At The Existentialist Café by Sarah Bakewell (2016)

A writer is a person who describes, and thus a person who is free – for a person who can exactly describe what he or she experiences can also exert some control over those events.
(At The Existentialist Café, page 104)

Brilliant

Suffice to say this is the only book I’ve ever read which not only explains what phenomenology was, but makes you understand how cool and revolutionary it felt in the 1920s.

It also provides, better than anything I’ve ever read, an intellectual biography of Martin Heidegger, explaining his initial devotion to the founder of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl, then their growing estrangement, in terms of their diverging philosophies and worldviews.

I thought the book would be mostly about Sartre, Camus and de Beauvoir, and they certainly appear at the beginning and then feature in the second half – but the central achievement of At The Existentialist Café is to embed them among a) the broader strands of existentialist thought of the 1920s, 30s and 40s b) among a whole range of other thinkers who emerge as at least, if not more, interesting than the famous three, namely:

  • Husserl and Heidegger, who are worth reading about again and again
  • their disciples, like Karl Jaspers or Emmanuel Levinas
  • French colleagues, especially the fascinating figure of Maurice Merleau-Ponty
  • and related writers – there’s a section on Black American émigrés to post-war Paris such as Richard Wright and James Baldwin, which is very enlightening

Bakewell has the priceless gift of being able to weave together biography, cultural context and summaries of (sometimes very difficult) philosophical writings, to dazzling effect. She doesn’t just summarise the philosophy but – in the classic existentialist style – makes you feel the force and excitement of the ideas of Husserl or Heidegger.

Thus the chapter on Simone de Beauvoir’s feminist classic, The Second Sex, makes it sound like not just another long old dusty tome languishing on your to-do list – but an intellectually thrilling, world-changing book which is still completely relevant to our contemporary situation.

Similarly, her description of Heidegger takes full account of his personal weirdness, his obsessions and narrowness, his impenetrable home-made jargon and, of course, his notorious Nazi sympathies – but nonetheless argues strongly for the sheer beauty of many passages in his strange disorientating philosophy, and actually manages to convey this.

Her description of Richard Wright immediately made me want to run out and grab a copy of his novel, Native Son. The same for the works of Merleau-Ponty – until this book just a name I’d come across in biographical sketches of Sartre, but who now emerges as a fascinating thinker in his own right – and for Emmanuel Levinas and Karl Jaspers, and so on.

Edmund Husserl (1859 to 1938)

At the turn of the twentieth century Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) thought that philosophy had become too technocratic, too dominated by bloodless, calculating scientific attitudes, by grand theories starting from over-familiar axioms or philosophical cruxes. But it is obvious that humans – even philosophers – are already in the world, engaged in all kinds of ways with eating, drinking, sleeping, and managing innumerable encounters with other people.

Edmund Husserl

Edmund Husserl

Husserl advocated stripping away, ‘bracketing out’, all the philosophical, rational, technical and scientific terminology from our thoughts (in a move known as the ‘phenomenological reduction’) and then trying to describe what it feels like to think, to see, to perceive, to encounter others – in other words, to be. Husserl’s war cry was ‘To the things themselves!’

The word ‘phenomenon’ is used because it’s an ancient Greek word meaning appearances; generations of philosophers have got hung up on the fundamental question of whether what we (seem to) perceive reflects an actual world ‘out there’. Who cares, says Husserl. If what all of us perceive of the world is the phenomena which fill our minds, so be it: Describe them! Describe the phenomena!

Successive generations of students came to study with him in Freiburg, nicknamed by Levinas ‘the city of phenomenology’, through the 1910s and ’20s. But, unfortunately, they all tended to then go off and develop their own versions of phenomenology. Some were atheist (Heidegger), some were Christian (Jaspers), or at least spiritual – all can be interpreted as part of the anti-rational reaction between the wars which included, in the broadest perspective, movements like Surrealism or Fascism.

Martin Heidegger (1889 to 1976)

Martin Heidegger grew up in a small German village, helped out with church chores, admired traditional local craftsmen, went for long walks in the huge Black Forest. As a student he went to study under Husserl in Freiburg and for three years was his assistant, many thought he was the chosen heir and successor.

Martin Heidegger

Martin Heidegger

But Heidegger grew apart from the master, considering that phenomenology applied itself too promiscuously to all kinds of areas of mental perception and experience, while all the time missing the key, fundamental issue: the nature of existence itself.

For Heidegger all previous philosophy, since the time of Plato and Aristotle, concentrated on knowing, with two thousand years of thinkers elaborating vast superstructures and generating thousands of terms describing theories of sense perception and knowledge and so on.

Heidegger thought this was all a mistake. Every previous philosopher had been in a sense too complex, and had missed the most fundamental thing, the thing right in front of their noses – the fact that we exist at all. What is existence? What the hell is being?

Where Husserl had developed the ‘phenomenological reduction’ as a manoeuvre designed to focus the area of study, Heidegger spoke of the ontological difference. This is the distinction between beings of which there are, of course, an almost infinite number and a vast number of ways of studying – and Being itself, the fundamental bedrock of all lesser beings.

‘Forgetting’ the difference between Being and beings allows traditional philosophers to ‘fall’ into well-worn habits of doing psychology or sociology or any of scores of human sciences, i.e. studying the myriad individual entities in the world: but what of Being itself, the deep ocean which underpins all of existence? What do we know of that? How do we go about understanding the most fundamental aspect of the universe – the simple fact that it exists.

Heidegger wanted to single-handedly overthrow the existing tradition and replace it with a philosophy which systematically explores the nature and consequences of Being. Since no-one else had done this, he naturally had to make up his own terminology for the rapidly proliferating series of ideas and concepts this point of view generated.

Dasein is probably the single most important new term: rather than refer to mankind, or humanity, or people, Heidegger uses Dasein (literally ‘there-be’, more loosely ‘being-there’) to denote the presence of the human in the world. Dasein can then be examined from various perspectives, in relation to other Dasein, to the inanimate world, and to death.

The scale of Heidegger’s ambition – working through a completely new way of seeing and understanding human existence – explains why his work is so often seen as a momentous revolution in philosophy and he is often credited with being the most important 20th century philosopher.

Many readers then and now are put off by his tendency to generate long portmanteau words to try and describe the slippery concepts he’s noticing and explaining. Bakewell comes up with the characteristically useful suggestion that Heidegger (whose work she knows very well, having begun a PhD on him) can sometimes be thought of as a Modernist, experimental writer. His aim is to defamiliarise the world, to constantly make us aware of the strangeness of existence. This is a generally accepted technique in a wide range of literary writers; why not in a philosopher, too?

Existentialism

According to Sartre in Being and Nothingness, there are two types of being: being-in-itself (être-en-soi) describes all inanimate objects and animals; they just persist in their pre-ordained, unthinking selfhood. And this is contrasted with being-for-itself (être-pour-soi) i.e. human beings.

We can think and, above all, choose. We are thrown into the world, interacting with objects and other people, from earliest consciousness and, at countless moments, can choose what to do. We may well be constrained by biology, culture, history and so on, but – deep down and fundamentally – human beings are free as no other entities in the universe are. Free to choose and, when you reflect on it for a moment, this means that the accumulation of all our choices amounts to who we are.

Thus, human beings are unique in that we are continually inventing and creating ourselves through our choices, as no other entities in the world seem to.

Jean-Paul Sartre

Jean-Paul Sartre

This is the meaning of the catch-phrase, ‘Existence preceded essence’. We are born, thrown into the world, grow, exist and then we choose what we want to be. We exist first – and then we create our essence. There is (on this reading) no pre-existing human nature, or not enough to interfere with the radical uniqueness each of us possesses.

This explains existentialism’s thrilling sense of liberation and freedom for a whole generation of young people after the war.

For sure, Sartre also emphasises the weight of responsibility anyone who really acknowledges their freedom must consequently feel; he bandies around words like anguish and angst quite freely. But the reward for fully acknowledging your freedom and responsibility, is a sense that you are living an ‘authentic’ life, true to yourself, making conscious choices to be what you want to be.

This idea – whether the life you’re living is ‘authentic’ or ‘inauthentic’ – in popular phraseology whether you’re being true to yourself or are a ‘phoney’ – became a dominant idea in pop culture for decades. ‘Phoniness’ is a central issue in the classic teen novel of angst and alienation, Catcher in the Rye (1951).

In fact all these key terms – existentialism, essence, freedom, anguish, authenticity – were widely popularised through newspapers, magazines, radio and so on to become key ideas, feelings, subjects of debate and rules for living among young people in the decades after the war.

Levinas, Merleau-Ponty et al

Bakewell explains how this radical new way of thinking about philosophy (and the drastic new ideas it threw up about human beings, life, society and ethics) opened up all sorts of new perspectives, which were followed up and worked out by slightly more peripheral figures such as Karl Jaspers, Emmanuel Levinas, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and many others.

Thus Bakewell paints a really broad and deep and engaging picture of the philosophical tides surging around between-the-wars Western Europe into which keen young, clever young intellectuals like Jean-Paul Sartre and Simon de Beauvoir arrived. Her accounts of their early works make sooooo much sense because she locates them as dialogues and divergences from the writings of these other, earlier, figures who she has spent the first half of the book so thoroughly explaining.

Weil, Arendt, de Beauvoir

Bakewell’s book embodies, for me, the best kind of feminism, which is that she doesn’t nag and complain about all the men being sexists or misogynists (as they probably were); instead she accentuates the positive and devotes a lot of space to showing how many women thinkers of the time more than held their own against the men, and made valuable contributions in their own right.

Simone de Beauvoir is mentioned throughout, as she reacted to the developments in phenomenology and developed her own brand of existentialist thought. She emerges as more nuanced, subtle and life-affirming than Sartre with his queasy hallucinations of being. Bakewell’s passage summarising The Second Sex not only places it among, but makes it sound just as exciting as, the masterworks of Darwin, Freud and Einstein.

Simone de Beauvoir

Simone de Beauvoir

But Bakewell also devotes a long, sympathetic section to the strange, passionate, mystical figure of Simone Weil who achieved a staggering amount in her short life (she died from self-induced starvation Emmanuel presumably some form of anorexia Emmanuel aged just 34).

And she spends some time explicating the biography and changing ideas of Hannah Arendt (1906-75) who, in the 1920s, studied with all three of Heidegger, Husserl and Jaspers, before pursuing her own, definitive, explorations of power and violence.

Her book made me realise how pitifully ignorant I am of the writing of all three of these women, but then it made me realise how ignorant I am of the entire Continental tradition she’s describing. Must try harder.

Summary

If you’re at all interested in the intellectual life of mid-twentieth-century Europe, this book is absolutely vital. It is one of the best, most thorough, capable, calm and lucid, but exciting and motivating books of intellectual history I’ve ever read.


Related links

Related reviews

  • Sartre reviews
  • Camus reviews

Ulysses on the Liffey by Richard Ellmann (1972)

The book as image demands these glosses as registers of their meaning.
(Richard Ellmann justifying his high-level, abstract, structural analysis, page 60)

Almost everything is coupled.
(Ellmann’s habit of defining binaries and dichotomies on every page, p.72)

Joyce liked to work his prose into patterns as intricate and individualised as the initial letters in the Book of Kells.
(Pretty analogy if not, ultimately, very useful, p.73)

A quick reminder of the chapter numbers and names in James Joyce’s epic modernist novel, ‘Ulysses’. Pretty much all discussions of the book refer to them but note that none of the Greek chapter titles are indicated in the actual text of ‘Ulysses’; they were given by Joyce to early commentators who published them in books and articles about the novel, and have been used by critics and commentators, including me, ever since – but none of them actually appear in hard copies or online versions of the text, which only indicate the chapters with numbers.

Part 1. The Telemachiad or the odyssey of Telemachus

  1. Telemachus
  2. Nestor
  3. Proteus

Part 2. The Odyssey

  1. Calypso
  2. Lotus Eaters
  3. Hades
  4. Aeolus
  5. Lestrygonians
  6. Scylla and Charybdis
  7. Wandering Rocks
  8. Sirens
  9. Cyclops
  10. Nausicaa
  11. Oxen of the Sun
  12. Circe

Part 3. The Nostos or Return

  1. Eumaeus
  2. Ithaca
  3. Penelope

Ulysses on the Liffey

This is an old book, written in the late 1960s and early ’70s, before the deluge of modern critical theory transformed the discipline of literary criticism. Back then American scholar and academic Richard Ellman (1918 to 1987) was famous as the man who wrote the huge and definitive biography of James Joyce (published in 1959) which single-handedly transformed Joyce studies. And yet this book, published just 13 years later, is deeply disappointing. I wouldn’t recommend it. Read the Hugh Kenner primer about ‘Ulysses’, but don’t bother with this one.

This is because Ellmann goes very heavy indeed on the schemata, on the high-level diagrams of organs, and colours, and symbols and tones that Joyce drew up for the book – and to which Ellmann adds further levels and frameworks of his own. On every page he adds structural analyses, building platforms upon platforms – for example his suggestion in the first chapter that ‘Ulysses’ needs to be interpreted on four levels: literal, ethical aesthetic and anagogic.

The trouble with his relentless focus on the (pretty simple-minded) structures he finds everywhere in the book is that they continually take us away from the actual text and make us dwell in the bloodless world of tables and blueprints. This book not only reproduces the detailed schema which Joyce sent to the Italian critic Linati, it is punctuated by three schemas of Ellman’s own creation summarising the first, middle and final six chapters.

And they’re not one-page wonders, they’re very detailed, each one extending over six pages. Possibly they’re considered the USP and backbone of this volume, maybe this book exists not to help the reader read ‘Ulysses’ better but as a scholarly presentation of Ellmann’s structural and thematic theories but I found them unreadable. Like reading a PowerPoint presentation about ‘Midsummer Night’s Dream’. Buzzkill. Way to drain all the joy out of a subject.

His chapter on Molly Bloom is disappointing

But not only is Ellmann’s approach boring, it’s often disappointingly banal.

I read his chapter ‘Why Molly Bloom menstruates’ immediately after reading the Molly Bloom chapter of ‘Ulysses’ and was immensely disappointed. First he wastes time summarising the theories of William Empson and Edmund Wilson (from the 1930s) and then disappears off into more schemas. He tells us that, according to Joyce’s notes, in the previous chapter Leopold Bloom had headed off into Deep Night while Stephen headed for Alba, the dawn. Is this useful? Sort of, kind of, mildly interesting – but it doesn’t really illuminate your reading of the actual words.

He says that after the dry officialese of ‘Ithaca’, Molly’s soliloquy offers ‘a joyful efflorescence’. Except it doesn’t, does it? It’s a long rambling repetitive tissue of memories about neighbours and soldiers and relatives and boyfriends and shopping and childhood games and biscuits and lots of graphic sexual descriptions. Until the last page which, for sure, leads us up to the famous great lyrical climax. But it’s not an ‘efflorescence’ before that. It’s a rambling character sketch. Ellmann’s characterisation is, in my opinion, flat wrong.

Ellmann compares Molly to the Wife of Bath (p.163) and Moll Flanders (p.165), which struck me as bleeding obvious, but missed what to me is the even more obvious point that all three of these famous fictional women were created by men. What does that tell us? But Ellmann doesn’t notice.

He asserts that if Stephen represents genuine philosophy, and Bloom represents half-educated magazine philosophising, then Molly represents all flesh. But isn’t that a very patronising and (as usual) over-schematic way of thinking about her? Instead of considering what she actually says, Ellmann is more concerned to fit her into his high-level patterns and plans.

I couldn’t believe it when he writes:

Molly’s nature [is] so much more earthy, trivial, sexualised and lyrical than Aristotle’s or Hume’s… (p.163)

Er, yes. This isn’t in doubt, the question is what makes you want to compare Molly Bloom to Aristotle in the first place? I well understand that Stephen expounds Aristotelian ideas in ‘Proteus’ and ‘Scylla and Charybdis’ and that Molly, in her semi-literate physicality, could be said to embody anti-philosophy. This would make her having Stephen to stay and her fantasies of having sex with him a real meeting of opposites. But directly comparing Molly the character with Aristotle or Hume seems to me ludicrous.

Ellman’s endless thirst for binaries and dichotomies is typified when he says:

Basically she is earth to Bloom’s sun, modifying his light by her own movements. (p.166)

This may or may not be ‘true’ but I think it misses the point by being so abstract. It feels like any moment he’s going to tell us that men are from Mars and women are from Venus. Or, in Ellmannese:

The ‘Ithaca’ episode had offered a heliocentric view of Bloom, Molly offers a geocentric one, the two together forming the angle of parallax… (p.167)

I know that one of the guiding principles of ‘Ulysses’ is the notion of parallax which the dictionary defines as ‘the displacement or difference in the apparent position of an object viewed along two different lines of sight’ (basically seeing the same thing from two points of view) and I certainly know that Molly’s character can be described as ‘earthy’ – but I don’t really see why Bloom should be considered as especially ‘heliocentric’ and I don’t see that it helps my close reading of specific passages, or of the text as a whole.

I just don’t like thinking about ‘Ulysses’ like this. It seems pointless and boring to me. It takes us light years away from the actual text in all its wonderful detail and difficulty and comedy and makes the thing sound like a lecture in comparative religion or structuralist anthropology. But this dry colourless theoretical level is the only level Ellmann operates at.

Despite disliking it more and more as I read on, I persisted and here’s the best summary I can manage. I try to give credit where credit’s due for Ellmann’s insights and ideas.

Learnings, sort of

Threes Joyce liked threes, so Ellmann suggests that the chapters proceed in triads: three in the opening section, four sets of three in the middle, three in the final section. Each trio contains internal contrasts and Ellmann has his own schema to impose:

I shall propose that in every group of three chapters the first defers to space, the second has time in the ascendant, and the third blends (or expunges) the two. (p.19)

Thus:

  • chapter one (space) opens in the extremely solid tower, with plump Buck Mulligan, the serving of food, and looking out over the big sea
  • chapter two (time) opens with a history lesson and contains Stephen’s famous outburst about history being a nightmare from which he’s trying to awake. Within this chapter Ellmann divides time into two types, secular and spiritual time, Caesar’s and Christ’s
  • chapter three synthesises the first two as Stephen crackles his way through the bladderwrack testing Aristotelian reality by closing then reopening his eyes, to see if the world is still there. (Oddly enough, it is)

Layers As a freethinker Bloom is post-Christian. As a Christian convert, he is post-Judaic. As a Judeo-Christian he is post-Homeric. So his character represents historical layer upon layer.

Dedalus If you think about it, Dedalus is a bad name for the young male protagonist in this novel. Stephen Dedalus perfectly suits the character in ‘Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man’ because he is (like Saint Stephen) the ‘martyr’ of the new religion (in Joyce’s case, of the new literature) which, like the legendary Greek Daedelus, he has fathered, a labyrinth of artistic artifice. But in ‘Ulysses‘ Stephen is no longer a father (as Daedelus was father to Icarus), he is a son. If you think about it, there’s a real confusion here, which Joyce just outfaces and all his critics accept.

Loose fits Similarly, none of the many literary correspondences the text invokes – namely to the ‘Odyssey’ and ‘Hamlet’, with occasional nods to Dante’s ‘Divine Comedy’ and Goethe’s ‘Faust’ – fully fit.

  • In ‘The Odyssey’ Telemachus goes looking for his actual father but in the novel, Bloom is not Stephen’s father and Stephen isn’t consciously looking for him.
  • Hamlet is in mourning but for a dead father whose wife has quickly had sex with/married his uncle, whereas Stephen is in mourning for a dead mother, and there’s not a shred of unfaithfulness about either Simon or May Dedalus.
  • In chapter 4 Molly stands for Calypso, the sensual enchantress, and yet in chapter 18 the same Molly stands for the devoted wife Penelope. Not only that, but Penelope is famously chaste while Molly is famously promiscuous.

In other words, the classic literary texts hover in the background like ghostly amplifiers or underpinnings of the narrative, but they only loosely inform the main characters. To put it another way, Joyce plays fast and loose with all the correspondences, making them close when they can be, but quietly ignoring them altogether when they don’t fit.

Antisemitism Ellmann tells us that antisemitism is Joyce’s touchstone for ‘cravenheartedness’. I’ll second that. Both the Englishman Haines, the Unionist Deasy, and the Irish nationalist citizen are guilty of it. For me antisemitism is not only bigoted racism but, just as bad, it’s stupid. It indicates someone who can’t cope with the complexity of the modern world and so resorts to medieval simplifications.

Two types Haines represents a British empire reduced to having nightmares and shooting in the dark, combined with embarrassing sentimentalism about the locals i.e. the milkwoman, while Mulligan is flashily hollow, ‘Ireland’s gay betrayer’, betrayer of his own culture. They represent antitheses with Stephen in the middle.

Refuser At the Forty Foot bathing hole Stephen refuses to bathe with the other two. This is because he is the great refuser; he refused to kneel at his mother’s bedside, he has refused Roman Catholicism, he refused the suggestion of becoming a priest in ‘A Portrait’, he refuses the Italian music teacher’s kindly suggestion to become a professional singer, he refuses the Irish nationalism of the peasant student Davin and the drunken bigot the citizen. All leading up to the climactic moment in the brothel where he smashes the chandelier as he declares he will not serve. He is Mr No.

Just regarding the refusal to bathe, it’s noteworthy that Stephen is a hydrophobe. We are told he hasn’t had a bath for months. He must have stunk. It’s typical of Ellmann that he instantly spots the structural element of the Forty Foot rejection scene, neatly pointing out how Stephen’s refusing to pray and refusing to swim amount symbolise his rejecting spiritual and physical purification, but isn’t interested in its practical consequences (p.11).

Chapter 3. Proteus

Aristotle Joyce worshipped Aristotle. He thought him the greatest thinker who ever lived. What he chiefly liked was he was against Plato’s idealism.

What he liked about Aristotle was he had demoted Plato’s Ideas, had denied that universals could be detached from particulars, and in short had set himself against mysticism. (p.13)

Just as Joyce set himself against the Celtic Revival, the fairies and twilight and legends of Olde Irelande, against aestheticism and the yellow nineties, occultism and spiritualism. As dramatised in the confrontation with A.E. in the National Library in ‘Scylla and Charybdis’.

(I agree, which is why I try to stick as closely as possible to the actual text and narrative of the books I review. The further away you get, the more it becomes something else. So it’s ironic that Ellmann fully understands Joyce’s liking for Aristotle while himself demonstrating precisely the flight from the (messy, confusing) details of the text into (overneat and tidy) literary archetypes and symbols, which sound more like Plato and his timeless Forms.)

The now, the here This is the point of Stephen’s dismissal of William Blake’s followers (although he himself liked Blake and lectured on him) for wittering on about the void and eternity, whereas Stephen wants to concentrate on the exact present. Stephen thinks:

Through spaces smaller than red globules of man’s blood they creepycrawl after Blake’s buttocks into eternity of which this vegetable world is but a shadow. [Whereas we should] Hold to the now, the here, through which all future plunges to the past.

Crunching Hence Joyce is so careful to describe the sound of Stephen’s boots crunching through the bladderwrack on the beach and then tries to depict the sound of the waves with made-up words. ‘Ulysses’ is about these vivid sensual details. Almost all of which are overlooked in Ellmann’s quest for structures and schemas.

The Holy Office In his poem The Holy Office, Joyce mocks female coyness as much as male idealism because they are both denials of the mucky reality of love and sex – they are part of what Ellmann summarises in a powerful phrase as ‘the general self-deception’ and refusal to face reality. Joyce is about facing reality. People are not what you want them to be. The world is not what you want it to be. You are not what you want to be. Face it.

Ellmann says Joyce’s message is ‘Accept the universe’. It is what it is and ‘Ulysses’ is an encyclopedic transcription of its itness. This, of course, is highly debatable, because the book presents a polemically dirty, messy, squalid often very sordid view of human nature. Now wonder Virginia Woolf loathed it. For her it missed vast realms of beauty and art. My point is that Ellmann’s description of the book is not really adequate. Like many fans and commentators he takes Joyce’s own opinion of it at face value.

Caesuras Ellmann points out something I hadn’t noticed which is that most if not all the chapters have a break or caesura in the middle. I can see that in the ‘Nausicaa’ chapter (first half ladies’ romance, second half reverting to the initial style) but less so the others. In the first half of chapter 3 Ellmann says Stephen is thinking about creation, fathers, mothers, fertilisation and giving birth; but half-way through he changes the direction of his walk and this triggers a change in his thoughts, which become about death and decomposition, starting with the carcass of a dog he sees on the beach. So two parts: birth and death, growth and corruption. Maybe. But I’m suspicious of this because Ellmann quickly turns everything into binaries and opposites. And it feels so easy just throwing out these grand pairs of synonyms and antonyms: Expansion and collapse. Addition and subtraction. Creation and destruction. I could go on all night.

Pee Meanwhile, in the actual text, Stephen has a pee (‘Better get this job over quick’) then picks his nose: ‘He laid the dry snot picked from his nostril on a ledge of rock, carefully’. You can see how very aggressively non-spiritual, how aggressively, vulgarly materialistic this deliberately is.

More antitheses Ellmann spots that the chapter opens with Stephen reading (the signature of all things) and ends with him writing (a poem). The poem he wrote in ‘Portrait’ is a portrait of attraction (‘Lure of the fallen seraphim’), here it is a poem about death, and so of repulsion.

Rosevean Stephen looks over his ship and sees a ship, the Rosevean, but for Ellmann, this ship also:

seals the marriage of form and matter, of body and soul, of space and time, at which Aristotle officiated. (p.26)

Yes I know Joyce packed the book full of structures and correspondences, so no doubt the ship is part of his elaborate symbology because everything is, I’m not denying that. I’m just suggesting that Ellmann’s focus exclusively on these structures a) excludes the riot and fun of the language and b) often feels stretched and contrived.

Chapter 4. Calypso

Ellmann prioritises abstract over concrete Language is diffusive, fissiparous, uncontainable, whereas Ellmann continually locks everything down to really boring binaries. This chapter covers the introduction of Leopold Bloom in chapter 4 of ‘Ulysses’ and embarks on another set of binaries comparing him and Stephen. Father versus son. Married versus single. Intellectual versus middle-brow. Solipsist versus realist. Inbound versus outbound. I could go on for hours trotting out the same slightly interesting but ultimately tedious dichotomies. Stephen is edgy, Bloom is placid. Stephen is a loner while Bloom is convivial. Stephen gets drunk while Bloom stays sober. Bloom has a job while Stephen is unemployed. Stephen thinks about the soul, Bloom about the body (specially sex). Stephen ponders the nature of the Trinity; to Bloom, such questions are pointless. Stephen is haunted, Bloom is not. Stephen’s lost a mother, Bloom’s lost a father. I could go on…

These facts are not untrue, and they are sort of interesting, and it’s probably as well to know them but, in my opinion, they are just the starting point for engaging with the difficult and cornucopian text itself, whereas for Ellmann, stating these very obvious binaries and dichotomies is where he ends, is the end result.

Disembodied/embodied If Stephen in chapter 3 is a disembodied intellect, Bloom in chapter 4 is an aggressively embodied material man, what with buying and cooking and eating the pork kidney, admiring his wife’s plumpness, feeding the cat, going for a poo and so on.

Both In something like a joke, discussing the not perfect fit of Molly with either Calypso or Penelope, Ellmann cracks that:

Whenever confronted by a choice between two possible things to include, Joyce chose both. (p.34)

Bloomism Ellmann coins the term ‘bloomism’ which he defines as an effort to recall an important fact and getting it wrong. Like when Bloom thinks the elegy in a country churchyard was written by Wordsworth (rather than the correct author, Thomas Gray).

Reject/accept Stephen opens the novel with a series of rejections; Molly closes it with her famous acceptance, Yes.

Zionism versus beddism But Bloom is a rejecter too. In the butcher Moses Dlugacz’s he picks up a leaflet for Zionist settlement in Palestine and has a strangely negative image of it, triggered by vague ideas about the Dead Sea, of a barren volcanic ash land, ‘a barren land, bare waste’. Out in the street a wizened old hag crosses his path. All this dried-up deathness makes him want to hurry back to plump warm Molly in bed, ‘Warm beds; warm fullblooded life’ (p.51). Bed, warmth, life.

Chapter 6. Hades

Life and death The same fundamental (and pretty obvious) dichotomy between life and death underpins chapter 6, ‘Hades’, set in the funeral carriage going to Glasnevin Cemetery. Ellmann’s entry-level binaries make it all sound very boring, which it isn’t to actually read, not least because like most of the rest of the book, it’s full of gags and gossip and character studies. But Ellmann isn’t interested in any of that, misses out everything that makes ‘Ulysses’ fun to read, just cherrypicks the details which help his structural analyses and comparisons with Homer.

Chapter 7. Aeolus

Sufficient for the day is the newspaper thereof.

Three types of diffusion Ellmann usefully points out the schematic nature of the opening of chapter 7, ‘Aeolus’, describing three modes of diffusion: in quick succession we see 1) a fleet of trams setting out from their base in the heart of Dublin; 2) His Majesty’s mail cars setting out from the post office; 3) and draymen rolling barrels of stout to be loaded onto carts and distributed to the city’s pubs. Ellmann neatly summarises these as exemplars of 1) physical, 2) written and (insofar as booze loosens tongues) 3) oral communication – appropriate for a chapter referencing the Greek god of wind’s far-reaching influence, and its modern incarnation in the power of the press.

Keys… Ellmann embarks on the idea that Bloom and Stephen (who both appear in this chapter, separately visiting the newspaper office of the Evening Telegraph) are in some sense seeking the keys which will unlock the city. I’ve no idea what he means and it only becomes more obscure when he goes on to suggest that they themselves are the keys which unlock the gates to Dante’s purgatory, with the claim that these central, post-hell chapters, are purgatorial.

and Keyes The keys theme is more obvious in Bloom’s mission to get an ad into the newspaper for The House of Keyes, owned by Alexander Keyes (‘tea, wine and spirit merchant’) who’s devised his own logo. Ellmann acutely points out that both Bloom and Stephen are keyless, Stephen having had the key to the Martello tower taken off him by Mulligan, and Bloom (though he doesn’t know it yet) will find out in penultimate chapter, ‘Ithaca’, that he’s left his front door keys in his other pair of trousers. And in the closing portion of the chapter the newspaper editor Crawford turns out to have mislaid the keys to his office. OK. We have to be key-sensitive.

Three speeches Ellmann points out that, in line with the theme of windy communication, the ‘Aeolus’ chapter contains three speeches which can be compared and contrasted. Less understandable is his claim that the speeches represent ‘three sorties’ ‘sent out’ by the city of Dublin ‘against’ Bloom and Stephen. Ellmann claims that in these central chapters the two men are ‘in league against the powers of this world and the next’, albeit ‘unconsciously’. This high-level interpretation may or may not ring your bell. I found his focus on the specific speeches more useful.

1. Bloom enters the office as Ned Lambert is reading out an amazingly flowery speech given by Dawson, a baker, to the city council about the importance of Ireland’s forests, as reported in the paper and mockingly read out by Lambert. This speech is deliberative.

2. The speech of the barrister Seymour Bush in the Childs murder case, which is praised in the newspaper office by the lawyer J.J. O’Molloy. This speech is forensic.

3. A speech given in 1903 by John F. Taylor in defence of the Irish language revival and published as a pamphlet, declaimed by Professor MacHugh in the newspaper office (not without interruptions). This speech is a public oration.

This is all true, but it’s also important and funny that Simon Dedalus comments on the first speech:

—Agonising Christ, wouldn’t it give you a heartburn on your arse?

And begs Ned to stop reading it:

Shite and onions! That’ll do, Ned. Life is too short.

The structures are no doubt there, and noticing them is part of the pleasure. But so is the texture of the prose.

Wind Types of wind are referenced throughout, as when Bloom thinks about how newspapermen change jobs.

