Ulysses on the Liffey by Richard Ellmann (1972)

The book as image demands these glosses as registers of their meaning.
(Richard Ellmann justifying his high-level, abstract, structural analysis, page 60)

Almost everything is coupled.
(Ellmann’s habit of defining binaries and dichotomies on every page, p.72)

Joyce liked to work his prose into patterns as intricate and individualised as the initial letters in the Book of Kells.
(Pretty analogy if not, ultimately, very useful, p.73)

A quick reminder of the chapter numbers and names in James Joyce’s epic modernist novel, ‘Ulysses’. Pretty much all discussions of the book refer to them but note that none of the Greek chapter titles are indicated in the actual text of ‘Ulysses’; they were given by Joyce to early commentators who published them in books and articles about the novel, and have been used by critics and commentators, including me, ever since – but none of them actually appear in hard copies or online versions of the text, which only indicate the chapters with numbers.

Part 1. The Telemachiad or the odyssey of Telemachus

  1. Telemachus
  2. Nestor
  3. Proteus

Part 2. The Odyssey

  1. Calypso
  2. Lotus Eaters
  3. Hades
  4. Aeolus
  5. Lestrygonians
  6. Scylla and Charybdis
  7. Wandering Rocks
  8. Sirens
  9. Cyclops
  10. Nausicaa
  11. Oxen of the Sun
  12. Circe

Part 3. The Nostos or Return

  1. Eumaeus
  2. Ithaca
  3. Penelope

Ulysses on the Liffey

This is an old book, written in the late 1960s and early ’70s, before the deluge of modern critical theory transformed the discipline of literary criticism. Back then American scholar and academic Richard Ellman (1918 to 1987) was famous as the man who wrote the huge and definitive biography of James Joyce (published in 1959) which single-handedly transformed Joyce studies. And yet this book, published just 13 years later, is deeply disappointing. I wouldn’t recommend it. Read the Hugh Kenner primer about ‘Ulysses’, but don’t bother with this one.

This is because Ellmann goes very heavy indeed on the schemata, on the high-level diagrams of organs, and colours, and symbols and tones that Joyce drew up for the book – and to which Ellmann adds further levels and frameworks of his own. On every page he adds structural analyses, building platforms upon platforms – for example his suggestion in the first chapter that ‘Ulysses’ needs to be interpreted on four levels: literal, ethical aesthetic and anagogic.

The trouble with his relentless focus on the (pretty simple-minded) structures he finds everywhere in the book is that they continually take us away from the actual text and make us dwell in the bloodless world of tables and blueprints. This book not only reproduces the detailed schema which Joyce sent to the Italian critic Linati, it is punctuated by three schemas of Ellman’s own creation summarising the first, middle and final six chapters.

And they’re not one-page wonders, they’re very detailed, each one extending over six pages. Possibly they’re considered the USP and backbone of this volume, maybe this book exists not to help the reader read ‘Ulysses’ better but as a scholarly presentation of Ellmann’s structural and thematic theories but I found them unreadable. Like reading a PowerPoint presentation about ‘Midsummer Night’s Dream’. Buzzkill. Way to drain all the joy out of a subject.

His chapter on Molly Bloom is disappointing

But not only is Ellmann’s approach boring, it’s often disappointingly banal.

I read his chapter ‘Why Molly Bloom menstruates’ immediately after reading the Molly Bloom chapter of ‘Ulysses’ and was immensely disappointed. First he wastes time summarising the theories of William Empson and Edmund Wilson (from the 1930s) and then disappears off into more schemas. He tells us that, according to Joyce’s notes, in the previous chapter Leopold Bloom had headed off into Deep Night while Stephen headed for Alba, the dawn. Is this useful? Sort of, kind of, mildly interesting – but it doesn’t really illuminate your reading of the actual words.

He says that after the dry officialese of ‘Ithaca’, Molly’s soliloquy offers ‘a joyful efflorescence’. Except it doesn’t, does it? It’s a long rambling repetitive tissue of memories about neighbours and soldiers and relatives and boyfriends and shopping and childhood games and biscuits and lots of graphic sexual descriptions. Until the last page which, for sure, leads us up to the famous great lyrical climax. But it’s not an ‘efflorescence’ before that. It’s a rambling character sketch. Ellmann’s characterisation is, in my opinion, flat wrong.

Ellmann compares Molly to the Wife of Bath (p.163) and Moll Flanders (p.165), which struck me as bleeding obvious, but missed what to me is the even more obvious point that all three of these famous fictional women were created by men. What does that tell us? But Ellmann doesn’t notice.

He asserts that if Stephen represents genuine philosophy, and Bloom represents half-educated magazine philosophising, then Molly represents all flesh. But isn’t that a very patronising and (as usual) over-schematic way of thinking about her? Instead of considering what she actually says, Ellmann is more concerned to fit her into his high-level patterns and plans.

I couldn’t believe it when he writes:

Molly’s nature [is] so much more earthy, trivial, sexualised and lyrical than Aristotle’s or Hume’s… (p.163)

Er, yes. This isn’t in doubt, the question is what makes you want to compare Molly Bloom to Aristotle in the first place? I well understand that Stephen expounds Aristotelian ideas in ‘Proteus’ and ‘Scylla and Charybdis’ and that Molly, in her semi-literate physicality, could be said to embody anti-philosophy. This would make her having Stephen to stay and her fantasies of having sex with him a real meeting of opposites. But directly comparing Molly the character with Aristotle or Hume seems to me ludicrous.

Ellman’s endless thirst for binaries and dichotomies is typified when he says:

Basically she is earth to Bloom’s sun, modifying his light by her own movements. (p.166)

This may or may not be ‘true’ but I think it misses the point by being so abstract. It feels like any moment he’s going to tell us that men are from Mars and women are from Venus. Or, in Ellmannese:

The ‘Ithaca’ episode had offered a heliocentric view of Bloom, Molly offers a geocentric one, the two together forming the angle of parallax… (p.167)

I know that one of the guiding principles of ‘Ulysses’ is the notion of parallax which the dictionary defines as ‘the displacement or difference in the apparent position of an object viewed along two different lines of sight’ (basically seeing the same thing from two points of view) and I certainly know that Molly’s character can be described as ‘earthy’ – but I don’t really see why Bloom should be considered as especially ‘heliocentric’ and I don’t see that it helps my close reading of specific passages, or of the text as a whole.

I just don’t like thinking about ‘Ulysses’ like this. It seems pointless and boring to me. It takes us light years away from the actual text in all its wonderful detail and difficulty and comedy and makes the thing sound like a lecture in comparative religion or structuralist anthropology. But this dry colourless theoretical level is the only level Ellmann operates at.

Despite disliking it more and more as I read on, I persisted and here’s the best summary I can manage. I try to give credit where credit’s due for Ellmann’s insights and ideas.

Learnings, sort of

Threes Joyce liked threes, so Ellmann suggests that the chapters proceed in triads: three in the opening section, four sets of three in the middle, three in the final section. Each trio contains internal contrasts and Ellmann has his own schema to impose:

I shall propose that in every group of three chapters the first defers to space, the second has time in the ascendant, and the third blends (or expunges) the two. (p.19)

Thus:

  • chapter one (space) opens in the extremely solid tower, with plump Buck Mulligan, the serving of food, and looking out over the big sea
  • chapter two (time) opens with a history lesson and contains Stephen’s famous outburst about history being a nightmare from which he’s trying to awake. Within this chapter Ellmann divides time into two types, secular and spiritual time, Caesar’s and Christ’s
  • chapter three synthesises the first two as Stephen crackles his way through the bladderwrack testing Aristotelian reality by closing then reopening his eyes, to see if the world is still there. (Oddly enough, it is)

Layers As a freethinker Bloom is post-Christian. As a Christian convert, he is post-Judaic. As a Judeo-Christian he is post-Homeric. So his character represents historical layer upon layer.

Dedalus If you think about it, Dedalus is a bad name for the young male protagonist in this novel. Stephen Dedalus perfectly suits the character in ‘Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man’ because he is (like Saint Stephen) the ‘martyr’ of the new religion (in Joyce’s case, of the new literature) which, like the legendary Greek Daedelus, he has fathered, a labyrinth of artistic artifice. But in ‘Ulysses‘ Stephen is no longer a father (as Daedelus was father to Icarus), he is a son. If you think about it, there’s a real confusion here, which Joyce just outfaces and all his critics accept.

Loose fits Similarly, none of the many literary correspondences the text invokes – namely to the ‘Odyssey’ and ‘Hamlet’, with occasional nods to Dante’s ‘Divine Comedy’ and Goethe’s ‘Faust’ – fully fit.

  • In ‘The Odyssey’ Telemachus goes looking for his actual father but in the novel, Bloom is not Stephen’s father and Stephen isn’t consciously looking for him.
  • Hamlet is in mourning but for a dead father whose wife has quickly had sex with/married his uncle, whereas Stephen is in mourning for a dead mother, and there’s not a shred of unfaithfulness about either Simon or May Dedalus.
  • In chapter 4 Molly stands for Calypso, the sensual enchantress, and yet in chapter 18 the same Molly stands for the devoted wife Penelope. Not only that, but Penelope is famously chaste while Molly is famously promiscuous.

In other words, the classic literary texts hover in the background like ghostly amplifiers or underpinnings of the narrative, but they only loosely inform the main characters. To put it another way, Joyce plays fast and loose with all the correspondences, making them close when they can be, but quietly ignoring them altogether when they don’t fit.

Antisemitism Ellmann tells us that antisemitism is Joyce’s touchstone for ‘cravenheartedness’. I’ll second that. Both the Englishman Haines, the Unionist Deasy, and the Irish nationalist citizen are guilty of it. For me antisemitism is not only bigoted racism but, just as bad, it’s stupid. It indicates someone who can’t cope with the complexity of the modern world and so resorts to medieval simplifications.

Two types Haines represents a British empire reduced to having nightmares and shooting in the dark, combined with embarrassing sentimentalism about the locals i.e. the milkwoman, while Mulligan is flashily hollow, ‘Ireland’s gay betrayer’, betrayer of his own culture. They represent antitheses with Stephen in the middle.

Refuser At the Forty Foot bathing hole Stephen refuses to bathe with the other two. This is because he is the great refuser; he refused to kneel at his mother’s bedside, he has refused Roman Catholicism, he refused the suggestion of becoming a priest in ‘A Portrait’, he refuses the Italian music teacher’s kindly suggestion to become a professional singer, he refuses the Irish nationalism of the peasant student Davin and the drunken bigot the citizen. All leading up to the climactic moment in the brothel where he smashes the chandelier as he declares he will not serve. He is Mr No.

Just regarding the refusal to bathe, it’s noteworthy that Stephen is a hydrophobe. We are told he hasn’t had a bath for months. He must have stunk. It’s typical of Ellmann that he instantly spots the structural element of the Forty Foot rejection scene, neatly pointing out how Stephen’s refusing to pray and refusing to swim amount symbolise his rejecting spiritual and physical purification, but isn’t interested in its practical consequences (p.11).

Chapter 3. Proteus

Aristotle Joyce worshipped Aristotle. He thought him the greatest thinker who ever lived. What he chiefly liked was he was against Plato’s idealism.

What he liked about Aristotle was he had demoted Plato’s Ideas, had denied that universals could be detached from particulars, and in short had set himself against mysticism. (p.13)

Just as Joyce set himself against the Celtic Revival, the fairies and twilight and legends of Olde Irelande, against aestheticism and the yellow nineties, occultism and spiritualism. As dramatised in the confrontation with A.E. in the National Library in ‘Scylla and Charybdis’.

(I agree, which is why I try to stick as closely as possible to the actual text and narrative of the books I review. The further away you get, the more it becomes something else. So it’s ironic that Ellmann fully understands Joyce’s liking for Aristotle while himself demonstrating precisely the flight from the (messy, confusing) details of the text into (overneat and tidy) literary archetypes and symbols, which sound more like Plato and his timeless Forms.)

The now, the here This is the point of Stephen’s dismissal of William Blake’s followers (although he himself liked Blake and lectured on him) for wittering on about the void and eternity, whereas Stephen wants to concentrate on the exact present. Stephen thinks:

Through spaces smaller than red globules of man’s blood they creepycrawl after Blake’s buttocks into eternity of which this vegetable world is but a shadow. [Whereas we should] Hold to the now, the here, through which all future plunges to the past.

Crunching Hence Joyce is so careful to describe the sound of Stephen’s boots crunching through the bladderwrack on the beach and then tries to depict the sound of the waves with made-up words. ‘Ulysses’ is about these vivid sensual details. Almost all of which are overlooked in Ellmann’s quest for structures and schemas.

The Holy Office In his poem The Holy Office, Joyce mocks female coyness as much as male idealism because they are both denials of the mucky reality of love and sex – they are part of what Ellmann summarises in a powerful phrase as ‘the general self-deception’ and refusal to face reality. Joyce is about facing reality. People are not what you want them to be. The world is not what you want it to be. You are not what you want to be. Face it.

Ellmann says Joyce’s message is ‘Accept the universe’. It is what it is and ‘Ulysses’ is an encyclopedic transcription of its itness. This, of course, is highly debatable, because the book presents a polemically dirty, messy, squalid often very sordid view of human nature. Now wonder Virginia Woolf loathed it. For her it missed vast realms of beauty and art. My point is that Ellmann’s description of the book is not really adequate. Like many fans and commentators he takes Joyce’s own opinion of it at face value.

Caesuras Ellmann points out something I hadn’t noticed which is that most if not all the chapters have a break or caesura in the middle. I can see that in the ‘Nausicaa’ chapter (first half ladies’ romance, second half reverting to the initial style) but less so the others. In the first half of chapter 3 Ellmann says Stephen is thinking about creation, fathers, mothers, fertilisation and giving birth; but half-way through he changes the direction of his walk and this triggers a change in his thoughts, which become about death and decomposition, starting with the carcass of a dog he sees on the beach. So two parts: birth and death, growth and corruption. Maybe. But I’m suspicious of this because Ellmann quickly turns everything into binaries and opposites. And it feels so easy just throwing out these grand pairs of synonyms and antonyms: Expansion and collapse. Addition and subtraction. Creation and destruction. I could go on all night.

