer (p.434).

D) Considerations of representability

Some dreams make use of ‘primeval’ imagery, being similes reaching back to remote antiquity (p.462).

Wherever neuroses make use of such disguises they are following paths along which all humanity passed in the earliest days of civilisation. (p.463).

E) Symbols in dreams: some further typical examples

Tempting to think that recurrent symbols in dreams may be universal symbols, specially when they recur in ‘popular myths, legends, linguistic idioms, proverbial wisdom and current jokes’ (which gives you a good sense of Freud’s evidence base).

Freud proceeds to give a lexicon or handbook of symbols, starting with the King and Queen who are, of course, the dreamer’s parents, moving on to how playing with a little child, especially beating it, betokens masturbation, and so on.

  • a hat is symbolic of a man, or the male genitals
  • a little one is the penis
  • being run over is coitus
  • buildings, stairs and shafts represent the genitals
  • female genitals represented by a landscape
  • castration dreams
  • urinary symbolism
  • staircase dreams
  • flowers represent the genitals (p.496)
  • dreams of flying or floating have a very varied meaning

He makes the ‘shocking’ claim that psychoanalysis makes no qualitative distinction between normal and neurotic life i.e. there is no ‘normality’ i.e. we are all on a spectrum (p.493).

And the centrality of sex in all these hundreds and hundreds of examples:

The more one is concerned with the solution of dreams, the more one is driven to recognise that the majority of the dreams of adults deal with sexual material and give expression to erotic wishes. (p.520)

F) Some examples: calculations and speeches in dreams

The special significance of numbers in dreams.

Speech rarely makes sense in dreams, being recombinations of words or phrases taken from other sources.

G) Absurd dreams: intellectual activity in dreams

Obviously many dreams are absurd or absurdist in content, but Freud tries to identify different reasons for this, often to do with negative or contradictory elements in the motivating dream content.

The dream-work produces absurd dreams and dreams containing individual absurd elements if it is faced with the necessity of representing any criticism, ridicule or derision which may be present in the dream-thoughts. (p.576)

H) Affects in dreams

It is commonly observed that the mood induced by a dream lingers longer than most of the details into the waking day.

I) Secondary revision

This occurs at the end of the process of dream-construction and is the application of conscious thought processes to the dream material. Just before waking the renascent ego tries to gloss over inconsistencies in the dream narrative, trying to create sense out of absurdity.

So it’s not part of the censor’s work, not part of displacement and condensation; it comes after that and re-arranges elements of the dream, but has the practical effect of scrambling it even more, making dream interpretation even harder (pages 641 and 642).

7. The psychology of the dream process

The dream-work is not simply more careless, more irrational, more forgetful and more incomplete than waking thought; it is completely different from it qualitatively and for that reason not directly comparable with it. (p.650)

A) The forgetting of dreams

Forgetting details of a dream is a common experience. But Freud is convinced that more is retained than we commonly think and that in the therapeutic situation more can be reclaimed than you’d expect. And often the so-called ‘forgetting’ of a dream is really only the work of the censor and repression; with sensitive work it can be recalled.

Can we interpret every detail of a dream, or every dream? No. Because the power of repression and resistance is so severe. But you can interpret much more than you’d initially believe.

B) Regression

Freud works through a series of diagrams meant to convey the relationship between dream wishes, memories, the preconscious, the unconscious and so on. By ‘regression’ Freud means that, with the motor system i.e. active use of the body, shut down in sleep, wishes express their outcomes not in (sleeping) body but by bouncing back into the psyche. Regression refers to internally generated images which are fed backwards into the cortex as if they were coming from the outside. He goes on to distinguish three types of regression:

  1. topographical regression
  2. temporal regression, the harking back to earlier psychic structures
  3. formal regression, where primitive methods of expression and representation take the place of the usual ones (p.699)

He concludes by making the picturesque but now discredited claim that some element of dreams also connects us with primeval memories of our ancestors.

We may expect that the analysis of dreams will lead us to a knowledge of man’s archaic heritage, of what is psychically innate in him. Dreams and neuroses seem to have preserved more mental antiquities than we would have imagined possible; so that psychoanalysis may claim a high place among the sciences which are concerned with the reconstruction of the earliest and most obscure periods of the beginnings of the human race. (p.700)

C) Wish-fulfilment

It may be intuitively agreed that a dream expresses a wish, albeit heavily disguised by the censorship, but Freud goes on to address the paradox that anxiety and negative dreams can also express wishes. He devotes 2 pages to explaining the definition of a ‘wish’ as it first comes to be experienced by the screaming baby, considered as an inchoate organism seeking the most basic physical satisfactions.

During which he makes the kind of comment that I like, namely that ‘thought is after all nothing but a substitute for the basic physical wish’.