Funny the way those newspaper men veer about when they get wind of a new opening. Weathercocks. Hot and cold in the same breath. Wouldn’t know which to believe. One story good till you hear the next. Go for one another baldheaded in the papers and then all blows over.

Or Professor MacHugh calls Dawson an ‘inflated windbag’.

The tissues rustled up in the draught, floated softly in the air blue scrawls and under the table came to earth.
—It wasn’t me, sir. It was the big fellow shoved me, sir.
—Throw him out and shut the door, the editor said. There’s a hurricane blowing.

The highfalutin proverbial description for poetic inspiration, ‘the divine afflatus’, simply means breath, wind. And one of Homer’s stock descriptions for Troy is ‘windy Troy’. In other words, as with so much Joyce, once you’re tipped off to start looking for a particular theme, you find more and more of it hidden in plain sight.

Lungs One interesting thing Ellmann says is that the organ Joyce himself assigned to ‘Aeolus’ in his schema was the lungs and this explains why so many phrases are paired and follow the rhythm of breathing, in and out, in a process of ‘pulmonary give and take’. Doors open and close, people enter and leave (although you could say the same of every play ever written).

The door of Ruttledge’s office whispered: ee: cree. They always build one door opposite another for the wind to. Way in. Way out.

Caesura Ellmann identifies the caesura in this chapter as coming when the three speeches have been discussed, and Stephen proposes that everyone shifts location to the nearest pub, Mooney’s – so they severally exit the office and make their way confusedly down the stairs and into the street.

Nelson On this walk to the pub Stephen tells the Professor his rather stupid story about two old ladies who buy some fruit and go on a holiday excursion to the top of Nelson’s column where, puffed out, they eat fresh plums, spit the pips out through the railings, and look up at ‘the one-handled adulterer’.

Mockery There are two ideas at work here. 1) The characters have just heard detailed descriptions of three types of grand Irish speech; Stephen’s story is intended to deflate all three and mock all grand rhetoric. 2) More specifically, the Taylor speech contained a description of Moses climbing to the top of Mount Sinai. Stephen’s story is a parody and a mockery in that, instead of Moses, it’s two old biddies who are granted a ‘vision’ out over ‘the unpromised land’ of Ireland.

Clever, very, but no matter how many times I’ve had this story explained, I’ve never found it funny.

Pretentious It sometimes feels as if Ellmann’s writing becomes steadily more pretentious as he has steadily less to say:

Here in ‘Aeolus’ Joyce is less threnodic though equally clamant. (p.65)

The episode proceeds by magnification and parvification. (p.71)

By the latter he means that certain figures (Taylor, Moses) are bigged up in the first half of the chapter and then satirised in the second. Ellmann finds the same pattern in the famous newspaper headlines which litter the chapter, which start out genuinely impressive but become steadily diminished. Here’s on from the start of the chapter:

IN THE HEART OF THE HIBERNIAN METROPOLIS

Whereas see how an example from towards the end of the chapter has become longer but cruder:

SOPHIST WALLOPS HAUGHTY HELEN SQUARE ON PROBOSCIS. SPARTANS GNASH MOLARS. ITHACANS VOW PEN IS CHAMP.

Chapter 8. Lestrygonians

This is the very worst hour of the day. Vitality. Dull, gloomy: hate this hour. Feel as if I had been eaten and spewed.
(Bloom’s internal monologue)

‘Lestrygonians’ is all about food and is packed to the hilt with food references, similes and metaphors. Bloom feeling hungry, seeing people eating in the street, fantasising about food, looking into Burton’s restaurant which is so packed with diners he backs out and instead drops into Davy Byrne’s pub for a cheese sandwich.

Church versus state Ellmann spots one of the book’s recurring binaries at the start, between State and Church. If you recall, this is encoded in the very first sentence of the book which starts with the word state and ends with a cross.

Stately, plump Buck Mulligan came from the stairhead, bearing a bowl of lather on which a mirror and a razor lay crossed.

Similarly, here at the start of ‘Lestrygonians’ Bloom 1) sees ‘A sugarsticky girl shovelling scoopfuls of creams for a christian brother’ and then 2) notices a lozenge and comfit manufacturer to His Majesty the King, and imagines King Edward VII sitting on his throne sucking boiled sweets. Christian / king. Church / state.

Up and down Quickly Ellmann is quick to find in this chapter the kinds of binary opposition he loves. Bloom’s thoughts always start on the ground, Stephen’s in the air. Stephen is racked with guilt, which is a sort of intellectual bad feeling; Bloom’s more earthy equivalent is disgust.

Comparisons Meaning is generated by a whole series of binary contrasts:

  • Molly versus Josie Bloom bumps into Mrs (Josie) Breen. She was at one point Bloom’s girlfriend but Molly won him off her. She has aged badly compared to Molly.
  • Josie versus Denis Breen This is because she married a man with severe mental problems, Breen, who she tells Bloom received an obscure insulting postcard reading U.P. up this morning.
  • Two madmen: Breen cf Cashel Boyle O’Connor Fitzmaurice Tisdall Farrell.
  • Mina Purefoy versus Molly Josie tells Bloom Mina Purefoy is having a terrible time giving birth at the maternity hospital; Bloom compares this with Molly’s easy deliveries.
  • Large versus small families Bloom sees poverty-stricken Dilly Dedalus and marvels that May Dedalus bore 15 children, Mina is bearing her ninth, while Molly only had two.
  • Sandwich men versus blind Bloom sees the five men wearing sandwich boards spelling HELYS pass by, but has to help the blind stripling across the road.
  • A.E. and Lizzy Up behind walk the noted Dublin poet and mystic A.E. accompanied by a lady poet. Bloom can’t help despising their airy-fairy artiness, the opposite of his own earthiness.
  • Meat versus vegetarian A.E. and lady friend have just exited a vegetarian restaurant while Bloom’s thoughts are stuck on all types of meat, butchery and cooking.
  • Molly versus Martha Molly is obviously a real woman of flesh and blood, versus Martha Clifford who only exists in her rather pathetic letters.
  • Fertility versus disease For a bad moment Bloom panics that Blazes Boylan may give Molly a venereal disease – their diseased and infertile sexual act contrasts strongly with the ‘healthy’ philoprogenitive sex of May Dedalus and Mina Purefoy.
  • Love versus sex Contrasted with the implied animality of Boylan tupping Molly, Bloom has a lyrical memory of their tender first kissing and touching on Howth Hill (the scene which Molly will vividly remember at the end of her soliloquy in chapter 18).

In the same spirit, Ellmann neatly points out that Boylan is as thoughtlessly sensual as the men stuffing their faces in Burton’s restaurant, because womanising is like gourmandising, both are about objectifying and consuming inanimate objects. Whereas love, which is what Bloom has for Molly, animates its object, brings it to life.

Chapter 9. Scylla and Charybdis

The aesthetic debate In this chapter Stephen Dedalus tries and fails to make an impression on representatives of Dublin’s literary elite by making an informal presentation of his theory about Shakespeare’s Hamlet to the (real-life) author and mystic A.E., and author, editor and librarian John Eglinton. From his materialist Aristotelian point of view, Stephen seeks to refute the kind of gassy aesthetic idealism which places Shakespeare among the gods or says he’s great because he embodies spiritual ideals. A.E. expresses this high-minded aesthetic thus:

—Art has to reveal to us ideas, formless spiritual essences. The supreme question about a work of art is out of how deep a life does it spring… The deepest poetry of Shelley, the words of Hamlet bring our minds into contact with the eternal wisdom, Plato’s world of ideas.

Stephen refutes this with a thumping return to earth, insisting that what powers the great plays is Shakespeare’s life, his biography. Thus he thinks ‘Hamlet’ is so much more than another Jacobean tragedy because it is powered by Shakespeare’s rage and humiliation at being cuckolded, that one of his brothers had an affair with his older wife, Anne Hathaway, who he abandoned back in Stratford for twenty long years while he made his career in London (the length of time that Odysseus was absent from Ithaca).

Ellmann the biographer Now Ellmann was, of course, himself a famous biographer, having written monumental biographies of Joyce and Oscar Wilde. In a chapter about biographies, then, Ellmann can be forgiven for letting down his schematic guard for a moment and sharing some biographical facts about Joyce. These are that Joyce himself delivered a set of no fewer than 13 public lectures, in 1912 to ’13, solely on the subject of Shakespeare’s ‘Hamlet’. In addition, we know he had read the recent biographies of Shakespeare by Dowden, Lee, Harris and Wilde, as well as following the latest scholarship about newly discovered manuscripts. Sort of interesting to know, but then what…? If anything, the fact that Joyce did so much reading about Shakespeare makes the thinness of his presentation in the Library scene all the more disappointing.

Caesura Remember how Ellmann thinks every chapter is divided in two by a caesura? In this chapter he neatly suggests the caesura is marked by the arrival of Buck Mulligan halfway through Stephen’s presentation.

Mulligan mocks Up to this point in the narrative, there’d been an easy binary, between the young materialist Stephen set against the high-minded idealist, old A.E. Mulligan’s arrival introduces a third element because he is as irreverent as Stephen, he is as much a materialist as Stephen, but unlike Stephen he doesn’t care about the subject. Mulligan immediately jumps to the sexual interpretation of everyone, including Bloom who he later implies is gay – but done in a frivolous, superficial crowd-pleasing way.

Stephen’s theory is serious and hard-won, but Mulligan merely exaggerates and mocks it for effect, producing with a flourish a parody he’s written named ‘Everyman His Own Wife or A Honeymoon in the Hand (a national immorality in three orgasms)’ in which the artistic productivity of Stephen’s theory is reduced to a crude farce about masturbation.

Envy So Stephen is furious when it is Mulligan who is invited to a literary soirée at the author George Moore’s house that evening.

As Ellmann puts it, for A.E. the things of this world are illusory; for Mulligan they are inconsequential; only for Stephen are they real, as he repeatedly tells himself throughout the book.

Vico I’m translating this into my own phraseology, which I continually try to make comprehensible and practical. Not so Ellmann, who is ever-ready to rope in not only Homer and Shakespeare, Aristotle and Hume, Dante and Goethe but, in this instance, the Italian philosopher, rhetorician, historian and jurist, Giambattista Vico (1668 to 1744).

Stephen is propounding here not subjectivism, but Vico’s notion that the human world is made by man, and that we can only encounter it in what is already implicit in ourselves. Put another way, Shakespeare’s plays are a record of what was possible for him, and so are his experiences. Life coexists with art as a representation of self. (p.84)

Is that helpful to you? We know that Joyce read and admired Vico for his huge vision of the eternal recurrence of human history but:

  1. it’s not true
  2. Ellmann’s summary of it isn’t very useful (‘the human world is made by man’, duh, who did you think the human world was made by, dolphins?)
  3. it’s a foolishly simplified summary of Shakespeare’s plays to say they were ‘a record of what was possible for him’ – what does that even mean? but mostly it’s hugely misleading and grossly simplistic, they were based on all kinds of sources and written for a complex and fast-changing market

Ellmann’s discussion leads up to a pithy and meaningless summary: ‘Life coexists with art as a representation of self.’ What does that mean? It might just about mean something, but it’s barely worth knowing, is it?

Ellmann then goes on to a series of grand statements about Art which are so witless they made me really cross. Like most literary critics he is obsessed with sex, and suggests that Joyce solves the Scylla and Charybdis problem (what problem?) by having the two monsters have sex with each other. This is because:

The sexual act is the essential act of artistic as of natural creation.

Is it?

This act has to occur within the artist’s brain so that he is mother as well as father of the issuing word. Shakespeare, has, therefore, like all artists, a double nature, is like Bloom, a womanly man, is victim as well as victimiser… God himself must be both father and mother to Christ in the same way. In short, the artist, combining both parents in himself, is an androgyne. (p.86)

Does God have to be both mother and father to Christ? Does the artist have to combine both parents and become an androgyne? Why am I reading this pretentious guff? Was Bach an androgyne? Constable? Van Gogh? It leads into a small orgy of Ellmann’s favourite trope, the dichotomy.

In this two-backed beast are united the various symbols of maleness and femaleness in this episode – ashplant and hat, flag and pit, Prospero’s buried staff and drowned book, and also the categories of space and time… the present and the possible, the now-here and the there-then, Stratford and London, Dublin and Paris, land and sea. (p.87)

Remember how I summarised Ellmann’s claim that it is A.E. and Mulligan who are the real opposites here, well Ellmann takes this to extremes:

Mulligan mocks his ‘conception’ by saying that he is himself his own father, and by offering to parturiate. He also offers his own play, an anti-Hamlet, in which he says his hero is his own wife. Instead of being androgynous, like the true artist, he is only masturbatory, like the false artist…

‘Masturbatory, like the false artist…’ Is there such an easily knowable thing as ‘the false artist’? But there’s more:

Mulligan is all penis while A.E. is all vagina. (p.87)

If you think it helps you understand ‘Ulysses’ to know that ‘Mulligan is all penis while A.E. is all vagina’, then this is the book for you, as it overflows with such high-level and often preposterous generalisations. But I’m more tempted to say, with Simon Dedalus:

—Shite and onions! That’ll do, Dick. Life is too short.

Chapter 10. Wandering rocks

Ellmann is on fire now. At the end of the previous chapter, Stephen emerged into the open air and saw two plumes of smoke mounting heavenward which Ellmann thinks represent Stephen and Bloom. Remember how The Artist (apparently) has to combine both parents in himself? Well, Ellmann now tells us that The Artist also has to fuse with God:

God the creator has fused with man the creator, both androgynous, ostlers and butchers, Iagos and Othellos, both producing, by intercourse of contraries, life from death, generation from corruption, art from dialectic. (p.89)

Of course it has to be an intercourse of contraries as this is more or less the only mental structure Ellmann seems to know. Anyway, all that came at the end of the preceding chapter; at the start of this chapter Ellmann continues in the same high mystical vein, summarising Stephen’s aesthetic thus:

The true parents of the artist are less his real father and mother, who engender his body, than a ghostly pair who, in the spiritual womb of mankind, husband and wive to form the soul.

Put another way [a favourite phrase of Ellmann’s] male and female elements – world without world and world within, agent and reagent – copulate to form by spirit from what once was flesh the word which is fleshed spirit. (p.90)

‘The spiritual womb of mankind’ eh? If, like me, you don’t believe there is a God or a spirit or a soul let alone a ‘spiritual womb of mankind’, then although you have to concede that these words have a kind of gestural, ghostly or psychological meaning (because words always have some meaning) you can be fairly certain they bear no relation to anything in the real world.

Compare and contrast Ellmann’s high diction with just one random sentence from the concrete reality of the text itself.

Blazes Boylan walked here and there in new tan shoes about the fruitsmelling shop, lifting fruits, young juicy crinkled and plump red tomatoes, sniffing smells.

That is more immediate and compelling, more inventive and interesting, more revealing of ‘Ulysses” concerns and processes, than anything in Ellmann’s entire book.

The labyrinth of doubt

But Ellmann soldiers on. In chapter 10, he suggests that in order to be tested, his theory of copulating androgynes must enter ‘the labyrinth of doubt’.

Now I have to concede that Joyce himself very much did deal with this level of abstraction. He was the first to create complex schemas for the novel, in which he attributed to each chapter a presiding subject, tone, organ, colour and so on. In the Linati scheme he actually states that the meaning of chapter 10 is ‘the hostile environment’, so Ellmann is not wrong to pick up on these themes and ideas and to address them systematically.

What I object to is I think he develops them in a particularly fruitless way, travelling further and further from the complexity (and the humour and Irishness) of the text, and deeper into an academic fantasyland, into a mode of discourse where he increasingly relies on big names (Blake, Milton, Goethe, Shakespeare, Homer) in formulations which sound more like they’re devised to impress American college students doing Great Works of Western Literature 101 courses. A lot of the time Ellmann’s theories feel only vestigially attached to the actual text of ‘Ulysses’ the book.

In my opinion, Joyce needed his elaborate schemas in order to create his text; they are quite literally foundations and scaffolds and frameworks upon which he built the multistorey palace of the final text; they were the matrix within which to create evermore complex systems of images, comparisons, metaphors and so on which he packed into every chapter. You only have to notice the scores of words describing different types of wind in ‘Aeolus’ or of food in ‘Lestrygonians’ to see this. But in my reading, these elaborate schemas were an aid to composition not necessarily to understanding.

It is necessary to understanding the book to know that each chapter is based on an episode from Homer, and that each chapter focuses on a particular theme, often accompanied by keywords and images and, in the later chapters, all cast in an appropriate mode or format. And it is fairly important to understand Stephen’s commitment to Aristotelian materialism against Plato’s forms, so that you understand the debate taking place in chapters 3 and 9. But you don’t need to know much more than that. No-one needs to know that:

male and female elements – world without world and world within, agent and reagent – copulate to form by spirit from what once was flesh the word which is fleshed spirit.

That is just Ellmann taking elements from the text and taking them to rarefied and esoteric heights – quite impressive as a virtuoso performance in literary criticism of a certain flashy type, but pretty much irrelevant to an actual reading of the actual novel.

Joyce is far more vivid, immediate, evocative and funny and textually interesting than Ellmann’s colourless abstractions ever suggest. Most of ‘Ulysses’ sounds like this:

He crossed Westmoreland street when apostrophe S had plodded by. Rover cycleshop. Those races are on today. How long ago is that? Year Phil Gilligan died. We were in Lombard street west. Wait: was in Thom’s. Got the job in Wisdom Hely’s year we married. Six years. Ten years ago: ninetyfour he died yes that’s right the big fire at Arnott’s. Val Dillon was lord mayor. The Glencree dinner. Alderman Robert O’Reilly emptying the port into his soup before the flag fell. Bobbob lapping it for the inner alderman. Couldn’t hear what the band played. For what we have already received may the Lord make us. Milly was a kiddy then. Molly had that elephantgrey dress with the braided frogs. Mantailored with selfcovered buttons. She didn’t like it because I sprained my ankle first day she wore choir picnic at the Sugarloaf. As if that. Old Goodwin’s tall hat done up with some sticky stuff. Flies’ picnic too. Never put a dress on her back like it. Fitted her like a glove, shoulders and hips. Just beginning to plump it out well. Rabbitpie we had that day. People looking after her.

It is rich with felt life and textual tricksiness. Ellmann’s discussion of Aristotle and Hume, Vico and Blake are obviously not completely irrelevant, as we know from letters and lectures that Joyce thought deeply about those specific authors, and also their names are mentioned in the text itself. I just think that the way Ellmann discusses them is showy but superficial, and always takes us away from the specificity of the text.

David Hume

He does this big time when he embarks on the claim that the presiding spirit of chapter 10 is no longer Aristotle but the Scottish sceptical philosopher David Hume (1711 to 1776). If Aristotle presided over the first nine books, Ellmann suggests that Hume presides over the final nine.

Now Hume is a hero of mine and I have read several of his books very closely, notably the ‘Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion’, and I think Ellmann’s discussion of him is problematic. Number one, Joyce himself seems to have thought, erroneously, that Hume was in part an idealist, which I understand to be completely wrong. Hume was the sceptic’s sceptic, pushing philosophical scepticism to the limit.

Second objection is I think Ellmann’s discussion of Hume is short and superficial. Here’s an adapted AI summary of Hume’s thought:

Empiricism Hume divided all knowledge into 1) ‘relations of ideas’ (logic/mathematics) which have an internal logic and 2) ‘everything else’, which can be categorised as ‘matters of fact’ i.e. based on experience. Hume argued that we cannot prove anything outside these two categories. Hence all theology, metaphysics and a good deal of what passed for philosophy is literally non-sense and should be rejected.

The Problem of Causation Hume argued that we cannot directly perceive causation. Instead of knowing that A causes B we only observe that A and B appear together, leading us to feel a causal connection based on habit, not reason. None of us can know, for sure, that the sun will rise tomorrow, or that there will even be a tomorrow. Most of our knowledge of the world we live in is based on habit not reason.

Moral sentimentalism Ditto morality. Morality is rooted in feelings, sentiments, and emotions (what the eighteenth century called ‘passions’) not reason. Virtue arises from sympathy, and our reactions to events around us are mostly based on sentiment and emotion not reason or logic.

Scepticism and religion Hume fiercely attacked religion, the belief in God, miracles and so on, advocating for a purely naturalistic understanding of the world.

The self Hume argued that the ‘self’ is just a bundle of perceptions, not a stable, persisting entity.

In a nutshell, Hume dismissed all talk about subjects which aren’t based on either 1) pure maths / logic or 2) on observed phenomena, as rubbish. That’s to say, Hume dismissed all theology and most philosophy, certainly all idealist philosophy which supposes Ideals stored in some high Otherplace, all this he considered ‘sophistry and illusion’. In fact in his ‘Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding’ Hume famously argued that any book containing neither “abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number” nor “experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence” should be “committed to the flames”.

This is not quite my position, I have a more open, tolerant position which is closer to William Blake’s saying that ‘Everything possible to be believed is an image of truth’. Put another way (as Ellmann so often says), theology and metaphysics are interesting 1) as intellectual games to play, like chess and 2) were and are valid creative activities of the human mind. But it doesn’t make them ‘true’ in the sense Hume uses.

When I read ‘Game of Thrones’ I lend Westeros credence in my imagination for as long as I read the books, so why can’t I lend the theology of St Augustine or Don Cupitt just as much credence, and of the same sort, getting thoroughly involved in them as I read them – but pretty obviously separating them from my lived experience of life?

It’s intellectually rewarding to study and follow the lines of thought of the major theologians and philosophers; and it’s also part of the intellectual legacy of humankind. But it’s not ‘true’. There is no God, there is no heaven, there is no soul, there are no angels, there is no Devil, there was no Fall, there is no redemption, there is no salvation, and so on. Just as there is no Hamlet or Jon Snow or Stephen Dedalus.

The way these made-up entities effect our mental lives may be very powerful indeed and in that way – in terms of psychological effects – they can have an awesome reality, as they determine the thoughts and actions of real people in the real world, in fact they can affect entire cultures, they can determine the course of history. But that doesn’t make them ‘true’ in the way this laptop I’m typing these words on is a verifiable fact. They don’t objectively exist outside the human imagination.

So I know these metaphysical imaginings are non-real (like Hume did) but I don’t commit them to the flames as hastily as he did because they are part of the vast imaginarium which we are all heirs to and it would be pointless to deny their enormous influence over people’s lives in former times, and their legacies which live on and underpin a surprising amount of what people still think and believe today. Imaginative truth (Hamlet is a powerful imaginative creation) is different from objective truth (Hamlet does not now and never has existed).

As Wittgenstein put it (and in my mind, Hume and Wittgenstein are closely allied, in their outcomes if not in their methods), ‘The world is all that is the case’. My take on this is that ‘the world’ also includes everything that has ever been believed by everyone.

This is where I differ from liberals and the high-minded who limit their view of human achievement to a handful of Great Achievements of Civilisation by a handful of Great Men, constantly citing Michelangelo or Rembrandt or Shakespeare, narrowly cherrypicking humanity’s positive achievements.

In my version of human history, everything that humans have done is our legacy, and this includes not just all the philosophy and theology, all the literature, poetry, tales and legends — but also the innumerable atrocities, slaughters and genocides. In my view, we have to face the totality of the facts, no matter how disgusting.

Anything less is sentimentalism, denial, self deception. We are what we are and we have done what we have done, no sweeping it under the carpet. I know many people who are so upset by a true understanding of the horror of history that they reject it, deny it, don’t want to know. My view is that, the more unshrinking a view you have of the abattoir that is human history, the more rare and precious become the urges to create and beautify, the more wonderful and beautiful become the relics of culture, from whichever culture, from all cultures.

This face-the-facts-and-accept-everything view is very close to Joyce’s, which is why I not only enjoy but relate to the ‘Ulysses’ so much, with all its farting, belching, masturbating, snot and semen, menses and afterbirths. It embraces the entire human organism and all of human experience as it actually is. And this is why Virginia Woolf – with her high-minded Bloomsbury view that Literature should be about Art and Beauty, so utterly loathed it. I can understand her point of view. But I’m in Joyce’s camp.

Two objections Ellmann suddenly reveals that Hume might be as much of a source for Stephen’s thinking as Aristotle was in chapter 3. This is an unusual and largely unevidenced thing to say and there are two problems with it: 1) why does Joyce only reveal it now half-way through the book? Why was Hume not present from the start? The answer might be that if Joyce had invoked Hume alongside Aristotle his explication would have gotten too complicated. But I think there’s a simpler explanation, which is that Hume isn’t as important to Joyce as Ellmann claims he is.

Ellmann cites some passages from Hume’s masterwork the ‘Treatise of Human Nature’ in which Hume describes closing and opening his eyes to test the concept of space and extension before going on to say that the concept of time is indicated by the succession of our thoughts or perceptions. Ellmann finds places in ‘Ulysses’ where Stephen has similar thoughts about space and time and quotes them to prove that Joyce is here basing Stephen on Hume.

The trouble with this is, which major philosophers have not at some point meditated on the nature of time and space? Not to mention the astronomers and cosmologists? And all the theologians? Thousands of them have. If you put a little effort into it I bet you could compare Stephen’s doodling about space and time with the writings of any number of philosophers and theologians since those are just the kinds of subjects most of them spent a lot of their lives writing about…

The main problem with Ellmann’s presentation is not so much that it might be untrue but that it is only a fraction of the possible sources. They’re just snippets which he has cherry-picked. A full and complete discussion of the concept of time in James Joyce’s ‘Ulysses’ would take an entire book and call on countless philosophers and theologians for detailed comparisons.

But none of these alternative sources are mentioned here and why not? Because Ellmann’s book isn’t a serious presentation of the issues. It’s a snapshot. It’s a summary. It’s a brief overview of some of the philosophical issues raised by the book. It’s not really serious. It’s a brief presentation of snippets and fragments, for students-in-a-hurry to finish their Great Books of Modern Literature modules. It’s a TikTok version, a Twitter treatment of the themes.

So Ellmann’s assertion that if the spirit of Aristotle presided over the first half of ‘Ulysses’, then the spirit of Hume presides over the second half is an example of fun intellectual games critics can play with an epic text like this (if you like these kinds of games). But I don’t think anyone should be fooled into thinking it’s either 1) ‘true’ (whatever that means) but more importantly 2) that it’s necessary for reading and understanding the novel. There are other, faaaar more relevant and practical things to pay attention to first.

Back to ‘Ulysses’ Ellmann is more modest and therefore more useful, when he points out the simple fact that in the ‘Wandering Rocks’ chapter, Joyce begins to play with space and time. All he means by this is that fragments from one of the 18 vignettes are likely to pop up in another vignette, and he usefully refers to them as ‘interpolations’.

Church and State (again) More useful to my practical text-based way of thinking is when Ellmann points out that chapter 10 is, once again, foundationed on the binary of church and state. By this all he means is that the chapter opens with the friendly priest Father Conmee walking through the streets of Dublin and bumping into various acquaintances, popping up in the background of other people’s vignettes; while in the second half of the chapter, we catch steadily more glimpses of the progress of the Viceroy of Dublin riding in his carriage to open a bazaar, glimpses which lead up to its full presentation in the 19th and final vignette.

Thus it’s easy to claim that a representative of Church and a representative of the State establish the physical and conceptual framework of the chapter by topping and tailing it, and it is then fleshed out with appearances from 40 or more other characters in between.

Mocked And the key point here, is that both representatives are mocked, gently but steadily. With Father Conmee, Joyce does it with the butter-wouldn’t-melt-in-his-mouth squeaky cleanness of Conmee’s supposed thoughts. With the Viceroy the mockery is implicit in the generally indifferent reaction to his passing by of the various Dubliners.

Material rebukes The final response to the Viceroy in the chapter is the Italian music teacher Almidano Artifoni going into his house and, in effect, turning the bum of his trousers to the august carriage as it trots by. Father Conmee receives a more obvious rebuke to his values and worldview when he is suddenly confronted by a couple stumbling out of some bushes, flushed because they’ve just had sex. Sex, in comedies, especially farces, is the great puncturer of human pompousness and pretension.

Binaries Both Stephen and Bloom are given one of the 18 vignettes. Both find our protagonists looking at books, according to their intellectual levels: Bloom is buying a popular romance, Sweets of Sin, for Molly; Stephen is looking through Abbot Peter Salanka’s book of charms and spells, specifically ones designed to attract a woman’s love. Love and sex. Highbrow and middlebrow versions.

Heart If you visualise Dublin as a heart (as the first headline in ‘Aeolus’ suggests):

IN THE HEART OF THE HIBERNIAN METROPOLIS

Then the 40 or so characters we meet in chapter 10 can be thought of as blood corpuscles circulating round it and bumping into each other.

Chapter 11. Sirens

Bulging According to Ellmann, in chapter 11 ‘Sirens’, the ear is female, concave and a receptacle whereas in chapter 12 ‘Cyclops’, the eye is male, bulging, invasive.

Music ‘Sirens’ is about sounds and music, it contains countless references to music, sounds and noise, to different instruments up to full orchestra, and also related defects, as in the comic figure of Pat the (almost) deaf waiter and the blind piano tuner.

Singer Joyce had a fine tenor voice and briefly considered a career in singing before rejecting it. Late nineteenth century aestheticism took it for granted that music was the highest art form but Joyce rejected this and claimed literature was.

Fugue ‘Sirens’ is Joyce’s extended attempt at converting musical form into language. It is based on the classical music form of the fugue.

A fugue is a contrapuntal compositional technique based on a main theme (subject) introduced alone, then imitated in succession by other voices. It traditionally follows a three-part structure: Exposition (subject/answer entries), Development (alternating episodes and subject entries in new keys), and Final Entry (return to the tonic).

Key components of fugue structure

  • Subject: The principal, recognizable musical theme that drives the entire piece.
  • Answer: The subject repeated by a second voice, typically transposed to the dominant key.
  • Countersubject: A distinctive contrapuntal melody that accompanies the subject/answer, often returning throughout the piece.
  • Exposition: The opening section where every voice has stated the subject at least once.
  • Episode: Transitional, developmental sections that do not contain the full subject, often using sequences and modulations to create contrast.
  • Middle Entries: Subsequent appearances of the subject after the exposition, often in related keys.
  • Stretto: A device where subject entries overlap, with a voice starting the theme before the previous voice finishes it, increasing tension.
  • Coda/Final Entry: The conclusion, often featuring a strong, final statement of the subject in the original key.

Developmental techniques

Fugues often manipulate the subject through various techniques:

  • Inversion: Playing the melody upside down (intervals reversed).
  • Augmentation: Doubling the note values (making it twice as slow).
  • Diminution: Halving the note values (making it twice as fast).
  • Retrograde: Playing the subject backward.

Once you know all this, the game becomes to apply these rules to the elements in the ‘Sirens’ chapter. Can you find examples of every rule somewhere in the prose? You can be some academic somewhere has written a book about it.

A tale of two barmaids The chapter is set in the Ormond Hotel and the obvious binary at the centre of the chapter is the contrast between the two young attractive barmaids, Miss Kennedy and Miss Douce, the one a redhead, the other dark.

Chapter 12. Cyclops

All the chapters are packed with ingenious references to their leading theme, wind in ‘Aeolus’, food in ‘Lestrygonians’, music in ‘Sirens’, and so it’s eyes in the chapter about the one-eyed cyclops. Which is why its opening sentence is:

I was just passing the time of day with old Troy of the D. M. P. at the corner of Arbour hill there and be damned but a bloody sweep came along and he near drove his gear into my eye.

Exactly as Odysseus and his men drove their stake into the single eye of the cyclops who had imprisoned them (Stuart Gilbert pointed all this out, apparently).

Having sketched out the ubiquity of eye imagery, Ellmann goes beyond it to suggest that the waspishly cynical narrator of ‘Cyclops’ is a modern avatar of mean-minded cynical Thersites, the meanest hero in the original Odyssey, who has a larger part in Shakespeare’s play of the Tale of Troy, ‘Troilus and Cressida’. Ellmann suggests cynicism is a more subtle form of bigotry, the nationalist Citizen’s crime of being one-eyed. In this respect, when Bloom stands up for himself and his ‘race’, the Jews, rejects violence and calls for love, he is showing himself to be two-eyed. Full stereoscopic vision.