Pee Meanwhile, in the actual text, Stephen has a pee (‘Better get this job over quick’) then picks his nose: ‘He laid the dry snot picked from his nostril on a ledge of rock, carefully’. You can see how very aggressively non-spiritual, how aggressively, vulgarly materialistic this deliberately is.

More antitheses Ellmann spots that the chapter opens with Stephen reading (the signature of all things) and ends with him writing (a poem). The poem he wrote in ‘Portrait’ is a portrait of attraction (‘Lure of the fallen seraphim’), here it is a poem about death, and so of repulsion.

Rosevean Stephen looks over his ship and sees a ship, the Rosevean, but for Ellmann, this ship also:

seals the marriage of form and matter, of body and soul, of space and time, at which Aristotle officiated. (p.26)

Yes I know Joyce packed the book full of structures and correspondences, so no doubt the ship is part of his elaborate symbology because everything is, I’m not denying that. I’m just suggesting that Ellmann’s focus exclusively on these structures a) excludes the riot and fun of the language and b) often feels stretched and contrived.

Chapter 4. Calypso

Ellmann prioritises abstract over concrete Language is diffusive, fissiparous, uncontainable, whereas Ellmann continually locks everything down to really boring binaries. This chapter covers the introduction of Leopold Bloom in chapter 4 of ‘Ulysses’ and embarks on another set of binaries comparing him and Stephen. Father versus son. Married versus single. Intellectual versus middle-brow. Solipsist versus realist. Inbound versus outbound. I could go on for hours trotting out the same slightly interesting but ultimately tedious dichotomies. Stephen is edgy, Bloom is placid. Stephen is a loner while Bloom is convivial. Stephen gets drunk while Bloom stays sober. Bloom has a job while Stephen is unemployed. Stephen thinks about the soul, Bloom about the body (specially sex). Stephen ponders the nature of the Trinity; to Bloom, such questions are pointless. Stephen is haunted, Bloom is not. Stephen’s lost a mother, Bloom’s lost a father. I could go on…

These facts are not untrue, and they are sort of interesting, and it’s probably as well to know them but, in my opinion, they are just the starting point for engaging with the difficult and cornucopian text itself, whereas for Ellmann, stating these very obvious binaries and dichotomies is where he ends, is the end result.

Disembodied/embodied If Stephen in chapter 3 is a disembodied intellect, Bloom in chapter 4 is an aggressively embodied material man, what with buying and cooking and eating the pork kidney, admiring his wife’s plumpness, feeding the cat, going for a poo and so on.

Both In something like a joke, discussing the not perfect fit of Molly with either Calypso or Penelope, Ellmann cracks that:

Whenever confronted by a choice between two possible things to include, Joyce chose both. (p.34)

Bloomism Ellmann coins the term ‘bloomism’ which he defines as an effort to recall an important fact and getting it wrong. Like when Bloom thinks the elegy in a country churchyard was written by Wordsworth (rather than the correct author, Thomas Gray).

Reject/accept Stephen opens the novel with a series of rejections; Molly closes it with her famous acceptance, Yes.

Zionism versus beddism But Bloom is a rejecter too. In the butcher Moses Dlugacz’s he picks up a leaflet for Zionist settlement in Palestine and has a strangely negative image of it, triggered by vague ideas about the Dead Sea, of a barren volcanic ash land, ‘a barren land, bare waste’. Out in the street a wizened old hag crosses his path. All this dried-up deathness makes him want to hurry back to plump warm Molly in bed, ‘Warm beds; warm fullblooded life’ (p.51). Bed, warmth, life.

Chapter 6. Hades

Life and death The same fundamental (and pretty obvious) dichotomy between life and death underpins chapter 6, ‘Hades’, set in the funeral carriage going to Glasnevin Cemetery. Ellmann’s entry-level binaries make it all sound very boring, which it isn’t to actually read, not least because like most of the rest of the book, it’s full of gags and gossip and character studies. But Ellmann isn’t interested in any of that, misses out everything that makes ‘Ulysses’ fun to read, just cherrypicks the details which help his structural analyses and comparisons with Homer.

Chapter 7. Aeolus

Sufficient for the day is the newspaper thereof.

Three types of diffusion Ellmann usefully points out the schematic nature of the opening of chapter 7, ‘Aeolus’, describing three modes of diffusion: in quick succession we see 1) a fleet of trams setting out from their base in the heart of Dublin; 2) His Majesty’s mail cars setting out from the post office; 3) and draymen rolling barrels of stout to be loaded onto carts and distributed to the city’s pubs. Ellmann neatly summarises these as exemplars of 1) physical, 2) written and (insofar as booze loosens tongues) 3) oral communication – appropriate for a chapter referencing the Greek god of wind’s far-reaching influence, and its modern incarnation in the power of the press.

Keys… Ellmann embarks on the idea that Bloom and Stephen (who both appear in this chapter, separately visiting the newspaper office of the Evening Telegraph) are in some sense seeking the keys which will unlock the city. I’ve no idea what he means and it only becomes more obscure when he goes on to suggest that they themselves are the keys which unlock the gates to Dante’s purgatory, with the claim that these central, post-hell chapters, are purgatorial.

and Keyes The keys theme is more obvious in Bloom’s mission to get an ad into the newspaper for The House of Keyes, owned by Alexander Keyes (‘tea, wine and spirit merchant’) who’s devised his own logo. Ellmann acutely points out that both Bloom and Stephen are keyless, Stephen having had the key to the Martello tower taken off him by Mulligan, and Bloom (though he doesn’t know it yet) will find out in penultimate chapter, ‘Ithaca’, that he’s left his front door keys in his other pair of trousers. And in the closing portion of the chapter the newspaper editor Crawford turns out to have mislaid the keys to his office. OK. We have to be key-sensitive.

Three speeches Ellmann points out that, in line with the theme of windy communication, the ‘Aeolus’ chapter contains three speeches which can be compared and contrasted. Less understandable is his claim that the speeches represent ‘three sorties’ ‘sent out’ by the city of Dublin ‘against’ Bloom and Stephen. Ellmann claims that in these central chapters the two men are ‘in league against the powers of this world and the next’, albeit ‘unconsciously’. This high-level interpretation may or may not ring your bell. I found his focus on the specific speeches more useful.

1. Bloom enters the office as Ned Lambert is reading out an amazingly flowery speech given by Dawson, a baker, to the city council about the importance of Ireland’s forests, as reported in the paper and mockingly read out by Lambert. This speech is deliberative.

2. The speech of the barrister Seymour Bush in the Childs murder case, which is praised in the newspaper office by the lawyer J.J. O’Molloy. This speech is forensic.

3. A speech given in 1903 by John F. Taylor in defence of the Irish language revival and published as a pamphlet, declaimed by Professor MacHugh in the newspaper office (not without interruptions). This speech is a public oration.

This is all true, but it’s also important and funny that Simon Dedalus comments on the first speech:

—Agonising Christ, wouldn’t it give you a heartburn on your arse?

And begs Ned to stop reading it:

Shite and onions! That’ll do, Ned. Life is too short.

The structures are no doubt there, and noticing them is part of the pleasure. But so is the texture of the prose.

Wind Types of wind are referenced throughout, as when Bloom thinks about how newspapermen change jobs.

Funny the way those newspaper men veer about when they get wind of a new opening. Weathercocks. Hot and cold in the same breath. Wouldn’t know which to believe. One story good till you hear the next. Go for one another baldheaded in the papers and then all blows over.

Or Professor MacHugh calls Dawson an ‘inflated windbag’.

The tissues rustled up in the draught, floated softly in the air blue scrawls and under the table came to earth.
—It wasn’t me, sir. It was the big fellow shoved me, sir.
—Throw him out and shut the door, the editor said. There’s a hurricane blowing.

The highfalutin proverbial description for poetic inspiration, ‘the divine afflatus’, simply means breath, wind. And one of Homer’s stock descriptions for Troy is ‘windy Troy’. In other words, as with so much Joyce, once you’re tipped off to start looking for a particular theme, you find more and more of it hidden in plain sight.

Lungs One interesting thing Ellmann says is that the organ Joyce himself assigned to ‘Aeolus’ in his schema was the lungs and this explains why so many phrases are paired and follow the rhythm of breathing, in and out, in a process of ‘pulmonary give and take’. Doors open and close, people enter and leave (although you could say the same of every play ever written).

The door of Ruttledge’s office whispered: ee: cree. They always build one door opposite another for the wind to. Way in. Way out.

Caesura Ellmann identifies the caesura in this chapter as coming when the three speeches have been discussed, and Stephen proposes that everyone shifts location to the nearest pub, Mooney’s – so they severally exit the office and make their way confusedly down the stairs and into the street.

Nelson On this walk to the pub Stephen tells the Professor his rather stupid story about two old ladies who buy some fruit and go on a holiday excursion to the top of Nelson’s column where, puffed out, they eat fresh plums, spit the pips out through the railings, and look up at ‘the one-handled adulterer’.

Mockery There are two ideas at work here. 1) The characters have just heard detailed descriptions of three types of grand Irish speech; Stephen’s story is intended to deflate all three and mock all grand rhetoric. 2) More specifically, the Taylor speech contained a description of Moses climbing to the top of Mount Sinai. Stephen’s story is a parody and a mockery in that, instead of Moses, it’s two old biddies who are granted a ‘vision’ out over ‘the unpromised land’ of Ireland.

Clever, very, but no matter how many times I’ve had this story explained, I’ve never found it funny.

Pretentious It sometimes feels as if Ellmann’s writing becomes steadily more pretentious as he has steadily less to say:

Here in ‘Aeolus’ Joyce is less threnodic though equally clamant. (p.65)

The episode proceeds by magnification and parvification. (p.71)

By the latter he means that certain figures (Taylor, Moses) are bigged up in the first half of the chapter and then satirised in the second. Ellmann finds the same pattern in the famous newspaper headlines which litter the chapter, which start out genuinely impressive but become steadily diminished. Here’s on from the start of the chapter:

IN THE HEART OF THE HIBERNIAN METROPOLIS

Whereas see how an example from towards the end of the chapter has become longer but cruder:

SOPHIST WALLOPS HAUGHTY HELEN SQUARE ON PROBOSCIS. SPARTANS GNASH MOLARS. ITHACANS VOW PEN IS CHAMP.

Chapter 8. Lestrygonians

This is the very worst hour of the day. Vitality. Dull, gloomy: hate this hour. Feel as if I had been eaten and spewed.
(Bloom’s internal monologue)

‘Lestrygonians’ is all about food and is packed to the hilt with food references, similes and metaphors. Bloom feeling hungry, seeing people eating in the street, fantasising about food, looking into Burton’s restaurant which is so packed with diners he backs out and instead drops into Davy Byrne’s pub for a cheese sandwich.

Church versus state Ellmann spots one of the book’s recurring binaries at the start, between State and Church. If you recall, this is encoded in the very first sentence of the book which starts with the word state and ends with a cross.

Stately, plump Buck Mulligan came from the stairhead, bearing a bowl of lather on which a mirror and a razor lay crossed.

Similarly, here at the start of ‘Lestrygonians’ Bloom 1) sees ‘A sugarsticky girl shovelling scoopfuls of creams for a christian brother’ and then 2) notices a lozenge and comfit manufacturer to His Majesty the King, and imagines King Edward VII sitting on his throne sucking boiled sweets. Christian / king. Church / state.

Up and down Quickly Ellmann is quick to find in this chapter the kinds of binary opposition he loves. Bloom’s thoughts always start on the ground, Stephen’s in the air. Stephen is racked with guilt, which is a sort of intellectual bad feeling; Bloom’s more earthy equivalent is disgust.

Comparisons Meaning is generated by a whole series of binary contrasts:

  • Molly versus Josie Bloom bumps into Mrs (Josie) Breen. She was at one point Bloom’s girlfriend but Molly won him off her. She has aged badly compared to Molly.
  • Josie versus Denis Breen This is because she married a man with severe mental problems, Breen, who she tells Bloom received an obscure insulting postcard reading U.P. up this morning.
  • Two madmen: Breen cf Cashel Boyle O’Connor Fitzmaurice Tisdall Farrell.
  • Mina Purefoy versus Molly Josie tells Bloom Mina Purefoy is having a terrible time giving birth at the maternity hospital; Bloom compares this with Molly’s easy deliveries.
  • Large versus small families Bloom sees poverty-stricken Dilly Dedalus and marvels that May Dedalus bore 15 children, Mina is bearing her ninth, while Molly only had two.
  • Sandwich men versus blind Bloom sees the five men wearing sandwich boards spelling HELYS pass by, but has to help the blind stripling across the road.
  • A.E. and Lizzy Up behind walk the noted Dublin poet and mystic A.E. accompanied by a lady poet. Bloom can’t help despising their airy-fairy artiness, the opposite of his own earthiness.
  • Meat versus vegetarian A.E. and lady friend have just exited a vegetarian restaurant while Bloom’s thoughts are stuck on all types of meat, butchery and cooking.
  • Molly versus Martha Molly is obviously a real woman of flesh and blood, versus Martha Clifford who only exists in her rather pathetic letters.
  • Fertility versus disease For a bad moment Bloom panics that Blazes Boylan may give Molly a venereal disease – their diseased and infertile sexual act contrasts strongly with the ‘healthy’ philoprogenitive sex of May Dedalus and Mina Purefoy.
  • Love versus sex Contrasted with the implied animality of Boylan tupping Molly, Bloom has a lyrical memory of their tender first kissing and touching on Howth Hill (the scene which Molly will vividly remember at the end of her soliloquy in chapter 18).

In the same spirit, Ellmann neatly points out that Boylan is as thoughtlessly sensual as the men stuffing their faces in Burton’s restaurant, because womanising is like gourmandising, both are about objectifying and consuming inanimate objects. Whereas love, which is what Bloom has for Molly, animates its object, brings it to life.

