Appointment with Death by Agatha Christie (1938)

‘Decidedly wherever I go, there is something to remind me of crime!’ he murmured to himself.
(Chapter 1)

Frenchmen were all alike, she thought, obsessed by sex!
(Chapter 2)

‘Here’s to crime!’
(Bluff Colonel Carbury’s toast to Poirot)

Psychological deduction
(Only now, in the 16th Poirot novel, do we get this, the best short description of his method, p.111)

This is one of Christie’s ‘travel’ detective novels i.e. set in an exotic location. Its predecessor, ‘Death on the Nile’ is set in Egypt. This one is set in the geographically adjacent territory of British-run Palestine and Jordan. One imagines Agatha had recently taken some trips to these locations because the books contain (a handful) of vivid descriptions of their respective landscapes.

Part 1

Mrs Boynton

Despite the overall structural similarity, the novel feels different from anything else I’ve read by Christie for a central reason. This is because of its peculiar atmosphere of psychological horror.

The first half of the book is dominated by the horrible, controlling figure of old Mrs Boynton, an American widow who wields a genuinely horrifying psychological control over her three young adult step-children (her dead husband’s children by his first wife) – Lennox (unhappily married), Raymond and Carol – and her own daughter by her dead husband, Ginevra, a deeply disturbed young girl.

Old Mrs Boynton is a monster, who keeps absolute control over her brood, banning them from going anywhere without her, banning them from having contact with outsiders, banning them speaking to members of the opposite sex. If she catches them fraternising with outsiders, it only takes a few words of her low, rasping, threatening voice to make them quail, dry up, and step back into line.

And then, suddenly, the old woman’s eyes were full on him, and he drew in his breath sharply. Small, black, smouldering eyes they were, but something came from them-a power, a definite force, a wave of evil malignancy. (Chapter 4)

This psychological menace is a new tone in her works, which are generally light and cartoonish in feel.

At the Solomon Hotel

So the novel falls naturally into two parts, with the first part itself divided in two.

In part one a) we find ourselves in the Solomon Hotel, Jerusalem, where we are introduced to the members of the cast – to the Boynton family, dominated by their horrifyingly controlling matriarch, but also to a few other guests at the hotel, including the bland and optimistic Jefferson Cope, a fellow American and old friend of the Boynton family who carries a torch for the married daughter, Nadine; to a couple of Christie’s comic female characters, the big, loud American feminist Lady Westholme who married a British peer, got herself elected to the House of Commons and works on all kinds of committees and causes, and her polar opposite, and the feeble Miss Annabel Pierce.

There are also two psychiatrists – a famous older academic named Dr Gerard, and a young newly-qualified and idealistic psychiatrist named Sarah King. I’ve mentioned Christie’s (generally fairly superficial) interest in psychology, which has occasionally led to discussion of psychological theories in her previous novels, and there have been several characters who run sanatoriums for nerve patients, most notably the scary Dr Nicholson in ‘Why Didn’t They Ask Evans?’

But I think this is the first time we’ve had really serious psychiatrists as central characters, and not just one but two of them. This means Christie can give them differing opinions about how and when to apply psychiatric theories and have them debate them, specifically their analysis of the character of Mrs Boynton.

To spice things up, Christie also has Gerard be a man with outrageously sexist views about women which, predictably, bridle young female psychologist Sarah King.

And to make the distinction even clearer, Gerard is very much a French man who airily tells Sarah that all English women (and men) are repressed about sex, much to her fury.

Sarah cried out, laughing: ‘Oh, you Frenchmen! You’ve got no use for any woman who isn’t young and attractive.’
Gerard shrugged his shoulders. ‘We are more honest about it, that is all. Englishmen, they do not get up in tubes and trains for ugly women-no? No.’ (p.81)

Last but by no means least, at the Solomon Hotel also happens to be staying the world-famous detective Hercule Poirot without whom the novel wouldn’t be possible.

Trip to Petra

In part one b) this motley crew – the Boynton family, Cope, Lady W and Pierce, Sarah and Gerard but not Poirot – set off in several charabancs on the two-day journey across the desert to the fabled stone city of Petra, in the Jordanian desert.

The trip is arranged by a tour operator which lays on a fat and unstoppably garrulous dragoman or local guide and factotum, Mahmoud (who, interestingly, won’t stop telling everyone about the iniquities visited on the Arab population by Jewish immigrants and Zionists). (Just to be crystal clear, I am not taking sides in this endless argument, just pointing out that it was a familiar enough issue to her readers, for Christie to attribute it as a clichéd or stock topic to what is essentially a comic character. I.e. it was an over-familiar issue in 1938!)

By this stage we have been in the company of all the characters long enough to realise that every member of the Boynton family has cause to murder, or has thought about murdering, or has even been overheard discussing murdering, their terrible stepmother. They are all potential suspects.

When they get to Petra, Mrs Boynton takes up pole position sitting in a chair at the entrance of one of the caves which has been rigged up as accommodation for some of the tourists (others are staying in tents down on the valley floor). From here she looks down on proceedings like some grotesque Buddha.

On the afternoon of their arrival, all the other characters go for a walk, soon splitting up into smaller groups, who all drift back to the camp around 6pm at sunset. It’s only when a ‘boy’ (as the native servants are uniformly referred to) is sent up to her cave to fetch Mrs M for supper, that he discovers she is stone dead, still squatting in her chair. When he runs back down to the camp in a panic, pandemonium ensues.

Whodunnit?

And, as always happens, suddenly all the events surrounding the trip have a bright spotlight shone on them to reveal all kinds of motives and possibilities and discrepancies and anomalies.

Nadine had finally told her mother-ridden husband Lennox that she was going to leave him so as to escape the family’s poisoned atmosphere. Would that have motivated him to kill the old biddy in a bid to keep his wife?

Right at the start of the novel Raymond and Carol were overheard discussing the possibility of murdering their stepmother, so was it them? Later, Raymond had managed (despite the monster’s best efforts) to meet, talk to and boyishly fall in love with the student psychiatrist staying at the hotel, Sarah King. Now, on this late afternoon walk, he tells her he going to do something decisive, it’s now or never etc, and sets off back to the camp on his own? Was he referring to bumping his stepmother off?

And his sister, Carol – she was part of that early conversation about killing Mrs B, so was it her?

Or could it have been the outsider Jefferson Cope, vowing to liberate the woman he loves from the thrall of the monster, Nadine, even though she’s married to Lennox?

Or was it Sarah King, who has the medical expertise, and realised the only way to free a family she’d come to realise were living in hell, was to kill off the she-devil?

Or was it even her superior as a psychiatrist, Dr Gerard? Early in the novel the pair had had a debate about when it was right to intervene in people’s psychological problems: was this a dramatic intervention by the older doctor? Short answer, almost certainly not because before the walk I’ve mentioned even got going Dr Gerard was struck down by a recurrence of malaria (picked up in the Congo) and so turned and blundered back to his tent, looking for quinine to pump himself full of before passing out?

Or did he? He therefore has the best alibi of the lot but, as we know from reading Christie, often it’s the people with the best alibis who turn out to be the murderer.

Or, last and least, was it the much-overlooked youngest member of the downtrodden family, young Ginevra, who Gerard had diagnosed as being on the verge of schizophrenia (p.131), withdrawing from the impossibly controlled environment of her family life into a world of romantic fantasies picked up from popular fiction and the movies? Could she be Christie’s first child murderer?

Part 2

Part two whisks us away from the crime scene at Petra and to Amman, capital of Jordan. This is where Poirot came when he left the Solomon Hotel, so wasn’t at all involved in the death at Petra. But it’s here that he is summoned to the office of a pukka British official, Colonel Carbury. This chap has heard about Poirot from his friend, Colonel Race, the British intelligence officer who we met working with Poirot in the previous book, ‘Death on the Nile’ and, earlier, in the Shaitana murder, described in ‘Cards on the Table’.

Now Mrs Boynton’s death would have been treated as entirely natural – she was old, she had a heart condition, the trip to Petra had been arduous even for the younger members of the family – all would have been accepted and forgotten had it not been for Dr Gerard.

It is Dr Gerard who comes to the British authorities in Amman saying there was something fishy about the incident. Specifically that when he stumbled back to his tent on that ill-fated afternoon, 1) he looked for the syringe which he normally used to inject quinine but couldn’t find it anywhere so ended up taking the drug orally. 2) Next day, when he searched through his portable case of medicines, he discovered that his stock of digitoxin was very much diminished and the point is that Mrs Boynton was taking the closely related digitalis. An injection of digitonin would cause her heart to go into spasm but not show up at an autopsy as chemically different from the digitalis which everyone would expect to find in her body. 3) Lastly, when he examined her, Dr Gerard discovered a mark on Mrs Boynton’s wrist that could have been caused by the insertion of a hypodermic syringe. Did someone steal his syringe and digitonin and give Mrs B a fatal injection?

So all this has been enough to make him very suspicious and go to the authorities in the shape of Colonel Carbury. Carbury knew that the world famous detective Hercule Poirot was in the city (Amman) on holiday, and invites him in to see if he can shed light on the case.

Now Carbury can only hold the relatives for two days, so Poirot rather cockily promises he will discover the truth of the matter by the evening of the following day.

The interview board

And so we have the setup for a classic Poirot investigation and he sets about things in the usual way, calling each of the participants / suspects into an office for one-on-one questioning.

This procedure is a set piece in Christie’s novels, most memorably in ‘Orient Express’, in which she enjoys showing us how Poirot varies his voice, tone and approach to match each of the interviewees, in which the reader enjoys the series of oddballs and eccentrics being displayed for our entertainment and, if they’re really keen, tries to fit together the increasingly complicated and bewildering array of facts, events and motivations to find out whodunnit before Poirot reveals all.

He’s mentioned it a few times in earlier novels, but here Christie has Poirot quite a few times emphasise the essence of his approach, which is long interviews or more casual conversations, in which he gets the suspects to talk at such length that they eventually give themselves away.

‘To investigate a crime it is only necessary to let the guilty party or parties talk.’ (p.217)

Cast

  • Hercule Poirot
  • wicked old Mrs Boynton – second wife of millionaire Elmer Boynton – ‘that hulk of shapeless flesh, with her evil, gloating eyes’ (p.59)
  • Lennox Boynton – 30, ‘fair-haired, loose-limbed’, married to…
  • Nadine – Lennox’s wife, pleads with him to break free, ‘tall, dignified’, eventually threatens to leave him for Mr Cope
  • Raymond Boynton – young adult stepson of Mrs B
  • Carol Boynton – 23, young adult stepdaughter of Mrs B
  • Ginevra ‘Jinny’ Boynton – Mrs B’s only biological daughter
  • Dr Sarah King – young idealistic newly qualified psychologist, on the rebound from a 4-year-long affair with a doctor four years her senior
  • Dr Theodore Gerard – famous French psychologist, author of papers on schizophrenia
  • Mr Jefferson Cope – idealistic American, friend of the Boynton family, secretly in love with Nadine
  • Lady Westholme – an enormous booming masterful American woman, married an English lord and so became a ‘Lady’, got herself elected to the House of Commons, sits on numerous committees, interested in lots of social causes, an earnest feminist, quick to criticise men for being rubbish
  • Annabel Pierce – mimsy and timid, as the story evolves she becomes a comic companion and foil to Lady Westholme
  • Mahmoud – the ‘ample’ dragoman or guide, ‘fat and dignified’
  • Colonel Carbury – bluff British official in Amman, Jordan, who Gerard’s concerns force to order an investigation into Mrs Boynton’s death (p.111)

Sex

The word ‘sex’ had of course been around for some time to refer to gender, even existed in anodyne phrases such as ‘the fairer sex’. But sometime during the 1920s it began to acquire its more modern meaning of referring to the actual act of sexual intercourse, with the result that sensitive souls like Miss Pierce blush when they hear it.

Whereas, on the contrary, liberated modern scientifically-minded young women like Sarah King have no inhibitions about using the word with its modern connotation. So far, so ‘liberated’. But Sarah does, however, still bridle at discussing sex openly and candidly. She blushes or bridles when Dr Gerard raises the subject, leading him to accuse her of being as repressed on the subject as all her fellow English. And she still gives expression to basically Victorian conventions that somehow sex is associated with men, men have sex on the brain, sex is not something that ‘nice’ women talk about etc.

This is dramatised in conversations between the psychologists Gerard and King, which use three vectors or binaries – gender, age and nationality.

What I mean is they not only take different views because one is a man and one is a woman; but because Gerard is middle-aged, with lots of experience and so somewhat cynical, compared with King’s youthful idealism. And that he is French and therefore considers he has a much more liberated attitude to sex than a repressed, hung-up Englishwoman like King.

Thus when they are discussing how to get through to the stepchildren who are so obviously under Mrs Boynton’s horrible control, after Sarah hasn’t made much impact on Carol, Gerard points out that she can use her ‘sex’, by which he means that she can try ‘attracting’ Raymond away from the prison of the family.

‘One comes always back to sex, does one not?’ (p.69)

He provocatively explains he means that the ‘desire of a man for a mate’ will be stronger than Mrs Boynton’s ‘hypnotic spell’. When Sarah makes excuses why she doesn’t want to do this, Gerard launches into his nationality-based critique.

‘That is because you are English! The English have a complex about sex. They think it is “not quite nice”.’
Sarah’s indignant response failed to move him.
‘Yes, yes; I know you are very modern – that you use freely in public the most unpleasant words you can find in the dictionary – that you are professional and entirely uninhibited! Tout de même, I repeat you have the same racial characteristic as your mother and your grandmother. You are still the blushing English Miss although you do not blush!’ (p.70)

Psychology

On a different tack, Gerard and King also have extended discussions analysing the origins and nature of the hold Mrs Boynton has over her stepchildren, and its possible origins, in professional psychological terms. Early on Sarah has a hurried conversation with poor Carol, who snatches some free time to explain the key fact about her stepmother:

Carol leaned forward and touched her arm. ‘Listen. I must try and make you understand! Before her marriage my mother – she’s my stepmother really – was a wardress in a prison. My father was the Governor and he married her. Well, it’s been like that ever since. She’s gone on being a wardress – to us. That’s why our life is just being in prison!’ (Chapter 6)

When she reports this to Dr Gerard, he mansplains the deeper significance to her. I’ll quote it at length because it’s one of the longest expositions about psychology in any of the Christie novels I’ve read so far:

Gerard pounced on one point. ‘Wardress in a prison, was she, that old hippopotamus? That is significant, perhaps.’
Sarah said: ‘You mean that that is the cause of her tyranny? It is the habit of her former profession?’
Gerard shook his head. ‘No, that is approaching it from the wrong angle. There is some deep underlying compulsion. She does not love tyranny because she has been a wardress. Let us rather say that she became a wardress because she loved tyranny. In my theory it was a secret desire for power over other human beings that led her to adopt that profession.’

From there he delivers a little explanation about human nature:

His face was very grave. ‘There are such strange things buried down in the unconscious. A lust for power – a lust for cruelty – a savage desire to tear and rend – all the inheritance of our past racial memories . . . They are all there, Miss King, all the cruelty and savagery and lust . . . We shut the door on them and deny them conscious life, but sometimes they are too strong.’
Sarah shivered. ‘I know.’

So by the end of the 1930s these ideas, originally outlined by Freud but subsequently elaborated by umpteen followers (Adler, Jung) not to mention countless popularisers, magazine articles, books etc were widespread enough to be completely assimilable in a popular fiction like this.

But Gerard doesn’t stop there. His speech goes on to generalise about the state of society as a whole, by which he means the (by 1938) very obvious threats from totalitarian regimes, in Soviet Russia, Fascist Italy, and Nazi Germany, and their psychological origins.

Gerard continued: ‘We see it all around us today-in political creeds, in the conduct of nations. A reaction from humanitarianism, from pity, from brotherly good will. The creeds sound well sometimes, a wise regime, a beneficent government – but imposed by force-resting on a basis of cruelty and fear. They are opening the door, these apostles of violence, they are letting out the old savagery, the old delight in cruelty for its own sake! Oh, it is difficult. Man is an animal very delicately balanced. He has one prime necessity – to survive. To advance too quickly is as fatal as to lag behind. He must survive! He must, perhaps, retain some of the old savagery, but he must not – no, definitely he must not – deify it!’

And then, from this lofty disquisition on the nature of Mankind and Society, we revert back to the individual specimen under analysis.

There was a pause. Then Sarah said: ‘You think old Mrs. Boynton is a kind of Sadist?’
‘I am almost sure of it. I think she rejoices in the infliction of pain-mental pain, mind you, not physical. That is very much rarer and very much more difficult to deal with. She likes to have control of other human beings and she likes to make them suffer.’ (Chapter 6)

But there is one more point Gerard / Christie has to make, about what happens to all these raging unconscious forces if they are repressed. And this again is worth quoting because you suspect it represents Christie’s view or, more precisely, is a point of view which underpins and enables the fictions:

Dr Gerard said gravely: ‘I believe at least in one of the chief tenets of the Christian faith – contentment with a lowly place. I am a doctor and I know that ambition-the desire to succeed-to have power-leads to most ills of the human soul. If the desire is realized it leads to arrogance, violence and final satiety; and if it is denied – ah! If it is denied let all the asylums for the insane rise up and give their testimony! They are filled with human beings who were unable to face being mediocre, insignificant, ineffective and who therefore created for themselves ways of escape from reality so to be shut off from life itself forever.’
Sarah said abruptly: ‘It’s a pity the old Boynton woman isn’t in an asylum.’
Gerard shook his head. ‘No – her place is not there among the failures. It is worse than that. She has succeeded, you see! She has accomplished her dream.’ (Chapter 6)

The idea of the lowly and frustrated achieving power and specialness through appalling behaviour, specifically the act of murder, underpins some of the stories – for example, it features heavily in ‘The A.B.C. Murders’ until the real motive for the crimes emerges. It’s so important this novel that Gerard repeats the idea, explaining it to the naive and optimistic Jefferson Cope:

‘My dear sir, I have made a life’s study of the strange things that go on in the human mind. It is no good turning one’s face only to the fairer side of life. Below the decencies and conventions of everyday life, there lies a vast reservoir of strange things. There is such a thing, for instance, as delight in cruelty for its own sake. But when you have found that, there is something deeper still. The desire, profound and pitiful, to be appreciated. If that is thwarted, if through an unpleasing personality a human being is unable to get the response it needs, it turns to other methods – it must be felt – it must count – and so to innumerable strange perversions. The habit of cruelty, like any other habit, can be cultivated, can take hold of one –.’ (p.98)

So this kind of things isn’t exactly a fundamental premise of all the stories, it’s more like one of the received opinions of the time, which helps the stories function and provides a sort-of psychological explanation, if you need one.

This is all interesting up to a point, but at that point you realise that Christie doesn’t really have that deep an understanding of the subject. She knows enough to be able to give basic psychological analyses to her characters, but then it stops. To be honest, given the setup and centrality of this monster figure, I was hoping for more. What I’ve just quoted is the two psychologists’ longest conversation and it feels disappointingly shallow.

It’s a good indicator of the way Christie’s books aren’t literature, because she needs just enough ideas to make her stagey characters and their conversations sound sort of plausible, and to make the plot whizz along at speed. But there’s no depth. And the more the two psychologists explain, the more superficial and entry-level they sound. Magazine level.

This kind of thing, this entry level psychology, also provides opportunities for comedy

And just enough air of fake sophistication to make bluff old Colonel Carbury’s philistine English response to all this psychology stuff amusing (p.114).

Turning point in Sarah’s perception of Mrs Boynton

It is maybe Sarah’s psychological training which gives her the key insight into Mrs Boynton:

Sarah passed them and went into the hotel. Mrs. Boynton, wrapped in a thick coat, was sitting in a chair, waiting to depart. Looking at her, a queer revulsion of feeling swept over Sarah. She had felt that Mrs. Boynton was a sinister figure, an incarnation of evil malignancy. Now, suddenly, she saw the old woman as a pathetic ineffectual figure. To be born with such a lust for power, such a desire for dominion, and to achieve only a petty domestic tyranny! If only her children could see her as Sarah saw her that minute – an object of pity – a stupid, malignant, pathetic, posturing old woman. (Chapter 9)

Christie’s anti-feminists

Christie’s feminists are always figures of fun. In this book it is the larger-than-life American loudmouth Lady Westholme, one of Christie’s fearsomely strong, bullish feminists, always ready with a pithy saying that ridicules men and promotes womankind:

Lady Westholme looked with grim satisfaction after the departing car. ‘Men always think they can impose upon women,’ she said. Sarah thought that it would be a brave man who thought he could impose upon Lady Westholme! (p.78)

And turning her fearsome address onto Sarah:

‘You are a professional woman Miss King?’
‘I’ve just taken my M.B.’
‘Good,’ said Lady Westholme with condescending approval. ‘If anything is to be accomplished, mark my words, it is women who will do it.’ (p.79)

These stirring words do not, however, ‘liberate’ Sarah, just make her feel uneasy, making her feel ‘uneasily conscious for the first time of her sex’.

It is no coincidence that this storm-the-barricades, feminist force of nature turns out, in the end, to be the baddy and, when found out, kills herself rather than face the humiliation.

One of the surprises of reading Laura Thompson’s biography of Christie is to discover just how untouched she was by feminism or suffragettism, and how utterly conventional in her views of gender relations (a young woman’s job was to find a man, marry and have babies; careers were for men, and other shockingly anti-feminist beliefs). In this novel, although she bridles at Dr Gerard’s outrageously sexist comments, Sarah also recoils from Lady Westholme’s boosterism. She is sensibly centrist which, you can’t help thinking (after reading Thompson’s biography) was Christie’s position.

‘It’s awful, isn’t it, but I do hate women! When they’re inefficient and idiotic like Miss Pierce, they infuriate me, and when they’re efficient like Lady Westholme, they annoy me more still.’ (p.82)

And when Miss Pierce feebly praises big strong Lady Westholme, Sarah again expresses views very close to her creator:

Miss Pierce did not notice the acerbity [in Sarah’s voice] and twittered happily on: “I’ve so often seen her name in the papers. So clever of women to go into public life and hold their own. I’m always so glad when a woman accomplishes something!’
‘Why?’ demanded Sarah ferociously.
Miss Pierce’s mouth fell open and she stammered a little. ‘Oh, because – I mean-just because – well – it’s so nice that women are able to do things!’
‘I don’t agree,’ said Sarah. ‘It’s nice when any human being is able to accomplish something worthwhile! It doesn’t matter a bit whether it’s a man or a woman. Why should it?’ (p.84)

Bookishness

As always, the novel has characters commenting on how events sound like they come from a detective novel, or are reading such a novel, or interpret events in light of their reading of such books. My working hypothesis is that rather than conceal the fact that her stories are popular entertainments, Christie thus emphasises the fact, emphasises their artificiality, and thus encourages readers away from applying everyday standards of plausibility and verisimilitude, instead luring them into her MurderMysteryWorld of caricatures characters, stock situations and outrageous solutions.

Colonel Carbury… said: ‘Know what I think?’
‘I should be delighted if you would tell me.’
‘Young Raymond Boynton’s out of it.’
‘Ah! You think so?’
‘Yes. Clear as a bell what he thought. We might have known he’d be out of it. Being, as in detective stories the most likely person. Since you practically overheard him saving he was going to bump off the old lady – we might have known that meant he was innocent!’
‘You read the detective stories, yes?’
‘Thousands of them,’ said Colonel Carbury. He added and his tone was that of a wistful schoolboy: ‘I suppose you couldn’t do the things the detective does in books? Write a list of significant facts – things that don’t seem to mean anything but are really frightfully important – that sort of thing?’
‘Ah,’ said Poirot kindly. ‘You like that kind of detective story? But certainly, I will do it for you with pleasure.’

And Poirot proceeds to raw up precisely the kind of list of suspects and key facts about them that Colonel Carbury expects any self-respecting detective to do, based on his extensive reading in the genre.

Christie is clearly playing with the reader, sharing the joke that what we are reading is a story, meeting our scepticism head-on, and defusing it with a smile.

And it’s not just passive references to those kinds of novels: some of the characters actively copy the behaviour and information they’ve learned from these kinds of books.

Poirot said quickly: ‘That is the one point on which I am not yet completely informed. What was the method you counted on employing? You had a method – and it was connected with a hypodermic syringe. That much I know. If you want me to believe you, you must tell me the rest.’
Raymond said hurriedly: ‘It was a way I read in a book – an English detective story – you stuck an empty hypodermic syringe into someone and it did the trick.’ (p.226)

Americans

The family at the centre of the story are American, as are Jefferson Cope and Lady Westholme. There are lots of Americans in Christie’s stories. After all, her father was American so she had a plenty of American in-laws and a feeling for the national character. On the whole her books are very favourable to Americans.

As Dr Gerard knew by experience, Americans are disposed to be a friendly race. They have not the uneasy suspicion of a travelling Briton. (Chapter 5)

But here, as everywhere, stereotypes and caricatures (in this instance national stereotypes and caricatures) allow her to generate text, copy, discourse.

Mr Cope rose. ‘In America,’ he said, ‘we’re great believers in absolute freedom.’
Dr Gerard rose also. He was unimpressed by the remark. He had heard it made before by people of many different nationalities. The illusion that freedom is the prerogative of one’s own particular race is fairly widespread.
Dr Gerard was wiser. He knew that no race, no country and no individual could be described as free. But he also knew that there were different degrees of bondage… (p.39)

This isn’t particularly deep or insightful, just ‘deep’ enough to feel significant as you skate through the book breathlessly waiting for the next event. They’re like the quick crossword, an interesting blip, an amusing distraction, then back to the plot.

Poirot’s OCD

Poirot took a little time to speak. Methodically he arranged an ash-tray or two and made a little heap of used matches. (p.127)

Incidentally, we learn that Poirot insists on cleaning his own shoes. He takes everywhere his own little shoe-cleaning outfit and duster (p.150).

Poirot’s method

It is Colonel Race who uses the handy phrase ‘psychological deduction’, when recommending Poirot to his friend Colonel Carbury (p.111). And when Carbury asks how he intends to solve the mystery, Poirot patiently explains:

‘By methodical sifting of the evidence, by a process of reasoning… And by a study of psychological probabilities.’ (p.127)

Which is a pithy summary of the three elements. First the physical facts, the evidence. Then reflecting how the evidence can be fitted together like a jigsaw. Then the final test, whether the various jigsaw shapes can be reconciled with, align with, the psychology of the suspects, as he has come to know them through his extensive questioning and conversation and observation. The talking, the questioning, the careful listening, the picking up clues from the most casual remark, all key parts of the process:

‘My theory is that criminology is the easiest science in the world! One has only to let the criminal talk-sooner or later he will tell you everything.’ (p.185)

Only when all three elements are aligned does he have the solution.

Pity and compassion

Nadine mentions the case of the Orient Express which she, and all the other characters, have (apparently) read about. Somehow she knows that, at the end of that novel, Poirot effectively let all the murderers off because of the ‘justice’ of the murder they carried out (although, if you think about it a minute, this can’t have been common knowledge – the whole point is that Poirot decided to keep their actions and motivation a secret from the authorities; nobody could know this).

Anyway, that logical glitch aside, in this novel, during the investigation phase, Nadine asks whether Poirot can extend the same forgiveness to the wretched Boynton family and drop his investigation. Strikingly, Poirot refuses, and his reasons are worth noting here.

Nadine said passionately: ‘I have heard, M. Poirot, that once, in that affair of the Orient Express, you accepted an official verdict of what had happened?’
Poirot looked at her curiously. ‘I wonder who told you that.’
‘Is it true?’
He said slowly: ‘That case was – different.’
‘No. No, it was not different! The man who was killed was evil,’ her voice dropped, ‘as she was…’
Poirot said: ‘The moral character of the victim has nothing to do with it! A human being who has exercised the right of private judgment and taken the life of another human being is not safe to exist amongst the community. I tell you that! I, Hercule Poirot!’
‘How hard you are!’
‘Madame, in some ways I am adamant. I will not condone murder! That is the final word of Hercule Poirot.’
(Book 2, chapter 7)


Credit

‘Appointment with Death’ by Agatha Christie was published by the Collins Crime Club in 1938. Page references are to the 2017 HarperCollins paperback edition.

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A Room of One’s Own by Virginia Woolf (1929)

Literature is impoverished beyond our counting by the doors that have been shut upon women.

A pioneering work of feminism, Virginia Woolf’s long essay, ‘A Room of One’s Own’, was based on two lectures she was invited to deliver at Cambridge University in October 1928 on the subject of ‘Women and Fiction’. In fact the text as we have it was extensively worked over, and is divided into six, not two, sections. In the 1977 Granada paperback edition I own, it is 107 pages long, not quite book length but long for an essay.

Be warned: it gets off to a very, very slow start. Several times I put it down, bored and dismayed by the deliberately whimsical inconsequentiality of the opening section. It only really gets interesting with the start of section 3, about page 40, and from then on contains a steady flow of interesting, sometimes important, insights and ideas.

Section 1. A library, lunch and dinner in Cambridge (20 pages)

Summaries (Wikipedia, the blurb on the back) always quote ‘A Room of One’s Own’s eighth sentence as its most significant message:

A woman must have money and a room of her own if she is to write fiction.

She states this right at the very beginning of the text and then explains that she will try and convey the thought processes which led her to this conclusion. The trouble is that these processes are long-winded, deliberately whimsical and digressive, and slow to get started.

The odd or funny thing about this is that one of the oldest sexist libels against women is that they are incapable of logical, rational thought – and here is what is supposed to be one of the great feminist texts of the century apparently justifying that very libel, going out of its way to demonstrate Woolf’s reluctance to write clearly and logically, and her preference for apparently aimless, subjective rambling. Think I’m exaggerating? Here’s a slab from the second paragraph:

Here then was I (call me Mary Beton, Mary Seton, Mary Carmichael or by any name you please – it is not a matter of any importance) sitting on the banks of a river a week or two ago in fine October weather, lost in thought. That collar I have spoken of [the commission to deliver lectures about] women and fiction, the need of coming to some conclusion on a subject that raises all sorts of prejudices and passions, bowed my head to the ground.

To the right and left bushes of some sort, golden and crimson, glowed with the colour, even it seemed burnt with the heat, of fire. On the further bank the willows wept in perpetual lamentation, their hair about their shoulders. The river reflected whatever it chose of sky and bridge and burning tree, and when the undergraduate had oared his boat through the reflections they closed again, completely, as if he had never been. There one might have sat the clock round lost in thought.

Thought – to call it by a prouder name than it deserved – had let its line down into the stream. It swayed, minute after minute, hither and thither among the reflections and the weeds, letting the water lift it and sink it until – you know the little tug – the sudden conglomeration of an idea at the end of one’s line: and then the cautious hauling of it in, and the careful laying of it out?

Alas, laid on the grass how small, how insignificant this thought of mine looked; the sort of fish that a good fisherman puts back into the water so that it may grow fatter and be one day worth cooking and eating. I will not trouble you with that thought now, though if you look carefully you may find it for yourselves in the course of what I am going to say…

‘I will not trouble you with that thought now…’ Instead she rambles on to describe getting up and setting off walking across the grass. Here she is collared and her train of thought interrupted by an officious college beadle who tells her to keep off the grass and walk on the path. ‘What idea it had been that had sent me so audaciously trespassing I could not now remember’ and she doesn’t tell us.

Something makes her think about the essays of Charles Lamb, and she remembers the one where he comments on seeing a manuscript of the poem Lycidas by John Milton and marvelling that the great work was ever different from how it’s come down to us (from Lamb’s essay ‘Oxford in the Vacation’). Then she remembers that the manuscript of Lycidas is kept in Cambridge, so she sets off to the library where it’s kept (the library of Trinity College, Cambridge). Here she is outraged when a flunky tells here that ‘ladies are only admitted to the library if accompanied by a Fellow of the College or furnished with a letter of introduction.’ She turns away, angry and disgusted.

She hears the organ playing in a chapel, calling people – well, men, old men dressed in fur-trimmed cloaks and college gowns – to a service, which in turn triggers a sort of historical fantasy.

The outside of the chapel remained. As you know, its high domes and pinnacles can be seen, like a sailing-ship always voyaging never arriving, lit up at night and visible for miles, far away across the hills. Once, presumably, this quadrangle with its smooth lawns, its massive buildings and the chapel itself was marsh too, where the grasses waved and the swine rootled. Teams of horses and oxen, I thought, must have hauled the stone in wagons from far countries, and then with infinite labour the grey blocks in whose shade I was now standing were poised in order one on top of another, and then the painters brought their glass for the windows, and the masons were busy for centuries up on that roof with putty and cement, spade and trowel. Every Saturday somebody must have poured gold and silver out of a leathern purse into their ancient fists, for they had their beer and skittles presumably of an evening. An unending stream of gold and silver, I thought, must have flowed into this court perpetually to keep the stones coming and the masons working; to level, to ditch, to dig and to drain. But it was then the age of faith, and money was poured liberally to set these stones on a deep foundation, and when the stones were raised, still more money was poured in from the coffers of kings and queens and great nobles to ensure that hymns should be sung here and scholars taught. Lands were granted; tithes were paid. And when the age of faith was over and the age of reason had come, still the same flow of gold and silver went on; fellowships were founded; lectureships endowed; only the gold and silver flowed now, not from the coffers of the king. but from the chests of merchants and manufacturers, from the purses of men who had made, say, a fortune from industry, and returned, in their wills, a bounteous share of it to endow more chairs, more lectureships, more fellowships in the university where they had learnt their craft. Hence the libraries and laboratories; the observatories; the splendid equipment of costly and delicate instruments which now stands on glass shelves, where centuries ago the grasses waved and the swine rootled. Certainly, as I strolled round the court, the foundation of gold and silver seemed deep enough; the pavement laid solidly over the wild grasses…

You can see how it’s not really discussing the subject of ‘women and fiction’ nor explaining the thinking behind her ‘money and a room of her own’ conclusion.

Then, in the story of her day in Cambridge, it’s time for lunch. She thinks it a shame that traditional fiction rarely describes actual dishes people consume and so she goes out of her way to describe what she had for lunch.

I shall take the liberty to defy that convention and to tell you that the lunch on this occasion began with soles, sunk in a deep dish, over which the college cook had spread a counterpane of the whitest cream, save that it was branded here and there with brown spots like the spots on the flanks of a doe. After that came the partridges, but if this suggests a couple of bald, brown birds on a plate you are mistaken. The partridges, many and various, came with all their retinue of sauces and salads, the sharp and the sweet, each in its order; their potatoes, thin as coins but not so hard; their sprouts, foliated as rosebuds but more succulent. And no sooner had the roast and its retinue been done with than the silent servingman, the Beadle himself perhaps in a milder manifestation, set before us, wreathed in napkins, a confection which rose all sugar from the waves. To call it pudding and so relate it to rice and tapioca would be an insult.

She listens to the civilised talk at the table and feels like something has changed since the war. What is it? Well, poetry.

Before the war at a luncheon party like this people would have said precisely the same things but they would have sounded different, because in those days they were accompanied by a sort of humming noise, not articulate, but musical, exciting, which changed the value of the words themselves. Could one set that humming noise to words? Perhaps with the help of the poets one could. A book lay beside me and, opening it, I turned casually enough to Tennyson.

And she quotes a stanza from Tennyson and then one from Christina Rossetti, the idea being that the rhythms of these poets dictated how people spoke before the war but now, since the war, that rhythm has been lost. The thought makes her laugh out loud but when someone enquires why she’s laughing, rather than confess this rather frivolous idea, she instead points to a Manx cat, a cat without a tail, which she’s seen through a window walking across the college quadrangle. Left alone again, she continues about Tennyson and Rossetti:

What poets, I cried aloud, as one does in the dusk, what poets they were!

The old poets expressed feelings one was familiar with and so one hummed and declaimed them with confidence and happiness. Modern poetry is very different:

But the living poets express a feeling that is actually being made and torn out of us at the moment. One does not recognize it in the first place; often for some reason one fears it; one watches it with keenness and compares it jealously and suspiciously with the old feeling that one knew. Hence the difficulty of modern poetry; and it is because of this difficulty that one cannot remember more than two consecutive lines of any good modern poet.

For ‘the illusion which inspired Tennyson and Christina Rossetti to sing so passionately about the coming of their loves is far rarer now than then.’ Did the old poets sing under the influence of a beautiful illusion? Did the war strip away that illusion and show us the truth of human nature? Ah, what is truth, what is illusion? (the kind of rhetorical question which packs ‘The Waves’). The question sets her thinking, musing and daydreaming as she walks the road towards Headingley and is so distracted that she misses the turning she wanted to take to Fernham [Fernham is a fictional college, an amalgamation of the Cambridge colleges, Newnham and Girton].

Yes indeed, which was truth and which was illusion? I asked myself. What was the truth about these houses, for example, dim and festive now with their red windows in the dusk, but raw and red and squalid, with their sweets and their bootlaces, at nine o’clock in the morning? And the willows and the river and the gardens that run down to the river, vague now with the mist stealing over them, but gold and red in the sunlight – which was the truth, which was the illusion about them? I spare you the twists and turns of my cogitations, for no conclusion was found on the road to Headingley, and I ask you to suppose that I soon found out my mistake about the turning and retraced my steps to Fernham.

‘I spare you the twists and turns of my cogitations…’ she writes, but that, of course, is exactly what she is not doing. Surely any keen young undergraduate who turned up for her lecture (or bought this book) expecting some insight into the subject of women and fiction was expecting more than this. A long self-indulgent account of the author’s rambling day, complete with the full menu of the nice lunch she ate, and her strolling around the city? You might expect the lecture to eventually return to the nominal subject, but the most impressive thing about it is the way it refuses to address the subject at all. Instead she now tells us that her autumn rambling triggered a kind of vision of an autumn garden:

A fancy – that the lilac was shaking its flowers over the garden walls, and the brimstone butterflies were scudding hither and thither, and the dust of the pollen was in the air. A wind blew, from what quarter I know not, but it lifted the half-grown leaves so that there was a flash of silver grey in the air. It was the time between the lights when colours undergo their intensification and purples and golds burn in window-panes like the beat of an excitable heart; when for some reason the beauty of the world revealed and yet soon to perish (here I pushed into the garden, for, unwisely, the door was left open and no beadles seemed about), the beauty of the world which is so soon to perish, has two edges, one of laughter, one of anguish, cutting the heart asunder. The gardens of Fernham lay before me in the spring twilight, wild and open, and in the long grass, sprinkled and carelessly flung, were daffodils and bluebells, not orderly perhaps at the best of times, and now wind-blown and waving as they tugged at their roots. The windows of the building, curved like ships’ windows among generous waves of red brick, changed from lemon to silver under the flight of the quick spring clouds. Somebody was in a hammock, somebody, but in this light they were phantoms only, half guessed, half seen, raced across the grass—would no one stop her?—and then on the terrace, as if popping out to breathe the air, to glance at the garden, came a bent figure, formidable yet humble, with her great forehead and her shabby dress—could it be the famous scholar, could it be J—— H—— herself? [according to the notes, this is Jane Harrison, classical scholar and anthropologist] All was dim, yet intense too, as if the scarf which the dusk had flung over the garden were torn asunder by star or sword – the gash of some terrible reality leaping, as its way is, out of the heart of the spring.

But just when you thought she might be trembling on the brink of saying something clear, logical, rational and useful, she cuts away to… dinner! Yes she is in another college hall stuffing herself with a posh dinner.

Here was my soup. Dinner was being served in the great dining-hall. Far from being spring it was in fact an evening in October. Everybody was assembled in the big dining-room. Dinner was ready. Here was the soup. It was a plain gravy soup. There was nothing to stir the fancy in that. One could have seen through the transparent liquid any pattern that there might have been on the plate itself. But there was no pattern. The plate was plain. Next came beef with its attendant greens and potatoes—a homely trinity, suggesting the rumps of cattle in a muddy market, and sprouts curled and yellowed at the edge, and bargaining and cheapening and women with string bags on Monday morning. There was no reason to complain of human nature’s daily food, seeing that the supply was sufficient and coal-miners doubtless were sitting down to less. Prunes and custard followed. And if anyone complains that prunes, even when mitigated by custard, are an uncharitable vegetable (fruit they are not), stringy as a miser’s heart and exuding a fluid such as might run in misers’ veins who have denied themselves wine and warmth for eighty years and yet not given to the poor, he should reflect that there are people whose charity embraces even the prune. Biscuits and cheese came next, and here the water-jug was liberally passed round, for it is the nature of biscuits to be dry, and these were biscuits to the core. That was all. The meal was over.

To recap, it is one of the oldest sexist libels that women are incapable of abstract, logical thought and instead are limited to either a narcissistic obsession with the minutiae of their own lives, or, at best, with humble domestic topics such as cooking and gardening. In the opening sections of this book it seems as if Woolf is going out of her way to justify the grossest sexist libelling of the female mind? I was genuinely shocked by the self-centred, rambling set of inconsequential impressions and memories with which it opens.

And continues in the same vein. The college guests go back to the room of a friend of hers, a science tutor, where they open wine and gossip (first topic of conversation being someone who’s recently got married, as if she’s deliberately playing to the grossest stereotype of the female mind being continually obsessed with who’s going out with who, getting married to who, getting divorced from who). But this gossip doesn’t hold her and again she drifts off into her own personal fantasy.

A scene of masons on a high roof some five centuries ago. Kings and nobles brought treasure in huge sacks and poured it under the earth. This scene was for ever coming alive in my mind and placing itself by another of lean cows and a muddy market and withered greens and the stringy hearts of old men – these two pictures, disjointed and disconnected and nonsensical as they were, were for ever coming together and combating each other and had me entirely at their mercy. The best course, unless the whole talk was to be distorted, was to expose what was in my mind to the air, when with good luck it would fade and crumble like the head of the dead king when they opened the coffin at Windsor. Briefly, then, I told Miss Seton about the masons who had been all those years on the roof of the chapel, and about the kings and queens and nobles bearing sacks of gold and silver on their shoulders, which they shovelled into the earth; and then how the great financial magnates of our own time came and laid cheques and bonds, I suppose, where the others had laid ingots and rough lumps of gold. All that lies beneath the colleges down there, I said; but this college, where we are now sitting, what lies beneath its gallant red brick and the wild unkempt grasses of the garden? What force is behind that plain china off which we dined, and (here it popped out of my mouth before I could stop it) the beef, the custard and the prunes?

I thought it would go on forever like this but at the very end of the first section the tone does, at last, change and some sort of facts enter. She makes some kind of point. She abruptly describes the immense struggle it took the education pioneers Emily Davis and Barbara Bodichon to raise the money to found the first women’s college in Cambridge, Girton College, which was opened in 1869 (and where the lecture is being given).

And for the first time the essay comes to life and actually addresses the struggle for women’s rights. Woolf quickly lays down the reasons why it was so difficult to raise the money to establish this college for women’s higher education, namely:

1. In the mid-Victorian era women were considered baby factories. Woolf invents a fictional Victorian woman who had no fewer than 13 children, and this was physically exhausting and immensely time consuming. No wonder so many of their foremothers had no time or inclination for business or moneymaking activities of any kind.

2. The law forbade women from owning money or property. Any money they made, by law belonged to their husbands. What motivation was there, then, to set up in business, to found business dynasties and so on when, the moment you married, the entire thing was handed over to your husband? No motivation at all. Demotivation.

After throwing this bombshell of hard fact into her talk, Woolf returns to her earlier musing, meditative mode and describes walking back to the inn she was staying at, pondering the experiences of her day – being chastised by the beadle, being turned away from the library, watching all the crusty old men lining up to enter their church service – and reconsiders it in the light of the point she’s just made about women’s lack of legal and financial rights, ‘thinking of the safety and prosperity of the one sex and of the poverty and insecurity of the other.’

It’s only now that the rather dim reader (i.e. me) can see that there was a pattern to these ramblings after all: that all these ‘trivial’ personal experiences are designed to build up a portrait of a world where women are subject to an infinite number of regulations and restrictions, from the petty to the serious, life-limiting. And so, she wonders, what is the cumulative effect of so many restrictions on women’s minds and on the tradition of women’s writing?

What is the effect of tradition and of the lack of tradition upon the mind of a writer? She doesn’t quite say this but the implication is clear: that male writers benefited from every privilege possible in a patriarchal society, whereas women writers had to fight against a huge battalion of legal, financial, cultural, traditional enemies facing them at every turn.