Continuing the idea, Ellmann suggests that if the previous chapters had leaned on the influence of (generous) David Hume, this one invokes the spirit of the dry, satirical Voltaire. Maybe. Hardly helps you either read or understand the text, though.

For reasons I couldn’t follow, Ellmann suggests that at the climax of this chapter Bloom is apotheosised i.e. turned into a god, but many of his assertions seem so wilful and contrived as to feel a little demented.

Chapter 13. Nausicaa

In Homer’s Odyssey, Odysseus’s shipwreck is caused because he has offended two gods, Hyperion the sun god for killing his cattle and Poseidon for blinding his son, Cyclops. As is his way, Ellmann immediately sees a binary at work, declaring Hyperion represents idealism and Poseidon materialism, or height and depth (he could have carried on with light and darkness, or dry and wet).

As he stated at the start, Ellmann thinks the 18 chapters are arranged in triads; here he adds the thought they all these triads enact the dialectic i.e. thesis, antithesis, synthesis. And so Ellmann suggests chapters 13, 14 and 15 enact:

  • Nausicaa – sentimentalised idealism
  • Oxen of the Sun- materialistic callousness
  • Circe – both

More practically useful, Ellmann confirms a really basic fact about ‘Ulysses’ which is that, for all its obsessive detail in many places, in others it contains great yawning gaps. For example, we never learn how Bloom made it from running out of Barney Kiernan’s pub as the Citizen threw his biscuit tin at him, to being comfortably leaning against a rock on Sandymount Strand about an hour later. We are never told how he got there or what happened during that hour.

High on Hegelian dialectic, Ellmann claims that, in this setting, Joyce makes Howth promontory male, the bay itself as female, and the voice of the priests praying to the Virgin a combination of both = androgynous.

Back with his more obvious binaries, he tells us that the chapter is a tale of two fantasies or the projecting of imagined mirages: Gerty projects her sentimental romantic fantasies onto Bloom; Bloom projects his narrow sexual fantasies onto Gerty; and both are accompanied by two priests projecting their fantasy of the Mother of God onto the world.

‘Cyclops’ is notable for featuring a narrator who isn’t the omniscient third-person narrator of the ‘initial style’. ‘Nausicaa’ furthers the text’s uncoupling from the novel’s early style in being written in a comic pastiche of sentimental romantic fiction, which is attributed to Gerty. The nauseatingly sentimental style is, it is implied, the tone of Gerty’s half-educated thoughts.

Gerty MacDowell who was seated near her companions, lost in thought, gazing far away into the distance was, in very truth, as fair a specimen of winsome Irish girlhood as one could wish to see.

(Ellmann notes that some critics have thought the entire thing is also a sly dig at the Edwardian author Samuel Butler, who claimed the Odyssey was written by Princess Nausicaa not Homer. That’s entertaining gossip about the aim but doesn’t help much with appreciating the actual text. )

It’s also, of course, a chapter contrasting not only idealism and realism, female fantasy and male earthiness, exhibitionism and voyeurism, but also youth and age. In amid her naive thoughts, Gerty thinks of herself as unique and special, and this is the classic delusion of youth (‘I’m special. I’m different. No-one has ever felt like this before.’) By contrast, after he’s climaxed and slowly come back down to earth, Bloom rather gloomily thinks it’s the just same old thing again, repetition, nothing new under the sun. Youth = the delusion of uniqueness. Age = the disillusion of familiarity.

So it returns. Think you’re escaping and run into yourself. Longest way round is the shortest way home. And just when he and she. Circus horse walking in a ring.

Chapter 14. Oxen of the Sun

Having described sexual ejaculation in chapter 13, the next chapter moves on to its consequences, fertilisation and pregnancy.

Here, in the common room of the National Maternity Hospital, the drunk medical students offend the god by mocking true fertility, by telling all kinds of jokes, bawdy humour, climaxing in Buck Mulligan’s jokey setting up a company whereby he promises to fertilise any woman who asks, for a fee.

There is a tension between the students’ cynical stripping of the act of love down to its heartless physical basics and the way Joyce chose to convey it, in a series of elaborate pastiches of historical English prose styles. If the subject is infertility, the parade of prose styles demonstrates exactly the opposite, humanity’s endless fertility in coming up with new and intricate ways to describe things and tell stories.

Ellmann notes something I hadn’t heard before which is the way the prose goes all to hell after the students leave the hospital and go round to the nearest pub. I’d read that the chaos of voices reflected closing time in a busy city centre pub. Ellmann makes the clever suggestion that it also represents the messy afterbirth, slopping everywhere after Mina Purefoy’s baby has been born.

’Tis, sure. What say? In the speakeasy. Tight. I shee you, shir. Bantam, two days teetee. Bowsing nowt but claretwine. Garn! Have a glint, do. Gum, I’m jiggered.

Chapter 15. Circe

In the morning light at the start of the novel Stephen had descanted on the ineluctable modality i.e. continuity, of the visible. In ‘Circe’ it is far after dark and all such certainties have disappeared, leaving the characters in a place which has no rules of extension or time or logic, but inhabits the inner self of anxieties, lusts, fantasies and hallucinations.

As you might expect, Ellmann finds in this longest and most delirious chapter a cornucopia of his favourite pattern, dichotomies – inside and outside, mind and body, dream and reality, male and female, body and soul, ego and id, England and Ireland (in the form of the soldiers and the Watch), you name it, it’s here. This is what I disliked about this book: it reduces the teeming fecundity of the weirdest, most diverse novel in the Western tradition to a handful of threadbare clichés.

Ellmann equates Bloom’s sudden vision, at the end of the chapter, of his dead son Rudy but now 11 years old, as he would now be, with the visions in Dante. Well, OK, but there are plenty of other works of literature featuring visions. And Dante doesn’t have a son.

He also claims that with the visions of this chapter, Bloom has harrowed hell, as did Odysseus, Jesus and Dante before him. But did he? Metaphorically maybe. Maybe this is a valid, even obvious, suggestion but, as I’m always saying, it takes you away from the wonderful (and often gross) specificity of the text and into a Western Literature 101 seminar room where everyone’s talking about Dante, Vico and Blake, and nobody’s talking about the obscenity of the Croppy Boy scene, because that’s difficult, embarrassing and vulgar. As it’s meant to be. Ellmann’s schematic approach sanitises Joyce, who went out of his way to be as scabrous as he could be (where scabrous means ‘indecent, salacious or scandalous material that is shocking or offensive’).

Chapter 16. Eumaeus

Although Stephen announced the annihilation of space and time in ‘Circe’ when he smashed the chandelier in the brothel, the next chapter reveals the return of time and space, solider than ever.

Addicted to his philosophers, Ellmann says that if (big ‘if’) Hume’s scepticism has guided the chapters of the second half of the novel, then space and time return in the spirit of Immanuel Kant, not as the properties of things, but as the conditions of perception built into the human condition. Maybe. It’s a thought, if you know enough about Kant to really apply it…

Trinities are nearly as addictive to the conspiracy theorist as simple dichotomies, and Ellmann reads into the final three chapters an earthly trinity of Bloom the father, Stephen the son and… well, there is no equivalent of the Holy Ghost, instead the best he can offer is Molly as a blasphemous avatar of the Virgin Mary (just as she is a mocking avatar of the chaste Penelope) (remember what I said at the start about Joyce using all kinds of literary, theological and philosophical patterns when it suited him and when it didn’t… just walking away).

In the Linati schema Joyce described the style of ‘Eumaeus’ as ‘relaxed’, which seems signally inadequate – it’s a ‘tired’ and threadbare in the style of provincial newspapers, made up of journalistic clichés but without any of the vim and vigour of ‘Aeolus’. It’s ‘Aeolus’ with a hangover.

Nowhere in his book does Ellmann address the fact that large chunks of ‘Ulysses’ are so cryptic and chopped-up as to be almost unreadable. His book gives the impression it’s all clear and readable figures of allegory and philosophy which you can understand with a little guidance, as in Dante or Spenser. Nowhere does he engage with the actual text which is often impenetrable.

Hark! Shut your obstropolos. Pflaap! Pflaap! Blaze on. There she goes. Brigade! Bout ship. Mount street way. Cut up! Pflaap! Tally ho. You not come? Run, skelter, race. Pflaaaap!

In the same way, both he (and Hugh Kenner) treat the later chapters as if they’re the same as the earlier ones but they aren’t at all: ‘Nausicaa’, ‘Oxen of the Sun’, ‘Circe’, ‘Eumaeus’ and ‘Ithaca’ are all much, much easier to read and process than the earlier chapters. I once read someone saying ‘Ulysses’ starts out very English and clear and comprehensible but then gets steadily more Irish and radical and impenetrable, whereas in my reading I’ve always found it the other way round. Here’s Stephen’s stream of consciousness from chapter 2:

Proudly walking. Whom were you trying to walk like? Forget: a dispossessed. With mother’s money order, eight shillings, the banging door of the post office slammed in your face by the usher. Hunger toothache. Encore deux minutes. Look clock. Must get. Fermé. Hired dog! Shoot him to bloody bits with a bang shotgun…

It requires quite a lot of effort to tease out the meaning and point of every one of these cryptic references. Whereas:

Nausicaa – pastiche but immediately understandable:

The summer evening had begun to fold the world in its mysterious embrace. Far away in the west the sun was setting and the last glow of all too fleeting day lingered lovingly on sea and strand, on the proud promontory of dear old Howth guarding as ever the waters of the bay, on the weedgrown rocks along Sandymount shore and, last but not least, on the quiet church whence there streamed forth at times upon the stillness the voice of prayer to her who is in her pure radiance a beacon ever to the stormtossed heart of man, Mary, star of the sea.

Oxen of the Sun – the style of some of the parodies might be a little difficult but a) not if you’re used to older English prose, and b) there’s none of the clipped, truncated, cryptic quality which makes the first half so challenging:

And whiles they spake the door of the castle was opened and there nighed them a mickle noise as of many that sat there at meat. And there came against the place as they stood a young learning knight yclept Dixon.

Circe – is delirious and occasionally cryptic but nowhere near as impenetrable as Stephen’s thoughts:

The Mabbot street entrance of nighttown, before which stretches an uncobbled tramsiding set with skeleton tracks, red and green will-o’-the-wisps and danger signals. Rows of grimy houses with gaping doors. Rare lamps with faint rainbow fans. Round Rabaiotti’s halted ice gondola stunted men and women squabble.

Eumaeus – stylised, maybe, but very, very easy to read.

Preparatory to anything else Mr Bloom brushed off the greater bulk of the shavings and handed Stephen the hat and ashplant and bucked him up generally in orthodox Samaritan fashion which he very badly needed. His (Stephen’s) mind was not exactly what you would call wandering but a bit unsteady and on his expressed desire for some beverage to drink Mr Bloom in view of the hour it was and there being no pump of Vartry water available for their ablutions let alone drinking purposes hit upon an expedient by suggesting, off the reel, the propriety of the cabman’s shelter, as it was called, hardly a stonesthrow away near Butt bridge where they might hit upon some drinkables in the shape of a milk and soda or a mineral.

Ithaca – once you’ve got the hang of the question and answer format this, again, is mostly a breeze to read:

What parallel courses did Bloom and Stephen follow returning?

Starting united both at normal walking pace from Beresford place they followed in the order named Lower and Middle Gardiner streets and Mountjoy square, west: then, at reduced pace, each bearing left, Gardiner’s place by an inadvertence as far as the farther corner of Temple street: then, at reduced pace with interruptions of halt, bearing right, Temple street, north, as far as Hardwicke place.

Penelope – and even Molly Bloom’s famous soliloquy, the critics and commentators all make it sound difficult, and in some places the stream of thoughts does jump about a bit, but the thoughts themselves, once you get a handle on her biography and the telegraphic style, are not that hard to understand:

Yes because he never did a thing like that before as ask to get his breakfast in bed with a couple of eggs since the City Arms hotel when he used to be pretending to be laid up with a sick voice doing his highness to make himself interesting for that old faggot Mrs Riordan that he thought he had a great leg of and she never left us a farthing all for masses for herself and her soul greatest miser ever was

Back to ‘Eumaeus’, addicted to binaries, Ellmann decides it is all about duplicity, lies and truth. He bases this on the relevant episode in the Odyssey, where Odysseus wakes up on the shore of his kingdom and cautiously adopts a disguise before making his way to the hut of his old swineherd, Eumaeus. Here he makes up a cock and bull story about who he is while Eumaeus greets him with open-hearted candour and hospitality. Secrets versus honesty. And so Ellmann finds numerous instances of secrets and deceptions in this chapter:

  • the chapter opens with Bloom cautioning Stephen against Mulligan’s deceitfulness
  • although Lynch accompanied him into Nighttown, Stephen calls him Judas for abandoning him
  • the pair get lost and have to double back through the streets
  • Bloom delights in the Italian being spoken by some loiterers round the shelter but Stephen points out they’re arguing over money
  • all the characters they meet are deceitful e.g:
    • Lord John Corley who isn’t a lord
    • the shelter owner may or may not be Skin-the-Goat itself (obviously) a pseudonym
    • the sailor D.B. Murphy tells tall tales which Bloom thinks are probably a pack of lies, purveyor of what Bloom calls ‘genuine forgeries’
  • the conversation takes in all kinds of secrets and lies:
    • Skin’s claim that Parnell isn’t dead, his coffin is full of stones, he’s alive and well in Paris from whence he will return
    • someone claims Francis Bacon wrote Shakespeare’s plays
    • reference to the fraudulent Protocols of Zion
    • cases of forged identity such as the Tichborne Claimant
    • the Evening Telegraph gets details of Paddy Dignam’s funeral wrong, notably Bloom’s name (spelled as Boom)

It’s an impressive list of deceits and errors, in the same way as ‘Lestrygonians’ is packed with references to food and ‘Sirens’ with references to music etc. This kind of specificity, which takes you back to the detail of the text, I like.

Chapter 17. Ithaca

This is the chapter cast in the form of a catechism, questions and answers. (Ellmann likens it to the cold information retrieval systems of a computer, reminding us that this book was published in 1972, over half a century ago – computers have come on a bit since then.)

Ellmann, like Kenner, reacts negatively to this chapter, saying it strips human activity to the skeleton, that ‘the imagination is impoverished’ (p.157) but I’ve always liked this chapter for the same reasons: it is clear and lucid, it tells us exactly what is happening but also, far from being unimaginative, many of the answers depart on wild fantasias of factuality, for example the ones about water or about the stars.

Ellmann zeroes in on the sections which supposedly compare Stephen and Bloom’s contrasting views about the purpose of literature: well, he would say that, being a professor of literature. Personally I find writers writing about writing the most boring subject in the world, whereas the descriptions of the lost key, the evocative objects in Bloom’s drawers, the pondering on the mystery of the stars, the magic qualities of water and so on, I find these fresh and vivifying, enlivening, expanding my understanding of the world. And often very funny.

Ellmann is still banging on about finding the influence of Aristotle wherever he looks. Thus, in the answer about human nature:

He affirmed his significance as a conscious rational animal proceeding syllogistically from the known to the unknown and a conscious rational reagent between a micro and a macrocosm ineluctably constructed upon the incertitude of the void.

Whereas fooey to Aristotle, I love the image of these two so different men sharing an amiable pee in Bloom’s back garden under the twinkling stars.

At Stephen’s suggestion, at Bloom’s instigation both, first Stephen, then Bloom, in penumbra urinated, their sides contiguous, their organs of micturition reciprocally rendered invisible by manual circumposition, their gazes, first Bloom’s, then Stephen’s, elevated to the projected luminous and semiluminous shadow.

Treating an outdoor piss in this pseudo-scientific way is funny. Well, I find it funny. But comedy is difficult if not impossible to convey in literary analysis, whereas detecting binaries and dichotomies everywhere is like falling off a log.

Bloom’s pottering round his house after Stephen leaves, as he intersperses getting undressed with poking around in drawers, finding objects and photos which trigger memories of his family, before climbing into bed next to the slumbering Molly – all this I find warm and homely and moving, all the more so because it is conveyed not with conventional sentimentality, but in the brilliantly hard and clear FAQ format Joyce had invented for this chapter.

Chapter 18. Penelope

Ellmann tells us the conclusion of the book has been much debated. He cites two critics who were still active forces when he wrote, William Empson and Edmund Wilson, who were both concerned about what happened next, after the end of the book. Empson speculates that Stephen did indeed come back the next day, 17 June, to give the first of his Italian lessons to Molly and receive singing lessons in return. Wilson speculated that Bloom’s request to have breakfast served to him in bed symbolised his return to mastery in the marriage with Molly, which would be cemented by them having sex for the first time in 11 years.

Both now seem wildly out of date and irrelevant. What might happen to the characters after the end of the book is a completely different type of conversation, academics at the dinner table conversation, pub conversation, next to nothing to do with the chapter under discussion which, of course, is entirely concerned with Molly’s late-night thoughts.

It is in this chapter that Ellmann compares Molly’s character to Aristotle, Hume and Darwin, which I found ridiculous.

He quotes Joyce writing to his friend Frank Budgen that ‘Penelope’ is ‘more obscene than any preceding episode, which is debatable, seeing as the entire chapter ‘Nausicaa’ is about a middle-aged married man masturbating in public at the sight of a young woman’s knickers, and that ‘Circe’ has some scenes of unparalleled obscenity. But I take the point that Molly’s soliloquy contains more sustained and explicit descriptions of sex than any previous chapter.

Ellmann briskly runs through some of the details in the chapter but without really capturing its spirit and power. He tells us Molly at moments mixes up her various men, calling them all ‘he’. But at other moments she makes a very clear distinction between her lover, Blazes Boylan who is exciting but doesn’t respect her, and her husband Bloom, who is a little odd, a little boring but who does genuinely care for her.

But on the whole Ellmann isn’t happy down among the details. He’s happier when he can find an abstract binary, and so hastens to tell us that Molly is the earth to Bloom’s sun, which is fine and dandy but doesn’t really get us anywhere (p.166). He thinks Molly’s soliloquy:

resolves the questions of belief and incertitude which have dogged Stephen and western philosophy (p.168)

Which is ludicrous because a) she doesn’t – if she had what are all the philosophers in all the Philosophy departments of the universities of the world wasting their time doing? And b) can you see how wildly adrift of the actual content of her soliloquy this is?

Ellmann’s bloodless approach can’t do justice to sex, real mucky flirty dirty sex, any more than it can do justice to Joyce’s many types of comedy and humour, both crucial elements in the book, both overlooked as he struggles to make out Molly Bloom as a thinker on a par with Aristotle or David Hume.

Maybe those elements are there; maybe Joyce himself described them as being there: but they’re not the main part of the book. The book is the text itself and not the neatly cut and dried concepts which Joyce attributed to it and generations of academics have enthusiastically added to.

Obsessed with academic notions of art and artists, Ellmann whips himself up into absurdities:

Joyce said that his episode had no art but his book is consummated by the principle that art is nature’s self. (p.173)

What does this mean and why should I care? Meanwhile, of Molly’s desires and schemes and fantasies and seductions and flirtations and consummations, her friendships, her love of flowers, her fondness of displaying herself in the bedroom window to attract the attention of the handsome young medical student in the house across the road, of everything which makes her such a storming presence in modern literature, nothing, nothing at all.

Dwelling on abstract structures to the bitter end, Ellmann claims that:

The first nine episodes of the book ended with a vision of the act of love as the basic act of nature. The last nine episodes end with a vision of love as the basic act of nature. (p.174)

What Ellmann doesn’t bring out, on his own ground, on his own terms, is that Molly (and, by implication Joyce) in her soliloquy, says it all comes down to sex; that sex is the ultimate truth of human nature, of human life. This I would agree with, and is one way of summarising Darwin: we breed, we rear young, for all sorts of reasons to do with the environment, competition from other families and species, and huge slices of dumb luck, some survive to create the next generation; all organisms do this; the result over billions of years is the beautifully intricate web of natural ecosystems which form the world around us and which humanity is busily destroying and degrading as I write.

But the urge to reproduce is central and this is, of course, contrary to Christian ideology and so completely contrary to Dante (and Plato) who Ellmann is roping in here at the end of his book. In their different ways both Plato and Dante thought sexual love must be rejected, in Plato to achieve the highest form of rational thought, in Dante in order to achieve full love of God.

Molly denies all of that and locates the highest reality in her big breasts and hungry fanny. Oh how she is longing for Monday to come when she will see Boylan again, and he will plook her senseless again with his big willy.

But that’s not how Ellmann sees it. He ends this short but gruellingly wrong-headed book with a slab of characteristically high-minded rhetoric. If you like this kind of thing, you’ll love this book:

On the ethical level Bloom and Stephen have succeeded in taking the city of Dublin by exposing enthusiasm and superstition there, and by disclosing a truer way of goodwill and freedom. Molly’s hardwon approbation confirms their enterprise. On this historical level, the characters have awakened from the Circean nightmare of history by drawing the past into the present (a timeless present) and making it an expression of love instead of hatred, of fondness rather than remorse. Art has been shown to be a part of nature, and in all its processes an imitation of natural ones. These processes have their summit in love, of which the highest form is sexual love. (p.175)

Well, we agree about that much. But what a mealy-mouthed, detail-denying way of getting there.


Credit

‘Ulysses on the Liffey’ by Richard Ellmann was published by Faber and Faber in 1972.

Related links

Joyce reviews

Ulysses, James Joyce and Jacques Derrida

Step 1. The proliferatious text

James Joyce’s ‘Ulysses’ is a vast system of interlocking words and meanings, huge tracts of text consisting of sentences cut back to phrases, fragments of speech, words truncated into bits and glued together to make new portmanteau words, fleeting quotes, even sound effects, thousands of which recur over and again with subtle variations, rephrasings, reappearing hundreds of pages apart, often creating impenetrably difficult passages. If you don’t quite believe me, here’s the opening of chapter 11 (the Sirens chapter):

Bronze by gold heard the hoofirons, steelyringing.
Imperthnthn thnthnthn.
Chips, picking chips off rocky thumbnail, chips.
Horrid! And gold flushed more.
A husky fifenote blew.
Blew. Blue bloom is on the.
Goldpinnacled hair.
A jumping rose on satiny breast of satin, rose of Castile.
Trilling, trilling: Idolores.
Peep! Who’s in the… peepofgold?
Tink cried to bronze in pity.
And a call, pure, long and throbbing. Longindying call.
Decoy. Soft word. But look: the bright stars fade. Notes chirruping answer.
O rose! Castile. The morn is breaking.
Jingle jingle jaunted jingling.
Coin rang. Clock clacked.
Avowal. Sonnez. I could. Rebound of garter. Not leave thee. Smack. La cloche! Thigh smack. Avowal. Warm. Sweetheart, goodbye!
Jingle. Bloo.

You need to read the commentaries to understand that this opening passage is a kind of ‘overture’ or statement of themes, like a trailer for a movie, bringing together fragments which, when we read the main body of the chapter, we will encounter again only explained at slightly more comprehensible length.

This vast matrix, this treasure house of glittering fragments sets up tens of thousands of correspondences and contrasts, within itself and beyond itself, generating new types of meaning in all kinds of non-traditional ways.

Arguably, no final ‘meaning’ could ever be found for ‘Ulysses’ because it not only contains so many ‘meanings’ (at the obvious level of, say, theme and character) but because the huge interplay of broken words and phrases is remade every time a new reader reads it or an old reader reads it again. Although it’s a static text (although even this isn’t true, because there were thousands of textual errors in the original printing which, moreover, were exacerbated by the attempts of Joyce himself and subsequent scholars to fix them, generally introducing new ones) ‘Ulysses’ contains so many sentences made of fragments which don’t make any sense themselves but only in interplay with other, related fragments, that making sense of all these fragments in any one reading is impossible for one human being.

And the next time you (or anyone else) rereads it, you’re likely to notice a different range of fragments and allusions, thus creating an entirely new experience of the book. In this very real sense, the text is endless.

Step 2. The exegesis industry

Since its publication 124 years ago (1922) ‘Ulysses’ has gathered a small industry of commentators and exegetes (where exegesis means ‘critical explanation or interpretation of a text, especially of scripture’). There are no end of essays, PhD dissertations, academic papers, conferences, books, presentations, seminars, workshops and whatnot all adding innumerable new layers of interpretation and analysis to the original text every year.

In a very real sense (to coin a cliché again) there is no end to the Joyce industry because there will be no end to the millions of students and tens of thousands of academics writing papers about Joyce all year, every year, as long as there are literature courses, at universities all around the world.

So 1) the book itself was already endless in the ways I’ve suggested, but 2) its endlessness has been endlessly complexified by the endless reinterpretations offered by an endlessly expanding interpretation industry.

Step 3. The internet

Obviously the advent of the internet 30 years ago exacerbated all this even further, in the sense that it made many of these academic papers, seminars, PowerPoints, PDFs and whatnot publicly accessible in a way they hadn’t been before, thus making countless interpretations reinterpretable by a wider-than-ever-before audience of lay readers.

But it also introduced a whole new set of channels for readers to express their readings and misreadings through – on websites professional and amateur, in blogs (like this one), alongside the proliferation of streamed conferences and workshops and seminars and so on. A whole new layer of endless interpretation was added to the two existing ones.

Step 4. Social media

And then around 2009 along came social media, which allowed people much more easily to share their short Facebook and Twitter-sized opinions about any aspect of the book, opinions large of microscopic relating to their reading or reading of the many biographies or commentaries or guided tour round Joyce’s Dublin, or anything even remotely related, which all added to the vast cosmic cloud of meanings and thoughts and opinions and versions of this multitudinous text.

Step 5. Artificial intelligence

And now we have the arrival of artificial intelligence. To be precise (and to quote Wikipedia):

The AI boom started with the initial development of key architectures and algorithms such as the transformer architecture in 2017, leading to the scaling and development of large language models exhibiting human-like traits of knowledge, attention, and creativity. The new AI era began in 2020, with the public release of a scaled large language model (LLM) GPT-3, the predecessor of ChatGPT.

And:

ChatGPT was launched on 30 November 2022, marking a pivotal moment in artificial intelligence’s public adoption. Within days of its release it went viral, gaining over 100 million users in two months and becoming the fastest-growing consumer software application in history.

Current estimates are that some 2 billion people round the world have used AI at least once, with as many as 600 million people using it every day (I know I do).

So, how does this affect the reading of ‘Ulysses’. Sorry to be predictable, but it quite clearly is going to add yet another layer of complexification to interpretations of the never-ending book. To be more precise, two fairly obvious points:

1. Unstoppable proliferation

An AI like Chat writes new interpretations of the book every time it is asked a question about it. I would be amazed if students of Joyce aren’t asking it questions all day long (I know I am), so we can be fairly confident that new interpretations of Joyce (sometimes small scale, sometimes large scale) are being produced every day, every hour and every minute. The volume of new sentences being generated by AI about ‘Ulysses’ is probably incalculable. All this is fed back into the vast cyberscape via all the channels I’ve listed above, from student essays to amateur observations on social media, and this becomes part of the resource which AI subsequently bases its answers on.

2. Hallucinations

The key thing about AIs, as far as I’m concerned, is they make stuff up, all the time, about everything. As a civil servant I’ve used the carefully vetted, government-approved AI, Assist, and a security-cleared version of CoPilot, and have been genuinely taken aback by how much they get wrong and how often. We are, in my opinion, entering an age characterised by unmanageable amounts of digital slop, with vast tsunamis of hallucinated misinformation already washing over the worlds of discourse.

When it comes to the endless text of ‘Ulysses’, then, not only is AI producing vast amounts of summaries and explanations, but an unknowable amount of these will be rubbish – but will nonetheless go to form part of the evidence base from which the next generations of AI will be trained, and so on.

It’s hard to know whether Joyce would be weeping in his grave or laughing his head off.

Step 6. Enter Jacques Derrida

It’s a long time since I tried and failed to read the key works of the great French philosopher and celebrity thinker Jacques Derrida (1930 to 2004). I’ve easily understood the various summaries of his thought but found the books themselves very hard work, not least because the early ones, at least, are 1) running commentaries on other philosophers which you therefore need to be very familiar with to understand how he’s interpreting them; and 2) invoke the world of his post-structuralist peers (Lacan, Barthes, Cixous et al) who you also need to be very familiar with in order to fully follow, or half follow, or pretend to follow, the way he’s riffing off their ideas.

But I have always understood the basic idea of the school of thought he invented, which is generally called deconstruction or deconstructionism, to mean that the meaning of a word or phrase is always fugitive because it can only be generated by reference to other words and phrases, which themselves cannot be understood without reference to other words or phrases, and so on indefinitely.

Literally, indefinitely. The quest for a final definitive meaning can never be achieved in language because the mythical Final Word or phrase which anchors everything else in the system doesn’t exist. There is no centre. Or to put it another way, there is no outside. There is no world outside the text which offers a complete foundation and anchor point. There is no transcendent source of authority. From which it follows that no system of meaning can be stable or complete. All meaning is provisional and can at any moment be subverted by new eddies washing in from other parts of the universe of meaning.

(For me personally, this worldview maps easily onto my existing reading of David Hume, a ferociously sceptical British figure from outside Derrida’s continental culture; and with Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later idea of language games – both of which are intuitively easier to process than Derrida’s playfully impenetrable French.)

But back to Derrida and Joyce. Having followed my argument this far it occurred to me that not only Joyce’s original text, but all the proliferations it has been, and is still being, subjected to, bear out Derrida’s idea of the endless proliferation of deferred meaning. So I did what we all do nowadays and asked Chat GPT.

I asked: ‘Does James Joyce’s Ulysses embody Jacques Derrida’s idea of deconstruction?’ and within a few seconds it replied:

Yes, James Joyce’s ‘Ulysses’ is frequently interpreted as an embodiment of Jacques Derrida’s ideas of deconstruction, to such an extent that Derrida himself suggested Joyce prefigured his theories. The novel is considered a prime example of dissemination, a key Derridean concept whereby language breaks free from a single, authorized meaning and plays uncontrollably.

Here is how Ulysses embodies deconstruction:

Différance and Interpretation: The ‘Proteus’ episode is often cited as a prefiguration of différance (the deferral and difference of meaning). The chapter emphasizes metamorphosis in which symbols, thoughts and language are in constant flux, preventing a stable, present meaning.

Destabilizing the Signified: ‘Ulysses’ challenges Western dichotomies (self/other, presence/absence, speech/writing) by placing words and sounds above fixed meaning. The text acts as a ‘decomposing form’, where language breaks down into its constituent units, similar to the digestive processes often mentioned in the book itself. [The ‘Lestrygonians’ chapter, in particular, is set at lunchtime and focuses on food.]

Il n’y a pas de hors-texte‘: This is a famous quote of Derrida’s, meaning that all reality is mediated through interpretation, context and language (through a ‘fabric of signs’) and that we cannot access an objective, uninterpreted reality independent of these structures. With regard to ‘Ulysses’, although the novel references a real place (Dublin) in mind-bogglingly accurate detail, along with quite a few real-life characters of its time, most of the actual text of the novel functions as a self-referential system where meaning is generated, not by any reference to an external reality, but through internal networks of words and allusions. In this way it forces the reader to engage with the text as a text rather than a representation of life.

Undecidability and “Yes”: In 1984 Derrida was invited to deliver the opening address at the
Ninth International James Joyce Symposium in Frankfurt and produced a long (two-and-a-half hours) rambling address titled ‘Ulysses Gramophone’. It makes many points but a recurring one is the importance of the ‘yeses’ uttered by Molly Bloom in her famous final monologue, as affirmations that embrace the undecidability of language, which acts as both a totalising generator of what we take to be ‘meaning’ but which in the long text which precedes her climactic speech, has also proven that full meaning is impossible to achieve; making language a controlling but also liberating force at the same time.