Chapter 9. Scylla and Charybdis

The aesthetic debate In this chapter Stephen Dedalus tries and fails to make an impression on representatives of Dublin’s literary elite by making an informal presentation of his theory about Shakespeare’s Hamlet to the (real-life) author and mystic A.E., and author, editor and librarian John Eglinton. From his materialist Aristotelian point of view, Stephen seeks to refute the kind of gassy aesthetic idealism which places Shakespeare among the gods or says he’s great because he embodies spiritual ideals. A.E. expresses this high-minded aesthetic thus:

—Art has to reveal to us ideas, formless spiritual essences. The supreme question about a work of art is out of how deep a life does it spring… The deepest poetry of Shelley, the words of Hamlet bring our minds into contact with the eternal wisdom, Plato’s world of ideas.

Stephen refutes this with a thumping return to earth, insisting that what powers the great plays is Shakespeare’s life, his biography. Thus he thinks ‘Hamlet’ is so much more than another Jacobean tragedy because it is powered by Shakespeare’s rage and humiliation at being cuckolded, that one of his brothers had an affair with his older wife, Anne Hathaway, who he abandoned back in Stratford for twenty long years while he made his career in London (the length of time that Odysseus was absent from Ithaca).

Ellmann the biographer Now Ellmann was, of course, himself a famous biographer, having written monumental biographies of Joyce and Oscar Wilde. In a chapter about biographies, then, Ellmann can be forgiven for letting down his schematic guard for a moment and sharing some biographical facts about Joyce. These are that Joyce himself delivered a set of no fewer than 13 public lectures, in 1912 to ’13, solely on the subject of Shakespeare’s ‘Hamlet’. In addition, we know he had read the recent biographies of Shakespeare by Dowden, Lee, Harris and Wilde, as well as following the latest scholarship about newly discovered manuscripts. Sort of interesting to know, but then what…? If anything, the fact that Joyce did so much reading about Shakespeare makes the thinness of his presentation in the Library scene all the more disappointing.

Caesura Remember how Ellmann thinks every chapter is divided in two by a caesura? In this chapter he neatly suggests the caesura is marked by the arrival of Buck Mulligan halfway through Stephen’s presentation.

Mulligan mocks Up to this point in the narrative, there’d been an easy binary, between the young materialist Stephen set against the high-minded idealist, old A.E. Mulligan’s arrival introduces a third element because he is as irreverent as Stephen, he is as much a materialist as Stephen, but unlike Stephen he doesn’t care about the subject. Mulligan immediately jumps to the sexual interpretation of everyone, including Bloom who he later implies is gay – but done in a frivolous, superficial crowd-pleasing way.

Stephen’s theory is serious and hard-won, but Mulligan merely exaggerates and mocks it for effect, producing with a flourish a parody he’s written named ‘Everyman His Own Wife or A Honeymoon in the Hand (a national immorality in three orgasms)’ in which the artistic productivity of Stephen’s theory is reduced to a crude farce about masturbation.

Envy So Stephen is furious when it is Mulligan who is invited to a literary soirée at the author George Moore’s house that evening.

As Ellmann puts it, for A.E. the things of this world are illusory; for Mulligan they are inconsequential; only for Stephen are they real, as he repeatedly tells himself throughout the book.

Vico I’m translating this into my own phraseology, which I continually try to make comprehensible and practical. Not so Ellmann, who is ever-ready to rope in not only Homer and Shakespeare, Aristotle and Hume, Dante and Goethe but, in this instance, the Italian philosopher, rhetorician, historian and jurist, Giambattista Vico (1668 to 1744).

Stephen is propounding here not subjectivism, but Vico’s notion that the human world is made by man, and that we can only encounter it in what is already implicit in ourselves. Put another way, Shakespeare’s plays are a record of what was possible for him, and so are his experiences. Life coexists with art as a representation of self. (p.84)

Is that helpful to you? We know that Joyce read and admired Vico for his huge vision of the eternal recurrence of human history but:

  1. it’s not true
  2. Ellmann’s summary of it isn’t very useful (‘the human world is made by man’, duh, who did you think the human world was made by, dolphins?)
  3. it’s a foolishly simplified summary of Shakespeare’s plays to say they were ‘a record of what was possible for him’ – what does that even mean? but mostly it’s hugely misleading and grossly simplistic, they were based on all kinds of sources and written for a complex and fast-changing market

Ellmann’s discussion leads up to a pithy and meaningless summary: ‘Life coexists with art as a representation of self.’ What does that mean? It might just about mean something, but it’s barely worth knowing, is it?

Ellmann then goes on to a series of grand statements about Art which are so witless they made me really cross. Like most literary critics he is obsessed with sex, and suggests that Joyce solves the Scylla and Charybdis problem (what problem?) by having the two monsters have sex with each other. This is because:

The sexual act is the essential act of artistic as of natural creation.

Is it?

This act has to occur within the artist’s brain so that he is mother as well as father of the issuing word. Shakespeare, has, therefore, like all artists, a double nature, is like Bloom, a womanly man, is victim as well as victimiser… God himself must be both father and mother to Christ in the same way. In short, the artist, combining both parents in himself, is an androgyne. (p.86)

Does God have to be both mother and father to Christ? Does the artist have to combine both parents and become an androgyne? Why am I reading this pretentious guff? Was Bach an androgyne? Constable? Van Gogh? It leads into a small orgy of Ellmann’s favourite trope, the dichotomy.

In this two-backed beast are united the various symbols of maleness and femaleness in this episode – ashplant and hat, flag and pit, Prospero’s buried staff and drowned book, and also the categories of space and time… the present and the possible, the now-here and the there-then, Stratford and London, Dublin and Paris, land and sea. (p.87)

Remember how I summarised Ellmann’s claim that it is A.E. and Mulligan who are the real opposites here, well Ellmann takes this to extremes:

Mulligan mocks his ‘conception’ by saying that he is himself his own father, and by offering to parturiate. He also offers his own play, an anti-Hamlet, in which he says his hero is his own wife. Instead of being androgynous, like the true artist, he is only masturbatory, like the false artist…

‘Masturbatory, like the false artist…’ Is there such an easily knowable thing as ‘the false artist’? But there’s more:

Mulligan is all penis while A.E. is all vagina. (p.87)

If you think it helps you understand ‘Ulysses’ to know that ‘Mulligan is all penis while A.E. is all vagina’, then this is the book for you, as it overflows with such high-level and often preposterous generalisations. But I’m more tempted to say, with Simon Dedalus:

—Shite and onions! That’ll do, Dick. Life is too short.

Chapter 10. Wandering rocks

Ellmann is on fire now. At the end of the previous chapter, Stephen emerged into the open air and saw two plumes of smoke mounting heavenward which Ellmann thinks represent Stephen and Bloom. Remember how The Artist (apparently) has to combine both parents in himself? Well, Ellmann now tells us that The Artist also has to fuse with God:

God the creator has fused with man the creator, both androgynous, ostlers and butchers, Iagos and Othellos, both producing, by intercourse of contraries, life from death, generation from corruption, art from dialectic. (p.89)

Of course it has to be an intercourse of contraries as this is more or less the only mental structure Ellmann seems to know. Anyway, all that came at the end of the preceding chapter; at the start of this chapter Ellmann continues in the same high mystical vein, summarising Stephen’s aesthetic thus:

The true parents of the artist are less his real father and mother, who engender his body, than a ghostly pair who, in the spiritual womb of mankind, husband and wive to form the soul.

Put another way [a favourite phrase of Ellmann’s] male and female elements – world without world and world within, agent and reagent – copulate to form by spirit from what once was flesh the word which is fleshed spirit. (p.90)

‘The spiritual womb of mankind’ eh? If, like me, you don’t believe there is a God or a spirit or a soul let alone a ‘spiritual womb of mankind’, then although you have to concede that these words have a kind of gestural, ghostly or psychological meaning (because words always have some meaning) you can be fairly certain they bear no relation to anything in the real world.

Compare and contrast Ellmann’s high diction with just one random sentence from the concrete reality of the text itself.

Blazes Boylan walked here and there in new tan shoes about the fruitsmelling shop, lifting fruits, young juicy crinkled and plump red tomatoes, sniffing smells.

That is more immediate and compelling, more inventive and interesting, more revealing of ‘Ulysses” concerns and processes, than anything in Ellmann’s entire book.

The labyrinth of doubt

But Ellmann soldiers on. In chapter 10, he suggests that in order to be tested, his theory of copulating androgynes must enter ‘the labyrinth of doubt’.

Now I have to concede that Joyce himself very much did deal with this level of abstraction. He was the first to create complex schemas for the novel, in which he attributed to each chapter a presiding subject, tone, organ, colour and so on. In the Linati scheme he actually states that the meaning of chapter 10 is ‘the hostile environment’, so Ellmann is not wrong to pick up on these themes and ideas and to address them systematically.

What I object to is I think he develops them in a particularly fruitless way, travelling further and further from the complexity (and the humour and Irishness) of the text, and deeper into an academic fantasyland, into a mode of discourse where he increasingly relies on big names (Blake, Milton, Goethe, Shakespeare, Homer) in formulations which sound more like they’re devised to impress American college students doing Great Works of Western Literature 101 courses. A lot of the time Ellmann’s theories feel only vestigially attached to the actual text of ‘Ulysses’ the book.

In my opinion, Joyce needed his elaborate schemas in order to create his text; they are quite literally foundations and scaffolds and frameworks upon which he built the multistorey palace of the final text; they were the matrix within which to create evermore complex systems of images, comparisons, metaphors and so on which he packed into every chapter. You only have to notice the scores of words describing different types of wind in ‘Aeolus’ or of food in ‘Lestrygonians’ to see this. But in my reading, these elaborate schemas were an aid to composition not necessarily to understanding.

It is necessary to understanding the book to know that each chapter is based on an episode from Homer, and that each chapter focuses on a particular theme, often accompanied by keywords and images and, in the later chapters, all cast in an appropriate mode or format. And it is fairly important to understand Stephen’s commitment to Aristotelian materialism against Plato’s forms, so that you understand the debate taking place in chapters 3 and 9. But you don’t need to know much more than that. No-one needs to know that:

male and female elements – world without world and world within, agent and reagent – copulate to form by spirit from what once was flesh the word which is fleshed spirit.

That is just Ellmann taking elements from the text and taking them to rarefied and esoteric heights – quite impressive as a virtuoso performance in literary criticism of a certain flashy type, but pretty much irrelevant to an actual reading of the actual novel.

Joyce is far more vivid, immediate, evocative and funny and textually interesting than Ellmann’s colourless abstractions ever suggest. Most of ‘Ulysses’ sounds like this:

He crossed Westmoreland street when apostrophe S had plodded by. Rover cycleshop. Those races are on today. How long ago is that? Year Phil Gilligan died. We were in Lombard street west. Wait: was in Thom’s. Got the job in Wisdom Hely’s year we married. Six years. Ten years ago: ninetyfour he died yes that’s right the big fire at Arnott’s. Val Dillon was lord mayor. The Glencree dinner. Alderman Robert O’Reilly emptying the port into his soup before the flag fell. Bobbob lapping it for the inner alderman. Couldn’t hear what the band played. For what we have already received may the Lord make us. Milly was a kiddy then. Molly had that elephantgrey dress with the braided frogs. Mantailored with selfcovered buttons. She didn’t like it because I sprained my ankle first day she wore choir picnic at the Sugarloaf. As if that. Old Goodwin’s tall hat done up with some sticky stuff. Flies’ picnic too. Never put a dress on her back like it. Fitted her like a glove, shoulders and hips. Just beginning to plump it out well. Rabbitpie we had that day. People looking after her.

It is rich with felt life and textual tricksiness. Ellmann’s discussion of Aristotle and Hume, Vico and Blake are obviously not completely irrelevant, as we know from letters and lectures that Joyce thought deeply about those specific authors, and also their names are mentioned in the text itself. I just think that the way Ellmann discusses them is showy but superficial, and always takes us away from the specificity of the text.

David Hume

He does this big time when he embarks on the claim that the presiding spirit of chapter 10 is no longer Aristotle but the Scottish sceptical philosopher David Hume (1711 to 1776). If Aristotle presided over the first nine books, Ellmann suggests that Hume presides over the final nine.

Now Hume is a hero of mine and I have read several of his books very closely, notably the ‘Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion’, and I think Ellmann’s discussion of him is problematic. Number one, Joyce himself seems to have thought, erroneously, that Hume was in part an idealist, which I understand to be completely wrong. Hume was the sceptic’s sceptic, pushing philosophical scepticism to the limit.

Second objection is I think Ellmann’s discussion of Hume is short and superficial. Here’s an adapted AI summary of Hume’s thought:

Empiricism Hume divided all knowledge into 1) ‘relations of ideas’ (logic/mathematics) which have an internal logic and 2) ‘everything else’, which can be categorised as ‘matters of fact’ i.e. based on experience. Hume argued that we cannot prove anything outside these two categories. Hence all theology, metaphysics and a good deal of what passed for philosophy is literally non-sense and should be rejected.

The Problem of Causation Hume argued that we cannot directly perceive causation. Instead of knowing that A causes B we only observe that A and B appear together, leading us to feel a causal connection based on habit, not reason. None of us can know, for sure, that the sun will rise tomorrow, or that there will even be a tomorrow. Most of our knowledge of the world we live in is based on habit not reason.

Moral sentimentalism Ditto morality. Morality is rooted in feelings, sentiments, and emotions (what the eighteenth century called ‘passions’) not reason. Virtue arises from sympathy, and our reactions to events around us are mostly based on sentiment and emotion not reason or logic.

Scepticism and religion Hume fiercely attacked religion, the belief in God, miracles and so on, advocating for a purely naturalistic understanding of the world.

The self Hume argued that the ‘self’ is just a bundle of perceptions, not a stable, persisting entity.