She isn’t quite that vehement, but the thought is there, implied in everything she’s said. To be honest it was only reading the introduction to the Oxford University Press edition that helped me see that what comes over as a meandering stream of memories and impressions can be stripped down and turned into bullet points which are a list of exclusions which women have been subject to:

  • being told by a man to keep off the grass destroys her train of thought
  • being excluded from the library of the male-only college speaks for itself, a grotesque form of intellectual censorship
  • being excluded from the all-male congregation going into a church service stands for women’s exclusion from organised religion since time immemorial
  • and then something I hadn’t realised at all, the point of giving the menus, of describing what she had for lunch and what for dinner, was to contrast the fancy haute cuisine menu of lunch at the all-male college with the very plain meat and two veg, prunes and custard menu at Girton, the all-women college which struggled so hard to raise the money to be founded and which still lacks the massive endowments of the all-male colleges which, of course, stretch back to the Middle Ages

When rearranged and presented like this it makes for an impressive list and a handy if highly subjective introduction to the theme of how women in England have for centuries been excluded from business, finance, education and learning and culture. And some of these incidents (the officious beadle, the blocking from the library) return throughout the text, becoming leitmotifs and symbols standing for the greater wrongs of the patriarchy, exactly as she made fairly trivial childhood incidents become repeated leitmotifs which gained layers of meaning and emotion, in her experimental novel ‘The Waves’

But this wasn’t at all obvious from actually reading the text: I had to have it explained to me by the introduction to the Oxford University Press edition (by Morag Shiach).

Section 2. The British Museum, the patriarchy, her legacy (14 pages)

Section 2 starts off a little more as you might expect a lecture to, with a little fleet of rhetorical questions:

That visit to Oxbridge and the luncheon and the dinner had started a swarm of questions: Why did men drink wine and women water? Why was one sex so prosperous and the other so poor? What effect has poverty on fiction? What conditions are necessary for the creation of works of art?

Alas, it quickly falls back into Woolf’s facetious style. There is something about her continual irony, sometimes sarcasm, which continually makes you think she isn’t serious. Hedging everything with irony makes everything a playful game which, I suggest, undermines her own cause.

A thousand questions at once suggested themselves. But one needed answers, not questions; and an answer was only to be had by consulting the learned and the unprejudiced, who have removed themselves above the strife of tongue and the confusion of body and issued the result of their reasoning and research in books which are to be found in the British Museum. If truth is not to be found on the shelves of the British Museum, where, I asked myself, picking up a notebook and a pencil, is truth?

I’ve complained of a similarly irritatingly facetious tone in H.G. Wells and E.M. Forster. Maybe it was entertaining in its day, maybe it was the standard and expected style for fiction and essays. But now it comes over as irritating and stupid. Who cares about this silly little aside about ‘truth’? ‘What is truth’ is quite a big question. Writing such silly ironies makes her sound like precisely the stereotype of the superficial woman which she is meant to be at such pains to explode.

Thus provided, thus confident and enquiring, I set out in the pursuit of truth.

What this silly ironising about ‘truth’ really highlights is that Woolf had very little formal education and never studied for a degree. In other words, she doesn’t understand what academic study is. It is silly to think she can sit down for a morning at the British Museum, skim through half a dozen books and come up with The Truth about anything. But she hides her intellectual embarrassment behind these silly petticoat jokes and is very aware of her shortcomings. When the books she orders (almost at random) arrive:

The student who has been trained in research at Oxbridge has no doubt some method of shepherding his question past all distractions till it runs into his answer as a sheep runs into its pen. The student by my side, for instance, who was copying assiduously from a scientific manual, was, I felt sure, extracting pure nuggets of the essential ore every ten minutes or so. His little grunts of satisfaction indicated so much. But if, unfortunately, one has had no training in a university, the question far from being shepherded to its pen flies like a frightened flock hither and thither, helter-skelter, pursued by a whole pack of hounds.

She discovers there’s a huge number of books written by men about women, but hardly any by women about men. Characteristically, she makes a ‘perfectly arbitrary choice of a dozen volumes or so’ and orders them up from the library stacks. (Why does she take every opportunity to emphasise how arbitrary, flighty and superficial she is? It’s like she’s playing into the enemy’s hands at every opportunity. [Or, more subtly, is she demonstrating and embodying an alternative, non-male, non-rational, non-aggrandising way of thinking, letting thoughts wander and digress and reveal their own ‘female’ truths? Discuss])

Similarly, not knowing how to study a subject and not realising it might take more than a morning to research a subject like ‘the oppression of women’ or ‘women in British history’, instead she reads a random selection of books, randomly, and makes random notes in her notebook, which she then proceeds to read out to her audience. She might as well say ‘Look how stupid and badly educated I am.’

Instead of taking careful notes and marshalling them into some semblance of an argument, Woolf admits that she spent half the time doodling the face and figure of a big, hairy bombastic man, an angry professor, the type who writes weighty tomes about the inferiority of women. Then she starts wondering what made this (made-up) figure so angry – was it because his wife had run off with a dashing cavalry officer (‘slim and elegant and dressed in astrakhan’)? Is this frivolous or subtly effective, her turning serious social questions into deliberately frivolous fictions?

In my review of ‘The Waves’, I pointed out how the six characters are never shown interacting with each other, rarely if ever have any dialogue, but instead stand stiffly like actors on a stage, facing the audience and declaiming their solipsistic monologues. This stiff absence of any interaction made me look up the symptoms of Asperger’s Syndrome and discover that they displayed every single one.

Here, the inability to focus, concentrate or develop any train of thought without wandering off into daydreaming or doodling, which Woolf attributes to herself, made me look up the symptoms of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). They are:

  • difficulty paying attention or staying focused
  • being restless or overactive
  • interrupting others or having trouble waiting
  • poor time management
  • being forgetful
  • procrastinating
  • disorganization

It’s hard not to relate at least some of these symptoms to the self-portrait of the forgetful, easily distracted woman incapable of sustained research or thought which emerges from the opening sections of this book.

The patriarchy

Eventually she finds something to say. The one thing all the books she’s skimmed through written by men about women possess is the common tone of anger. Why are so many men angry at women and so quick to put them down? This is an absolutely vast question which invokes psychology, psychoanalysis, sociology and any number of other disciples.

but having briefly mentioned it, Woolf strolls off to find a restaurant to have lunch in. Here a previous diner had left the daily newspaper. She peruses it and finds more than she found in all the books, for she realises just how profoundly England is in the grip of a patriarchy.

The most transient visitor to this planet, I thought, who picked up this paper could not fail to be aware, even from this scattered testimony, that England is under the rule of a patriarchy. Nobody in their senses could fail to detect the dominance of ‘the professor’ [the angry caricature she doodled in the museum]. His was the power and the money and the influence. He was the proprietor of the paper and its editor and sub-editor. He was the Foreign Secretary and the judge. He was the cricketer; he owned the racehorses and the yachts. He was the director of the company that pays two hundred per cent to its shareholders. He left millions to charities and colleges that were ruled by himself…He it is who will acquit or convict the murderer, and hang him, or let him go free. With the exception of the fog he seemed to control everything.

The human (male) need to feel superior

And at last, a third of the way through the book, Woolf starts to say interesting things. She starts from the premise that life is a struggle for most people, that most people need to maintain illusions to make it bearable to carry on. One of the most widespread of these illusions is finding comfort in the idea that, whatever your situation, you are at least superior to some other group of people. A feeling of superiority allows you to maintain the illusion of purpose and achievement in your life.

Woolf speculates that maybe men need to feel superior to women in order to achieve all their great achievements. This explains many things. It explains why, when a woman makes a perfectly valid criticism of some man’s writing or painting or speech or whatever, men tend to over-react, becoming furious. It is because even a small criticism is an attack on the entire psychological system whereby men maintain what they like to think of as their superiority.

This, maybe, is one explanation for the otherwise incomprehensible anger of so many men against women.

Her aunt’s legacy

Then Woolf shares something profound and central to the book and its famous central thesis (‘A woman must have money and a room of her own if she is to write fiction.’)

Around the time (some) women were given the vote (the Representation of the People Act, February 1918) Woolf inherited a legacy from an aunt. It paid £500 a year in perpetuity. Woolf is interesting when she describes how this changed her whole view of the world. Until then she’d had to scrabble for an income via all kinds of menial reviewing jobs, almost all controlled and doled out by men. Now she no longer had to flatter or fear men. She slowly realised that she was completely liberated. Slowly this caused her to reconsider lots of things in society, starting with war itself, all the statues and guff about glory and so on. So much of it seemed like men justifying male behaviour.

The protected sex

The section ends with a new thought, that women have for centuries been ‘the protected sex’. What will happen when the social transformations of the 1920s work their way through, when women are allowed or encouraged to do any job, when women cease to be ‘the protected sex’? Who knows, maybe the fact that women, on average, live longer than men will itself change.

All assumptions founded on the facts observed when women were the protected sex will have disappeared – as, for example (here a squad of soldiers marched down the street), that women and clergymen and gardeners live longer than other people. Remove that protection, expose them to the same exertions and activities, make them soldiers and sailors and engine-drivers and dock labourers, and will not women die off so much younger, so much quicker, than men?

In the event, no. Women have for some decades being doing more and more of the jobs previously restricted to men, but it hasn’t dented the fundamental gender gap in life expectancy.

Life expectancy at birth in the UK in 2020 to 2022 was 78.6 years for males and 82.6 years for females. (Office for National Statistics)

Section 3. Women in history and literature (14 pages)

So she has gotten round to opening up some pretty massive issues (the patriarchy, male control, male anger, male jobs, social and economic changes of the 1920s).

The next section presents, on the face of it, another disappointment. Rather than dig deeper into these sociological issues, it feels like Woolf retreats to her comfort zone to talk about literature. To be precise, her focus suddenly shifts to the question of why there were no women writers during the Golden Age of Queen Elizabeth I?

Powerless in society, powerful in literature

To do so she makes a quick review of women in the literature of the ages and points out the paradox that, although throughout most of history women have been slaves and drudges, pawns in family marriages, entirely at the beck and call of fathers and husbands… yet the classic literature of the ages, all written by men, is thronged with women of dazzling power and agency, from the heroines of the Greek epics and tragedies, through Cleopatra and the strong women of Rome, through the leading figures in Shakespeare, Lady Macbeth, Viola, Portia. Why did societies which fiercely policed and repressed women (for example, ancient Greece) produce toweringly powerful figures of women in literature, poetry and plays?

Woolf relies heavily on the experts of her day and quotes the historian G.M. Trevelyan (1876 to 1962) and the classicist F.L. Lucas (1894 to 1967). It is instructive reading their prose next to hers i.e. theirs is full of intellectual meat and interesting views, whereas hers are much weaker, relying much more on poetic impressions of, for example, characters like Cleopatra, Lady Macbeth and Rosalind. The paradox of Greek women which I just summarised, in fact derives entirely from a man, Lucas.

Lack of knowledge of women in history

Still, she makes one Massive Point: this is that there is a pitiful absence of information about women’s lives before the eighteenth century. She directly addresses her audience of bright young women undergraduates at Girton and asks if none of them can devote their lives to the historical study of women’s lives. It would be fascinating to know if anyone in her audience (or who later read the book) was inspired to do just that.

A joke

Woolf’s works are conspicuous for their almost total lack of humour. There are few if any laughs in ‘Jacob’s Room’, ‘Mrs Dalloway’, ‘To The Lighthouse’, a humorous tone but no actual jokes in ‘Orlando’, and none in ‘The Waves’. She certainly never tells jokes with a witty punchline or outcome, just as she never tells ‘stories’. I’m not saying it’s easy. That’s why really successful comic writers are few and far between. So when something funny crops up it’s worth recording. This made me laugh out loud.

I thought of that old gentleman, who is dead now, but was a bishop, I think, who declared that it was impossible for any woman, past, present, or to come, to have the genius of Shakespeare. He wrote to the papers about it. He also told a lady who applied to him for information that cats do not as a matter of fact go to heaven, though they have, he added, souls of a sort. How much thinking those old gentlemen used to save one! How the borders of ignorance shrank back at their approach! Cats do not go to heaven. Women cannot write the plays of Shakespeare.

Shakespeare’s sister

Anyway, back to the central theme of this section which is the question why there are no women writers from the Golden Age of Elizabethan Literature.

To sketch an answer Woolf rather brilliantly invents a sister for Shakespeare, named Judith, and wonders what her life would have been like. In a nutshell, repressed and stifled at every turn, not sent to school, mocked by her parents, fleeing a loveless engagement by running away to London, where nobody would hire her as an actor let alone a playwright, she ended up becoming mistress to the theatre owner and, driven mad by frustration, killing herself.

How many thousands of other women, born with sparkling gifts and epic potential, Woolf asks, found themselves similarly stifled?

Whenever one reads of a witch being ducked, of a woman possessed by devils, of a wise woman selling herbs, or even of a very remarkable man who had a mother, then I think we are on the track of a lost novelist, a suppressed poet, of some mute and inglorious Jane Austen, some Emily Brontë who dashed her brains out on the moor or mopped and mowed about the highways crazed with the torture that her gift had put her to.

She suggests that many of the poems which have come down to us attributed to ‘Anon’ might well have been written by women given no admittance into the male domain of writing.

Having to use a man’s name

Even into the 19th century it lasted, with authors as big as Currer Bell (Charlotte Brontë), George Eliot (Mary Ann Evans), George Sand (Amantine-Lucile-Aurore Dudevant) being forced to pretend to be men.

Hard for men, impossible for women

Woolf goes on to describe the way that, since the time of Rousseau and his famous Confessions (1782) we have had more and more autobiographies and biographies and editions of the letters of great writers, and if one thing comes over it is how very hard it is to write a masterpiece.

But if hard for men, then impossible for women, who faced a barrage of opposition from everyone they knew, plus from their own personal doubts and hesitations. Any woman foolish enough to try and write was likely to be ‘snubbed, slapped, lectured and exhorted’ and she cites some mind-bogglingly sexist put-downs of women from the likes of Dr Johnson to Oscar Browning to even Desmond McCarthy, a friend of hers.

The history of men’s opposition to women’s emancipation is more interesting perhaps than the story of that emancipation itself.

Shakespeare had no psychological blockers

The thrust of this section is that Shakespeare was so complete a poet in part because he seems to have had no obstacles to encumber his self expression, obviously a debatable theory. She applies it to the many men we know who did struggle to find a room of their own, financial independence, acknowledgement and encouragement, to explain why even their work was often botched and compromised. And then applies the same theory to the majority of women writers, many of whom (she speculates) never got to write a thing, due to the lack of opportunities, the lack of education, and their asphyxiation by a life of endless childbirth, child-rearing, housework and husband tending.

Section 4. Historical women writers (19 pages)

Section 4 continues on where the last section left off, to give half a dozen quotes from the poet Ann Finch, Lady Winchelsea (1661 to 1720) which demonstrate how angry she was at the way women were mocked and held back in her day. Woolf’s point being that this is precisely the kind of psychological snag, the bitterness and resentment, which prevented many women’s self-expression being pure and complete, as in the hypothetical model of Shakespeare’s mind, pure and unblemished by doubt or resentment (in her theory/model).

Woolf goes on to lament that the voluminous writings of Margaret of Newcastle (1623 to 1673), who was never given the education, discipline or support, deteriorated into long rants and screeds. Then she moves on to praise the letters of Dorothy Osborne (1627 to 1695).

Aphra Behn

Next she moves on to (very briefly) discuss the career of Aphra Behn (1640 to 1689), by which point I’d realised that all this is by way of being a pocket review of the earliest English woman authors (it would be nice of this had been explained but rational structuring, ordering and introducing of her material is not, as we’ve seen, Woolf’s strong point).

Behn changed the rules of the game by making a successful living as a woman writer. She could be used as an example by the aspiring women writers of subsequent generations.

All women together ought to let flowers fall upon the tomb of Aphra Behn, which is, most scandalously but rather appropriately, in Westminster Abbey, for it was she who earned them the right to speak their mind.

And so, skipping ahead a bit, by the middle of the eighteenth century there were lots of women authors, churning out bad novels, unreadable poetry and thousands of essays about Shakespeare.

The advent of middle-class women authors

Woolf then alights on another key turning point: at the turn of the nineteenth century, middle class women began to write and she swiftly moves on to consider the Big Four, being: Jane Austen, Charlotte and Emily Bronte, and George Eliot.

Why did they all write novels, when the original motivator for literature was poetry? Because they all lived in the early nineteenth century drawing room, which was a kind of laboratory of character and conversation. Often they had no room of their own (aha) and so actually wrote in the communal living space, in the company of siblings and family and even visitors and guests.

Jane Austen’s perfection

Then she comes back to her theory of the lack of internal, mental, psychological blockage, especially regarding Austen. The anger and bitterness she finds in the 17th century women poets was entirely absent in Jane Austen.

Here was a woman about the year 1800 writing without hate, without bitterness, without fear, without protest, without preaching. That was how Shakespeare wrote, I thought, looking at ‘Antony and Cleopatra’; and when people compare Shakespeare and Jane Austen, they may mean that the minds of both had consumed all impediments; and for that reason we do not know Jane Austen and we do not know Shakespeare, and for that reason Jane Austen pervades every word that she wrote, and so does Shakespeare… Her gift and her circumstances matched each other completely.

Woolf compares Austen with Charlotte Bronte’s character, the governess Jane Eyre, who feels restless and confined and frustrated at wanting to live a larger life, and uses quotes from ‘Jane Eyre’ to indicate the pitiful limitations of these women’s lives.

All those good novels, Villette, Emma, Wuthering Heights, Middlemarch, were written by women without more experience of life than could enter the house of a respectable clergyman; written too in the common sitting-room of that respectable house and by women so poor that they could not afford to buy more than a few quires of paper at a time.

When put like that, it’s an amazing achievement. Woolf contrasts the pitifully restricted domestic experience of George Eliot with the florid adventures in life and love of the young Leo Tolstoy who, as a man, was free to travel widely, join the army, take up any profession. No wonder her (wonderful) novels are so constrained while his encompass the whole world.

Deferring to male values

Woolf makes an interesting point when she says that in so many of these women writers you can feel the subtle or not-so-subtle deferral to male values. Women writers feel they have to justify their subject matter because they are writing about ‘women’s matters’ in a world ruled by patriarchal values and judgements.

It is obvious that the values of women differ very often from the values which have been made by the other sex… yet it is the masculine values that prevail. Speaking crudely, football and sport are ‘important’; the worship of fashion, the buying of clothes ‘trivial’. And these values are inevitably transferred from life to fiction. This is an important book, the critic assumes, because it deals with war. This is an insignificant book because it deals with the feelings of women in a drawing-room. A scene in a battle-field is more important than a scene in a shop — everywhere and much more subtly the difference of value persists.

The whole structure, therefore, of the early nineteenth-century novel was raised, if one was a woman, by a mind which was slightly pulled from the straight, and made to alter its clear vision in deference to external authority. One has only to skim those old forgotten novels and listen to the tone of voice in which they are written to divine that the writer was meeting criticism; she was saying this by way of aggression, or that by way of conciliation. She was admitting that she was ‘only a woman’, or protesting that she was ‘as good as a man’. She met that criticism as her temperament dictated, with docility and diffidence, or with anger and emphasis. It does not matter which it was; she was thinking of something other than the thing itself… She had altered her values in deference to the opinion of others.

Fascinating. A really important insight. All the more impressive the achievement of Jane Austen and Emily Brontë to write as women write, without fear or favour or excusing themselves to men and their male values.

Male and female traditions

Then she devotes a few pages to the idea that male writers have a long tradition of male writers to fall back upon. Not just subjects and treatment but the flow of individual sentences. She quotes a sentence from the early nineteenth century and declares it a man’s sentence, with the weighty rhythms of male concerns. Then says this kind of heavy style was wholly inappropriate for women and what they wanted to say.

Lamb, Browne, Thackeray, Newman, Sterne, Dickens, De Quincey – whoever it may be – never helped a woman yet, though she may have learnt a few tricks of them and adapted them to her use. The weight, the pace, the stride of a man’s mind are too unlike her own for her to lift anything substantial from him successfully

In this respect, Jane Austen perfected sentences for women, ‘devised a perfectly natural, shapely sentence proper for her own use and never departed from it’ which explains why, though she had less genius for writing than Charlotte Brontë, she got infinitely more said.

Shorter books for women?

In the last paragraph of this section she speculates about women’s fiction of the future (much as she speculated about the death gender gap, earlier), and wonders whether women don’t require shorter books than men.

The book has somehow to be adapted to the body, and at a venture one would say that women’s books should be shorter, more concentrated, than those of men, and framed so that they do not need long hours of steady and uninterrupted work. For interruptions there will always be.

Section 5. Mary Carmichael (14 pages)

Mary Carmichael

The most striking feature of Woolf’s day is that women now write as much as men (or nearly) and upon an equally wide range of subject matter. She takes down from her shelf (ostensibly at random, which is her wont) a bang up-to-date novel, Life’s Adventure, or some such title, by Mary Carmichael. (The notes tell me that Mary Carmichael was a pen-name used by the family planning i.e. contraception campaigner, Marie Stopes (1880 to 1958).

At first she considers her style, which is thorny, unlike the flowing Jane Austen. Then the subject matter which she finds interrupted. But then she comes across a sentence which hits her like a hammer, ‘Chloe liked Olivia…’ and this triggers the thoughts which fill the rest of the section. For Woolf reflects how often women, in fiction by both men and women, are defined primarily by contrast with men. The notion that this novel will consider the secret and special tone of friendship between women strikes Woolf as opening a major new epoch in fiction. How much men’s fictions concern deep friendships between men, close bonding going back to classical times (Achilles and Patroclus). How very few are the works which have tackled the subject of friendship between women.

Women’s creativity

Woolf asserts that women have a special type of creativity. Literature has been greatly impoverished for rejecting and ignoring it. As testimony witness the many Great Men who have freely admitted the need of women’s company, the company of wives or close women friends, in order to shed a different perspective on their thoughts and endeavours, to refresh and renew them (she singles out Dr Johnson’s friendship with Hester Thrale).

Women have been trapped indoors by so many societies that interiors, rooms, have a special feminine power undetectable by men.

Departing a little from conventional feminism, maybe, she says it would be a great pity if modern women just started writing like men. It is vital that women maintain their difference.

It would be a thousand pities if women wrote like men, or lived like men, or looked like men, for if two sexes are quite inadequate, considering the vastness and variety of the world, how should we manage with one only? Ought not education to bring out and fortify the differences rather than the similarities? For we have too much likeness as it is…

Women writers like Mary Carmichael should not only record the obscure lives of lower middle class and working women, they also have large scope on reporting on the deficiencies of men. God knows men have been writing libels about women’s imperfections for millennia. Now, with more women writers than ever before, freed to write more candidly than ever before, about the strangeness and peculiarity of men.

The result is bound to be amazingly interesting. Comedy is bound to be enriched. New facts are bound to be discovered.

Woolf concludes, rather patronisingly, that given a room of her own and £500 a year, Mary Carmichael might, in another hundred years, be a decent writer.

Section 6. (17 pages)

Out the window

The pressure drops off. Woolf reverts to her fiction manner. She looks out of the window at busy London and marvels that none of the passersby gave any indication of caring for the plays of Shakespeare or the future of women’s novels. Moments like this make you think very badly of Woolf. She comes across as a simpleton. In the manner of her novels she observes different people doing things and invests them with tremendous significance as if that, just doing that, is the same as writing a story or narrative. When she writes:

The mind is certainly a very mysterious organ, I reflected, drawing my head in from the window, about which nothing whatever is known, though we depend upon it so completely

I felt pity for her shallowness, for her uneducated, unintellectual falling-back on the lamest clichés.

Male and female parts of the mind

She watches a couple meet on the corner of her street and get into a taxi. This leads to a sequence of doodling and pondering in which she wonders whether all of us have a male part and a female part of our minds and that we are at our best when they are integrated and in balance. This echoes Freud’s theory of the fundamental bisexuality of the psyche and Jung’s theories of the ‘anima’ or feminine aspects within a man and the ‘animus’ or masculine aspects within a woman, meaning that every individual contains both masculine and feminine qualities within their unconscious mind, regardless of their gender. Except that both of them were professional psychologists and Woolf is a writer looking out a window and having some random thoughts.

Characteristically, her mind goes to Shakespeare, her go-to author in every situation, who she praises for being genuinely androgynous, containing what she calls the man-womanly and the woman-manly equally.

She makes the rather startling claims that ‘No age can ever have been as stridently sex-conscious as our own’ and blames it on the suffragettes whose sustained campaign against the patriarchy forced millions of men to reflect on their masculinity and rush to defend it.

Masculine writing

She takes down a book written by a contemporary male author and finds it a relief after living with women writers for the past few weeks:

It was delightful to read a man’s writing again. It was so direct, so straightforward after the writing of women. It indicated such freedom of mind, such liberty of person, such confidence in himself. One had a sense of physical well-being in the presence of this well-nourished, well-educated, free mind, which had never been thwarted or opposed, but had had full liberty from birth to stretch itself in whatever way it liked.

But then she slowly realises she doesn’t like something about it. It is the tone of strident self-assertion. He uses ‘I’ at absurd length. The women’s movement has triggered a counter-reaction.

The limitations of modern masculine writing

And she develops this further by considering the writing of Rudyard Kipling and John Galsworthy. The sex awareness she mentioned a moment ago, this means that these modern writers write with just the male part of their minds.

Virility has now become self-conscious—men, that is to say, are now writing only with the male side of their brains. It is a mistake for a woman to read them, for she will inevitably look for something that she will not find.

Shakespeare, Coleridge, they wrote out of a type of mental androgyny: their writings feed both sexes. Modern male writers have become sex-aware and polemically masculine and so their writings leave the female reader cold.

It is not only that they celebrate male virtues, enforce male values and describe the world of men; it is that the emotion with which these books are permeated is to a woman incomprehensible… all their qualities seem to a woman, if one may generalize, crude and immature.

Fascism

In a surprising move – because her works give so little sense of being aware of the wider world, the world outside her privileged flow of sensations and impressions – she suddenly mentions Fascist Italy. In her place and time, October 1928, Fascist Italy is an absurd over-exaggeration of the masculine. It seems like a mad over-reaction to the (relative) modern liberation of women: ‘For one can hardly fail to be impressed in Rome by the sense of unmitigated masculinity.’

A balance

The best writers balance the gender elements in the mind, are man-womanly or woman-manly, approach a state of androgyny.

One must turn back to Shakespeare then, for Shakespeare was androgynous; and so were Keats and Sterne and Cowper and Lamb and Coleridge. Shelley perhaps was sexless. Milton and Ben Jonson had a dash too much of the male in them. So had Wordsworth and Tolstoi. In our time Proust was wholly androgynous, if not perhaps a little too much of a woman.

As you can see, this suffers, like so much older writing about gender, from the kind of essentialism which later feminists like Simone de Beauvoir criticised. Gender essentialism is:

‘the belief that gender is a biological, innate, and unchangeable quality that determines how men and women behave. It’s based on the idea that there are distinct qualities that make men and women different, that women are naturally caring and maternal while men are naturally aggressive and competitive.’

By basing so much of her critique on a very basic belief in masculine and feminine parts of the mind Woolf is, by definition, employing gender stereotypes which more contemporary feminists would (I think) reject.

Coda: addressing criticisms

That’s it. Her presentation is over. She hopes she’s achieved her aim of demonstrating why, in order to write freely, a woman needs an income of £500 a year and a room of her own, preferably one with a lock. She anticipates criticisms:

1. Is she going to appraise the relative merits of male writers and female writers? No. Nothing could be more puerile or pointless.

So long as you write what you wish to write, that is all that matters; and whether it matters for ages or only for hours, nobody can say.

2. Isn’t she being too materialistic with this emphasis on £500 a day? Isn’t the great artist or poet happy to be penniless? No. This also is a puerile delusion. Intellectual achievement depends on financial independence, always has, always ill. Which is also why there have been so few women writers. Because so few women have had the material independence which permitted intellectual achievement.

3. Why this focus on fiction, it sounds hard to write and profoundly unrewarding? This is correct. She advises her audience of young women to write about anything.

I am by no means confining you to fiction. If you would please me—and there are thousands like me—you would write books of travel and adventure, and research and scholarship, and history and biography, and criticism and philosophy and science. By so doing you will certainly profit the art of fiction. For books have a way of influencing each other. Fiction will be much the better for standing cheek by jowl with poetry and philosophy. Moreover, if you consider any great figure of the past, like Sappho, like the Lady Murasaki, like Emily Brontë, you will find that she is an inheritor as well as an originator, and has come into existence because women have come to have the habit of writing naturally; so that even as a prelude to poetry such activity on your part would be invaluable.

All women’s writing, on any topic, supports and enables all other women’s writing. As to the future, be yourselves.

It is much more important to be oneself than anything else.


Thoughts

My main impression from reading Woolf’s long-winded and cumbersome historical entertainment, ‘Orlando’, was the way Woolf completely avoided discussion or even mention of all the political, cultural, economic, social, religious, scientific and technological controversies, discoveries and developments which took place during the 340 or so years which the narrative covers. Instead she fills page after page with her protagonist’s vapourings about love, love and poetry, poetry and truth, poetry and love, truth and love, until you want to bang your head against a brick wall.

On the handful of occasions when she tried to address even subjects close to her own heart, like the literary achievements of the Elizabethan poets (Shakespeare, Marlowe) or the Augustans (Dryden, Pope, Swift) Woolf demonstrated beyond a shadow of a doubt that she had absolutely nothing of any interest to say about any of them. I was, frankly, astonished that this long book, which I’d read so many proud claims about for decades, turned out to be such an intellectual desert. Surely she can do better than this, I thought.

‘A Room of One’s Own’ proves that she could, up to a point. Summaries of the book’s main points don’t really convey the reading experience, which is of being subjected to Woolf’s deliberate whimsy, digression and lack of direction. On one level this book is a long admission of her own intellectual incapacity, epitomise by the ‘scene’ in the British Museum, which reads more like a scene from a novel than any attempt at intellectual research.

It was impossible to make head or tail of it all, I decided, glancing with envy at the reader next door who was making the neatest abstracts, headed often with an A or a B or a C, while my own notebook rioted with the wildest scribble of contradictory jottings. It was distressing, it was bewildering, it was humiliating. Truth had run through my fingers. Every drop had escaped.

So far so strange and clumsy. But once she starts considering the role of the woman writer in history, Woolf suddenly starts making a steady stream of interesting and useful insights. ‘Orlando’ suggested she couldn’t think her way out of a paper bag but this long essay shows that she can… just not in the traditional logical, and maybe ‘male’, style which you might expect.

Then again maybe, just maybe, that is one of her points. She describes Jane Austen as finding the right style for what she wanted to say by simply ignoring the style and weight and rhythms of the male writers who’d come before her. When she says things like that, it’s tempting to think that Woolf was (as usual in her essays) also describing herself – suffering from a lack of education which wasn’t her fault, wounded by the countless rejections and denigrations she had received in her own writing career, battling through to a position where she felt confident sharing her own ideas and perceptions, memories and impressions in her own way, unintimidated by the demands of an aggressively rational, logical patriarchy.

So maybe my negative response to the whimsical indirection of the opening section simply proves that I’m on the opposite team and not sufficiently feminine enough to really grasp the alternative, woman’s way of thinking and perceiving, which Woolf was deliberately and consciously creating. Maybe. As so often with Woolf, you’re left with a kind of teasing ambivalence.

London

As in so many of Woolf’s writings, descriptions of London punctuate the text. As a Londoner, I find descriptions of London endlessly fascinating, for the light they shed on what has changed and what remains the same.

The day, though not actually wet, was dismal, and the streets in the neighbourhood of the Museum were full of open coal-holes, down which sacks were showering; four-wheeled cabs were drawing up and depositing on the pavement corded boxes containing, presumably, the entire wardrobe of some Swiss or Italian family seeking fortune or refuge or some other desirable commodity which is to be found in the boarding-houses of Bloomsbury in the winter. The usual hoarse-voiced men paraded the streets with plants on barrows. Some shouted; others sang. London was like a workshop. London was like a machine.

Windows

Maybe it’s whimsical and inconsequential of me but I can’t help noticing, as I have in the last few Woolf books I’ve read, that her characteristic gesture is to have her characters get up and look out the window. In a book like ‘Jacob’s Room’ this is to escape the sensory overload which comes from engaging with other people. In a more relaxed book like this one, it symbolises dreaminess, pondering, relaxing the mind and letting it drift.

Thus after lunch she sits in the window seat of the college looking into the quad; after dinner she stands at the window and looks out over the domes and towers of Cambridge; the day after visiting the British Museum she looks out the window at the busy streets of London; and then looks out her window on 26 October 1928 and sees the couple get into a taxi.

Daydreaming, pondering, drifting, observing, a woman looking out a window is the stock, standard, emblematic image of Woolf’s work. In fact it becomes such an obvious recurring image that I’ve written a separate blog post about it.

A personal view on the subject

I think it’s unwise to generalise about men or women (or gays or Blacks or any other demographic group). Nowadays, if you blithely stated that ‘All Chinese people are x’, ‘All Black people are y’ or ‘All Muslims are z’, you would get into trouble and might be prosecuted. Anybody writing ‘All women are this’ or ‘All women like that’ or ‘All women do the other’ is likely to get into similar trouble.

My experience, after reading thousands of books, many of them stuffed with misogynist attitudes and sexist tropes, and taking part in endless conversations on the subject, is to back off and leave the whole subject well alone. There is no victory in these kinds of conversations, you can only make yourself look stupid or bigoted. Rarely is the subject discussed dispassionately, with the use of reliable evidence and data; more often people just vent their opinions, prejudices and bigotries on whatever side of the argument they stand. Rarely does the argument end well; more usually all sides dismiss the others as bores, bigots or worse.

Therefore I think we should treat people, and think about people, as individuals, regardless of their ethnicity or gender. I try to take people as they come, assess them as I find them, without prejudging anyone. Some generalisations about groups or concepts is unavoidable in studying and discussing societies and history. But the optimum approach is to restrict yourself to specific, well-defined groups and use only clear and well-defined data. The alternative is the poisonous hatreds into which so much gender-based discourse has now descended, and which I’m trying my best to avoid.


Credit

‘A Room of One’s Own by Virginia Woolf was first published by the Hogarth Press in 1929. Page references are to the 1977 Granada paperback edition, although the text is easily available online.

Related links

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The Longest Journey by E.M. Forster (1907)

He was not an inquisitive boy; but as he leant against the tree he wondered what it was all about, and whether he would ever know.
(E.M. Forster’s milksop protagonist limply pondering in The Longest Journey, page 137)

Forster’s second novel, The Longest Journey, is the diametric opposite of his first, Where Angels Fear To Tread. Angels is short (160 pages), focused, and its main narrative moves at speed. Journey is long (290 pages), slow, digressive and self indulgent. It opens abruptly and a bit confusingly, with a series of scenes depicting Frederick ‘Rickie’ Elliott as an undergraduate at Cambridge, having jokey philosophical debates with his close friends led by the boy they all look up to, Stewart Ansell, before – confusingly – going into a flashback describing Rickie’s earlier life and how he ended up at Cambridge.

Rickie has a deformed foot which gives him a pronounced limp and requires him to wear specially adjusted shoes. As a boy he came to realise that his parents never loved each other; then they both died within 11 days of each other, leaving him an orphan. He inherited a tidy sum of money and was sent to live with a family called the Silts, ‘needy cousins of his father’s’. He had already begun at a public school as a day boy and continued there till he passes his exams to go up to Cambridge and it is here that we catch up with the scenes depicted in the opening pages.

What’s missing from Forster

The first 50 or 60 pages prompted a Big (negative) Thought which dominated the rest of my reading. This that the book contains many, many, many conversations about life and human nature and so on but, placed in a historical context, all these conversations are rendered moot, or even worthless, by their ignorance of everything we, a hundred years later, now know about human nature, science and society…

A few years after the book was published came the Great War which triggered a complete disillusion with the values of previous generations, then the Bolshevik revolution which swept away previous socialist rhetoric and replaced it with a much more militant model of violent revolution and anti-bourgeois terror. There followed the Jazz Age decade of amoral hedonism, short skirts, wild dances and the advent of Fascism in Italy. At the end of the decade, a worldwide economic collapse encouraged the spread of communist belief across the West, which helped the rise to power of the genocidal Nazi movement, all of which led up to the most destructive conflagration in human history. This climaxed with the dropping of the two atom bombs which ushered in the atomic age and generations of fear that the entire human race might be wiped out in a nuclear holocaust. Alongside this, in the post-war years, went the decolonisation which ended the European empires and led to the rise of what we call the Third World, often characterised by ruinous civil wars and/or famines, which recur across Africa to this day. From the 1960s onwards women’s liberation, gay rights and so on have transformed our attitudes to sex, sexuality and gender identity.

By the time I came along, as a schoolboy in the 1970s, all this history was the basic, entry-level materials of serious discussion. As earnest 6th formers our debates about politics or the meaning of life weren’t based on the ancient Greeks or the Renaissance but were informed by the horrors of twentieth century history. Entry-level debate was aware that any line of thought about, say, trying to improve society by scientific means, risked raising eugenics and the Nazis; arguments about trying to enforce a fairer society sooner or later invoked the dire example of Stalin and the gulags; anyone promoting belief in could easily be refuted by the atom bomb, and so on.

Debate about the big issues was both a) informed by the extreme political, social and scientific experiments of the 20th century and b) hemmed in by the way so many of these experiments had ended in utter disaster.

My point is that Forster and his characters know none of this. Everything which makes up the backdrop, the atmosphere, of serious modern debate on almost every issue (politics,economics, socialism, imperialism, feminism, the environment, multicultural society, science and technology, art and aesthetics, you name it) hadn’t happened yet, was invisible, didn’t exist. Although Edwardian people were as clever, canny, passionate, loving, cruel etc as you or me, they lived and thought and acted in a world Before The Fall.

This explains several things about Forster’s novels and our feeling about the Edwardian period as a whole. The obvious one is an idealised nostalgia for a much simpler, more innocent world. This explains the popularity of the Merchant Ivory dramatisations of his novels, especially ‘A Room With A View’, and the tremendous popularity of ‘Downton Abbey’ on the telly.

But the reason I’ve described all this is that, for me, the vast absence of knowledge drums home the boring triteness of the characters’ supposedly ‘serious’ conversations.

Forster’s novels regularly pause while the characters discuss the nature of Truth or Beauty or Love, ‘the Spirit of Truth’, ‘real Life’ and so on, in an embarrassingly callow, undergraduate way – but to our jaded modern eye i.e. to anyone born After the Fall, after the calamitous twentieth century, these conversations, recorded in loving detail and clearly intended to indicate important differences between characters’ beliefs and attitudes, come across as vapid, naive and irrelevant. Basically, who can care for these characters when they’re all so dim and ignorant of everything the 20th century revealed to us about human nature?

This is particularly problematic in ‘The Longest Journey’ because it is a Bildungsroman, the German term for ‘a novel dealing with one person’s formative years or spiritual education’. It is the story of the development of a mind and personality (Rickie’s) – but before most of the issues which form modern minds and personalities even existed.

To take the subject of Art which the characters waste lots of breath talking about, Forster’s novels were written before Modern Art existed or, more precisely, had become known in Britain. The full force of Symbolism across northern Europe, Cubism and the Fauves in France, the Expressionists in Germany, the first stirrings of Futurism in Italy and Vorticism in England – all these are completely absent from Forster’s texts and endless conversations about Art. His and his characters’ notions of Beauty with a capital B are almost unbearably simple-minded. They are late-Victorian, bourgeois clichés about Masterpieces of the Renaissance and the most stiflingly conventional of British salon art.

Mr. Elliot [Rickie’s father] had not one scrap of genius. He gathered the pictures and the books and the flower-supports mechanically, not in any impulse of love. He passed for a cultured man because he knew how to select, and he passed for an unconventional man because he did not select quite like other people. In reality he never did or said or thought one single thing that had the slightest beauty or value.

These people’s one aesthetic idea is that ITALY is the venerated location of Life and Beauty and, above all, the treasures of Renaissance Art, which anyone who aspires to be anyone has to know and remember, down to the finest detail of the obscurest painting in the remotest Tuscan chapel.

These axioms explain how the characters can talk the most almighty guff about the same three subjects (Beauty, Art, Italy) over and over again, in complete ignorance of the worlds of art and philosophy and politics (and communism and existentialism, feminism and environmentalism) which were to colour modern, 20th century, conversations. What I’m trying to explain is the oppressive feeling of painfully limited horizons, petty provincial opinions, naivety and simple-mindedness, which hamper and limit every conversation, character and the overall the narration.

The worship of the Renaissance is tied up with the way Rickie and his friends’ intellectual life is cabined and confined by The Classics. Top subject at the school Rickie joins is Classics. The teachers dream of editing Sophocles. In the British Museum Ansell and Widdrington marvel at how immature they are against a background of Grecian friezes. Ansell, trapped in the Classics perspective, compares everyone and everything to Greek personages and philosophy. So does Rickie, who comments on one of his fellow teachers, Mr Jackson, that:

‘He cheers one up. He does believe in poetry. Smart, sentimental books do seem absolutely absurd to him, and gods and fairies far nearer to reality. He tries to express all modern life in the terms of Greek mythology, because the Greeks looked very straight at things, and Demeter or Aphrodite are thinner veils than ‘The survival of the fittest’, or ‘A marriage has been arranged,’ and other draperies of modern journalese.’

A lot later, commenting on Stephen’s fondness for getting drunk, the narrator says:

Drink, today, is an unlovely thing. Between us and the heights of Cithaeron the river of sin now flows. Yet the cries still call from the mountain, and granted a man has responded to them, it is better he respond with the candour of the Greek. (p.266)

The very same Classics and ancient world which forms the foundation and perspective of almost all these characters’ thought and which they consider an escape from the brutality of British commercial culture, to the modern mind seems more like an incredibly constricted prison-house they can’t escape.

Forster is a subtle, intricate writer but he is writing about a tiny world, a small pond of terribly nice chaps, their paramours and maiden aunts, all displaying exquisite feelings about trivia. Seven years after the book was published they would all be marched off to the meadows of Flanders and blown to pieces in their millions, exposing their naive vapourings about Art or Beauty for the childish posturing it was, for its pitiful inadequacy to the catastrophic possibilities of life.

The Wikipedia article about ‘The Longest Journey’ quotes the critic Gilbert Adair saying that the greatest weaknesses for readers is the book’s ‘unrelenting intellectuality’, which struck me as hilariously wrong. The greatest drawback for readers is the book’s unrelenting dimness. It may often be emotionally subtle, but it is intellectually bereft. And this is important, in fact it’s vital, because the book sets out to be a description of the intellectual journey of the central character.

The plot

The book is divided into three sections which have symbolic meanings associated with the three key locations in Rickie’s life:

He was extremely sensitive to the inside of a house, holding it an organism that expressed the thoughts, conscious and subconscious, of its inmates. He was equally sensitive to places. He would compare Cambridge with Sawston, and either with a third type of existence, to which, for want of a better name, he gave the name of ‘Wiltshire’.

1. Cambridge obviously symbolises Rickie’s callow student days, more generally the life of the mind, intellect etc, and his revered friend Ansell.

2. Sawston becomes associated with his career as a teacher, work, his adult life with Agnes, supervised by her father, Mr Pembroke.

3. Wiltshire stands apart as symbolising the pagan countryside, Rickie’s malicious aunt and his stupid, virile half-brother Stephen.

Part 1. Cambridge

Frederick ‘Rickie’ Elliot has inherited his father and grandfather’s deformed foot, which makes him walk with a limp. His father is quite heartless to him, nicknaming him ‘Rickie’ as short for ricketty. His parents are well-off enough to send him to public school as a day boy. When he’s 15 his father dies and shortly afterwards so does his mother so he is passed to the care of cousins. His only friends from boyhood is the Pembroke family.

Rickie goes up to Cambridge where he makes like-minded friends (Ansell, Widdrington, Tilliard). Handily the Pembroke family son, Herbert, is there and is involved in some scenes. His little band are intellectuals or at least self-consciously aware that they are not sporty types, what later generations would call Jocks or hearties. Rickie is in awe of / worships Ansell, a philosophy student who his little group all think is the real thing although, as always with books like this, there is absolutely no evidence whatsoever of his philosophical abilities.

In the vacation Rickie goes to stay with the Pembroke family where he observes young Miss Pembroke, Agnes, engaged to a hearty a year or so older than him, Gerald Dawes. Something really weird happens to the narration whereby the narrator describes the couple in visionary terms almost as Greek gods, writing paragraphs of purple prose about how the sight of them inspires him to lyrical paeans.

This is all the odder because, once the narration comes back down to earth, it turns out that Gerald was at school with Rickie and sadistically and systematically bullied him. I found it impossible to understand how Rickie the character combines terrorised memories of Gerald with such overblown idealisation of the couple. Maybe it’s meant to indicate how young and callow he is, but it just comes over as weird.