The ‘Gay Betrayer’: In a typically smartarse move, Derrida concludes that to be ‘faithful’ to ‘Ulysses’ is to constantly betray it (obviously himself referencing the novel’s central theme of marital fidelity and infidelity), as the text itself undermines its own structure and authorial intent.

Personally, I would disagree with that last point: I don’t think the text undermines its own structure because that suggests the text is staying roughly the same ‘place’, that the undermining is going on in the same space, just digging away at its own foundations. Whereas in my visualisation the text of ‘Ulysses’ amplifies itself, continually spawning concatenations of extra meanings completely out of Joyce’s control, out of anybody’s control, until the text and all its meanings are large enough to be seen from space, until it reaches out beyond this puny planet and colonises space.


Credit

‘Ulysses’ by James Joyce was published by Shakespeare and Company in 1922.

Related links

Joyce reviews

Leonard Woolf: A Life by Victoria Glendinning (2006)

Leonard and Virginia were agreed that his chief fault was cowardice, and hers was snobbery.
(page 151)

‘If it were not for the divine goodness of L. how many times I should be thinking of death.’
(Virginia Woolf diary 28 May 1931, quoted p.291)

Having read most of Virginia Woolf’s adult work, why read a biography of her husband, Leonard, and not her?

1) Because I’d had enough of Virginia: the essays finished me off, my cup overflowed with Woolf style, snobbery and delirium. 2) I’d learned most of the important facts about her life from the short biographies and notes in each of her novels, and the essays. 3) These notes sometimes referred to books by Leonard, notably a book he wrote called Quack! Quack! mocking the 1930s dictators, Mussolini and Hitler, which intrigued me. He wrote two novels, over 15 books of political science, was a committed socialist, literary editor, publisher, and wrote six volumes of autobiography. Does anyone ever read these? No.

So 4) Leonard is the underdog. The critical industry around Woolf is now mountainous – as Glendinning puts it, ‘There is a small mountain of books and articles on the life and work of Virginia Woolf’ (p.502) – and will only increase year by year. She is a patron saint of feminist writing, as iconic as fellow feminist saints Frida Kahlo and Sylvia Plath. There are lots of biographies of her, hundreds of books and tens of thousands of critical essays about her writing. But what about the mystery man who loved and supported her throughout the years of her great achievements, who tried to manage her recurring bouts of mental illness, who co-founded and ran their famous Hogarth Press? Let’s find out.

Jewish

Woolf was Jewish. He came from a large and extensive Jewish family. I enjoyed Glendinning’s handy summary of the history of the Jews in England, their slow liberation from various legal and customary restrictions during the nineteenth century, and then the transformation in the size of the Jewish population and in attitudes towards them triggered by the mass immigration of Jews from Russia in the 1880s and ’90s.

This more than quadrupled the size of the Jewish community in England and, because so many of them were very poor, from peasant communities, and often settled in the slummiest parts of the East End, it was this mass influx which gave rise to the casual antisemitism you find (distressingly) in so many Edwardian and Georgian writers (Saki and D.H. Lawrence spring to mind. The fact that Virginia includes antisemitic comments in some of her novels, and was regularly casually antisemitic in her letters and diaries – ‘I do not like the Jewish voice, I do not like the Jewish laugh,’ (p.189) – requires a separate explanation).

Father

Woolf was born in London in 1880, the third of ten children of Solomon Rees Sidney Woolf (known as Sidney Woolf), a barrister and Queen’s Counsel, and his wife Marie, maiden name de Jongh). Both parents were Jewish, and from extended families. This is why Glendinning needed four pages to depict the full, extended family trees of both parents. At various points, family members are quoted jokingly referring to it as ‘the Woolf pack’. From time to time grown-up Leonard, feeling sorry for himself, referred to himself as ‘a lone Woolf’.

The family lived at 101 Lexham Gardens off the Earl’s Court Road. The household was:

an example of a typical, well-to-do Victorian way of life, underpinned by an unquestioned social hierarchy and set of values. (p.13)

As a young man Leonard was conscious of ‘the snugness and smugness, snobbery, its complacent exploitation of economic, sexual and racial classes’ (quoted p.15).

We are told all kinds of things about Sidney Woolf but the single most important fact is that he died in his prime, in 1892, aged 47 (p.23). He had earned a lot as a lawyer and that income ended overnight. Now relatively impoverished his widow, Marie, was fortunate enough to have a legacy to live off. She hung on at Lexham Gardens for two years then moved the family to a smaller house further out of town – 9 Colinette Road, off the Upper Richmond Road in Putney.

School

After prep school, Leonard was sent to the prestigious St Paul’s School in west London. Lots of anecdotes, prizes and whatnot, but the important thing is that it was as a slight, shy, Jewish teenager that he developed what he called his ‘carapace’, the protective shell he was to deploy for the rest of his life.

Trinity College, Cambridge

In 1899 he won a classical scholarship to Trinity College, Cambridge. Glendinning vividly paints how he encountered a small group of fellow undergraduates who became soul mates, including the flamboyant Lytton Strachey and the hulking great Thoby Stephen, nicknamed The Goth, son of the biographer Sir Lesley Stephen and brother of the sisters, Vanessa and Virginia Stephen, the second of which Leonard was, of course to marry. But Strachey was the man. Before he’d arrived at Cambridge Strachey was a fully-formed individual with outrageous views and a particular way of speaking which influenced all his friends. Leonard became closer to Lytton Strachey than anyone else in the world, calling him ‘the most charming and witty of human beings since Voltaire’ (p.189).

I tend to think of E.M. Forster as being an old man, but he was actually a year younger than Leonard and they got to know each other at Cambridge.

Leonard was elected to the elite discussion society called The Cambridge Apostles and it is fascinating to learn the rules of this elite club and the kind of topics they discussed. When I was a sixth-former I read A.J. Ayer, learned about Logical Positivism, and went on to read Wittgenstein, all of which convinced me that talk of Beauty and Love and Truth and God is enjoyable, entertaining but ultimately meaningless.

More precisely, they may have a psychological importance and impact on the people who discuss, write and read about such topics, but they don’t really relate to anything in the real world. They derive from a misunderstanding of language. Because we talk about a good meal, a good person and a good day, it’s easy to be deluded into thinking there must be something they have in common. Plato started the ball rolling by writing dialogues in which Socrates and his followers endless debate the True Nature of The Good. Two and a half thousand years later, clever undergraduates at Cambridge were doing just the same.

I follow Wittgenstein in believing there can be no answer to these kinds of questions because they are non-questions based on a misapplication of language. Viewed from a correct understanding of language i.e. that language consists of a vast number of language games – then any given use of language may or may not be appropriate to the vast number of language games people continually play, invent and evolve and self-important Oxbridge discussions of these great big concepts simply take their place among myriads of other linguistic interactions.

Anyway, all this was to come. For the time being these clever young men thought Truth and Beauty were excellent subjects to write long papers about and present at gatherings of like-minded chaps who all considered themselves part of a literally self-selecting intellectual elite, the Apostles. Members of the Apostles included Leonard, Strachey, E. M. Forster and a year or so later, John Maynard Keynes. Thoby Stephen (his future wife’s brother) was friendly with the Apostles, though not a member himself. What comes over from Glendinning’s comprehensive accounts of these meetings and discussions is how absolutely irrelevant everything they discussed is to us today. Here are the dates of Leonard and significant contemporaries:

  • E.M. Forster b. 1879
  • Lytton Strachey b.1880
  • Thoby Stephen b.1880
  • Leonard Woolf b. 1880
  • Clive Bell b.1881
  • John Maynard Keynes b.1883

G.E. Moore

All of them were deeply in thrall to the moral philosopher George Edward (G. E.) Moore (1873 to 1958), himself an older member of the Apostles. They were still undergraduates when Moore published his influential book, Principia Ethica, in 1903, which was concerned with that age-old problem, What is the good? Moore decides that ‘the good’ is ultimately unknowable, so that:

By far the most valuable thing, which we can know or can imagine, are certain states of consciousness, which may roughly be described as the pleasures of human intercourse and the enjoyment of beautiful objects.’ (p.63)

1. The pleasures of human intercourse and 2. the enjoyment of beautiful objects. Friends, lovers and art. Or, as Wikipedia summarises it:

that the summum bonum lies in achieving a high quality of humanity, in experiencing delectable states of mind, and in intensifying experience by contemplating great works of art,

Moore’s conclusions led his book to be treated as a kind of Bible by the network of friends which came to be known as the Bloomsbury Group, validating their belief that human relationships are what count most: Love and Beauty. Sounds like Keats, doesn’t it, from almost a century earlier? Glendinning quotes John Maynard Keynes’s extravagant response to Moore’s theory: ‘It seemed the opening of a new heaven on a new earth’ (p.64).

The thing to understand is that the younger generation experienced this as a tremendous liberation from the oppressive burden of Victorian beliefs in duty and honour and nation and empire and queen and country and all the rest of it. For believers like Leonard the book stripped away centuries of oppressive religious beliefs, shedding the calm light of common sense on the agonising questions of how to live and what to believe.

‘Isn’t that the supreme, the only thing – to be loved.’ (Strachey, quote p.98)

But there were plenty of critics who mocked these earnest young believers. Glendinning quotes Beatrice Webb’s shrewish view that the book had little or no value and simply gave the young generation who worshipped it ‘a metaphysical justification for doing what you like’ (p.65).

Glendinning herself criticises the Principia because:

  1. Its unquestioning definition of The Beautiful was heavily Victorian and becoming out of date as the new aesthetics of the 20th century kicked in
  2. Moore’s idea of the good life was very passive and quiescent i.e. simply ignored the active life of politicians, engineers, administrators, people who did things. It was a privileged academic’s conclusion that the best possible way of life was… to be a privileged academic.
  3. No sex please, we’re British: Moore’s ‘asexual mind-set seemed to preclude the “intrinsic value” of any “state of consciousness” elicited by anything more urgent than affection’ (p.63). In other words, Moore’s was a very pallid, underpowered, sexless view of human emotions.

Choice of career and the Civil Service exam

Woolf was awarded his BA in 1902 but stayed on at Cambridge for another year to study for the Civil Service examinations which he took in the summer of 1904. He got a low pass, 69th in the list, and was offered a job as an imperial administrator in Ceylon. First he went the round saying goodbye to his uni friends and this included dinner at the Stephens new house. Sir Leslie Stephen had recently died (February 1904) and his children had moved out of the gloomy family house in Hyde Park Gate to a roomier lighter one in Bloomsbury. Visiting his friend Thoby (the Goth), meant meeting the two beautiful sisters, Vanessa and Virginia. Glendinning points out that the latter was still recovering from the nervous breakdown triggered by her father’s death, one of what was to become a string of breakdowns and mental health problems. During this breakdown she had made the first of several suicide attempts (p.129).

Ceylon

Woolf was in Ceylon for 7 long years, 1904 to 1911. Glendinning makes the point that he met hundreds of native Sinhalese and Tamils but never became friendly with one of them. He liked Ceylon, some of the scenery was breath-taking. He wrote that the jungle:

‘is a cruel and dangerous place, and, being a cowardly person, I was always afraid of it. Yet I could not keep away from it.’ (quoted p.109)

, but he became an increasingly conflicted imperialist. As he was slowly, systematically promoted, he found himself adjudicating law cases and arguments and realised the only thing to do was be as strict and impartial as possible. At the same time he came to hate the impact many imperial laws and restrictions had on the natives.

Glendinning gives a vivid and fascinating account of all this, based on the twin sources of the official diary he kept of his duties, along with the many letters he exchanged with his friends back in England, Thoby, a friend called Saxon but above all Lytton Strachey.

He lost his virginity to a Singhalese woman and seems to have had occasional sexual encounters, but didn’t keep a native mistress as many other young male imperial administrators did.

The conversation of whores is more amusing than the conversation of bores.

The correspondence with Lytton back in England, in Cambridge, is extraordinarily candid about sex. Lytton deploys what he himself calls ‘the dialect of their intimacy’ (p.146). Lytton was a promiscuous homosexual who needed to be falling in love with new young men all the time. Glendinning quotes liberally from his letters which depict not just his sex life, but the sex lives of those in their set or circle, including Duncan Grant, Clive Bell and Keynes. For example, where he explains that he is having an affair with Duncan Grant, who is also sleeping with Keynes. Lytton and the others delighted in using the word ‘copulate’, in a self-mocking tone.

‘I copulated with him [Duncan] again this afternoon, and at the present moment he is in Cambridge copulating with Keynes.’ (p.115)

As always, it’s the promiscuity of gay men which staggers me, compared with the, as far as I can tell, complete chastity of their female contemporaries, specifically Virginia and Vanessa.

A note that Leonard’s sister, Bella, came out to Ceylon in 1907. She married a colonial administrator, Robert Heath Lock, Assistant Director of the Peradeniya Botanical Gardens, near Kandy in 1910. She wrote children’s books and the first tourist guide to Ceylon. She was one of many voices advising Leonard to get married. She merits a Wikipedia page of her own.

The Longest Journey

While Leonard was in Ceylon, his friend E.M. Forster published an autobiographical novel, The Longest Journey which describes the coming-to-maturity of young Frederick ‘Rickie’ Elliott, including lengthy descriptions of his time as an undergraduate at Cambridge. Critics think the character of Stewart Ansell, the clever student which Rickie’s and their circle look up to, is at least partly based on Woolf. Certainly the flashy pseudo-philosophical conversations at Cambridge which the novel opens with, are based on The Apostles. Woolf and Strachey both hated it.

Back from Ceylon

After seven years service Leonard was given an extended leave to return to England. Glendinning quotes many of the colleagues and managers in the Colonial Service who advised him to get married. it’s interesting to read the opinions of quite a few contemporaries all advising that marriage is the best thing or only thing which a young man can do to acquire focus and purpose in his life. ‘Marriage was the only way forward’ (p.120).

We know from their letters and diaries that it was Lytton who first proposed to Virginia, in a panic that she might accept (p.114). You have to have followed the text quite closely to understand why this flamboyant queer would even consider such a mad move in the first place. She sensibly turned him down.

Virginia’s character As the focus of the story turns towards Virginia Stephen, Glendinning gives a useful profile and description of her (pages 128 to 130). The bit that stood out for me was the notion that her mother was aloof and distant, so that the girl Virginia hardly ever had time with her alone.

In adolescence and beyond, she became emotionally attached to older women. (p.128)

Aha, I thought – this sheds light on the warmth and fondness for mother figures and older women which you find in her fiction – Betty Flanders, Clarissa Dalloway, Mrs Ramsay, Lucy Swithin.

Virginia’s physicians We learn about the wonderfully named Dr Savage, the physician treating her mental illness, and that he had treated her father for depression, and one of her cousins, who ended up committing suicide. Also, we learn that her sister, Vanessa, was also prey to anxiety and depression. She had her own ‘nerve doctor’, Dr Maurice Craig of 87 Harley Street. So was it genetic?

Brunswick Square The Stephens children moved again, to 38 Brunswick Square, and invited several friends to move in and take rooms. Among these was Leonard who moved in on 20 November 1911. Their wooing was slow and painful.

The Aspasia Papers Constant company led Leonard to fell deeper and deeper in love with the beautiful, mercurial, charismatic Virginia, who he came to nickname Aspasia. This was the name of the wife of Pericles (495 to 429 BC), leader of Athens during its so-called Golden Age. He wrote descriptions of her and these expanded to become sketches of the entire social circle or set, all under pen-names, eventually called the Aspasia Papers. The whole gang he joking referred to as The Olympians.

Leonard proposes to Virginia On 10 January 1912 he proposed to her. This upset her so much she took to her bed. But over the following weeks he maintained his suit and the great day came on Wednesday 29 May when she acknowledged the loved him. They told the gang who reacted in different ways. Rupert Brooke claimed it was Leonard’s sexual know-how that got her. He described her eyes lighting up when Leonard described having sex with prostitutes in Ceylon. Put simply, he was the only man she knew who wasn’t gay and had had sex. With a woman!

He was 31, she was 30, both getting on a bit.

Quits the Colonial Service The Colonial Office required him to end his leave and return to Ceylon by May at the latest but Leonard realised he couldn’t go back, and after some surprising shows of flexibility by Whitehall, he eventually resigned his position. Now what was he going to do? He was writing a novel and had written some short stories, but hadn’t made any money from them.

Wedding They were married on Saturday 10 August 1912 at St Pancras Registry Office, a very small low-key affair. As Glendinning puts it:

Leonard and Virginia were agreed that his chief fault was cowardice, and hers was snobbery.
(p.151)

And both faults lay behind his failure to invite his mother to the wedding. Not being invited to the most important day of a son for whom she had made such sacrifices as a single mother deeply hurt her.

Sex

Glendinning (like all their friends) moves onto the subject of sex. Virginia seems to have got to the ripe old age of 30 without every experiencing sexual feelings. This is what you’d deduce from her novels and essays which have a kind of hallucinatory sexlessness. So she didn’t have a clue and he wasn’t savvy enough to be a teacher. He’d only slept with a few Singhalese prostitutes and prostitutes are 1) experienced and 2) compliant. Apparently when Leonard went to make his move, Virginia became increasingly anxious and over-excited in the way which preceded her breakdowns so he had to desist. Permanently.

Glendinning cites a letter exchange of 1933 with Ethel Smyth the feminist composer, where they talk about a news story that young women are having operations to break their hymens ahead of getting married, and joke about going to have the operation themselves. Woolf was 51 and apparently serious. Glendinning concludes from this and plenty of other evidence that Leonard and Virginia never had penetrative sex, so the marriage was never consummated in the normal way. Within a year they took to sleeping in separate rooms and never again slept together.

Events

Breakdown and suicide attempt After the marriage Virginia’s anxiety, nerves and depression grew worse. She became extremely anxious about the likely reception of her first novel, ‘The Voyage Out’. They went to the country hotel to celebrate the first anniversary of their honeymoon but it was a disaster. Virginia had high anxieties about food and refused to eat. Back in Brunswick Square, unattended for a few hours, she took an overdose of veronal (100 grains of veronal) sleeping pills. Prompt action by Keynes’s brother, Geoffrey who was staying in the house, and a stomach pump, saved her life but this necessitated a round of carers, nurses, consultations with the three physicians now treating her.

The Village in the Jungle In the middle of all this Leonard’s first novel, The Village in the Jungle, was published to good reviews. It’s set in Ceylon but not among the white ex-pat and colonial community, instead it entirely habits the minds of poor Singhalese villagers. And it’s written in what, for the times, was very plain factual English, what Glendinning calls ‘spare and unmannered’. Woolf’s old boss, Sir Hugh Clifford, wrote that:

‘Your book is the best study of Oriental peasant life that has ever been written, or that I have ever read.’ (p.168)

It’s available online and I’ve read and reviewed it for this blog.

Virginia Woolf was five feet ten inches tall. She had a ‘cut glass accent’ (p.299).

The Women’s Co-operative Guild The misery with Virginia lasted for months. Throughout this period Leonard became involved with the Women’s Co-Operative Guild, led by its young and energetic president, Margaret Llewelyn Davies. He went to meetings and the annual conference and write articles to promote their work.

He was by this stage writing lots of articles and reviews for a variety of journals, including the New Statesman.

Exempted from war service When the war came the army was at first fuelled with volunteers. The Military Service Act of 1916 widened the age of conscription to all men aged between 16 and 41. Leonard was 35 but underweight and anxious, with a permanent tremor in his hands. In the next three years he underwent three medical examinations but each time presented a letter from his doctor exempting him, predicting that if he were conscripted he would have a physical and mental breakdown within months.

The Fabian Society As well as the Women’s Co-Operative, Leonard had been collared by Sidney and Beatrice Webb, leading lights of the Fabian Society, who were always recruiting likely young chaps for their cause. Sympathetic to gradualist socialism based on facts and figures, Leonard was commissioned to research and write various reports. Thus in 1916 was published the result of extensive researches, his International Government. The book’s central proposal was for an international agency to enforce world peace, and he went on to join a number of the organisations lobbying for a League of Nations to be set up, becoming friendly with the genial H.G. Wells in the process.

Labour Party Leonard joined the Labour Party and helped research and write policy papers. Women’s Co-Operative, League of Nations charities, Fabians and Labour, he wrote research papers, pamphlets and books for all of them. His next book was the thoroughly researched Empire and Commerce in Africa.

1917 Club As a left-winger Leonard welcomed the Russian Revolution. As promptly as December 1917 he helped set up the 1917 Club in Soho as a discussion forum.

The Hogarth Press In 1917 the couple bought an old printing press for £19 and set it up on the dining room table of Hogarth House in Richmond and taught themselves how to use it, to print pages and stitch them together into books. Their first publication was Two Stories, one by Leonard, one by Virginia. Hers was The Mark On The Wall, a free-associating flight of fancy. It was her first published story. His old friend Lytton Strachey immediately saw it was a work of genius. But as Virginia’s confidence grew, Leonard’s shrank. He had published two novels but began to lose faith. He was happier writing factual books.

Mark Gertler, Lady Morrell, Katherine Mansfield They make friends with Mark Gertler, self-obsessed Jewish painter and lover of Dora Carrington. At Garsington Manor, home of Lady Ottoline Morell, they meet the New Zealand short story writer Katherine Mansfield and her husband, the editor John Middleton Murray. They agreed to published Mansfield’s 68-page story The Prelude on their press

Leonard produced another book, Co-operation and the Future of Industry and agreed to edit a journal called International Review. The publishing sensation of 1918 was his old friend, Lytton Strachey’s debunking work of biography, Eminent Victorians.

In the war one of Leonard’s brothers, Cecil, was killed and one, Philip, badly wounded.

Recap When the war ended Glendinning summarises that Woolf had established himself as a documentary journalist and political propagandist, an experienced public speaker and author of distinguished books, as well as a seasoned book reviewer, and publisher in his own right. He was a behind-the-scenes figure in the growing Labour Party and was offered a seat to contest as an MP but, after some hesitation, turned it down.

James Joyce In April 1918 Harriet Weaver, patron of The Egoist magazine, approached them with the unfinished manuscript of James Joyce’s Ulysses but they had to turn it down. Far too big for their expertise, it was rejected on the grounds of obscenity by the two commercial printers they approached. Obscenity was Virginia’s central objection to Joyce, see her essay Mr Bennett and Mrs Brown (1923). She couldn’t get past her snobbish aversion to his references to peeing, pooing and the male anatomy. (The book’s central character, Leopold Bloom, has a bath and idly watches his willy floating in the water.) In her own fictions, almost all references to the body, let alone sex (God forbid) are rigorously excluded, which helps to give them their strange, bloodless, ethereal character.

Woolf’s problematic reaction to Joyce (admiration, envy, rivalry, disgust at his physicality) are explored in two excellent essays by James Heffernan:

T.S. Eliot Conversation with Weaver turned to her other protegé, T.S. Eliot, who they invited to tea to discuss whether he had anything to publish. As a result they published seven of his poems in a small edition of 140 in November 1919. Initially stiff and inhibited, Eliot became friends with Virginia who referred to him, unpretentiously, as Tom. He, like Leonard, was to become carer to a mad wife. He was six years younger than Virginia (born 1888 to Virginia’s 1882). (Later Glendinning wryly notes that ‘Eliot continued to consult Leonard as an expert on mad wives,’ p.265. Ten years later they could have both helped Scott Fitzgerald with Zelda.)

Monk House In 1919 they were meant to go down to Cornwall to join the ménage which had been set up by D.H. Lawrence, his wife Frieda, Middleton Murray and Mansfield – but never did. They had been used to a place in the country named Asheham House but it was sold by the owner. They looked around and settled on Monks House in the village of Rodmell in Sussex. They paid £580 plus £120 for the freehold. This is now a National Trust property. When they moved in it had no running water, electricity or toilet facilities. These two highbrows put up with conditions which would nowadays as unfit for human habitation. Leonard became addicted to working in the garden and had to be dragged away to take Virginia for constitutional walks.

Back in London they bought a bigger press and began to consider the Hogarth Press as a commercial venture. They published Virginia’s story, Kew Gardens. It was 1919 the year of the Paris Peace Conference and Leonard nearly went. They printed Leonard’s Three Tales from the East with a cover by Dora Carrington, to very positive reviews.

Friends’ success Lytton had become a famous name with his Eminent Victorians and Keynes became famous for writing a scathing indictment of the peace terms imposed on Germany in The Economic Consequences of the Peace (December 1919). But although much of Leonard’s research for International Government was used by the British government or other organisations at the Conference, he got little recognition.

Empire and Commerce in Africa: A Study in Economic Imperialism (1920) a scathing indictment of British imperial policy in Africa. He was writing for the New Statesman and wrote leading articles on foreign affairs for the Nation. He was secretary to the Labour Party Committee on International and Imperial Questions. He was in the loop.

The Memoir Club Molly McCarthy set up the Memoir Club to bring together old pals from Cambridge to read works in progress. A propos of this you realise that Leonard, the man, was the objective authoritative and grounded one; Virginia, the woman, was flighty, solipsistic, experimental (p.237).

Gorki and the Russians In 1919 Maxim Gorky sent a friend of theirs, Kotelianski, a manuscript of his life of Trotsky, which he brought to the Woolfs. Thus began a series of careful translations of contemporary Russian literature by the Hogarth Press.

Teeth out In June 1921 Virginia had another nervous collapse. It is mind-boggling to read that some experts thought that having your teeth extracted was a cure from mental illness. On this occasion she had three pulled out. By the end of her life she’d had all her teeth pulled out by these experts.

Jacob’s Room In November 1921 she finished writing Jacob’s Room but with the end of any book came a rush of doubt, anxiety and sometimes collapse. She had come to rely on Leonard entirely, and he had evolved to know his place was by her side and supporting. At the time of the peace conference he had been asked to travel abroad, the Webbs asked him to visit Bolshevik Russia and report back, but he turned all offers down in order to remain by Virginia’s side. This makes him a hero, doesn’t it?

Passage To India Leonard played a key role in helping Morgan Foster complete his most important novel, A Passage To India, when Forster had severe doubts and thought of abandoning it (p.242). Passage was published in 1926 and made Forster famous and financially secure. Leonard was the grey eminence behind it.

Stands for Parliament Leonard stood as a Labour candidate for Liverpool in the 1922 General Election but, thanks to his lacklustre speeches about international affairs and against imperialism, came bottom of the poll. It was a relief.

Literary editor

‘I expect you have heard that, having failed as a) a civil servant b) a novelist c) an editor d) a publicist, I have now sunk to the last rung… literary journalism. I am now Literary Editor of The Nation and Athenaeum.’ (letter to Lytton Strachey, 4 May 1923)

The salary, £500 a year, gave the couple some financial stability and coincided with the start of ‘the most prolific and successful period of Virginia’s writing life’ (p.248). She had published Jacob’s Room and started the long process of writing Mrs Dalloway and was, in addition, writing important essays and reviews.

Leonard’s literary positions Wikipedia gives a handy list of Leonard’s editorial positions:

  • 1919 – editor of the International Review
  • 1920 to 1922 edited the international section of the Contemporary Review from 1920 to 1922
  • 1923 to 1930 – literary editor of The Nation and Athenaeum (generally referred to simply as The Nation)
  • 1931 to 1959 – joint founder and editor of The Political Quarterly from 1931 to 1959

The Waste Land It’s a bit mind-boggling to learn that the Hogarth Press published The Waste Land and the type was set in the household larder. ‘Tom’ was pleased with the typescript and layout. In the same year he established a literary magazine of his own, the Criterion and he and Leonard now were friendly and conspiring literary editors, swapping reviewers and ideas. Tom became a regular visitor to their house, mostly alone, in fact maybe a bit too often as his marriage with the mentally unstable Vivian sank into misery.

Glendinning very entertainingly punctuates the key events of Leonard’s life with a roundup of what all the other Bloomsburies were doing, which is mainly having hetero or bisexual affairs with each other. A little grenade was thrown into the mix when Keynes announced he was not only in love with, but going to marry a dancer from the Ballets Russes, Lydia Lopokova (p.249).

52 Tavistock Square Virginia felt out of it in Richmond and wanted to socialise more. So they sold Hogarth House (for £1,350) and rented 52 Tavistock Square for £140 a year.

Vita Sackville-West At this time Virginia met and became friends with socialite and author Vita Sackville-West. She was married to diplomat Harold Nicholson but they led separate lives, he with a string of boyfriends, she having affairs with women and, eventually, with Virginia. They became ‘tentative’ lovers for about three years. But sex was alien to Virginia’s nature and Vita was a passionate collector of conquests.

Labour As well as working full time as literary editor of the Nation, he continued to be secretary to Labour’s Advisory Committee on International and Imperial Questions. He drafted the foreign policy section of Labour’s 1929 manifesto. Throughout the 1920s he campaigned for India and Ceylon to be given independence. If they had, he later wrote, the murder and mayhem of the independence struggle and the catastrophe of partition would never have happened.

Freud The Hogarth Press embarked on publishing the complete works of Freud being translated by James and Alix Strachey. This project carried on into the 1960s, long after Leonard had parted company with Hogarth, and they’re the edition I own, as republished by Penguin. Despite this, Leonard grew more anti-analysis as he grew older. I’ve reviewed quite a few of Freud’s works:

Vita It became a love affair in December 1925. They took trouble to conceal the full depth of it from Leonard.

Car In August 1927 he bought a car. He drove Virginia all round the country. They drove to the south of France. He wrote that nothing changed his life as much as owning a car.

Mrs Dalloway was published by the Hogarth Press on 14 May 1925. The Common Reader, a volume of 21 short literary essays, was published the same year, and the following year was the first one in which Virginia’s income exceeded Leonard’s. In 1927 her masterpiece To The Lighthouse was published. In 1928 she earned £1,540 to his £394.

Nicknames Virginia never called him Len, she called him Leo. From the start of the marriage they had numerous nicknames for each other but the enduring ones were the Mongoose and the Mandrill. Before she married, Virginia’s nickname in the Stephen household was ‘the Goat’.

They went to Berlin to visit Harold Nicholson, it was a long draining visit with many late nights, and on her return she had a relapse and was in bed for three weeks. Glendinning quotes her as saying she really wanted ‘the maternal protection which… is what I have always wished from everyone’. Suddenly, reading that, I saw how Woolf was a child, endlessly seeking reassurance. And it made me see her novels as essentially childlike, a sexless, jobless, workless, child’s-eye view of life.

Orlando: A Biography was published on 11 October 1928 and sold well, securing their finances. A year later, in October 1929, A Room of One’s Own was also successful.

Richard Kennedy, 24, was the latest young graduate taken on to help out at the Hogarth Press. He describes how Leonard was:

the magician who keeps us all going by his strength of will… and Mrs W is a beautiful, magical doll, very precious but sometimes rather uncontrollable.’

He describes how, when she was lifting off into one of her manic spells, Leonard would gently tap her on the shoulder and she would stop talking, and quietly follow him, go to her bedroom where he talked quietly, read to her and calmed her down. Leonard had to warn new people what they could not say to Virginia to avoid a problem/getting her over-excited. I hadn’t realised she was this on the edge, all the time.

Ethel Smyth During 1930 Virginia gets to know the deaf, feminist composer Ethel Smyth and they become regular, and sometimes bawdy, correspondents. Smyth was 72, Virginia 48. Here’s Smyth’s most famous work, The March of The Women. Very worthy, but heavily Victorian and boring.

New Fabian research Bureau Leonard is appointed to its executive committee in 1931.

Kingsley Martin, an earnest young nonconformist, is appointed editor of the New Statesman which he would remain for 30 years. Leonard became joint editor of the Political Quarterly which he remained for the next 27 years.

The Hogarth Press published 31 books or pamphlets in 1930, 34 in 1931.

John Lehmann just down from Trinity Cambridge, was hired to work on the Press. He lasted two years. While here he published New Signatures, the selection which introduced the poets of the Auden generation. He introduced the Woolfs to Christopher Isherwood. They published Laurens van der Post’s first book. The more I read about the Hogarth press, the more impressive it becomes.