D) Arousal by dreams: the function of dreams: anxiety dreams

Further clarification of why anxiety dreams and other dreams with acutely negative affect are, nonetheless, expressions of a wish. The anxiety is an index of the force of the repression needed to keep the unacceptable wish material under wraps.

E) The primary and secondary processes: repression

In technical and difficult phraseology, Freud repeats the basic idea that the primary system (the unconscious) is concerned with securing the free discharge of the quantities of excitation which are troubling it, while the second system, attempts to inhibit this discharge (p.759).

The primary process endeavours to bring about a discharge of excitation in order that, with the help of the amount of excitation thus accumulated, it may establish a ‘perceptual identity’ with the experience of satisfaction. The secondary process, however, has abandoned this intention and taken on another in its place – the establishment of a ‘thought identity’ with that experience.

All thinking is no more than a circuitous path from the memory of a satisfaction (a memory which has been adopted as a purposive idea) to an identical cathexis of the same memory which it is hoped to attain once more through an intermediate stage of motor experiences. (pages 761 to 762)

These final pages take us deep, deep into Freud’s most theoretical musings about the nature of the mind and of thought, which tend to undermine the possibility of ‘reason’ at all, because he makes all the activities of the mind arise from a really primeval stratum of primitive needs, as transmuted into wishes, as repressed and distorted into a thousand and one memories, behaviour patterns, obsessions and so on. Nobody can think rationally, because this unconscious swamp is the basis of all human thought.

I’m not sure it’s worth reading the preceding 750 pages to get here, but they are in a sense the preface to a deep dive into a truly other vision of human nature, the human mind, human existence. All thinking is, in a sense, repeated attempts to recapture the primeval, primitive physical satisfactions of the baby which have been so thoroughly repressed that they can never be achieved. All humans are, in a sense, condemned to search endlessly for the unfindable. Hence [Freud doesn’t say this, I’m saying this] the universal notion of The Quest found across all human cultures.

F) The unconscious and consciousness: reality

The unconscious is vast and the basis of the psyche. The conscious mind is a small, fragile blip floating on the great unknown ocean of the unconscious.

The unconscious must be assumed to be the general basis of psychical life. The unconscious is the larger sphere which includes within it the smaller sphere of the conscious….The unconscious is the true psychic reality. (p.773)

Typically, Freud immediately goes on to say that this explains a lot of creative process too, with numerous poets and composers describing how their great works ‘came to them’ without planning, unexpectedly, whole and complete. Well…the unconscious!

The conscious mind is like a kind of sense organ for the perception of psychic qualities. It is entirely typical of Freud that this dense and difficult conceptualising gives way, on the page before last, to yet another reference to Greek mythology, and to the story of Zeus castrating his father, Kronos. Literature and myth are never far away in Freud’s writings. And are often a welcome respite from the more difficult technical passages.

And one of the oldest traditions of dreams, which he mentioned right at the start, 780 pages earlier, widely believed in the ancient world that they predict the future. Do they? No, not in a literal sense, no. And yet, in another sense:

By picturing our wishes as fulfilled, dreams are, after all, leading us into the future. But this future, which the dreamer pictures as the present, has been moulded by his indestructible wish into a perfect likeness of the past. (last sentences, page 783)

Criticism

The same period (1895 to 1900) saw the zenith of detectivehood in the fictional figure of Sherlock Holmes. Very widespread was the idea human personality as a mystery, a puzzle to be solved.

And the idea of psychic division into two opposing parts, light and dark, good and bad: the döppelgänger or split personality abounds in the stories of the time: Jeckyll and Hyde and The Secret Sharer and Dorian Gray and all the characters in Holmes leading respectable lives while concealing depths of vice and criminality.

After the long dull review of existing dream literature, Freud’s exposition his new theory of the interpretation of dreams contains steadily more and more personal material, including candid stories of antisemitism. He shares with us his identification with Hannibal; he describes himself as a conquistador; the narrative of the dream of Irma’s injection is above all a wish to be justified.

Surprisingly, maybe, there is no mention of the Oedipus Complex and little mention of childhood sexuality. He added notes about these to all the later editions, but reading the text as first published makes you realise how very bare of all his theories it is, or to put it another way, what a huge edifice of complex psychological theory it was to grow into.

Throughout the book you can see Freud extending the mechanisms revealed by his own dream analysis in order to derive a psychology of all stages of life; in particular pushing the source of almost all dreams back into childhood. The nature of childhood fantasy and its connection with childhood sexual feelings were to become central to the development of his theory over the next five years.


Credit

All Freud’s works have complicated histories in translation. The Interpretation of Dreams was first translated into English in 1953 as part of The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. References in this blog are to the revised version, published in 1976 as Volume 4 of the Pelican Freud Library.

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