In a nutshell, Hume dismissed all talk about subjects which aren’t based on either 1) pure maths / logic or 2) on observed phenomena, as rubbish. That’s to say, Hume dismissed all theology and most philosophy, certainly all idealist philosophy which supposes Ideals stored in some high Otherplace, all this he considered ‘sophistry and illusion’. In fact in his ‘Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding’ Hume famously argued that any book containing neither “abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number” nor “experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence” should be “committed to the flames”.

This is not quite my position, I have a more open, tolerant position which is closer to William Blake’s saying that ‘Everything possible to be believed is an image of truth’. Put another way (as Ellmann so often says), theology and metaphysics are interesting 1) as intellectual games to play, like chess and 2) were and are valid creative activities of the human mind. But it doesn’t make them ‘true’ in the sense Hume uses.

When I read ‘Game of Thrones’ I lend Westeros credence in my imagination for as long as I read the books, so why can’t I lend the theology of St Augustine or Don Cupitt just as much credence, and of the same sort, getting thoroughly involved in them as I read them – but pretty obviously separating them from my lived experience of life?

It’s intellectually rewarding to study and follow the lines of thought of the major theologians and philosophers; and it’s also part of the intellectual legacy of humankind. But it’s not ‘true’. There is no God, there is no heaven, there is no soul, there are no angels, there is no Devil, there was no Fall, there is no redemption, there is no salvation, and so on. Just as there is no Hamlet or Jon Snow or Stephen Dedalus.

The way these made-up entities effect our mental lives may be very powerful indeed and in that way – in terms of psychological effects – they can have an awesome reality, as they determine the thoughts and actions of real people in the real world, in fact they can affect entire cultures, they can determine the course of history. But that doesn’t make them ‘true’ in the way this laptop I’m typing these words on is a verifiable fact. They don’t objectively exist outside the human imagination.

So I know these metaphysical imaginings are non-real (like Hume did) but I don’t commit them to the flames as hastily as he did because they are part of the vast imaginarium which we are all heirs to and it would be pointless to deny their enormous influence over people’s lives in former times, and their legacies which live on and underpin a surprising amount of what people still think and believe today. Imaginative truth (Hamlet is a powerful imaginative creation) is different from objective truth (Hamlet does not now and never has existed).

As Wittgenstein put it (and in my mind, Hume and Wittgenstein are closely allied, in their outcomes if not in their methods), ‘The world is all that is the case’. My take on this is that ‘the world’ also includes everything that has ever been believed by everyone.

This is where I differ from liberals and the high-minded who limit their view of human achievement to a handful of Great Achievements of Civilisation by a handful of Great Men, constantly citing Michelangelo or Rembrandt or Shakespeare, narrowly cherrypicking humanity’s positive achievements.

In my version of human history, everything that humans have done is our legacy, and this includes not just all the philosophy and theology, all the literature, poetry, tales and legends — but also the innumerable atrocities, slaughters and genocides. In my view, we have to face the totality of the facts, no matter how disgusting.

Anything less is sentimentalism, denial, self deception. We are what we are and we have done what we have done, no sweeping it under the carpet. I know many people who are so upset by a true understanding of the horror of history that they reject it, deny it, don’t want to know. My view is that, the more unshrinking a view you have of the abattoir that is human history, the more rare and precious become the urges to create and beautify, the more wonderful and beautiful become the relics of culture, from whichever culture, from all cultures.

This face-the-facts-and-accept-everything view is very close to Joyce’s, which is why I not only enjoy but relate to the ‘Ulysses’ so much, with all its farting, belching, masturbating, snot and semen, menses and afterbirths. It embraces the entire human organism and all of human experience as it actually is. And this is why Virginia Woolf – with her high-minded Bloomsbury view that Literature should be about Art and Beauty, so utterly loathed it. I can understand her point of view. But I’m in Joyce’s camp.

Two objections Ellmann suddenly reveals that Hume might be as much of a source for Stephen’s thinking as Aristotle was in chapter 3. This is an unusual and largely unevidenced thing to say and there are two problems with it: 1) why does Joyce only reveal it now half-way through the book? Why was Hume not present from the start? The answer might be that if Joyce had invoked Hume alongside Aristotle his explication would have gotten too complicated. But I think there’s a simpler explanation, which is that Hume isn’t as important to Joyce as Ellmann claims he is.

Ellmann cites some passages from Hume’s masterwork the ‘Treatise of Human Nature’ in which Hume describes closing and opening his eyes to test the concept of space and extension before going on to say that the concept of time is indicated by the succession of our thoughts or perceptions. Ellmann finds places in ‘Ulysses’ where Stephen has similar thoughts about space and time and quotes them to prove that Joyce is here basing Stephen on Hume.

The trouble with this is, which major philosophers have not at some point meditated on the nature of time and space? Not to mention the astronomers and cosmologists? And all the theologians? Thousands of them have. If you put a little effort into it I bet you could compare Stephen’s doodling about space and time with the writings of any number of philosophers and theologians since those are just the kinds of subjects most of them spent a lot of their lives writing about…

The main problem with Ellmann’s presentation is not so much that it might be untrue but that it is only a fraction of the possible sources. They’re just snippets which he has cherry-picked. A full and complete discussion of the concept of time in James Joyce’s ‘Ulysses’ would take an entire book and call on countless philosophers and theologians for detailed comparisons.

But none of these alternative sources are mentioned here and why not? Because Ellmann’s book isn’t a serious presentation of the issues. It’s a snapshot. It’s a summary. It’s a brief overview of some of the philosophical issues raised by the book. It’s not really serious. It’s a brief presentation of snippets and fragments, for students-in-a-hurry to finish their Great Books of Modern Literature modules. It’s a TikTok version, a Twitter treatment of the themes.

So Ellmann’s assertion that if the spirit of Aristotle presided over the first half of ‘Ulysses’, then the spirit of Hume presides over the second half is an example of fun intellectual games critics can play with an epic text like this (if you like these kinds of games). But I don’t think anyone should be fooled into thinking it’s either 1) ‘true’ (whatever that means) but more importantly 2) that it’s necessary for reading and understanding the novel. There are other, faaaar more relevant and practical things to pay attention to first.

Back to ‘Ulysses’ Ellmann is more modest and therefore more useful, when he points out the simple fact that in the ‘Wandering Rocks’ chapter, Joyce begins to play with space and time. All he means by this is that fragments from one of the 18 vignettes are likely to pop up in another vignette, and he usefully refers to them as ‘interpolations’.

Church and State (again) More useful to my practical text-based way of thinking is when Ellmann points out that chapter 10 is, once again, foundationed on the binary of church and state. By this all he means is that the chapter opens with the friendly priest Father Conmee walking through the streets of Dublin and bumping into various acquaintances, popping up in the background of other people’s vignettes; while in the second half of the chapter, we catch steadily more glimpses of the progress of the Viceroy of Dublin riding in his carriage to open a bazaar, glimpses which lead up to its full presentation in the 19th and final vignette.

Thus it’s easy to claim that a representative of Church and a representative of the State establish the physical and conceptual framework of the chapter by topping and tailing it, and it is then fleshed out with appearances from 40 or more other characters in between.

Mocked And the key point here, is that both representatives are mocked, gently but steadily. With Father Conmee, Joyce does it with the butter-wouldn’t-melt-in-his-mouth squeaky cleanness of Conmee’s supposed thoughts. With the Viceroy the mockery is implicit in the generally indifferent reaction to his passing by of the various Dubliners.

Material rebukes The final response to the Viceroy in the chapter is the Italian music teacher Almidano Artifoni going into his house and, in effect, turning the bum of his trousers to the august carriage as it trots by. Father Conmee receives a more obvious rebuke to his values and worldview when he is suddenly confronted by a couple stumbling out of some bushes, flushed because they’ve just had sex. Sex, in comedies, especially farces, is the great puncturer of human pompousness and pretension.

Binaries Both Stephen and Bloom are given one of the 18 vignettes. Both find our protagonists looking at books, according to their intellectual levels: Bloom is buying a popular romance, Sweets of Sin, for Molly; Stephen is looking through Abbot Peter Salanka’s book of charms and spells, specifically ones designed to attract a woman’s love. Love and sex. Highbrow and middlebrow versions.

Heart If you visualise Dublin as a heart (as the first headline in ‘Aeolus’ suggests):

IN THE HEART OF THE HIBERNIAN METROPOLIS

Then the 40 or so characters we meet in chapter 10 can be thought of as blood corpuscles circulating round it and bumping into each other.

Chapter 11. Sirens

Bulging According to Ellmann, in chapter 11 ‘Sirens’, the ear is female, concave and a receptacle whereas in chapter 12 ‘Cyclops’, the eye is male, bulging, invasive.

Music ‘Sirens’ is about sounds and music, it contains countless references to music, sounds and noise, to different instruments up to full orchestra, and also related defects, as in the comic figure of Pat the (almost) deaf waiter and the blind piano tuner.

Singer Joyce had a fine tenor voice and briefly considered a career in singing before rejecting it. Late nineteenth century aestheticism took it for granted that music was the highest art form but Joyce rejected this and claimed literature was.

Fugue ‘Sirens’ is Joyce’s extended attempt at converting musical form into language. It is based on the classical music form of the fugue.

A fugue is a contrapuntal compositional technique based on a main theme (subject) introduced alone, then imitated in succession by other voices. It traditionally follows a three-part structure: Exposition (subject/answer entries), Development (alternating episodes and subject entries in new keys), and Final Entry (return to the tonic).

Key components of fugue structure

  • Subject: The principal, recognizable musical theme that drives the entire piece.
  • Answer: The subject repeated by a second voice, typically transposed to the dominant key.
  • Countersubject: A distinctive contrapuntal melody that accompanies the subject/answer, often returning throughout the piece.
  • Exposition: The opening section where every voice has stated the subject at least once.
  • Episode: Transitional, developmental sections that do not contain the full subject, often using sequences and modulations to create contrast.
  • Middle Entries: Subsequent appearances of the subject after the exposition, often in related keys.
  • Stretto: A device where subject entries overlap, with a voice starting the theme before the previous voice finishes it, increasing tension.
  • Coda/Final Entry: The conclusion, often featuring a strong, final statement of the subject in the original key.

Developmental techniques

Fugues often manipulate the subject through various techniques:

  • Inversion: Playing the melody upside down (intervals reversed).
  • Augmentation: Doubling the note values (making it twice as slow).
  • Diminution: Halving the note values (making it twice as fast).
  • Retrograde: Playing the subject backward.

Once you know all this, the game becomes to apply these rules to the elements in the ‘Sirens’ chapter. Can you find examples of every rule somewhere in the prose? You can be some academic somewhere has written a book about it.

A tale of two barmaids The chapter is set in the Ormond Hotel and the obvious binary at the centre of the chapter is the contrast between the two young attractive barmaids, Miss Kennedy and Miss Douce, the one a redhead, the other dark.

Chapter 12. Cyclops

All the chapters are packed with ingenious references to their leading theme, wind in ‘Aeolus’, food in ‘Lestrygonians’, music in ‘Sirens’, and so it’s eyes in the chapter about the one-eyed cyclops. Which is why its opening sentence is:

I was just passing the time of day with old Troy of the D. M. P. at the corner of Arbour hill there and be damned but a bloody sweep came along and he near drove his gear into my eye.

Exactly as Odysseus and his men drove their stake into the single eye of the cyclops who had imprisoned them (Stuart Gilbert pointed all this out, apparently).

Having sketched out the ubiquity of eye imagery, Ellmann goes beyond it to suggest that the waspishly cynical narrator of ‘Cyclops’ is a modern avatar of mean-minded cynical Thersites, the meanest hero in the original Odyssey, who has a larger part in Shakespeare’s play of the Tale of Troy, ‘Troilus and Cressida’. Ellmann suggests cynicism is a more subtle form of bigotry, the nationalist Citizen’s crime of being one-eyed. In this respect, when Bloom stands up for himself and his ‘race’, the Jews, rejects violence and calls for love, he is showing himself to be two-eyed. Full stereoscopic vision.

Continuing the idea, Ellmann suggests that if the previous chapters had leaned on the influence of (generous) David Hume, this one invokes the spirit of the dry, satirical Voltaire. Maybe. Hardly helps you either read or understand the text, though.

For reasons I couldn’t follow, Ellmann suggests that at the climax of this chapter Bloom is apotheosised i.e. turned into a god, but many of his assertions seem so wilful and contrived as to feel a little demented.

Chapter 13. Nausicaa

In Homer’s Odyssey, Odysseus’s shipwreck is caused because he has offended two gods, Hyperion the sun god for killing his cattle and Poseidon for blinding his son, Cyclops. As is his way, Ellmann immediately sees a binary at work, declaring Hyperion represents idealism and Poseidon materialism, or height and depth (he could have carried on with light and darkness, or dry and wet).

As he stated at the start, Ellmann thinks the 18 chapters are arranged in triads; here he adds the thought they all these triads enact the dialectic i.e. thesis, antithesis, synthesis. And so Ellmann suggests chapters 13, 14 and 15 enact:

  • Nausicaa – sentimentalised idealism
  • Oxen of the Sun- materialistic callousness
  • Circe – both

More practically useful, Ellmann confirms a really basic fact about ‘Ulysses’ which is that, for all its obsessive detail in many places, in others it contains great yawning gaps. For example, we never learn how Bloom made it from running out of Barney Kiernan’s pub as the Citizen threw his biscuit tin at him, to being comfortably leaning against a rock on Sandymount Strand about an hour later. We are never told how he got there or what happened during that hour.

High on Hegelian dialectic, Ellmann claims that, in this setting, Joyce makes Howth promontory male, the bay itself as female, and the voice of the priests praying to the Virgin a combination of both = androgynous.

Back with his more obvious binaries, he tells us that the chapter is a tale of two fantasies or the projecting of imagined mirages: Gerty projects her sentimental romantic fantasies onto Bloom; Bloom projects his narrow sexual fantasies onto Gerty; and both are accompanied by two priests projecting their fantasy of the Mother of God onto the world.