Glendinning cites eye witness accounts from Lehmann, Barbara Bagenal and Harold Nicholson of how Virginia needed Leonard to calm her when she got over-excited or had a fugue, a loss of awareness of where she was or what she was doing (p.294).

There are plenty of eye witnesses testifying to how happy Leonard and Virginia were at Monks House, how relaxed with each other and a civilised routine. Visitors heard Virginia endlessly talking to herself, in the bath, as she pottered round the big garden, and along country lanes, so that the locals came to think of her as bonkers. The servant Louie Everest came to recognise when Virginia was having one of her bad headaches because she pottered round the garden, bumping into trees.

1932

21 January: Lytton Strachey died of cancer. Leonard wrote a sensitive obituary. He had been Leonard’s best friend in their youth. His death confirmed Leonard was middle aged.

11 March, Lytton’s partner, the painter Dora Carrington, shot herself.

Mains water is brought to Monks House and they get a telephone, Lewes 832. Virginia buys new beds from Heals.

1 October Oswald Mosley founded the British Union of Fascists. Marches, rallies and violence in the East End. The Woolfs were connected to all this because up till this point Virginia’s lover, Vita Sackville West’s husband, Harold Nicholson, had been secretary to Mosley. Now he quit.

Conversely, T.S. Eliot‘s mentally unstable wife, Vivian, joined the Fascists. Eliot separated from her and never saw her but she stalked him and made public scenes. Virginia sympathised and ‘Tom’ became a good friend and regular visitor to their London or Sussex house.

1933

1933: Victor Gollancz asked Leonard to edit An Intelligent Man’s Way to Prevent War. This is the same subject as prompted Virginia’s great book, Three Guineas. In April Mosley held a rally for 10,000 followers at the Albert Hall. Leonard and the Fabians thought he might be in power in five years’ time.

1934

July: they visited the fabulously wealthy Victor Rothschild and promised to look after his pet marmoset while he went abroad. It was called Mitzy and became so attached to Leonard’s kindness that she never went back. She perched on Leonard’s shoulder or head and the back of his jacked was routinely strewn with her poo.

5 to 10 September: Leonard listens to the Nazi Nurenberg rally, relayed on the radio. He was inspired to write his satire on the totalitarian regimes, Quack Quack!

9 September: art critic and populariser of the French post-impressionist painters, Roger Fry, died. Vanessa had had a fiercely sexual affair with him (13 years older than her) and was inconsolable. Slowly the idea crystallised that Virginia should write his biography. This was to turn into a chore and produce a not very good book.

1935

May: Driving to Italy Leonard decided to take a detour through Nazi Germany. Glendinning points out that in his autobiographies he doesn’t mention the antisemitism of the 1930s, doesn’t mention Mosley or the British Union of fascists. She thinks this is because he didn’t want to put down in black and white even the possibility of his country’s rejection of himself, as a Jew. The British Foreign Office advised Jews not to visit Hitler’s Germany. Brief description of their journey through Nazi Germany, soldiers everywhere, public notices against Jews, mobs of children giving the Nazi salute. They had taken Mitzy the marmoset with them who made people laugh and defused tensions.

June: published his attack on the Fascist governments, Quack Quack!

September: Nazi Nuremberg Race Laws Jews legally different from their non-Jewish neighbours introducing all kinds of legal discrimination.

September: Leonard and Virginia attended the Labour Party Conference where Ernest Bevin argued that Britain had to rearm to face the Fascist powers, annihilating pacifist speaker in the process.

2 October: Mussolini invaded Abyssinia. Sanctions were useless as didn’t include Germany or the USA. Leonard wrote bleakly about the failure of the League of Nations. He had spent 20 years arguing that the only way to keep peace was international co-operation. Now he was forced to abandon that position and agree with Bevin that Britain needed to re-arm and make itself strong.

1 November: UK General Election in which Labour were thrashed and the new coalition government of Conservatives along with small breakaway factions of the Labour and Liberal parties, was headed by Conservative Stanley Baldwin.

Tom Eliot brought Emily Hale, a former love and confidante, to meet Leonard and Virginia, who left a record of their tea, finding Leonard more sympathetic, warm and tired.

1936

20 January: King George V died, succeeded by his son, Edward VIII.

6 March: Hitler’s troops reoccupied the Rhineland in breach of the Versailles Treaty. The atmosphere of growing antisemitism in Britain. British Union of Fascists symbols drawn on the walls.

Trying to finalise The Years and separate out the polemical book which was to become Three Guineas brought Virginia closer to breakdown than she’d been since 1913. She lost half a stone and for over three months was unable to work, an unusual hiatus. Only in the last 3 months of the year could she resume work on what was to be her longest novel.

July: Spanish Civil War broke out with the army’s coup against the republican, anti-clerical socialist government. Leonard concluded the international system had collapsed and a European war was inevitable.

Sunday 4 October: the Battle of Cable Street as anti-fascists attacked a march by the British Union of Fascists through the East End.

5 to 31 October: the Jarrow march.

19 December: after a prolonged constitutional crisis, Edward VIII abdicates because of the Establishment’s refusal to let him marry the American divorcee, Wallis Simpson.

1937

Leonard was ill for an extended period of time. Glendinning thinks it expressed his anguish about the international situation and dread for the plight of the Jews. He tried various consultants who thought it was diabetes or prostate trouble i.e. didn’t have a clue.

April: the bombing of Guernica.

24 June: Leonard and Virginia were among many artists and performers onstage at the Albert Hall for a concert to raise money for Basque orphans.

20 July: the terrible news that Virginia’s nephew (Vanessa’s son) Julian Bell had been killed after volunteering to drive an ambulance in Spain.

Leonard was diagnosed with numerous ailments and prescribed loads of medicines none of which worked. He even went to see the inventor of the Alexander technique, Frederick Alexander, but gave it up as too arduous. His ongoing illness prompted love and support from Virginia. Glendinning quotes Virginia’s diary describing them walking round Tavistock Square like a lovestruck couple:

‘love-making – after 25 years can’t bear to be separate…you see it is enormous pleasure being wanted: a wife. And our marriage so complete.’ (Virginia’s diary 22 October 1937)

21 October: after a long gestation, Virginia’s final and longest novel, The Years was published. It received good reviews and was her most commercially successful novel although Leonard thought it was her worst.

In late 1937 John Lehmann became a partner in the Hogarth press, buying out Virginia’s share for £3,000.

1938

March: Lehmann started full time as co-director of the Hogarth Press. Endless bickering with Leonard. But it was making more money than ever, £6,000 in this tax year.

March: Leonard installs a wireless in 52 Tavistock Square. He himself makes regular radio broadcasts.

12 March: the Anschluss, Nazi Germany marches into Austria and takes it over. At the Labour Party Executive Leonard argues for a coalition with the Conservatives and the introduction of conscription.

April: Lady Ottoline Morrell, hostess of the literary salon at Garsington Manor, died.

June: Three Guineas published. Leonard thought it typified Virginia’s impeccable feminism but their friends didn’t like it. Forster thought it cantankerous, Keynes thought it silly, Vita thought it unpatriotic. I think its structure (like a lot of Woolf’s writing) is eccentrically oblique and sometimes confusing, but the picture she builds up, especially through the extended notes, of the patriarchy which held back British women, is magnificent, radiating scorn and quiet rage.

August: Tom Eliot’s wife Vivian was certified insane and sent to a lunatic asylum where she spent the last 9 years of her life. Eliot never visited her.

September: the Munich Crisis, Neville Chamberlain flies to Munich and along with the French Prime Minister allows Hitler to annex the Sudetenland, part of Czechoslovakia with a large German population. Leonard predicted war. Virginia is still very much in love with him. She bakes a loaf of bread and calls out to the garden, where he’s up a ladder ‘where he looked so beautiful my heart stood still with pride that he had ever married me’ (letter to Vanessa Bell, October 1938).

9 November: Kristallnacht when the Nazis unleashed stormtroopers on Jewish homes, business and synagogues across Germany. Hundreds of synagogues throughout Germany, Austria and the Sudetenland were damaged, over 7,000 Jewish businesses were damaged or destroyed, and 30,000 Jewish men were arrested and incarcerated in concentration camps. Leonard has a recurrence of the painful rash which covers his back and other parts. He sees doctors but Glendinning thinks it was psychosomatic, stress, and to do with the persecution of the Jews.

December: Leonard finished the first volume of After the Deluge, an analysis of Enlightenment thought into the early nineteenth century. His aim was to show the psychological and sociological process which bring about wars, and so avoid them. Fat chance. When it was published in September 1939 it sold pitifully.

1939

January: Leonard and Virginia go to tea with Sigmund Freud, recently escaped from Nazi Vienna. The Hogarth press had been publishing his works for 15 years. Leonard was struck by Freud’s aura of greatness. Freud died a few weeks into the war, on 23 September 1939.

15 March: German army annexes the rest of Czechoslovakia and claims the country has ceased to exist. France and Britain bring forward their rearmament programmes. Leonard’s psychosomatic rash returns with a vengeance.

23 June: their friend the artist Mark Gertler gassed himself. He was suffering from financial difficulties, his wife had recently left him, his most recent exhibition had been slammed, he was still depressed by the death of his mother and the suicide of Dora Carrington with whom he’d been madly in love, and was fearful of the imminent world war.

Victor Gollancz commissioned Leonard to write a book in defence of civilisation and tolerance for the Left Book Club for £500. But the final manuscript of Barbarians at the Gate contained criticisms of the Soviet Union which were unacceptable to the communists at the club, leading to a prolonged exchange of angry letters.

2 July: Leonard’s mother died. He was unsentimental.

The Woolfs moved to 37 Mecklenburg Square, taking their thousands of books and the Hogarth printing press.

23 August: Germany and Russia signed their non-aggression pact. 1 September Germany invaded Poland. 3 September Britain was at war with Germany.

November: The Barbarians at the Gate was published and slated by left-wing fellow travellers.

1940

The War for Peace published in which Leonard defended what critics called his utopianism in international relations.

June: France collapsed. Hitler enters Paris. Dunkirk. Leonard was shaken.

September: the Blitz began and was to last until May 1941. The blackout is enforced in Rodmell (the village where they had their country home). Virginia spoke to the local Women’s Institute then became its secretary. Like many others they equipped themselves with means of committing suicide should the Germans invade (p.353).

Correspondents: Virginia was still writing letters about her everyday life to Ethel Smyth who didn’t die until May 1944. Leonard still wrote letters to Margaret Llewelyn Davies of the Women’s Co-operative Guild.

They drove to London but couldn’t get as far as Mecklenburgh Square because of the bombing. A pill box was built in the field beyond their garden. German planes flew overhead every day. The flat in Mecklenburgh had its windows blown out by bombs, but their old place at 52 Tavistock Square was reduced to rubble. The Hogarth press machinery was evacuated to Letchworth. The books from Mecklenburgh were shipped down to Monks House where they packed the corridors.

23 November: Virginia finishes first draft of Between the Acts. She slowly fell into a depression, Her hand started to shake.

1941

25 January: Virginia turned 59 and Leonard began to be worried about her persistent depression. She was revising Between the Acts, always a dangerous time. They socialise, Virginia telling people her new novel is no good, though Leonard praised it.

March: she went for a walk in the fields and fell into the river whose banks had broken and flooded some of their land. Leonard returned from giving a talk to find her staggering back towards the house, wet and upset. Vanessa visits and tries to cheer her up.

Monday 24 1941: he realised she was becoming suicidal. The situation was as bad as her collapse in 1913. He consults a friend, Octavia Wilberforce, about whether to his nurses and force 24 hour supervision on Virginia against her will. But this is what had triggered furious psychotic breakdowns in the past so they decided to try and gentler approach, of Leonard calmly supporting and encouraging her.

Next day was a series of humdrum chores, recorded by Leonard and the house servant, and Virginia said she was going for a walk before lunch. An hour or so later Leonard went up to his sitting room and found two letters there, one for Vanessa one for himself, suicide notes. The letter to him is so full of love it made me cry. She thanked him and said she had had a wonderful life but she could feel her madness coming on, she was hearing voices, she couldn’t read, he would be better off without her.

Obviously he came running downstairs, hailed all the servants, sent one to get the police and help and spent the day till sunset searching the flooded river Ouse. He found Virginia’s walking stick lying on the bank. In subsequent days the river was dragged for the body. Eventually the authorities gave up the search for her body.

Three weeks later he body was discovered floating in the river by some teenagers having a picnic. They called the police. Leonard had to identify it. Coroner’s report etc. Leonard drove on his own to the cremation.

All his friends tried to console him, saying she was better off dead than really mad, but Leonard swore she would have recovered from this attack as from previous ones. He buried her ashes under two elm trees in the garden at Monks House which they had jocularly named after themselves.

Joyce and death Born February 2, 1882, Joyce was precisely eight days younger than Virginia. Two days after his death on January 13, 1941, she noted in her diary that he was ‘about a fortnight younger’ (D 5: 352-53). She outlived him by just a little over ten weeks.

Virginia asked Leonard to destroy all her papers

He disobeyed and in the years to come Virginia Woolf’s diaries and letters, autobiographical writings and unpublished works, were to be published and pored over in ever greater detail. The shape of her legacy, and the broader picture of the Bloomsbury Group, would have been very different if he’d obeyed her wishes.

Was he right to ignore her explicit, direct request, as Max Brod disobeyed Kafka’s request to burn his papers?

The shocked response of friends and family, other writers, journalists, and the wider world, are described and done with by about page 380 of this 500-page book. Leonard Woolf still had 28 years to live (died 14 August 1969). A man who was born the year Gladstone replaced Disraeli as Prime Minister (1880) lived to see men land on the moon. The twentieth century, century of marvels but also cataclysmic disasters.

After Virginia

What’s interesting is the power of the biography completely evaporates with Virginia’s death. I hadn’t realised how much Leonard’s story had come to be entwined with hers, and his existence justified by his support of her as she wrote her masterpieces. When it’s back to just him it remains sort of interesting in a journalistic gossipy way but the pressure drops right down.

Twenty-eight more years of living, writing, politicking, editing, publishing and loving – one year less than his marriage to Virginia (1912 to 1941). According to Glendinning ‘Few people are so fortunate in their later life as Leonard Woolf’ and he had many happy years. But for this reader, at any rate, all the life went out of the book when Virginia died.

Trekkie

In the next few years he fell in love with a woman called Trekkie (real name Margaret Tulip) Parsons, a keen but nondescript painter, married to Ian Parsons, an editor at Chatto and Windus, a handsome charming man. Ian sort of permitted a menage a trois to develop though it’s doubtful that Leonard and Trekkie ever had sex, and I hate myself for reading about other people’s sex lives, though this is an unavoidable aspect of modern biography. Ian meanwhile was having an affair with his editorial assistant Norah Smallwood so… so people will be people.

Superficial though it sounds, the relationship with Trekkie lasted for the rest of their lives.

The growth of Bloomsbury

The other theme which emerges is the slow steady growth of the Bloomsbury industry. Post-war interest in Virginia and other figures just kept on growing. The surviving members of the network –published books every year and fed the market throughout the 1950s (p.433). The advent of the swinging 60s, sexual liberation, the decriminalisation of homosexuality in 1967, a greater openness about sex, made the Bloomsburies, with their fluid sexuality and open relationships, seem forebears and founders.

The members wrote autobiographies and memoirs, and a steadily growing tribe of academics wrote books about them. Glendinning describes some of the early Virginia scholars who began to approach Leonard asking for help, advice, an interview, and whatever papers he could spare.

Glendinning records Leonard’s growing involvement with not just American scholars but professional buyers of manuscripts such as Hamill and Barker, to whom he sold off packets and parcels of letters, manuscripts and diaries, through the 1950s and ’60s, for lucrative sums (pages 427, 450).

The schism between academics and public intellectuals

This move to biography was encouraged by the growing schism between general, freelance public intellectuals such as Leonard, and the growing number of professional academics housed in the growing number of postwar universities. When Virginia and Leonard started writing all intellectuals were on about the same level, with some being experts at universities, but many freelance writers knowing quite as much across a broad range of subjects. The tone of discourse across public writers and academics was comparable. In the new era of academic specialisation, academics developed technical terms and jargon, assumed specialist knowledge, which increasingly cut them off from generalists let alone the man in the street.

Leonard fell victim to this specialisation with his book on international politics, After the Deluge, published in 1955. He intended it to form the third part of a trilogy (the previous books published in 1931 and 1939) which he allowed himself to be persuaded to give the grandiose title Principia Politica. This begged comparisons with the masterworks of Newton (Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica), Whitehead and Russell’s Principia Mathematica or GE Moore’s Principia Ethica, but it was nothing of the kind, as reviewers were quick to point out. Compared to the new ranks of professional academics, Leonard appeared discursive, repetitive, anecdotal and amateurish (p.444).

The spread of universities and growth of a class of specialist academics was epitomised by the opening, in 1961, of the University of Sussex, just outside Brighton and only 5 miles from Leonard’s rural retreat in the village of Rodmer (p.465).

For the public intellectual locked out of the growing ivory tower of academia, there remained publishing (he continued to be a director of the Hogarth Press), ‘the higher journalism’ (he continued to edit the Political Quarterly, and biography and memoirs. So this feeds back into the growth of Bloomsbury books – none of the survivors (Vanessa, Duncan, Quentin and so on) were really expert, scholarly expert-level on anything except… themselves.

Leonard himself epitomised the trend. Having had his masterwork of political commentary rubbished he retreated to the safer territory of his own life, and commenced his own autobiography which ended up taking no fewer than six volumes:

  • Sowing: An Autobiography of the Years 1880 to 1904 (1960)
  • Growing: An Autobiography of the Years 1904 to 1911 (1961)
  • Diaries in Ceylon 1908 to 1911, and Stories from the East: Records of a Colonial Administrator (1963)
  • Beginning Again: An Autobiography of the Years 1911 to 1918 (1964)
  • Downhill All the Way: An Autobiography of the Years 1919 to 1939 (1967)
  • The Journey Not the Arrival Matters: An Autobiography of the Years 1939 to 1969 (1969)

I’d never heard of these but they won him prizes. Beginning Again won the W.H. Smith book prize and the handy sum of £1,000.

Michael Holroyd’s two-volume biography of Lytton Strachey published in 1967-8 proved to be a turning point. Its openness about Strachey’s homosexuality, his numerous affairs, his thousands of camp letters, shed a completely new light on the Bloomsburies, rendering much that had been written up to that point obsolete, but confirming their reputation as sexual pioneeers (p.475).

Pointless

In the last volume of his autobiography Leonard candidly, devastatingly, adjudged that a lifetime of political activism, sitting on innumerable committees, spending years researching and writing position papers and polemical books (calling for international co-operation for peace) achieved more or less nothing.

‘I see clearly that I achieved practically nothing.’ (quoted p.484)

Thoughts

Authoritative, thorough, empathetic, insightful, fascinating and often very funny, nonetheless Glendinning’s definitive biography becomes increasingly focused on the mental illness of poor Virginia, relentlessly building up to Virginia’s suicide which is so terrible, so upsetting, so devastating, that I could barely read on and stopped trying to review it after that point.


Credit

‘Leonard Woolf: A Life’ by Victoria Glendinning was first published by Simon and Schuster in 2006. Page references are to the 2007 Pocket Books paperback edition.

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Virginia explaining and justifying her technique in ‘Modern Novels’ (TLS 10 April 1919):

The mind, exposed to the ordinary course of life, receives upon its surface a myriad impressions–trivial, fantastic, evanescent, or engraved with the sharpness of steel. From all sides they come, an incessant shower of innumerable atoms, composing in their sum what we might venture to call life itself; and to figure further as the semi-transparent envelope, or luminous halo, surrounding us from the beginning of consciousness to the end. Is it not perhaps the chief task of the novelist to convey this incessantly varying spirit with whatever stress or sudden deviation it may display, and as little admixture of the alien and external as possible.

Let us record the atoms as they fall upon the mind in the order in which they fall, let us trace the pattern, however disconnected and incoherent in appearance, which each sight or incident scores upon the consciousness. Let us not take it for granted that life exists more in what is commonly thought big than in what is commonly thought small.

Revised as ‘Modern Fiction’ in The Common Reader (1925).

Conclusion by Walter Pater

Walter Pater

Walter Pater was born in 1839 in the East End of London where his father was a doctor. At the age of 14 he was sent to private school in Canterbury where he was influenced by the soaring beauty of the cathedral and the stylish art criticism of John Ruskin. Aged 19 he went up to Oxford where he took a degree in Literae Humaniores in 1862. Within a few years he began writing essays about poets and artists, including ground-breaking essays about Leonardo da Vinci (1869), Sandro Botticelli (1870) and Michelangelo (1871). He gathered these in his 1873 volume, Studies in the History of the Renaissance.

The Renaissance had a big impact on the literary world because of 1) the length and thoroughness of the essays and 2) the exquisitely sensitive prose they were written in, prose which delicately describes the psychological impact of interacting with great works of art.

It is also a goldmine of literary quotes, for example the Leonardo essay contains the famous line that the Mona Lisa is ‘older than the rocks among which she sits’. The essay on ‘The School of Giorgione’, originally published in 1877 and added to the third edition of The Renaissance (in 1888), features Pater’s much-quoted saying that: ‘All art constantly aspires towards the condition of music.’

The Conclusion

Studies in the History of the Renaissance ended with a so-called Conclusion. As Pater’s biographer Michael Levey points out in his edition of Pater’s novel, ‘Marius the Epicurean’, the Conclusion is not really a conclusion at all, certainly not to a book of essays about the Renaissance. It is a free-standing essay in its own right.

The Conclusion is a miniature work of philosophy which takes as its starting point the swirl of impressions which make up the conscious mind: a drift of perceptions, feelings, thoughts and memories, reduced to impressions ‘unstable, flickering, inconstant’, ‘ringed round for each one of us by that thick wall of personality’ and ‘with the passage and dissolution of impressions…a continual vanishing away, that strange, perpetual weaving and unweaving of ourselves’.

Having described the weaving and unweaving of sensory information for a couple of paragraphs, Peter goes on to propose an ideal for living. Given the never-ending flux of sense data and the perceptions which they prompt in us and the impossibility of bursting through this flux to find any permanent structures or resting places, then it makes sense to live this life of sensations to the max: to seek to live where ‘the greatest number of vital forces unite in their purest energy’.

He uses half a dozen phrases to describe the same basic idea – the quest to live and experience the most vivid sensations possible, but the one that is most quoted is To burn always with this hard, gemlike flame, to maintain this ecstasy, is success in life.

We should seek to have a ‘quickened, multiplied consciousness’ and the best way to achieve this is through a life of artistic appreciation, ‘the desire of beauty, the love of art for its own sake‘.

Quite obviously this is a deeply amoral and asocial idea. For most of recorded history, art and literature have been created with deeply moral messages in mind, reinforcing the values and norms of the society which produced it. The literature of ancient Greece and ancient Rome was fiercely judged by critics in terms of its social and moral impact and so was every literature up to and including the Victorians.

Pater’s very short essay is proposing a radical alternative, that art has no moral or social message whatsoever, and that the best way to live is simply to enjoy art for its own sake, enjoy beauty for beauty’s sake alone.

Here’s the full text of the Conclusion. I have added to it my own numbered headings and the bold (neither are in Pater’s original text) mainly to help me remember the structure and key points of the argument.

The Conclusion by Walter Pater (1868)

1. The external life

To regard all things and principles of things as inconstant modes or fashions has more and more become the tendency of modern thought. Let us begin with that which is without – our physical life. Fix upon it in one of its more exquisite intervals, the moment, for instance, of delicious recoil from the flood of water in summer heat. What is the whole physical life in that moment but a combination of natural elements to which science gives their names? But those elements, phosphorus and lime and delicate fibres, are present not in the human body alone: we detect them in places most remote from it. Our physical life is a perpetual motion of them – the passage of the blood, the waste and repairing of the lenses of the eye, the modification of the tissues of the brain under every ray of light and sound – processes which science reduces to simpler and more elementary forces. Like the elements of which we are composed, the action of these forces extends beyond us: it rusts iron and ripens corn. Far out on every side of us those elements are broadcast, driven in many currents; and birth and gesture and death and the springing of violets from the grave are but a few out of ten thousand resultant combinations. That clear, perpetual outline of face and limb is but an image of ours, under which we group them – a design in a web, the actual threads of which pass out beyond it. This at least of flamelike our life has, that it is but the concurrence, renewed from moment to moment, of forces parting sooner or later on their ways.

2. The internal world

Or if we begin with the inward world of thought and feeling, the whirlpool is still more rapid, the flame more eager and devouring. There it is no longer the gradual darkening of the eye, the gradual fading of colour from the wall – movements of the shore-side, where the water flows down indeed, though in apparent rest – but the race of the mid-stream, a drift of momentary acts of sight and passion and thought. At first sight experience seems to bury us under a flood of external objects, pressing upon us with a sharp and importunate reality, calling us out of ourselves in a thousand forms of action. But when reflexion begins to play upon these objects they are dissipated under its influence; the cohesive force seems suspended like some trick of magic; each object is loosed into a group of impressions – colour, odour, texture – in the mind of the observer. And if we continue to dwell in thought on this world, not of objects in the solidity with which language invests them, but of impressions, unstable, flickering, inconsistent, which burn and are extinguished with our consciousness of them, it contracts still further: the whole scope of observation is dwarfed into the narrow chamber of the individual mind. Experience, already reduced to a group of impressions, is ringed round for each one of us by that thick wall of personality through which no real voice has ever pierced on its way to us, or from us to that which we can only conjecture to be without. Every one of those impressions is the impression of the individual in his isolation, each mind keeping as a solitary prisoner its own dream of a world. Analysis goes a step farther still, and assures us that those impressions of the individual mind to which, for each one of us, experience dwindles down, are in perpetual flight; that each of them is limited by time, and that as time is infinitely divisible, each of them is infinitely divisible also; all that is actual in it being a single moment, gone while we try to apprehend it, of which it may ever be more truly said that it has ceased to be than that it is. To such a tremulous wisp constantly re-forming itself on the stream, to a single sharp impression, with a sense in it, a relic more or less fleeting, of such moments gone by, what is real in our life fines itself down. It is with this movement, with the passage and dissolution of impressions, images, sensations, that analysis leaves off – that continual vanishing away, that strange, perpetual weaving and unweaving of ourselves.

3. Philosophy as observation

‘Philosophiren,’ says Novalis, ‘ist dephlegmatisiren, vivificiren.’ The service of philosophy, of speculative culture, towards the human spirit, is to rouse, to startle it to a life of constant and eager observation. Every moment some form grows perfect in hand or face; some tone on the hills or the sea is choicer than the rest; some mood of passion or insight or intellectual excitement is irresistibly real and attractive to us – for that moment only. Not the fruit of experience, but experience itself, is the end. A counted number of pulses only is given to us of a variegated, dramatic life. How may we see in them all that is to be seen in them by the finest senses? How shall we pass most swiftly from point to point, and be present always at the focus where the greatest number of vital forces unite in their purest energy?

4. Therefore, we must burn with ecstatic perceptions

To burn always with this hard, gemlike flame, to maintain this ecstasy, is success in life. In a sense it might even be said that our failure is to form habits: for, after all, habit is relative to a stereotyped world, and meantime it is only the roughness of the eye that makes any two persons, things, situations, seem alike. While all melts under our feet, we may well grasp at any exquisite passion, or any contribution to knowledge that seems by a lifted horizon to set the spirit free for a moment, or any stirring of the senses, strange dyes, strange colours, and curious odours, or work of the artist’s hands, or the face of one’s friend. Not to discriminate every moment some passionate attitude in those about us, and in the very brilliancy of their gifts some tragic dividing of forces on their ways, is, on this short day of frost and sun, to sleep before evening. With this sense of the splendour of our experience and of its awful brevity, gathering all we are into one desperate effort to see and touch, we shall hardly have time to make theories about the things we see and touch. What we have to do is to be for ever curiously testing new opinions and courting new impressions, never acquiescing in a facile orthodoxy of Comte, or of Hegel, or of our own. Philosophical theories or ideas, as points of view, instruments of criticism, may help us to gather up what might otherwise pass unregarded by us. ‘Philosophy is the microscope of thought.’ The theory or idea or system which requires of us the sacrifice of any part of this experience, in consideration of some interest into which we cannot enter, or some abstract theory we have not identified with ourselves, or of what is only conventional, has no real claim upon us.

5. The aim of life is not to ‘learn’ or ‘mature’ or find The Truth, but to cram as many sensations as possible into our short span, purely for their own sake

One of the most beautiful passages of Rousseau is that in the sixth book of the Confessions, where he describes the awakening in him of the literary sense. An undefinable taint of death had clung always about him, and now in early manhood he believed himself smitten by mortal disease. He asked himself how he might make as much as possible of the interval that remained; and he was not biased by anything in his previous life when he decided that it must be by intellectual excitement, which he found just then in the clear, fresh writings of Voltaire. Well! we are all condamnés, as Victor Hugo says: we are all under sentence of death but with a sort of indefinite reprieve – ‘les hommes sont tous condamnés a mort avec des sursis indefinis‘ – we have an interval, and then our place knows us no more. Some spend this interval in listlessness, some in high passions, the wisest, at least among ‘the children of this world’, in art and song. For our one chance lies in expanding that interval, in getting as many pulsations as possible into the given time. Great passions may give us this quickened sense of life, ecstasy and sorrow of love, the various forms of enthusiastic activity, disinterested or otherwise, which come naturally to many of us. Only be sure it is passion – that it does yield you this fruit of a quickened, multiplied consciousness. Of such wisdom, the poetic passion, the desire of beauty, the love of art for its own sake, has most. For art comes to you proposing frankly to give nothing but the highest quality to your moments as they pass, and simply for those moments’ sake.

******************

Upon the essay’s publication, four things happened:

1) Pater was a tutor at Oxford and this slender essay was adopted as a manifesto and a creed by some of his students and their friends and quickly ramified out into the doctrine and critical theory known as Art for Art’s Sake which was then also christened ‘Aestheticism’.

2) This produced a backlash in Oxford’s authorities and Pater was deprived of a promised position as proctor of Balliol (although more recent scholarship suggests this was as a result of a scandal caused when a student handed over to the authorities homosexual love letters between Pater and a student).

3) Pater himself was dismayed by the impact his essay had on the rising generation (and on his career) and adopted radio silence. For the next 12 years he published nothing except a few discreet essays. And in the second edition of Studies in the History of the Renaissance he quietly omitted the Conclusion altogether, hoping nobody would notice.

4) But, also, Pater grew up. He came to think of the fervid promotion of a life of sensations as immature. He calmed down. He came to see life more as a question of carefully perceiving and distinguishing between perceptions rather then feverishly cramming in as many sensations as you can manage. When you think about it this is rather a schoolboy-let-loose-in-a-sweetshop philosophy of life. This maturity and sobriety may have mirrored a movement in his personal beliefs from an apparent amoral epicureanism back towards the Christian faith of his pious boyhood.

Whatever precisely it was that prompted the long silence, Pater finally broke it when, in 1885 he published a long novel, ‘Marius the Epicurean’. In the same year he published a new, third edition of The Renaissance, as he now called his collection of essays, and this time he allowed the Conclusion to be reincluded, but with a note:

This brief ‘Conclusion’ was omitted in the second edition of this book, as I conceived it might possibly mislead some of those young men into whose hands it might fall. On the whole, I have thought it best to reprint it here, with some slight changes which bring it closer to my original meaning. I have dealt more fully in Marius the Epicurean with the thoughts suggested by it.

Does ‘Marius the Epicurean’ deal more fully with the issues raised in the Conclusion? Sounds like an A-level English question. Read my review of ‘Marius the Epicurean’ (which I’m publishing on Wednesday) to find out.