Anyway, shortly afterwards Gerald dies (in a football match, the details are left vague and completely unconvincing). To nobody’s surprise this clears the way for Rickie’s lyrical feelings to spill over into Miss Pembroke and a few short years later he is introducing her to his Cambridge friends as his fiancée.

The minute-by-minute subtleties of interaction between Rickie and his friends, the descriptions of his parents and their tense household, the strange descriptions of Gerald and Miss Pembroke (Agnes), his debates about Love and Art with his best friend Ansell, his visit back to the old school, all the other little interactions with his relatives or friends at uni or his bedder or Miss Pembroke’s chaperone (Mrs Lewin) – I register all the micro-discriminations embedded in the text but just didn’t care. His depiction of Cambridge stinks of the kind of incestuous pretentiousness where everyone talks about each other having a ‘first rate mind’, being a genius, being fearfully bright etc. The Bloomsbury style of navel-gazing much of which, to us, sounds like children.

Rickie: ‘Doing right is simply doing right.’
Agnes: ‘I think that all you say is wonderfully clever.’ (p.143)

Anyway, his best friend Ansell takes against Agnes and thinks they are badly mismatched. He thinks ‘she is happy because she has conquered; he is happy because he has at last hung all the world’s beauty on to a single peg’ but, in Ansell’s view, they are both deluded.

So: sensitive young man goes to Cambridge, falls in love with schoolfriend’s fiancée, his best friend disapproves, he hopes to become a writer but his ambitions are disappointed yadda yadda.

Mrs Failing in Wiltshire

The happy couple go to visit his closest living relative, his aunt, his father’s sister, Mrs Emily Failing who lives in a grand grey house, Cadover, with a farm in flat Wiltshire (‘From the distance it showed as a grey box, huddled against evergreens’).

Aunt Emily is a distracting character, a widow deliberately taunting her staff and in particular a beefy young man Agnes’ and Rickie’s age who’s staying with her, named Stephen Wonham, who is remarkably stupid and earthy. She has a gift for making everyone uncomfortable. She makes Rickie go for a horse ride he doesn’t want to and then is tiresome and contrary with Agnes who she takes on a walk to her arbour. She nastily insists on calling Stephen a ‘hero’ for belittling and mocking Rickie.

Anyway, one day on a walk out to a barrow near her land Miss Failing deliberately shocks and upsets Rickie by telling him the family secret that Stephen is his half-brother. Rickie is so shocked he faints. When he tells Agnes she is repelled but cross at Miss Failing. She confronts her and the latter admits she did it partly to shock Rickie. She reassures Agnes that she hasn’t told Stephen himself. They fob the poor dolt (Stephen) off, in a bizarre way, by giving him a few sovereigns and telling him to go for a walk down to the sea (a journey which will take several days) and off he lumbers into the night.

If I may hazard an interpretation, the two brothers symbolise opposites, like Cain and Abel. Where Rickie is effete, over-intellectual callowness, Stephen is under-brained and earthy. Spirit versus matter. Soul versus body, etc etc.

Oddly, with the odd change of perspective and unexpected events which you wouldn’t have expected, the narrator very casually tells us that Rickie found this news so traumatic that he took to his bed for a year. During this period he tried to get his eight or nine little short stories published. When we are told they are tales of paganism in England and he has titled the volume ‘Pan Pipes’ we realise this is very close to Forster’s own short stories which are unexpectedly strange and visionary tales of paganism in England.

(Agnes is justifiably sceptical about Rickie’s chances as a writer: ‘she had always mistrusted the little stories, and now people who knew agreed with her. How could Rickie, or any one, make a living by pretending that Greek gods were alive, or that young ladies could vanish into trees?’ p.156.)

Rickie goes to see the editor of Holborn magazine who is supportive but unfortunately can’t publish any of his stories, saying they are good in parts but need to be good throughout (p.149). He meets Agnes in a London restaurant:

‘Can’t you try something longer, Rickie?’ she said; ‘I believe we’re on the wrong track. Try an out-and-out love story.’
‘My notion just now,’ he replied, ‘is to leave the passions on the fringe. She nodded, and tapped for the waiter: they had met in a London restaurant. ‘I can’t soar; I can only indicate…’

Is that a self portrait, Forster’s deprecating view of his own fiction? Or, more probably, a view he once and sometimes held, attributed to this ambitious but ineffectual young character? If so it’s ironic that so much of this novel is strange and visionary – in other words, does soar.

Anyway, the (unnamed) editor suggests that Rickie try to see a little more of Life. All very well but as he takes a cab through the London streets, Rickie wonders where you find this Life.

As he rumbled westward, his face was drawn, and his eyes moved quickly to the right and left, as if he would discover something in the squalid fashionable streets some bird on the wing, some radiant archway, the face of some god beneath a beaver hat. He loved, he was loved, he had seen death and other things; but the heart of all things was hidden. There was a password and he could not learn it, nor could the kind editor of the Holborn teach him. He sighed, and then sighed more piteously.

Alack-a-day.

2. Sawston

Part two describes how Agnes’s weak-willed schoolmaster father, Mr Pembroke, in need of help, suggests to his daughter Agnes that she and Rickie get married, come and live and work at the school. (There is a comic digression when Mr Pembroke proposes to his kindly old friend Miss Orr, who has the good sense to turn him down.) Agnes thinks it’s a great idea and sets about persuading him, using the argument that there’ll be long holidays to write in, and it’s an altruistic profession with lots of opportunities to do good. Which triggers a typically naive effusion from Rickie:

To do good! For what other reason are we here? Let us give up our refined sensations, and our comforts, and our art, if thereby we can make other people happier and better. The woman he loved had urged him to do good! With a vehemence that surprised her, he exclaimed, ‘I’ll do it.’ (p.156)

So Rickie and Agnes move into the free accommodation arranged by her father and he is paid to become a trainee teacher, learning about the gown, the timetable, how to manage the boys, the other members of staff. He is supervised and supported by Agnes’ brother, Herbert, who had been with him at Cambridge and has gone on to follow his father into teaching. Slyly, Forster shows us how Rickie finds himself being manipulated and used in the tiny but fiercely fought micro politics of the staff room, specifically by Herbert whose drawbacks Rickie slowly comes to realise.

Rickie and Agnes get married

They all get married, don’t they, the young characters in novels by Forster, H.G. Wells and Arnold Bennett? In one sense it’s all they can do with their lives, it’s the only interest in them as characters. Rickie’s marriage to Agnes is treated as an anti-climax. The ceremony isn’t described, instead the way they settle into their new roles as man and wife both living at Sawston school. Agnes dislikes emotion and turmoil and quite quickly Rickie gets used to not discussing his deeper feelings.

Remember the rather ludicrous vision Rickie had of Agnes and Gerald as Greek gods when he saw them embracing? Now that turns out to be playing a sort of structural role for Rickie, because it turns out he is destined never again to see Agnes with the same intensity.

In such a bustle, what spiritual union could take place? Surely the dust would settle soon: in Italy, at Easter, he might perceive the infinities of love. But love had shown him its infinities already. Neither by marriage nor by any other device can men insure themselves a vision; and Rickie’s had been granted him three years before, when he had seen his wife and a dead man clasped in each other’s arms. She was never to be so real to him again. (p.171)

They settle into a frank good fellowship.

Ansell and Widdrington

Ansell is in the British Museum studying for his second dissertation. Tellingly, his first one failed. I think the novel is dramatising the discovery that real life turns out not to be the glamorous cakewalk we think it’ll be when we’re carefree students.

Widdrington is a mutual friend of his and Rickie’s. He went to see the newly married couple at Sawston and discovered two things: 1) he doesn’t like Agnes, who he finds stony and abrupt, no soul; and 2) Rickie is unhappy. This is due to something which the narrator told us about earlier and I didn’t really understand, but which this character Widdrington explains with admirable clarity. It is that the school where Rickie’s teaching was established as a private school for day boys from the locality. However the more ambitious head master and teachers want to expand the number of boarders because 1) more money 2) posher, like a proper public school. But this will reduce the places available for day boys and so there is quite a fierce debate going on between two factions of the staff but also with angry parents of day boys who feel their being bilked. Ansell says he couldn’t care less. He and Rickie now have nothing in common and describes Agnes as ‘that ghastly woman’.

Back at school

Back at Sawston School Rickie has realised he is not cut out to be a teacher, that Agnes doesn’t respect him and he was ceasing to love her. The boys despise Rickie and hate Agnes’s strictness. Oh dear, we’re on page 186 of 288. Will he find another love or will he soldier on becoming more lonely and sad? In one sense it’s a portrait of the many men who were relieved by the outbreak of the First World War because it liberated them from lives of quiet despair.

The daughter

Agnes gets pregnant and in due course goes into labour. As was the custom Rickie wasn’t even told, just a tap at the door of the prep class he’s taking and Herbert takes him into the corridor to deliver the news. He has a daughter but she is lame, much lamer than him, will only walk with crutches. Everyone is very nice but Rickie is stricken. After just a week the poor mite dies.

Varden

Another bad thing happens. The weakest member of the house he’s in charge of, Varden, is set upon by virtually the entire class one night after school, pushing him down onto the floor, rubbing his nose in the dirt and yanking his ears. Herbert hears and breaks it up but Varden is injured and has to have an operation before being taken out of the school by his parents. Herbert can’t understand how his young men could be so beastly but the narrator has an explanation:

What had come over his boys? Were they not gentlemen’s sons? He would not admit that if you herd together human beings before they can understand each other the great god Pan is angry, and will in the end evade your regulations and drive them mad.

Forster genuinely seems to believe in his rather limp-wristed form of paganism. In the complete absence of Freud, Jung and modern psychology, this kind of literature-based – and Classical literature-based – theory of human nature appears to be all Forster had.

Agnes has gotten over the dead daughter (‘She had got over the tragedy: she got over everything.’) She tells Rickie he needs to make up the argument he had with Aunt Emily. In a flash he perceives it’s because Agnes is after Aunt Emily’s money and they have a big quarrel, their first big fight. Agnes despises him for thinking in poetic terms; he is desperately disappointed she is so mundane and mercenary. He is learning wisdom = the disillusionments of life.

He perceived more clearly the cruelty of Nature, to whom our refinement and piety are but as bubbles, hurrying downwards on the turbid waters. They break, and the stream continues.

In a strange and wildly improbable development it turns out that this wretched bullied boy Varden had been sending letters to a variety of people, public and private, asking for their help and prayers, many of whom had charitably replied. What’s improbable is that the boy had somehow managed to write to Stephen, Rickie’s half-brother, who had written a semi-illiterate reply. This is a wild improbability but it is here so that Rickie can be plunged into a crisis about his life, filled with anger and despair that his half-brother, in his sturdy peasant illiteracy, is the one who will survive and flourish.

Forster’s narrators are surprisingly intrusive, explaining, judging, leaping gaps in the narrative and generally showing us round. Just such a passage ends a horrible sleepless night of dreams and nightmares when the narrator baldly tells us:

Henceforward he deteriorates. Let those who censure him suggest what he should do. He has lost the work that he loved, his friends, and his child. He remained conscientious and decent, but the spiritual part of him proceeded towards ruin. (p.197)

In a department store in London the pair bump into Maud Ansell, Stewart’s sister. She informs them that Stewart failed his dissertation a second time. Now he will never be a don, never have a Cambridge career, everything they scrimped and saved for has been wasted. Agnes is patronising to her; Maud gets angry.

A digression in which Forster, to be fair, tells us Agnes has her own tragedy. She realises her marriage has failed but refuses to be sentimental about it. She wishes her husband was taller, richer, more domineering. Ho hum. Life goes on.

But this is prelude to a big family fight. At dinner with Agnes and Herbert when the post arrives. First a small surprise, that Mr Jackson, a teacher in the rival ‘progressive’ faction has invited them to dinner. This is because, slightly incomprehensibly, Jackson is playing host to Stuart Ansell who has invited himself down to the school but not wanting to stay with Rickie, who he has been so long estranged from.

But another letter is from Aunt Emily and it’s this that triggers the bitter argument. Rickie knows that Agnes has been to visit Aunt Emily several times. Now a letter comes with the upshot of these visits which is that Emily is dismissing Stephen from staying with her and sending him off to a colony to make his own way. Rickie is outraged to learn that Agnes has been using his name to blacken Stephen in his aunt’s eyes and lets slip the secret fact that his father ‘strayed’ i.e. Stephen is his half-brother.

Rickie’s anger against his wife not surprisingly makes Herbert rise to the defence of his sister but also because Herbert doesn’t like disorder and wants to calm any argument. He backs up her accusation that the Elliots are an odd family, that Aunt Emily has behave badly, that Stephen is a monster best out of the country etc. Rickie could weep with frustration at not being able to make him see what Agnes has done wrong and how manipulative she’s being. For a moment brother and sister are very close in their wrong-headedness. Then the narrator goes on to editorialise.

There are moments for all of us when we seem obliged to speak in a new unprofitable tongue. One might fancy a seraph, vexed with our normal language, who touches the pious to blasphemy, the blasphemous to piety. The seraph passes, and we proceed unaltered. (p.210)

Whether you like this kind of rhetoric and diction will determine whether you like this book. I understand its delicate poetic intent. I understand it is a metaphor. But in the difficult lives we are faced with I find it neither really insightful nor a practical help.

Ansell visits

I haven’t mentioned that Aunt Emily’s deceased husband, Anthony Failing (‘He loved poetry and music and pictures, and everything tempted him to live in a kind of cultured paradise, with the door shut upon squalor’), left a volume of essays (titled ‘What We Want’) to which she wrote a little introduction and which has now been published. Ansell, the failed philosopher is reading and annotating it in the garden of Sawton School.

The passage he’s reading is on the difference between coarseness and vulgarity (coarseness, revealing something; vulgarity, concealing something). This is an example of the useless, superficial diddling which passes for ‘thought’ among these people. It’s more a question of manners and etiquette than any kind of serious structural analysis. No wonder England was considered the unintellectual country all across the Continent.

Anyway Ansell is quietly seething because at dinner the night before, old Mr Pembroke and his daughter, Agnes, had both commiserated in a way which made it clear they consider him a failure. His reflections are interrupted when someone throws a clod of earth at his back and he gets into a ridiculous fight with Stephen Wonham although it takes him a moment, and the narrator quite a long time, to confirm his identity. When you’re a hammer, everything looks like a nail. Ansell is oversoaked in late-Victorian fetish for all things ancient Greek and so is struck that Stephen is like…an ancient Greek.

He gave the idea of an animal with just enough soul to contemplate its own bliss. United with refinement, such a type was common in Greece. It is not common today (p.216)

Because this is such an obvious thought the narrator tries to dress it up in fancy syntax.

Was it only a pose to like this man, or was he really wonderful? He was not romantic, for Romance is a figure with outstretched hands, yearning for the unattainable. Certain figures of the Greeks, to whom we continually return, suggested him a little. (p.217)

Anyway Stephen tells the story of how Aunt Emily, backed up by the old retainers, kicked him out, giving him £100 and throwing a packet at him which contained the documents proving he is Rickie’s half-brother. He’s been travelling rough across country to the school to tell Rickie (not realising that Rickie already knows). At this point, the maid comes to call Stephen into the house for an interview with Mrs Elliot (not Rickie). Ansell fantasises that the menfolk will have gone up to dress for dinner not realising what a bombshell was bursting downstairs and, characteristically, sees it through the prism of ancient Greek drama.

The irony of the situation appealed to him strongly. It reminded him of the Greek Drama, where the actors know so little and the spectators so much. (p.221)

Part one of the denouement is Stephen and Mrs Elliot (Agnes). She invites him in for an interview and immediately gets down to business offering him £2 if he will sign a contract swearing to keep silent forever about being Rickie’s brother. it takes him some minutes to understand what is going on which Agnes takes for playing hard to get. Once he understands he stands up, outraged or disgusted, and simply walks out.

Part two of the denouement comes when Agnes, Rickie and Herbert call Ansell to come into the hall because it is now dinner time. The hall is full of their boys and servants bringing in the meal. It is in front of all these that Ansell deliberately humiliates Rickie by telling him he has a brother he doesn’t know about, and that his wife has hidden from him. Much gasping among the boys, and some prefects stand as if to make a physical defence but Ansell ploughs on to accuse Rickie of being the one who’s passed on accusations about Stephen and so caused his brother to be turned out of his home and sent to be a tramp. It’s hard to imagine a more ruinous accusation and in front of Rickie’s entire House.

But Rickie compounds the situation by admitting he had a philanderer for a father and a dark horse for a brother. In front of all the boys. Who will go home and tell their parents. Who will threaten to withdraw their boys from the school. But it’s then that Ansell drops the real bombshell which none of us expected: Stephen is not the son of his philandering father but of his unfaithful mother! Rickie faints and has to be carried from the hall. Pandemonium. The gossip is broadcast throughout the school within the hour.

Part 2 ends with a page of Forster editorialising which I will include in its entirety as a chunk of his style and thought. I understood all the words and read it twice but still don’t know what it means.

The soul has her own currency. She mints her spiritual coinage and stamps it with the image of some beloved face. With it she pays her debts, with it she reckons, saying, ‘This man has worth, this man is worthless.’ And in time she forgets its origin; it seems to her to be a thing unalterable, divine. But the soul can also have her bankruptcies.

Perhaps she will be the richer in the end. In her agony she learns to reckon clearly. Fair as the coin may have been, it was not accurate; and though she knew it not, there were treasures that it could not buy. The face, however beloved, was mortal, and as liable as the soul herself to err. We do but shift responsibility by making a standard of the dead.

There is, indeed, another coinage that bears on it not man’s image but God’s. It is incorruptible, and the soul may trust it safely; it will serve her beyond the stars. But it cannot give us friends, or the embrace of a lover, or the touch of children, for with our fellow mortals it has no concern. It cannot even give the joys we call trivial – fine weather, the pleasures of meat and drink, bathing and the hot sand afterwards, running, dreamless sleep. Have we learnt the true discipline of a bankruptcy if we turn to such coinage as this? Will it really profit us so much if we save our souls and lose the whole world?

If we start from the position that there is no soul and no God then surely these 250 words are literally meaningless. They may have value as a metaphor but like so many of Forster’s metaphors are such hard work for so little reward that it’s not worth the effort.

I liked the Great Scene of Ansell denouncing his old friend because it was dramatic, and the entire storyline of the disreputable relative carries the whiff of Victorian melodrama at its most garish. Think of Pip discovering the truth about Magwitch in Great Expectations. But the comparison also highlights Forster’s limp-wristed diffuseness. He has regular moments of great perspicuity and imagines his characters in great detail – but at the same time he drowns them in half-hearted treacle about The Greek Spirit and the Great God Pan and the currency of the soul.

Part 3. Wiltshire

I was expecting Rickie to quit being a schoolmaster, maybe separate from Agnes, and retire injured to Aunt Emily’s estate where, maybe, he finds his true self amid the pagan countryside… Maybe someone has to die or commit suicide to give it the real oomph that a serious novel of his time aspired to…

But the book commences a new part because it denotes a change not only of scenery but of time. It took me a few pages to realise what was going on, but the entire narrative ups sticks and flashes back twenty years or more, to an account of How Mrs Elliot, Rickie’s Mother, Ran Off With a Farmer i.e. how Stephen the half-brother was conceived.

Basically a farmer named Robert fell hopelessly in love with Mrs Elliot on first meeting her at Tony and Emily Failing’s house when Mr and Mrs Elliott are visiting. Tony Failing gets wind of it and escorts him off the premises but not too sharply since he is the author of those whimsical essays about vulgarity and whatnot and so tolerates Robert’s visits on condition they are squeaky clean. Typically, Tony’s confused moral position is expressed in classical metaphor:

For he remembered that sensual and spiritual are not easy words to use; that there are, perhaps, not two Aphrodites, but one Aphrodite with a Janus face. (p.233)

And so Robert nurses his love but remains outwardly clean, polite and civil for six long years until one day he calls and finds Mrs Elliot alone and, in his blunt country way, declares his love for her. She tells him to leave this instant but Mr Elliot returns at this point and is much more civil and suave. This turns out to be a mistake because it breaches the emotional defences against Robert which Mrs Elliot was just about holding together and next thing you know… they have run off to Stockholm!

Tony and Emily Failing get a letter from her from Stockholm, debate what to do, then set off to Stockholm to confront her. However, by the time they arrive, Robert has drowned. A landsman, he had never swum in the sea before and didn’t know about tides, got carried away and drowned. (You can’t help feeling Forster has a very casual way with his characters’ lives.) So the lover is conveniently out of the way but not before impregnating Mrs Elliot. The Mrs and Mrs Elliot manage to reconcile but Mrs Elliot remains abroad in order to conceal her pregnancy and giving birth: she returns to England with him, giving out that he is the baby of a family friend. Everything about her elopement and having another man’s baby is covered up.

She comes to dislike her forgiving husband but, strangely, to love both her boys. Love for Stephen, who’s the spitting image of his father, rough and strong and blunt, makes her love Rickie the more. When Mr Elliot dies in middle age, his wife looks forward to the autumn of her years raising her two boys but fate had other plans and she herself dies shortly afterwards.

So there’s the backstory – how Rickie has a half-brother of a completely different characters – all neatly explained. The next chapter describes the growth of young Stephen. Actually it jumps straight to his young manhood when he wanders like a pagan god among the rolling farmland of Wiltshire. The deaths in quick succession of Mr Failing who was looking after him, Mr Elliot and then Mrs Elliot who was always kind to him (because she was, unknown to him, his mother) means none of them had had time to make a will or leave him any money. Instead he falls into the care of Mrs Failing, Aunt Emily, who maliciously thinks it will be comical to keep the two boys apart and in ignorance of their true relationship.

Jump back to the present and the scene we left, with Stephen blundering out of Sawston school. Ansell goes running round looking for Stephen but the latter has hidden under a railway archway. He heads into London and gets a job for a few weeks with a removal company. He holds a horse for a man who overtips him. He sends some of the money to Cadover to pay for the windows he smashed after being kicked out by Mrs Failing. Then, unable to stay away, he gets blind drunk and makes his way back to Sawston where he announces his presence by throwing a brick through a window and breaking down the front door, waking up Rickie, Herbert and Ansell.

So. There are 40 pages of the novel left and we are in a pickle. What can possibly happen next? What happens is next day Stephen is full of contrition while Rickie, Herbert and Agnes have to go about their days’ duties. Once Stephen’s woken up from his hangover sleep, Rickie has an interview with him which goes wrong because Stephen is pagan simplicity and refuses to fit into Rickie’s bourgeois preconceptions and concerns.

Above all, Stephen realises that Rickie’s wish to have him (Stephen) stay at Sawston isn’t based on a true understanding of his personality, but because Stephen reminds him of his mother who he has never stopped loving. Stephen rejects all this sentimental tripe and tears up the photo of their mother which Rickie hands him, steps outside into the fog and then… asks Rickie to come with him! It is a key decision point. Rickie looks back at the house containing Herbert, an average scheming teacher who sides against him, and his wife who despises him and… what the hell! goes running off into the fog with Stephen.

Rickie set free

I was hoping the two half-brothers would roam like swaggering vagabonds across the south of England but this is a Forster novel, timid and fearful like its author. So Rickie and Steven end up going to stay with the Ansells in some village. Agnes quickly learns that Rickie’s gone there, she and Herbert try to persuade him to come home but he isn’t interested.

There’s some chaff about this but the last big action of the novel comes when Aunt Emily invites Rickie to visit her at Cadover. Again. So off he sets. Just for a lark, Stephen at the last minute jumps into the train in order to come with him, despite all Rickie’s protestations. He’s grown to like his straightforward, undeceitful brother, even if they all disapprove of his new penchant for heavy drinking.

There follows a surprisingly prolonged description of Rickie’s railway journey towards Salisbury. During it Rickie extracts a promise from Stephen that he’ll remain sober for the duration of their two or three-day stay. Then he gets a pony and trap out to Mrs Failings’ house. Rickie forbids Stephen from accompanying him so Stephen instead goes to the local pub, The Antelope.

The title phrase and homosexuality

The phrase ‘the longest journey’ comes from Percy Bysshe Shelley’s poem Epipsychidion. Rickie reads this section of the poem aloud when he’s in Wiltshire.

I never was attached to that great sect
Whose doctrine is, that each one should select
Out of the crowd a mistress or a friend,
And all the rest, though fair and wise, commend
To cold oblivion, though it is in the code
Of modern morals, and the beaten road
Which those poor souls with weary footsteps tread,
Who travel to their home among the dead
By the broad highway of the world, and so
With one chained friend, perhaps a jealous foe,
The dreariest and longest journey go.

I’m not completely certain what it means or what its relevance is to the narrative. Does it imply that Rickie is one of ‘those poor souls’ who condemns himself to travelling the ‘longest journey’ (of life?) ‘with one chained friend, perhaps a jealous foe’? In which case, who precisely is this chained friend and jealous foe? Is it Stephen, the half-brother who haunts his respectable life? Or his heartless wife, Agnes?

The phrase is repeated again, right at the end of the book, when Stephen has come along with Rickie on his visit to Aunt Emily. Before Rickie goes on to visit the aunt the pair play like schoolboys in a stream, lighting paper lanterns which float down the stream, rather beautifully. Rickie is caught wondering what his life has been about.

Romantic love is greater than this. There are men and women — we know it from history — who have been born into the world for each other, and for no one else, who have accomplished the longest journey locked in each other’s arms. But romantic love is also the code of modern morals, and, for this reason, popular. Eternal union, eternal ownership—these are tempting baits for the average man. He swallows them, will not confess his mistake, and — perhaps to cover it — cries ‘dirty cynic’ at such a man as Stephen. (p.271)

Again, I didn’t really follow this. As Rickie follows Stephen’s instructions for making the lanterns, he feels transformed.

Rickie obeyed, though intent on the transfigured face. He believed that a new spirit dwelt there, expelling the crudities of youth. He saw steadier eyes, and the sign of manhood set like a bar of gold upon steadier lips. Some faces are knit by beauty, or by intellect, or by a great passion: had Stephen’s waited for the touch of the years?

Is this gay? The scene is set at dusk in a country stream and the mood is of tremendous acceptance and affection between the brothers. It’s a lyrical scene and all the better for not being saddled with one of Forster’s heavy classical references, just being itself.

But is the obscurity of phrasing because Forster feels in his heart a gay or queer connection between them? He’s feeling the love that dare not speak its name and so is censoring himself and so it comes out in this cryptic mode?

Dinner and the pub

Rickie goes on to have dinner with Aunt Emily. She advises him to go back to Agnes but he seems to have made his mind up to devote his life to literature. Some friends have encouraged him to write and also advise him to go to Italy (as Forster himself did). Anyway, he’s not going back to Agnes.

And in a far bigger ‘anyway’, he is now obsessed with Stephen. He replays the scene at dusk in the stream during dinner and, afterwards, asks Aunt Emily’s youngish manservant, Leighton, if he wants to accompany him to the village to find Stephen. When they get to the pub where Stephen’s staying, Rickie asks Leighton to go in, to ask if Stephen wants to come for a walk (Rickie is scared of going into a pub. That’s what a ‘milksop’ he is). Meanwhile Rickie’s feelings about Stephen are blossoming.

Stephen was a hero. He was a law to himself, and rightly. He was great enough to despise our small moralities. He was attaining love. This evening Rickie caught Ansell’s enthusiasm, and felt it worth while to sacrifice everything for such a man. (p.278)

But Leighton discovers that Stephen’s been drinking, in fact he’s so drunk he can’t stand. Rickie is outraged that Stephen has broken his promise but then directs his disillusionment against himself. He was foolish to trust him, to believe in people i.e. a typically immature over-reaction.

The brutal shock ending

It’s worth portraying Rickie’s state of mind just before he dies.

He leant against the parapet and prayed passionately, for he knew that the conventions would claim him soon. God was beyond them, but ah, how far beyond, and to be reached after what degradation! At the end of this childish detour his wife awaited him, not less surely because she was only his wife in name. He was too weak. Books and friends were not enough. Little by little she would claim him and corrupt him and make him what he had been; and the woman he loved would die out, in drunkenness, in debauchery, and her strength would be dissipated by a man, her beauty defiled in a man. She would not continue. That mystic rose and the face it illumined meant nothing. The stream — he was above it now — meant nothing, though it burst from the pure turf and ran for ever to the sea. The bather, the shoulders of Orion-they all meant nothing, and were going nowhere. The whole affair was a ridiculous dream.

You feel there could be no arguing for a young man who was so immature and melodramatic. Leighton goes back to the pub to reason with Stephen only to be told Stephen left a while ago to follow them. Puzzled they arrive at the railway level crossing as a slow goods strain is approaching, to see Stephen drunkenly sprawled across the rails. Rickie runs forward and throw his drunken brother free of the rails, but is too slow himself. It’s worth quoting the entire scene in full, mostly because of the abrupt and brutal, throwaway treatment of the event, but also because it demonstrates Forster’s peculiar way with language and psychology. I’ve reread it numerous times and don’t really understand exactly how or why it happens.

He wandered a little along the Roman road. Again nothing mattered. At the level-crossing he leant on the gate to watch a slow goods train pass. In the glare of the engine he saw that his brother had come this way, perhaps through some sodden memory of the Rings, and now lay drunk over the rails. Wearily he did a man’s duty. There was time to raise him up and push him into safety. It is also a man’s duty to save his own life, and therefore he tried. The train went over his knees. He died up in Cadover, whispering, ‘You have been right,’ to Mrs Failing.

‘It is also a man’s duty to save his own life, and therefore he tried,’ what does that mean? What does he mean ‘tried’. If he was stone cold sober surely there was time to nip out of the train’s way. But why is it phrased like this, ‘It is also a man’s duty to save his own life’? Is the implication that he is so, so tired and disillusioned that, although consciously aware of this ‘duty’, he is only half-hearted? But the text says ‘he tried’? Maybe it’s me but I find Forster’s psychology, I mean the way he depicts the minds and feelings of all his characters, very often bewilderingly obtuse.

Coda

What’s surprising is that, after this ‘random’ brutal killing of his protagonist, Forster gives us a final chapter of six more pages. In this Stephen has established himself as a farmer, and is discussing the posthumous publication of Rickie’s stories in a volume to be titled Pan’s Pipes, with Mr Pembroke, who is now a clergyman. They are arguing, Stephen is supplying 10 of Rickie’s stories to the clergyman’s 4, and demands a similar percentage of the royalties. Disgruntled, the clergyman leaves in a pony and trap.

Stephen is now married and has a three-year-old daughter so this must be 4 years (?) later. Now, as dusk falls, he wraps his little girl up and insists, despite his wife calling, that they go and sleep out on the Downs, in the warm evening. After opening with the silly conversation of the over-educated Cambridge undergraduates, the novel closes with the man of the soil Stephen, refusing his wife’s womanly entreaties to stay home, and insisting on wrapping up his small daughter and taking her to commune with the earth. From spirit to body. From air to earth. This ending has a surprisingly D.H. Lawrence primitivism, despite that the face the Lawrence hadn’t yet published a word.


Rickie the intellectual midget

He was only used to Cambridge, and to a very small corner of that. He and his friends there believed in free speech. But they spoke freely about generalities. They were scientific and philosophic. They would have shrunk from the empirical freedom that results from a little beer.

Ludwig Wittgenstein arrived in Cambridge in autumn 1911 and came to loathe it for its intellectual provincialism, its idiocy and its smug air of self congratulation. This novel helps you understand why. I found the self-satisfied triteness about ‘morality’ and ‘the Good’ and ‘the True’ unbearable, stuff like:

The sense of purity is a puzzling and at times a fearful thing. It seems so noble, and it starts as one with morality. But it is a dangerous guide, and can lead us away not only from what is gracious, but also from what is good. (p.144)

You can argue that Rickie, his friends and girlfriend are meant to be immature, silly, callow, and that this is the novel’s deliberate aim. But this is the narrator speaking, this is the narrative voice, which interchanges quite easily with the characters. It’s only when Rickie arrives in Sawston that the narrator comes clean about his limitations:

Rickie’s intellect was not remarkable. He came to his worthier results rather by imagination and instinct than by logic. An argument confused him, and he could with difficulty follow it even on paper. (170)

But by then it was too late for me, I was irrevocably put off the book by its undergraduate callowness. W.H. Auden has a line in ‘To a writer on his birthday’, looking back on himself and Isherwood as two sniggering students, declaring that ‘all the secrets we discovered were extraordinary and false.’ All the great ‘intellectual’ and ‘moral’ findings in this novel strike me in the same way.

Purple patches

With a canvas twice the long as his first book, Forster lets himself go and I don’t like it.

The rain tilted a little from the south-west. For the most part it fell from a grey cloud silently, but now and then the tilt increased, and a kind of sigh passed over the country as the drops lashed the walls, trees, shepherds, and other motionless objects that stood in their slanting career. At times the cloud would descend and visibly embrace the earth, to which it had only sent messages; and the earth itself would bring forth clouds — clouds of a whiter breed — which formed in shallow valleys and followed the courses of the streams. It seemed the beginning of life. Again God said, ‘Shall we divide the waters from the land or not? Was not the firmament labour and glory sufficient?’ At all events it was the beginning of life pastoral, behind which imagination cannot travel.

I’m afraid I think this is rubbish, on every possible level, as either literal description or as insight into Rickie’s supposed state of mind; and the casual invocation of the kind of meek God that suits Forster made me barf. There’s a lot, lot more written in the same overblown style. Here’s Rickie in love:

She had been a goddess both in joy and sorrow. She was a goddess still. But he had dethroned the god whom once he had glorified equally. Slowly, slowly, the image of Gerald had faded. That was the first step. Rickie had thought, ‘No matter. He will be bright again. Just now all the radiance chances to be in her.’ And on her he had fixed his eyes. He thought of her awake. He entertained her willingly in dreams. He found her in poetry and music and in the sunset. She made him kind and strong. She made him clever. (p.71)

Masquerading as Significant Thought, there are repeated passages saying what frail insects we are on the huge indifferent earth etc etc, which just feel banal and obvious:

Ah, the frailty of joy! Ah, the myriads of longings that pass without fruition, and the turf grows over them! Better men, women as noble — they had died up here and their dust had been mingled, but only their dust. These are morbid thoughts, but who dare contradict them? There is much good luck in the world, but it is luck. We are none of us safe. We are children, playing or quarrelling on the line, and some of us have Rickie’s temperament, or his experiences, and admit it. So he mused, that anxious little speck, and all the land seemed to comment on his fears and on his love…

He had lost all sense of incident. In this great solitude — more solitary than any Alpine range — he and Agnes were floating alone and for ever, between the shapeless earth and the shapeless clouds. An immense silence seemed to move towards them. A lark stopped singing, and they were glad of it. They were approaching the Throne of God. The silence touched them; the earth and all danger dissolved.

It feels like Thomas Hardy without Hardy’s rich lugubriousness. Then again, is all this a sly game? Is it over-written and shallow like this to indicate Rickie’s immaturity and callowness?

Name-dropping

The characters move in a miasma of artistic and literary references. I don’t think a single one of these does anything to move the story forwards. As far as I can tell they are there solely to signal the educated class the characters come from and the book is aimed at and, more practically, to flatter the bourgeois reader by dispensing cultural references easy enough for us to recognise and feel smug about:

He thought of Renan, who declares that on the Acropolis at Athens beauty and wisdom do exist, really exist, as external powers.

Suddenly she stopped, not through any skill of his, but because she had remembered some words of Bacon: ‘The true atheist is he whose hands are cauterized by holy things.’ (p.97)

Having changed her dress and glanced at the poems of Milton, she went to them, with uplifted hands of apology and horror. (p.97)

And when Rickie and Stewart exchange letters criticising each other’s worldview:

Read poetry – not only Shelley. Understand Beatrice, and Clara Middleton, and Brunhilde in the first scene of Gotterdammerung. Understand Goethe when he says ‘the eternal feminine leads us on.’ (p.87)

Understand Xanthippe, and Mrs. Bennet, and Elsa in the question scene of Lohengrin. Understand Euripides when he says the eternal feminine leads us a pretty dance. (p.87)

Even Mrs Failing’s two horses are named Dido and Aeneas, ho ho.

Again he spoke of old Em’ly, and recited the poem, with Aristophanic variations.

In the scene between Mr Wonham and the soldier you can feel the way the narrator’s deployment of cultural references like this is not an amplification of lived experience but an old maid escape, a denial or rejection of life. Books are safer than life, an attitude Forster embodies and lightly satirises in the character of the intellectual eunuch, Ansell. But although his story mocks Ansell the text itself subscribes to Ansell’s bookish values.

There may be moments of insight and clever psychology in such a long baggy monster, but overall I didn’t enjoy this book.

Gay

What makes all the purple patches about heterosexual love so funny is that Forster was gay, homosexual, queer. In 1914 he wrote ‘Maurice’, a novel about a gay love affair which he kept secret and wasn’t published until after his death, in 1971. I’m afraid knowledge of his lifelong homosexuality completely undermined my belief in the scores of passages where Rickie waxes lyrical about his beloved Agnes being a goddess, a spirit, a divine being etc.

Obviously the main intention of these passages is to flag Rickie’s hopeless immaturity but it’s hard to avoid the suspicion that Forster was also overdoing it, overcompensating, replacing the subtleties and edginess of real love (gay or straight) with great dollops of Victorian romanticism, and doing it for security reasons. In order to be safe and avoid the slightest accusation of homosexuality. He was writing just ten years after the Oscar Wilde case. Everyone was scared. Lilia’s infatuation with Gino and Philip’s obsession with Miss Abbott in his previous novel, ‘Where Angels Fear To Tread’ both felt more convincing (relatively speaking).

The passages at the very end, from the train journey Rickie and Stephen share and especially the lovely description of lighting the paper lanterns on the stream, and the lyrical mood it puts Rickie in, is this all queer love, Rickie’s gay love for lovely rough and manly Stephen? And is this why Rickie has to die? Partly because, as a character, he’s pretty much played out? But mostly because the love that dare not speak its name needs to be censored out of existence?


Credit

The Longest Journey by E.M. Forster was first published in 1907 by Blackwood. References are to the 1982 Penguin paperback edition.

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The Culminating Ape by Peter Kemp (1982)

Carey and Dickens

In 1973 the literary critic Professor John Carey published an entertaining study of Charles Dickens’ imagination entitled ‘The Violent Effigy’. Instead of analysing Dickens’ novels in terms of themes or issues or morality or symbolism, of gender or class or race and so on – Carey instead devoted a chapter each to half a dozen primal aspects of human experience which really fired Dickens’s writing, identifying the situations and subjects which triggered his most vivid writing, starting with violence and working through topics like fire, food, sex, death and so on.

Each chapter was stuffed with examples from the novels (and essays and travel books) as if Carey had read Dickens’s complete works with a set of index files constantly open by his side in which paragraphs or entire scenes would be assigned to each theme and sub-theme. The result was chapters made up of quotes and scenes and characters and events and words and phrases and metaphors illuminating each particular topic. Thus the opening chapter, on violence, shows how powerfully, repeatedly and obsessively Dickens was attracted by public hangings, raging fires, murderers, how his gargoyle imagination created characters who burst into flame or wanted to eat one another, and so on and so on.

Kemp and Wells

Well, in 1982 literary journalist Peter Kemp did something similar to H.G. Wells.

Introduction: the Darwinian worldview

Kemp starts from the basic premise, readily attested by umpteen quotes from Wells himself, that the year Wells spent studying under the great promoter of Darwinian evolution, Thomas Henry Huxley, at the South Kensington College, was the most important of his life. And that the central learning of that year was a kind of biological reductionism, the radical teaching that humans are animals like any other, just another twig on the vast tangled bush of life, entirely physical and material in nature, with no hint of a God to promote our sense of specialness and apartness from all the other living things.

No, we are living organisms, one species among the million or so others which have evolved over three billion years of chance and accidents, most closely related to the family of primates and, within that family, to the great apes. In this brief opening chapter Kemp gathers together a dozen or so Wells quotes all repeating the same idea, that ‘humanity is but animal rough-hewn to a reasonable shape’, but ‘an etherealised monkey’, ‘a creature not ten thousand generations from the ape his ancestor’, is:

no privileged exception to the general conditions that determine the destinies of other living species.

Just like all the other animals, humans need to ‘eat, mate, find a congenial habitat, and survive danger – by fighting, escaping or co-operating with other members of his species’. Man is, in other words, ‘the culminating ape’ i.e. the culmination, in the present, of the line of descent from the apes (‘in the present’ for who knows what mutations and evolutions await in the future).

So, having established that this materialist, Darwinian view of humanity underpins everything Wells wrote, Kemp then does a Carey, and devotes a series of chapters to looking in great detail at specific aspects of this human-as-animal worldview, and how these fundamental aspects are embodied and dramatised and described across the full range of Wells’s forbiddingly vast oeuvre.

Kemp’s five big chapters address:

  1. Food (The Edible Predator)
  2. Sex (The Slave Goddess)
  3. Habitat (The Redeveloped Basement)
  4. Survival Mechanisms (The Pugnacious Pacifist)
  5. Self Image (The Grand Earthly)

And just like Carey’s book, Kemp’s is stuffed to overflowing with as many examples, quotes, scenes and passages, keywords, symbols and metaphors as he could find about each of these core issues from all over Wells’s works. What it lacks in ‘theory’, Kemp’s entertaining book makes up for in its hundreds of juicy examples and entertaining quotes. It sometimes contains ideas and thoughtful interpretations but really it is a riotous guided tour of the phantasmagoria of Well’s unquenchable imagination, and so it is a riot to read.

1. Food

Having just read it I can confirm that the real message of ‘War of the Worlds’ is not so much alien invasion but the idea that humans, so long accustomed to being top of the food chain, suddenly find themselves the prey and foodstuff of the Martians. Just like rabbits and grouse and all the other animals we’re used to hunting, now we have to go on the run, find burrows, hide during the day and only come out at night.

‘The Island of Dr Moreau’s central idea is to blur the boundaries between the human and the animal, as Dr Moreau does in his demented vivisection experiments. Closely connected to it is the notion of cannibalism, as his half-man half-animal creations show no reluctance to kill and eat people or each other. Kemp offers a summary of Wells’s overall intention:

The cannibalism and carnivorous preying in his books are designed to frighten man into a full awareness of his biological condition. (p.34)

‘The Food of the Gods’ is, as the name suggests, entirely about the impact of a wonderfood which makes babies grow into giants and the social disruption this brings.

One of the Invisible Man’s many problems is that when he eats anything it is, to start with, entirely visible inside him as half-digested chunks of matter. Only as his system breaks food down and absorbs it into him does it become invisible which explains why, after eating, he has to hide till this biological process has been achieved (p.49).

Kemp cites Wells writing that he aimed to counter and refute what he called ‘Bio-Optimism’ i.e. the sentimental belief that evolution means things steadily improve, countering it with a healthy dose of what could be called ‘Bio-Realism’ (p.12). Certainly his scientific romances all point to the disasters that mankind’s accelerating technologies seem liable to bring.

The phrase Bio-Optimism made me think that, if the dictionary definition of ‘woke’ is being ‘alert to racial prejudice and discrimination’, you could conceive a term closer to my sense of things, which would be ‘biowoke’, meaning being ‘alert to the evolutionary, biological, Darwinian nature of human beings’ and, indeed, of the entire natural world we live in.

Anyway, the opening passages about Wells’s polemical materialism soon get swamped by the avalanche of Kemp’s examples, which feel like they quickly wander far from the point and descend to a kind of fascinating triviality.

Leaving the marvels of the scientific romances mentioned above for the bathos of Wells’s social novels, Kemp explains at some length how ‘The History of Mr Polly’ is a novel about a man who is a martyr to his bad digestion (pages 52 to 54). In fact, Kemp shows how Wells’s own personal history of stomach and digestive problems is echoed in lots of novels and characters.

In Mr Polly he builds a whole book around human indigestion…basically, it is the story of a man who leaves a bony woman who is a bad cook for a plump woman who is a good cook. (p.52)

Having just read it, I was amused by the accuracy of this summary. Kemp neatly balances Polly (about bad food and indigestion) with ‘Tono-Bungay’, which is a novel about a cure for indigestion which becomes a worldwide smash hit and propels its creator and his nephew, the book’s narrator, to giddy heights of fame and wealth – but all based on exploiting the bad guts of its credulous consumers (p.55). And so it makes a neat counterpoint to Polly:

Real ills are displayed in Mr Polly; spurious remedies in Tono-Bungay. (p.54)

Kemp modulates from the level of considering entire plots of novels to zooming in on particular aspects of food and eating. He gathers quotes from umpteen novels to show us that Wells had a thing about tentacles e.g the horrible tentacles gathered at the mouths of the hungry Martians and the tentacles of giant crabs the time traveller encounters in the dying days of the planet, through to the social comedies where, for example, innocent Ann Veronica feels harassing Mr Ramage’s hands ‘stretching [like]

hungry invisible tentacles about her’.