‘Cyclops’ is notable for featuring a narrator who isn’t the omniscient third-person narrator of the ‘initial style’. ‘Nausicaa’ furthers the text’s uncoupling from the novel’s early style in being written in a comic pastiche of sentimental romantic fiction, which is attributed to Gerty. The nauseatingly sentimental style is, it is implied, the tone of Gerty’s half-educated thoughts.

Gerty MacDowell who was seated near her companions, lost in thought, gazing far away into the distance was, in very truth, as fair a specimen of winsome Irish girlhood as one could wish to see.

(Ellmann notes that some critics have thought the entire thing is also a sly dig at the Edwardian author Samuel Butler, who claimed the Odyssey was written by Princess Nausicaa not Homer. That’s entertaining gossip about the aim but doesn’t help much with appreciating the actual text. )

It’s also, of course, a chapter contrasting not only idealism and realism, female fantasy and male earthiness, exhibitionism and voyeurism, but also youth and age. In amid her naive thoughts, Gerty thinks of herself as unique and special, and this is the classic delusion of youth (‘I’m special. I’m different. No-one has ever felt like this before.’) By contrast, after he’s climaxed and slowly come back down to earth, Bloom rather gloomily thinks it’s the just same old thing again, repetition, nothing new under the sun. Youth = the delusion of uniqueness. Age = the disillusion of familiarity.

So it returns. Think you’re escaping and run into yourself. Longest way round is the shortest way home. And just when he and she. Circus horse walking in a ring.

Chapter 14. Oxen of the Sun

Having described sexual ejaculation in chapter 13, the next chapter moves on to its consequences, fertilisation and pregnancy.

Here, in the common room of the National Maternity Hospital, the drunk medical students offend the god by mocking true fertility, by telling all kinds of jokes, bawdy humour, climaxing in Buck Mulligan’s jokey setting up a company whereby he promises to fertilise any woman who asks, for a fee.

There is a tension between the students’ cynical stripping of the act of love down to its heartless physical basics and the way Joyce chose to convey it, in a series of elaborate pastiches of historical English prose styles. If the subject is infertility, the parade of prose styles demonstrates exactly the opposite, humanity’s endless fertility in coming up with new and intricate ways to describe things and tell stories.

Ellmann notes something I hadn’t heard before which is the way the prose goes all to hell after the students leave the hospital and go round to the nearest pub. I’d read that the chaos of voices reflected closing time in a busy city centre pub. Ellmann makes the clever suggestion that it also represents the messy afterbirth, slopping everywhere after Mina Purefoy’s baby has been born.

’Tis, sure. What say? In the speakeasy. Tight. I shee you, shir. Bantam, two days teetee. Bowsing nowt but claretwine. Garn! Have a glint, do. Gum, I’m jiggered.

Chapter 15. Circe

In the morning light at the start of the novel Stephen had descanted on the ineluctable modality i.e. continuity, of the visible. In ‘Circe’ it is far after dark and all such certainties have disappeared, leaving the characters in a place which has no rules of extension or time or logic, but inhabits the inner self of anxieties, lusts, fantasies and hallucinations.

As you might expect, Ellmann finds in this longest and most delirious chapter a cornucopia of his favourite pattern, dichotomies – inside and outside, mind and body, dream and reality, male and female, body and soul, ego and id, England and Ireland (in the form of the soldiers and the Watch), you name it, it’s here. This is what I disliked about this book: it reduces the teeming fecundity of the weirdest, most diverse novel in the Western tradition to a handful of threadbare clichés.

Ellmann equates Bloom’s sudden vision, at the end of the chapter, of his dead son Rudy but now 11 years old, as he would now be, with the visions in Dante. Well, OK, but there are plenty of other works of literature featuring visions. And Dante doesn’t have a son.

He also claims that with the visions of this chapter, Bloom has harrowed hell, as did Odysseus, Jesus and Dante before him. But did he? Metaphorically maybe. Maybe this is a valid, even obvious, suggestion but, as I’m always saying, it takes you away from the wonderful (and often gross) specificity of the text and into a Western Literature 101 seminar room where everyone’s talking about Dante, Vico and Blake, and nobody’s talking about the obscenity of the Croppy Boy scene, because that’s difficult, embarrassing and vulgar. As it’s meant to be. Ellmann’s schematic approach sanitises Joyce, who went out of his way to be as scabrous as he could be (where scabrous means ‘indecent, salacious or scandalous material that is shocking or offensive’).

Chapter 16. Eumaeus

Although Stephen announced the annihilation of space and time in ‘Circe’ when he smashed the chandelier in the brothel, the next chapter reveals the return of time and space, solider than ever.

Addicted to his philosophers, Ellmann says that if (big ‘if’) Hume’s scepticism has guided the chapters of the second half of the novel, then space and time return in the spirit of Immanuel Kant, not as the properties of things, but as the conditions of perception built into the human condition. Maybe. It’s a thought, if you know enough about Kant to really apply it…

Trinities are nearly as addictive to the conspiracy theorist as simple dichotomies, and Ellmann reads into the final three chapters an earthly trinity of Bloom the father, Stephen the son and… well, there is no equivalent of the Holy Ghost, instead the best he can offer is Molly as a blasphemous avatar of the Virgin Mary (just as she is a mocking avatar of the chaste Penelope) (remember what I said at the start about Joyce using all kinds of literary, theological and philosophical patterns when it suited him and when it didn’t… just walking away).

In the Linati schema Joyce described the style of ‘Eumaeus’ as ‘relaxed’, which seems signally inadequate – it’s a ‘tired’ and threadbare in the style of provincial newspapers, made up of journalistic clichés but without any of the vim and vigour of ‘Aeolus’. It’s ‘Aeolus’ with a hangover.

Nowhere in his book does Ellmann address the fact that large chunks of ‘Ulysses’ are so cryptic and chopped-up as to be almost unreadable. His book gives the impression it’s all clear and readable figures of allegory and philosophy which you can understand with a little guidance, as in Dante or Spenser. Nowhere does he engage with the actual text which is often impenetrable.

Hark! Shut your obstropolos. Pflaap! Pflaap! Blaze on. There she goes. Brigade! Bout ship. Mount street way. Cut up! Pflaap! Tally ho. You not come? Run, skelter, race. Pflaaaap!

In the same way, both he (and Hugh Kenner) treat the later chapters as if they’re the same as the earlier ones but they aren’t at all: ‘Nausicaa’, ‘Oxen of the Sun’, ‘Circe’, ‘Eumaeus’ and ‘Ithaca’ are all much, much easier to read and process than the earlier chapters. I once read someone saying ‘Ulysses’ starts out very English and clear and comprehensible but then gets steadily more Irish and radical and impenetrable, whereas in my reading I’ve always found it the other way round. Here’s Stephen’s stream of consciousness from chapter 2:

Proudly walking. Whom were you trying to walk like? Forget: a dispossessed. With mother’s money order, eight shillings, the banging door of the post office slammed in your face by the usher. Hunger toothache. Encore deux minutes. Look clock. Must get. Fermé. Hired dog! Shoot him to bloody bits with a bang shotgun…

It requires quite a lot of effort to tease out the meaning and point of every one of these cryptic references. Whereas:

Nausicaa – pastiche but immediately understandable:

The summer evening had begun to fold the world in its mysterious embrace. Far away in the west the sun was setting and the last glow of all too fleeting day lingered lovingly on sea and strand, on the proud promontory of dear old Howth guarding as ever the waters of the bay, on the weedgrown rocks along Sandymount shore and, last but not least, on the quiet church whence there streamed forth at times upon the stillness the voice of prayer to her who is in her pure radiance a beacon ever to the stormtossed heart of man, Mary, star of the sea.

Oxen of the Sun – the style of some of the parodies might be a little difficult but a) not if you’re used to older English prose, and b) there’s none of the clipped, truncated, cryptic quality which makes the first half so challenging:

And whiles they spake the door of the castle was opened and there nighed them a mickle noise as of many that sat there at meat. And there came against the place as they stood a young learning knight yclept Dixon.

Circe – is delirious and occasionally cryptic but nowhere near as impenetrable as Stephen’s thoughts:

The Mabbot street entrance of nighttown, before which stretches an uncobbled tramsiding set with skeleton tracks, red and green will-o’-the-wisps and danger signals. Rows of grimy houses with gaping doors. Rare lamps with faint rainbow fans. Round Rabaiotti’s halted ice gondola stunted men and women squabble.

Eumaeus – stylised, maybe, but very, very easy to read.

Preparatory to anything else Mr Bloom brushed off the greater bulk of the shavings and handed Stephen the hat and ashplant and bucked him up generally in orthodox Samaritan fashion which he very badly needed. His (Stephen’s) mind was not exactly what you would call wandering but a bit unsteady and on his expressed desire for some beverage to drink Mr Bloom in view of the hour it was and there being no pump of Vartry water available for their ablutions let alone drinking purposes hit upon an expedient by suggesting, off the reel, the propriety of the cabman’s shelter, as it was called, hardly a stonesthrow away near Butt bridge where they might hit upon some drinkables in the shape of a milk and soda or a mineral.

Ithaca – once you’ve got the hang of the question and answer format this, again, is mostly a breeze to read:

What parallel courses did Bloom and Stephen follow returning?

Starting united both at normal walking pace from Beresford place they followed in the order named Lower and Middle Gardiner streets and Mountjoy square, west: then, at reduced pace, each bearing left, Gardiner’s place by an inadvertence as far as the farther corner of Temple street: then, at reduced pace with interruptions of halt, bearing right, Temple street, north, as far as Hardwicke place.

Penelope – and even Molly Bloom’s famous soliloquy, the critics and commentators all make it sound difficult, and in some places the stream of thoughts does jump about a bit, but the thoughts themselves, once you get a handle on her biography and the telegraphic style, are not that hard to understand:

Yes because he never did a thing like that before as ask to get his breakfast in bed with a couple of eggs since the City Arms hotel when he used to be pretending to be laid up with a sick voice doing his highness to make himself interesting for that old faggot Mrs Riordan that he thought he had a great leg of and she never left us a farthing all for masses for herself and her soul greatest miser ever was

Back to ‘Eumaeus’, addicted to binaries, Ellmann decides it is all about duplicity, lies and truth. He bases this on the relevant episode in the Odyssey, where Odysseus wakes up on the shore of his kingdom and cautiously adopts a disguise before making his way to the hut of his old swineherd, Eumaeus. Here he makes up a cock and bull story about who he is while Eumaeus greets him with open-hearted candour and hospitality. Secrets versus honesty. And so Ellmann finds numerous instances of secrets and deceptions in this chapter:

  • the chapter opens with Bloom cautioning Stephen against Mulligan’s deceitfulness
  • although Lynch accompanied him into Nighttown, Stephen calls him Judas for abandoning him
  • the pair get lost and have to double back through the streets
  • Bloom delights in the Italian being spoken by some loiterers round the shelter but Stephen points out they’re arguing over money
  • all the characters they meet are deceitful e.g:
    • Lord John Corley who isn’t a lord
    • the shelter owner may or may not be Skin-the-Goat itself (obviously) a pseudonym
    • the sailor D.B. Murphy tells tall tales which Bloom thinks are probably a pack of lies, purveyor of what Bloom calls ‘genuine forgeries’
  • the conversation takes in all kinds of secrets and lies:
    • Skin’s claim that Parnell isn’t dead, his coffin is full of stones, he’s alive and well in Paris from whence he will return
    • someone claims Francis Bacon wrote Shakespeare’s plays
    • reference to the fraudulent Protocols of Zion
    • cases of forged identity such as the Tichborne Claimant
    • the Evening Telegraph gets details of Paddy Dignam’s funeral wrong, notably Bloom’s name (spelled as Boom)

It’s an impressive list of deceits and errors, in the same way as ‘Lestrygonians’ is packed with references to food and ‘Sirens’ with references to music etc. This kind of specificity, which takes you back to the detail of the text, I like.

Chapter 17. Ithaca

This is the chapter cast in the form of a catechism, questions and answers. (Ellmann likens it to the cold information retrieval systems of a computer, reminding us that this book was published in 1972, over half a century ago – computers have come on a bit since then.)

Ellmann, like Kenner, reacts negatively to this chapter, saying it strips human activity to the skeleton, that ‘the imagination is impoverished’ (p.157) but I’ve always liked this chapter for the same reasons: it is clear and lucid, it tells us exactly what is happening but also, far from being unimaginative, many of the answers depart on wild fantasias of factuality, for example the ones about water or about the stars.

Ellmann zeroes in on the sections which supposedly compare Stephen and Bloom’s contrasting views about the purpose of literature: well, he would say that, being a professor of literature. Personally I find writers writing about writing the most boring subject in the world, whereas the descriptions of the lost key, the evocative objects in Bloom’s drawers, the pondering on the mystery of the stars, the magic qualities of water and so on, I find these fresh and vivifying, enlivening, expanding my understanding of the world. And often very funny.

Ellmann is still banging on about finding the influence of Aristotle wherever he looks. Thus, in the answer about human nature:

He affirmed his significance as a conscious rational animal proceeding syllogistically from the known to the unknown and a conscious rational reagent between a micro and a macrocosm ineluctably constructed upon the incertitude of the void.

Whereas fooey to Aristotle, I love the image of these two so different men sharing an amiable pee in Bloom’s back garden under the twinkling stars.

At Stephen’s suggestion, at Bloom’s instigation both, first Stephen, then Bloom, in penumbra urinated, their sides contiguous, their organs of micturition reciprocally rendered invisible by manual circumposition, their gazes, first Bloom’s, then Stephen’s, elevated to the projected luminous and semiluminous shadow.

Treating an outdoor piss in this pseudo-scientific way is funny. Well, I find it funny. But comedy is difficult if not impossible to convey in literary analysis, whereas detecting binaries and dichotomies everywhere is like falling off a log.