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The Question of a Weltanschauung by Sigmund Freud (1932)

Caveat

To avoid misunderstanding, I believe Freud is a figure of huge cultural and historical importance, and I sympathise with his project of trying to devise a completely secular psychology building on Darwinian premises. Many of his ideas about sexuality as a central motive force, about the role of the unconscious in every aspect of mental life, how repressing instinctual drives can lie behind certain types of mental illness, his development of the talking cure, these and numerous other concepts have become part of the culture and underlie the way many people live and think about themselves today.

However, I strongly disapprove of Freud’s gender stereotyping of men and women, his systematic sexism, his assumption of Western superiority over ‘primitive’ peoples, and many other axioms of his theory. Despite the revolutionary impact of his thought, Freud carried a lot of Victorian assumptions over into psychoanalysis. He left a huge and complicated legacy which needs to be examined and picked through with care. My aim in these reviews is not to endorse his opinions but to summarise his writings, adding my own thoughts and comments as they arise.

***

‘The Question of a Weltanschauung’ is the last in Freud’s 35 Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis. It is a polemical defence of psychoanalysis seen as the vanguard of science, and an attack on established religion seen as the main obstacle in its way and which it must vanquish.

Weltanschauung is the German word for ‘worldview’. Many people ask Freud if psychoanalysis has a worldview of its own and this irritates him for 2 reasons: 1) psychoanalysis is a branch of psychology and thus shares the general scientific worldview, but 2) science itself can’t even be said to have a proper worldview because it is not complete.

A Weltanschauung is an intellectual construction which solves all the problems of our existence on the basis of one overriding hypothesis which leaves no question unanswered and in which everything that interests us finds its fixed place.
(Pelican Freud Library Volume 2, page 193)

A Weltanschauung, in Freud’s view, is a bad thing. It represents people’s wish to have the answers to everything, including the meaning of life. Science cannot provide this. Science proceeds by trial and error. Its theories are contingent, provisional upon verification. Therefore, science doesn’t have a Weltanschauung in the fullest sense.

Science is the merciless unblinking quest for Truth and:

Truth cannot be tolerant. It admits of no compromise or limitations. Research regards every sphere of human activity as belonging to it and must be relentlessly critical if any other power tries to take over part of it. (2:195)

There are three other worldviews which challenge science: art, philosophy and religion. Art is not a threat because everyone knows it doesn’t aspire to scientific truth. Philosophy is ludicrous because it is always having to change its theories as science discovers more truths about the world and the mind. So religion is the only real enemy to the scientific worldview and, in its bid for a complete explanation to everything, may lay claim to being the most thorough Weltanschauung devised by the human mind.

Why does religion exert such a powerful hold over the human mind?

  1. Religion offers an explanation of how the universe came into being and why we’re here, thus satisfying the human thirst for knowledge.
  2. Religion assures us of ultimate happiness and reward despite the tribulations of life, thus fulfilling the childish wish to be comforted.
  3. Religion lays down precepts for behaviour ie it enforces a morality.
  4. In a word: religion represents a childish wish-fulfilment, the longing for illusions to conceal the brutal realities of life.

How is it that a pseudo-scientific cosmogony, a system of punishment and reward, and an ethical system are always combined in religion?

Because religion is based on the Father, your father, as he appeared in all his magnificence and omnipotence to you when you were a small child. This Father is the reason you exist: he gave you life. He is the source of punishment and praise when you’ve behaved well or badly, even if you don’t quite understand why.

And he is the ultimate source of a steady stream of instruction on how to behave = morality. All the instructions of the Father, all the conditionality of having to behave well to be loved and rewarded, these are introjected by the child to form the superego or conscience, in the first few years of childhood. Later, in puberty, all these rules and conventions are projected outwards onto the Father-figure conveniently offered by organised religion from your earliest youth. Just as you’re making the stormy transition from adolescence to adulthood, society offers you an attractive, age-old and aesthetically pleasing system within which to sublimate many of your strongest drives.

(N.B. Freud said the child is highly sexual between 0 and 5 years of age, during which it undergoes a development through fixed stages: 0-1 oral, obsessed with the breast, pleasure and sustenance through the mouth; 1-3 anal, where you learn to enjoy controlling your bowels and their product, faeces; phallic, when you realise you have a little winkle and your sister doesn’t because Daddy has cut hers off for being naughty. This terrifying realisation results in the Castration Complex and this contributes to the grand resolution of childhood sexuality in the Oedipus Complex, a wish to overcome your father and take possession of your mother. The Oedipus Complex is duly overcome and the child lapses into the Latency Phase (6-11) when you largely forget the upsets and turmoil of the earlier years and become more socialised, introjecting the commands and morality of your parents into the superego. With the eruption of the hormones in puberty many unconscious fears and desires from the infant period are revived and largely dictate how you respond to the new sexual and social demands being made on you. It is at this stage that society holds out organised religion as a way of overcoming many of the problems which face you, notably the perceived weakness of your real father as against the ego-ideal you have set up in your mind; and the fear of loss of love as you move away from your parents. Those childhood feelings of awe and fear and abasement can now be projected onto a Big Daddy in the sky. The strong but confused and contradictory sexual drives which are awakened in adolescence can also be sublimated into adolescent infatuations with the suffering Christ. And this explains why so many adolescents undergo a religious infatuation before settling into the common light of day.)

Freud then recapitulates the argument of ‘Totem and Taboo’. Briefly, he sees societies and their religions as going through fixed developmental stages rather as the human child does. This parallel allows him to make many comparisons between infantile states and early religious beliefs. This parallelism also allows him to say that, just as neurotic, hysterical and obsessive behaviours are the result of a reversion to childhood experiences which exert an unconscious power over the adult – so, by extension, various religious beliefs or practices are reminiscent in appearance and actually identical in structure to mental illnesses.

(This insight first saw the light in Freud’s paper ‘Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices’ (1907) where he compares compulsive religious observance to the kind of obsessive behaviour often practiced by neurotics; for example, obsessively washing your hands or tapping every railing on the way to the Tube etc, and explains how failure to carry out these actions leads to guilt and self-punishment out of all proportion to their external value.)

To return to the analogy between the growing child and the growth of religion: the childish belief in the omnipotence of its thoughts in the child’s oral phase is paralleled in religious history by the development of animism, where the woods and streams are haunted by spirits. The child/primitive man’s tool for propitiating these spirits also relies on the ‘omnipotence of thoughts’ = Magic. Primitive man makes things happen by re-enacting them (performing a rain dance, painting pictures of a successful bison hunt on cave walls). Freud compares primitive ritual to the child’s gameplaying to overcome, to internalise events in the outside world beyond its control (see ‘Beyond The Pleasure Principle’).

Then, just as the child learns to talk and this new skill vastly expands its ability to control the coming and going of its parents, so the primitive mind develops language and is stunned by the effect of this huge leap forward. In religion the full plenitude of language is, again, projected onto God, of which our own language is a puny copy. Let there be light, says God, and there is light. Adam names the animals and knows them. Mastery of language brings to the child, and to the ‘primitive’, alike, a mystical sense of oneness with, and control of, the world. The myth of Babel is necessary to explain the transition from the childish power of language to its sadly limited capability in adult life.

Then comes totemism, where many of the fears of spirits have been concentrated onto the tribal totem, a feared and worshipped animal. The totem is also the nexus of complicated systems of morality based around kinship and marriage. In ‘Totem and Taboo’ Freud says these all boil down to barriers to incest which are powerfully close to the surface in the primitive mind. (In line with the Freudian principle that nothing is ever lost to the psyche, many relics of the age of animism survive to this day in the form of superstitions – black cats – or are incorporated into mainstream religious belief – the enduring belief in ‘dark forces’ and ‘the Evil Spirit’, Satan etc.)

How primitive it feels even to think about Satan, much more exciting than thinking about God – sending us back to a time of primal thrills and excitements and terrors.

For Freud, then, the investigations of the 19th century (and particularly the encyclopedic work of Sir James Frazer, ‘The Golden Bough’ with which ‘Totem and Taboo’ is saturated) show that religion has a natural history like any other human institution. Freud has contributed to this an explanation of how the fulfilments of the wishes of different parts of the developing mind were satisfied by different components in religion which drew them together in evermore sophisticated syntheses.

As to the present day, Freud’s view is that religion is starting to crumble before the investigations of science, of which psychoanalysis is at the cutting edge. Religion’s attraction in the modern world is the guarantee of an all-powerful God who looks after your destiny and rewards virtue. However:

It seems not to be the case that there is a power in the Universe which watches over the well-being of individuals with parental care and brings all their affairs to a happy ending. On the contrary the destinies of Mankind can be brought into harmony neither with the hypothesis of a Universal Benevolence nor with the partly contradictory one of a Universal Justice. Earthquakes, tidal waves, conflagrations, make no distinction between the virtuous and pious and the scoundrel or unbeliever. Even where what is in question is not inanimate Nature but where an individual’s fate depends on his relations to other people, it is by no means the rule that virtue is rewarded and that evil finds its punishment. Often enough, the violent, cunning or ruthless man seizes the envied good things of the world and the pious man goes away empty. Obscure, unfeeling and unloving powers determine men’s fate; the system of reward and punishments which religion ascribes to the government of the universe seems not to exist. (2:203)

The latest contribution to the critique of the religious Weltanschauung has been effected by psychoanalysis, by showing how religion originated from the helplessness of children and by tracing its contents to the survival into maturity of the wishes and needs of childhood. (2:203)

Religion is an attempt to master the sensory world in which we are situated by means of the wishful world which we have developed within us as a result of biological and psychological necessities. But religion cannot achieve this. Its doctrines bear the imprint of the times in which they arose, the ignorant trust of the childhood of humanity. Its consolations deserve no trust. Experience teaches us that the world is no nursery. The ethical demands on which religion lays stress need, rather, to be given another basis; for they are indispensable to human society and it is dangerous to link obedience to them with religious faith. (2:204)

Freud, then, does not set out to subvert conventional morality. On the contrary, he sees some form of morality as vital to civilised life and fears it will be eroded if it remains attached to crumbling religious belief. Freud calls for morality to be rebuilt on the more solid ground of science and a scientific understanding of what is best for human beings.

Religion may well reply to Freud’s attack, ‘What right have you to criticise or judge the noblest creation of the human spirit, inspired by the Divine Creator Himself?’ Freud:

We reply by saying that what is in question is not in the least the invasion of the field of religion by the scientific spirit, but on the contrary an invasion by religion of the sphere of scientific thought. Whatever may be the value and importance of religion, it has no right in any way to restrict thought. (2:206)

Here Freud clearly shows himself the heir to the spirit of the rational Enlightenment.

The prohibition against thought issued by religion to assist in its self-preservation is also far from being free from danger either for the individual or for human society. Analytic experience has taught us that a prohibition like this, even if it is originally limited to a specific field, tends to widen out and become the cause of severe inhibitions in the subject’s conduct of life. This result may be observed, too, in the female sex, following from their being forbidden to have anything to do with their sexuality even in thought. Biography is able to point to the damage done by all religious inhibition of thought in the life story of nearly all eminent individuals in the past. On the other hand intellect – or Reason – is among the powers which we may most expect to exercise a unifying influence on men – on men who are held together with such difficulty and whom it is therefore scarcely possible to rule… Our best hope for the future is that intellect – the scientific spirit, Reason – may in process of time establish a dictatorship in the mental life of man. The nature of reason is a guarantee that afterwards it will not fail to give man’s emotional impulses and what is determined by them the position they deserve. But the common compulsion exercised by such a dominance of reason will prove to be the strongest uniting bond among men and lead the way to further unions. Whatever, like religion’s prohibition against thought, opposes such a development, is a danger for the future of mankind. (2:208)

Here we get to the heart of Freud’s argument; religion is not only an irritating sign of immaturity and the childish wish to live in a world of illusions. It is positively dangerous insofar as it hinders the movement towards the triumph of reason. So what is this scientific spirit which Freud goes on about so much?

Scientific thinking does not differ in its nature from the normal activity of thought, which all of us, believers and unbelievers, employ in looking after our affairs in ordinary life. It has only developed certain features: it takes an interest in things even if they have no immediate, tangible use; it is concerned carefully to avoid individual factors and affective influences; it examines more strictly the trustworthiness of the sense-perceptions on which it bases its conclusions; it provides itself with new perceptions which cannot be obtained by everyday means and it isolates the determinants of these new experiences in experiments which are deliberately varied. Its endeavour is to arrive at correspondence with reality – that is to say, with what exists outside of us and, as experience has taught us, is decisive for the fulfilment or disappointment of our wishes. This correspondence with the real external world we call ‘truth’. It remains the aim of our scientific work even if we leave the practical value of that work out of account. (2:206)

Freud then turns to consider other Weltanshauungen of our times, the intellectual relativism generated by modern physics and the ‘new religion’ of Russian communism etc (cf his savage critique of Bolshevism in ‘Civilization and Its Discontents’).

Thoughts

This is Freud’s best single work outlining what science is, how psychoanalysis fits into it, the origins and growth of religion, and why religion presents a mortal threat to science’s attempts to build a better world. Indispensable even if, by the end, you come out disagreeing with most of his premises and conclusions.

Also, after reading Totem and Taboo, Future of An Illusion, Civilisation and its Discontents, Moses and Monotheism, with their relentless attacks on Christianity, not to mention the countless places in other essays where he suddenly starts attacking Christianity, the reasonably impartial reader can’t help being struck by the deep-seated and lifelong animosity Freud felt, thought and expressed against Christianity at every possible opportunity.

As Pfister’s writings make clear, it was perfectly possible to be a devout Christian and a thorough-going psychoanalyst as well. The more you read of it, the more antiquated and Victorian Freud’s anti-religious prejudice seems, the optimistic anti-Christian positivism of his student days in the 1880s carried over into the 1920s and 30s, and revived any time anyone reads one of these dusty old works.

It feels more than ever outdated in a world where a) religious belief is on the rise, across the Muslim world, the Hindu world, and in Christian Africa; and b) when a central premise of our times, in the multicultural West, is about fluidity of identities and allegiances. In the modern context Feud’s simplistic binary opposition of Science versus Religion seems almost 18th century, Voltairian, and his naive belief that rational science will lead us to some utopian future feels all the more dusty, dated and irrelevant.


Credit

The history of the translation of Freud’s many works into English forms a complicated subject in its own right. ‘The Question of a Weltanschauung’ was first translated into English by James Strachey in 1964 as part of The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. My quotes are from the version included in volume 2 of the Pelican Freud Library, ‘New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis’, published in the 1973.

Related links

Freud and religion reading list

Freud reviews

Future of an Illusion and other writings on religion by Sigmund Freud

Note: to avoid misunderstanding, I believe Freud is a figure of huge cultural and historical importance, and I sympathise with his project of trying to devise a completely secular psychology building on Darwinian premises. Many of his ideas about sexuality as a central motive force, about the role of the unconscious in every aspect of mental life, how repressing instinctual drives can lie behind certain types of mental illness, his development of the talking cure, these and numerous other ideas have become part of the culture and underlie the way many people live and think about themselves today. However, I strongly disapprove of Freud’s gender stereotyping of men and women, his systematic sexism, his assumption of Western superiority over ‘primitive’ peoples, and so on. Despite the revolutionary impact of his thought, Freud carried a lot of Victorian assumptions into his theory. He left a huge and complicated legacy which needs to be examined and picked through with care. My aim in these reviews is not to endorse his opinions but to summarise his writings, adding my own thoughts and comments as they arise.

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1. The Future of An Illusion (1927)

Freud posits a parallel between the development of a child and the development of civilisation. In individuals you get a progression through helpless infant, wilful adolescent and mature adult. By an analogous evolution society can be said to develop through stages, from savage tribes with beliefs in all kinds of spirits; to semi-civilised societies who believe in one God; then onto modern society, rational, scientific and atheist.

1. Civilisation is based on, indeed, is to some extent defined as, the amount of instinctual repression it can achieve. Some people (i.e. communists) may wish for a redistribution of wealth so that everyone will work joyfully and creatively together. Unlikely. People don’t like work; people prefer indulging their instincts in pleasurable pursuits. Civilisation means coercing people into wealth-creating work and making them repress their instinctual desires.

2. Society organises instinctual repression. The upper classes repress their instincts in order to provide a ‘moral’ role-model for the workers. The workers are ambivalent towards this model of rational self-repression, partly resenting it because they are clearly not getting as much wealth and power as the upper classes; but allying with their rulers if the latter identify threats from outsiders, for example, the ‘barbarians’ for ancient Greece or Rome, or ‘outsider’ groups such as Jews in 20th century societies (or refugees and immigrants in contemporary Britain). But all sectors of society can be united by certain artistic ideals (in the sense that art is a sublimation of our instinctual wishes). A shared art can help unite people in their ideal.

(N.B. Freud wrote this during the heroic age of Bolshevik propaganda – 1927 – and anticipated many of the aesthetic theories of the Nazis, namely to unite the Volk in worship of high ideals while focusing anti-social energy onto outsider groups like the Jews.)

3. Primitive man is paralysed with fear in face of the horrors of existence, the arbitrariness of disease, famine, catastrophe, death and so on. He peoples the world with spirits who he tries to relate to in the same way he relates to those around him i.e. family, chief, slaves etc. As mankind develops, so does this primitive pantheism, so that the many spirits and their functions become concentrated into a king of the gods and, eventually, into one figure, one God, ruler of a totally controlled Providence, in charge of divine justice, deciding who has been good and will be rewarded etc. Naturally, whoever thought up this monotheism consider themselves to be The One People, the Chosen People (i.e. the Jews).

4. Freud reminds the reader of the theory he outlined in Totem and Taboo 15 years earlier. There he took a hint from Darwin about the possibility that early man lived in hordes, a band of brothers borne by a harem of mothers owned and inseminated by one semi-divine Father. In Freud’s fantasy of ‘primitive’ society the brothers rose up in rebellion, overthrew the ruling Father, killed him and ate him in a communal meal deliberately designed to implicate everyone in the guilt. This ‘historical’ fact is what lies behind the practice found among so many cultures – the worship of a totem animal which is superstitiously revered all year round, except for the one holy day when it is executed and ritually eaten. (In fact, no history or anthropology has come anywhere near confirming Freud’s fantasy of this primal parricide, which is generally discredited.)

Freud then highlights the continuity between his explanation of religion as a protection for the helpless savage from the cruel forces which surround him, and modern-day religious belief.

5. Freud lists the reasons our parents and priests give for believing religion:

  1. it is handed down from time immemorial
  2. there are many proofs
  3. in any case, you’re forbidden to discuss it

In fact 2) is demolished because religious belief is so riddled with contradictions and falsehoods, for example, the contradictions in the Bible, the explosion of the Genesis myths by archaeology and geology and so on. Some Christians say, ‘I believe precisely because it is absurd’ but if that is the case, why not believe any old absurdity and fantasy? The fact is that religious people may differ in details of theology or ritual but overlap considerably in their basic, primeval wishes – to be consoled, protected, assured of life after death.

Spiritualists try and persuade us of the immortality of the soul but how pitiful is the transparent egotism of such a wish, the wish to live forever, to deny the upsetting reality of death and extinction.

6. Religion is an illusion: an illusion is a belief incorporating a large amount of wish-fulfillment. We all want a Big Daddy to hide from us the desolation and heartbreak of reality, to pick us up and dust us off and make things better. Religious beliefs cannot be proved or refuted, and this is clearly what gets Freud’s goat about religious people – they are so dishonest. They have no intellectual discipline but use whatever tools lie to hand – logic till that runs out, absurdity till that won’t serve, the strength of tradition till that is proved to be largely false, and then the testimony of personal experience which can’t be proved or disproved – they will do anything to cling onto their pitifully childish wishes: Yes, I will live forever; Yes, Daddy loves me, totally, completely; Yes, all the injustices I suffer now are recorded and will be set right in the Afterlife.

Even a bunch of ‘savages’ ought to be embarrassed by the childishness of all this, let alone so-called ‘civilised’ men.

7. ‘Ah but’ (says The Voice of The Believer, which Freud invents to play Devil’s advocate), ‘it is:

  1. dangerous to undermine religion since this will lead to anarchy
  2. cruel to deprive people of the illusions that sustain them

Now these are good points which Freud doesn’t really rebut. He concedes that that religion has achieved much, historically, by making civilization possible (i.e. focussing people’s anarchic wishes and fears onto one controllable God) but moves on swiftly to point out how, after thousands of years of its hegemony, just look around at the misery, injustice and inhumanity which still plague us. Far from ensuring moral behaviour, religion has in fact made many scandalous concessions to the weakness of human nature, for example, the rigmarole of confession and penance and masses for dead relatives, and so on.

But fortunately, in Freud’s view, the spirit of Science is now abroad: we live in dangerous times and pretty soon the repressed masses are going to realise that the sanctions against rebellion underpinned by religion have evaporated. So if we want to keep order in society, we have to do something about the fact that religion is collapsing and have to establish a firmer foundation for law and morality than this dying system – solid, secular ethics.

8. By basing the undoubtedly wise injunction ‘Thou Shalt Not Kill’ exclusively on God’s authority, along with a host of other restrictions and laws, we risk the collapse of these injunctions so vital to civilisation when religion itself collapses, as it inevitably will, before the onslaught of science.

Better to be honest. Religion is ‘true’ (just like dreams and neurotic symptoms) insofar as it tells us a psychologically true story in symbolic terms (for example, the central event of the sacrifice and cannibalism of the Father as depicted in Totem and Taboo is psychologically true depiction of the Oedipus Complex which Freud claims every male human experiences). But now, says Freud, it’s time to cast symbols aside and face the facts, to move into the scientific – or adult – phase of civilization.

9. The Voice of the Believer says this is dangerous talk because it is naive to think that Reason can replace Religion as the glue binding Society together. Look at the French Revolution which tried just this and catastrophically failed.

Once again, Freud doesn’t quite refute this good point. Instead he says the reason to be sceptical about any triumph of Reason is because so many people’s adult intellects are weakened, and this is because:

  1. their instinctual sex life is so repressed that they become obsessed and/or ill
  2. as children they are force-fed so much illogical nonsense under threat of hellfire

No, says Freud, we must take the risk, we must draw up a plan for modern education which omits religion. It may take a while for the reform to take affect (he cites the slow progress of Prohibition in the USA, 1920 to 1933) but it will be worth it to build the just, unrepressed, scientific society of the future.

Instead of wasting our energy on vain hopes of an afterlife, let’s build a New Jerusalem on earth ‘by concentrating all our liberated energies into life on earth.’ Freud expresses the ‘hope that in the future science will go beyond religion, and reason will replace faith in God’.

10. The Voice of Religion says:

  1. you are trying to replace a tried and tested illusion with an untried one, and
  2. religion unites all levels of society from labourer to intellectual. What else can do this?

Once again Freud answers his own question unconvincingly by resorting to the relatively small example of the help he has been able to give individual patients in coming to terms with their illnesses. Freud hopes that psychoanalysis can extend that help to society at large.

This is, to put it mildly, quite a big hope…

Thoughts

Given Freud’s lifelong animus against religion, it’s surprising that, when he finally got round to writing a complete book on the subject, it turned out to be such a surprisingly bad and unsystematic text. It trots through various arguments for atheism, buttressed by bits of psychoanalytic theory, but is surprisingly ramshackle and unconvincing.

For me, the Voice of the Believer which he creates in order to dramatise the text, is much more persuasive, especially when you consider that, as Freud was writing, some European nations stood poised to experiment with just the sort of non-religious, ‘scientific’ ideologies to bind society together which Freud appears to recommend: Stalin’s Russia and Nazi Germany.

Obviously, Freud wasn’t a Nazi or a Bolshevik, but both those ideologies claimed to have ‘scientific’ solutions to society’s problems, circa 1927, which just goes to show what a slippery term ‘science’ is, just as liable to ideological manipulation and distortion as the ‘religion’ he so simple-mindedly attacks.

And then, looking back with the benefit of hindsight from 2023, it’s clear that, despite with all the gee whizz technology we in the West have invented, if you look at the world as a whole, religious fundamentalism (Muslim and Hindu, in particular) and irrational nationalisms (Russia, Turkey, Brazil), are on the rise almost everywhere.

It is Freud’s hopes for a rational, secular and scientific future which seem naive and superficial.

2. Oskar Pfister’s The Illusion of A Future: A Friendly Disagreement with Professor Sigmund Freud (1928)

Freud wrote The Future of an Illusion in 1927 partly with his friend and devout Christian, Oskar Pfister, in mind. The following year Pfister wrote a pamphlet refuting Freud’s points, The Illusion of a Future, which Freud welcomed (dissent was OK as long as fundamental allegiance to The Movement remained unquestioned).

Pfister summarises Freud’s critique of religion in The Future of an Illusion, thus:

  1. Religion is a universal obsessional neurosis based on the Oedipus Complex.
  2. Religion comprises a system of wishful illusions together with a disavowal of reality.
  3. Religion is hostile to free thought.
  4. Religion has failed as a guardian of civilisation.

Pfister’s rebuttals

1. Undoubtedly religious belief can include a neurotic component. Undoubtedly early religious systems were based on ‘primitive’ mental states. Undoubtedly religious belief in its earliest phase was bound up with the repression of instinctual drives accompanied by neurotic components. But that doesn’t disprove the validity of belief itself.

Freud oversimplifies to say the same Oedipal complex lies at the bottom of all religious belief. Can such a simple explanation really explain the religion of the totemists, the social-ethical monotheism of the Israelites, the Aten-belief of the Egyptians, the piety of the conquistadors, and so on?

In contrast to the many repressive elements of primitive religious belief, Pfister sets the uniquely unrepressed and liberating belief of reformed Christianity, and above all, the ethical achievement of Jesus’s commandment of Love.

Jesus overcame the collective neurosis of his people according to good psychoanalytic practice in that he introduced love – morally complete love – into the centre of life.

For Pfister, Jesus was the first psychoanalyst. Therefore Freud, insofar as he is following in Jesus’s footsteps, is a good Christian!

Whoever has fought with such immense achievements for the truth and argues for the salvation of love, as you have [Pfister’s book is directly addressed to Freud], is a true servant of God according to Protestant standards.

For Pfister Protestantism is the reverse of Freud’s neurotic, repressed illusion: it is the blossoming of man into his full biological destiny of love.

It is misleading of Freud to write his natural history of the development of religion in such a way as to tar Christian belief with the brush of primitive animism etc. The entire point of Christianity is that Jesus represents a triumph over the irrational compulsions of the Old Law, the superstitious repressions of the Old Testament, and its replacement with a new dispensation of brotherly love and love of God.

2. Undoubtedly there is a large element of wish-fulfilment in much religious experience. Pfister points out that Freud is indebted to the pioneering ideas of Ludwig Feuerbach (1804 to 1872) and his psychologising of religion; it was Feuerbach who first demonstrated that much theology is disguised anthropology and religion a dream.

But, for a start, many atheists are governed just as much by wish-fulfilment as believers; and their compulsion to disbelief, their atheism, is no more than their Oedipal wish to do away with the Father. Wishes are common to all mankind, as psychoanalysis shows. Pfister agrees with Freud that the moral progress of mankind consists of the overcoming of egotistical wishes: where he differs is in insisting that Jesus enjoins the highest form of overcoming egotism.

The gentleness and humility, the self-denial and rejection of the hoarding of wealth, the surrender of one’s life for the highest moral values, in short the whole way of living that he who was crucified at Golgotha demanded of the apostles, is diametrically opposed to the appetites of human nature.

Consider the Lord’s prayer. It embodies the overcoming of everything egotistical. Freud, by implication, is attacking a Judaic, a Mosaic religion, based on the jealous God of the Old Testament and operating through fear. Not Pfister’s God of liberation through love.

Pfister goes onto the attack to say that there is in fact a huge element of wish-fulfilment in science. The history of science is an unceasing struggle against anthropomorphisms. This was being highlighted at the time these books were being written by quantum physics and the splitting of the atom. Now we know that reality is textured and fissured in complicated, sometimes incomprehensible ways: to continue to see colours as colours not frequencies, to see this table as solid and not a buzzing mass of particles, these could be said to be wishes for the world to remain stable and meaningful despite the strict testimony of science.

Science and philosophy have to take into account the experiential, the phenomenological. In order to function in the world we make leaps beyond what science can now prove: this is not wish-fulfilment, it is being human.

Nor is Religion inflexible. After some resistance (and hasn’t psychoanalysis shown that resistance is a common human quality?) religion has adapted to Copernicus and Evolution. And so it will assimilate Freud’s insights as easily.

3. Is religion hostile to thought? No, says Pfister. On the contrary, his brand of Protestantism encourages freedom of thought whenever possible.

We calm frightened persons who are experiencing a crisis of belief with the assurance that God loves the sincere doubter and that a belief made more secure through thought is more valuable than one which has simply been taken over and taught.

Contrary to Freud’s claim that religion has stifled thought, consider the great thinkers who were Christians. Descartes, Newton, Faraday, Pasteur, Leibnitz, Pascal, Lincoln, Gladstone, Bismarck, Kant, Hegel, Goethe et al were all Christians; did belief stop them from thinking new and original thoughts? No. Look at Einstein who, through brilliant scientific achievement, has come to believe that the universe has a design.

4. Freud claims that religion has held the field for thousands of years as a civiliser of mankind and look at the mess we’re still in, so now – says Freud – it’s Science’s turn. Pfister agrees that there is much to abhor in the contemporary world. But it is just silly to blame religion for this. Religion is and always has been: ‘not a police force that conserves, but a leader and beacon toward true civilization from our sham civilization.’

Religion should bring forth the greatest achievements in art and science; should fill the lives of all people, even the poorest, with the greatest treasures of truth, beauty and love; should help to overcome the real stresses of life; should pave the way for new, more substantive and genuine forms of social life, and thus call into being a higher, inwardly richer humanity, which corresponds more closely to the true claims of human nature and of ethics than our much-praised uncivilisation.

Pfister then moves on to the offensive to attack Freud’s scientism (defined as ‘the belief that science and the scientific method are the best or only way to render truth about the world and reality’). Freud (optimistically) writes that Science will steadily reveal the truth of the world to us and that the advance of intellect will in time reconcile us to the hard facts of existence.

We believe that it is possible for scientific work to gain some knowledge about the reality of the world by means of which we can increase our power and in accordance with which we can arrange our life.
(The Future of an Illusion)

Pfister replies that this vision is breath-takingly naive. Freud sidesteps all the epistemological questions which have dogged science, questions about the ‘reality’ of the outside world on which we conduct our experiments, and the nature of the knowledge we acquire about it.

On the one hand Freud’s naive faith in the reality of external appearances has been hugely undermined by recent (1920s) science, which has consisted precisely in dissolving appearances: optics dissolves colour into frequencies, physics dissolves solids into whirling worlds of atoms, and atoms themselves disappear into smaller entities which are both particles and waves, at the same time. So Pfister accuses Freud of being a philosophical novice:

Natural science without metaphysics doesn’t exist. The world is accessible to us only through our intellectual make-up and not through the senses alone. Our categories of thought, whether one considers them according to Kant’s method or some other way, always play a part. Therefore we must engage in criticism of knowledge. We need concepts like cause and effect, although they have been discovered to have their origins in anthropomorphisms, we need molecules and atoms [though they are now realised to be artificial constructs]. Even the measuring and weighing has to do with abstractions for numerical concepts are, like all concepts, abstract. Philosophy, which begins as soon as experience ends, extends into the empirical sciences and whoever doesn’t seriously come to grips with philosophical problems will do so in an amateur confused way.

So, according to Pfister: 1) Freud’s deliberate ignorance of philosophy seriously undermines his understanding of what science is and how it proceeds. But 2) given that Freud’s ‘science’ is a rather simple-minded, uncritical concept, how can we believe Freud’s predictions of a future world ruled by it?

Thus I don’t know through Freud’s generally accessible concept of science how far knowledge extends, what degree of reliability it can establish and what opportunities are allotted to it. How can I know if the extension of power through knowledge means an increase in happiness for humanity?….