And teeth – when we see other people’s teeth we realise they are descended from countless generations of animals which have used them to rip and tear to pieces other living animals. The front teeth are acceptable but sight of the incisors should make anyone with an imagination shiver, so Kemp then proceeds to give us loads of examples of monsters with horrific teeth, or people with notable teeth, examples of where teeth are used as symbols or metaphors, and so on.

So when Kemp is at level 1, showing how a theme or idea dominates an entire narrative, such as ‘War of the Worlds’ or ‘Moreau’ or, in a domestic vein, ‘Polly’ or ‘Tono’, Kemp is interesting and useful. When he shifts down to level 2 and throws at the reader loads of quotes describing tentacles or teeth, he persuades us that these are recurring obsessions of Wells’s which we will, as a result, be more aware of next time we read a Wells text. But you can’t help feeling he is descending to trivia when, at level 3, he has a few pages telling us that Wells repeatedly gives characters food names and rattles off a long list of examples, from Amontillado (a cardinal in Meanwhile) to Wensleydale (in The Sea Lady) via characters named Butter, Beans, Bramble, Cranberry, Cabbage, Lettice. Or when he gives us a few pages full of quotes showing that Wells also liked to use similes comparing people to food (a veiled bride looking like confectionary, an albino having a head like a coconut, someone who is ‘egg-faced’, a man who looks like a chestnut, and so on and so on). You can’t help feeling that, by this stage, the method has dwindled down to a form of stamp collecting or train spotting.

On the other hand, though, this stamp collecting approach does remind you of the thousands of throwaway details in a novel which you enjoy at the moment but tend to forget in the sweep and overall shape of the narrative, and it is enjoyable to be reminded of these details, and hundreds and hundreds of forgotten details is what this book overflows with. I’d forgotten that in the future when ‘The Sleeper Awakes’ the white cliffs of Dover are covered in advertising hoardings – things like that which spark sudden memories of the feel and flavour of books you read a while ago…

2. Sex (The Slave Goddess)

Scientific premise: All animals have to mate. Humans breed. Society replenishes itself with new generations.

Kemp kicks off, a bit tangentially, by highlighting the handful of places where Wells tangles with eugenics, the idea of breeding a better standard of human, but Wells was the first to admit that science didn’t have the first idea how to do this, knowing nothing of genetics.

This chapter gives the impression of flitting about the large subject of sex and love and reproduction almost at random. Next thing we know Kemp is describing the basis biographical fact that Wells married his cousin when he was a very young man, discovered she was dim and sexless so ran off with one of his students, but soon enough got bored of her and embarked on a series of affairs, some of which caused public scandal. The point of all this is just how often he recycled these facts in his novels, marriage to someone markedly beneath the protagonist’s intellectual and cultural level in ‘Love and Mr Lewisham’, a dry and disappointing marriage followed by a happier one in Mr Polly, running away for the sake of true love in Ann Veronica, and so on.

Then Kemp spots that Wells, in his autobiography, says his first sexual stirrings came from the images of Britannia and other female national symbols he saw in Punch (the weekly humorous magazine), followed by seeing big bare-breasted sculptures in art galleries, and Kemp goes on to list all the male characters who admit to the same foible scattered through his fiction. And then specific instances of Greek goddesses being cited, Aphrodite or Athena.

The scene of a boy or young man looking up at a girl sitting on a wall occurs in Tono-Bungay and Mr Polly. These and other women are generally a social class above the protagonist, who is looked down on in both a literal and metaphorical sense.

Proposals or love happen at elevations. Helen Walsingham crowds Kipps into proposing to her up the old keep at Lympne. Ann Veronica finally knows passionate love in the Alps, and many other examples.

The ultimate high place is flying, which is described with sensual lavishness in Tono-Bungay.

However, these high-up women invariably end up very much the junior partners, and Kemp brings together the many places where female characters explicitly refer to their men as Master or King, as Ann Veronica does in the Alpine section of her novel. Kemp cites a whole series of characters who are sceptical of women’s ability to have original thoughts and of women who are all too ready to abase themselves as helpers to strong men.

In fact Kemp more or less lists a whole load of sexist attributes which Wells consistently gives to his women, which includes:

  • making his women honorary men or boys
  • making women describe themselves as slaves who venerate their beloved men as King or Master
  • ridiculing women’s intellectual ability as non-existent
  • making them indulge in childish play talk with their lovers
  • characterising women as extravagant spenders of men’s hard-earned cash

All the early social comedies feature a woman ‘wrecker’ who diverts and destroys a promising man’s career, reworkings of the autobiographical fact that Wells gave up his studies to marry his cousin who turned out to be intellectually dim and frigid – ‘research disruptors’ such as Ethel in ‘Love and Mr Lewisham’, Marion in ‘Tono-Bungay’, Miriam in ‘Mr Polly’, Remington’s career ruined by his elopement with Isabel Rivers in ‘The New Machiavelli’).

Many of the novels feature a love triangle, itself the trigger for jealousy, sometimes murderous rage.

By contrast, his various utopias envisage a jealousy-free world of free love.

For an advocate of free love Wells is surprisingly judgemental about smut and sordid fumbling and horrible male banter. This is all muddy and grubby. It is contrasted with the ‘clean’, pure love of clean young men and women for each other as, for example, Ann Veronica.

Wells the Victorian anathematised what he saw as the moral collapse of the 1920s into obscenity and pornography. Thus he thinks Brave New World demonstrated that Aldous Huxley was obsessed with sex (which is a bit rich coming from the notorious old philanderer). When the Sleeper Wakes he discovers the future has Pleasure Cities where the lascivious and promiscuous exhaust themselves in hedonism till they die childless, what Kemp calls ‘camouflaged extermination chambers’ (p.109). Like everyone who enjoys speculating about utopias and perfect worlds, Wells knows it will require exterminating quite a lot of the actual existing human population.

What comes over is that Wells consistently thinks of sex as a powerful urge which has to be slaked but shouldn’t be over-indulged in or get in the way of work. Incidentally Kemp quotes at length the description of Ramage from Ann Veronica which summarises very well a certain experimental male attitude to sex as endless quest and adventure:

His invalid wife and her money had been only the thin thread that held his life together; beaded on that permanent relation had been an inter-weaving series of other feminine experiences, disturbing, absorbing, interesting, memorable affairs. Each one had been different from the others, each had had a quality all its own, a distinctive freshness, a distinctive beauty. He could not understand how men could live ignoring this one predominant interest, this wonderful research into personality and the possibilities of pleasing, these complex, fascinating expeditions that began in interest and mounted to the supremest, most passionate intimacy. All the rest of his existence was subordinate to this pursuit; he lived for it, worked for it, kept himself in training for it.

Ramage is an example of the City gent as sexual hypocrite, all immaculate facade and coercive exploitation. Another type of hypocrite is the sexually repressed Oxbridge don, such as Prothero in ‘The Research Magnificent’ (1915).

Although he counsels restraint and balance in his books, between grubby promiscuity and his other enemy, celibacy, ‘that great denial of life.’ Celibacy is particularly dangerous when the sexually abstinent take out their frustrated energy in other mediums, especially politics, as Rud Whitlow in ‘The Holy Terror’ (1939).

I’ve just finished reading his feminist novel, ‘Ann Veronica’ so was surprised that Kemp pulls out so many quotes demonstrating Wells’s intense antipathy to the suffragettes. Wells thought they would be a sisterhood of pure-hearted statuesque females as per his fantasies. Instead he was disillusioned to realise they were a screeching rabble, addicted to violence and hooliganism. He has one of his characters describe suffragettism as ‘The Great Insane Movement’.

Kemp is funny on Wells taking the mickey out of the suffragettes. I liked his characterisation of Wells dwelling on the feminists’ preference for ‘damage over debate’, and how, in order to demonstrate the special qualities of reason and compassion which women said they would bring to politics, they set about burning letter boxes, smashing shop windows, spitting at cabinet ministers, assaulting the police, slashing paintings and sending letter bombs. Feminists and our culture, generally, nowadays downplays the impressive Suffragette bombing and arson campaign which contemporaries and the activists themselves referred to as terrorism.

3. Habitat (The Redeveloped Basement)

Scientific premise: species, and life in general, are shaped and moulded by their environments. Man is the first species which can substantially alter his environment and, Wells argued, he needs to do it more and faster if he is to survive.

Basements: The odd chapter title derives from the fact that Wells spent his early formative years living in a series of basements (in his parents’ shop, then when his mother became a housekeeper at Up Park country house, then he was apprenticed to various drapers’ shops). These grim subterranean experiences meant that, once he escaped from a life of humiliating toil, Wells’s imagination fantasised about high, light, open places. And it’s this dichotomy, between dark cramped dingy underground and light bright upstairs, as dramatised in umpteen ways throughout his writings, which this chapter explores.

As with the other chapters, it starts by exploring the theme very literally and then slowly moving out to more metaphorical or related topics.

TM: Probably the most striking example of this upstairs-downstairs dichotomy in The Time Machine between the sunny happy world inhabited by the Eloi, who are preyed on by the Morlocks who emerge from their underground dens, but that’s not where Kemp starts.

Rising: Kemp starts by showing us how very widespread the description of basements is, particularly in the social comedies. By contrast, he shows us that when Wells characters go up in the world they not only rise up the social hierarchy, but move to bigger higher lighter houses (with bigger windows).

Uncle Edward’s ascent: He particularly focuses on Tono-Bungay in which Uncle Edward Pondorevo, as he amasses more wealth, rises from living in a basement in Highbury, to living in a house, to moving out to a house in the country (big windows, aery rooms) and the logical conclusion of all this rising which is to commission his own house to be built on a hilltop. Clearly, this physical ascent out of the gloomy underground to a rich man’s mansion on a height mirrors Uncle Edward’s social ascent, as he climbs the social ladder, taking lessons in etiquette and elocution along the way.

Disorder: But ‘Tono-Bungay’ also demonstrates related topics. For Wells the country house of Bladesover represents order and hierarchy. Kemp demonstrates how ‘Tono-Bungay’ contains a dazzling variety of embodiments of disorder, chaos, collapse, disintegration. This extends from the speech patterns of many of the comic characters who can barely speak or have odd mannerisms, through to the symbolism of ‘quap’ which rots and decays everything it comes into contact with. Kemp lists and explains a whole raft of images of decay which infect the novel at every level and this passage really deepened my appreciation of the novel (pages 131 to 137).

Ruins of the future: In this respect, ‘Tono-Bungay’ is deeply connected to ‘The Time Machine’ because the latter describes collapse and decay but in a science fiction context, as when the time traveller goes exploring the ruins of latter-day London far in the future, and Wells luxuriates in page after page of descriptions of ruined buildings and statues covered in vines etc, images which have become standard in sci fi but which must have been phenomenally powerful to those first readers.

London cancer: This segues into a brief section about Wells’s dislike of the way London has spread out chaotically, like a cancer, swallowing up the nice orderly villages around it (compare E.M. Forster’s similar dislike of London’s inexorable spread, destroying the surrounding country e.g. the end of Howards End).

New York: By contrast Kemp describes Wells’s admiration for New York, with what was then (1910s/1920s) its unprecedented array of soaring skyscrapers. Its height and space dazzled Wells on his first visit (in 1906, described in ‘The Future in America’) and triggered admiring references throughout his writings.

Ideal cities: New York’s mathematical orderliness of avenues and streets was a model for some of the ideal cities of Wells’s utopias and this takes Kemp on to a consideration of the new worlds described in his various utopias which, of course, consisted of high light aery buildings. If they have undergrounds these echo the fundamental dichotomy laid out in The Time Machine as in When the Sleeper Wakes, with its extensive network of of ‘underways’.

Magic transformation of society: This leads Kemp, in passing, to note how bad Wells was at thinking through the process whereby humanity would get from its chaotic present to the gleaming futures he imagines. In one a man falls asleep and wakes up 200 years later. In another a comet passes through the earth’s atmosphere, trailing a chemical which brings about a complete transformation in human nature. In ‘Things To Come’ only a ruinous war which almost destroys civilisation can clear the ground for the bright new future.

Relations between the sexes have always been poor with both sides complaining long and bitterly about the other, and the modern ubiquity of feminism means that it is difficult to think, write or talk about men and women, love and sex, without triggering an avalanche of parti pris comment from one side or another of the toxic culture wars. So the sex chapter (above) felt vexed and embattled.

By complete contrast, this chapter about spatial and geographic metaphors in the life, autobiographies and fictions of H.G. Wells – free of gender cultural controversy – felt enlightening and rather wonderful.

4. Survival Mechanisms (The Pugnacious Pacifist)

Scientific premise: Animals have three strategies to cope with threat: fight, flight or co-operation.

Fight

Destruction: As Kemp’s title suggests he is at pains to show that, although Wells described himself as a pacifist, his imagination overflowed with images of war, specially in the science fiction and utopias. World war destroys civilisation in ‘The War in the Air’ and ‘the World Set Free’ and in ‘The Shape of Things To Come’, and ‘The War of the Worlds’ revels in massive destruction.

Soldiers: His autobiographies reveal that he loved playing with toy soldiers and imagining himself a general as a boy. But once war arrived, in 1914, after an embarrassing early rush of blood to the head (in which he wrote unforgivable things about conscientious objectors) he grew increasingly haunted by the realities of war and Kemp quotes some choice passages from the novels which describe various protagonists at the front squidging through rotten corpses, seeing maggots breeding in dead bodies, rotting faces covered with flies etc.

Wells’s temper: Moving on, Kemp tells us that Wells had a very short temper and was quick to fury. One aspect of this was the scathing letters he wrote to reviewers and fellow authors, the blistering caricatures he carried out at book length (Henry James caricatured in ‘Boon’, Ford Madox Ford in ‘The Bulpington of Blup’).

Anti-Catholic: Wells’s fiction takes swipes at clerics, lampoons bishops and develops a really blistering hatred of the Roman Catholic church, leading up to the gassing of the Pope in ‘The Shape of Things To Come’.

Violent chaps: Wells has surprisingly violent characters: it’s easy to forget how homicidal the invisible man becomes or just how violent us ‘Uncle Jim’ who aims to maim and injure the hero of ‘Mr Polly’, turning what ought to be the bucolic Potwell Inn into a warzone.

Flight

Bicycles: In a typically lateral move, Kemp associates the ‘flight’ part of an animal’s response to danger with The Bicycle. Wells was an early adopter and proselytiser for bicycles, his happiest characters ride one (e.g. Mr Polly) and he wrote an entire novel about a draper shop assistant’s cycling holiday, ‘The Wheels of Chance’. Bert Smallways, hero of ‘The War in the Air’, goes from running a bicycle repair shop in a Kent suburb to witnessing the end of civilisation.

Running away from domesticity: Kemp cites lots of evidence from Wells’s autobiographical writings of his need to escape the chains of custom and habit and the humdrum, which translates into his small trapped men who try to run away – Lewisham, Kipps, Polly. Many of his novels are studies in frustration by a man who moved restlessly from love affair to love affair, and also moved house regularly, and at one stage planned to have four dwellings, two in Britain, two in France, which he could move between, restlessly in movement (p.166). Wells later wrote that the entire novel ‘The New Machiavelli’ was ‘a dramatised wish…about going off somewhere.’ Ann Veronica performs a series of escapes ending up with her running off with her lover, Capes.

Suicide: I think Kemp misses a trick by not mentioning suicide; he doesn’t discuss it and it doesn’t appear in the index and yet a number of his heroes in the social comedies feel so wretchedly trapped that they consider suicide. The most florid example is Mr Polly. After 15 years trapped in a loveless marriage and a poky little shop, the only way out he can conceive of is to cut his throat and set fire to the shop. It is comic that he sets fire to the shop alright but then bottles out of the suicide and so finds himself in the middle of a raging house fire, and it is farcical that this quickly runs out of control into the Great Fire of Fishbourne.

Adventure running: Obviously, in the science fiction adventures there is a great deal or running, such as the narrator running from the Martians or Graham going on the run in ‘Sleeper Wakes’ and the invisible man is on the run from London where he’s committed various crimes. Kemp thinks the scene where Bedford is racing across the moon crater trying to keep ahead of the creeping shadow of the lunar night is the most exciting thing Wells ever wrote. Here, as at other points, Kemp comes close to banality because, when you think about it, almost all adventure stories involve chase scenes…

Flying: Paralleling the passage Kemp devoted to cycling, he then has a section citing all Wells’s references to flying. First there’s the fact that Wells himself became addicted to flying and took early flights to and within a variety of countries. Then Kemp lists the characters who fly, including George Pondorevo who’s a flight designer as well as Graham in ‘When The Sleeper Wakes’, but many other, and not forgetting the ultimate extension of flying, Bedford and Cavour’s flight to the moon.

Co-operation

Finally, Wells thought of flying as having the capacity to bring mankind together into the kind of world state he fantasised about, in two ways: one, commercial travel would bind together countries in common economic and cultural ties. Two, the mere fact of airplanes diminishes the idea of the self-contained nation state. No country is secure once manned flight gets off the ground, every country becomes vulnerable to aerial attack, and so the arrival of manned flight would, Wells, thought, provide a great spur towards nations weakening their identity and moving towards a world government. Some hope. Thus, for example, the fact that the new world order in ‘The Shape of Things To Come’ is established by a brotherhood of engineer aviators, represented in the movie version, ‘Things To Come’ by the aviator hero John Cabal.

In his factual writings Wells used his biological training to highlight examples of co-operation or symbiosis in the natural world and spent 50 years repeating over and over than humanity had to do the same, to coalesce, to become one organism, sometimes meaning it almost literally. Look at the world today: Gaza, Ukraine, Xinjiang, Sudan, Syria, drugs gangs everywhere. Is Wells’s vision of a united human race under a world government any nearer than during his lifetime? No, because it is a profoundly stupid idea which reveals the basic shallowness and naivety of his ‘thought’.

This explains why the three massive factual books he wrote between the wars, the so-called ‘Outline of History’ trilogy – The Outline of History (1920); The Science of Life (1930); The Work, Wealth and Happiness of Mankind (1931) – are completely unread today, because they had little of enduring value to say.

Never judge creative writers for the power of their ‘ideas’ which are almost always tripe. Assess them on the power of their imaginings and their prose, which are often transformational.

All Wells’s writings about a World State are based on one primordial error, which is the assumption, so common up to the present day among western liberals and writers and commentators, that western values are world values, that the values of the west (democracy, human rights, freedom of speech, freedom of expression) are universal values, but they are not. Russia, China and the entire Islamic world are cultures and places where some of these values are paid lip services but other values are more important, nationalistic values in Russia and China and Islam in the Islamic world.

Remember the Iraqi farmer who told Rory Stewart that Iraq would never be a democracy, never. Why not? Because the great majority of its people don’t want it to be – democratic values of the kind Wells spent 50 years (from the 1890s to the 1940s) banging on about, are a particular outcome of the particular religious, social, cultural, economic and military histories of western countries. Other peoples and places haven’t had the same experiences and so prioritise other values. In Iraq identity is predominantly about family, tribe, region and religion, a long way from western notions of deracinated, rootless, atomised units of labour, citizens detached from ancient identities who are free to debate, assemble and vote according to their consciences.

Kemp entertainingly highlights the complete contradiction between Wells’s lifelong hectoring of mankind to co-operate and collaborate more, and his complete failure to collaborate with anyone in his own life. Anybody, like scientist Julian Huxley, who worked with him on joint authored books struggled with his domineering decisions. Beatrice Webb wrote scathingly about his inability to work with anyone in the Fabian Society, his bad manners, rudeness and dictatorial style. And the film professionals he wrote screenplays for complained about Well’s inability to compromise and respect others’ specialisms.

It’s like an alcoholic preaching to everyone about abstinence before passing out from inebriation.

A concrete barrier in Wells’s own writings about a unified mankind was that he himself was riddled with prejudices. Kemp confirms what I’ve noticed in all his books which is a consistent antisemitism, and selects quotations whose gross stereotyping sometimes make Wells sound like a Nazi.

Mind you, Kemp goes straight on to give us quotes where Wells comprehensively badmouths the Germans, who he began criticising during the Great War and didn’t stop for the next 30 years. Germans, in his view, are insensitive, brutish and only happy when obeying orders.

Kemp then quotes Wells’s views on Black people which are at best patronising (colourful clothes, happy smiles, upbeat music) and at worst, casually belittle Blacks with comments about their supposed stupidity and vanity. Wells’s fears are dramatised in ‘When The Sleeper Wakes’ in which, during the world revolution, colonial Black police are sent to London bringing their terrifying reputation for rape and violence. In the Fourth Year (1918) includes the quote:

It is absolutely essential to the peace of the world that there should be no arming of the negroes beyond the minimum necessary for the policing of Africa. (quote p.185)

5. Self Image (The Grand Earthly)

Scientific premise: human beings aren’t really individuals but collections of moods, emotions, personalities and so on. What gives humans a shaky unity is what Wells calls the persona.

This is a promising idea but Wells expresses it in a terrible wishy-washy, humanist manner. Compare and contrast Sigmund Freud’s dazzling succession of theories about the unconscious and the dynamic nature of mind, or Carl Jung’s theories about archetypes, the anima and so on, and Wells is nowhere. (Kemp picks out a passage where Wells explicitly says he prefers Alfred Adler’s theory of the inferiority complex to Freud’s theories of the human mind, quoted p.194).

Still, we’re not interested in Wells as a ‘thinker’ where he’s a non-starter, but as an entertainer. As Kemp aptly phrases it, we enjoy his best works because they are:

enriched with unexpected detail scooped from life by deftly imaginative phrases. (p.214)

In this respect Kemp kicks off with a consideration of how many of his characters pretend to be someone else, associate, worship, model themselves on others.

Kemp starts with the men Wells modelled himself on, paying repeated tribute to the medieval scientist Roger Bacon, but the central figure is Thomas Huxley, who moulded his thinking on scientific lines, who showed the central importance of education, and who showed that being an educator could lead to fame and respect.

So his entire life was dedicated to the role of public educator with reams of articles and lots of books designed to educate the public away from religion and superstition and towards science. He became hysterically convinced that society was in a ‘race between education and catastrophe’, as he put it in ‘World Brain’. And Mr Lewisham has the slogan ‘Knowledge is Power’ pinned to his garret wall.

Yes but knowledge of what? And what kind of power?

Wells makes the two same mistakes most commentators do of thinking a) that most people give a toss about ‘education’, when quite obviously plenty of people hated school, left as soon as they could, and passed on their know-nothing attitude to their kids, whilst many people just aren’t suited to academic study; and b) that education means one commonly agreed thing: i) 100 years later educators are still squabbling about what to teach and how; ii) in many parts of the world, for example the Muslim world, teaching religion is hugely more important than ‘western science’, compare Saudi Arabia’s funding of madrassahs across the Muslim world.

So Wells’s vast output of texts advocating for ‘education’ are i) irrelevant to most people ii) based on an untenable notion that there is just One Education, one kind of knowledge, one incontestable Science which everyone needs to be converted to and which, it becomes clear as his books progress, simply equates to his own views, a utopia where ‘world government’ is the simple-minded answer to all problems.

So it’s a meaningless concept, and even if it had any meaning, it’ll never happen. In fact the error is summed up in Kemp’s pithy opening sentence:

A scientific education saved Wells’s life; he assumed it would do the same for the world. (p.1)

But he was wrong.

Back to the books, Wells spoke about all knowledge being brought together into a ‘World Brain’ (the title of a book) and Kemp links this back to the colourful idea of the Grand Lunar who rules Selenite society in ‘First Men in the Moon’. (This explains the title of this chapter, for the Grand Lunar, essentially one big brain yards wide, cannot believe that earth society is run by governments of men. ‘Is there not a Grand Earthly? he asks.)

The dominating importance of education moves onto the dominating educator. We’ve seen how Wells talked about co-operation but was in practice a difficult domineering personality.

From there Kemp moves on to discuss dictators in Wells’s work, men who exercise total control. He praises Adler because he thinks the inferiority complex and the will to power operate continually whereas Freud’s sex instincts are more intermittent.

But Wells doesn’t venerate one particular leader. In his prophetic writings he went on and on about an elite, what he calls the Samurai in ‘A Modern Utopia’, the subject of his essay ‘An Open Conspiracy’. In ‘After Democracy’ he calls for ‘a Liberal Fascisti, for enlightened Nazis’ (p.196).

He prided himself on his access to the powerful, to the great minds of the age, a trend which reached its peak in his notorious meeting with Stalin. His idiocy about the world reaches a kind of climax, as he subsequently wrote that Stalin is modest and self-critical and that no-one is afraid of him (p.197). Someone that completely wrong about one of the key figures of the twentieth century and everything he represented is hardly to be trusted on any other subject.

All this can be seen as an astonishing achievement for the son of a housekeeper. More subtly you can see how it is motivated by the wish to create an alternative hierarchy of values and achievers – scientists and educators – than the hierarchy Wells was brought up in and oppressed by – aristocrats and their parasites, religion and superstition.

The exorbitance of his imagination is revealed by the books titles, 11 of which have ‘world’ in the title, most of the others overdoing it – First and Last Things, The Fate of Homo Sapiens, Mankind in the Making.

And the length – many of them are very, very long. Wells freely explained that many of the reasonable length novels (Kipps, Ann Veronnica) were fragments of what he originally planned.

And the unstaunchable prolificness, the terrifying amount he wrote, came at the price of repetition. Many of the later novels echo or repeat plots and characters from earlier ones. Kemp points out that the novels about sexual relations show a tendency to fall back on the same limp scenarios and emotions.

That said, Kemp makes the interesting point that scientists, previously thin on the ground in English fiction, throng Wells’ novels and short stories i.e. he helped to make the serious research scientist a plausible figure, many of them Fellows of the Royal Society, which, as he grew older, Wells yearned to be elected to.

Alliteration

It’s not a heavy theoretical book, there aren’t really many ideas in it although lots of insights, but Kemp clearly set out to enjoy himself and to entertain his readers. One amusing aspect of this is his fondness for alliteration:

Drudgery in draperies sapped his energy… (p.1)

He bounded energetically towards affluence and achievement… (p.1)

Subsisting on a medical menu, Mrs Tewler is duped and doped to death… (p.57)

It’s a trivial detail, really, but Kemp’s enjoyment of his own alliteration is infectious and worth mentioning.

Conclusion

This kind of book has at least two definable merits. One, its selection of quotes and scenes and examples reminds you of moments in the novels which you’d forgotten, so it works as a pleasurable aide memoire, a collection of memory jogs.

Secondly, the extended descriptions of basements and downstairs spaces in Wells’s own life and then in his fiction – as of all the other topics and themes which Kemp lists and describes – don’t explain the novels, they enrich them. They bring all these aspects – which it is easy to overlook in the hurry of reading for the plot – to life. It makes them 3D. it gives them an extra power and pungency. It makes reading or remembering these themes and images in the novels more rich and pleasurable. It enhances your enjoyment. This is a very enjoyable and enriching book.


Credit

The Culminating Ape by Peter Kemp was published by Macmillan Press in 1982. References are to the 1996 revised paperback edition.

Related reviews

Against Therapy by Jeffrey Masson (1988)

‘Psychiatry, in my opinion, has always been intrusive, destructive, and vicious.’
(Against Therapy, Introduction, page 39)

Why? because:
‘The therapeutic relationship always involves an imbalance of power.’ (p.290)

This is less a book than a sustained polemic – an impassioned, one-sided, take-no-prisoners exposé of the historical and modern abuses of psychiatry and psychotherapy, designed to support Masson’s simple, drastic proposition: that all forms of psychotherapy must necessarily be abuses of power and should be banned.

In Masson’s view, all forms of psychotherapy, no matter how cuddly and collaborative they make themselves appear, eventually boil down to the same basic power dynamic which is that – the therapist claims to know best.

Most of us who’ve been in therapy really want this to be true. We want the therapist to be wise and all-knowing and more experienced than us, a qualified professional, an expert in their field, who will sensitively tease out of us our life story and identify the problem points and help us understand our issues and resolve them so that we emerge from therapy less troubled, less depressed, less anxious, more able to cope with life.

BUT, says Masson, therapists are NOT superhumanly gifted magi, they are just people like you or me and they’re as prone as you or me to be bored, impatient, imperceptive, to let their own prejudices and assumptions cloud their judgement and so on. Moreover, psychotherapy, and the profession of psychiatry which preceded it, have historically been marked and limited by hair-raisingly anti-patient assumptions.

His book then sets out on a selective historical review of the professions (psychiatry and psychotherapy) to smack you in the face with examples of the appallingly cruel and inhumane ways they’ve treated their patients.

Introduction by Dorothy Rowe

The book kicks off with an introduction by the Australian psychologist and author Dr. Dorothy Rowe who puts the boot into the profession of psychiatry and psychology as she first encountered them on coming to Britain in the late 1960s. Dismayed at the male chauvinism, strict hierarchy and snobbishness of the professions she encountered, she was then appalled to discover the way poor suffering vulnerable people were treated at every level of the system.

She describes the way psychotherapy slowly entered the profession of psychiatry (long resistant to it as ‘unscientific’) and has proliferated during her time so that nowadays (at the time of writing, 1988) society is overrun with therapists and counsellors offering marriage counselling, grief counselling, family counselling, group therapy, depth therapy. But the fundamental fact has not changed – which is that psychiatry doesn’t cure people. In Rowe’s opinion, psychiatry is about managing people with mental problems. It is about power. One group of people set themselves up as experts and then try to impose their version of reality on the ill and unhappy and vulnerable. At which point she ends her introduction and so, over to Masson…

Chapter 1. The prehistory of psychotherapy

Masson starts his sustained flaying of psychiatry by going back to the nineteenth century and the treatment of women patients who were supposedly mentally ill, ‘hysterical’ and so on. Specifically, he considers the stories of two women patients who were consigned to mental institutions in the late nineteenth century and are rarities, because they left such thorough records of their treatment, being: Hersilie Rouy in France and Julie La Roche in Switzerland.

Masson shows that these women were incarcerated for the crimes of being strong-willed and independent, contradicting the wishes of their husbands or fathers, and how a sequence of male ‘doctors’, ‘psychiatrists’, ‘inspectors’ and ‘judges’ back each other up, even when they were obviously at fault.

If you doubted the existence of the ‘patriarchy’ in Western societies these are the kinds of howling historical injustices which will change your mind. (In fact, these two stories are by way of being extracts from Masson’s previous book, a study of the horrors of nineteenth century psychiatry, ‘A Dark Science: Women, Sexuality and Psychiatry in the Nineteenth Century’ 1986.) Time and again Masson finds that:

women were branded as ‘morally insane’ merely because they did not conform to what their parents or society or medicine expected of them. (p.78)

Masson uses the Hersilie Rouy and Julie La Roche stories to establish his principle that any form of treatment of mental illness is always, by its nature, coercive and controlling. The two young women in question had their own truths, their opinions and characters and behaviours, and a whole litany of male ‘experts’ lined up to deny their version of reality and to impose the male doctors’ version of reality upon them.

It is in the nature of therapy to distort another person’s reality. (p.247)

This, claims Masson, is what all therapy must always be like. Even if we go to the most liberal, fair-minded, progressive and feminist therapy imaginable, the therapist is still only human. They are subject to institutional pressures (NHS waiting lists and turnaround times and budget cuts) or, even if working privately, still need to manage their time and their cases in a cost-effective way.

They are shaped by the training they’ve had – if American, they’ll have had psychiatric training and be heirs to the terrible tradition of coercion, electroshock therapy, indiscriminate use of drugs which scar psychiatry as a profession; if European, they might only have had psychoanalytic training, which Masson then proceeds to demolish and excoriate in the following chapters.

Chapter 2. Dora and Freud

Freud published his case study of the patient he named ‘Dora’ (real name Ida Bauer) in 1905. Ida had been referred to Freud at the age of 16 by her parents because she had become depressed, moody, often silent and, in particular, had taken violently against close family friends of her parents, referred to in the case study as Herr and Frau K. Freud diagnosed Ida with hysteria and treated for about eleven weeks in 1900.

This was Freud’s first, longest and most detailed case study and has been pored over hundreds of thousands of analysts and scholars. It features in tens of thousands of scholarly papers and books. On account of its incredible detail and the subtlety of Freud’s interpretations it marked a complete departure in psychiatric practice. Masson calls it ‘a turning point in the history of Western man’ (p.112). It has been almost as pored over as the Bible and has given rise to radical criticism, most obviously from feminists outraged at Freud’s patriarchal assumptions and suggestions.

To summarise: Dora discovered her father was having an affair with Frau K and lying to her mother about it. When she was 14 and alone with him in his office, Herr K grabbed her and kissed her. Two years later, on a walk by the lake, again alone, Herr K grabbed her, kissed her and asked her to be his mistress. When Dora told her parents they both vehemently denied any such thing could have taken place. Among many other feelings, this left Dora speculating that her father, instead of protecting her, had offered her to Frau K as a quid pro quo for being allowed to continue his affair with Frau K. During Dora’s visits to Freud it further came out that Dora had learned that Herr K had also propositioned his family’s governess. This made her feel even more worthless, as if she was just an object to be seduced and discarded. And then she made another discovery. Dora’s family had a much beloved governess, who read to the children, loved them etc. One day Dora discovered that this governess was deeply in love with her father and that her ostensible affection for the children was merely a pretext to get closer to the father.

Thus Dora, a bright intelligent upper-middle-class Jewish 18-year-old woman had been profoundly betrayed by all the important figures in her life. Her father dragging her along to see Freud was yet another betrayal. At first Freud listened and was the first person to take the two seduction moments, in the office and by the lake as true. But in a way Freud’s betrayal was worse, because he then interpreted Dora’s disgust at being grabbed and snogged by a family friend, and then propositioned for heartless sex as signs of Dora’s hysteria. He actually writes in the case study, what healthy young woman would not be thrilled to be approached in such a manner by Herr K – who he happens to know and who he tells Wilhelm Fliess in one of his letters about the case, is a fine figure of a man?

Freud then went to town, combining his early ideas about infant sexuality with his theory of the unconscious. He told Dora that her problem was that she was in love with too many people. She loved her father, as all good girls should. But she also, despite all protestations to the contrary, loved Herr K as well. The most Freudian i.e. far-fetched and counter-intuitive interpretation, was the Dora was, deep in her unconscious, in love with Frau K! The cure for her nervous symptoms was simple. She must offer herself to Herr K on condition that he leave his wife. Then everyone would live happily ever after.

As all commentators and scholars remark, Freud’s case studies are more like short stories or novellas than scientific write-ups. His fans say this with awe, but there is another interpretation which is that Freud used the subtlety of his theory and ‘insights’ to do a more subtle kind of damage. Traditional nineteenth century psychiatry locked recalcitrant young women up in mental institutes. Freud is not as brutal; he locks recalcitrant young women up in subtle matrices of his theory, using concepts like the unconscious and the fundamental bisexuality of human beings, to produce interpretations which are every bit as controlling as the psychiatrists he sought to supersede.

And this, says Masson, is because psychotherapy is always a warzone between conflicting interpretations of reality where one side has all the power. As Freud himself put it in ‘On The History of the Psychoanalytic Movement’, psychotherapy:

‘is a situation in which there is a superior and a subordinate’ (quoted p.41)

The expert’s ‘reality’ always trumps the patient’s reality. It is a power dynamic. Right from its inception Freud’s psychoanalysis created an atmosphere of ‘denial and disbelief’, in the words of Judith Herman (cited p.265). Freud used Dora to flesh out evidence for his new theories, just as she thought Herr K wanted to use her body, and her father used her as a bargaining token in his own affair with Frau K. One more middle-aged man refusing to listen, talking over her, mansplaining her own motivations and feelings to her, denying her personhood.

This explains why Dora cut short the analysis before Freud thought he was finished. Freud gives this rejection a typically clever-clever interpretation, noting it as a prime example of patient transference, meaning that Dora was projecting onto Freud the feelings she had for Herr K which were, above all, revenge. By breaking off the therapy Dora was, in Freud’s terms, ‘acting out’ what she wished she could do in real life i.e. snub and spurn Herr K. A clever interpretation and one which gave rise to the concept of transference which is still used in many kinds of psychotherapy. But maybe just wrong. Maybe this plucky 18-year-old had had enough of being used and lied to by creepy old men.

I understand what Masson is aiming to do by going into the Dora case at such length – to prove that therapy is always one-sided and always provides the therapist with endless opportunities to abuse that power, that therapy allows the therapist to project their personal prejudices onto the patient, or force them to conform to conservative social norms, or both.

But as I read on, my heart sank. Part of Masson’s technique is a very close reading of the original German and thus he plays into Freud’s hands. This is just one more interpretation of Freud’s words, one more reading or misreading of a canonic text to be added to the vast pile of similar readings and interpretations which have accumulated over the past century. What would impress me a lot more in a book seeking to undermine the validity of psychotherapy would be facts, data and statistics.

Chapter 3. Ferenczi’s secret diary and the experiment in mutual analysis

Sandor Frenczi was a golden boy of psychoanalysis, one of Freud’s favourites, generally considered the best, most intuitive analyst/therapist among the first generation. But, in full-on debunking mode, Masson reveals that Ferenczi kept a diary in the last year of his life, from 7 January to 2 October 1932 (he died on 22 May 1933) in which he confided radical doubts about the whole idea of analysis. He recorded several recent occasions on which he had made snide or sarcastic remarks to patients or, worse, jumped to impose psychoanalytic interpretations onto patient admissions and confessions which he later came to realise were totally inappropriate. Thus he becomes increasingly worried with the temptation for the therapist to ‘entice, seduce and infantilise the patient because it can lead to abuse’ (p.171). He is the only one of Freud’s disciples to glimpse what Masson sees as the essential truth of therapy.

Chapter 4. Jung among the Nazis

Part 1. Jung and the Nazis

Masson dwells on Carl Jung’s involvement with the Nazis, namely that when the Nazis came to power Jung accepted the presidency of the International Medical Society for Psychotherapy, at the same time that Matthias Göring, cousin of the leading Nazi Hermann Göring, became president of the German branch. The main function of the society was to publish an academic journal and Jung became editor in chief of it, in December 1933, a post he was to hold until 1939.

At the time and for decades afterwards, when Jung came to justify this step, his argument was that the Nazis were on the verge of banning psychotherapy altogether, throughout Germany, and that the intervention of a Gentile with a good international reputation allowed him to save it.

Masson piles on the accusations by citing Jung’s equally contentious statements from this period, distinguishing between a ‘Jewish psychology’ and an ‘Aryan psychology’, as well as making very badly phrased references to ‘the Jewish problem’. He finds it impossible to believe that Jung didn’t know something about the acquiescence of the entire German psychiatric profession with the mass murder of up to 350,000 mental patients. And he goes on to quote Jung’s hair-raisingly racist comments on black people dragging down every culture they come into contact with (pages 155 and 156).

Colonialism:

‘The savage inhabitants of a country have to be mastered. In attempt to master, brutality rises in the master.’ (quoted p.156)

Black people:

‘…the American Complex, namely living together with lower races, especially with Negroes. Living together with barbaric races exerts a suggestive effect on the laboriously tamed instincts of the white race and tends to pull it down.’ (quoted p.156)

Obviously this looks catastrophic for Jung’s reputation, but, as it happens, I’ve just been reading the same subject, as covered in Paul Roazen’s book, ‘Freud and His Followers’ (1975). Roazen’s account is better because he puts Jung’s statements in a broader context, namely Jung’s beliefs about deep racial archetypes. Roazen makes the point that Jung also commented on the French or Spanish or Italian ‘races’, in other words he wasn’t focused solely on antisemitism, and his antisemitic statements were part of a wider theory of human nature.

It still sounds like attempts to ‘explain away’ his Jewish/Aryan remarks but Roazen comes over as more fair-minded. He doesn’t have the very obvious axe to grind that Masson does. In all these chapters, Masson’s narrative is continually undermined by his evident straining to get to the punchline. Every other paragraph seizes the reader by the throat and yells: ‘See? I told you! Therapy is evil!’

(Incidentally, Masson appears to have studied the subject of the Nazis and psychiatry in some detail and mentions having read over 25 books on the subject. He singles out, and so I’m passing on to interested readers, ‘Psychotherapy in the Third Reich: The Göring Institute’ by Geoffrey Cocks, 1985, and ‘Mass Murderers in White Coats: Psychiatric Genocide in Nazi Germany and the United States’ by Lenny Lapon, 1984.)

Part 2. Jung’s therapeutic technique

Doubts about Masson’s entire approach are revived when he makes a massive swerve from the huge panorama of the Nazi genocide and switches to part two of the essay on Jung, which is a detailed look at Jung’s practice as a therapist. The key fact, according to the witnesses Masson has lined up, is that Jung spent the therapeutic hour yakking on about his own bizarre hobby horses (Tantric sex, the racial archetypes, telepathy, UFOs and much more) while showing next to no interest in the details of the patient’s actual life story and problems.

If we skip the details the punchline is the same one Masson is at pains to make throughout the book, which is that therapy is always and everywhere a power struggle in which the therapist assumes the right to impose their version of reality on the patient’s version of reality.

Chapter 5. John Rosen and Direct Psychoanalysis

A 30-page chapter about John Rosen, a ‘pioneer’ of a technique he called ‘direct psychoanalysis’.

Direct analysis was based on the notion that serious disorders such as schizophrenia were the result of deficient, inadequate or harmful mothering. Therefore, the patient was to be treated like a baby, and given ‘the gift of unconditional love’. Contrary to the impression that gives, in practice Rosen’s treatment often included threats, threats of violence, and actual physical assault. In the late 70s patients began coming forward with horror stories which eventually led him to be hand in his medical license in 1983.

Masson then describes the appalling abuse Rosen subjected patients to, including threatening them, beating them, slapping and punching, and forcing them to have sex with him and others. Several long-term patients at his psychiatric facility were found dead. One was able to prove with eye witnesses, that she had on one occasion been stripped to her panties and held down by his associates while Rosen punched her in the face and breasts. One patient, Claudia Ehrman, was found dead with severe bruising to the face and lacerations of the liver caused by sustained punching and kneeing, and witnesses testified to seeing her being held down by Rosen’s associates and repeatedly beaten.

Only when one of the patients, Sally Zinman, many years later, hired a private detective to investigate Rosen, did evidence of the squalor and violence carried out at his ‘clinic’ come to light.

But Masson’s point is that the psychiatric and psychotherapeutic professions had known about him for 30 years. Rosen had published his most influential paper as far back as 1947. In 1959 he was made an Associate Professor of Psychiatry. In 1971 he won the Man of the Year Award of the American Academy of Psychotherapy. Masson cites numerous ‘experts’ and notable analysts who praised Rosen’s theory and practice.

Masson recounts a phone conversation with the ‘reputable’ psychiatrist who hired Rosen to teach at the Temple University Medical School, and then with another colleague at the same institution. They wrote books and papers about Rosen’s practice and still defended him to Masson, even after the full story of his therapy had come out and the man forced to give up his licence. (Rosen was never charged with an offence so none of these events ever came to trial.)

All this is shocking but Masson is alert to the obvious criticism of his position – that Rosen was obviously an extreme outlier, a rarity in the intensity of his abuse and brutality and that you can’t discredit an entire profession by picking on one crook.

Masson rebuts this criticism and tries to make Rosen stand for the entire profession of psychotherapy by pointing to 1) the many awards and plaudits Rosen won right up to the moment he was forced to quit; 2) the large number of fellow therapists who wrote admiring references and tributes; and 3) the phone calls Masson has with two university colleagues who, despite all the evidence of his barbarity, still refuse to condemn him or his techniques. I.e Masson tries to show that Rosen is not an outlier but a respected and admired theorist and practitioner from the heart of the profession.

I take the point but, as with his account of Jung and the Nazis, it feels as if Masson is cherrypicking the worst cases he can find to try and tar the entire profession.

Chapter 6. Sex and battering in psychoanalysis

Part 1. Another example of Rosen-style therapeutic brutality

Anyway, Masson refutes the claim that Rosen was a one-off, bad apple and outlier by describing the equally outrageous, scandalous, violent and sexually abusive treatment of patients at a mental institute in Pennsylvania run by colleagues and devotees of Rosen. At this place, severely schizophrenic patients were threatened, shouted at, repeatedly electrocuted with cattle prods. Their genitals were exposed to patients of the opposite sex, often in ‘group therapy’ sessions. The behaviour recorded and testified to by ex-patients beggars belief.