Bloom’s pottering round his house after Stephen leaves, as he intersperses getting undressed with poking around in drawers, finding objects and photos which trigger memories of his family, before climbing into bed next to the slumbering Molly – all this I find warm and homely and moving, all the more so because it is conveyed not with conventional sentimentality, but in the brilliantly hard and clear FAQ format Joyce had invented for this chapter.

Chapter 18. Penelope

Ellmann tells us the conclusion of the book has been much debated. He cites two critics who were still active forces when he wrote, William Empson and Edmund Wilson, who were both concerned about what happened next, after the end of the book. Empson speculates that Stephen did indeed come back the next day, 17 June, to give the first of his Italian lessons to Molly and receive singing lessons in return. Wilson speculated that Bloom’s request to have breakfast served to him in bed symbolised his return to mastery in the marriage with Molly, which would be cemented by them having sex for the first time in 11 years.

Both now seem wildly out of date and irrelevant. What might happen to the characters after the end of the book is a completely different type of conversation, academics at the dinner table conversation, pub conversation, next to nothing to do with the chapter under discussion which, of course, is entirely concerned with Molly’s late-night thoughts.

It is in this chapter that Ellmann compares Molly’s character to Aristotle, Hume and Darwin, which I found ridiculous.

He quotes Joyce writing to his friend Frank Budgen that ‘Penelope’ is ‘more obscene than any preceding episode, which is debatable, seeing as the entire chapter ‘Nausicaa’ is about a middle-aged married man masturbating in public at the sight of a young woman’s knickers, and that ‘Circe’ has some scenes of unparalleled obscenity. But I take the point that Molly’s soliloquy contains more sustained and explicit descriptions of sex than any previous chapter.

Ellmann briskly runs through some of the details in the chapter but without really capturing its spirit and power. He tells us Molly at moments mixes up her various men, calling them all ‘he’. But at other moments she makes a very clear distinction between her lover, Blazes Boylan who is exciting but doesn’t respect her, and her husband Bloom, who is a little odd, a little boring but who does genuinely care for her.

But on the whole Ellmann isn’t happy down among the details. He’s happier when he can find an abstract binary, and so hastens to tell us that Molly is the earth to Bloom’s sun, which is fine and dandy but doesn’t really get us anywhere (p.166). He thinks Molly’s soliloquy:

resolves the questions of belief and incertitude which have dogged Stephen and western philosophy (p.168)

Which is ludicrous because a) she doesn’t – if she had what are all the philosophers in all the Philosophy departments of the universities of the world wasting their time doing? And b) can you see how wildly adrift of the actual content of her soliloquy this is?

Ellmann’s bloodless approach can’t do justice to sex, real mucky flirty dirty sex, any more than it can do justice to Joyce’s many types of comedy and humour, both crucial elements in the book, both overlooked as he struggles to make out Molly Bloom as a thinker on a par with Aristotle or David Hume.

Maybe those elements are there; maybe Joyce himself described them as being there: but they’re not the main part of the book. The book is the text itself and not the neatly cut and dried concepts which Joyce attributed to it and generations of academics have enthusiastically added to.

Obsessed with academic notions of art and artists, Ellmann whips himself up into absurdities:

Joyce said that his episode had no art but his book is consummated by the principle that art is nature’s self. (p.173)

What does this mean and why should I care? Meanwhile, of Molly’s desires and schemes and fantasies and seductions and flirtations and consummations, her friendships, her love of flowers, her fondness of displaying herself in the bedroom window to attract the attention of the handsome young medical student in the house across the road, of everything which makes her such a storming presence in modern literature, nothing, nothing at all.

Dwelling on abstract structures to the bitter end, Ellmann claims that:

The first nine episodes of the book ended with a vision of the act of love as the basic act of nature. The last nine episodes end with a vision of love as the basic act of nature. (p.174)

What Ellmann doesn’t bring out, on his own ground, on his own terms, is that Molly (and, by implication Joyce) in her soliloquy, says it all comes down to sex; that sex is the ultimate truth of human nature, of human life. This I would agree with, and is one way of summarising Darwin: we breed, we rear young, for all sorts of reasons to do with the environment, competition from other families and species, and huge slices of dumb luck, some survive to create the next generation; all organisms do this; the result over billions of years is the beautifully intricate web of natural ecosystems which form the world around us and which humanity is busily destroying and degrading as I write.

But the urge to reproduce is central and this is, of course, contrary to Christian ideology and so completely contrary to Dante (and Plato) who Ellmann is roping in here at the end of his book. In their different ways both Plato and Dante thought sexual love must be rejected, in Plato to achieve the highest form of rational thought, in Dante in order to achieve full love of God.

Molly denies all of that and locates the highest reality in her big breasts and hungry fanny. Oh how she is longing for Monday to come when she will see Boylan again, and he will plook her senseless again with his big willy.

But that’s not how Ellmann sees it. He ends this short but gruellingly wrong-headed book with a slab of characteristically high-minded rhetoric. If you like this kind of thing, you’ll love this book:

On the ethical level Bloom and Stephen have succeeded in taking the city of Dublin by exposing enthusiasm and superstition there, and by disclosing a truer way of goodwill and freedom. Molly’s hardwon approbation confirms their enterprise. On this historical level, the characters have awakened from the Circean nightmare of history by drawing the past into the present (a timeless present) and making it an expression of love instead of hatred, of fondness rather than remorse. Art has been shown to be a part of nature, and in all its processes an imitation of natural ones. These processes have their summit in love, of which the highest form is sexual love. (p.175)

Well, we agree about that much. But what a mealy-mouthed, detail-denying way of getting there.


Credit

‘Ulysses on the Liffey’ by Richard Ellmann was published by Faber and Faber in 1972.

Related links

Joyce reviews

The Trouble With Nigeria by Chinua Achebe (1983)

Political and biographical background

Nigeria attained independence in 1960. Twenty-three years later author, poet and essayist Chinua Achebe published this extended essay briskly summarising the problems his nation faced. Before we get to the text, there’s some interesting biography to point out. Achebe had published his last novel, A Man of The People in 1966, so what had he been doing between 1966 and this publication 16 years later?

Soon after the publication of A Man of The People Nigeria experienced the 1966 military coup. This in turn led to the Nigerian Civil War, triggered when the region of Biafra broke away from Nigeria in 1967.  In fact some in the military thought the ending of A Man of The People so closely paralleled the real-life coup that he must have had some foreknowledge so he had to flee to Biafra to escape arrest. Achebe supported Biafran independence and acted as ambassador for the new state, travelling to European and North American cities to drum up support. He helped draft a declaration of principles for the new country. The Achebe family narrowly escaped disaster several times during the war, including a bombing of their house. The general disruption favoured the form of poetry and in 1971 he published the collection ‘Beware, Soul Brother.

With the end of the war, he returned to the family home in Ogidi only to find it destroyed. His passport was revoked. He took up a teaching post at the University of Nigeria. In 1971 he helped set up two literary magazines. In 1972 he published a collection of short stories, ‘Girls At War’.

In 1972 he took up a teaching post at the University of Amherst, later adding a visiting professorship at the University of Connecticut. It was at Amherst in 1975 that he gave his famous lecture accusing Joseph Conrad of being a ‘racist’.

Achebe returned to the University of Nigeria in 1976, where he held a chair in English until his retirement in 1981. He edited the literary journal Okike and became active with the left-leaning People’s Redemption Party (PRP). In 1983, he became the party’s deputy national vice-president and it was now, after 17 busy, traumatic, and globetrotting years, that he published the pamphlet under review, ‘The Trouble with Nigeria’. Its publication was timed to coincide with the upcoming elections i.e. it was a direct and controversial intervention in Nigerian politics by someone who was, by now, a veteran of political commentary.

The Trouble with Nigeria

In this brief pamphlet Achebe set out to enumerate Nigeria’s many problems and suggest solutions. His stated aim was to challenge the resignation and negativity of his fellow Nigerians ‘which cripple our aspiration and inhibit our chances of becoming a modern and attractive country’. He aimed to inspire them to reject the old habits which, in his opinion, prevented Nigeria from becoming a modern country.

The book became famous because it attributed the fundamental failure of Nigeria on its disastrously bad leadership. With the right leadership he thought the country could resolve its many problems such as: tribalism, lack of patriotism, social injustice, the cult of mediocrity indiscipline and, of course, corruption. The essay is divided into ten parts.

Rather than give a long conclusion at the end I’ll comment on the points he raises chapter by chapter.

1. Where the problem lies (3 pages)

The trouble with Nigeria is simply and squarely a failure of leadership. There is nothing basically wrong with the Nigerian character. There is nothing wrong with the Nigerian land or climate or water or air or anything else. The Nigerian problem is the unwillingness or inability of its leaders to rise to the responsibility, to the challenge of personal example, which are the hallmarks of great leadership. (p.22)

Change is possible but it requires ‘a radical programme of social and economic reorganisation’.

I believe that Nigeria is a nation favoured by Providence. I believe there are individuals as well as nations who, on account of peculiar gifts and circumstances, are commandeered by history to facilitate mankind’s advancement. Nigeria is such a nation…the fear that should haunt our leaders (but does not) is that they may already have betrayed Nigeria’s high destiny. (p.24)

I find it hard to take this overblow rhetoric seriously. There is no Providence. There is no guiding hand. ‘History’ is not a force in the world, it is just the record of what we’ve done. There is no ‘high destiny’. There is no God or law saying mankind will ‘advance’ in any particular direction – what a ridiculous idea.

Throughout his career Achebe railed against Western misconceptions about Africa and yet here he is spouting just such 19th century, positivistic rhetoric about the forward march of humanity etc etc. Population growth is out of control. We are burning the world and destroying the habitats we rely on for our survival. Russia bombs maternity hospitals. Israel bombs refugee camps. The Sudanese massacre each other. Famine is coming in Ethiopia. What advancement of mankind?

Right here, right at the start of the pamphlet, Achebe reveals that he is more attached to high-sounding rhetoric than any kind of detailed analysis of the geography, agriculture, resources or economy of Nigeria, and this tone of lofty generalisation characterises most of the essay.

He is closer to reality when he says Nigeria benefited from an oil boom which should have been invested to modernise the country but instead Nigeria’s leaders have stolen or embezzled huge sums, and squandered the rest on importing expensive fancy foreign goods.

2. Tribalism (4 pages)

Achebe dates the triumph of tribalism in politics, and the death of a pan-Nigerian dream, to the moment in 1951 (when the country was still nominally owned and run by Britain) when Chief Obafemi Awolowo stole the leadership of Western Nigeria from Dr Nnamdi Azikwe (aka Zik). This is interesting to readers of his novels because it seems to be the basis for the similar cabinet coup described at the start of A Man of The People.

Achebe blames the fact that the national anthem was written by a British woman for perpetuating the idea of tribe and goes on to describe how, after 1966, another national anthem was adopted.

Achebe skims through a work of academic discussion and defines tribalism as ‘discrimination against a citizen because of his place of birth’, gives examples of how this discrimination operates at the time of the essay. He points to the American example where, in the specific example of filling out forms to apply to university, specifying a person’s state of origin is forbidden precisely to eliminate discrimination. Nigeria should do the same.

And that’s it on the issue of tribalism, one of the most complex and difficult problems facing almost every African country. Not exactly a thorough analysis, maybe – and it’s so typical of a writer to think that the key to such a super-complex social and political issue can be found in a couple of poems, and an official form. It feels like he lacks the academic training or background in the subject to engage with it properly.

3. False image of ourselves (2 and a half pages)

One of the commonest manifestations of under-development is a tendency among the ruling elite to live in a world of make-believe and unrealistic expectations. (p.29)

In Achebe’s view, Nigeran leaders spout high-sounding rhetoric to inspire their auditors and make themselves sound big by, for example, going on and on about Nigeria being a great country. Whereas Achebe, being an ordinary (albeit literary and articulate) citizen, is able to tell the truth.

Nigeria is not a great country, it is one of the most disorderly nations in the world. It is one of the most corrupt, insensitive, inefficient places under the sun…It is dirty, callous, noisy, ostentatious, dishonest and vulgar. In short, it is among the most unpleasant places on earth. (p.30)

Achebe is straight-talking like this throughout the essay and it’s fun. Even if he then ruins the effect with the empty, hackneyed phrases of his ‘solution’:

Nigeria is not absolutely beyond redemption. Critical, yes, but not hopeless. But every single day of continued neglect brings her ever closer to the brink of the abyss. To pull her back and turn her around is clearly beyond the contrivance of mediocre leadership. It calls for greatness. (p.31)

Greatness? Unfortunately much of his argumentation consists of a rhetorical exaggeration of Nigeria’s plight, so that he can then propose surprisingly windy and rhetorical solution.

Achebe’s negativism about Nigeria is a kind of mirror image of its leaders overblown boosterism: both are just fine-sounding words, both fail to engage with the horribly complex realities on the ground.

4. Leadership, Nigeria-style (1 page)

Achebe accuses the founding fathers of Nigeria of lacking intellectual rigour, of a tendency to ‘pious materialistic woolliness and self-centred pedestrianism’. As you’ve read, I detect exactly that kind of ‘woolliness and lack of intellectual rigour in Achebe’s own discourse. He is himself part of the problem he claims to be finding a solution for.

On Unity and Faith (one and a half pages)

Leaders call loudly for unity. The word is on the Nigerian coat of arms. But Achebe says unity is only valuable if it’s for a good purpose. The mafia is united. Also on the Nigerian coat of arms is the word Faith. So he also asks, faith in what? Answering these questions:

calls for a habit of mental rigour, for which, unfortunately, Nigerians are not famous. (p.33)

(You can’t help thinking this is the kind of sweeping statement about an entire people that Achebe can make, but any white author would be cancelled for.)

Anyway, the really interesting question is why the founding fathers chose Unity and Faith at all, given that they are such vague and ill-defined terms, rather than, say Justice and Honesty and Truth, which are for more clear and definable. Is it because the founding fathers didn’t think Nigerians could live up to those harder ideals?