Is it unthinkable that a civilisation that is guided only by science will succumb to wild passions after the World War has revealed to us the barbarism lurking in the depths of nations? Has it been settled so definitely that progress in the sciences until now has increased the sum total of human joy in life? Is it certain that we are happier than we were 100 years ago? What will become of the most beautiful characteristics of technology when they are forced into the service of the inhuman hunger for money, of human cruelty, of inhuman dissipation?

(Very prophetic in the light of the uses science was shortly to be put to in the Soviet Union, in Nazi Germany, and in the countries who developed and dropped the atomic bomb.)

Pfister then delivers a sustained assault on the implications of Freud’s narrow scientism: human beings are not just thinking machines, they make and feel and judge. Setting up rational Science as the great shibboleth is throwing out everything which makes human existence glorious and humane: the great achievements in art, in poetry, in philosophy, in architecture; the entire realm of aesthetics and the judgement of beauty; the realm of ethics which must guide us through all the decisions of a lifetime.

Freud seems to think that knowing something gives us control over it and that therefore Science will provide the rational mind with everything it needs to rule its life. This is a demonstrably silly idea. What’s more, it is subverted by the very discoveries Freud himself has made about the vast amount of human behaviour which is subject to irrational determination, to unconscious motivation.

For Pfister Religion, not Science, offers the best means of overcoming these instinctual drives and determinants, of arriving at the full freedom and self-determination offered by Jesus.

A positivistic Science such as Freud promotes cannot begin to offer the foundations for morality, for art, for any sensible guidance on how to live our lives. Psychoanalysis can restore the overdetermined subject to his or her proper autonomy, but the big decisions in life still lay all before them and science alone is nowhere nearly enough of a guide.

Conclusion

Pfister summarises his case: Isn’t Freud’s scientism every bit as much of a wish-fulfilment, of an illusion, as the simple-minded version of faith he ascribes to religious believers?

Freud’s airy visions of the future triumph of his vague, ill-defined ‘Science’ are a limp wish next to the solidity of the science of the human heart which he has developed. And Pfister delivers his punchline: In his social and religious writings, then, Freud is labouring under ‘the illusion of a future’ i.e. a naive, utopian belief in a future where human beings are governed by reason and science – as obvious a wish-fantasy as anything Freud attributes to believers.

3. Psychoanalysis and Faith: The Letters of Sigmund Freud and Oskar Pfister

Oskar Pfister was a Swiss pastor who was introduced to Freud’s writings by Jung in 1909. Freud and Pfister exchanged letters between 1909 and 1937.

Pfister – born in 1873, the same year Freud entered University – was the youngest of four sons of a Swiss pastor. His father died when Pfister was three and he was afflicted with a lifelong sense of loss and a search for love. After attending university he trained in theology and took charge of his first congregation in 1902. Repelled by the word-spinning of traditional theology Pfister looked for a more practical way of helping the souls in his charge. When Jung introduced him to Freud’s work in 1909 he became a convert and from that moment never wavered in his belief in the insights and usefulness of psychoanalysis, writing books on technique, pastoral care and pedagogy up to his death in 1956.

When Jung left Freud in 1913 and then the Swiss psychoanalysts rebelled against the founder, Pfister stayed loyal. But Pfister never wavered either from his Christian faith, and in the letters and in the two pamphlets, Future of an Illusion and Illusion of a Future Freud and Pfister carried out a private and public debate about psychoanalysis’s implications for religion. Only some of their correspondence has been published. In among a good deal of chat about books, congresses and the spread of the Psychoanalytic Movement there are exchanges on religion. Here are some highlights:

Pfister sends Freud an outline of how he treats adolescents. Freud says analysis consists in two stages: the release of tension and the sublimation of instinctual drives. To release tension in his patients is relatively easy and helped, Freud says, by their irreligion and by the analyst’s openness to sexuality. Freud says Pfister is lucky to have religion to help him with the second part of the process.

Freud: ‘In itself, psychoanalysis is neither religious nor non-religious but an impartial tool which both priest and layman can use in the service of the sufferer.’

Pfister says there’s little difference between them in views on sexual morality. The Reformation was, after all, an analysis of Catholic sexual repression, imperfectly carried through. Pfister sees himself now at the forefront of a further evangelical movement towards the liberation of love. He is working for better education, better social conditions, a healthier moral outlook.

Freud agrees with the description of himself as ‘a sexual protestant’.

Freud ironically asks why none of the pious discovered psychoanalysis, why was it left to a godless Jew? Pfister replies that he doesn’t regard Freud as a Jew at all, but in his emphasis on the healing power of love, says of Freud, ‘A truer Christian never was.’ Anna Freud interpreted this as Pfister’s inability to accept Freud’s militant atheism. But then, Anna would say that. You can read Pfister’s Illusion of a Future as a (persuasive) attempt to incorporate Freud into a Christian tradition of love.

Pfister quotes Plato to Freud: ‘The art of healing is knowledge of the body’s loves and he who is able to distinguish between the good and bad kinds, and is able to bring about a change, so that the body acquires one kind of love instead of the other, and is able to impart love to those in whom there is none is the best physicians.’

Freud perceptively points out that psychoanalysis can only catch on in Protestant countries. No surprise that its first foreign conquest was Protestant Switzerland, with son-of-a-pastor Jung and son-of-a-pastor Pfister. Whereas it had hardly made any headway in arch-Catholic Austria. Cf Protestant England where it caught on up to a point, and Puritan America, where it became wildly popular.

Pfister critiques The Future of an Illusion by saying it is too simplistic. If there are contradictions in the religious world-view, why doesn’t Freud refer to the many theologians who have attempted new syntheses?

‘Your substitute for religion is basically the idea of 18th century Enlightenment in proud modern guise.’

How awful if the aim of Freud’s therapy is to bring people into ‘the dreadful icy desolation’ of a godless stoicism. Pfister, by contrast, tries to bring people through therapy to a love of life, a life of love.

Freud replies by saying that he wrote Future of an Illusion as his own opinion; his personal views on religion form no essential part of psychoanalysis (shrewd politics here, from Freud). The book only really contains one argument: religion is a means of sublimating instinctual drives; it is wish-fulfilment.

Freud regards the icy waste of atheism as beyond the reach of most analysands; most will have to sublimate their needs into higher forms – art, religion etc. (Note the implication that Freud’s atheism is in some sense heroic, beyond the reach of most mortals).

Pfister suggests that Freud’s militant atheism is due to his having been brought up round arch-Catholics (not least his Catholic nurse, who terrified the infant Freud with visions of hell and was then sacked for theft, leaving him with an indelibly poor opinion of Catholics).

Pfister assures Freud that Freud’s great god Science is just as full of contradictions as Religion and, what’s worse, it’s continually changing. Moreover, look at the great minds who have been believers – a counterthrust to Freud who had said, ‘Look at the great minds who have been twisted and distorted by religious repression’.

Freud says his one big argument against religion is, ‘How the devil do you reconcile all that we experience and have to expect in this world with your assumption of a moral world order?’ It is a restatement of the age-old, single biggest objection to belief in a caring God, the so-called Problem of Pain. Freud writes:

I do not know if you have detected the secret link between the Lay Analysis and the Illusion. In the former I wish to protect analysis from the doctors and in the latter from the priests. I should like to hand it over to a profession which does not yet exist, a profession of lay curers of souls who need not be doctors and should not be priests.

Pfister replies that it’s wrong to forbid priests to practice psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis purifies and refines art, philosophy and religion.

Freud: The essence of religion is the pious illusion of a providence and a moral world order, which are in conflict with reason. It becomes clear that Freud’s Number One problem is with the idea of a divine Providence ruling over everything and ensuring its followers peace, health and happiness. For him, this simply does not exist and people who pretend it does are giving in to infantile wishes. Ethics are not based on an external world order but on the inescapable exigencies of human existence.

On receiving a copy of Civilisation and its Discontents Pfister says: Freud is a biological conservative, Pfister a biological progressive. In the biological theory of evolution Pfister sees a progression upwards. Pfister reads Freud’s concept of the Death Drive, Thanatos, as not an instinct but a slackening of the master life-force, Eros. Civilisation aspires upwards.

Freud thinks Mind is special. But, at the end of the day, it is only an infinitesimally small part of Nature. Would Nature really miss ‘Mind’ if it was snuffed out? Only if you argue that Mind is the point, the purpose of Nature i.e. that the world was created as a garden for mankind, either in Christian or Jewish or Muslim belief. Freud looks coldly at the evidence and thinks such a belief is childish.

Pfister tells Freud that just because the ego-ideal (i.e. the ‘conscience’) may be based on an introjection of parental demands doesn’t diminish its value. Just because Freud demonstrates how even the highest products of the mind develop from the basest instincts doesn’t invalidate those highest products – art, religion, morality – in their own terms.

Morality is vital to physical and psychological health. Immoralism leads to anarchy and unhappiness. Morality is a kind of mental hygiene; it seems designed to keep mankind well. Pfister tries to persuade Freud that he himself lives a deeply moral, kind and loving life, despite all his attempts to deny it.

Right to the end of their correspondence, Pfister and Freud seem to be talking at cross-purposes, arguing past each other.

Thoughts

The difference between the two thinkers is they start from different premises. Freud has the panoramic view and Pfister the humanistic. Freud’s imagination roams across all of human history and across all the modern world. Makes you suspect that there is something in the panoramic imagination which predisposes a person to finding the miserable and the wretched aspects of human existence.

On the other hand Pfister, starting from the wishes and desires of the individual, our need for love, our creativity and imagination, produces a far more optimistic world-view.

Maybe all people who view human beings sub specie aeternitatis – possibly the great majority of scholars and intellectuals – are drawn to a pessimistic view,  whereas particularists, people interested in the trials and triumphs of the individual, tend towards a more optimistic view of life. Take the striking example of Bruno Bettelheim who went through Auschwitz but retained a faith in the improvability of ‘the informed heart’.

4. A religious experience (1927)

This an exchange of letters between Freud and an American doctor in 1927.

In the autumn of 1927 G.S Viereck, a German-American journalist who had paid me a welcome visit, published an account of a conversation with me, in the course of which he mentioned my lack of religious faith and my indifference on the subject of survival after death. This ‘interview’ as it was called, was widely read and brought me, among others, the following letter from an American physician:

“… What struck me most was your answer to the question whether you believe in a survival of the personality after death. You are reported as having said: I give no thought to the matter. I am writing now to tell you of an experience that I had in the year I graduated at the university of X.

“One afternoon while I was passing through the dissecting room my attention was attracted to a sweet-faced dear old woman who was being carried to the dissecting-table. This sweet-faced woman made such an impression on me that a thought flashed up in my mind: There is no God; if there were a God he would not have allowed this dear old woman to be brought into the dissecting room.

“When I got home that afternoon the feeling I had had at the sight in the dissecting-room had determined me to discontinue going to church. The doctrines of Christianity had before this been the subject of doubts in my mind. While I was meditating on this matter a voice spoke to my soul that ‘I should consider the step I was about to take’. My spirit replied to this inner voice by saying, ‘If I knew of a certainty that Christianity was truth and the Bible was the Word of God, then I should accept it.’

“In the course of the next few days God made it clear to my soul that the Bible was His Word, that the teachings about Jesus Christ were true, and that Jesus was our only hope. After such a clear revelation I accepted the Bible as God’s Word and Jesus Christ as my personal Saviour. Since then God has revealed Himself to me by many infallible proofs. I beg you as a brother physician to give thought to this most important matter, and I can assure you, if you look into this subject with an open mind, God will reveal the truth to your soul, as He did to me and to multitudes of others.”

I sent a polite answer, saying that I was glad to hear that this experience had enabled him to retain his faith. As for myself, God had not done so much for me. He had never allowed me to hear an inner voice; and if, in view of my age, he did not make haste, it would not be my fault if I remained to the end of my life what I now was – an infidel Jew.

In the course of a friendly reply, my colleague gave me an assurance that being a Jew was not an obstacle in the pathway to true faith and proved this by several instances. His letter culminated in the information that prayers were being earnestly addressed to God that he might grant me faith to believe.

I am still awaiting the outcome of this intercession. In the meantime my colleague’s religious experience provides food for thought. It seems to me to demand some attempt at an interpretation based upon emotional motives; for his experience is puzzling in itself and is based on particularly bad logic. God, as we know, allows horrors to take place of a kind very different from the removal to a dissecting-room of the dead body of a pleasant-looking old woman. This has been true at all times and it must have been so while my American colleague was pursuing his studies. Nor, as a medical student, can he have been so sheltered from the world as to have known nothing of such evils. Why was it, then, that his indignation against God broke out precisely when he received this particular impression in the dissecting-room?

For anyone who is accustomed to regard men’s internal experiences and actions analytically the explanation is very obvious – so obvious that it actually crept into my recollections of the facts themselves. Once, when I was referring to my pious colleague’s letter in the course of a discussion, I spoke of his having written that the dead woman’s face had reminded him of his own mother. In fact these words were not in the letter, and a moment’s reflection will show that they could not possibly have been. But that is the explanation irresistibly forced on us by his affectionately phrased description of the ‘sweet-faced dear old woman’. Thus the weakness of judgement displayed by the young doctor is to be accounted for by the emotion roused in him by the memory of his mother. It is difficult to escape from the bad psychoanalytic habit of bringing forward as evidence details which also allow of more superficial explanations – and I am tempted to recall the fact that my colleague addressed me as a ‘brother-physician’.

We may suppose, therefore, that this was the way in which things happened. The sight of a woman’s dead body, naked or on the point of being stripped, reminded the young man of his mother. It roused in him a longing for his mother which sprang from his Oedipus Complex, and this was immediately completed by a feeling of indignation against his father. His ideas of ‘father’ and ‘God’ had not yet become widely separated; so that his desire to destroy his father could become conscious as doubt in the existence of God and could seek to justify itself in the eyes of reason as indignation about the ill-treatment of a mother-object. It is, of course, very natural for a child to regard what his father does to his mother in sexual intercourse as ill-treatment. The new impulse, which was displaced into the sphere of religion, was only a repetition of the Oedipus situation and consequently soon met with a similar fate. It succumbed to a powerful opposing current. During the actual conflict the level of displacement was not maintained: there is no mention of arguments in justification of God, nor are we told what the infallible signs were by which God proved his existence to the doubter. The conflict seems to have been unfolded in the form of a hallucinatory psychosis: inner voices were heard which uttered warnings against resistance to God. But the outcome of the struggle was displayed once again in the sphere of religion and it was of a kind predetermined by the outcome of the Oedipus complex: complete submission to the will of God the Father. The young man became a believer and accepted everything he had been taught since his childhood about God and Jesus Christ. He had had a religious experience and had undergone a conversion.

All of this is so straightforward that we wonder whether this case throws any light on the psychology of conversion in general. Our case does not contradict the views arrived at on the subject by modern research. The point it throws into relief is the manner in which the conversion was attached to a particular determining event, which caused the subject’s scepticism to flare up for a last time before being finally extinguished.

This is an excellent example of Freud’s technique of rewriting or over-writing other people’s experiences and beliefs in terms of his own theory. Some patients found and still find it liberating. Others have found it authoritarian and oppressive.


Credit

The history of the translation of Freud’s many works into English forms a complicated subject in its own right. Freud’s works quoted here were translated into English as part of The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, published throughout the 1950s and into the early 1960s. My quotes are taken from the versions which were included in the relevant volumes of the Pelican Freud Library, published in the 1980s. ‘The Future of an Illusion’ is in volume 12.

I read ‘The Illusion of a Future’ in The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, Volume 74, part 3 (1993), in a translation by Susan Abrams, as edited by Paul Roazen. I can’t remember where the short text ‘A religious experience’ comes from. I’ll add an update when I find the source.

Freud and religion reading list

  • Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905)
  • Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices (1907)
  • Totem and Taboo (1913)
  • On Transience (1915)
  • A Seventeenth Century Demonological Neurosis (1923)
  • The Future of An Illusion (1927)
  • Civilisation and Its Discontents (1930)
  • Group Psychology (1930)
  • Question of a Weltanschauung (1933)
  • Moses and Monotheism (1939)
  • Freud, A Life For Our Times by Peter Gay (1988)

More Freud reviews

On Transience by Sigmund Freud (1916)

Written during the Great War, this little essay is a useful outline of the psychology of atheism. Many adolescents, troubled by the world, realising for the first time the fact of their mortality, ask what’s the point of being alive? This short essay is by way of being Freud’s existentialist response.

Freud tells us he was out walking with a poet (not named in the piece but, in fact, the eminent Austrian poet Rainer Maria Rilke) who said: ‘Everything will die and pass away, what’s the point of even being alive?’ Freud, solid, sensible, stoic, replied: The brevity of life is all the more reason to value things, flowers, friends, works of art – to appreciate and value them properly while they’re here.

The proneness to decay of all that is beautiful and perfect can, as we know, give rise to two different impulses in the mind. The one leads to the aching despondency felt by the young poet, while the other leads to rebellion against the fact asserted. ‘No! It is impossible that all this loveliness of Nature and Art, of the world of our sensations and of the world outside, will really fade away into nothing. It would be too senseless and too presumptuous to believe it. Somehow or other this loveliness must be able to persist and to escape all the powers of destruction.’

But this demand for immortality is a product of our wishes too unmistakeable to lay claim to reality: what is painful may nonetheless be true. I could not see my way to dispute the transience of all things, nor could I insist upon an exception in favour of what is beautiful and perfect. But I did dispute the pessimistic poet’s view that the transience of what is beautiful involves any loss of its worth.

On the contrary, an increase! Transience value is scarcity value in time. Limitation in the possibility of an enjoyment raises the value of an enjoyment. It was incomprehensible, I declared, that the thought of the transience of beauty should interfere with our joy in it. As regards the beauty of Nature, each time it is destroyed by winter it comes again next year, so that in relation to the length of our lives it can in fact be regarded as eternal. The beauty of the human form and face vanish forever in the course of our own lives, but their evanescence only lends them a fresh charm. A flower which blossoms only for a single night does not seem to us on that account less lovely. Nor can I understand any better why the beauty and perfection of a work of art or of an intellectual achievement should lose its worth because of its temporal limitation.

A time may indeed come when the pictures and statues which we admire today will crumble to dust, or a race of men may follow us who no longer understand the works of our poets and thinkers, or a geological epoch may even arrive when all animate life upon the earth ceases; but since the value of all this beauty and perfection is determined only by its significance for our own emotional lives, it has no need to survive us and is therefore independent of absolute duration.

So: enjoyment of life is an act of the will, is a choice. Freud’s calm defence of enjoyment (not just of the body, but of the mind) looks back to the calm, sensible hedonism of Horace (Epistles) and anticipates the willed leap of faith into positive action taken by the existentialists.

For my money the best, the most practical and least politically compromised of those post-war European thinkers was Albert Camus. His early essay The Myth of Sisyphus (1939) starts from a meditation on suicide (‘What’s the point of living in a world without God or meaning?’) works its way round to affirming man’s rebellion against a world without God or meaning, and ends up by describing the physical, sensual pleasure of being alive, swimming and sunbathing and smoking by the sea and drinking wine and laughing with friends, sensations which were to be marvellously captured in many of his later novels and stories.


Credit

The history of the translations of Freud’s many works into English form a complicated subject in their own right. The very short essay ‘On Transience’ was first translated into English in 1957 as part of The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. My quote is from the version included in Volume 14 of the Pelican Freud Library, ‘Art and Literature’, published in 1985.

Related link

More Freud reviews

Why Seneca was wrong

In his ‘Letters to Lucilius’ Seneca expounds his version of Stoic philosophy. As I explain in my review of the letters, I think they consist more of a mix of moral exhortation and self-help advice than a fully worked-out ‘philosophy’. But on the occasions when he does set out to argue from first principles I find myself quite strongly disagreeing with just about every assertion and every argument Seneca makes. Letter 76 lays out the premises of Seneca’s philosophy with particular clarity (a ‘premise’ being defined as “a statement taken to be true and used as a basis for argument or reasoning”). From Letter 76 I extract the following sequence of assertions.

Seneca’s argument

Seneca says there is a God who made the universe and created man. Wrong.

Seneca says God planted a fragment of divine Reason in man. Wrong. No God, no divine Reason.

Seneca says every created thing has one particular merit or attribute which sets it apart – the fruit of the vine, the speed of the stag, the strong back of a pack animal, the hunting dog’s sense of smell and so on. The one distinctive attribute of human beings is Reason. Wrong:

a) This notion that every thing has just one peculiar merit is primitive and childish. Quite clearly all living organisms have multiple features and qualities. Study biology.

b) To say that the One Special Thing about humans is Reason is a wild underestimate of the numberless qualities which contribute to human survival and evolution. As one example, according to my son the biologist, humans can run for longer than any other animal, not a massively important attribute but a refutation of Seneca’s claim that there is just one thing which sets humans apart from other animals. Then there’s also the small factor of the opposable thumb, which gives us the ability to manipulate tools and develop the countless inventions and technologies we have devised – far more distinctive than ‘divine Reason’.

(As an indication of how malleable this argument is, I have just read in Tacitus’s Histories the stirring speech of Gaius Julius Civilis who tells his warriors that The One Distinctive Thing About Humans is Courage [Tacitus, Histories, book 4, chapter 17]. 1,900 years later, Jean-Paul Sartre would claim the One Distinctive Thing About Humans is our existentialist Freedom. It’s a parlour game. Anyone can join in. What do you think the One Distinctive Things About Human Beings is?)

c) Anyway, humans are emphatically not rational. Humans are wildly irrational. A book like Stuart Sutherland’s Irrationality, brings together a century of psychological study of how clumsily and irrationally all humans think, almost all the time, and demolishes the Rationalist argument forever.

d) The entire form of this argument is tendentious because it is clearly designed to justify what follows.

Seneca says all these animals are designed to ‘reach the goal of their nature’ i.e. they aspire to maximise the distinctive attribute given to them by God. Wrong. There is no God and this one, special attribute he claims for each species doesn’t exist. Seneca has invented it for the sake of his argument.

Seneca says that, seeing as man’s one special attribute is Reason, and that all beings find their greatest fulfilment when they maximise their one special attribute, it follows that man will be happiest and most fulfilled when he cultivates his Reason to the max.

Well:

a) It’s wrong to say that man’s one special attribute is ‘Reason’.

b) Humans are wildly irrational.

c) Since it doesn’t exist, this ‘Reason’ can’t be developed to the maximum.

d) If this notion of ‘Reason’ actually existed, surely all ‘philosophers’ would agree about it, whereas anyone who’s read a bit of philosophy immediately discovers that there are hundreds of ‘philosophies’ and philosophers who completely contradict each other.

e) Far from ‘philosophy’ making its practitioners calm and content, there’s plenty of evidence that some of the greatest philosophers were deeply unhappy individuals: characters as different as Nietzsche and Wittgenstein spring to mind. There is no evidence whatsoever that someone who practices ‘philosophy’ is more happy than the general run of the population.

(By this point it should be clear that although Seneca uses philosophical-sounding arguments to support his case, he isn’t really dealing in philosophy at all, but with lessons in mental resilience and moral uplift.)

Seneca goes on to say that when this ‘Reason’ is brought to ‘perfection’ through the study of ‘philosophy’, ‘this perfected reason is called virtue’ (Letter 76, section 10). This also is obviously wrong:

a) There is no such thing as ‘Reason’ with a capital R, instead:

i) Two and a half thousand years of philosophers can’t agree what ‘Reason’ is or how it works.

ii) According to psychologists like Sutherland, instead of One Universal Reason, humans use hundreds of different strategies for thinking and problem solving, which often overlap and contradict each other, hence the fact of the human world we actually live in which is quite obviously made up of endlessly conflicting opinions and plans.

b) What is this ‘virtue’? Seneca identifies ‘virtue’ with the perfection of human ‘Reason’ but, by now, we should be able to see that this is just playing with words, it’s like moving shiny counters around on a board game, it doesn’t relate to anything in the real world.

Seneca goes on to identify this maximised Reason with ‘virtue’ and ‘the good’ and ‘the honourable’. I appreciate that Seneca is engaging with the tradition of moral philosophy which is concerned with trying to define terms like ‘the good’, ‘honour’, ‘virtue’ but I believe that, mildly entertaining although these verbal games are, they have little or nothing to do with real people or the actual world we live in. Within the rules of the game called ‘moral philosophy’ these kinds of definitions and redefinitions may have meaning, but it is a niche activity with no impact on the real world.

Also, it often feels as if Seneca is using rhetorical tricks to prove that His Way is the Only Way to achieve these great goals i.e. it is less an open-ended enquiry designed to establish an objective truth than a tendentious distortion of arguments all designed to ‘prove’ a view of human nature and a way of life which he already subscribes to. It amounts to a wordy rationalisation of a personal lifestyle preference (to live a simple life and read books is best). And, quite obviously, most people do not want to live like this.

The counter-argument to Seneca

There is no God.

The universe came about in a big bang 13.7 billion years ago.

Certain laws and regularities emerge from the nature of the matter created by this cataclysm.

Stars form, galaxies form,  planets form around suns.

Conditions for life happened to occur on this planet as they probably have on countless others.

Primitive replicating structures come about as an inevitable product of chemistry, sunlight, energy.

As soon as even the most primitive replicating structures come about they are governed by evolution through natural selection, which dictates that some will be more effective than others, thus setting in train an endless process of diversity and selection.

Human beings are a random offshoot of mammals, themselves lucky to survive the last great extinction event 66 million years ago.

So there is no teleology or purpose or plan. Shit happens, whether it’s your valley flooding or a meteor hitting the earth, and some organisms survive to pass on their genes to their offspring.

Over vast distances of time – hundreds of millions of years – fast-breeding ever-evolving organisms have diverged to fill every available niche in countless different ecosystems across the planet, which themselves change and evolve all the time.

Modern archaeology shows that there is not one human race, but that over the past few hundred thousand years, many different forms of the genus Homo have sprung up, flourished for a time, then died out. Seneca and we happen to belong to the one branch or variety which happens to have survived. Others might have; we happened to. There was no God, providence or teleology involved.

To attribute this immensely long chain of chance and accident to the providence of some creator God is psychologically appealing but factually ludicrous. If there is a God behind it then he works so completely through accident and mass extinction as to be indistinguishable from randomness. His method is mass murder on an unimaginable scale.

Therefore humans do not possess some ‘divine Reason’ which can be cultivated to its maximum potential at which point it can grandly be called ‘virtue’. The exact opposite. Humans quite evidently employ hundreds, maybe thousands of different mental strategies, tricks and approaches to solve the problems thrown up by day-to-day existence, and struggle daily to implement our deep biological drives (to eat and drink, get shelter, find a mate, raise a new generation, find physical and psychological security) against the challenges of the hostile real world, leading to all kinds of florid, varied and unpredictable outcomes.

Summary

Seneca’s theistic rationalism looks for, and privileges, One Thing in every field: One God, One Human Race, One Reason, One Virtue, One Philosophy.

Although I can see the appeal of submitting to this One World point of view – I can see the comfort it brings to its adherents or even to modern readers who bathe in its simple-minded reassurance while they’re reading his text (and I can also see how so much of Stoicism was incorporated into the equally consoling and comforting One World Christian ideology) – nonetheless, I find it creepy, I detect in it authoritarian, even totalitarian tendencies. To genuinely believe that there is just One Way to Virtue which all people should submit themselves to…

And it also happens to be factually incorrect at every step.

By contrast, I believe in diversity, in manyness, in multitudes. In my worldview, humans have evolved over a very long period to possess incredibly complex mental and physical attributes, far too complex and multifaceted to encompass in one definition, in one ‘philosophy’, in one set of magic words like ‘Reason’, ‘good’ and ‘virtue’, even in words like ‘science’ or ‘biology’. The real world continually surprises us and overflows all human attempts at neat definitions, whether in philosophy, religion, science or any other system.

People are quite obviously capable of believing all kinds of things, struggle with all kinds of problems, use all manner of beliefs and faiths and rites and rituals and traditions and cultures to get them through their days and lives. All these belief systems and practices are themselves constantly evolving, added to, improved, fossilise, dumped, revived, you name it – with the result that human cultures are mind-bogglingly rich and diverse and many-sided – far too many to summarise or encapsulate in this prescriptive One World dogma.

Conclusion

Therefore it is my view that, although I can see why, narrowly appealing and comforting though Seneca’s teachings may appear at a first reading, they are nonetheless not only a) factually incorrect at every level, at every step or his argument, but b) derive from an incredibly narrow social caste (the Roman aristocracy) during an incredibly narrow moment in history (Nero’s tyranny).

Seneca’s letters are worth reading because they give a vivid insight into the mindset of a very clever man situated very close to a terrifyingly arbitrary tyrant and working out a philosophical tradition he inherited from Greek originators to fit his very specific (and very fraught) circumstances (hence the obsessive belief in suicide as an escape from tyranny which haunts his writings and, in the end, was his only way out).

Seneca circles around central Stoic beliefs, reviewing them from different angles in different contexts and this provides a very useful, panoramic view of this particular belief system – and a fascinating insight into a particular cultural moment.

And many of his recommendations – shorn of their theistical underpinning – are of value, at least to the kind of reader who is already predisposed to bookish aloofness. Advice such as: avoid the crowd, despise pleasure, cultivate the life of the mind, rise above the chaos of petty emotions and transient enjoyments – all this reads very well and flatters a certain kind of bookish reader who’s already like this and so temperamentally inclined to agree that these are world-shattering ‘truths’.

But then surely these precepts are taught by the high-minded in pretty much every major religion: surely this kind of advice can be found not only in the Christianity which incorporated so much of it, but in Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, Sikhism, Jainism, Shintoism and countless other religious traditions? Or expounded by high-minded secular humanists. Ignore the trashy entertainments of the masses, despise the vulgar trappings of wealth, be content with the simple life, concentrate on acquiring wisdom blah blah, standard rules of procedure for most high-minded traditions.

Widespread though his conclusions may be, because they speak to a certain character type which recurs across diverse cultures, and propose a type of psychological practice which clearly speaks to a certain type of person.

But to focus back on the specific arguments Seneca uses to justify and underpin his philosophy and the sequence of arguments which I summarised at the start of this post – I have explained why I believe why Seneca’s premises are factually incorrect and intellectually untenable from start to finish.


Related links

On the diversity of belief systems

Roman reviews

Moral letters by Seneca

What do you need to be a good man? Willpower.
(Letter 80, section 4)

Whatever you do, keep death in mind.
(Letter 114, section 27)

You must embed these thoughts deep in your heart, Lucilius.
(Letter 7, section 12)

Stoicism

The thing about Stoic philosophy is how wrong its premises are and how banal its teachings.

Stoics believed there is a God, that the universe or Nature is God, or God suffuses Nature. Human beings were created by God with a spark of Divine Reason within us. Our job is to clear away all the clutter of work, society, gossip, all relationships, friends and family, all the clamour which clogs up our lives, including all our own passions and emotions, love, anger and so on – in order to cultivate this fragment of the Divine Reason in each of is and, by doing so, bring our lives into alignment with the values of the universe/God. Then, by cultivating detachment from all earthly worries and passions, by strengthening our minds, we can prepare for the worst the world has to throw at us and defuse the ultimate terror, the fear of death.

That’s it. You can vary the wording and multiply the precepts with lots of specific examples (avoid gossip, avoid crowds, eat moderately, don’t get drunk, treat everyone with respect – ponder with the worst possible outcomes so nothing surprises you, analyse every situation with detachment), but it’s that simple and, after the initial novelty has worn off, that boring.

Seneca

The Roman author, tutor, Stoic philosopher, politician and immensely rich man, Lucius Annaeus Seneca (4 BC to 65 AD) is called Seneca the Younger because his father (54 BC to 39 AD) – author of a collection of reminiscences about the Roman schools of rhetoric (which survives) and a history of Roman affairs from the beginning of the Civil Wars until the last years of his life (which is lost) – had the exact same name, so is known as Seneca the Elder.