The most scandalous incident was when one of the supervising ‘psychotherapists’ forced one of the severely ill patients to eat the contents of several ashtrays. When she vomited it all back up, he ordered her to eat the vomit. Now Masson concedes that, in the investigation which followed, the ‘ashtray incident’ was described as unusual and the institute manager claimed to have reprimanded the therapist responsible.

What’s so hard to believe is that this level of abuse was not only be permitted but that, when it eventually came to light via various affadavits to police and state authorities, and increasing flow of newspaper articles, nobody seems to have been prosecuted, in fact the county district attorney’s office produced a critical 10-page report but allowed the institute to continue to function.

It is so incredible that you wonder whether, here as in the Rosen case, there’s more to it than Masson is telling us. Anyway, he uses the gobsmacking revelations to ram home his central point:

As Thomas Szasz has so often and so cogently argued, once somebody is declared ‘mentally ill’, you can do anything you want to them, including torture, as long as you claim that you are doing it for their own good. (p.204)

Part 2. Sabina Spielrein

Masson describes the three-way relationship between Jung, one of his earliest patients – Sabina Speilrein, who went on to become a noted psychoanalyst in her own right – and Freud. Basically Jung fell in love with Spielrein (despite being married), pestered her to have sex, and both of them wrote to Freud to intervene or explain or help. Both men come over as self-serving, sexist hypocrites and Sabina, like the women in almost all these stories, as the hapless victim of manipulating men, who make up the most preposterous lies, and use the most pompous psychoanalytical language, to justify crudely selfish behaviour.

It’s a bit of a puzzle why this passage about Jung and Freud didn’t come in the Jung chapter and had to wait until after Rosen, whose story goes up to the 1980s. Gives the impression that Masson struggles a bit to order his material

Part 3. Therapists and sex

Maybe it’s because he uses the Sabina story to introduce this section, about therapists having sexual contact with their patients.

A review of the literature about psychiatrists and psychotherapists who have sex with their patients. Although the official bodies disapprove, maybe 1 in 10 therapists have erotic contact with their patients (p.222). A 1984 survey said the number was higher, at 15%, and bear in mind that that’s the number who are prepared to admit it (p.224). Masson cites a number of critical books by feminists which have increasingly raised the issue of the power imbalance implicit in the psychotherapeutic situation and described cases of inappropriate sex between therapist and patient – and makes the general point that the statistics cited above are based on the admissions of practitioners. If someone did a big survey of patients, almost certainly the figures would be higher.

Part 4. The outcomes of psychotherapy

A bit of a shift of subject, again, as Masson tries to address the fairly fundamental question of whether therapy actually works.

There appear to be no studies of the outcomes of therapy which have produced knock-down, statistically significant, clear-cut, indisputable statistics on whether it works, whether it’s worth the time and money, at least when Masson was writing in the late 1980s. Instead there appear to be a multitude of small studies and papers which express a variety of views, all the way from crediting therapy with complete cures to the claim that it can contribute to a deterioration in mental health and, in extreme cases, suicide.

Masson enjoys citing the work of psychotherapy researcher Hans Strupp who, in one study, showed that friendly engagement with a college professor showed as much improvement in mental state as costly sessions with a ‘professional’ therapist. As if all people really need is an intelligent listener (p.227).

According to Strupp’s Wikipedia entry, he was ‘a prolific scholar and researcher who published 16 books and over 300 papers.’ All the odder, then, that the outcome of all this effort was the unsurprising conclusion that:

the attitude of the therapist toward the patient was the most significant ingredient for a successful psychotherapy; therapists who were supportive and empathetic were the most likely to have success.

A quick Google search of the subject shows that there appears to be a consensus that therapy helps patients to some extent in up to 75% of cases. This page cites specific research papers to that effect. The most noteworthy fact is that ‘the differences between established models of psychotherapy do not significantly alter outcomes’. It really does seem to be the mere fact of finding someone intelligent to listen to you, that works.

Chapter 7. The problem with benevolence: Carl Rogers and humanistic psychology

To address the criticism that he is only focusing on the most extreme and outrageous examples of psychotherapeutic abuse, Masson devotes a chapter to considering the good guy of American psychotherapy, the immensely popular and influential Carl Rogers.

Masson cites 18 quotes from Rogers’ teachings and subjects them to a systematic critique, pointing out how utopian it is to expect every therapist to have the kind of genuine and authentic empathy for every one of his clients which Rogers calls for, that 100% of the clients are capable of engaging fully in the therapeutic process, through to the more woolly utopianism of imagining that a ‘new America’ was being born at the end of the 1960s. Fifty years later we know better.

Masson then has a go at Rogers’ book, The Therapeutic Relationship and Its Impact: A Study of Psychotherapy with Schizophrenics, published in 1967. A cohort of psychiatrists descended on Mendota State Hospital in Wisconsin and subjected 32 chronic and acute schizophrenics to a barrage of tests and treatments over a five-year period. Masson quotes key passages which show that, far from being Mr Empathy as he liked to think of himself, Rogers in fact subjected patients to tests even when they hated it, even when it was visibly psychologically damaging to them.

At a deeper level, Rogers and some of his students carrying out the work were depressed by the patients’ apathy. Masson points out that there was a simple explanation: the patients knew very well that Rogers and his colleagues couldn’t get them released from the mental hospital, so had every reason to be unexcited and cynical about the whole exercise (p.242).

Masson uses quotes to demonstrate that even Mr Nice Guy worked to the same basically abusive, corrupting power imbalance implicit in all psychiatry and psychotherapy.

Once again, you get the sense that Masson is cherry picking the evidence and straining to make his case. A skim through Carl Rogers’ Wikipedia page suggests a figure who was really consciously humanistic and hugely influential. The book Masson so objects to, The Therapeutic Relationship and Its Impact, isn’t even mentioned in Rogers’s long Wiki article. Masson is cherry picking.

Chapter 8. And furthermore

The chapter about Rogers felt pretty dated, with Masson ganging up on a book from 1967. This chapter feels even worse, with him saying that psychotherapy has only ‘recently’ admitted the existence of child sex abuse and wife-beating, topics which have, from the perspective of 2023, received a growing drumroll of attention in the past 30 years or so. Masson appears to have been writing at a time when they were only just breaking through as subjects of discussion in the media.

Family therapy

In family therapy a large number of culturally sanctioned assumptions are brought into play as if they were brand-new insights. These assumptions are rarely more than prejudices of the time. (p.250)

On the one hand family therapy at least goes beyond Freud. Freud attributes everything to the individual and their fantasy life. Family therapy at least realises the individual exists within a family unit, with a number of psyches jostling for attention, power, love etc. But family therapy, in Masson’s view, is just a theatre where psychotherapists can come out of the closet and start bossing people around. Analysis needs to go one step further up the scale and look at society and its values. A different kind of analysis is required, a political analysis.

Gestalt therapy

An entertaining character assassination of Fritz Perls, the inventor and guru of Gestalt therapy. Masson makes him sound like a self-important ass. He freely admitted sleeping with many of his women patients (p.256).

Feminist therapy

For all that Masson is a feminist and conspicuously stands up for the many women who have been denied and diminished and mocked through the long sorry history of psychiatry – in the Dora case, in Ferenzi’s diary, in Jung’s behaviour with Sabina Spielrein, in the despicable behaviour of John Rosen, and so on – nonetheless, he makes the point that even feminist psychotherapy – well-meaning, intelligent and aware though it may be – is still psychotherapy and so imports the same corrupt power relationship implicit in all therapy, that between an arrogantly all-knowing therapist and a patient or ‘client’ whose reality and truth the analyst denies and overwrites.

He is upset that some ‘feminist’ therapists have changed the gender and are more sensitive to women’s issues or have foregrounded the importance of ‘mothering’ (Helene Deutsch, Melanie Klein) but have kept the fundamental power imbalance which Masson sees at the heart of psychotherapy. It may have feminist tweaks, but at bottom:

Most of the ideas of feminist therapy per se derive from traditional psychotherapy. (p.260)

Thus he agrees with the feminist writer Mary Daly that ‘feminist therapy’ is a contradiction in terms.

Incest-survivor therapy

Only very recently has therapy and counselling for incest survivors been developed. For the middle years of the 20th century the scale of incest and child sex abuse was denied, not least because of the baleful influence of psychoanalysis and Freud’s insistence that it was all fantasy and infantile wish fulfilment. Masson is dismayed that the very profession which denied and covered up child sex abuse has, in a very few years, made a 180 degree turnaround and now claims to be shiny experts.

Ericksonian hypnotherapy

Not the Freudian, Erik Erikson, but a figure much more mainstream and influential, Milton Erickson. Masson first cites authorities claiming Erickson to be a central figure and then does his usual schtick of lining up quotes from Erickson’s theory and case studies which demonstrate a hair-raisingly sexist attitude to women. An example of Erikson’s therapy is to tell a young woman to go home, strip off, and examine ‘the pretty patch of fur between her legs’. His aim is to help troubled young women meet a man, get married, have children and be fulfilled (p.272).

Erickson is, in other words, yet another example of stereotypical social values being imposed on troubled and vulnerable people in the name of ‘medicine’. The accounts of his treatments of young women have to be read to be believed. It is another amazing indictment. And yet the editor of his papers, Jeffrey Zeig, claims that Erickson was ‘the premier psychotherapist of the century’ (p.278). These aren’t freaks. Masson cites numerous authorities to claim they are central to the tradition.

Eclecticism

In the early 1980s about half of American therapists described themselves as ‘eclectic’. Masson cites Sol Garfield, editor of the Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology that all the evidence is it doesn’t matter what type of therapy is used, they all have comparable outcome rates – apparently backing up Hans Strupps’ findings.

Objections

Long before the end of the book the reader has thought of several objections to Masson’s approach.

The most obvious one is that each of the chapters, though they might be 100% accurate as far as they go, have clearly been cherry-picked and chosen to provide the most damning evidence possible.

Thus as early as the chapter about Dora I was thinking, you know what I’d like to read: a really solid statistic study which simply attempted to show whether psychoanalysis or any other flavour of depth therapy actually works. Just another semi-literary interpretation of Freud’s most famous case study – no matter how damning it becomes in Masson’s hands – feels a bit lame. It’s tackling Freud on his home ground, it’s giving the enemy the choice of battlefield. Taking down psychoanalysis as a theory and practice needs more than the demolition of one case study.

In the event, Masson’s book amounts to about eight case studies (Dora, Ferenczi, Jung, Sabina, Rosen and a few others). In each chapter he tries to generalise out from the therapist under discussion a general indictment of psychotherapy but, for me, doesn’t really succeed.

Insofar as any of this is meant to be scientific, I would have preferred a data-driven approach in which he proved his points statistically, which gave hard statistics about the number of abusive therapists, about court cases and lost licences, about the success and failure rates of therapy and so on. For me, Masson’s essentially ad hominem approach of rubbishing half a dozen famous therapists ends up feeling anecdotal, patchy and gossipy, rather than the sweeping demolition he obviously intends it to be.

What’s the alternative?

Quite early in the book, in fact in the introduction, Masson addresses the most obvious issue which arises from his polemical opposition to psychotherapy which is, very simply: If you abolish therapy – what would you put in its place?

First of all Masson says he doesn’t feel any obligation to propose an alternative. He’s reporting on abuses, not putting the world to rights. He quotes a woman friend who says the question is as silly as asking, ‘What would you replace misogyny with?’ The aim is not to replace it, but to abolish it.

But the question is not not that silly. After all, there really are mentally ill people, in fact an ever-growing number of them – on a spectrum from the florid conditions associated with hallucinations and severe dysfunction termed schizophrenia’, through a variety of specific mental problems and issues, from the obsessions and neuroses which Freud set out to treat, on to the mild depression or unhappiness which so many people seem to suffer from.

Something has to be done about them but, if Masson’s argument against therapy is taken literally, what? His tentative solution is worth quoting in full:

I have some ideas about how people could live without psychotherapy or psychiatry. I am thinking of self-help groups that are leaderless and avoid authoritarian structures, in which no money is exchanged, that are not grounded on religious principles (a difficulty with Alcoholics Anonymous and similar groups, since not all members share spiritual or religious interests), and in which all participants have experienced the problem they have come to discuss. I know that some women who have been sexually abused have been helped by getting together with other sexually abused women to share experiences, survival strategies, political analysis, and just their own outrage. What we need are more kindly friends and fewer professionals. (p.30)

Uh-huh. Reads OK till you start thinking about it. Where are these kindly friends going to come from, then? Are they available on Amazon? Not enough, is it? People go to therapists as they went to priests in the past, because they need help with big life problems from someone they can talk to in confidence. And this may explain why, despite its surplus of excoriating evidence, Against Therapy appears not to have had the slightest impact on the twin professions of psychiatry or psychotherapy. Masson’s argufying is an entertaining droplet in the vast oceans of unhappiness and need all around us.

Because in the final analysis, psychiatry and psychotherapy may be flawed in all kinds of ways, and implicated in terrible attitudes and behaviours in their pasts. They may be rotten. But they’re all we have.

Gurus and John Lennon

From time to time Masson repeats the assertion that ‘there are no gurus‘ (p.29). It helps to understand his insistence if you know that he was raised in an odd family whose parents were both in thrall to a literal guru, a self-proclaimed magi named Paul Brunton, and that Masson had to painfully extract himself from his parents’ unquestioning faith in this ‘wise man’, a process he only managed when he was a student living apart his family. The whole painful process was documented in a book that came out after this one, ‘My Father’s Guru: A Journey Through Spirituality and Disillusion’ (1993).

Seen from this biographical perspective, it’s easy to dismiss Masson’s attack on psychotherapy as a repetition of the intellectual and emotional rebellion he had to go through as a teenager and young man. As a man addicted to hero worshipping Great Men for a while, only to angrily reject them and rubbish them.

The connection is made explicit at one point, more than a connection, more of a template; beneath Masson’s rubbishing of psychotherapists he admits that his act of critique and rejection is based on his own, earlier rejection of his father’s guru:

How does a role model differ from the guru/seer model, the wise person who is part and parcel of all traditional psychotherapies? (p.260)

This would explain why his book is so focused on individual ‘name’ therapists (Freud, Jung, Ferenczi, Rosen, Rogers, Perls et al) rather than taking a more statistical, data-driven approach, and exudes a tone of disappointment; it’s because the book is, in a deep sense, about his own disappointment and disillusion with the whole idea of Great Men. As he writes, more than once, ‘there are no gurus’ And every time he I read the word, I heard in my mind the John Lennon line, ‘There ain’t no guru who can see through your eyes.’ All very 1970s, all very dated.

And today?

Obviously this book is 35 years old. I wonder what the state of current thinking is about psychotherapy? Did Masson’s polemic have the slightest effect? My sense is that there is more psychotherapy, especially in the form of counselling for every conceivable situation and crisis, than every before in history. Is that right? How do I find out? Where are the statistics?

Would reading this book stop me having therapy? No. If I felt I needed it, I’d still consider it. This book would just make me much more aware of the risks involved in the therapeutic relationship and more alert to the clash of ‘realities’ Masson sees at the heart of it. But then I’m reasonably sane and compos mentis; I’m not one of the legions of damaged, distressed people who so desperately need help and whose predecessors have been so horribly abused and exploited in the past, as this distressing book records..


Credit

Against Therapy by Jeffrey Masson was published in Britain by Collins in 1989. References are to the 1992 Fontana paperback edition.

More Freud reviews

  • More Freud reviews

Freud and The Problem of God by Hans Küng (1979)

Hans Küng (1928 to 2021) was a Swiss Catholic priest, theologian, and author. These are notes on his 1979 book, ‘Freud and the Problem of God.’

1. The genesis of Freud’s atheism

For the German tradition, ‘theology has been dissolved in the nitric acid of the natural sciences’, so said the philosopher Ludwig Feuerbach. Medicine and physiology were at the centre of German materialism, a movement which aimed to show that the activity of the mind was entirely the result of physiological changes in the brain.

Freud’s father, Jacob Freud, was an orthodox Jew who never converted to Christianity (unlike Marx’s father). Freud was taught Jewish doctrine by his mother and a schoolteacher. In his autobiography, Freud says that early Bible classes had ‘an enduring effect on the direction of my interest.’

Jacob and his first wife had two sons; by his third wife, Amalia, he had eight offspring! Freud was the eldest. A childhood aversion to his distant, forbidding father and the young beauty of his mother led to Freud’s recognition of the Oedipus Complex in himself.

Freud’s early religious experiences:

  1. The Catholic nanny who took Freud to Mass and explained Heaven and Hell to him. Freud used to come home and parody the arm-waving of the priests to his family’s amusement (laying the basis of his later paper Obsessive Actions and Religious Rituals)
  2. Antisemitism: from schooldays onwards Freud suffered persecution by antisemitic Catholics. A founding moment in his life was when, age 12, his father admitted to him how he had acquiesced in his hat being knocked into the mud by racist hoodlums.

When Freud entered university in 1873 there had just been a stock market crash and many in politics and the press explicitly blamed ‘the Jews’.

Freud entered university (aged 17) to study medicine with the aim of seeking answers to the riddles of life rather than merely curing people.

Student Freud fell under the influence of Ernst Brucke, head of the Institute of Physiology, a follower of Hermann von Helmholtz. Helmholtz was a genius who, aged 26, helped secure recognition for the First Law of Thermodynamics (the sum total of energy remains constant in an isolated system). Together with the law of Entropy (energy cannot be turned back into mass without some loss – the Second Law of Thermodynamics) these form the most fundamental of all laws of nature.

Helmholtz later went on to do pioneering work in eye-surgery, optics and physiology. A school grew around him committed to the positivist creed, confident that science would one day be able to explain all the activity in the universe, including all activities of the human mind, on the basis of purely physical and chemical laws.

Brucke was a founder-member of this school in Berlin. When Brucke came to Vienna to head up the Institute of Physiology, he brought this powerful materialistic ideology with him. Freud studied under Brucke for 6 years, years he later recalled as the happiest of his life.

Physicalist physiology got rid of the idealist philosophy of Nature and eliminated the vitalism of the Aristotelian and Scholastic tradition i.e. the belief that God created organisms with forms and purposes, higher goals and objectives of their own. No, said physicalist physiology: all life can be explained in terms of the purely causal, deterministic forces described by biochemistry.

Freud applied these metaphors to clinical psychological observation: he saw the psyche as a machine reacting to the increase and release of tension (the unpleasure-pleasure principle) as a result of the demands of internal instincts on the one hand and external stimuli on the other (the basic argument of An Outline of Psychoanalysis).

For Küng, Freud made the mistake of turning science – a method of investigation – into a worldview – an Idol, in the Baconian sense.

Freud set up his private practice in nervous diseases in 1886, aged 30, on Easter Sunday. His wife, Martha Bernays, came from an eminent orthodox Jewish family in Hamburg. Freud suppressed her religious practices ruthlessly (she later said nothing upset her so much in her life as Freud forbidding her to light the holy candles on the first Friday of their marriage).

They had three sons (Ernst, named after Brucke; Martin, named after Jean-Martin Charcot, the French pioneer of nervous diseases; and Oliver, named after Oliver Cromwell) and two daughters, Sophie and Anna (born in 1895).

In Küng’s opinion, Freud made two great breakthroughs:

a) A theory of the unconscious

Freud’s achievement was to differentiate between the Primary Process of the Unconscious, the vast majority of mental life – and the preconscious and conscious mind, very much the Secondary Process; and to devise a method for examining the workings of the Unconscious.

Freud’s theory that unacceptable wishes are repressed only to return as symptoms. These are expressed in free association so the patient comes to know himself to his depths. All this occurs through transference i.e. replaying the repressed feelings in the privileged arena of ‘the therapeutic alliance’.

Through transference the patient is led to a lasting restructuring of his mental processes, the abolition of morbid symptoms, and restored to the ability to love and work. Interpretation is also carried out on dreams and parapraxes.

b) A theory of libido

Freud’s theory of libido hugely widened the concept of sexuality, extending it far beyond the specifics of genital sexuality in the present, and extending it back in time to cover all of human existence from the earliest part of life i.e. the invention of the concept of childhood sexuality.

Doing this enabled explanations of almost all sexual activity, perversions, love, affection etc to be brought under the rubric of one theory, rather than simply being rejected as extrinsic to human nature, ‘degenerate’ or ‘immoral’, as previously.

The progression of Freud’s medical-scientific investigations can be summarised: cerebral physiology > psychopathology > depth psychology > theory of everything.

2. Freud on the origin and nature of religion

Freud’s critique of religion is twofold:

  1. he tries to explain away the history of religion
  2. he tries to undermine the psychological basis of religion

1. The history

There are two broad theological movements:

  • Degenerationist: pagan religions are distorted versions of the original pristine version of the True Religion clearly understood by Adam and Eve; then came the Fall, the Tower of Babel and it’s been downhill ever since.
  • Meliorist: religion is evolving into higher and purer spiritual forms from its early primitive, half-savage forms.

The 18th century Enlightenment philosophers were degenerationists. For them denominational religion was a distortion of the original clear light of Reason which God had given to Mankind, which had been distorted by popular custom and the inventions of priests.

The nineteenth century saw Enlightenment Nature-theism transmuted into a Science of Religion. Simultaneously, colonial discoveries and the improvement of philology and textual criticism, provided a number of tools for paring away the ‘nonsense’ which had accumulated around the pure creed. The high point of this tradition is the work of Ludwig Feuerbach, who sought to remove the superstitions and legends accumulated over time in order to get back to the original pure creed of Christ.

Darwin turned the theory of degeneration – religion starting from the divine heights – on its head. Evolution implied a struggle upwards of intellect and reason from the savage swamp. This prompted a revolution in the ‘Science of Religion’; instead of hypothesising about what the early and purest creed must have been, scholars now examined earliest religions to ‘get at the heart’ of belief.

It is as a result of this new model that specialists devised a developmental model of religions, speculating that all religions start with primitive animism – then proceed to pagan polytheism – and then evolve to an intellectual and spiritual climax in monotheism (with a possible pre-animistic stage of belief in a world-soul, or mana).

An ethnologist called W. Robertson Smith thought the key parameter was not spirits and gods but the development of ancient rites and rituals: totemism, always accompanied by systems of taboos (‘Thou shalt not kill the totem animal’, ‘Thou shalt not marry thy sister’ (exogamy) and so on). (Taboo is Polynesian for untouchable). Thus civilisations pass through a series of stages: Magic, Religion, Science. These kinds of theories were backed up by the tremendous encyclopedic systematisation of Sir James Frazer (whose masterwork, ‘The Golden Bough’, Freud was such a big fan of – see his own annotated copy included in the exhibition at the Freud Museum).

This was the background Freud drew on when writing Totem and Taboo (1912) – at the suggestion of Carl Jung (still in the Movement at the point).

In Totem and Taboo Freud tries to assimilate the underlying fear of incest expressed in so many taboos (i.e. primitive morality) with the developmental model of religions, and with the ubiquity of totemism based round a holy animal who is eaten in an annual festival. Freud tries to draw a parallel between the religious practice of ‘primitive’ man and the behaviour of modern, urban obsessional neurotics, and between the savage’s reverence for the totem animal, representing the Father, with the explicit rise of the Father to pre-eminence in monotheistic religions.

In explaining the rise of totem animals Freud points to the suggestive way that young children initially like animals but then develop fears of them as they unconsciously project their Oedipal feelings (feelings of rage and of reciprocal anger) onto them.

The classic example in Freud’s writings is the case study of Little Hans, who was petrified of horses. This irrational phobia analyses out into fear they will bite him; and soon enough it is discovered that the horses in fact stand for the father who Han is afraid will chop his penis off.

To revere a totem all the year round and then kill it and eat it in a festive meal is, for Freud, a beautiful demonstration of Oedipal ambivalence, love/hate, revere/kill.

For Freud the Oedipus Complex is at the centre of all religions. The difference with Christianity is that it is a Son-religion. We identify with the Son crucified to appease the guilt we all feel at the communal assassination of the primal Father. To identify with Christ is to be relieved of the guilt of the primal parricide which Freud posits as the basis of human society in Totem and Taboo. It is to become free, rather as the neurotic, after analysis, is freed from his irrational obsessions and becomes free and autonomous to work and love.

2. The essence

Religious belief is an illusion, the fulfilment of the oldest deepest wishes of Mankind, childish wishes for:

  • protection from an uncaring world
  • universal justice (recognition of our own deserts, punishment of those who have wronged us)
  • eternal life

Freud’s diachronic history of religion – comparing early religion with childhood stages of thought – is complemented by his synchronic analysis – comparing contemporary, modern religious belief and practice with the behaviour and motivation of neurotics.

Freud doesn’t really say this fulfilment of deep wishes makes religion wrong – only that all aspects of it can be explained away in other, more scientific terms. Now, he says, as we acquire more knowledge about its origins and nature, religion is gradually dying (just as their as neurosis disappears from a gradually enlightened patient).

By contrast with religion, which fosters and encourages illusions about reality, Freud sees Science as providing an education for reality, in order to abolish childish reliance on religion and rebuild morality and social institutions on a clearer, unillusioned understanding of human nature.

We must grow up, master our own resources for real life, concentrate on this earthly life, prepare to build the New Jerusalem here on earth.

3. Critiques of Freud

In his 1927 pamphlet, The Future of An Illusion, Freud said that attacking religion may do psychoanalysis harm and the book proceeded to do just that by rousing the wrath of churchmen and moralists against him and his movement.

So Freud tried to emphasise that psychoanalysis is a neutral scientific tool, like infinitesimal calculus, a specialised tool for examining the human psyche. It could equally well be used by the defenders of religion.

Eugene Bleuler

Eugene Bleuler was one of the first to take issue with Freud. Bleuler, head of the Bergholzli mental institute in Zurich, Jung’s boss and man who gave us the terms ‘depth psychology’, ‘schizophrenia’ and ‘ambivalence’ was an early convert to psychoanalysis, but he could not go the whole way with Freud.

He granted the discovery of the unconscious but asked, Is it right to consider it only negatively, as a reservoir of repressed wishes, of the dark side? Is it right to regard the psyche as a simple machine, a mechanism within which psychic forces trigger each other and energy is circulated as in a sophisticated steam engine? Is it right to see the human animal motivated only by sexuality (even in the special widened sense Freud gave the word)? Is it right to see the mind as entirely determined by events in the distant past and not as a creative, proactive organism capable of creating new meanings and goals?

Alfred Adler

In 1911 Adler published his Critique of the Freudian Sexual Theory of Mental Life and was expelled from the Psychoanalytic Movement as a result.

A convinced socialist and, later, friend of Trostsky, Adler believed in looking at the individual as a whole in relation to the social world and all his relations with it. The aim of therapy is to build up the individual’s integrity and wholeness. Neuroses start in inferiority (the inferiority complex) and maladjusted attempts to overcome it (“the Masculine Protest”). The patient must abandon these ‘egocentric’ positions and get involved with the group. Happiness is community-based (you can clearly see Adler’s socialist bias).

(Although he powerfully denied Adler’s views once he’d been booted out of the movement, Freud later accepted some of his ideas about aggression. Some critics say Freud’s 1922 revision of instinct-theory dividing instinct into two drives, Eros and the death drive, are indebted to Adler.)

Jung

In 1913 Jung left the Movement and refined his own theories into what became Analytic Psychology. Jung redefined the libido as undifferentiated psychic energy (effectively denying its sexual nature) and claimed that it produces four processes – thinking, feeling, sensation and intuition. Each of these is governed by a dialectic, thus:

  • thinking – the rational evaluation of right and wrong
  • feeling – you divide feelings into pleasurable and unpleasurable
  • sensation – you divide into external and internal stimuli
  • intuition – according as it is effective or ineffective

The individual is governed by two modes of approach to these four processes:

  • extravert – influenced by objective factors
  • introvert – influenced by external factors

The two modes apply to each of the four processes thus giving you eight character types. Whenever the one mode of each process dominates, the opposite mode rules the unconscious, and you have to get to grips with this dark side of the soul, ‘the shadow’.

The psyche is also defined by whether it is dominated by anima (female) or animus (male). Whichever dominates, you have to accept the opposite into your life. And you have to reconcile the ‘persona’, the face we make to meet the outside world, with the demands of the ego.

The aim of Jungian therapy is to bring all these facets of the personality into alignment into one integrated personality. (This brief account leaves out all Jung’s theories of the individual and the collective unconscious, archetypes, myths and symbols etc.)

For Adler, religion is the expression of the will-to-overcome humanity’s perceived inferiority in the face of implacable reality: religion works towards an ideal future perfection. For Adler, God is the perfection of a thoroughly human ideal of overcoming. Adler sees a place for religion in the perfect human society since it reflects a thoroughly human wish – but he doesn’t believe in it.

Jung blamed Freud’s thoroughgoing rejection of religion on his being a child of the late-Victorian rationalist materialist worldview (as described above). For Jung, religion is true insofar as it is believed. Jung wanted to remain a Christian but thought denominational Christianity was chaotic and confused and stood in need of further clarifying about the human soul: and this is what his depth psychology could provide.

Neither Jung nor Adler answer the big question set by Freud: Is religion nothing more than a fulfilment of mankind’s oldest deepest wishes?

Küng’s critique

Freud’s developmental history of religion (animism >pantheism > monotheism > science) is nowhere now taken seriously. All these belief systems exist in various places in the world but have nowhere been found to follow this pattern. Sometimes they’ve gone ‘backwards’. In many places aspects of the supposed different levels of development exist happily alongside each other. Nowhere is there proof of development from one stage to the next.

Nowadays Freud’s optimistic scientism has been replaced by a belief that science may have reached its limits in explaining the origins of the human mind. We even consider that primitive peoples know better than us how to live in sympathy with their environment and that – far from leading us to a utopia cleansed of irrationalism – there may be something inherently destructive in scientific enquiry.

In 1912, the same year as Totem and Taboo was published, Emile Durkheim, the founder of modern sociology, refuted Freud’s idea of primitive religions as slavishly superstitious, but said that they contained a hard core of reality, in laying down codes of practice which had their origins in relationships in primitive society, the clan.

Durkheim was followed by most modern anthropologists and sociologists in looking no further for meaning than the internal rules of each individual tribe and culture. (Compare the anthropological structuralism of Claude Levi-Strauss.)

Thus neither the degenerative or the evolutionary theory of religion can be proved or disproved. Modern ‘primitive’ peoples aren’t photographs of the early days of humanity, as Freud and his sources thought. They themselves are the result of immense histories and traditions, albeit unwritten.

(One modern theory to explain their lack of development is to assign a crucial role to writing; whoever learns to write can leave histories; histories can be compared with modern practice and so enable the beginnings of a rational critique of social practices.)

Today there is less historical speculation, less moral-drawing, more studying of patterns of culture in situ using the functionalist approach pioneered by Bronislaw Malinowski.

At the other end of the scale modern research shows that religion has always existed. 100,000 years ago Neanderthal Man made grave furnishings; 150,000 years ago Heidelberg Man apparently offered the first fruits to his gods. The question has become not to explain away the existence of religion but to understand that for primitive man everything was religious. The more modern challenge is to explain away the rise of the secular, the scientific worldview.

Even Freud’s facts are largely wrong: totemism is not found among the beginnings of religion; among hundreds of totemic tribes discovered and documented only four knew of a rite which even vaguely resembled killing and eating the father. For anthropologist Mircea Eliade, the triumph of Freud’s views for a while was due to fashion: he established a fashionable doctrine which explains nothing in history or the rest of the world but does help explain the western intellectual’s own sense of dissatisfaction with established religion but obscure sense of guilt at the prospect of overthrowing it.

Freud claimed that psychoanalysis was a neutral tool for the cure of souls, practicable by lay and pious alike.

All Freud’s actual arguments for atheism are old, taken from Feuerbach et al but given new impetus by being underpinned by this new method of exploring the psyche. For example, all ‘projection theories’ of God as fictional answer to suffering humanity’s wishes and fantasies stem back to Feuerbach.

But Feuerbach’s, Marx’s and Freud’s atheisms are hypotheses which have not been proved. Against the reality of experience they set theory; and in the end, for all the subtlety of their critique of the social, economic or psychological determinants of the formation of religious belief in individuals and societies, no conclusion can be drawn from their theories about the existence or non-existence of God.

All human believing, hoping, loving contain elements of projection. But its object need not therefore be merely a projection. (page 77)

From the psychological point of view, faith is always going to look like the projection of early father-figures but this does not mean that God does not exist. That’s to say, the mere existence of a wish for God does not throw doubt on the actual existence of God. Perhaps it’s true:

Perhaps this being of our longings and dreams does actually exist. (page 79)

Thus Freud’s atheism (which he professed long before the discovery of psychoanalysis) turns out to ‘a pure speculation, an unproved postulate, a dogmatic claim’, just as dogmatic as anything laid down by his hated Church.

Freud’s scientism

Nowadays it is Freud’s belief in the ability of science to tell us the truth about the world, and to tell us how to behave in the light of this truth, which seems dogmatic and irrational.

Oskar Pfister, prophetically enough, criticised Freud’s position as itself an illusion before the Second World War; and since the experience of National Socialism, communist totalitarianism and the forces unleashed by the Western development of atomic bombs, the promises of atheistic science have themselves come to look deeply compromised.

The nineteenth century positivistic tradition of science delivering a utopian future now seem ludicrous. (To be fair, Freud towards the end of his life became increasingly pessimistic about this). The ideology of total planning based on rational analyses of human nature and human needs now lies in ruins: we are resigned to living with our imperfections.

For many people it is godless technocratic progress which has become the monster from which we must free ourselves. Cannot religion in fact help here, by providing a morality, a synthesis with science to create a humanistic morality?

Or will society create a new space of total disillusion with both modes of thought, neither militantly atheist nor evangelistically believing – simply drifting from belief to belief in a vast supermarket of the soul?

Is psychoanalysis a Jewish science?

Yes, says Kung. Freud was a stern Jewish moralist in a long tradition of stern Jewish moralists. He taught that all decent human life, all civilisation, rests on the suppression of sexuality, instinct and childhood gratification.

Everywhere in Freud you sense the return of the repressed legalism of the Jewish tradition which he ostentatiously rejected. There is little talk of joy or pleasure in Freud (this is what the French brought to it in the ‘jouissance’ of Barthes et al, bringing actual sex into all Freud’s talk about sex).

No, Freud’s psychology is deeply indebted to the repressed heritage of ancient Mosaic legalism. And this helps explain his lifelong obsession with Moses and his embarrassing attempts to explain away, to master, to over-write the mystery of Moses and Monotheism in his last work.

4. Critique of the critique

From Freud onwards every sphere of human knowledge has had to take account of the vast new terrain of the unconscious which Freud uncovered, and its impact on our lives. What Feuerbach wanted to achieve by a ‘cleansed’ philosophy, what Marx wanted to achieve by a science of social relations, Freud wanted to achieve through depth-psychology: an emancipation, a revaluation of the humanity of Man.

Kung concedes Freud’s criticisms of the failings of denominational religion and agrees that psychoanalysis can help in counselling etc. Psychoanalysis can liberate us from neurotic guilt feelings and help the neurotic subject return to autonomy. But it can’t relieve us of the fact of sin.

It can eliminate illness but it cannot answer ultimate questions about meaning and meaninglessness, life and death. Its aim is to bring things into consciousness, not to forgive; it is healing not salvation.

Küng’s advice to therapists is to be more religious.

Küng’s advice to theologians is to take more account of depth psychology.

Freud thought all neuroses were the result of repressed sexuality. On the contrary, Jung thought all neuroses were the result of what used to be called religion; the lack in people’s lives of a system to give their lives meaning or purpose. Jung criticises psychoanalysis for thinking the ego can stand up to the ‘dark side’ of the soul without the help of some revealed superhuman agency. In Jungian analysis this actually becomes the therapist and the therapeutic alliance.

Erich Fromm in Psychoanalysis and Religion sees two kinds of therapist:

  • the adjustment advisers
  • the doctors of the soul, committed to the optimum development of the self

For Fromm psychoanalysis is adaptable to humanitarian religion. ‘Wonder, rapture, becoming one with the world,’ all these feelings are generated in analysis, in the proper acknowledgement of the power of the id and the assent to life with all its imperfections. Fromm is an assimilationist. There should be no enmity between psychoanalysis and religion.

One of Freud’s problems was that he concentrated on an Old Testament punitive, superego-led religion; he completely failed to understand the quality of rational assent to the New Dispensation. For example, Freud tends to see Jesus only in terms of a revision of Judaism – Jesus as the sacrifice of the Son to the Father which ends the thousand years of Jewish guilt. Despite railing against it all his life, Freud showed surprisingly little understanding Christianity and its new creed of Love, of salvation through Love. (This was Pfister’s complaint also).

In pre-War Vienna Victorian sexual repression led to sex, instincts and the id being at the centre of investigations of psychic life. But, Küng argues, since the middle of the twentieth century there has been a steady growth in indulgence of all these instincts. Nowadays (when he was writing, in the 1970s) Küng thought that our biggest problems were caused by the opposite of repression, but by the overindulgence of the instincts and all the addictions and moral anarchy they lead to.

Since repression is no longer the problem it was in Freud’s day (1880s to 1910s) modern psychology has become more ego-orientated: how to give people a meaning and purpose, existential questions. The problem nowadays is one of spiritual emptiness. Technology may be daily triumphing over every aspect of our existence but it cannot finally give that existence a meaning. Küng (like Pfister before him) argues for a rational religion to cure the ill, prevent regression, channel grief and fear, help control the unbridled pleasure principle and contribute to healthy individuation.

Very late in the day, in 1933, when Hitler took power, Freud and Einstein exchanged letters on how to prevent another war. Freud seems in this late exchange to have suddenly grasped the reason behind, and the need for, a socially approved creed of Love.


More Freud reviews

Freud and His Followers by Paul Roazen (1975)

Paul Roazen (1936 to 2005) was a political scientist who became a leading historian of psychoanalysis. I first read this history of Freud and the psychoanalytic movement back in the early 1990s when it was only 15 or so years old. Now it’s getting on for 50 years old and, as I set off to read it again, I wondered about its value and relevance. Hasn’t it been superseded by more recent accounts with more modern perspectives?

Interviews

But, as I read on I discovered that this book has one really unique and enduring selling point which keeps it relevant. In 1964 Roazen set out to interview as many people as possible who had had direct experience and knowledge of Sigmund Freud. He managed to interview over 70 people who knew Freud personally; 40 or so who had taken part in the early movement or had a professional interest in its history; 25 of Freud’s actual patients; Freud’s sister-in-law, two daughters-in-law and three of Freud’s children.

(Roazen gives a full list of all those interviewed in an appendix. He also gives an extensive account of his interviewing methodology in the opening chapter.)

So even though this book is almost 50 years old, and the project itself began almost 60 years ago, the number and range of people he interviewed makes the book itself a unique historical record. While he was doing his research a steady stream of the interviewees, many in their 70s or 80s, passed away, slowly converting the book into a unique source of opinions from people who were patients of, trained under, or were directly related to Freud.

Having established his methodology, Roazen goes on to compare himself with the leading Freud biography of his day. From 1953 to 1957 Freud’s most loyal English disciple, Ernest Jones, wrote his epic three-volume biography of Freud. In this, as in all his other assessments and judgements, Roazen gives the impression of being thorough and balanced and fair. His view is that Jones was immensely thorough but, at many points, erred on the side of caution and discretion, not least to please Freud’s daughter Anna who, as early as the 1920s, had emerged as Freud’s heir and keeper of the flame and was to live on, protecting her father’s archive and reputation, until 1982.

So Roazen’s aim was to go beyond Jones, not by doing more work in the Freud archives (although he did gain unique access to the archive, as well as to the papers Jones acquired in researching his biography); but by using the method outlined above, by undertaking the most comprehensive possible set of interviews with people who knew Freud.

Context

This means that the book has much more context than a straight biography, in at least three distinct ways.

1. The followers

The most obvious way is indicated in the title of the book, which declares that it will treat Freud’s followers as thoroughly as the master. Hence, after spending 200 pages retelling the story of Freud’s early life, family, student days, tentative steps as a medical researcher, then covering the breakthrough into the invention of psychoanalysis and his development of it up to about 1910 – Roazen then devotes the remainder of this long book to a series of lengthy, in-depth chapters about ‘the followers’. These are:

  • Alfred Adler and Wilhelm Stekel (pages 187 to 233)
  • Jung (pages 235 to 300)
  • the followers who remained ‘loyal’, being Victor Tausk, Lou-Andreas-Salomé, Ernest Jones, Sandor Ferenczi, JJ Putnam, HW Frink, AA Brill (pages 304 to 386)
  • another rebel, Otto Rank (pages 389 to 413)
  • a chapter devoted to women followers: Ruth Mack Brunswick, Anna Freud, Helene Deutsch, Melanie Klein (pages 415 to 478)
  • a short section about Erikson and Hartmann (pages 499 to 505)

All this before finally returning to the man himself in the final chapter to describe Freud’s decline, flight to England, and death. Well over half the book’s 520 or so pages of text are devoted to ‘the followers’.

2. Using the interview material

Early on, when dealing with Freud’s parents and birth and boyhood and so on, all the interview material Roazen goes to some trouble to explain right at the start of the book, isn’t used very much. Even when we get to the time Freud spent in Paris studying under Jean-Martin Charcot (October 1885 to January 1886), or his ten-year collaboration studying the origins of neuroses with Josef Breuer (1890 to 1900), or his intense correspondence with sounding board Wilhelm Fliess (1887 to 1904) – Roazen gives some quotes and opinions from his interview material but not enough to change the already established stories.

The benefit of the interview project really kicks in when Roazen starts to explain the theory and practice of psychoanalytical therapy itself, the famous talking cure. This is because he now quotes extensively from many of the actual patients Freud treated, and so you he starts to depart from all the official, stiff and often pompous descriptions which Freud and his followers gave in their writings, and depicts actual practice which is far more irregular, ad hoc, unpredictable than you would have imagined. Suddenly the narrative becomes really gripping, and really human. Roazen’s interviewees’ testimonies build up a vivid picture of a flawed and deeply complicated person.

This account feeds off in two directions. It links up with the idea of the ‘followers’ because many of the patients not only describe their therapy with Freud himself, but were farmed out to what, by the 1920s, had become a sizeable number of disciples in what was now an international Psychoanalytical Movement. My point being you don’t have to wait till the later chapters to hear about the followers, you begin to get a sense of which patients Freud assigned to which of his followers, and why, and how they fared, and sometimes the conversations which went on between, say Ferenczi or Deutsch, about a patient he’d given them.

There’s a fascinating section about how long an analysis should last, with a wild variation, from one or two months to 3 or 4 or 5 years, with some patients requiring top-ups for the rest of their lives (p.145). He even admitted, on a rare occasion, that analysis could in fact, last a lifetime (p.146).

It’s here, about page 140, that the book suddenly opens up and starts giving you all kinds of insights and information you don’t get from a standard biography.

If Freud allowed himself privileges which were not for younger and more inexperienced analysts, it was because he was above all an investigator and would try almost anything once. (p.139)

Suddenly, you start seeing Freud in the wider context of the broad Psychoanalytic Movement, at first regarding treatment of patients, then other issues, and this prepares you for what’s coming up, which is the major disagreements which caused the schisms.

3. The American context

Lastly, Roazen is an American academic living on the East Coast familiar with New York and New York psychoanalysts. So a thread running through the book (once it gets warmed up about page 140) is continual comparisons between Freud’s official writings and the (sometimes wild variation in his actual) therapeutic practice on the one hand – and the staid, dull, conformist practice of the American psychoanalysts Roazen appears to know or writes confidently about.

In a nutshell, the early psychoanalytic movement included quite a few madly inventive, not to say screwed-up, individuals who rang all possible changes on Freud’s original ideas, from modifying them, to introducing new concepts, to rejecting the entire thing and walking away to set up their own movements (Adler, Jung, Rank).

But when the founding fathers and mothers fled Europe with the rise of the Nazis and then the Second World War, they found themselves in a completely different culture, far less anarchic and individualistic, far more intensely capitalist and professionalised than the old world. And so the next generation of analysts, American-born, tended to be much more professional and regular and strict and boring.

Psychoanalysis grew so fast as a movement that it has sometimes oversold itself as therapy; Americans in particular have been guilty of this. (p.186)

This decline was part of the general disappointment which came to characterise the movement, and which Roazen mentions again and again:

Psychoanalysis began with the bold hope of freeing us from mental conflicts. Its history, however, records a series of retreats in its claims for therapeutic efficacy. Originally Freud proposed to apply depth psychology to all the human sciences. But by now psychoanalysts are largely content to restrict their profession to a medical specialty. Whereas Freud and his immediate followers were radical in their expectations and their promises, and considered themselves at odds with conventional society, success has now bred a very different group of psychoanalysts … Psychoanalysis as a field is now incapable of attracting people as original and, it should be said, as undisciplined as those who joined it half a century ago. (p.32)

Compare with the repeated criticism of contemporary (1975) New York analysts for being cold and distant (p.147). But the real criticism of American psychoanalysis is that it lost its theoretical energy, its radical charge, and became just one depth therapy among many others (p.388).