5. Patriotism (3 and a half pages)

Nigerians are among the world’s most unpatriotic people. (p.34)

This is because patriotism requires trust or belief in a country’s leaders and Nigerians don’t have that. A patriot, he says, is someone who truly loves their country, who holds it to the highest standards and demands the best. Is that right?

Quite clearly patriotism is not going to be easy in a country as badly run as Nigeria. (p.35)

What Nigeria abounds in is the spurious patriotism of its ruling class. True patriotism can only exist when a country is ruled well by leaders who have the welfare of the majority at heart and not the material gain of the few. In other words, a country’s leaders have to give its population something to be patriotic about.

6. Social injustice and the cult of mediocrity (8 pages)

The worst impact of tribalism is injustice in awarding jobs to mediocre or incompetent candidates who come from ‘the right tribe’. It multiplies incompetence in the system and demoralisation among the victims. Thus Nigeria is a country where it’s difficult to point to even one job which is done by the best available candidate. Consistently picking a third or fourth eleven means Nigeria will never make it into the world league. This explains why the public services are so dire:

Look at our collapsing public utilities, our inefficient and wasteful parastatals and state-owned companies. If you want electricity, you buy your own generator; if you want water, you sink your own bore-hole; if you want to travel, you set up your own airline. (p.39)

But it’s not just the inefficiency and waste which promoting mediocrities to run everything badly leads to. The bigger issue is the enormous disparity between the class of people who manage things, in effect a managerial elite, who award each other huge pay packets and perks, and the vast majority of the population who remain dirt poor.

Even if the perks and luxuries and payoffs are a legacy of the colonial system, Nigerians have had two decades to reform them instead of which they’ve made the problem ten times worse.

What is the purpose of government? Surely there are two:

  1. to maintain peace and security
  2. to establish social justice, a sense of fairness and equality

Peace and stability depends on a sense of fairness. If people’s sense of unfairness and injustice is pushed to breaking point, you get revolution. All the talk about ministers and perks and chief executives ignores the fact of the tens of millions scraping a living from infertile soil, living under flyovers, scavenging on waste dumps, ‘the wretched of the earth’.

He is fully aware that most of the conversations of intellectuals or the political or business elite are incredibly aloof and disconnected from the great mass of the population.

7. Indiscipline (12 pages)

He defines indiscipline as:

a failure or refusal to submit one’s desires and actions to the restraints of orderly social conduct in recognition of the rights and desires of others. (p.45)

As a parent I know another way of saying this is acting like a grown-up and not a spoilt child. He himself says lack of self discipline is a sign of immaturity. He says lack of self discipline blights the majority of Nigerians and helps make the place a madhouse.

You can see it most clearly in the behaviour of the traffic on the roads, which Achebe has a real bee in his bonnet about. He comes back again and again to Nigerians’ terrible behaviour on the road and uses it as an example of the way Nigerians have given themselves entirely over to ‘rampaging selfishness’ (p.49).

Leaders are, among other things, role models. If a country’s leaders are selfish and greedy, lacking all restraint and self discipline, then it creates a climate of indiscipline in which millions of their countrymen think it’s OK to be like them.

Not only that but the leaders’ indiscipline also exacerbates the divide between the Big Man who has flunkeys and police and journalists falling over themselves to please him, and everybody else who has to get used to being browbeaten, insulted and extorted by every petty official (like the corrupt tax inspectors and police who victimise Odilo’s father in A Man of the People).

I don’t know any other country where you can find such brazen insensitivity and arrogant selfishness among those who lay claim to leadership and education. (p.53)

The siren mentality: he gives this name to the tendency of Nigerian officials of every rank to be accompanied everywhere by fleets of security and police cars all with sirens blaring to terrify everyone out of the way. Achebe says it is typical of Nigeria to have turned an invention of serious-minded people into:

a childish and cacophonous instrument for the celebration of status. (p.54)

‘Childish’ was the word I used to characterise the worldview and events of A Man of The People, feeling a bit nervous about accusing such an eminent author of dealing in such superficial characters and discussions – so I’m pleased to have the concept explicitly backed up by Achebe himself.

I also commented on the short temper, quickness to anger and general air of physical violence which soaks A Man of The People. Here, in the section about the siren mentality, Achebe associates the use of bombastic sirens broadcast by convoys of VIP’s cars with a kind of psychological violence, with:

  • the brutal aggressiveness which precedes a leader’s train
  • the violence of power
  • official thuggery

He calls Nigeria a ‘mentally underdeveloped’ country which ‘indulges in the celebration and brandishing of power’. Its leaders have created a mystique around themselves when a) they’re such fools they’re hardly worthy of it and b) this only creates a yawning divide between the elite class and everyone else, cowering and quivering by the side of the road as yet another cavalcade of VIPs roars past, lights flashing and sirens blaring. Undisciplined. Self centred. Childish.

8. Corruption (8 pages)

Keeping an average Nigerian from being corrupt is like keeping a goat from eating yam (1983 newspaper headline)

Nigerians are no different from other nations.

Nigerians are corrupt because the system under which they live today makes corruption easy and profitable; they will cease to be corrupt when corruption is made difficult and inconvenient. (p.58)

Achebe makes an important point which is that the exercise of corruption is intimately associated with the wielding of power; people in power have far more opportunity for corruption than the masses.

He has heard the figure that 60% of Nigeria’s wealth is consumed by corruption (p.61). He gives a couple of egregious examples of corruption scams from today’s newspapers. He explains the different types of corruption associated with big expensive building projects and refers to ‘political patronage on an unprecedented scale’ (p.63). With the result that:

Nigeria is without any shadow of doubt one of the most corrupt nations in the world… (p.63)

The only cure is for leaders to set an example, to put principle ahead of greed. A good leader would rid his administration of anyone suspected of corruption or bribery and ban them from public life.

(Just reading this passage you can see why it will never happen. In Nigeria as in most African countries corruption isn’t a blight on the system, it is the system.)

9. The Igbo problem (7 pages)

The title of this section is satirical, presumably a bitter reference to ‘the Jewish problem’, as Achebe is himself Igbo.

He explains something I didn’t know which is that the Igbo, within Nigeria, are often caricatured as aggressive, arrogant, clannish and greedy, which sounds like the worst stereotyping of the Jews.

Achebe himself calls Igbo culture ‘individualistic and highly competitive’. It is not held back by the wary religion of the other main tribal groups in Nigeria, the Hausa and Faluni, or the traditional hierarchies of the Yoruba. Igbo culture can display ‘noisy exhibitionism’ (p.67). Here’s Martin Meredith in his 2011 book The State of Africa explaining the same thing.

In the Eastern region, on the other side of the Niger river, the Igbo, occupying the poorest, most densely populated region of Nigeria, had become the best educated population, swarming out of their homeland to find work elsewhere as clerks, artisans, traders and labourers, forming sizeable minority groups in towns across the country. Their growing presence there created ethnic tensions both in the North and among the Yoruba in the West. Unlike the Hausa-Fulani and the Yoruba, the Igbo possessed no political kingdom and central authority but functioned on the basis of autonomous village societies, accustomed to a high degree of individual assertion and achievement. (p.76)

It was the tide of anti-Igbo violence which swept across northern Nigeria in reaction to the 1966 military coup, which led Igbo leaders to conceive the idea of seceding and setting up the separatist state of Biafra in 1967.

Achebe discusses the importance of the Town Union phenomenon. This seems to be the idea that the Igbo had networks of influence via their Town Union associations, which extended into clannish networks criss-crossing the nation. For political reasons leaders of other groups played on this fact to suggest Elders of Zion-style Igbo conspiracies to take other groups’ jobs, houses etc.

The reality, Achebe asserts, was exactly the opposite, the Igbo lacked strong centralised leadership. Instead, ruffians and upstarts were appointed by the British colonial authorities (as described in Achebe’s book Arrow of God) and then, since independence, hundreds and hundreds of ludicrously local ‘kings’ have sprung up like mushrooms (p.68).

Achebe mentions official policies of social, economic and political discrimination which the Igbo still labour under and pleads for them to be removed so the Igbo can play their full role in Nigerian society. In exchange the Igbo must learn to be less abrasive and more tactful.

He closes with some detailed examples of what he takes to be federal discrimination against the Igbo, namely the siting of huge new steel mills in every region except Igboland.

10. The example of Aminu Kano (15 and a half pages)

The last and longest section is devoted to Mallam Amino Kanu who had, apparently, just died. Who he?

Mallam Aminu Kano (9 August 1920 to 17 April 1983) was a Muslim politician from Nigeria. In the 1940s he led a socialist movement in the northern part of the country in opposition to British rule. (Wikipedia)

Achebe repeats Kano’s great question: what is the purpose of political power? It is certainly not to turn the population of their country into victims.

For we are victims. The entire Nigerian populace constitutes on huge, helpless electoral dupe in the hands of the politician/victimiser. (p.73)

And it’s the people’s fault. For some reason the electorate votes time and again for crooks. Politicians exploit ethnic differences not just to win the backing of ethnic groups but because it divides the electorate and makes them less able to hold politicians to account.

He calls on educated Nigerians to rouse themselves from their cynicism and ‘bestir themselves to the patriotic action of proselytising for decent and civilised political values’ (p.74). Here is where Achebe makes it clearest that he is primarily addressing Nigeria’s intelligentsia or educated class, rather than the people at large. As a matter of interest, I wonder what percentage of the total population this amounts to? 1%? It’s the narcissism of all academics, graduates, people in the media, the commentariat and so on to believe that they represent ‘the nation’.

Achebe hoped that, when democracy was restored in 1979, Nigeria would have learned from the ruinous civil war and a decade of military rule but no, the country just started making the same old mistakes all over again.

We have turned out to be like a bunch of stage clowns who bump their heads into the same heavy obstacles again and again because they are too stupid to remember what hit them only a short while ago. (p.76)

In my opinion this is a profoundly wrong way of thinking about politics. It is a commentator’s mindset, expecting that because series of events A took place which you, personally, disapproved of and learned from, that therefore everyone will have ‘learned’ from it and avoid repeating it. No.

But politics and political commentary are just the narcissistic froth bobbing on the deep slow-moving forces of geography, climate, agriculture, technology, social changes, the economy and the social realities stemming from them – such as widespread poverty, illiteracy, lack of housing, amenities, education, lack of experience working in factories (sounds trivial but cited by Paul Collier as a prime cause of poverty in the poorest countries) or of creating a civil life without universal corruption: the granular structures which actually make up a country, these are almost impossible to change.

Achebe professes himself disappointed because he thought that during the decades since Independence ‘an enlightened electorate’ would have come into being – by which he, like thousands of liberal commentators in countries round the world, meant an electorate who thinks like him.

But electorates around the world consistently don’t think like the tiny percentage of the population which enjoyed a liberal college education thinks they ought to think. Trump. Brexit. Erdoğan. Bolsonaro. Milei. The continuing success of authoritarian populists don’t prove that electorates are ‘wrong’ – all they do is highlight the gulf between liberal commentators and the populations and countries they claim to know about or speak for.

The chapter is the longest in the book because Achebe goes into some detail about political developments between the end of military rule / the advent of the second republic in 1979, and the time of writing i.e. 1983. This section assumes familiarity with leading figures in Nigerian politics and their careers to date which I didn’t have, so I struggled to follow it.

What it does convey to the outsider is the central importance of ethnicity or at least regional allegiance in Nigeria’s politics. He discusses figures like Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe and Chief Obafemi Awolowo entirely in terms of the ethnic groups they represented and promoted. There isn’t anywhere in this final section anything about these politicians’ economic or social policies. They don’t appear to have had any except to bring home the loot to their region, for ‘their’ people. Here’s a typical passage:

Professor Eyo Atik was an Efik, and the brutally unfair treatment offered him in Enugu did not go unremarked in Calabar. It contributed in no small measure to the suspicion of the majority Igbo by their minority neighbours in Eastern Nigeria – a suspicion which far less attractive politicians than Eyo Ita fanned to red-hot virulence, and from which the Igbo have continued to reap enmity to this day. (p.82)

See what I mean by not a hint of any actual policies, and how political figures are interpreted 100% in the context of their tribal allegiances? 1) Invoking tribalism i.e. getting your tribe to support you and vilifying opponents in terms of their tribal enmity, and 2) offering to bring home the bacon to your people i.e. divert profitable state funding, new roads, water, electricity, factories etc to your region – these remain the two easiest ways to drum up support among a largely illiterate electorate. They are the tried and tested routes to power and success, to personal wealth and prestige, so why on earth would any practical politician ignore them? University professors of literature like Chinua Achebe can write all the pamphlets they like but will ever change that.

Instead, people like Achebe are doomed to perpetual disappointment that ‘the people’ just don’t seem to be educated enough to share their enlightened point of view. But they never will be. This is the sentence of perpetual frustration which every intellectual in a mass democracy is condemned to. In old-fashioned Marxist terms, the bourgeois intellectual, depressed by his complete alienation from the masses, is stuck on the outside of the historical process, tutting and disapproving, and completely ineffectual because unattached to anything like a mass party which could actually change anything.

Contemporary Nigeria

Here’s the view of Africa scholar John Philips writing in Africa Studies Review in 2005:

Nigeria remains one of the most important and fascinating countries in Africa, with abundant human and material resources. If these could be harnessed effectively, Nigeria could easily become one of the most influential countries in the world. The country has played a leadership role in everything from the liberation of southern Africa to the formation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union, and the attempted stabilization of Liberia and other states in the region.

The decline of Nigeria, although not as severe as the decline and even collapse of other states in Africa, has saddened all who love her and disheartened all who had hoped for great things from independent Africa. Today Nigeria is better known for the ‘scam spam’ that clutters up internet mailboxes around the world than for its great authors, musicians, and other creative people.

Massive investments in industry have failed to industrialise the country; the hope of post-Biafra, oil-boom Nigeria has given way to cynicism, corruption, and despair. The great religiosity of Nigerians has become less a call to righteousness than a reason to murder followers of other religions. Who can ponder Confucius’s famous statement that ‘the material prosperity of a country does not consist in material prosperity, but in righteousness’ without thinking of Nigeria? Understanding the decline, if not quite yet fall, of Nigeria is one of the most important tasks facing Africanist scholars today.