Seneca the Younger, much more famous than his father, is sometimes just referred to as Seneca.

Seneca wrote a prodigious amount; later critics said too much. E.F. Watling, in his Penguin edition of Seneca’s plays, says that his best-loved works are the letters he wrote to one specific friend, Lucilius. Seneca himself titled these the Epistulae Morales ad Lucilium (‘Moral Letters to Lucilius’), also known in English as the ‘Letters from a Stoic’. Seneca wrote this collection of 124 letters at the end of his life, from approximately 63 to 65 AD, after he had largely retired as tutor and adviser to the Emperor Nero, a post he’d held since 49 – sixteen years.

The letters are addressed to Lucilius Junior who was then procurator of Sicily and is known to posterity only through Seneca’s writings. (Seneca also dedicated his dialogue On Providence and his encyclopedic Natural Questions to this same Lucilius.)

Scholars fret about whether these were ‘real’ letters, and what the structure of correspondence was – did Seneca only respond to questions sent him by Lucilius? Where is Lucilius’s half of the correspondence? etc. But whether or not they were ever part of a ‘real’ correspondence, it is clear that Seneca wrote these letters with a wider readership in mind. They contain numerous carefully crafted passages obviously aimed at posterity and are structured so as to cover a wide range of subjects dear to Stoics. The 124 letters were published grouped together into 20 ‘books’.

Philosophy as therapy

The letters amount to a series of short moral lessons, designed to help Lucilius achieve the wisdom and peace of mind (‘a calm and correct state of mind,’ Letter 4) promised by Stoic doctrine. In order to do this the letters focus on the traditional themes of Stoic philosophy such as removing oneself from the crowd; cultivating a contempt of death; learning to endure the ups and downs of life; acknowledging virtue as the supreme good, and so on.

The key point which the translator of the Oxford University Press edition, Elaine Fantham, makes in her introduction, is that the letters do not amount to a systematic exposition of Stoicism. Almost the reverse. They are like a series of lessons on ad hoc, specific topics, often beginning with an everyday experience and then extracting from it an insight or type of behaviour which Seneca tells Lucilius he can adopt in order to improve himself. Each letter contains ‘a little bit of profit’ (5) – like instalments in a self-help correspondence course.

Seneca wrote the letters not to promote a complete finished system of thought: he wasn’t necessarily interested in extrapolating a comprehensive system. As Fantham says, Seneca put moral impact before intellectual debate. He ‘puts the ability to avoid fear and desire ahead of any intellectual expertise’ (note, page 298). Seneca gave the work a new type of name, Epistulae Morales, and wrote them with a moral purpose to promote moral behaviour.

Philosophy is not a skill shaped for popular appeal or for display; it does not consist of words but of deeds…it moulds and shapes the mind, arranges one’s life, controls one’s actions, points out what is to be done and what to be avoided. (16)

Thus Seneca instructs Lucilius not about this or that point of abstract philosophical doctrine – but over and over again tells him that he must repeat certain thoughts in order to put them into practice, to make them part of his everyday waking thoughts.

Only Philosophy will wake us up, it alone will shake off our heavy sleep, so dedicate yourself wholly to it. (53.8)

Possibly the most consistent lesson (repeated so many times it gets a little boring) is cultivating a ‘contempt’ for death. When death comes it is over; it is nothing. We need to live with the idea of our death all the time, to get accustomed to it, so as to eliminate all fear and anxiety about it:

  • Let us order our minds so that we wish for whatever circumstances demand, and especially let us think about our ends without sadness. We need to be prepared for death before we are prepared for life. (61.3)
  • The more men have accustomed themselves to hardship, the more easily they will endure it. (76.34)
  • Whatever has been long anticipated comes as a lighter blow. (78.29)
  • Everyone approaches a hazard to which he has long squared himself with more courage and resists harsh events by contemplating them in advance. (107.4)

This accustoming to death takes effort so we must ‘practice thinking this over each day’ (4.5) and ‘ensure that what is now an urge becomes a lasting disposition’ (17.6).

Virtue does not come to a mind unless it is trained and taught and brought to its highest condition by constant exercise. (90.46)

Repeat, practice, memorise. The letters are lessons in how to think, in how to live life in order to maximise calm and reason, mental or psychological exercises which must be learned through constant repetition.

  • You must persist and build up strength by constant diligence until what is now a good intention becomes a good state of mind. (16.1)
  • These are things we must learn, in fact learn by heart. (123.17)

In this respect, the OUP is a good edition because Fantham precedes every letter with a short summary of its main topics, of its time and place of composition, and how it relates to other letters on the same topic. This is extremely useful. (Mind you, the 1917 translation by Richard Mott Gummere which is available online has something the Fantham edition hasn’t, which is attributing each letter a title such as ‘On saving time’, ‘On discursiveness in reading’ and so on. I imagine these titles aren’t in the original but they are extremely useful in remembering at a glance which letter is about what.)

There is some background information about Roman society, but not as much as you’d hope for, certainly nothing like the chatty detail you get in Cicero’s wonderful letters (Seneca consciously distances himself from Cicero’s style and gossipy subject matter in letter 118).

Like all Roman writers, Seneca now and then cites famous Roman heroes or historical figures as examples of ‘virtue’ (notably Marcus Porcius Cato, who committed suicide in 46 BC, as the example of fortitude in the face of death; or Gaius Mucius Cordus who unflinchingly put his hand into a fire to prove his bravery).

There is a description of the lives of the super-rich at Baiae (51), a fascinating portrait of the conditions of slaves (47), a vivid comparison of the spartan bathhouses of old with their modern luxurious equivalents (86), a description of the grand retinues of foreign slaves rich people insist on travelling with (123), a description of viticulture and grafting techniques (86). Mostly, though, the letters are disappointing from a social history point of view. Philosophy is drab.

This Oxford University Press edition does not contain all of the letters – it contains 80 out of 124 (introduction p.xxxv) – but still claims to be the largest selection available in print.

Epistolary traditions

In a throwaway remark, Fantham indicates that there were two types of letter, two epistolary traditions: the philosophical letter of advice (pioneered by Epicurus, born 341 BC, and into which these letters fall) and chatty personal correspondence (Cicero, born 106 BC). [She doesn’t mention a third type which occurs to me, which is the crafted verse epistle as epitomised by Horace’s Letters or Ovid’s Black Sea Letters.]

The problem of suicide

A major stumbling block is Seneca’s worldview, the classical Roman worldview, which promotes suicide as a noble, honourable and virtuous response to all kinds of social humiliations, setbacks, not least the threats from tyrannical power.

It is a noble thing to die honourably, prudently and bravely. (77)

Part of the reason for cultivating a contempt for death, for having death continually in your thoughts, is so that, when the moment comes, it will feel like only a small additional step to fall on your sword or open your veins in a hot bath.

How many people death has been useful to, how many it frees from torture, poverty, laments, punishment, weariness. We are not in any man’s power when death is in our power. (91.21)

The historical model Seneca invokes repeatedly is Cato, who committed suicide in 46 BC two years into the civil war, when he was governor of Utica, a city in North Africa, as Julius Caesar’s army was closing in. Cato killed himself to deprive Caesar of the power of either executing him or (more likely) humiliatingly pardoning him, meaning he would ignominiously owe the rest of his existence to a tyrant.

Desiring neither option, Cato stabbed himself. In the event failed to kill himself, a doctor was called who patched up his stomach wound, gave him medicine, put him to bed. In the night Cato placed his fingers into the stomach wound, ripped it open, and proceeded to pull out his intestines until he died of shock. This is held up by Seneca as exemplary behaviour.

This makes sense within the long Roman tradition of preferring honourable suicide to dishonour, but it is just not a worldview any modern person shares and Cato is not a role model any modern person would wish to copy. Of course, this strand in Seneca’s writings is magnified by the fact that Seneca himself did something similar, committing suicide on the orders of the emperor Nero, his one-time pupil, in an exemplary fashion, calmly dictating notes about Stoic resilience as he bled to death in a hot bath.

Thus he has gone down as a hero of high-minded Stoicism but there are numerous objections to this notion. One is that plenty, thousands, of other Roman notables killed themselves over the centuries, famous examples being Anthony and Cleopatra, and they weren’t Stoic philosophers. So Seneca’s high-minded end wasn’t unique, far from it, it was a very common behaviour among the aristocratic class in the ancient world, and not only under the Empire but the Republic, too.

So a) it was far from being an act unique to ‘philosophers’ but b) it is obviously something very remote indeed from modern society. Sure, people still kill themselves. But not many people kill themselves at the command of an emperor, or to demonstrate their high-minded command over their destiny and a Stoic rising above the petty concerns of life and death. This whole worldview is so remote as to be science fiction.

There seems to me something perverse, almost creepy, about a philosophy which is constantly preparing its followers for death and for suicide. The words ‘death’ or ‘die’ recur on every page. I infinitely prefer Horace’s encouragement to enjoy life to the full while we can.

Come, let’s
Go to the cave of love
And look for music in a jollier key.
(Horace Odes, book 2, poem 1)

Themes in the letters

Despise death

We start to die from the day we are born. When we die there is nothing. There was nothing before life and there will be nothing after. So be not afraid.

  • What I am recommending to you is not just a remedy for this disease but for your whole life: despise death. (78.5)
  • First free yourself from the fear of death. (80.5)

Freedom

Despising death means we are free from the threats of tyrants or society. What is the worst they can do to us if we despise the worst, consider it nothing? Nothing can harm the calm and virtuous mind. By welcoming whatever will happen, it creates its own freedom no matter what the external circumstances. With typical extremity of metaphor or rhetoric, Seneca continually contrasts freedom, not with being bogged down or caught up or hampered by obligations – such as most of us encounter in real life – but with full-on hardcore Roman slavery:

  • You ask what is liberty? To be enslaved to no object, no necessity, no chances, to reduce Fortune to a level field. (51.9)
  • We must busy ourselves with our studies and the sources of wisdom…this is how we should rescue our mind from a most wretched enslavement and restore it to liberty. (104.16)
  • We have enslaved our spirit to pleasure whose indulgence is the beginning of all evils. (110.10)

Now it makes sense that Seneca uses as metaphor the slavery which was, arguably, the central fact of Roman life. But as with the way his mind, when he wants to imagine examples of adversity, leaps straight towards images of torture and execution, it’s another example of the extremity of metaphor and argument which underpins his ‘philosophy’ and makes so much of it feel so alien to the modern mind.

True friendship

Gauge a man before making him a friend. Be cautious, test out friends. But once someone is a friend, bind them to you, share everything with them. True friends share everything, including misfortune. Seneca says you have to learn to be a friend to yourself.

Avoid crowds

‘Shun whatever pleases the common herd’ (8). One iniquitous example can adversely affect you. A crowd presents all kinds of bad examples. People are emboldened to behave badly in crowds. So withdraw into yourself and study philosophy, but not so conspicuously as to draw attention or criticism. Don’t draw attention to your retirement and quietism. Quietly disappear.

Your body

A great and cautious man separates his mind from his body and spends the better part of his time with his better and divine part. (78.10)

Provide it only as much as needed to preserve good health. Avoid excess. Consume as much plain drink as required to quench thirst, as much plain food as to quench hunger, the minimum clothes to protect you from the elements, a house sufficient to protect you from the weather.

Devote some days to eating as little as possible. Become familiar with the bare minimum needed to keep alive and healthy (so that if exile to a bare rock or sudden incarceration befall you, your body is ready for much reduced circumstances).

Don’t exercise to excess. Do as much as needed to keep healthy. Reserve your energy for cultivating the mind.

As to physical pleasures, avoid them like the plague; they enslave the body and then the mind.

  • Uproot pleasures and treat them with absolute loathing. (51.13)
  • First of all we must reject pleasures; they make men weak and effeminate and demand too much time and effort. (104.34)

Your house

Your house should be a size and contain only as much as needed to protect you from the elements. Despise ornament and decoration.

Possessions

Have as few as possible. ‘No one is worthy of God unless he despises possessions.’ (18.13) Have them, but adopt a mindset where you could happily dispense with all of them, where they are all taken from you and you don’t care a jot, because you are secure in the untroubled citadel of your mind.

Enough

Don’t overdo it: don’t mortify your body, don’t insist on eating bread and water, living in a hut, neglecting your body, like the Cynics who, following Diogenes, set out to punish their bodies. Live comfortably and sensibly, just not to excess.

  • So correct yourself, take off your burdens and shrink your desires within a healthy limit. (104.20)

How to be content

And cultivate contentment by being happy with what you’ve got.

  • I will tell you how you can recognise the healthy man: he is content with himself. (72.7)
  • This is what philosophy will guarantee you, something which nothing surpasses: you will never be dissatisfied with yourself. (115.18)

Excess

Similar to his thoughts about suicide and anger, in that it sounds reasonable of Seneca to tell his follower not live to excess, but what Seneca has in mind is Roman excess, the off-the-scale lavishness and baroque luxury of the Roman emperors and the richest in the known world (as described in the letters from the fashionable resort of Baiae, 49, 51).

  • Too many amenities make the spirit effeminate…The stricter discipline of a simpler place strengthens the mind and makes it fit for great undertakings. (51.10-11)

The general point is not so much that indulgence is morally bad in itself: but that people enslave themselves by indulging the pleasures of the senses, deform their minds, make themselves into addicts, by coming to rely on excessive behaviour, on excessive drinking, excessive eating, excessive sex, excessive gambling.

It’s not so much that moderation is good in itself but that it stops you developing addictions and so becoming enslaved to them. Moderation leaves your mind free to focus on more important, ‘higher’ things. Moderation sets you free from all the snares of the senses.

That is why:

We ought to concentrate on escaping as far as possible from the provocations to vice. One’s mind must be hardened and dragged away from the enticements of pleasure. (51.5)

Anger

Quite apart from the letters, Seneca wrote no fewer than three treatises on anger. Fantham makes a really profound point about this which depends, again, on the profound difference between us and Roman society. This is that Roman emperors had complete power over all citizens, and all citizens had complete power over huge numbers of slaves. In this society an angry citizen could order his slave to be tortured or killed, just as an angry emperor could order anyone he fancied to be exiled, thrown into gaol, tortured or executed. Therefore controlling anger was much, much more important than it is in our society. Anger is not a good emotion with us but could have catastrophic consequences in Seneca’s world.

The mind

‘Nothing deserves admiration except the mind’ (9). The mind alone is worth cultivating. No other skills, activities, pastimes are worth cultivating.

  • Control your mind so as to bring it to perfection in the most calm condition, a mind which feels neither what is taken from it nor added to it, but keeps the same disposition however affairs turn out. (36.6)
  • A great and cautious man separates his mind from the body and spends much of his time with his better and divine part. (78.10)

Moral behaviour

Imagine the most moral, honourable person you can. Then imagine they are watching everything you say or do.

Fear, anxiety, stress

All these are caused by worry that the worst is going to happen. Well, imagine the worst has happened. Live with the worst, imaginatively – prepare yourself for the worst. Once you dispel anxiety about unnamed and exaggerated fears, you can get rid of the panic and examine the issue rationally, restoring order and calm to the mind, allowing Reason to operate unhampered by over emotions.

Philosophy

Philosophy, for Seneca, isn’t the working out of a complex system or ideology: it is a psychological or spiritual practice. It is an exercise to attain an attitude, cultivated with the sole aim of making its practitioner mentally strong and resilient against tyranny, suffering and death.

Philosophy is not a skill shaped for popular appeal or for display; it does not consist of words but of deeds. It is not taken up to make sure the day passes with some enjoyment, to take the boredom out of leisure; it moulds and shapes the mind, arranges one’s life, controls one’s actions, points out what is to be done or avoided; it is seated at the helm and steers the course of those adrift among treacherous shoals. Without it no man can live without fear or anxiety; countless things occur each hour that need the advice which we must seek from philosophy. (16.3)

Philosophy may include technical aspects such as types of argument and syllogism (which he consistently ridicules and dismisses for its pedantry) but, far more importantly, Seneca sees ‘philosophy’ as a kind of mental fortress, a psychological redoubt:

So withdraw into philosophy as far as you may; she will protect you in her bosom and in her shrine you will be safe. (103.4)

In doing so, it can raise us above the level of mere mortals:

This is what philosophy promises me, to make me equal to a god. (48.11)

Slavery

As you might expect Seneca admonishes Lucilius to treat his slaves as equals because they are as human as you or I:

Kindly remember that he whom you call your slave sprang from the same stock, is smiled upon by the same skies, and on equal terms with yourself breathes, lives, and dies. It is just as possible for you to see in him a free-born man as for him to see in you a slave. (47.10)

But, just as predictably, Seneca doesn’t actually recommend actually freeing them. (In his introduction to the Penguin Classics edition of Juvenal’s Satires, Peter Green says this attitude was typical of Stoics: ‘[Juvenal] attacked wanton cruelty to slaves, but did not query the concept of slavery itself (another characteristically Stoic attitude.)] Introduction, page 23)

Letter 47 is fascinating for giving an extended description of the types of functions slaves performed in an aristocratic household and the brutal punishments they were liable to for the slightest infraction.

(It is a secondary consideration that in the long letter 90, a detailed list of the technical achievements and innovations which make up civilisation, Seneca despises them all and considers all of them – agriculture and irrigation and milling grain to make bread and architecture and glass windows and all the rest of it – only worthy of slaves and freedmen [who, apparently, largely made up the artisan class of Rome] and so far beneath an aristocrat like himself and his friend Lucilius. Aristocrats needed to rise above these slave occupations in order to practice the only thing worthwhile activity for humans, to cultivate the mind, perfect reason, acquire wisdom, so as to rise above passions and fear of death. That is the primary aim of the letter, but in order to make the point what comes over is a contempt for the artisan class, for engineers and innovators and craftsmen, which makes me dislike Seneca even more. His assumption is that all the achievements of the thousands of people who had perfected all aspects of civilisation and raised it to the luxurious heights of his day only matter insofar as they allow him to perfect his wonderful mind. It’s a privileged narcissism which is, in its own arrogant way, every bit as corrupt as the decadent court of the arch-egotist Nero.)

Self-help slogans

The book is stacked with improving and inspiring thoughts of the kind which have become over-familiar in the subsequent 2,000 years, particularly the last 50 years or so of self-help books.

  • I think it is the first proof of a stable mind to be able to pause and spend time with oneself. (2.1)
  • The best measure of wealth is to have what is necessary and the next best, is to have enough. (2.5)
  • The man at ease should take action, and the man at action should take ease. (5)
  • Who is well born? The man well set up by nature for virtue…it is the spirit that makes one noble. (44.5)
  • Nature made us teachable and gave us an imperfect reason but one which can be perfected. (50.11)

Although Seneca’s long porridgey paragraphs have the heavy feel of ‘philosophy’, the quality of the argumentation is often weak and many of the actual injunctions feel more like daytime TV, self-help guru-talk than Hegel or Hume. Once or twice he came close to the banal catchphrase mocked in the old TV sitcom, Some Mothers Do Have ‘Em: ‘Every day, in every way, I’m getting better and better.’

I rejoice that you are studying with perseverance and abandoning all else for this one thing, to make yourself a better man each day. (5.1)

Critique

As with all philosophy, and especially ‘moral’ philosophy, there is no end to the debate, discussion, critique and commentary which the Letters from a Stoic have spawned over the past 2,000 years. A handful of themes struck me:

1. Simplistic values

The most obvious, for me, is the extreme difference in the social context between Seneca and us and in particular his concept of negative life events. For Seneca a bad turn of events is an ever-present threat under the tyranny of imperial rule. It is associated with prison, torture, enslavement and all the other dire possibilities of life under arbitrary Roman emperors such as Nero. Thus there is a misleading simplicity to most of his meditations. When he imagines something bad, it’s being thrown into prison or tortured or executed by the emperor. The conception of negative life events which he uses to underpin his entire Stoic system is disconcertingly simple and extreme – exile, torture, death – and so the mental lesson he is teaching is concomitantly simplistic: prepare your mind to be strong and noble under torture or the threat of death (see the harping on about torture and death in letters 67 and 70).

But not many modern readers of the letters are going to have the same concerns – that they will thrown into prison, tortured or forced to commit suicide at the whim of a Roman emperor. The worst things I can imagine happening to me are: being in a life-changing accident i.e. becoming wheelchair-bound or having a stroke; being diagnosed with a terminal or life-changing illness; something bad happening to my loved ones, especially my children. But my day-to-day worries are more humdrum, recalcitrant, fiddly, frustrating: worried about my performance at work, this or that bit of the house needs maintenance, I’m worried about money, about not being able to pay my bills – fuel bills, heating bills, food bills.

I know Stoic thought can be applied to these modern circumstances i.e. I should try to cultivate mental detachment and resilience so I am ready to face bad events and rise above them. But the extremity and the simpleness of the situations Seneca describes and which form the basis of his entire philosophy (arbitrary arrest, torture, execution) rarely if ever occur in modern Western life and so all his much-repeated lessons rarely if at all apply to me. Modern life is more complex and multi-faceted than Seneca’s philosophy allows.

Seneca’s ‘philosophy’ is worth reading as an extremely vivid insight into the mindset of the Stoic classes during the tyranny of Nero but is, in my opinion, of limited use or value to modern readers leading modern lives.

2. Hypocrisy

I’ve just read Tacitus’s Annals where Seneca is described as being one of the richest men in Rome, with mansions as big as Nero’s and gardens even bigger, hundreds of servants, immense wealth in gold and assets. (In fact Seneca’s extreme wealth became proverbial to later generations: Juvenal’s tenth satire describes how Seneca, ‘grown too wealthy’ lost his magnificent gardens.) So it’s pretty ironic, knowing the man was a byword for obscene wealth, to read Seneca’s continual recommendation of the plain, simple life, eschewing pleasure and cultivating virtue. It’s easy advice for the ridiculously rich to give. The hypocrisy is summed up by a character in John Marston’s 1603 play, The Malcontent, which Watling quotes:

Out upon him! He writ of temperance and fortitude, yet lived like a voluptuous epicure and died like an effeminate coward. (The Malcontent, Act 3, scene 1, line 28)

Not quite accurate (Seneca definitely did not die ‘like an effeminate coward’) but the first half, the epicure accusation, has force. This point was epitomised, for me, in a throwaway remark of Seneca’s in a letter which is intended to be about exercise and physical frailty:

I have just returned from my ride. I am just as tired as if I had walked as far as I have been sitting. It is an effort to be carried for a long time, and I rather think the effort is greater because riding is contrary to nature. (55.1)

It is an effort to be carried for a long time. (In a sedan chair, presumably.) Well, what about the slaves who were doing the carrying? Bet it was a bit of an effort for them, too. Seneca’s writings cannot escape from the taint of the astonishing level of privilege enjoyed by his class in general, and the extraordinarily privileged lifestyle enjoyed by him – according to Tacitus the richest man in Rome – in particular.

3. How Christians appropriated Stoic rhetoric

Many of the lessons Seneca spells out to Lucilius are very familiar from the long tradition of Western moralists, from Erasmus, through Montaigne, on into the Enlightenment and then diffused out into the broader culture by thousands of Victorian moralists.

My mum used to tell us kids, ‘Moderation in everything’. You don’t need to read Seneca to already know half of his nostrums and tags. I suggest that much of it seems so familiar because Stoic teachings were taken over wholesale by the early Christians and formed the basis of much Christian everyday morality. Obviously not the bits specific to Christian theology (the Fall, Original Sin, the Crucifixion, the Resurrection etc) but the fundamental theist worldview is often indistinguishable from Christianity:

  • No one is worthy of God unless he despises possessions. (18.13)
  • God is near you, he is with you, he is within you. (41.1)
  • What is enough for God is not too little for masters. (47.18)
  • The place which God occupies in this universe is the place which mind occupies in man. (65.24)
  • God comes to men. Indeed, what is actually nearer, he comes into men. No mind is good without God. (73.16)
  • Whatever is good for us our God and father placed at hand. (110.10)

My point is that in the advice about day-to-day living, the Christians appropriated Stoic teachings so completely that the advice to Lucilius to cultivate the mind, avoid the crowd and their superficial entertainments, practice virtue, despise the knocks of Fortune and cultivate a contempt for death – all these are the familiar background hum of Christian morality, the subjects of hundreds of thousands of Sunday sermons and public lectures, recycled on radio phone-ins and daytime TV and millions of self-help columns in magazines and newspapers and books. Which explains why when we moderns come to read Seneca we are so rarely surprised and so often find his nostrums familiar and reassuring.

4. Repetition

Above all, like any good teacher, he repeats the same key points again and again, in different formulations, approached from different angles, but coming back again and again to the same fundamental idea: rise above the fortuitous events of your life; rise above all emotions and attachments; cultivate ‘philosophy’, which means a Buddhist detachment from everyone else and even from yourself; live with the idea of death so continually that it eventually presents no fears. And then you will have conquered yourself, your fear of death and you will be…free.

  • I am forcing my mind to focus on itself and not be distracted by outside events…The real calm is when a good state of mind unfolds. (56.6)
  • The wise man is full of joy, cheerful and calm, undisturbed. He lives on equal terms with the gods…The wise man’s mind is like the universe beyond the moon: there it is always fine and calm. (59.14)
  • Abandon those distractions which men have rushed to enjoy; abandon riches, which are either a danger or a burden to their possessors; leave the pleasures of body and mind, which soften and weaken you; abandon ambition, which is a bloated, hollow and windy condition with no limit. (84.11)
  • There is only one way the dawn can come: if a man takes in this knowledge of things human and divine and does not just sprinkle it over himself but but steeps himself in it; if he goes over the same things repeatedly (110.8)

But repetition is not argumentation. Despite Seneca using the word ‘philosophy’ all the time, this isn’t really philosophy at all. It is, as I’ve said, more like exhortation to a good frame of mind, moral uplift, encouragement to develop a tough attitude, therapy for the anxious, a self-help manual. And incredibly repetitive.

Unvexed by terrors and uncorrupted by pleasures we shall dread neither death nor the gods. We shall know that death is not an evil and the gods do not exist for evil. What harms us is as weak as what is harmed; the best things lack the power to harm. What awaits us, if we ever emerge from these dregs to the sublime and lofty region, is peace of mind and liberty free from the errors which have been driven out. What does that liberty consist of? Not fearing men or gods; wanting neither what is base nor excessive; having the greatest power over oneself. It is an incalculable good to become one’s own master. (75.17-18)

5. Family and friends

In nearly 300 pages of relentless insistence that we rise above all attachments and emotions, nowhere does he mention family (in just one letter, 104, he mentions his wife, Paulina).

Family was a very big thing indeed for noble Romans, so it’s a striking absence in the context of Seneca’s own time. But regarded as instructions for modern readers, his insistence on boiling your life right down to a relentless focus on cultivating your virtue and your indifference to death completely ignores the scores of relationships most people have in their lives, starting with their family.

Most modern therapy involves getting to grip with your childhood experiences and your relationship with your parents. But parents, spouses or children are completely absent from Seneca’s teachings. His Stoicism is an impressively selfish concern, in which he endlessly exhorts Lucilius to forget about everyone but himself, to focus on his own mind and anxiety of death etc, to think about no-one but me me me.

This makes his ‘philosophy’ inapplicable, in practice, to anyone who has parents, partners or children and really cares for them, is involved in their day-to-day wellbeing and, especially when it comes to children, to their little triumphs or setbacks. None of that for Stoic Seneca. He is in his study toughening up his mind by envisaging torture in every detail so as to be able to rise above it, when the time comes.

But it struck me that this deliberate ignoring of family sheds light on and helps to explain the humanistic obsession with friendship. Seneca’s letters on the importance of having one, key soulmate-level friend are one of the sources for the obsession with friendship which is a central theme of humanist writings from the 15th century onwards.

Friends know that they have everything in common…the true friendship which neither hope nor fear nor self-interest can sever, the friendship with which men die and for which they die. (6.2)

It’s possible to interpret this obsession with Perfect friendship as the Stoic replacing the messy, uncontrollable web of family relationships, with all its unpredictable ups and downs, with One Relationship with One Special Friend. To use the modern buzzword, it’s a very controlling approach. When you read the great humanist works on this subject (Cicero, Montaigne, Bacon) what comes over is that you are only going to meet one or two soulmates in your life and that you will become identical in interests and affections with this one special person. In a science fiction kind of way, you and the True Friend of humanist tradition will become one person.

So, to put it crudely, humanist teaching about friendship a) is a way of ducking the uncontrollable mess of family ties and responsibilities and b) ends up with you looking in a mirror. Solipsistic narcissism.

Horace

As Roman ‘moralists’ go, I prefer Horace. He’s lighter, funnier, his affable tone is more persuasive, more inspiring for me, than Seneca’s dour and relentless lecturing. Seneca sounds like the tutor he was:

I hereby order you to be slow in speaking. (40.14)

Whereas Horace sounds like a friend offering gentle advice:

Try not to guess what lies in the future, but,
As Fortune deals days, enter them into your
Life’s book as windfalls, credit items,
Gratefully…
(Horace, Odes, book 1, poem 9)

Seneca thinks of himself as embattled – quick! time is short! the enemy is at the door! focus on the essentials!

  • I am being besieged right now…the enemy is at our backs…I need a heroic spirit (49.9)
  • Fortune is waging war with me but I will not do what she orders, I will not accept the yoke. (51.8)
  • A real man prefers his sleep to be broken by a bugle than a chorus. (51.12)

This sense of the world as a battlefield, a fight, a struggle against countless enemies all trying to seduce your God-given soul, was inherited by Christianity. It dominates the letters of St Paul who wrote the most influential letters in Christendom, and used rhetoric similar to Seneca when he urged his followers to ‘fight the good fight’ (First letter to Timothy).

To understand Paul, we must grasp that he is at war, with the angels of heaven at his back. The Acts of the Apostles is, at its base, a power-struggle between Christ and Satan, wrenching whole peoples away from Satan’s grasp. (Jesus Walk Bible Studies)

In contrast to this worldview of unrelenting embattled paranoia, Horace writes a letter to a friend inviting him to come round and try the new wine they’ve just bottled on his estate. There’ll be other friends there, and they’ll stay up late together laughing and joking. Seneca’s remedy for the fickleness of human existence is to be continually, constantly thinking about death all the time.

Give me courage to meet hardships; make me calm in the face of the unavoidable…Say to me when I lie down to sleep: ‘You may not wake again!’ And when I have waked: ‘You may not go to sleep again!’ Say to me when I go forth from my house: ‘You may not return!’ And when I return: ‘You may never go forth again!’

Well, you may win the lottery this weekend. You may run down the escalator and bump into the woman of your dreams. If you start speculating about things which may happen, the sky’s the limit. In which case – why focus only on the bad things which ‘may’ happen. Lovely things ‘may’ happen, too. Pondering Seneca’s use of the conditional to dwell only on the most extreme negative outcomes (torture, execution) makes the reader realise how much he is obsessed with the dark side of life, and so insists that we be brutally harsh with ourselves:

  • Cast out whatever desires are lacerating your heart and if they cannot be pulled out any other way then you must tear out your heart with them. In particular, uproot pleasures and treat them with absolute loathing. (51.13)
  • We believe pleasure is a moral failing…Pleasure is a shameful thing. (59.1-2)

What a stupid attitude. Horace has an equally frank acceptance of how time is limited and we are hurrying towards our deaths, but he draws the exact opposite conclusion, which is: carpe diem, enjoy the moment. Instead of considering yourself under siege from wicked temptations so that you have to harden your heart against all affection, think of life as a blessing, bless every moment it brings you, and savour the fleeting pleasures. Horace gets my vote.

Last word to Martial

Martial book 11, epigram 56, begins, in the translation by James Michie:

Because you glorify death, old Stoic,
Don’t expect me to admire you as heroic…

And ends ten lines later:

It’s easy to despise life when things go wrong;
The true hero endures much, and long.


Credit

Selected Letters of Seneca, translated and introduced by Elaine Fantham, was published as an Oxford University Press paperback in 2010. All quotes are from this edition.

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