(Compare with Helene Deutsch’s disappointment, in later life, at the relative failure of analysis as a therapy, p.465.)

A lot later, Roazen summarises that the trend in American psychoanalysis has been towards emphasising the ego and the healthy-minded aspects of Freud’s work. It ‘hinges on Heinz Hartmann’s concept of the “autonomous” ego to resist regressions’ (p.473)

Recap

To recap, then, this is far superior to a standard biography because it a) quite quickly places Freud amid the burgeoning, squabbling world of his followers; b) Roazen’s unique interview material provides amazing insights into the actual practice of therapy in the 1920s and 30s, as well as the complex network of therapists and patients which surrounded the great man; and c) Roazen is viewing the whole thing from 30 or so years later, when the initial, explosive creativity of the movement has fizzled out (in America, anyway) into professional conformity. It went from being a radical revolution to a conservative profession. Freud unhappily anticipated this and tried to prevent it:

‘Because of the rarity of such a combination of qualities as are needed to form the true master of mental healing by the psychoanalytic method, psychoanalysis should always remain a vocation, a mission, and should never become (as unhappily it often does today) a mere occupation or business.’ (Freud quoted on page 143)

Topics

Rather than summarise the whole book, I’ll highlight interesting topics.

The roles of Charcot and Breuer

Charcot discovered that by implanting an idea into the unconscious mind, via hypnotism, he could trigger hysterical symptoms in a patient.

Breuer discovered that if you extracted a pathological idea from the unconscious by making it conscious, then a pathological symptom disappeared.

Is psychoanalysis a Jewish invention or profession?

Personally, I think it’s obvious that psychoanalysis was a Jewish invention, something to do with:

  • close scrutiny of the self
  • a Talmudic attention to texts and words for hidden meanings
  • the outsiderness of Jews in antisemitic central Europe made it easier for them to take unorthodox risks
  • a certain type of neurotic intensity which seems to be part of Jewish culture (this may be wrong, but my views are based on the novels of Saul Bellow, Philip Roth and the movies of Woody Allen, all of which tend to ridicule goyim for being so much simpler, cruder and less obsessively reflective than Jews)

But because its founder and earliest adherents were all Jewish doesn’t make it a ‘Jewish science’. Obviously, its teachings have been taken up and developed by plenty of non-Jews and it works as a therapy for all kinds of people. In the same way that soul music is indisputably the invention of Black people, comes out of black social and musical culture, but can be enjoyed by anyone and has led plenty of white people to develop their own variations.

For what it’s worth, here are some of Roazen’s references to Jews and Jewishness in the book:

  • Freud could be suspicious of non-Jews. (p.36)
  • A Viennese Jewish analyst, Hanns Sachs, on moving to America and treating more gentile patients than he had in Europe, was worried how he could continue to analyse without Jewish stories. (p.42)
  • Freud remained sensitive to antisemitism and wary of all gentiles. He believed that basically there was no-one who was not antisemitic. (p.49)
  • To accomplish a great intellectual (rather than military) achievement was not only far more in accord with Jewish culture but was also in itself enough to establish the superiority of the Jewish spirit over the philistine Gentile world. (p.55)
  • Freud founded a great movement by which, in a sense, he sought to undermine Gentile values. (p.55)
  • As a Jew, Freud felt keenly the need for the help of the Gentile Jung. The Viennese psychoanalytic group was made up almost entirely of Jews, and Freud wanted psychoanalysis to be something more than a Jewish sect. (p.238)
  • ‘It is really easier for you than it is for Jung to follow my ideas, for in the first place you are completely independent, and then you are closer to my intellectual constitution because of racial kinship, while he as a Christian and a pastor’s son finds his way to me only against great inner resistances. His association with us is the more valuable for that. I nearly said that it was only by his appearance on the scene that psychoanalysis escaped the danger of becoming a Jewish national affair.’ Freud writing to Abraham (quoted page 239)
  • As a Jew trying to subvert and overcome Christian standards of morality, Freud had to break out of the constricting confines of Jewish circles in Vienna. (p.239)
  • Others in the movement regarded Freud’s reliance on Jung as currying favour with the Gentile world. (p.259)
  • Freud as a Jew sought Jung for the sake of breaking out of the constricting milieu of Viennese Jewry. (p.261)
  • In Freud’s movement Ernest Jones stood out as one of the few notable Gentiles. (p.347)
  • [Freud was] a master of Jewish anecdotes. (p.405)
  • Like Jung, [Heinz] Hartmann represented the world of academic psychiatry and was the Gentile Freud could rely on to keep analysis from being a completely Jewish affair. (p.505)

Why did psychoanalysis take off so quickly in America?

Roazen lists possible reasons:

  • core aspects of American culture – optimism and belief in individualism – chimed with a therapy which promised that the individual can cure themselves, through their own efforts
  • a child-centred culture liked the idea that all problems can be traced to childhood traumas or, to put it another way, we can develop new types of education to prevent those traumas ever taking place
  • a childish culture took to the idea of idealising child-like spontaneity over stifling ‘society’
  • America contained many rich people, specially in New York where the fleeing analysts arrived; before they knew it, they were treating the neuroses of the very, very rich
  • the rich like fashions and fads; psychoanalysis became steadily more and more fashionable in the 1920s and 30s
  • America, as a young nation, had a young unformed, malleable culture which this ‘radical’ new therapy could penetrate more easily than in hidebound European societies
  • America is a nation of immigrants who must carve out their own identities – psychoanalysis promises to help you do that, get in touch with your inner child, work through your problems, become successful etc
  • America, unlike France, Germany, Britain, lacked a psychiatric tradition of their own, so they, in effect, imported one and adopted it

In 1921 Freud had nine patients in analysis: 6 were new, of which 5 were Americans (p.145). By 1928 the majority of Freud’s patients were Americans (p.137).

American analysts in particular tended to be more orthodox than Freud, since European analysts were likely to have more regular contact with him. (p.142)

Later, discussing the influence of Putnam, Frink and Brill in America, Roazen suggests the US has an odd schizophrenia because its public rhetoric is all about individualism and self expression and yet in many ways it’s a deeply conformist society (shaped, although he doesn’t say this, by the all-pervasive effect of consumer capitalism).

American psychoanalysis quickly became professionalised, and well paid, talking among themselves the rhetoric of rebellion and radicalism, but in practice helping the mentally ill fit better into their society’s needs.

Although Freud loathed America…

Freud visited America along with Jung in 1909. He was quietly appalled at the lack of manners and ceremony surrounding, for example, barbecues, the lack of culture, the frenetic pace of life. Throughout the 1910s and 20s Freud’s dislike of America steadily grew. He called America ‘a gigantic mistake’. He denied ‘hating’ America, merely ‘regretted’ it.

America offended Freud ‘by its deference to numerical superiority, its belief in statistics, and its worship of brash wealth’. He called Americans ‘savages (p.406).

Roazen shrewdly points out this was partly due to Freud’s aversion to feeling dependent and, by the later 1920s, most of his patients were American i.e. he had become financially dependent on the Yankee dollar (p.382 ff.) Well into the 1930s his American patients paid Freud $20 an hour (p.419).

Is psychoanalysis based around Freud’s own personality?

Yes and no. If you’re not expecting it, it comes as a surprise to read Freud and discover just how much he refers to his own experiences and dreams and intuitions on every page. His collected writings are more like literary works than scientific papers, and literary works which are, moreover, continually, insistently autobiographical. As he himself wrote in his Autobiographical Study:

Two themes run through these pages: the story of my life and the history of psychoanalysis. They are intimately interwoven. (quoted p.507)

Or as Roazen puts it:

It would be impossible to overestimate how much of himself Freud put into his work. (p.103)

His founding text, the Interpretation of Dreams, is one of the most autobiographical works ever written, the general principles he writes about being extrapolated from an apparently endless stream of Freud’s own dreams – many, many dreams from other sources, historical, from literature, from patients or friends; buy many of Freud’s own personal ones, too. And this feels like a fundamentally literary strategy:

As with other great writers, it required a rich self to enable him to recreate a version of human experience out of his autobiography. (p.44)

Freud was aware this was a very weak spot for his theory, and touchy about suggestions that the entire theory was a huge extrapolation of his personal neuroses (p.150), so there’s weight to the attack.

But you can’t dismiss psychoanalysis as being the extrapolation of one man’s personality for two obvious reasons: one, Freud developed and evolved his ideas, quite drastically, over the 40 years he wrote on the subject; sure, these were based on his own changing beliefs, but they also reflected changes in the evidence: some the result of long analyses over decades with scores or patients; some from the evidence of other analysts in the growing movement; but the biggest change coming as a result of the First World War and the epidemic of shell shock it created.

And the second rebuttal is the way psychoanalysis was taken up and developed and fine-tuned by plenty of other people, initially in the shadow of Freud (from which some rebelled), but then, in the next generation, among analysts who’d never met him and took his teachings in whole new directions.

Especially the women analysts. Yes, you can critique some aspects of the original teachings as reflecting his personality and obsession, for example, his persistent denigration of women:

  • He thought that shame was a specifically feminine trait (p.49)
  • Freud tended in an old-fashioned manner to idealise and yet also denigrate women…In Freud’s world women are treated as objects, rarely as subjects. (p.67)

And the way his entire model of the mind privileged the experience and development of boys and men, and placed the son’s alleged struggle with his father (the Oedipus complex, p.119) dead centre of his first model of the mind. Yes, his theory had far less to say about girls and women, and when it did, was of a consistently insulting nature:

Freud’s resistance to religious ideas as akin to his more general rejection of dependence and passivity, which he associated with femininity. (p.260)

But his followers a) included leading women figures, such as Anna Freud, Helene Deutsch, Melanie Klein  and b) they developed, rejected, improved and changed his teachings in all sorts of ways, especially regarding the role of mothers in the child’s development (see below).

Above all, psychoanalysis survived, as a theory and a practice, down to the present day, which it could never have done if it had just been an elaboration of just one man’s idiosyncrasies.

Psychoanalysis eventually became something quite different from Freud personally. As the movement expanded, changes were introduced into psychoanalytic thinking which would have been utterly alien to Freud himself. Working with the method he gave them, later investigators revised some of his most cherished positions. (p.46)

Prophet of doom

An interesting aspect which ties together the issues of Freud personality and success in America was his strong personal sense that civilisation was doomed (p.53). He was a pessimistic old so-and-so. He took a ‘characteristically harsh view of human nature’ (p.162).

Freud was inclined to think that not much could help improve mankind. (p.311)

Personally, I find his gloomy pessimism about human nature appealing about his work – as opposed to the happy, smiley, religiosity of Jung, which I find off-putting.

But there are two points: in his gloomy sense that civilisation was going down the tubes, Freud was very much of his time and place. Central European thinkers had been lamenting The End of Western Civilisation since the 1890s, a process crystallised in Oswald Spengler’s famous book, ‘The Decline of the West’ (1918). Freud’s own, late work, ‘Civilisation and Its Discontents’, published in 1930, took its place in this tradition of hand-wringing lament.

But it goes to show how little his personal opinions were stamped onto psychoanalysis that, in America, this gloomy old European defeatism was completely rejected in favour of the shiny can-do positivism mentioned above.

How important was the practice of psychotherapy to Freud?

The answer which emerges very clearly is ‘not very much’. Roazen’s account quotes sometimes shocking passages from Freud’s own letters to highlight two running themes:

1. Freud quite frequently refers to his patients as scum and riff-raff.

  • ‘I do not break my head very much about good and evil, but I have found little that is ‘good’ about human beings on the whole. In my experience most of them are trash…’ (quoted p.161)
  • ‘In the depths of my heart I can’t help being convinced that my dear fellow men, with a few exceptions, are worthless.’ (quoted p.161)

2. Freud thought psychoanalysis could only really work with patients who were a) mature and b) well educated enough for the ego to be able to make sense of the revelations therapy throws up (p.152); he preferred patients from ‘the more educated classes’ (p.153). In fact he went so far as stating that the ‘optimum conditions for psychoanalysis exist where it is not needed – among the healthy’ (p.175). He hoped for far more than palliating the anxieties of the well-off.

  • He had in mind something more cultured and more elevated than the treatment of psychotics; he wanted people to be higher and better. (p.158)
  • He demanded that people grow up; he expected more of mankind. (p.178)

And anyway: ‘No one has ever been fully satisfied with therapeutic results, analytic or otherwise’ (p.363).

3. He increasingly thought the hard labour of spending years trying to help people with obstinate mental problems was for ‘the theoretical yield’. In other words, he thought treating patients was only really justified by the new theoretical insights it could give you.

Freud the wordsmith

It’s extremely obvious that Freud was one of the great writers of the 20th century, that he based his theory and practice on a very close attention to words (in free association, slips of the tongue, as they transmuted into images in dreams, the acting out of transference in the analytical situation) and spread his teachings very successfully through his charming and persuasive writings.

An interesting light is shed by the fact that he didn’t like music because there are no words for the rational mind to latch onto.

  • Of all the arts music is perhaps closest to the id, and without a guide from the more rational part of his mind Freud felt uneasy. Unable to analyse the effects of music on himself, Freud could not enjoy it. (p.57)
  • ‘Music did not interest him because he regarded it as an unintelligible language.’ (Edward Hitschmann, quoted p.270)
  • ‘I feel no need for a higher moral synthesis in the same way that I have no ear for music.’ (Freud, quoted p.377)

The limits of psychoanalysis

Among the most interesting passages in the book is Roazen’s discussion of whether psychoanalysis can help mental illness beyond mild neurosis. Can it help with the more severe mental illnesses such as schizophrenia, manic-depression, multiple personality disorder? Short answer: No.

Tellingly, Roazen digresses from Freud to point out that psychiatry as a profession still (well, in 1975) had no hard and fast method of distinguishing between neurosis and psychosis, and only a poor understanding of the combined organic and psychological causes of severe mental illness; and a limited range of treatments, which often don’t really work.

That is the biggest context of all. Psychoanalysis evolved into a system of hermeneutics or interpretation – of signs, symbols, literature, art, film etc – in the essentially well. That’s where it has ended up having the longest life and biggest significance.

In the real world of psychology, it takes its place among a range of other talking therapies, strategies and medical treatment, of mild disorders such as neuroses and depression. It has turned out not to be the complete revolution in psychiatry which Freud and the early disciples hoped for.

Transference

The key criterion for deciding whether a patient was treatable was whether they could establish transference to the analyst. Yes, and the patient can project stifled feelings and act out smothered wishes onto the figure of the analyst and both can use these to dig down and unearth the roots of the neurosis. But if no transference can be established, no treatment is possible (p.165).

Darwin

Paul Robinson implies that describing Freud’s theory as an outcrop of Darwin’s theory of evolution was errant or scandalous, but that’s how I’ve always approached Freud. If there is no God, no plan, no teleology, if we have evolved by accident through a vast series of untold contingencies, if we are just another type of animal, but admittedly with this astonishing ability of reflection and thought – how would this ‘thought’ develop in the infant, how would its developmental stages linger in adult thinking; what is thinking? I like Freud because he situates us firmly in the animal kingdom where we belong, with no special dispensation.

It may be difficult for many of us to abandon the belief that there is an instinct towards perfection at work in human beings, which has brought them to their present high level of intellectual achievement and ethical sublimation and which may be expected to watch over their development into supermen. I…cannot see how this benevolent illusion is to be preserved. The present development of human beings requires, as it seems to me, no different explanation from that of animals. (p.261)

Its main legacy

Psychoanalysis has left a legacy too pervasive on twentieth century culture to be measured. But Roazen has a very simple paragraph which says that Freud’s greatest and indisputable discovery in psychology is the persistence of infantile remnants in the adult mind, to a greater extent and of a vastly more complex nature than anyone had ever realised before. (Mind you, he has Erik Erikson saying a sentence later that Freud’s ‘greatest contribution’ was the importance of psychosexuality, p.200).

Looked at another way, Freud’s main legacy is the widespread availability of depth psychological therapy in every country in the world. The basic idea that psychological problems and symptoms in any of us may have their roots in early infant experiences and that these can be recovered, remembered and resolved, may not be the universally recommended treatment of mental ailments, but is universally accepted as at least one of the main therapeutic strategies.

Titbits

Height

Freud was only just about five foot seven in height, whereas Jung, 19 years younger, was a strapping six foot two. If we adopt a heightist theory of history, trouble was inevitable.

The schism with Jung

After seven years of correspondence, during which Freud had adopted Jung as the Crown Prince of psychoanalysis, their relationship ended. On a lecture tour of America in 1912 Jung made his differences from Freud quite clear and throughout 1913 they argued, leading up to the Psychoanalytic Congress of September 1913 where battle lines were decisively drawn. Jung rejected the primacy of sexuality. He rejected the notion that children were in any sense sexual. He had the insight that the fact that so many patients in analysis brought up infantile sexual memories was in fact a screening device, a projection back into earliest memory, of problems the patient was facing in the present. That psychoanalysis presented many patients with the easy option of dwelling endlessly on the past rather than confront the difficult future. According to Roazen this insight is now generally accepted among contemporary psychoanalysts. In 1913 Jung delivered his paper announcing his concepts of introversion and extroversion, with Freudian psychoanalysis seen as merely a subset of the former.

He was, in short, developing an entirely different model of the psyche and Freud felt he had to make an absolute break in order to protect the integrity of his model and his movement.

Jung thought he was making common-sense adaptations to the evidence continually being thrown up by actual treatment of patient. But Freud thought the sexuality of children was the absolute bedrock of his theory and saw in Jung the same pattern he’d seen in Adler and, indeed, in most western medicine and psychiatry, which was inability to face the fact of childhood sexuality which was itself based on repression among the deniers. In a typically Freudian manoeuvre, he thought the more everyone around him denied the existence of childhood sexuality, the more true it must be.

Jung resigned his editorship of the movement’s magazine in late 1913 but hung on until April 1914 before resigning as president of the International Psychoanalytical Association.

Freud had to see things in embattled oppositions, a dialectic; at first the conflict between conscious and unconscious, after the Great War the conflict between the Life Drive and the Death Drive. Above all Freud had a strict requirement to make everything rational and clear and understandable; anything which couldn’t be clearly explained was a neurosis which had to be brought into the light of explanation.

Jung had a different temperament: he saw unity in the human mind, which could incorporate these other elements. He thought the mystical and unexplained needed to be experienced and healing, wholing properties. Freud thought only the unhappy neurotic man has fantasies. Jung saw fantasy as an aspect of creativity, as a positive component in a healthy mind.

Freud was obsessed with the impact of the earliest infant and childhood experiences on the adult. Jung became increasingly interested in the problems of the elderly. Older people are less concerned about the vicissitudes of sexuality, but by a search for meaning in life.

Jung had much more clinical experience working with the seriously mentally ill. This opened him up to a far greater range of ideas of what therapy could consist of and what ‘well’ looked like. Freud had a far narrower view and thought therapy could only work with neuroses and obsessions, in other words with relatively minor mental illness. This was because Freud’s model relied on the patient’s ego or rational self being relatively intact. Once the repressed traumas of childhood sexuality were dragged into the light of day and accepted, the patient could be relied on to integrate these insights and get on with life.

Whereas Jung treated patients whose egos were splintered and needed help just getting out of bed or getting dressed. So his model of therapy was far more interventionist. Freud advocated an aloof detachment, giving rise to a tradition of cold and antiseptic therapists. Jung thought therapy should more like a collaboration and a journey.

  • ‘The therapist is no longer the agent of treatment but a fellow participant in a process of individual development.’ (p.282)
  • ‘The psychotherapist should be absolutely clear in his own mind that the psychological treatment of the sick is a relationship in which the doctor is involved quite as much as the patient.’ (p.283)

Mind you Jung was a bigot, too. He was notoriously intolerant of male homosexuality. And he thought university education had a disastrous impact on women’s personalities (p.278).

Science

It was very characteristic of Freud not to define ‘science’ in terms of methodology, hypotheses, experiments and data, but solely in terms of his own model of the mind. Thus:

To Freud, the essence of science was that it represented ‘the most complete renunciation of the pleasure principle of which our mental activity is capable.’ (p.245)

But Roazen points out that this metaphor is immensely autobiographical. It simply described Freud’s personality – tight-lipped, stoical, immensely self-contained, aloof. An entirely subjective autobiographical model which every other analyst and therapist has been free to ignore, not least Jung with his emphasis on a more humane therapeutic engagement.

According to Roazen, it was in the 1920s that Freud moved away the often literary basis of his writings in a bid to emphasise the scientific nature of psychoanalysis.

Superstition

Superstition derives from suppressed hostile and cruel impulses. Superstition is in large part the expectation of trouble; and a person who has harboured frequent evil wishes against others, but has been brought up to be good and has therefore repressed such wishes into the unconscious, will be especially ready to expect punishment for his unconscious wickedness in the form of trouble threatening him from without. (Psychopathology of Everyday Life, 1901.)

Totem and Taboo

Roazen rubbishes Totem and Taboo as do all modern commentators. Freud projected his fairy tale ‘discovery’ of the Oedipus Complex back onto ‘primitive’ societies claiming that every society passed through the same developmental phase (just as he insisted all toddlers do), namely when the horde is dominated by a great Father who hogs all the nubile women, the young generation of men (all his sons) band together to kill and eat him, then are overcome with guilt and so institute a new religion around a great sacrificed god alongside complex taboos regarding incest and exogamy.

No anthropologist has ever found any evidence to support this story which amounts to a fairy tale, a projection by Freud of his pet developmental theory back into an invented prehistory. Totem and Taboo is Freud’s silliest book, though it has steep competition in the equally ludicrous Moses and Monotheism (Freud had the grace to describe Totem as a ‘novel’, though it is really the fantastical farrago of a very old man working out his obsessions in public) (p.301).

Famous analysands

‘Analysand’ means ‘someone undergoing psychoanalysis’. The most famous analysands would include composer Gustav Mahler, poet Rainer Maria Rilke, and novelist Herman Broch.

Ego psychology

Freud’s emphasis was on decoding the repressed wishes of the unconscious via dreams, slips and free association. His focus was on the unconscious and repressed drives. From the 1930s the younger generation of analysts began to switch the focus to the conscious mind, the ego, specifically to understand the mechanisms of coping and defence which the ego deployed.

In 1936 Freud’s daughter, Anna, who had followed him into analysis, published ‘The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence’, a study of the ‘ways and means by which the ego wards off depression, displeasure and anxiety’. It became a founding work of ego psychology. By the 1950s this focus on ego psychology had become the main stream of psychoanalysis.

Two paradoxes

Calvinism, Marxism and Psychoanalysis are all deterministic ideologies, propounding iron laws of causation, and yet all relied very heavily on the achievements of zealous and energetic individuals (p.350).

Marx loathed Russia, its backwardness and brutality, and yet it was in Russia, of all the European countries, that his followers seized power and he was set up as a god. Similarly, Freud came to deeply loathe America and all it stood for (fake egalitarianism, lack of culture, surplus money) and yet it was in the single nation he hated most that Freud’s invention became most successful and lucrative (p.384).

A fine figure

Ernest Jones, the only Gentile in Freud’s close circle, a feisty defender of the Master, and very energetic organiser, the man who wrote the magisterial three-volume biography of Freud – was also an excellent figure skater and actually wrote a book about figure skating. (p.353)

Freud’s followers

  • Paul Federn (1871 to 1950)
  • Edward Hitschmann (1871 to 1957)
  • Victor Tausk (1879 to 1919) suicide after Freud told Helene Deutsch to stop analysing him
  • Lou Andreas-Salome (1861 to 1937)
  • Hanns Sachs (1881 to 1947)
  • Theodor Reik (1888 to 1969)
  • Herman Nunberg (1883 to 1970)
  • Karl Abraham (1877 to 1925) solid, reliable
  • Max Eitingon (1881 to 1943) Russian with enough private fortune to fund the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute; analysed by Freud on evening strolls
  • Georg Groddeck (1866 to 1934) disorganised, Freud stole the word das Es for the unconscious, Groddeck believed organic illnesses were the product of thwarted desires, he specialised in applying psychoanalysis to organically sick patients
  • Paul Schilder (1886 to 1940) as professor of psychiatry at University of Vienna did more than any other man to promote psychoanalysis
  • Herbert Silberer (1882 to 1923) suicide
  • Ernest Jones (1879 to 1958)
  • Sandor Ferenczi (1873 to 1933) delightful, popular; Freud wrote more letters to Ferenczi than anyone else (2,500); diverged from Freud in later years by thinking patients needed the parenting and motherly love they often lacked in childhood
  • James Jackson Putnam (1846 to 1918) a Gentile, professor at Harvard and early American adopter of psychoanalysis; disagreed with Freud’s emphasis on conflict and the dark side of the unconscious
  • Horace W. Frink (1883 to 1935) a Gentile, had 2 analyses with Freud but then suffered a complete mental breakdown
  • Abraham A. Brill (1884 to 1948) by end of the Great War the acknowledged head of psychoanalysis in America (p.380)
  • Sandor Rado (1890 to 1972) brilliant pupil who was sent to direct training at the New York Institute but the faithful felt he had deviated in some of his books and led attacks which ended in him being expelled
  • Franz Alexander (1891 to 1964)
  • Erich Fromm (1900 to 1980) politically committed (Marxist) Fromm tried to integrate psychoanalysis with contemporary social thought. Together with Karen Horney and Harry Stack Sullivan, Fromm belongs to a Neo-Freudian school of psychoanalytical thought which is outside the scope of Roazen’s book
  • Erik Erikson (1902 to 1994) an intuitive child analyst with no medical or university training, Erikson was spotted and encouraged to become an analyst by Anna Freud. He found the atmosphere of the Vienna group stifling; after he fled the Nazis to America, Erikson worked on the formation of identity, postulating a sequence of identities which the developing must create in order to achieve ‘ego strength. Erikson coined the term ‘identity crisis’

Otto Rank

Otto Rank (1884 to 1939) from a very lowly background, was mentored and supported by Freud, became his indispensable secretary, expert on mythology, wrote The Myth of the Birth of the Hero which, in offering psychoanalytic interpretations of literature, was right up Freud’s street.

When the breach came it was about the role of the mother, and the aims of therapy. Up till the 1920s Freud’s theory focused almost entirely on the role of the father, specifically the boy child’s resentment and efforts to overthrow him, named the Oedipus complex. Mothers existed, but as the source of the succouring breasts or as objects of infantile sexual fantasy, rarely for themselves.

Rank greatly expanded the importance of the mother, the closeness of the mother-infant bond, and the importance of separation anxiety. Rank then sought the deep origin of that anxiety in the experience of the trauma of being born, a horrifying experience laid down in the unconscious and triggered by all kinds of later experiences. Therefore, he developed the idea that the patient relive the experience of being born; or at least act out the anxieties and terrors it gave rise to.

This was in flat contradiction to Freud’s notion that therapy be an entirely rational process whereby infantile issues were dragged into the light of day and calmly examined by the detached, clinical adult. Freud’s therapy was all about intellectual insight. Rank was suggesting emotional release. Insight was not enough; the patient needed active emotional support (something Jung had suggested before the war). All this was expressed in his 1924 book, The Trauma of Birth.

Wilhelm Reich (1897 to 1957)

Reich was one of the most extreme and radical analysts and Freud disliked him from the start. Where Freud thought therapy was predominantly about memory i.e. dredging up specific repressed memories which lay behind specific neurotic symptoms, Reich (like Jung and Adler) thought therapy should address the whole person.

He took a literalistic definition of sexuality as genital gratification, which Freud thought a massive step backwards to the traditional view of sex which his theory of libido was meant to expand and deepen. Reich thought mental illness was caused by sexual repression and therefore he promoted free expression of sexuality. In the 1960s this fed into the notion of ‘free love’ i.e. having sex whenever you wanted with whoever you fancied, leaving no sexual urge unexpressed.

Reich thought the family was the institution whereby each generation’s sexuality was defined, controlled, monitored and repressed and so he recommended abolishing the nuclear family, and having children raised by communities of adults (as later practiced in Israeli kibbutzim).

Finally, he was a Marxist, a rare political radical among the bourgeois analysts, who linked the overthrow of bourgeois society and taking ownership of the means of production, as cognate with overthrowing the nuclear family so that every individual could take ownership of their own sexuality.

In the late 1920s Reich went on a lecture tour of Bolshevik Russia where he claimed that without a full sexual revolution the Soviet state would degenerate into a repressive bureaucracy, the net effect of which was, amusingly, to prompt the Soviet authorities to shut down the until-then thriving Russian Psychoanalytic Society (p.493).

Reich was kicked out of the International Psychoanalytical Society in 1934. Reich moved to Norway where he carried out investigations into the nature of the orgasm (trying to measure electrical activity in the brain during sex). With the outbreak of war he fled to America.

Shortly after he arrived in New York in 1939 that Reich first said he had discovered a biological or cosmic energy, an extension of Freud’s idea of the libido. He called it ‘orgone energy’ or ‘orgone radiation’, and the study of it ‘orgonomy. (Wikipedia)

His increasingly wild experiments with orgone and erratic behaviour drew the attention of the authorities and, after a sequence of legal problems, he was sent to prison in Pennsylvania where he died of heart failure in 1957.

Women psychoanalysts

The penultimate chapter, chapter 9, (pages 415 to 478), is devoted to the key women in the movement, namely:

Ruth Mack Brunswick née Blumgart (1897 to 1946)

Brunswick worked closely with Freud to flesh out his theories, subtly bringing out the importance of the mother in the development of the child, and the importance of the pre-oedipal period, especially in women, which Freud admitted he had been unable to get at because his women patients always projected memories of their fathers onto him (p.424). Brilliant theorist but Roazen depicts her as working too closely with Freud, her extended analysis with him (1922 to 1938) turning into a psychological addiction. She became addicted to painkillers and died miserably.

Anna Freud (1895 to 1982)

Freud’s youngest child, an unwanted pregnancy, ended up becoming his primary carer after he was diagnosed with jaw cancer in 1923, and then jealous protector of the family archive, letters and so on. Nowhere near as intellectually brilliant or as good a writer as her father, she nonetheless developed into a leading figure in the next generation of the movement for her pioneering work with children. For five years before she thought about becoming an analyst, she worked as a schoolteacher with small children, and this experience fed into her therapeutic practice and then theoretical writing (p.433). She set up the Anna Freud Clinic which continues to this day.

Anna said that children couldn’t be directly analysed because their chief transference remained onto their parents. Therefore the analyst had to a) develop an educative relationship with the child i.e. stand in the relationship of teacher but also b) work through the parents. Often, changing the family situation was enough to cure a child’s symptoms (p.438).

But her key theoretical work was to pioneer the new focus from the 1930s onwards on ego psychology (see above). Her most famous book, ‘The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence’, listed these mechanisms: regression, repression, reaction-formation, isolation, undoing, projection, introjection, turning against the self, denial, identification with the aggressor – all strategies to help the ego cope, manage, survive.

With Dorothy Burlingham she set up a hostel for parentless children during the Second World War and noticed that if one of the women carers succeeded in forming a mothering bond with a child, the child’s halted development could resume. The importance of mothering. During the 1950s and 60s it became more obvious that relationships with the good or bad mother played as much or a greater role in child development as with the threatening father depicted in Freud’s version of analysis.

Helene Deutsch (1884 to 1982)

Pioneer of female psychology. Published The Psychology of Women (1945). Despite her emphasis on the importance of the mother in the child’s development, many of Deutsch’s views were, echoing Freud’s sexism, surprisingly conservative, and she has come in for criticism from feminists. For example, Deutsch’s belief that a woman only becomes fully a woman by transferring her agency onto a strong man to whom she willingly becomes a dependent. She must leave the initiative to the man; she must renounce her originality, etc. Roazen cites a critique by Germaine Greer. (Roazen gives a jaw-dropping compilation of Freud’s sexist assumptions, pages 462 to 465).

She was Freud’s golden girl in the early 1920s but they had a falling out and she never regained his trust, which hurt her for the rest of the life. She played a key role in setting up and running the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, but spotted the looming threat of the Nazis and emigrated to America in 1935, where she continued practicing and was held in high esteem.

Melanie Klein (1882 to 1960)

Klein was one of the next generation of women who emphasised the importance of the Mother in a child’s development, in Freudian terms focusing on ‘pre-oedipal’ layers of child development.

Freud, in his rationalist patriarchal way, had emphasised the importance of words and reason: the repressed material has to be dragged into the light of day in the form of words. The female psychoanalysts highlighted the pre-verbal communication of the really young infant.

Klein caused a lot of controversy because she moved a lot of Freud’s developmental schema much earlier, into the life of the pre-verbal baby. She sees the baby as seething with the rage and jealousies which Freud had attributed to the Oedipus complex about age 5.

Klein was a zealot. She believed that children responded to the same therapeutic environment as adults. She thought the child playing with toys as the exact equivalent of the adult’s free association with words, and both as direct channels into the unconscious. She thought every child without exception should be given analytic therapy as a prophylactic against later neurosis. Roazen calls Klein’s approach ‘crusading’ and ‘utopian’ (p.478).

In this stern inflexibility she was the opposite of Anna Freud’s more nurturing, mothering supportiveness. The differences between the two women were made explicit when they both gave papers on child psychoanalysis at a psychoanalytical congress in 1927, and remained the source of sometimes bitter enmity. Freud was prepared to leave a patient with some neuroses if they helped him or her cope. Klein was ferocious to pursue every single neurosis in order to effect a complete ‘cure’.

Freud came to disapprove of Klein as the 1920s went on but was wanted to avoid an open break as he had with the big male schismatics: partly because the big three schisms were with men he had overloaded with oedipal significance and seen as his ‘son and heir’, Crown Prince etc, whereas he never gave any female analyst the same significance; partly because Klein’s theory came from a place doubly removed from his own experience, analysing children and deep consideration of the female psyche, neither of which Freud had a feel for.

When, in 1926, Ernest Jones offered Klein a job at the British Psychoanalytic Institute in London in a bid to beef up its intellectual level, she accepted the offer, moved to London and lived there for the rest of her life. Her fierce character and intense convictions strongly influenced British psychoanalysis and Roazen speculates that the British wing might, eventually have been forced to secede from the international movement if it hadn’t been for the Nazis.

The advent of the Second World War brought a wave of Viennese analysts to London along, of course, with the Master himself and her daughter. The newcomers thought Klein’s focus on pre-oedipal experiences was yet another denial of and resistance to the centrality of the Oedipus Complex – the same crux which had forced out Jung, Adler and Rank.

This town ain’t big enough for the both of us describes the daggers drawn atmosphere that developed between the well-established Kleinians and the newly arrived, orthodox Freudians.

Reading about the way Freudian psychoanalysis developed, evolved and splintered, creating divergent heretics and sects, gives exactly the same pleasure as reading about the first few hundred years of Christian history. There are multiple levels of pleasure. One is watching the way a fundamental idea can be reinterpreted, expanded, followed to its logical conclusions in ways its founders never dreamed of – like watching a game of chess unfold, like watching the plot of a good novel develop in ways you never expected but seem logical as soon as they’re explained.

And the other pleasure is a soap opera-level enjoyment of watching very clever people fight like ferrets in a sack. Roazen’s descriptions of Ernest Jones’s political manoeuvrings are entertaining, but not as funny as his account of the way Jones’s number two in London, Edward Glover, was conducting an analysis on Klein’s daughter, Melitta Schmideberg, and used material thrown up by this to attack Klein in the name of orthodoxy and Anna.

In a phrase, these very clever, very subtle people, who liked to imagine they held the key to solving all the psychological problems of mankind, turn out to be just as underhand, devious, manipulative and vicious as a cellarful of rats.

Thus Roazen speculates the way Melanie Klein’s writings emphasise the goodness of the mother but the child’s vicious, negative emotions, its possessiveness and anger, can plausibly be mapped onto the way her own daughter, Melitta, attacked her, in writing and in public forums.

The war of words really broke out at the end of the bigger world war, in 1944 and 45. A compromise was proposed whereby two groups would have separate facilities, the B group (Anna and followers) and the B group (everyone else). Some members joined the A group, some the B group, but at least half rejected the idea of a split, and wanted peace.

These became known as the Middle Group or Independents, and it’s from their number that the most influential British theorists emerged, namely John Bowlby, Michael Balint and Donald Winnicott.

Other notable women in the movement included:

  • Dorothy Burlingham, American who left her disturbed husband to move to Vienna with her four children; worked closely with Anna
  • Marianne Kris
  • Jeanne Lampl-de Groot
  • Eva Rosenfeld
  • Hermine von Hug-Hellmuth
  • Princess Marie Bonaparte (1882 to 1962)

Thoughts – the widest impact

Reading this book through to the bitter end (Roazen’s apparently never-ending list of Freud’s followers eventually becomes quite exhausting) makes you realise it’s getting on for pointless to try and assess ‘the legacy of Freud’ because his biggest legacy was that he created an entire new field of human enquiry and medical practice, which has spawned scores, maybe hundreds, of followers, acolytes and heretics who have themselves gone on to develop or invent whole new sub-domains and new channels of investigation.

Without Freud an Adler, Jung, Rank or Erikson and some of his umpteen other followers might have gone into psychiatry, but many wouldn’t have because they didn’t have the strict medical training required. So Roazen’s book teaches us that alongside a consideration of Freud’s achievement in terms of his writings and theory, must go the obvious fact that just as important was his creation of such a league of followers.

And that it is often through the followers that major ideas have emerged which have percolated into popular consciousness and popular culture. The concepts of the inferiority complex, identity crisis, separation anxiety, are all products of the intellectual framework Freud created.

*****

Great men

The most dated thing about the book is that Roazen comes from a time and place where he still believes in ‘Great Men’ and ‘Great Thinkers’. Although he critiques multiple aspects of Freud’s character and theory, nonetheless his basic instinct is to place Freud firmly in the pantheon of Great Men.

  • ‘Freud’s genius’ (p.13)
  • ‘a revolutionary in the world of ideas’ (p.29)
  • ‘Freud deserves to be a hero of our time’ (p.40)
  • Jones interpreted Freud’s credulity as part of the receptivity and open-mindedness that accompanies genius. (p.108)

He carries a 1940s/50s mental model of Great Men who Made the Modern World and are Heroes of Thought, Intellectual Giants etc. I don’t know exactly when this model died off – sometime in the 1980s? – giving way to a far more complex model which, for a start, includes lots more women, but more generally opened up the world of the mind to thousands more creative thinkers, across the full range of the arts and humanities and sciences, and also opened the doors to non-white people beyond the Anglosphere – till you arrive at the jostling, thronged, progressive and often dangerous, sometimes bewildering, multicultural intellectual world we live in today.

Americanisation

The second aspect I found odd was how conventional and conservative his view of psychoanalysis is. This might partly be because he’s American. Americans are (or were) notorious for their positive, upbeat, can-do attitude. Businesslike, have-nice-a-day consumer capitalism. It’s fairly well known that most of the first generation psychoanalysts, being Jewish, fled Europe with the rise of the Nazis and settled in America, especially in New York with its large Jewish population.

In America the questing, experimental, tentative, the Middle European and often quite bleak, pessimistic tone of Freud and his first followers, refugees from the land of Kafka and Musil, was converted into a positive, upbeat, we-can-fix-you procedure for the land of Walt Disney and Oprah Winfrey. You can achieve your dreams! You can be happy and healthy! You can have it all! Just sign up here for your starter course of psychotherapy at the very reasonable price of 25 bucks an hour and we’ll have you back on your feet and back in the office in no time.

So although Roazen pays lip service to Freud as discoverer of the unconscious blah blah, along with all the other stuff about libido, repression, transference and so on, it doesn’t really worry him. He doesn’t seem to take on board what is truly revolutionary about Freud which is that he destroyed the rationale of two and a half thousand years of philosophy, theology, legal and political theory which were all based on the notion that human beings have a capacity for objective reason.

No they don’t. We are terrified animals which, in the course of our infant development, develop a set of psychic defence mechanisms to mediate between the inner world of our raging drives/desires and the cold, brutal outside world which doesn’t give a damn about us. No wonder so many people are damaged and betray odd compulsions, obsessions and anxieties. It’s a very anxious position to be in!

But deeper and more subversive than that, Freud asserts that the rational mind isn’t a shining Greek god, isn’t a gleaming repository of reason and morality, but is made out of the same dark chaotic stuff as the unconscious. The so-called ego is just bits of the unconscious which are split off by the human organism, which can’t help itself developing strategies to try and cope with the ongoing frustration of nearly all its instinctual drives and fantasies.

This is a complete, radical and devastating break with the age-old tradition that all humans contain a fragment of the divine reason in their minds, are mostly capable of rational self-interest (as the economists ridiculously claim), of rational debate and political decisions (as political theorists absurdly claim). No. We are petrified animals subject to a bewildering variety of psychic mechanisms and strategies designed first and foremost to allow us to fulfil psychic wishes and desires, albeit often sublimated into socially acceptable forms.

Thus all the social labels and categories dished out by traditional psychology, ‘neurotic’, ‘obsessive’, ‘degenerate’ and so on, are all relative. We are all on the spectrums of weird behaviour. People don’t just have quirks and anomalies which are basically additions to a reliable core of common sense and reason. There is no common sense and reason. We are all made entirely out of quirks and weirdness. Freud hoped his therapy might, a little, ameliorate and lessen the quirks and weirdnesses which afflict all of us, which humans are, in fact, made of.


Credit

Freud and His Followers by Paul Roazen was published by Alfred Knopf in the USA in 1975, and by Allen Lane in the UK in 1976. References are to the 1979 Peregrine paperback edition.

More Freud reviews

Future of an Illusion and other writings on religion by Sigmund Freud

Note: to avoid misunderstanding, I believe Freud is a figure of huge cultural and historical importance, and I sympathise with his project of trying to devise a completely secular psychology building on Darwinian premises. Many of his ideas about sexuality as a central motive force, about the role of the unconscious in every aspect of mental life, how repressing instinctual drives can lie behind certain types of mental illness, his development of the talking cure, these and numerous other ideas have become part of the culture and underlie the way many people live and think about themselves today. However, I strongly disapprove of Freud’s gender stereotyping of men and women, his systematic sexism, his assumption of Western superiority over ‘primitive’ peoples, and so on. Despite the revolutionary impact of his thought, Freud carried a lot of Victorian assumptions into his theory. He left a huge and complicated legacy which needs to be examined and picked through with care. My aim in these reviews is not to endorse his opinions but to summarise his writings, adding my own thoughts and comments as they arise.

***

1. The Future of An Illusion (1927)

Freud posits a parallel between the development of a child and the development of civilisation. In individuals you get a progression through helpless infant, wilful adolescent and mature adult. By an analogous evolution society can be said to develop through stages, from savage tribes with beliefs in all kinds of spirits; to semi-civilised societies who believe in one God; then onto modern society, rational, scientific and atheist.

1. Civilisation is based on, indeed, is to some extent defined as, the amount of instinctual repression it can achieve. Some people (i.e. communists) may wish for a redistribution of wealth so that everyone will work joyfully and creatively together. Unlikely. People don’t like work; people prefer indulging their instincts in pleasurable pursuits. Civilisation means coercing people into wealth-creating work and making them repress their instinctual desires.

2. Society organises instinctual repression. The upper classes repress their instincts in order to provide a ‘moral’ role-model for the workers. The workers are ambivalent towards this model of rational self-repression, partly resenting it because they are clearly not getting as much wealth and power as the upper classes; but allying with their rulers if the latter identify threats from outsiders, for example, the ‘barbarians’ for ancient Greece or Rome, or ‘outsider’ groups such as Jews in 20th century societies (or refugees and immigrants in contemporary Britain). But all sectors of society can be united by certain artistic ideals (in the sense that art is a sublimation of our instinctual wishes). A shared art can help unite people in their ideal.

(N.B. Freud wrote this during the heroic age of Bolshevik propaganda – 1927 – and anticipated many of the aesthetic theories of the Nazis, namely to unite the Volk in worship of high ideals while focusing anti-social energy onto outsider groups like the Jews.)

3. Primitive man is paralysed with fear in face of the horrors of existence, the arbitrariness of disease, famine, catastrophe, death and so on. He peoples the world with spirits who he tries to relate to in the same way he relates to those around him i.e. family, chief, slaves etc. As mankind develops, so does this primitive pantheism, so that the many spirits and their functions become concentrated into a king of the gods and, eventually, into one figure, one God, ruler of a totally controlled Providence, in charge of divine justice, deciding who has been good and will be rewarded etc. Naturally, whoever thought up this monotheism consider themselves to be The One People, the Chosen People (i.e. the Jews).

4. Freud reminds the reader of the theory he outlined in Totem and Taboo 15 years earlier. There he took a hint from Darwin about the possibility that early man lived in hordes, a band of brothers borne by a harem of mothers owned and inseminated by one semi-divine Father. In Freud’s fantasy of ‘primitive’ society the brothers rose up in rebellion, overthrew the ruling Father, killed him and ate him in a communal meal deliberately designed to implicate everyone in the guilt. This ‘historical’ fact is what lies behind the practice found among so many cultures – the worship of a totem animal which is superstitiously revered all year round, except for the one holy day when it is executed and ritually eaten. (In fact, no history or anthropology has come anywhere near confirming Freud’s fantasy of this primal parricide, which is generally discredited.)

Freud then highlights the continuity between his explanation of religion as a protection for the helpless savage from the cruel forces which surround him, and modern-day religious belief.

5. Freud lists the reasons our parents and priests give for believing religion:

  1. it is handed down from time immemorial
  2. there are many proofs
  3. in any case, you’re forbidden to discuss it

In fact 2) is demolished because religious belief is so riddled with contradictions and falsehoods, for example, the contradictions in the Bible, the explosion of the Genesis myths by archaeology and geology and so on. Some Christians say, ‘I believe precisely because it is absurd’ but if that is the case, why not believe any old absurdity and fantasy? The fact is that religious people may differ in details of theology or ritual but overlap considerably in their basic, primeval wishes – to be consoled, protected, assured of life after death.

Spiritualists try and persuade us of the immortality of the soul but how pitiful is the transparent egotism of such a wish, the wish to live forever, to deny the upsetting reality of death and extinction.

6. Religion is an illusion: an illusion is a belief incorporating a large amount of wish-fulfillment. We all want a Big Daddy to hide from us the desolation and heartbreak of reality, to pick us up and dust us off and make things better. Religious beliefs cannot be proved or refuted, and this is clearly what gets Freud’s goat about religious people – they are so dishonest. They have no intellectual discipline but use whatever tools lie to hand – logic till that runs out, absurdity till that won’t serve, the strength of tradition till that is proved to be largely false, and then the testimony of personal experience which can’t be proved or disproved – they will do anything to cling onto their pitifully childish wishes: Yes, I will live forever; Yes, Daddy loves me, totally, completely; Yes, all the injustices I suffer now are recorded and will be set right in the Afterlife.

Even a bunch of ‘savages’ ought to be embarrassed by the childishness of all this, let alone so-called ‘civilised’ men.

7. ‘Ah but’ (says The Voice of The Believer, which Freud invents to play Devil’s advocate), ‘it is:

  1. dangerous to undermine religion since this will lead to anarchy
  2. cruel to deprive people of the illusions that sustain them

Now these are good points which Freud doesn’t really rebut. He concedes that that religion has achieved much, historically, by making civilization possible (i.e. focussing people’s anarchic wishes and fears onto one controllable God) but moves on swiftly to point out how, after thousands of years of its hegemony, just look around at the misery, injustice and inhumanity which still plague us. Far from ensuring moral behaviour, religion has in fact made many scandalous concessions to the weakness of human nature, for example, the rigmarole of confession and penance and masses for dead relatives, and so on.

But fortunately, in Freud’s view, the spirit of Science is now abroad: we live in dangerous times and pretty soon the repressed masses are going to realise that the sanctions against rebellion underpinned by religion have evaporated. So if we want to keep order in society, we have to do something about the fact that religion is collapsing and have to establish a firmer foundation for law and morality than this dying system – solid, secular ethics.

8. By basing the undoubtedly wise injunction ‘Thou Shalt Not Kill’ exclusively on God’s authority, along with a host of other restrictions and laws, we risk the collapse of these injunctions so vital to civilisation when religion itself collapses, as it inevitably will, before the onslaught of science.

Better to be honest. Religion is ‘true’ (just like dreams and neurotic symptoms) insofar as it tells us a psychologically true story in symbolic terms (for example, the central event of the sacrifice and cannibalism of the Father as depicted in Totem and Taboo is psychologically true depiction of the Oedipus Complex which Freud claims every male human experiences). But now, says Freud, it’s time to cast symbols aside and face the facts, to move into the scientific – or adult – phase of civilization.

9. The Voice of the Believer says this is dangerous talk because it is naive to think that Reason can replace Religion as the glue binding Society together. Look at the French Revolution which tried just this and catastrophically failed.

Once again, Freud doesn’t quite refute this good point. Instead he says the reason to be sceptical about any triumph of Reason is because so many people’s adult intellects are weakened, and this is because:

  1. their instinctual sex life is so repressed that they become obsessed and/or ill
  2. as children they are force-fed so much illogical nonsense under threat of hellfire

No, says Freud, we must take the risk, we must draw up a plan for modern education which omits religion. It may take a while for the reform to take affect (he cites the slow progress of Prohibition in the USA, 1920 to 1933) but it will be worth it to build the just, unrepressed, scientific society of the future.

Instead of wasting our energy on vain hopes of an afterlife, let’s build a New Jerusalem on earth ‘by concentrating all our liberated energies into life on earth.’ Freud expresses the ‘hope that in the future science will go beyond religion, and reason will replace faith in God’.

10. The Voice of Religion says:

  1. you are trying to replace a tried and tested illusion with an untried one, and
  2. religion unites all levels of society from labourer to intellectual. What else can do this?

Once again Freud answers his own question unconvincingly by resorting to the relatively small example of the help he has been able to give individual patients in coming to terms with their illnesses. Freud hopes that psychoanalysis can extend that help to society at large.

This is, to put it mildly, quite a big hope…

Thoughts

Given Freud’s lifelong animus against religion, it’s surprising that, when he finally got round to writing a complete book on the subject, it turned out to be such a surprisingly bad and unsystematic text. It trots through various arguments for atheism, buttressed by bits of psychoanalytic theory, but is surprisingly ramshackle and unconvincing.

For me, the Voice of the Believer which he creates in order to dramatise the text, is much more persuasive, especially when you consider that, as Freud was writing, some European nations stood poised to experiment with just the sort of non-religious, ‘scientific’ ideologies to bind society together which Freud appears to recommend: Stalin’s Russia and Nazi Germany.

Obviously, Freud wasn’t a Nazi or a Bolshevik, but both those ideologies claimed to have ‘scientific’ solutions to society’s problems, circa 1927, which just goes to show what a slippery term ‘science’ is, just as liable to ideological manipulation and distortion as the ‘religion’ he so simple-mindedly attacks.

And then, looking back with the benefit of hindsight from 2023, it’s clear that, despite with all the gee whizz technology we in the West have invented, if you look at the world as a whole, religious fundamentalism (Muslim and Hindu, in particular) and irrational nationalisms (Russia, Turkey, Brazil), are on the rise almost everywhere.

It is Freud’s hopes for a rational, secular and scientific future which seem naive and superficial.

2. Oskar Pfister’s The Illusion of A Future: A Friendly Disagreement with Professor Sigmund Freud (1928)

Freud wrote The Future of an Illusion in 1927 partly with his friend and devout Christian, Oskar Pfister, in mind. The following year Pfister wrote a pamphlet refuting Freud’s points, The Illusion of a Future, which Freud welcomed (dissent was OK as long as fundamental allegiance to The Movement remained unquestioned).

Pfister summarises Freud’s critique of religion in The Future of an Illusion, thus:

  1. Religion is a universal obsessional neurosis based on the Oedipus Complex.
  2. Religion comprises a system of wishful illusions together with a disavowal of reality.
  3. Religion is hostile to free thought.
  4. Religion has failed as a guardian of civilisation.

Pfister’s rebuttals

1. Undoubtedly religious belief can include a neurotic component. Undoubtedly early religious systems were based on ‘primitive’ mental states. Undoubtedly religious belief in its earliest phase was bound up with the repression of instinctual drives accompanied by neurotic components. But that doesn’t disprove the validity of belief itself.

Freud oversimplifies to say the same Oedipal complex lies at the bottom of all religious belief. Can such a simple explanation really explain the religion of the totemists, the social-ethical monotheism of the Israelites, the Aten-belief of the Egyptians, the piety of the conquistadors, and so on?

In contrast to the many repressive elements of primitive religious belief, Pfister sets the uniquely unrepressed and liberating belief of reformed Christianity, and above all, the ethical achievement of Jesus’s commandment of Love.

Jesus overcame the collective neurosis of his people according to good psychoanalytic practice in that he introduced love – morally complete love – into the centre of life.

For Pfister, Jesus was the first psychoanalyst. Therefore Freud, insofar as he is following in Jesus’s footsteps, is a good Christian!

Whoever has fought with such immense achievements for the truth and argues for the salvation of love, as you have [Pfister’s book is directly addressed to Freud], is a true servant of God according to Protestant standards.

For Pfister Protestantism is the reverse of Freud’s neurotic, repressed illusion: it is the blossoming of man into his full biological destiny of love.

It is misleading of Freud to write his natural history of the development of religion in such a way as to tar Christian belief with the brush of primitive animism etc. The entire point of Christianity is that Jesus represents a triumph over the irrational compulsions of the Old Law, the superstitious repressions of the Old Testament, and its replacement with a new dispensation of brotherly love and love of God.

2. Undoubtedly there is a large element of wish-fulfilment in much religious experience. Pfister points out that Freud is indebted to the pioneering ideas of Ludwig Feuerbach (1804 to 1872) and his psychologising of religion; it was Feuerbach who first demonstrated that much theology is disguised anthropology and religion a dream.

But, for a start, many atheists are governed just as much by wish-fulfilment as believers; and their compulsion to disbelief, their atheism, is no more than their Oedipal wish to do away with the Father. Wishes are common to all mankind, as psychoanalysis shows. Pfister agrees with Freud that the moral progress of mankind consists of the overcoming of egotistical wishes: where he differs is in insisting that Jesus enjoins the highest form of overcoming egotism.

The gentleness and humility, the self-denial and rejection of the hoarding of wealth, the surrender of one’s life for the highest moral values, in short the whole way of living that he who was crucified at Golgotha demanded of the apostles, is diametrically opposed to the appetites of human nature.

Consider the Lord’s prayer. It embodies the overcoming of everything egotistical. Freud, by implication, is attacking a Judaic, a Mosaic religion, based on the jealous God of the Old Testament and operating through fear. Not Pfister’s God of liberation through love.

Pfister goes onto the attack to say that there is in fact a huge element of wish-fulfilment in science. The history of science is an unceasing struggle against anthropomorphisms. This was being highlighted at the time these books were being written by quantum physics and the splitting of the atom. Now we know that reality is textured and fissured in complicated, sometimes incomprehensible ways: to continue to see colours as colours not frequencies, to see this table as solid and not a buzzing mass of particles, these could be said to be wishes for the world to remain stable and meaningful despite the strict testimony of science.

Science and philosophy have to take into account the experiential, the phenomenological. In order to function in the world we make leaps beyond what science can now prove: this is not wish-fulfilment, it is being human.

Nor is Religion inflexible. After some resistance (and hasn’t psychoanalysis shown that resistance is a common human quality?) religion has adapted to Copernicus and Evolution. And so it will assimilate Freud’s insights as easily.

3. Is religion hostile to thought? No, says Pfister. On the contrary, his brand of Protestantism encourages freedom of thought whenever possible.

We calm frightened persons who are experiencing a crisis of belief with the assurance that God loves the sincere doubter and that a belief made more secure through thought is more valuable than one which has simply been taken over and taught.

Contrary to Freud’s claim that religion has stifled thought, consider the great thinkers who were Christians. Descartes, Newton, Faraday, Pasteur, Leibnitz, Pascal, Lincoln, Gladstone, Bismarck, Kant, Hegel, Goethe et al were all Christians; did belief stop them from thinking new and original thoughts? No. Look at Einstein who, through brilliant scientific achievement, has come to believe that the universe has a design.

4. Freud claims that religion has held the field for thousands of years as a civiliser of mankind and look at the mess we’re still in, so now – says Freud – it’s Science’s turn. Pfister agrees that there is much to abhor in the contemporary world. But it is just silly to blame religion for this. Religion is and always has been: ‘not a police force that conserves, but a leader and beacon toward true civilization from our sham civilization.’

Religion should bring forth the greatest achievements in art and science; should fill the lives of all people, even the poorest, with the greatest treasures of truth, beauty and love; should help to overcome the real stresses of life; should pave the way for new, more substantive and genuine forms of social life, and thus call into being a higher, inwardly richer humanity, which corresponds more closely to the true claims of human nature and of ethics than our much-praised uncivilisation.

Pfister then moves on to the offensive to attack Freud’s scientism (defined as ‘the belief that science and the scientific method are the best or only way to render truth about the world and reality’). Freud (optimistically) writes that Science will steadily reveal the truth of the world to us and that the advance of intellect will in time reconcile us to the hard facts of existence.

We believe that it is possible for scientific work to gain some knowledge about the reality of the world by means of which we can increase our power and in accordance with which we can arrange our life.
(The Future of an Illusion)

Pfister replies that this vision is breath-takingly naive. Freud sidesteps all the epistemological questions which have dogged science, questions about the ‘reality’ of the outside world on which we conduct our experiments, and the nature of the knowledge we acquire about it.

On the one hand Freud’s naive faith in the reality of external appearances has been hugely undermined by recent (1920s) science, which has consisted precisely in dissolving appearances: optics dissolves colour into frequencies, physics dissolves solids into whirling worlds of atoms, and atoms themselves disappear into smaller entities which are both particles and waves, at the same time. So Pfister accuses Freud of being a philosophical novice:

Natural science without metaphysics doesn’t exist. The world is accessible to us only through our intellectual make-up and not through the senses alone. Our categories of thought, whether one considers them according to Kant’s method or some other way, always play a part. Therefore we must engage in criticism of knowledge. We need concepts like cause and effect, although they have been discovered to have their origins in anthropomorphisms, we need molecules and atoms [though they are now realised to be artificial constructs]. Even the measuring and weighing has to do with abstractions for numerical concepts are, like all concepts, abstract. Philosophy, which begins as soon as experience ends, extends into the empirical sciences and whoever doesn’t seriously come to grips with philosophical problems will do so in an amateur confused way.

So, according to Pfister: 1) Freud’s deliberate ignorance of philosophy seriously undermines his understanding of what science is and how it proceeds. But 2) given that Freud’s ‘science’ is a rather simple-minded, uncritical concept, how can we believe Freud’s predictions of a future world ruled by it?

Thus I don’t know through Freud’s generally accessible concept of science how far knowledge extends, what degree of reliability it can establish and what opportunities are allotted to it. How can I know if the extension of power through knowledge means an increase in happiness for humanity?….

Is it unthinkable that a civilisation that is guided only by science will succumb to wild passions after the World War has revealed to us the barbarism lurking in the depths of nations? Has it been settled so definitely that progress in the sciences until now has increased the sum total of human joy in life? Is it certain that we are happier than we were 100 years ago? What will become of the most beautiful characteristics of technology when they are forced into the service of the inhuman hunger for money, of human cruelty, of inhuman dissipation?

(Very prophetic in the light of the uses science was shortly to be put to in the Soviet Union, in Nazi Germany, and in the countries who developed and dropped the atomic bomb.)

Pfister then delivers a sustained assault on the implications of Freud’s narrow scientism: human beings are not just thinking machines, they make and feel and judge. Setting up rational Science as the great shibboleth is throwing out everything which makes human existence glorious and humane: the great achievements in art, in poetry, in philosophy, in architecture; the entire realm of aesthetics and the judgement of beauty; the realm of ethics which must guide us through all the decisions of a lifetime.

Freud seems to think that knowing something gives us control over it and that therefore Science will provide the rational mind with everything it needs to rule its life. This is a demonstrably silly idea. What’s more, it is subverted by the very discoveries Freud himself has made about the vast amount of human behaviour which is subject to irrational determination, to unconscious motivation.

For Pfister Religion, not Science, offers the best means of overcoming these instinctual drives and determinants, of arriving at the full freedom and self-determination offered by Jesus.

A positivistic Science such as Freud promotes cannot begin to offer the foundations for morality, for art, for any sensible guidance on how to live our lives. Psychoanalysis can restore the overdetermined subject to his or her proper autonomy, but the big decisions in life still lay all before them and science alone is nowhere nearly enough of a guide.

Conclusion

Pfister summarises his case: Isn’t Freud’s scientism every bit as much of a wish-fulfilment, of an illusion, as the simple-minded version of faith he ascribes to religious believers?

Freud’s airy visions of the future triumph of his vague, ill-defined ‘Science’ are a limp wish next to the solidity of the science of the human heart which he has developed. And Pfister delivers his punchline: In his social and religious writings, then, Freud is labouring under ‘the illusion of a future’ i.e. a naive, utopian belief in a future where human beings are governed by reason and science – as obvious a wish-fantasy as anything Freud attributes to believers.

3. Psychoanalysis and Faith: The Letters of Sigmund Freud and Oskar Pfister

Oskar Pfister was a Swiss pastor who was introduced to Freud’s writings by Jung in 1909. Freud and Pfister exchanged letters between 1909 and 1937.

Pfister – born in 1873, the same year Freud entered University – was the youngest of four sons of a Swiss pastor. His father died when Pfister was three and he was afflicted with a lifelong sense of loss and a search for love. After attending university he trained in theology and took charge of his first congregation in 1902. Repelled by the word-spinning of traditional theology Pfister looked for a more practical way of helping the souls in his charge. When Jung introduced him to Freud’s work in 1909 he became a convert and from that moment never wavered in his belief in the insights and usefulness of psychoanalysis, writing books on technique, pastoral care and pedagogy up to his death in 1956.

When Jung left Freud in 1913 and then the Swiss psychoanalysts rebelled against the founder, Pfister stayed loyal. But Pfister never wavered either from his Christian faith, and in the letters and in the two pamphlets, Future of an Illusion and Illusion of a Future Freud and Pfister carried out a private and public debate about psychoanalysis’s implications for religion. Only some of their correspondence has been published. In among a good deal of chat about books, congresses and the spread of the Psychoanalytic Movement there are exchanges on religion. Here are some highlights:

Pfister sends Freud an outline of how he treats adolescents. Freud says analysis consists in two stages: the release of tension and the sublimation of instinctual drives. To release tension in his patients is relatively easy and helped, Freud says, by their irreligion and by the analyst’s openness to sexuality. Freud says Pfister is lucky to have religion to help him with the second part of the process.

Freud: ‘In itself, psychoanalysis is neither religious nor non-religious but an impartial tool which both priest and layman can use in the service of the sufferer.’

Pfister says there’s little difference between them in views on sexual morality. The Reformation was, after all, an analysis of Catholic sexual repression, imperfectly carried through. Pfister sees himself now at the forefront of a further evangelical movement towards the liberation of love. He is working for better education, better social conditions, a healthier moral outlook.

Freud agrees with the description of himself as ‘a sexual protestant’.

Freud ironically asks why none of the pious discovered psychoanalysis, why was it left to a godless Jew? Pfister replies that he doesn’t regard Freud as a Jew at all, but in his emphasis on the healing power of love, says of Freud, ‘A truer Christian never was.’ Anna Freud interpreted this as Pfister’s inability to accept Freud’s militant atheism. But then, Anna would say that. You can read Pfister’s Illusion of a Future as a (persuasive) attempt to incorporate Freud into a Christian tradition of love.

Pfister quotes Plato to Freud: ‘The art of healing is knowledge of the body’s loves and he who is able to distinguish between the good and bad kinds, and is able to bring about a change, so that the body acquires one kind of love instead of the other, and is able to impart love to those in whom there is none is the best physicians.’

Freud perceptively points out that psychoanalysis can only catch on in Protestant countries. No surprise that its first foreign conquest was Protestant Switzerland, with son-of-a-pastor Jung and son-of-a-pastor Pfister. Whereas it had hardly made any headway in arch-Catholic Austria. Cf Protestant England where it caught on up to a point, and Puritan America, where it became wildly popular.

Pfister critiques The Future of an Illusion by saying it is too simplistic. If there are contradictions in the religious world-view, why doesn’t Freud refer to the many theologians who have attempted new syntheses?

‘Your substitute for religion is basically the idea of 18th century Enlightenment in proud modern guise.’

How awful if the aim of Freud’s therapy is to bring people into ‘the dreadful icy desolation’ of a godless stoicism. Pfister, by contrast, tries to bring people through therapy to a love of life, a life of love.

Freud replies by saying that he wrote Future of an Illusion as his own opinion; his personal views on religion form no essential part of psychoanalysis (shrewd politics here, from Freud). The book only really contains one argument: religion is a means of sublimating instinctual drives; it is wish-fulfilment.

Freud regards the icy waste of atheism as beyond the reach of most analysands; most will have to sublimate their needs into higher forms – art, religion etc. (Note the implication that Freud’s atheism is in some sense heroic, beyond the reach of most mortals).

Pfister suggests that Freud’s militant atheism is due to his having been brought up round arch-Catholics (not least his Catholic nurse, who terrified the infant Freud with visions of hell and was then sacked for theft, leaving him with an indelibly poor opinion of Catholics).

Pfister assures Freud that Freud’s great god Science is just as full of contradictions as Religion and, what’s worse, it’s continually changing. Moreover, look at the great minds who have been believers – a counterthrust to Freud who had said, ‘Look at the great minds who have been twisted and distorted by religious repression’.

Freud says his one big argument against religion is, ‘How the devil do you reconcile all that we experience and have to expect in this world with your assumption of a moral world order?’ It is a restatement of the age-old, single biggest objection to belief in a caring God, the so-called Problem of Pain. Freud writes:

I do not know if you have detected the secret link between the Lay Analysis and the Illusion. In the former I wish to protect analysis from the doctors and in the latter from the priests. I should like to hand it over to a profession which does not yet exist, a profession of lay curers of souls who need not be doctors and should not be priests.

Pfister replies that it’s wrong to forbid priests to practice psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis purifies and refines art, philosophy and religion.

Freud: The essence of religion is the pious illusion of a providence and a moral world order, which are in conflict with reason. It becomes clear that Freud’s Number One problem is with the idea of a divine Providence ruling over everything and ensuring its followers peace, health and happiness. For him, this simply does not exist and people who pretend it does are giving in to infantile wishes. Ethics are not based on an external world order but on the inescapable exigencies of human existence.

On receiving a copy of Civilisation and its Discontents Pfister says: Freud is a biological conservative, Pfister a biological progressive. In the biological theory of evolution Pfister sees a progression upwards. Pfister reads Freud’s concept of the Death Drive, Thanatos, as not an instinct but a slackening of the master life-force, Eros. Civilisation aspires upwards.

Freud thinks Mind is special. But, at the end of the day, it is only an infinitesimally small part of Nature. Would Nature really miss ‘Mind’ if it was snuffed out? Only if you argue that Mind is the point, the purpose of Nature i.e. that the world was created as a garden for mankind, either in Christian or Jewish or Muslim belief. Freud looks coldly at the evidence and thinks such a belief is childish.

Pfister tells Freud that just because the ego-ideal (i.e. the ‘conscience’) may be based on an introjection of parental demands doesn’t diminish its value. Just because Freud demonstrates how even the highest products of the mind develop from the basest instincts doesn’t invalidate those highest products – art, religion, morality – in their own terms.

Morality is vital to physical and psychological health. Immoralism leads to anarchy and unhappiness. Morality is a kind of mental hygiene; it seems designed to keep mankind well. Pfister tries to persuade Freud that he himself lives a deeply moral, kind and loving life, despite all his attempts to deny it.

Right to the end of their correspondence, Pfister and Freud seem to be talking at cross-purposes, arguing past each other.

Thoughts

The difference between the two thinkers is they start from different premises. Freud has the panoramic view and Pfister the humanistic. Freud’s imagination roams across all of human history and across all the modern world. Makes you suspect that there is something in the panoramic imagination which predisposes a person to finding the miserable and the wretched aspects of human existence.

On the other hand Pfister, starting from the wishes and desires of the individual, our need for love, our creativity and imagination, produces a far more optimistic world-view.

Maybe all people who view human beings sub specie aeternitatis – possibly the great majority of scholars and intellectuals – are drawn to a pessimistic view,  whereas particularists, people interested in the trials and triumphs of the individual, tend towards a more optimistic view of life. Take the striking example of Bruno Bettelheim who went through Auschwitz but retained a faith in the improvability of ‘the informed heart’.

4. A religious experience (1927)

This an exchange of letters between Freud and an American doctor in 1927.

In the autumn of 1927 G.S Viereck, a German-American journalist who had paid me a welcome visit, published an account of a conversation with me, in the course of which he mentioned my lack of religious faith and my indifference on the subject of survival after death. This ‘interview’ as it was called, was widely read and brought me, among others, the following letter from an American physician:

“… What struck me most was your answer to the question whether you believe in a survival of the personality after death. You are reported as having said: I give no thought to the matter. I am writing now to tell you of an experience that I had in the year I graduated at the university of X.

“One afternoon while I was passing through the dissecting room my attention was attracted to a sweet-faced dear old woman who was being carried to the dissecting-table. This sweet-faced woman made such an impression on me that a thought flashed up in my mind: There is no God; if there were a God he would not have allowed this dear old woman to be brought into the dissecting room.

“When I got home that afternoon the feeling I had had at the sight in the dissecting-room had determined me to discontinue going to church. The doctrines of Christianity had before this been the subject of doubts in my mind. While I was meditating on this matter a voice spoke to my soul that ‘I should consider the step I was about to take’. My spirit replied to this inner voice by saying, ‘If I knew of a certainty that Christianity was truth and the Bible was the Word of God, then I should accept it.’

“In the course of the next few days God made it clear to my soul that the Bible was His Word, that the teachings about Jesus Christ were true, and that Jesus was our only hope. After such a clear revelation I accepted the Bible as God’s Word and Jesus Christ as my personal Saviour. Since then God has revealed Himself to me by many infallible proofs. I beg you as a brother physician to give thought to this most important matter, and I can assure you, if you look into this subject with an open mind, God will reveal the truth to your soul, as He did to me and to multitudes of others.”

I sent a polite answer, saying that I was glad to hear that this experience had enabled him to retain his faith. As for myself, God had not done so much for me. He had never allowed me to hear an inner voice; and if, in view of my age, he did not make haste, it would not be my fault if I remained to the end of my life what I now was – an infidel Jew.

In the course of a friendly reply, my colleague gave me an assurance that being a Jew was not an obstacle in the pathway to true faith and proved this by several instances. His letter culminated in the information that prayers were being earnestly addressed to God that he might grant me faith to believe.

I am still awaiting the outcome of this intercession. In the meantime my colleague’s religious experience provides food for thought. It seems to me to demand some attempt at an interpretation based upon emotional motives; for his experience is puzzling in itself and is based on particularly bad logic. God, as we know, allows horrors to take place of a kind very different from the removal to a dissecting-room of the dead body of a pleasant-looking old woman. This has been true at all times and it must have been so while my American colleague was pursuing his studies. Nor, as a medical student, can he have been so sheltered from the world as to have known nothing of such evils. Why was it, then, that his indignation against God broke out precisely when he received this particular impression in the dissecting-room?

For anyone who is accustomed to regard men’s internal experiences and actions analytically the explanation is very obvious – so obvious that it actually crept into my recollections of the facts themselves. Once, when I was referring to my pious colleague’s letter in the course of a discussion, I spoke of his having written that the dead woman’s face had reminded him of his own mother. In fact these words were not in the letter, and a moment’s reflection will show that they could not possibly have been. But that is the explanation irresistibly forced on us by his affectionately phrased description of the ‘sweet-faced dear old woman’. Thus the weakness of judgement displayed by the young doctor is to be accounted for by the emotion roused in him by the memory of his mother. It is difficult to escape from the bad psychoanalytic habit of bringing forward as evidence details which also allow of more superficial explanations – and I am tempted to recall the fact that my colleague addressed me as a ‘brother-physician’.

We may suppose, therefore, that this was the way in which things happened. The sight of a woman’s dead body, naked or on the point of being stripped, reminded the young man of his mother. It roused in him a longing for his mother which sprang from his Oedipus Complex, and this was immediately completed by a feeling of indignation against his father. His ideas of ‘father’ and ‘God’ had not yet become widely separated; so that his desire to destroy his father could become conscious as doubt in the existence of God and could seek to justify itself in the eyes of reason as indignation about the ill-treatment of a mother-object. It is, of course, very natural for a child to regard what his father does to his mother in sexual intercourse as ill-treatment. The new impulse, which was displaced into the sphere of religion, was only a repetition of the Oedipus situation and consequently soon met with a similar fate. It succumbed to a powerful opposing current. During the actual conflict the level of displacement was not maintained: there is no mention of arguments in justification of God, nor are we told what the infallible signs were by which God proved his existence to the doubter. The conflict seems to have been unfolded in the form of a hallucinatory psychosis: inner voices were heard which uttered warnings against resistance to God. But the outcome of the struggle was displayed once again in the sphere of religion and it was of a kind predetermined by the outcome of the Oedipus complex: complete submission to the will of God the Father. The young man became a believer and accepted everything he had been taught since his childhood about God and Jesus Christ. He had had a religious experience and had undergone a conversion.

All of this is so straightforward that we wonder whether this case throws any light on the psychology of conversion in general. Our case does not contradict the views arrived at on the subject by modern research. The point it throws into relief is the manner in which the conversion was attached to a particular determining event, which caused the subject’s scepticism to flare up for a last time before being finally extinguished.

This is an excellent example of Freud’s technique of rewriting or over-writing other people’s experiences and beliefs in terms of his own theory. Some patients found and still find it liberating. Others have found it authoritarian and oppressive.


Credit

The history of the translation of Freud’s many works into English forms a complicated subject in its own right. Freud’s works quoted here were translated into English as part of The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, published throughout the 1950s and into the early 1960s. My quotes are taken from the versions which were included in the relevant volumes of the Pelican Freud Library, published in the 1980s. ‘The Future of an Illusion’ is in volume 12.

I read ‘The Illusion of a Future’ in The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, Volume 74, part 3 (1993), in a translation by Susan Abrams, as edited by Paul Roazen. I can’t remember where the short text ‘A religious experience’ comes from. I’ll add an update when I find the source.

Freud and religion reading list

  • Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905)
  • Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices (1907)
  • Totem and Taboo (1913)
  • On Transience (1915)
  • A Seventeenth Century Demonological Neurosis (1923)
  • The Future of An Illusion (1927)
  • Civilisation and Its Discontents (1930)
  • Group Psychology (1930)
  • Question of a Weltanschauung (1933)
  • Moses and Monotheism (1939)
  • Freud, A Life For Our Times by Peter Gay (1988)

More Freud reviews

Civilisation and Its Discontents by Sigmund Freud (1930)

Note: to avoid misunderstanding, I believe Freud is a figure of huge cultural and historical importance, and I sympathise with his project of trying to devise a completely secular psychology building on Darwinian premises. Many of his ideas about sexuality as a central motive force, about the role of the unconscious in every aspect of mental life, how repressing instinctual drives can lie behind certain types of mental illness, his development of the talking cure, these and numerous other ideas have become part of the culture and underlie the way many people live and think about themselves today. However, I strongly disapprove of Freud’s gender stereotyping of men and women, his systematic sexism, his occasional slurs against gays, lesbian or bisexuals and so on. Despite the revolutionary impact of his thought, Freud carried a lot of Victorian assumptions into his theory. He left a huge and complicated legacy which needs to be examined and picked through with care. My aim in these reviews is not to endorse his opinions but to summarise his writings, adding my own thoughts and comments as they arise.

***

Civilisation and Its Discontents might more accurately be titled Why Civilisation Makes Us Unhappy. Freud suggests that civilisation is built on the renunciation of sexual and aggressive drives but that, although this benefits wider society, it often comes at the expense of anxiety and guilt i.e. mental illness, for us as individuals.

Many of the articles and books I’ve read about Freud claim that this was his single most influential book.

Civilisation and Its Discontents is a good example of Freud’s lifelong interest in the Big Questions of society – religion, morality, art and so on. His attempts at explaining the origins of society in Totem and Taboo (1914) and Moses and Monotheism (1939) were heavily criticised at the time and have been generally discredited since. His attack on Christianity in The Future of an Illusion (1927) doesn’t address (or invent) historical events in the same way as Totem and Moses does and so hasn’t dated so badly. It’s more an analysis of the psychological underpinnings of organised religion and so retains some force – although it has been superseded by thousands of later writers, commentators, utopians and revolutionaries, also seeking to abolish religious belief, so it’s just one polemic in a very crowded field.

By comparison with those other books, Civilisation and Its Discontents (although it kicks off with yet another dig at religious belief) is built on stronger foundations. Its central thesis that repression of our baser instincts is simultaneously the basis of a ‘civilised’ society and the source of many problems and mental illnesses suffered by its civilised citizens. This is an intuitively plausible argument which the passage of time has done nothing to discredit, which is why many critics reckon it might have been Freud’s single most influential book: its message that modern society makes us ill probably reached a far wider audience than any of his more theoretical or therapeutic works.

1.

Freud opens with a reference to his essay The Future of an Illusion, his most sustained, full-frontal attack on the psychological bases of religious belief. Freud replies to a critic who had written to say that Future failed to take into account genuinely spiritual feelings, in particular the ‘oceanic feeling’ of which the religious speak (as did Freud’s renegade follower, C.G. Jung).

Freud explains that this feeling is a relic, left after the realistic ego grew up, of a person’s infantile narcissism and sense of oneness with the world. For Freud religious belief begins in the infant’s sense of helplessness and need for parental protection, a feeling which is reborn and accentuated in the adult by their nervous awareness of the countless risks and dangers of human existence.

2.

Life is cruel. Human beings, endowed with memory to remember the past and reason enough to foresee the disasters of the future, need protection from both. There are three ways of escaping reality:

  1. Defence mechanisms, such as religion.
  2. Substitute satisfactions and sublimations of hopes and fears – Art.
  3. Intoxicants to extinguish consciousness.

What is the purpose of life? Well, who knows. But when you examine the way people actually behave – and not what they say – it is clear that most people live life in the pursuit of happiness. This happiness is threatened by three things:

  1. The decay and dissolution of the body.
  2. The destructiveness of the outside world.
  3. Our difficult relations with other people.

So how can we escape this dreadful predicament?

  • hedonism? (full of risks and danger)
  • art? (limited to the percipient few)
  • intoxicants? (ultimately self-destructive)
  • Eastern quietism? (brings only mild contentment, not happiness)
  • hermetic isolation? (you go mad)
  • delusions and mental illness? (as in psychotics and paranoiacs)
  • mass delusions? (for example, religion)
  • love, which may be the source of our greatest gratifications? (but oh how exposed and vulnerable we are to its sudden withdrawal)
  • the enjoyment of beauty? (fickle and easily destroyed)

There are maybe three psychological types, who will each tackle these problems differently:

  1. The Erotic Man who wants love and sexual satisfaction.
  2. The Narcissist who tries to take control of the world in his own mental pleasures.
  3. The Man of Action who seeks to change the world.

But there is one complete worldview which seeks to tackle all of these threats to our wellbeing – Religion. Religion tackles the vulnerability of human beings by:

  • depressing the value of life in this world
  • drawing its followers into an unreal view of the world, similar to mass delusion
  • fixing them in psychical infantilism

3.

So, it’s 1930. We are all discontented with civilisation. Why? Because in rising to a civilised level we have been forced to renounce many instinctual pleasures. A glance at many primitive peoples, for example, Australian aborigines, seems to show a people at one with life. By contrast, psychoanalysis has shown the terrible price in neurosis and nervous disease paid by ‘civilised’ people for the benefits of civilisation. A general disappointment with the early promises to improve life made by science and technology hasn’t improved things. So what are the salient features of this civilisation we are so unhappy with?

  • technology and the exploitation of nature
  • the creation of order and beauty
  • higher mental achievements, for example, religion, art and science
  • the ordering of human affairs via Justice and the Law

On the level of the individual citizen, civilisation is a process which results in:

  • character-formation
  • the sublimation of the instincts into ‘higher’ cultural achievements
  • the renunciation of instinct

4.

The development of civilisation is like the growth of an individual. Savage men are driven to compete for a wife/sex object. One strong man comes to rule the horde. Then the sons rise up and kill the Father. Genital love is the motor in the formation of the Family. Aim-inhibited love leads to friendship and camaraderies, useful for uniting the group and forming bonds between them. Once set on this path, Man is moved to sublimate his basic sex-drive into more complicated psychic and social structures. As society is built up it exerts tighter control on the individual’s potentially anarchic sexuality, corralling it and narrowing it down to focus on heterosexual pairing. Even that restricted arena of expression mustn’t come about before a rigorous series of rituals have been carried out.

So much for libido and sex drive. Are there other reasons for the unhappiness created by civilisation?

5.

Yes. Human beings are violent. The Biblical injunction to love your neighbour is only necessary because there is such a violent urge in all of us to rape, torture, exploit and mutilate our neighbour. Society uses every means at its disposal to rearrange libido so as to secure social acquiescence. One obvious way is via aim-inhibited libido, libido which is rerouted into either generalised affection (for your dog or children or old people) or into friendship, rerouted libido which vastly expand the ties of family into society.

Civilisation has to use its utmost efforts in order to set limits to man’s aggressive instincts and to hold the manifestations of them in check by psychical reaction formations. Hence, therefore, the use of methods designed to incite people into identifications and aim-inhibited relationships of ‘love’, hence the restriction upon sexual life, and hence, too, the ego-ideal’s commandment to love one’s neighbour as oneself – a commandment which is justified by the fact that nothing runs so strongly counter to the original nature of man.
(Pelican Freud Library, volume 12, page 303)

The communists say that men were originally peaceable and equal but that the institution of private property has corrupted them. Do away with private property and everything will be alright. Freud laughs. On the contrary, all societies are bound together by what they exclude, by their ability to project the natural aggression of their members outwards onto outsiders.

In this respect the Jewish people, scattered everywhere, have rendered most useful services to the civilisations who were their hosts. (volume 12, page 305)

A newly insurgent dream of Germanic world domination has inevitably raised the oldest scapegoat upon which to focus its anger – the Jew. And the communist utopia in Russia turns out to call for an entire class to anathematise, the bourgeoisie (although, at this period, the direst fate was being meted out to the wealthier peasants, known as kulaks.)

In order to become civilised, man has to give up these two elements: unbridled sexual satisfaction and the expression of aggression. Primitive man expressed these easily and was happy. He also died young. Civilised man has exchanged happiness for security. We live long lives with a lot of frustration and misery in them.

6.

Section 6 is a complicated defence of Freud’s theory of the death instinct or Thanatos. Originally Freud posited just two psychic classes, ego-instincts and object-instincts. The idea of narcissism, first developed in an essay of 1914, complicated matters and by 1920 Freud had developed a new fundamental opposition, that between Eros and the death drive, between instincts which seek to unify, to bind (in a primitive way with the breast, with food; later with a sex-object; in a sublimated form with friends or comrades, via aim-inhibited libido) and instincts which seek to break psychic energy down into smaller units, ultimately to death.

In practice our instincts always appear in some combination. On the personal level libido accompanied with aggression is sadism; the death drive comes to the aid of group psychology and aim-inhibited libido by being deflected outwards onto strangers and enemies. Aggression thwarted is turned inwards as masochism or self-punishment or suicide. Despite opposition and scepticism to these ideas, even within analytic circles:

I adopt the standpoint, therefore, that the inclination to aggression is an original, self-subsisting instinctual disposition in man, and that it constitutes the greatest impediment to civilisation. (12: 313)

Civilisation is a process in the services of Eros, whose purpose is to combine single human individuals, and after that families, then races, peoples and nations, into one great unity, the unity of mankind. These collections of men are libidinally bound to each other. Necessity alone, the advantages of work in common, will not hold them together. But man’s natural aggressive instinct, the hostility of each against all and of all against each, opposes this programme of civilisation. This aggressive instinct is the derivative and the main representative of the death instinct which we have found alongside Eros and which shares world dominion with it. Thus the evolution of civilisation represents a struggle between Eros and Death, between the instinct of life and the instinct of destruction, as it works itself out in the human species. This struggle is what all life essentially consists of and it is this battle of giants that our nursemaids try to distract us from with their lullaby about Heaven. (12: 314)

7.

So how is this aggression controlled in the individual? Through the superego. By returning it in upon itself, by setting a part of itself aside, the ego is able to satisfy upon itself the aggressive wishes it would like to impose on others – Freud calls this mental agency the conscience and the emotional affect it produces in us is guilt. The superego is the watch-dog of civilisation planted inside the head of each of us.

Guilt is the fear of the loss of love, its primal source the withdrawal of parental love. In its simplest form, if you do something bad you are anxious that you will be found out and that love will be withdrawn from you, the love of your parents or of the community at large. So you can still do wrong but will strive not to be found out.

In the more sophisticated form, you develop a full superego based on childish experiences and anxieties. Now you feel guilty even if no-one finds out or can find out what you’ve done – because someone does know; your conscience knows. What’s more, it knows about things you haven’t even done but have fantasised about doing; and it knows about things you’ve fantasised about doing and repressed so deeply you don’t even remember them. Since everyone has the same Oedipal fantasies, everyone suffers a greater or lesser sense of guilt.

More: the superego is fiercest in those who set out to please it most; the more you try to please it in every way, the more demanding the superego becomes. Hence the pathological saint. And if bad luck from the external world does actually befall you, this only provides the punishing superego with more opportunities to punish you for being such a loser. Hence, Freud declares, with the confidence of an unbelieving Jew, the characteristics of the Jewish race, in that the more calamities overtook it, the more they blamed themselves.

More: there is an original substratum of guilt laid down in all of us due to archaic vestiges of the primal Parricide, which is bequeathed to each of us at birth. Its traces are reawakened by naughty things we do, which introduces us to fear of punishment (withdrawal of love); and further reinforced by the introjection of that fear/aggression in a superego. The more we renounce our instincts, the more the superego is given energy to punish us, to demand more. Therefore, insofar as civilisation is defined as the renunciation of instinct, it must inevitably lead to an increase in guilt. Civilisation, by its very nature, reinforces the superego in all of us, and the superego is the punishing principle. Civilisation must make everyone feel guilty.

8.

So, to recap: The price we pay for civilisation and security is the loss of happiness through instinctual renunciation and an accompanying increase in personal guilt.

Freud goes on to speculate that maybe guilt is the product not of libidinal wishes but only of repressed aggressive wishes. So neurotic symptoms are the result of the libido being repressed; when aggression is repressed it reactivates ancient feelings of remorse (for murders, real or imaginary) and guilt i.e. the aggression is rechannelled, via the superego, against the repressing ego, in the form of demands for more obeisance and penitence.

Freud draws the analogy between the development of an individual and the development of civilisation. In the latter, also, a superego, an ego-ideal, is created in the form of a strong leader – Moses, Jesus et al. Just as the oedipal boy unconsciously wishes his authoritative father dead but then suffers remorse and guilt at these buried feelings, so the Jews and Christians wanted their insufferably strict leaders dead and then, in fact, killed them. And just as the individual superego – in the latency period – sets up an idealised version of the dead leader’s injunctions and punishes followers for not attaining them, so entire peoples feel guilt and remorse at the primal murder they’ve committed, set up idealised versions of the murdered Father (of Moses who talked to God, of Jesus who IS God) and punish themselves for not living up to these impossibly high ethical standards.

Over and above the vague sense of guilt or malaise whose origin Freud has explained, there are the specific injunctions of the superego. In individual patients, modern therapy often consists in softening the impossibly strict demands made on them by their own superegos, demands which result in unhappiness and illness.

In society as a whole, the same is true. Our society makes impossible demands on people. Freud singles out the injunction to love your neighbour as yourself as a prime example. It is a fine specimen of the highest ethical ideal a society can rise to, but its very impossibility leads to unhappiness among the many people who try to live up to it, fail, and then punish themselves.

Freud dryly remarks that he thinks maybe a real change in the relations of people and their possessions, a genuine redistribution of wealth – in other words communism – would be more likely to produce ethical improvement than religion’s insistence on demanding the impossible.


Credit

The history of the translation of Freud’s many works into English forms a complicated subject in its own right. Civilisation and Its Discontents was translated into English in 1961 as part of The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. Quotes in this blog post are from the version which was included in Volume 12 of the Pelican Freud Library, ‘Civilisation, Society and Religion’, published in 1985.

More Freud reviews

Freud on art and literature

Note: to avoid misunderstanding, I believe Freud is a figure of huge cultural and historical importance, and I sympathise with his project of trying to devise a completely secular psychology building on Darwinian premises. Many of his ideas about sexuality as a central motive force, about the role of the unconscious in every aspect of mental life, how repressing instinctual drives can lie behind certain types of mental illness, his development of the talking cure, these and numerous other ideas have become part of the culture and underlie the way many people live and think about themselves today. However, I strongly disapprove of Freud’s gender stereotyping of men and women, his systematic sexism, his occasional slurs against gays, lesbian or bisexuals and so on. Despite the revolutionary impact of his thought, Freud carried a lot of Victorian assumptions into his theory. He left a huge and complicated legacy which needs to be examined and picked through with care. My aim in these reviews is not to endorse his opinions but to summarise his writings, adding my own thoughts and comments as they arise.

***

In the realm of fiction we find the plurality of lives which we need.
(Thoughts on War and Death, Pelican Freud Library volume 12, page 79)

Introduction

Volume 14 of the Freud Pelican Library pulls together all of Sigmund Freud’s essays on art and literature.

From my point of view, as a one-time student of literature, one of the most obvious things about all Freud’s writings, even the most ostensibly ‘scientific’, is that he relies far more on forms of literature – novels, folk tales, plays or writers’ lives – than on scientific data, data from studies or experiments, to support and elaborate his theories.

In my day job I do web analytics, cross-referencing quantitative data from various sources, crunching numbers, using formulae in spreadsheets, and assigning numerical values to qualitative data so that it, too, can be analysed in numerical terms, converted into tables of data or graphical representation, analysed for trends, supplying evidence for conclusions, decisions and so on.

So far as I can tell, none of this is present at all in Freud’s writings. A handful of diagrams exist, scattered sparsely through the complete works to indicate the relationship of superego, ego and id, or representing the transformation mechanisms of wishes which take place when they’re converted into dream images, repressed, go on to form the basis of compromise formations, and so on. But most of Freud is void of the kind of data and statistics I associate with scientific writing or analysis.

Instead Freud relies very heavily indeed on works of fiction and literature, folk tales and fairy tales, the myths and legends of Greece and Rome, anecdotes and incidents in the lives of great writers or artists (Goethe, Leonardo).

Right from the start Freud’s writings provided a new model for literary, artistic and biographical interpretation and so it’s no surprise that psychoanalytical theory caught on very quickly in the artistic and literary communities, and then spread to the academic teaching of literature and art where it thrives, through various reversionings and rewritings (Lacan, feminist theory) to this day.

It’s probably too simplistic to say psychoanalysis was never a serious scientific endeavour; but seems fair to say that, in Freud’s hands, it was always an extremely literary one.

What follows is my notes on some, not all, of the essays contained in Volume 14 of the Freud Pelican Library.

1. Delusions and Dreams in Jensen’s ‘Gradiva’ (1907)

It was Jung, a recent convert to psychoanalysis, who brought this novel, Gradiva, by the German novelist Wilhelm Jensen, published 1903, to Freud’s attention. It is the story of an archaeologist, Norbert Hanold, who comes across an ancient bas-relief of a girl who is walking with a distinctive high-footed step. He names her ‘Gradiva’, which is Latin for ‘light-tripping’, and becomes obsessed with the image.

Cast relief of ‘Gradiva’​ (​1908​), which, as a result of Freud’s essay on the novel, he bought and hung on his study wall

It comes into Hanold’s head that the relief is from Pompeii and that he will somehow meet the girl who is the model for it if he goes there. So off to Pompeii he goes and, one summer day, walking among the ruins, comes across an apparition, a hallucination, of the self-same girl!

They talk briefly and then she disappears among the ruins but not before displaying the unique walk depicted in the frieze. A second time he meets her and their talk clears his muddled mind. Over subsequent meetings and conversations it becomes clear that she is the girl who lives across the road from him in Berlin, named Zoe Bertgang, and whom he loved playing with as a boy.

What happened is that, at puberty, Hanold became obsessed with archaeology and, in his pursuit of it, rejected normal social activity, including with the opposite sex. He repressed and forgot his childhood love for Zoe, redirecting his energies, sublimating them, into an abstract love of Science. But, despite the best efforts, the repressed material returned, but in a garbled censored form, as his irrational unaccountable obsession with this carving.

Over the course of their meetings, Zoe slowly pulls him out of what is clearly some kind of nervous breakdown, eliminating all the voodoo and hallucinatory significances which he had accumulated around the relief; makes him realise she is just an ordinary girl, but one he has continued to be in love with.

Through her long and patient conversations, through talking through his odd symptoms and obsessions, he is slowly returned to ‘normality’, ‘reality’, and to a conventional loving relationship with a young woman. And so they get engaged.

This novel could almost have been written expressly to allow Freud to deploy his favourite themes. For a start it contains many of Hanold’s, dreams which Freud elaborately decodes, thus reaffirming the doctrine that dreams are ‘the royal road to the unconscious’. Confirming the theories put forward in The Interpretation of Dreams that during sleep the censorship of feelings and complexes which are rigorously repressed during conscious waking life, is relaxed, allowing deep wishes to enter the mind, albeit displaced and distorted into often fantastical imagery.

It allows Freud to reiterate his theory that the mind is comprised of two equal and opposite forces which are continually in conflict – the Pleasure Principle which wants, wishes and fantasises about our deepest desires coming true, sometimes in dreams, sometimes in daydreams or fantasies, sometimes in neurotic symptoms and mental disturbances – because it is continually struggling to get past the repressing force of the Reality Principle.

Dreams, like the symptoms of the neurotic and obsessive patients Freud had been treating since the 1980s, are compromises between these two forces. Thus the hero of the novel, Norbert Hanold, is a timid man whose profession of archaeologist has cut him off from the flesh and blood world of real men and women.

This division between imagination and intellect destined him to become an artist or a neurotic; he was one of those whose kingdom was not of this world.

But, in Freudian theory, the unconscious wishes often return from the place where they are most repressed, at the point of maximum defence. Hence it was precisely – and only – from the dry-as-dust, academic world of archaeology, where he had fled from the real world, that the repressed feelings could return in the form of a two thousand year-old relief – that Hanold’s real passion for the flesh-and-blood girl who lives across the road, can emerge.

There is a kind of forgetting which is distinguished by the difficulty with which the memory is awakened even by a powerful external summons, as though some internal resistance were struggling against its revival. A forgetting of this type has been given the name of repression in psychopathology.

Norbert seeks for Gradiva in Pompeii, driven there by increasingly delusive fantasies. Freud explains these as the last desperate attempts of the Censor to flee the unconscious wish to sexually possess the girl he has loved since his childhood, but, fearing her sexuality, fearing his own untrammeled sexuality, has blocked, repressed and sublimated into a love for his passionless, ‘scientific’ profession’, archaeology. The repressed always returns. You can run but you can’t hide.

It is an event of daily occurrence for a person – even a healthy person – to deceive himself over the motives for an action and to become conscious of them only after the event…

[Hanold]’s flight to Pompeii was a result of his resistance gathering new strength after the surge forward of his erotic desires in the dreams [Norbert is plagued by obscure passionate dreams which Freud analyses as sex-dreams]. It was an attempt at flight from the physical presence of the girl he loved. In a practical sense, it meant a victory for repression…

Except that it is precisely in Pompeii, with a kind of dreamy, Expressionistic logic, that Hanold runs into the very girl he’s gone all that way to escape, and who initially presents herself as the living incarnation of the 2,000 year-old relief.

Only slowly does the truth dawn on Norbert (and the reader) and his secret desires become revealed to him, even as he slowly realises this is a real flesh-and-blood girl and not some spirit, a girl who reveals her name to be Zoe, Greek for ‘life’.

The entire novel turns, in Freud’s hands, into another one of his case studies: Hanold is an obsessive neurotic suffering from bad dreams and delusions; Zoe is in the unique position of being both his repressed love-object and his psychoanalyst. She practises the ultimate ‘cure through love’ by tenderly returning Hanold to a correct understanding of Reality, of who he is, who she is, and the true nature of his feelings for her.

How was Hanold able to go along in the grip of his powerful delusions for so long?

It is explained by the ease with which our intellect is prepared to accept something absurd provided it satisfies powerful emotional impulses

After all, Freud writes, in one of the many, many comparisons with religious beliefs and ways of thinking which litter his writings:

It must be remembered too that the belief in spirits and ghosts and the return of the dead which finds so much support in the religions to which we have all been attached, at least in our childhood, is far from having disappeared among educated people, and that many who are sensible in other respects find it possible to combine spiritualism with reason.

The Gradiva story allows Freud to elaborate on the link between but contrast between belief and delusion:

If a patient believes in his delusion so firmly, this is not because his faculty of judgement has been overturned and does not arise from what is false in the delusion. On the contrary there is a grain of truth concealed in every delusion, there is something in it which really deserves belief, and this is the source of the patient’s conviction, which is therefore to this extent justified.

This true element, however, has long been repressed. If eventually it is able to penetrate into consciousness, this time in a distorted form, the sense of conviction attaching to it is overintensified as though by way of compensation and is now attached to the distorted substitute for the repressed truth, and protects it from any critical attacks.

The conviction is displaced, as it were, from the unconscious truth on to the conscious error that is linked to it, and remains fixated there precisely as a result of this displacement.

The method described here whereby conviction arises in the case of a delusion does not differ fundamentally from the method by which a conviction is formed in normal cases. We all attach our conviction to thought-contents in which truth is combined with error and let it extend from the former over into the latter. It becomes diffused, as it were, from the original truth over onto the error associated with it, and protects the latter.

So in Gravida the dry, repressed Norbert is awakened from his dream-delusion of worship for a stone relief he has named Gradiva, into the reality of his long-lost childhood love for the flesh-and-blood woman Zoe:

The process of cure is accomplished in a relapse into love, if we combine all the many components of the sexual instinct under the term ‘love’; and such a relapse is indispensable, for the symptoms on account of which the treatment has been undertaken are nothing other than the precipitates of earlier struggles connected with repression or the return of the repressed, and they can only be resolved and washed away by a fresh high tide of the same passions. Every psychoanalytic treatment is an attempt at liberating repressed love which has found a meagre outlet in the compromise of a symptom.

So influential was Freud’s essay on Gradiva as suggesting and exemplifying a whole new way of reading and thinking about literature, that it became a cult, many of the early psychoanalysts carried round small models of the Gradiva relief and Freud had a full-scale replica hanging in his office (still viewable at the Freud Museum).

2. Psychopathic stage characters (1906)

Art allows for the vicarious participation of the spectator. When we read a poem we feel spiritually richer, subtler, nobler than we are. When we watch a play we escape from the confines of our dull cramped lives into a heroic career, defying the gods and doing great deeds. The work of art allows the spectator an increase, a raising of psychic power.

Lyric poetry serves the purpose of giving vent to intense feelings of many sorts – just as was once the case with dancing. Epic poetry aims chiefly at making it possible to feel the enjoyment of a great heroic character in his hour of triumph. But drama seeks to explore emotional possibilities more deeply and to give an enjoyable shape even to forebodings of misfortune; for this reason it depicts the hero in his struggles and, with masochistic satisfaction, in his defeats.

For Freud, crucially, human nature is based on rebellion:

[Drama] appeases, as it were, a rising rebellion against the divine regulation of the universe, which is responsible for the existence of suffering. Heroes are first and foremost rebels against God or against something divine.

We like to watch the hero rise, as a thrilling personification of the resentment we all feel against the limitations of Fate – and then to fall, after a brief heroic career, because their fall restores order and justifies our own craven supineness in relation to the world.

Freud likes the Greek dramatists because they openly understood and acknowledged the power of this: life is a tragic rebellion against Fate. The Greek view of life, essentially tragic – from Homer to Aeschylus – contrasted with the essentially rounded, optimistic view of the theisms, Judaism and Christianity, in which suffering may be pushed to its limit – Job, Jesus – but brings with its new understanding and even salvation.

Christianity takes an essentially comic, non-tragic view of the world; Jesus came to save us, to fulfil the Law, and in his torture, crucifixion and death we partake of a Divine Comedy of despair and renewal. With his resurrection the circle is complete. But there is no renewal in Greek tragedy. Neither Oedipus nor Thebes are renewed or improved.

The two worldviews deal with the same subject matter, and overlap in the middle, but from fundamentally opposed viewpoints.

Freud likes the Greeks because of their acknowledgment of the tragic fate of man: his later writings are loaded with references to Ananke and Logos, the twin gods of Necessity and Reason by which we must lead our lives.

Freud dislikes Christianity because it sets out to conceal this truth, to offer redemption, eternal life, Heaven, the punishment of the guilty and the salvation of the Good. It offers all the infantile compensations and illusions he associates with the weakest of his patients. It is intellectually and emotionally dishonest. It says the greatest strength is in submission to the Will of God, turning the other cheek, loving your neighbour as yourself.

As a good Darwinian Freud acknowledges that these standards may be morally admirable but, alas, unattainable for most, if not all of us mortals. In his view Christianity forced its adherents into guilt-ridden misery or to blatant hypocrisy. (Interestingly, it was actually Jung who, in their correspondence, called the Church ‘the Misery Institute’.)

Freud moves on to outline an interesting declension in the subject matter of drama:

Greek tragedy must be an event involving conflict and it must include an effort of will together with resistance. This precondition finds its first and grandest fulfilment in the struggle against divinity. A tragedy of this sort is one of rebellion, in which the dramatist and the audience takes the side of the rebel.

The less belief there comes to be in divinity, the more important becomes the human regulation of affairs; and it is this which, with increasing insight, comes to be held responsible for suffering. Thus the hero’s next struggle is against human society and here we have the class of social tragedies.

Yet another fulfilment of the necessary precondition is to be found in a struggle between individual men. Such are tragedies of character which display all the excitement of a conflict and are best played out between outstanding characters who have freed themselves from the bond of human institutions….

After religious drama, social drama and the drama of character we can follow the course of drama into the realm of psychological drama. Here the struggle that causes the suffering is fought out in the hero’s mind itself – a struggle between different impulses which have their end not in the extermination of the hero but in the victory of one of the impulses; it must end, that is to say, in renunciation…

For the progression religious drama, social drama, drama of character and psychological drama comes to a conclusion with psychopathological drama, hence the title of the essay. Psychological drama is where the protagonist struggles in his mind with conflicting goals, desires, often his personal love clashing with social values etc. Psychopathological drama is one step further, where the conflict takes place within the hero’s mind, but one side or aspect or impulse is repressed. It is the drama of the repressed motive, in which the protagonist demonstrates the symptoms Freud had written about in neurotic, namely that they are in the grip of fierce compulsions or anxieties but don’t know why.

The first of these modern dramas is Hamlet in which a man who has hitherto been normal becomes neurotic owing to the peculiar nature of the task by which he is faced, a man, that is, in whom an impulse that has been hitherto successfully repressed endeavours to make its way into action [the Oedipus impulse].

The essay repeats the interpretation Freud first gave of Hamlet in The Interpretation of Dreams, namely that the reason for Hamlet’s long delay in carrying out vengeance against his uncle is because his uncle has acted out Hamlet’s Oedipal dream – he has murdered his (Hamlet’s) father and bedded his (Hamlet’s) mother. This is the deep sexual fantasy which Freud posits at the core of the development of small boys and labelled the Oedipus complex, and Claudius has done it for Hamlet; he has lived out Hamlet’s deeply repressed Oedipal fantasy, and this is why Hamlet can’t bring himself to carry out the revenge on his uncle which his conscious mind knows to be just and demanded by social convention: it’s because his uncle has carried out Hamlet’s repressed Oedipal fantasy so completely as to have become Hamlet, on the voodoo level of the unconscious to be Hamlet. To kill his uncle would be to kill the oldest, most deeply felt, most deeply part of his childhood fantasy. And so he can’t do it.

I studied Hamlet at A-level and so know it well and know that Freud’s interpretation, although it initially sounds cranky and quite a bit too simplistic and glib – still, it’s one of the cleverest and most compelling interpretations ever made of the play.

Anyway, in this theoretical category of psychopathological drama, the appeal to the audience is that they, too, understand, if dimly, the unexpressed, repressed material which the protagonist is battling with. If in the tragic drama of the ancients the hero battles against the gods, at this other end of the spectrum, in modern psychopathological drama, the hero fights against the unexpressed, unexpressible, repressed wishes, urges, desires, buried beyond recall in his own unconscious.

3. Creative writers and daydreams (1907)

In this notorious essay Freud tries to psychoanalyse the foundation of creative writing but he’s notably hesitant. It’s a big subject and easy to look foolish next to professional critics and scholars. Hence Freud emphasises that he is only dealing with the writers of romances and thrillers i.e. anything with a simple hero or heroine or, to put it another way, which are simple enough for his psychoanalytical interpretation to be easily applied.

So: A piece of creative writing is a continuation into adulthood of childhood play. (The English reader may be reminded of Coleridge’s comment that the True Poet, as exemplified by his friend Wordsworth, is one who carries the perceptions of childhood into the strength of maturity.)

A piece of creative writing, like a day-dream, is a continuation of, and a substitute for, what was once the play of childhood.

Children play by recombining elements of the outside world into forms and narratives which suit their needs. As we grow up we stop overtly playing but Freud suggests that we never give up a pleasure once experienced and so we replace physically real playing with a non-physical, purely psychical equivalent, namely fantasising.

Childhood play is public and open but most people fantasise in private, in fact they’re more willing to admit to doing wrong than to confessing their fantasies. The child more often than not wants to be ‘grown up’; whereas many adults’ fantasies are childish in content or expression.

Now Freud steps up a gear and begins to treat fantasies as if they were dreams, in that he insists that ‘every single fantasy is the fulfilment of a wish, a correction of unsatisfying reality’. Each fantasy refers back to a childhood wish, attaches it to images or experiences in the present, and projects it into a future where it is fulfilled.

A work of art gathers its creative strength from the power of childhood recollections, for example Gradiva, centred on dreams and delusions powered by childhood erotic experiences.

At about this point it becomes clear that these ‘fantasies’ have a very similar structure to the dreams which Freud devoted such vast effort to interpreting in his book of the same title. Which is why everyday language in its wisdom also calls fantasies ‘day dreams’. So ‘day’ dreams and ‘night’ dreams are very similar in using imagery provide by the events of the day to ‘front up’ unexpressed, often repressed wishes.

Thoughts

The big flaw in this theory is, How do you deal with the fact that most of the literature of the ancients and of the Middle Ages consists of recycled stories, metaphors, even repeated lines i.e. are not the packaging of anyone’s childhood recollections but traditional narratives?

Freud says:

  1. the artist still makes decisions about how to order his material and these decisions are susceptible to psychoanalysis
  2. folk tales and myths i.e. recurrent stories, may themselves be seen as the wishful fantasies or the distorted childhood reminiscences of entire nations and peoples and be psychoanalysed accordingly

(Regarding the origin of myths, in a letter to his confidant Wilhelm Fliess, in 1897, Freud had written: ‘Can you imagine what endopsychic myths are? They are the offspring of my mental labours. The dim inner perception of one’s own psychical apparatus stimulates illusions of thought, which are naturally projected outwards and characteristically onto the future and the world beyond. Immortality, retribution, life after death, are all reflections of our inner psyche… psychomythology.)

The ‘voyeuristic theory’ outlined by Freud in Psychopathic Stage Characters, and this essay, would say the libidinal satisfaction to be achieved through watching or reading the literary work remains the same – the vested interest of the reader\spectator in vicariously rising above their dull every day lives – regardless of formal considerations. But there’s still a substantial objection which is, Why do we prefer some versions of a traditional story over others?

Freud is forced to concede the existence of a ‘purely formal – that is, aesthetic – yield of pleasure’ about which psychoanalysis can say little in itself.

The writer softens the character of his egoistic daydreams by altering and disguising it, and he bribes us by the purely formal – that is, aesthetic – yield of pleasure which he offers us in the presentation of his phantasies. We give the name of fore-pleasure to a yield of pleasure such as this which is offered to us so as to make possible the release of still greater pleasure arising from deeper psychic sources.

In my opinion all the aesthetic pleasure which a creative writer affords us has the character of a fore-pleasure of this kind, and our actual enjoyment of an imaginative work proceeds from a liberation of tensions in our minds.

Thus he has divided literary pleasure into two parts:

  • fore-pleasure ‘of a purely formal kind’, ‘aesthetics’
  • the deeper pleasure of psychic release, the cathartic release of libidinal energy

This is very similar in structure to his theory of jokes (as laid out in the 1905 work ‘Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious’). In this aesthetic, formal fore-pleasure – the structure of a limerick, the shape of a joke – is a pretext for the joke’s real work – the release of frustration, pent-up pressure, libido.

Critics argue that claiming the core purpose of art to be libidinal release – if the basic point of all art is some kind of psychosexual release – fails to acknowledge that the main thing people talk about when they discuss art or plays or books, the plot and characters and language, are secondary ‘aesthetic’ aspects. It is precisely the artfulness, the creative use the writer makes of traditional material, which is of interest to the critic and to the informed reader, upon which we judge the author, and it is this very artfulness which Freud’s theory leaves untouched. Which is to say that Freudianism has little to do with pure literary criticism.

Freudian defenders would reply that psychoanalysis helps the critic to elucidate and clarify the patterns of symbolism and imagery, the obsessions and ideas, which are crafted into the work of art. This clearly applies most to modern artists who think they have a personal psychopathology to clarify (unlike, say, Chaucer or Shakespeare, who focused on reworking their traditional material).

In practice, literary critics, undergraduates and graduate students by the millions have, since the publication of this essay, gone on to apply Freudian interpretations to every work of art or literature ever created, precisely be applying Freudian decoding to the formal elements of narratives which Freud himself, in his own essays, largely overlooked.

4. Leonardo da Vinci and a memory of his childhood (1910)

Leonardo could never finish anything. Freud says this was because he was illegitimate i.e. abandoned by his rich father and left with his peasant mother for years. This prompted two things: a sublime sense of the total possession of his mother without the rivalry of Daddy which is captured in his best art, for example the Mona Lisa; and a restless curiosity about where he came from.

These latter childhood sexual enquiries were sublimated into his scientific work, into his wonderful studies of Nature and its workings. But also explains why ,whenever he tried to do a painting, he ended up trying to solve all the technical problems it raised, and these problems raised others, and so on.

A good example is his trying to devise a way of doing frescoes with oil. It was his botched technical experiments in this medium which means the famous Last Supper has slowly fallen to pieces.

Observation of men’s daily lives shows us that most people succeed in directing very considerable portions of their sexual instinctual forces to their professional activity. The sexual instinct is particularly well-fitted to make contributions of this kind since it is endowed with a capacity for sublimation: that is, it has the power to replace its immediate aim by other aims which may be valued more highly and which are not sexual.

Freud turns Leonardo into a paradigmatic homosexual: a boy abandoned by his father and left too long under the influence of his mother who, in repressing his love for his mother, takes her part, introjects her into his psyche, identifies wholly with her and comes to look upon love-objects as his mother would i.e. looks for young boys whom he can love as his mother loved him. In a sense a return to auto-eroticism or narcissism.

Freud then uses his theory of Leonardo’s homosexuality to interpret the later figures in his paintings (for example, John the Baptist) as triumphs of androgyny, reconciling the male and female principles in a smile of blissful self-satisfaction.

Freud speculates that Mona Lisa re-awakened in Leonardo the memory of his single mother, hence the ineffable mystery of her smile – and Leonardo’s inability to finish the painting, which was never delivered to the patron, Mona’s husband, and so he ended up taking to the French court, where it was bought by King Francis I which is why it ended up hanging in the Louvre.

So Leonardo’s actual artistic technique, the extraordinary skill which produced the Mona Lisa smile, is merely a fore-pleasure, a pretext, a tool to draw us into what Freud sees as the real purpose of art, the libidinal release, in this case drawing us into sharing the same infantile memory of erotic bliss, of total possession of mummy, that Leonardo was expressing.

At the heart of this long essay is a dream Leonardo recorded in a notebook.

Leonardo dreamed that a vulture came into his room when he was a child and stuck its tail into his mouth. Freud says Leonardo would have known that the vulture was the Egyptian hieroglyph for ‘Mother’ and so the dream represents a deep memory of his infantile happiness at the total possession of his Mummy.

The only problem with this, as Peter Gay and the editors of the Freud Library point out, is that the word ‘vulture’ is a mistranslation in the edition of Leonardo’s notebooks which Freud read; the original Italian word means kite, a completely different kind of bird.

So a central plank on which Freud had rested a lot of his argument in this long essay is destroyed in one blow. But Freud never acknowledged the mistake or changed the passage and so it’s hard to avoid the conclusion that this is simple charlatanry, that Freud, here as in many other places, could not change mistakes because they were vital means which enabled him to project the powerful personal obsession which he called psychoanalysis out onto the real world. That, somehow, it was all or nothing. No gaps or retractions were possible lest the entire edifice start to crumble.

Leonardo is important to Freud because he was the first natural scientist since the Greeks. If Authority is the Father and Nature the Mother, then his peculiar fatherless upbringing also helps to explain Leonardo’s refusal to rely on ‘authorities’, and his determination to wrest the mysteries of Nature for himself, a rebellion against father and quest for total possession of mother which has clear Oedipal origins.

His later scientific research with all its boldness and independence presupposed the existence of infantile sexual researches uninhibited by the father…

This is an illuminating insight. But when, a few pages later, Freud says dreams of flying are all connected with having good sex, and Leonardo was obsessed with birds and flying machines because scientific enquiry stems from our infantile sexual researches, you begin to feel Freud is twisting the material to suit his ends.

This is even more the case in Freud’s treatment of Leonardo’s father. First we are told that not having a Dad helped Leonardo develop a scientific wish for investigation; then that having a father was vital to his Oedipal ‘overthrowing’ of Authority and received wisdom; then that Leonardo both overcame his father who was absent in his infancy and became like him insofar as he tended to abandon his artistic creations half-finished, just like Ser Piero (his dad) had abandoned him.

Freud is trying to have it all ways at once. A feeling compounded by moments of plain silliness: for example when Freud claims his friend Oskar Pfister found the outline of a vulture in the painting of St Ann with Jesus, or when Freud points out that a sketch of a pregnant woman from the notebook has wrong-way round feet, thus suggesting… homosexuality! In the notes we are told the feet look odd because they were, in fact, added in by a later artist. The net result of all these errors and distortions is that, by now, Freud is looking like a fool and a charlatan. The whole thing is riddled with errors.

Conclusion

Freud is like a novelist who scatters insights around him concerning the tangles, complexities, repressions and repetitions of human life with which we are all familiar – now that Freud has pointed them out to us. But whenever he tries to get more systematic, more ‘scientific’, he gets more improbable.

The insights into Leonardo’s psychology are just that, scattered insights. But when he tries to get systematic about infantile sexual inquiry or the origins of homosexuality, you feel credulity stretched until it snaps. It comes as no surprise to learn that the whole extended vulture-dream argument, which reeks of false scholarship and cardboard schematicism, has been shown to be completely wrong.

All the same, no less an authority than art historian Kenneth Clark said that, despite its scholarly errors, Freud’s essay was useful in highlighting the difference, the weirdness of Leonardo. This is the eerie thing about Freud: even when he’s talking bollocks, even when he’s caught out lying, his insights and his entire angle of vision, carry such power, ring bells or force you to rethink things from new angles, and shed fresh light.

5. The theme of the three caskets (1913)

This is an odd little essay on the three-choices theme found in many folk-tales, myths and legends. Freud concentrates on its manifestation in the Shakespeare plays, The Merchant of Venice and King Lear.

The Prince in Merchant wisely picks lead, rather than silver or gold, and thus wins the hand of Portia. Lear foolishly picks worldly things – Goneril and Regan’s sycophancy – and rejects Cordelia’s true love.

What Freud can now ‘reveal’ is that Cordelia and Lear really symbolise DEATH! By refusing his own death – i.e. his inevitable fate – Lear wreaks havoc on the natural order: a man must accept his death.

For the three caskets are symbols of the fundamental three sisters, the Norns of Norse, and the Fates of Greek mythology. The third Fate is Atropos or Death and so picking the third, the least attractive of three choices, is, in fact, to pick death.

Hang on, though: what about the classical story of the judgement of Paris? Paris gives the apple to Aphrodite, goddess of Love. Freud raises this objection only to smoothly deal with it: it’s because Man’s imagination, in rebellion against Fate, converts, in the Paris-myth, the goddess of Death into the goddess of Love, unconsciously turning the most hateful thing into the most loveful thing: it is one more example of the unconscious reversing polarities and making opposites meet.

The Fates were created as a result of the discovery that warned man that he too is a part of nature and therefore subject to the immutable law of death. Something in man was bound to struggle against this subjection, for it is only with extreme unwillingness that he gives up his claim to an exceptional position.

Man, as we know, makes use of his imaginative activity in order to satisfy the wishes that reality does not satisfy. So his imagination rebelled against the recognition of the truth embodied in the myth of the Fates and constructed instead, the myth derived from it, in which the goddess of Death is replaced by the goddess of Love.

This essay is a brilliant example of the weird, perverse persuasiveness of Freud’s imagination and a deliberate addition to the variety of strategies psychoanalysis has for literature:

  • to the psychoanalysis of plot: Gradiva
  • the psychoanalysis of artist’s character: Leonardo (above), Dostoyevsky (below)
  • the psychoanalysis of myth-symbolism: the three caskets
  • the psychoanalysis of the act of creation itself, what it does, what it’s for: Creative Writers and Daydreaming
  • the psychoanalysis of the history of a genre: Psychopathic stage characters (above)

When you list them like this you realise the justice of Freud’s self-description as a conquistador. He deliberately set out to conquer all aspects of all the human sciences – art, literature, anthropology, sociology, history – to which his invention could possibly be applied, and he was successful.

6. The Moses of Michelangelo (1914)

It has traditionally been thought that Michelangelo’s imposing statue of Moses in the church of San Pietro in Vincoli depicts the leader of the Israelites having come down from the mountain with the tablets of the commandments only to see the Israelites dancing round the Golden Calf and to be about to leap up in wrath.

Michelangelo’s statue of Moses in the church of St Peter In Chains in Rome

Freud completely reverses this view. Freud turns this Moses into a model of Freud’s idea of self-overcoming or the Mastery of Instinct:

The giant figure with its tremendous physical power becomes only a concrete expression of the highest mental achievement that is possible in a man, that of struggling successfully against an inward passion for the sake of a cause to which he has devoted himself.

This essay was written in 1914 just after the split with Freud’s disciples, Carl Jung and Alfred Adler, leaving Freud feeling bitter and angry. They thought they were rebelling against a stifling father figure who insisted on blind obedience to his theory and diktats. He thought he had given them a world of new insights, as well as personal help and support, only to watch them distort and pervert his findings for their own ends, to further their own careers.

You don’t have to be a qualified psychiatrist to speculate that there might be a teeny-weeny bit of self-portraiture in Freud’s interpretation of Moses: a heroic passionate man, founder of a whole new way of seeing the world, much-wronged by those he cared for, heroically stifling his justifiable feelings of anger and revenge. There is much in Moses for Freud to identify with.

Overcoming, this is Freud’s perennial theme: civilised man’s continual attempt to master his animal nature. It’s at its clearest here in his interpretation of Moses’ superhuman restraint but it runs like a scarlet thread through his work, eventually blossoming into full view in Civilisation and Its Discontents.

On the way to achieving the heroic self-denial which we call ‘civilisation’ the poor human animal takes many wrong turns and false steps: these are the illnesses, the neuroses, the hysterias and perversions which Freud spent the early part of his career discussing (see in particular, Three Essays On Sexuality 1905).

But even when you have achieved self-mastery, even if your development works out well and you rid yourself of your neuroses and arrive at a mature, adult morality, disenchanted from willful illusions like religious belief and personal superstition, all this heroic self-mastery only brings you face-to-face with a bigger problem: Fate and Death. How can you cope with this final insult to the narcissistic self-love which, despite all your conscious better intentions, nonetheless guides your actions?

Freud suggests a variety of strategies:

  1. falling ill: the ‘flight into illness’ identified as early as 1895 in his book on hysteria
  2. killing yourself: the superego’s rage against the failure of the ego to master reality
  3. rebellion against fate: as epitomised by all the heroes of myth and legend, which Freud identifies the core subject of heroic (Greek) tragedy
  4. sublimating unconscious panic-fear into its opposite, exaggerated submission and masochistic greeting of the blows of Fate (as in some types of submissive religious belief)
  5. outstaring Death with a calm rational stoicism (Freud’s view of himself)

But art, too, has a place among these responses. Art either:

  • provides parables and models which help us come to terms with illness and death and Fate (as Gradiva is a model of the psychoanalytic cure; the three caskets are fairy tales which help us, unconsciously, to accept the inevitable)
  • or helps us to rise emotionally above our narrow, cramped lives (as explained in Creative Writers and Psychopathic stage characters)

Or:

  • is the product of compulsions, obsessions and neuroses on the part of the artist (for example, Leonardo) for whom art acts as therapy and whose purely personal solutions to these problems may appeal to our own situation, and in some way reconcile us to our own fate
  • or simply evoke pleasant unconscious memories, for example the blissful mood conveyed by the smiles of the Mona Lisa or St John the Baptist

Art may leave us with a tantalising sense of mystery and transcendence; or it may thrill us with the spectacle of an artist grappling with feelings he barely understands, feelings and struggle which the art work makes us feel and sympathise with.

9. A childhood recollection from Dichtung Und Wahrheit (1917)

Dichtung Und Wahrheit was the title of the autobiography of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, the great German poet, playwright, novelist, scientist, statesman, theatre director, and critic. Goethe was Freud’s lifelong favourite writer and Freud is liable to drop a Goethe quote into any of his essays at the drop of a hat.

One of the first anecdotes in Goethe’s autobiography describes the little poet, aged about three, throwing all the crockery in the house out into the street and chuckling as it smashed.

Freud shows, by citing comparable stories told by his patients, that this was an expression of Goethe’s jealousy and hatred of his new young brother who had just been born and threatened to supplant him in his mother’s affections. The brother later died and Goethe was, unconsciously, happy. So, in Freud’s hands, this inconsequential anecdote turns out to be a vital key to Goethe’s personality:

I raged for sole possession of my mother – and achieved it!

As with Moses, the autobiographical element in Freud is large. As he says in his own autobiography:

A man who has been the indisputable favourite of his mother keeps for life the feeling of a conqueror, that confidence of success which often induces real success.

Compare with the way the ‘secret’ of Leonardo turned out to be the unquenchable if unconscious bliss he kept all his life of having possessed his mother’s love, undiluted by the absent father. The fact that so many of Freud’s insights turn out so nakedly to be repetitions of key aspects of his own personality prompts the $64,000 question: Are Freud’s insights into human nature the revelation of universal laws? Or a mammoth projection onto all mankind of his own idiosyncratic upbringing and personality?

10. The Uncanny (1919)

This is the first of these essays to be written under the influence of Freud’s second, post-Great War, theory of psychoanalysis. The new improved version was a great deal more complicated than earlier efforts.

This essay is an attempt to apply the symbolic mode of interpretation to the E.T.A Hoffman story of ‘Olympia and the Sandman’ in which several ‘doubles’ appear, creating an ‘uncanny’ effect.

For post-war Freud the human psyche is dominated by a compulsion to repeat: this is the secret of the anxiety dreams of shell-shock victims, or of the child’s repetitive games, discussed at such length in Beyond The Pleasure Principle, 1920.

An aspect of this profound human tendency to repeat is the idea of ‘doubles’. Beginning with the notion of the ‘soul’ – the Christian idea that we are made of two things, a body and a soul – doubles in various forms litter human culture.

Freud speculates that the role of doubles is to:

  • stave off death: you have a secret double fighting on your behalf, a good fairy, a good angel etc
  • underpin ideas of free will, of alternative actions which you could, but didn’t take
  • become, by reversal, objects of aggression and fear, doubles which return as harbingers of doom in fairy stories and in neurotic hallucinations

After this little detour Freud gets to the point: the uncanny is the feeling prompted by the return of the childish belief in the omnipotence of thoughts.

For example, you think of someone and the next minute the phone rings and it’s them on the line. You experience an ‘uncanny’ sensation because, for a moment, you are back in the three year old’s narcissistic belief that the universe runs according to your wishes.

And the eruption into your tamed adult conscious of this primitive, long-repressed idea prompts a feeling of being ‘spooked’, unsettled – the Uncanny.

When someone has an ‘uncanny’ knack of doing something it’s the same: it makes us feel weird because their consistent success reminds us of our infantile fantasies of immediate wish-fulfilment and gratification; the powerful wish to be able to do something effortlessly and easily which possessed us as children but which we had to painfully smother and put behind us in order to cope with the crushingly ungratifying nature of reality.

In the broadest sense the uncanny is the return of the repressed: the Oedipus Complex, the omnipotence of thoughts, the obsession with doubles, even return to the womb feelings: they are strange, disturbing, but ultimately not terrifying because we have felt them before.

11. A seventeenth century demonological neurosis (1923)

Freud’s interest in witchcraft, possession and allied phenomena was of longstanding, possibly stimulated by his trip to the Salpetriere Hospital to study under Charcot in 1885.

Freud’s ‘Report’ on his trip mentions that Charcot paid a great deal of attention to the historical aspects of neuroses i.e. to tales of possession and so on.

The series of lectures of Charcot’s which Freud translated into German includes discussion of the hysterical nature of medieval ‘demono-manias’ and an account of a sixteenth century case of demonic possession.

It is recorded that in 1909 Freud spoke at length to the Vienna Society on the History of the Devil and of the psychological composition of belief in the Devil.

In mentioning ‘the compulsion to repeat’ in The Uncanny (a phenomenon dealt with at length in Beyond The Pleasure Principle and vitally important for understanding Freud’s later theory) Freud says:

It is possible to recognise the dominance in the unconscious mind of a ‘compulsion to repeat’ proceeding from the instinctual impulses and probably inherent in the very nature of the instincts – a compulsion powerful enough to overcome the pleasure principle, lending to certain aspects of the mind their demonic character, and still very clearly expressed in the impulses of young children, a compulsion too which is responsible for the course taken by the analyses of neurotic patients.’

Here we have the first glimmerings of the set of ideas which were to crystallise around the new concept of the superego, namely that it is the agent of the death drive, the fundamental wish of all organisms to return to an inorganic state of rest.

The superego channels this drive through the introjection (or internalisation) of the infantile image of our demanding parents, who continue to demand impossible standards all our lives and, when we fail to live up to them, harry us, persecute us, make us feel guilty, anxious, or depressed, filled with self-hatred and self-loathing.

One aspect of this is what earlier ages called ‘possession’, when people heard voices or seemed impelled to do what they didn’t want to. This impelling comes from the id, from our dumb, voiceless instincts – but the self-reproaches for having stepped out of line come from the superego, which, in some circumstances, exaggerates the fairly common guilt at our ‘sinfulness’ into florid ideas of demonic possession.

The essay is a psychoanalysis, using these new concepts, of the historical case of one Christopher Haizmann, a painter in the seventeenth century who fell into a melancholy at the death of his father and then claimed to the authorities that he had signed a pact with the Devil. The historical sequence of events is that he eventually renounced his pact and was looked after for a while by the Christian Brothers.

Freud diagnoses Haizmann as Grade A neurotic. Upon his father’s death he was prompted to review his life and realised he was a failure, a good-for-nothing. The pacts he reports himself as making, bizarrely, ask the Devil to take him as His son. Haizmann is transparently looking for a father-substitute who will punish him for his perceived failure.

More subtly, then, Haizmann is inflating the punitive superego (based on infantile memories of his father) into the grand figure of Devil, the bad or punitive father.

Unfortunately, upon re-entering the world, Haizmann suffered a relapse. He claimed to be the victim of an earlier pact he signed with the Devil and, for some reason, forgot about. Once more he renounced it upon being readmitted to life with the Christian Brothers, but this time he renounced the world also and spent the rest of his life with them.

The devil is the bad side of the father i.e. the child’s projection of his ambivalent feelings onto an ego-ideal. Sociologically speaking, in the history of religion, ‘devils’ were old gods who we have overcome and onto whom we then project all our suppressed lust and violence. So Baal was a perfectly decent Canaanite god until the Israelites overthrew the Canaanites in the name of their god, Yahweh, at which point the Israelites projected onto Baal him all the wickedness and lust in their own hearts. Satan, in Christian doctrine, was originally the brightest and best of God’s angels, before a similar process of overthrow and then being scapegoated with all our worst imaginings. So the devil is the father-figure we have overcome in fantasy, but onto whom we then project all the vilest wickedness in our own rotten hearts.

12. Humour (1927)

By the early 1920s Freud had devised a radical new tripartite picture of the psyche as consisting of the ego, id and superego, and had posited the existence in the psyche of a powerful death drive. He had done this in order to explain the compulsion to repeat which he saw enacted in situations as varied as shell-shocked soldiers obsessively repeating their dreams of war and a young child’s game of repeatedly throwing a toy away and reclaiming it.

Freud was in a position to apply his new structure and psychology to various literary and psychological phenomena.

Different from jokes or wit, ‘humour’ is what we call irony and is endemic among the British. When the condemned man is walking towards the gallows and he looks up at the sunshine and remarks, ‘Well, the week’s certainly getting off to a pleasant start’ it is his superego making light of the dire situation his ego finds itself in.

Like neuroses or drugs, humour is a way of dealing with the harsh reality we find ourselves in. It is like our parents reassuring us how silly and inconsequential is the big sports game we’ve just lost is, so it doesn’t matter anyway.

As you might expect if you’ve read this far and have been noticing the key themes which emerge in Freud, it turns out that humour, like tragedy, like so much else in Freud, is an act of rebellion:

Humour is not resigned; it is rebellious.

Once again the image of rebellion, whether it’s in art, or vis-a-vis the authorities, or against the smothering restrictions of religion, or, most fundamentally, against the dictates of fate and death themselves, God-less Man’s fundamental posture is one of rebellion and revolt. This feels to me close if not identical to the position of the secular humanist, Camus.

In this brief, good-humoured essay the superego appears in a good light for once, as an enlightening and ennobling faculty, instead of the punitive father-imago which he elsewhere claims underlies secular guilt and depression.

13. Dostoyevsky and parricide (1928)

Which is how he appears here. Burdened with an unnaturally powerful, bisexual ambivalence towards his sadistic father, Dostoyevsky never recovered from the crushing sense of guilt when his unconscious hatred and death-wishes against his father were fulfilled when his father was murdered in a street when Fyodor was 18.

Dostoyevsky’s fanatical gambling and spiritual masochism were aspects of his need to punish himself for his suppressed parricidal death-wishes…which came true!

Freud claims that another aspect of Dostoyevsky’s self-punishment were his epileptic attacks. When he managed to get sent to a prison-camp in Siberia i.e. was sufficiently punished by the outside world, his attacks stopped. He had managed to make the father-substitute, the Czar, punish him in reality, and therefore the attacks from inside his own mind, the psychosomatic epilepsy, could cease.

In amongst these psychological speculations comes Freud’s final word on the individual work of literature which, above all others, was crucial to his philosophy:

It can scarcely be owing to chance that three of the masterpieces of literature of all time – the Oedipus Rex of Sophocles, Shakespeare’s Hamlet and Dostoyevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov – should all deal with the same subject, parricide. In all three, moreover, the motive for the deed, sexual rivalry for a woman, is laid bare.

He goes on to say that the essence of this master plot has been attenuated as civilisation has done its repressive work to try and conceal it, i.e. what Oedipus does openly and explicitly (murder his father and sleep with his mother) is later carried out by unconsciously envied representatives (by Claudius in Hamlet). But the continuity is certainly suggestive…

And it is in the course of this essay that Freud makes the key remark that the essence of morality is renunciation, the closest he comes to talk about the content of ‘morality’ in the conventional sense, as opposed to a technical approach to its psychological origins and development.

One conclusion among many

If you’ve read through all of this you’ll maybe agree that Freud’s way of seeing things was so distinctive and powerful that, even though much of his claims and arguments may be factually disproved, even if he can be shown to be actively lying about some things, nonetheless, in a strange, uncanny way, it doesn’t stop you beginning to see the world as he does. It’s a kind of psychological infection; or a process of being moved into an entirely new worldview.

Hence the strong feeling he and his followers generated that the psychoanalytic movement he founded wasn’t just a new branch of psychology but an entirely new way of seeing the world, a worldview which gave rise to ‘disciples’ and ‘followers’ in a sense more associated with a religious movement than a simple scientific ‘school’.

Freud was so obsessed with religions because he was founding a new one, and so obsessed with Moses because he identified with him as a fellow founder of a new belief system.


Credit

The history of the translation of Freud’s many works into English forms a complicated subject in its own right. The works in this review were translated into English between 1959 and 1961 as part of The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. All references in this blog post are to the versions collected into Volume 14 of the Pelican Freud Library, ‘Art and Literature’, published in 1985.

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