Here are responses from readers on Amazon (I know it’s not scholarly opinion, but they often come from people with a special interest in the subject i.e. actual Nigerians):

Although the book is relatively old (published 1983) it continues to be distressingly relevant to the actual Nigeria. Military dictators have disappeared (again) and been replaced by democratically-elected presidents (again), but this has had little effect on the basic problems identified by this book. The author says things that only a Nigerian could get away with – and says them well, as you would expect of Achebe.

it was written in 1983 but all the issues & failures he highlights are just as relevant in 2008.

Nigerians know all about the trouble but still cannot figure out a solution and Achebe tried to sketch a route past the troubles. But alas, it is no casual ‘trouble’, it is a deeply-seated neurosis. The sad reality is that even over 3 decades later not much has changed in Nigeria – if anything it has changed for the worse in some ways – despite the passing of leadership from the illegitimate military rulers to elected civilians. Nigeria’s ruling class treat the country as an all-you-can-eat buffet while unconnected citizens are viewed as destitute serfs outside the gates. (Chris Emeka, 2014)

Material facts

As anyone familiar with my blog knows I enjoy intellectual activity and products, art and literature, very much indeed, but my belief system is based on an atheistic materialist view of the world, on the bedrock of material facts, on the biological realities of the body, on the theory of evolution, on the unpleasant realities of humans’ complete reliance on a viable environment.

People’s opinions are as changeable as their moods, even the best commentator’s interpretation is based on partial understanding, whereas the material facts can be measured and recorded. I’m not necessarily saying they’re the most important aspects of life, but objective, material facts are generally the decisive ones.

For example, you can have the most poetic thoughts in the world but if someone cuts off your head with a machete that’s the end of them. You can write reams about your splendid homeland and its historic destiny, but it’s not your fancy words, it’s the availability of food, water and energy which will determine its future. Thus:

Although it was published in 1983, all the commentators point out that the issues Achebe addressed in 1983 still challenge Nigeria in 2023. The most tangible difference is that in 1983 Nigeria’s population was 80 million and now it’s nearly three times that, at 223 million. By 2050 the population is predicted to reach 400 million. If the trend isn’t stopped, it will exceed 728 million by 2100.

Given that much agricultural and coastal land is set to be lost to climate change and environmental degradation over the same period, it’s hard not to conclude that Nigeria’s future will be catastrophic.

John Oyefara, a professor of demography at the University of Lagos, is quoted as saying that unless this unprecedented population explosion is properly managed ‘there will be more crises, insurgency, poverty and insecurity.’ It’s difficult to detect the hand of Providence, history, high destiny or ‘mankind’s advancement’, of any of the windy highfalutin’ terms Achebe opened his essay with, in any of this.

Solutions

Achebe’s pamphlet is great fun, exuberantly written, eminently quotable and quite useless. Practical solutions can only be found in the complex economic and social analyses provided by the likes of:


Credit

The Trouble With Nigeria by Chinua Achebe was published in 1983 by The Fourth Dimension Publishing Company. References are to the 2010 Penguin Books paperback volume ‘An Image of Africa.’

Related links

  • The Trouble with Nigeria online [I can’t find an online version which is not only irritating but reprehensible. It’s a text of great public interest, surely it should be freely available]
  • 2006 interview with Achebe
  • Guardian Nigeria page

Chinua Achebe reviews

Africa reviews

The way things are by Lucretius translated by Rolfe Humphries (1969)

I try to learn about the way things are
And set my findings down in Latin verse.

(Book IV, lines 968 and 969)

This is a hugely enjoyable translation of Lucretius’s epic poem De rerum natura which literally translates as ‘On the nature of things’. Fluent, full of force and vigour, it captures not only the argumentative, didactic nature of the poem but dresses it in consistently fine phrasing. It has an attractive variety of tones, from the lofty and heroic to the accessible and demotic, sometimes sounding like Milton:

Time brings everything
Little by little to the shores of light
By grace of art and reason, till we see
All things illuminate each other’s rise
Up to the pinnacles of loftiness.

(Book V, final lines, 1,453 to 1,457)

Sometimes technocratic and scientific:

We had better have some principle
In our discussion of celestial ways,
Under what system both the sun and moon
Wheel in their courses, and what impulse moves
Events on earth.

(Book I lines 130 to 135)

Sometimes like the guy sitting next to you at the bar:

I keep you waiting with my promises;
We’d best be getting on.

(Book V, lines 95 and 96)

Sometimes slipping in slangy phrases for the hell of it:

What once was too-much-feared becomes in time
The what-we-love-to-stomp-on.

(Book V, lines 1,140 and 1,141)

Titus Lucretius Carus

Lucretius was a Roman poet and philosopher who lived from about 99 to about 55 BC. Not much is known about him. His only known work is the philosophical poem De rerum natura, a didactic epic poem of some 7,500 lines, written entirely to promote the abstract philosophy of Epicureanism. No heroes, no gods, no battles, no epic speeches. Just 7,500 lines comprehensively describing Epicurus’s atomic materialism and his ‘scientific’, rationalist worldview.

The title is usually translated into English as On the Nature of Things. It is a mark of Rolfe Humphries’ attractive contrariness that he drops the almost universally used English title in favour of the slightly more confrontational and all-encompassing The ways things are. He himself in his preface describes this title as ‘simple, forthright, insistent, peremptory’. Peremptory. Nice word. Like so much else in his translation, it feels instantly right.

The various modern translations

In the past few months I’ve had bad experiences with both Oxford University Press and Penguin translations of Latin classics. I thought the Penguin translation of Sallust by A.J. Woodman was clotted, eccentric and misleading. But I also disliked the OUP translation of Caesar’s Gallic Wars by Carolyn Hammond, which I bought brand new but disliked her way with English in just the introduction before I’d even begun the text, so that I ended up abandoning her for the more fluent 1951 Penguin translation by S.A Handford (which also features a useful introduction by Jane Gardner, who comes over as intelligent and witty in a way Hammond simply isn’t).

Shopping around for an English translation of Lucretius, I was not impressed by the snippets of either the Penguin or OUP translations which are available on Amazon. It was only when I went further down the list and read the paragraph or so of Rolfe Humphries’ translation which is quoted in the sales blurb that I was immediately gripped and persuaded to cough up a tenner to buy it on the spot.

I knew an OUP edition would be festooned with notes, many of which would be insultingly obvious (Rome is the capital city of Italy, Julius Caesar was the great Roman general who blah blah blah). Humphries’ edition certainly has notes but only 18 pages of them tucked right at the very back of the text (there’s no list of names or index). And there’s no indication of them in the actual body text, no asterisks or superscript numbers to distract the reader, to make you continually stop and turn to the end notes section.

Instead the minimal annotation is part of Humphries’ strategy to hit you right between the eyes straightaway with the power and soaring eloquence of this epic poem, to present it as one continuous and overwhelming reading experience, without footling distractions and interruptions. Good call, very good call.

[Most epics are about heroes, myths and legends, from Homer and Virgil through Beowulf and Paradise Lost. Insofar as it is about the nature of the universe i.e. sees things on a vast scale, The way things are is comparable in scope and rhetoric with Paradise Lost and frequently reaches for a similar lofty tone, but unlike all those other epic poems it doesn’t have heroes and villains, gods and demons, in fact it has no human protagonists at all. In his introduction, Burton Feldman suggests the only protagonist is intelligence, the mind of man in quest of reality, seeking a detached lucid contemplation of the ways things are. On reflection I think that’s wrong. This description is more appropriate for Wordsworth’s epic poem on the growth and development of the poet’s mind, The Prelude. There’s a stronger case for arguing that the ‘hero’ of the poem is Epicurus, subject of no fewer than three sutained passages of inflated praise. But ultimately surely the protagonist of The way things are is the universe itself, or Lucretius’s materialistic conception of it. The ‘hero’ is the extraordinary world around us which he seeks to explain in solely rationalist, materialist way.]

Epicurus’s message of reassurance

It was a grind reading Cicero’s On the nature of the gods but one thing came over very clearly (mainly from the long, excellent introduction by J.M. Ross). That Epicurus’s philosophy was designed to allay anxiety and fear.

Epicurus identified two causes of stress and anxiety in human beings: fear of death and fear of the gods (meaning their irrational, unpredictable interventions in human lives so). So Epicurus devised a system of belief based on ‘atomic materialism’, on a view of the universe as consisting of an infinite number of atoms continually combining in orderly and predictable ways according to immutable laws, designed to banish those fears and anxieties forever.

If men could see this clearly, follow it
With proper reasoning, their minds would be
Free of great agony and fear

(Book III, lines 907-909)

Irrelevant though a 2,000 year old pseudo-scientific theory may initially sound, it has massive consequences and most of the poem is devoted to explaining Epicurus’s materialistic atomism (or atomistic materialism) and its implications.

Epicurus’s atomic theory

The central premise of Epicureanism is its atomic theory, which consists of two parts:

  1. Nothing comes of nothing.
  2. Nothing can be reduced to nothing.

The basic building blocks of nature are constant in quantity, uncreated and indestructible, for all intents and purposes, eternal. Therefore, everything in nature is generated from these elementary building blocks through natural processes, is generated, grows, thrives, decays, dies and decomposes into its constituent elements. But the sum total of matter in the universe remains fixed and unalterable.

Once we have seen that Nothing comes of nothing,
We shall perceive with greater clarity
What we are looking for, whence each thing comes,
How things are caused, and no ‘gods’ will’ about it!

It may sound trivial or peripheral, but what follows from this premise is that nature is filled from top to bottom with order and predictability. There cannot be wonders, freak incidents, arbitrary acts of god and so on. The unpredictable intervention of gods is abolished and replaced by a vision of a calm, ordered world acting according to natural laws and so – There is no need for stress and anxiety.

Because if no new matter can be created, if the universe is made of atoms combining into larger entities based on fixed and predictable laws, then two things follow.

Number One, There are no gods and they certainly do not suddenly interfere with human activities. In other words, nobody should be afraid of the wrath or revenge of the gods because in Epicurus’s mechanistic universe such a thing is nonsensical.

Holding this knowledge, you can’t help but see
That nature has no tyrants over her,
But always acts of her own will; she has
No part of any godhead whatsoever.

(Book II, lines 1,192 to 1,195)

And the second consequence is a purely mechanistic explanation of death. When we, or any living thing, dies, its body decomposes back into its constituent atoms. There is no state of death, there is no soul or spirit, and so there is no afterlife in which humans will be punished or rewarded. We will not experience death, because all the functioning of our bodies, including perception and thought, will all be over, with no spirit or soul lingering on.

Therefore: no need for ‘the silly, vain, ridiculous fear of gods’ (III, 982), no need to fear death, no need to fear punishment in some afterlife. Instead, we must live by the light of the mind and rational knowledge.

Our terrors and our darknesses of mind
Must be dispelled, not by the sunshine’s rays,
Not by those shining arrows of the light,
But by insight into nature, and a scheme
Of systematic contemplation.

(Book I, lines 146 to 150)

Interestingly Lucretius likes this phrase so much that he repeats it verbatim at Book II, lines 57 to 61, at Book III, lines 118 to 112, and Book VI, lines 42 to 45. Like all good teachers he knows the essence of education is repetition.

Epicurus the god

The radicalness of this anti-religious materialist philosophy explains why, early in Book I, Lucretius praises Epicurus extravagantly. He lauds him as the man whose imagination ranged the lengths of the universe, penetrated into the secrets of its origin and nature, and returned to free the human race from bondage. One man alone, Epicurus, set us free by enquiring more deeply into the nature of things than any man before him and so springing ‘the tight-barred gates of Nature’s hold asunder’.

Epicureanism is as much as ‘religious’ experience as a rational philosophy and Lucretius’s references to Epicurus in the poem could almost be hymns to Christ from a Christian epic. They are full of more than awe, of reverence and almost worship. (Book I 66ff, Book II, Book III 1042, opening of Book V).

He was a god, a god indeed, who first
Found a new life-scheme, a system, a design
Now known as Wisdom or Philosophy…

He seems to us, by absolute right, a god
From whom, distributed through all the world,
Come those dear consolations of the mind,
That precious balm of spirit.

(Book V, lines 11 to 13 and 25 to 28)

Lucretius’s idolisation of Epicurus just about stops short of actual worship because Religion is the enemy. Organised religion is what keeps people in fear of the gods and makes their lives a misery. Epicurus’s aim was to liberate mankind from the oppression and wickedness into which Religious belief, superstition and fanatacism all too often lead it.

Religion the enemy of freedom

Lucretius loathes and detests organised Religion. It oppresses everyone, imposing ludicrous fictions and superstitions about divine intervention and divine punishment. Nonsense designed to oppress and quell the population.

I teach great things.
I try to loose men’s spirits from the ties,
Tight knotted, which religion binds around them.

(Book I, lines 930 to 932)

As a vivid example of the way Religion always stands with evil he gives the story of Agamemnon being told by soothsayers to sacrifice his own daughter, Iphigeneia, to appease the gods, to calm the seas, so that the fleet of 1,000 Greek ships can sail from Greece to Troy. Could you conceive a worse example of the wicked behaviour religious belief can lead people into.

Too many times
Religion mothers crime and wickedness…
A mighty counsellor, Religion stood
With all that power for wickedness.

(Book I, lines 83 to 84 and 99 to 100)

Epicureanism and Stoicism in their social context

I need your full attention. Listen well!

(Book VI, line 916)

The notes to the book were written by Professor George Strodach. Like the notes in H.H. Scullard’s classic history of Republican Rome, Strodach’s notes are not the frequent little factoids you so often find in Penguin or OUP editions (Democritus was born in Thrace around 460 BC etc), but fewer in number and longer, amounting to interesting essays in their own right.

Among several really interesting points, he tells us that after Alexander the Great conquered the Greek city states in the late 4th century (320s BC) many of those city states decayed in power and influence and their citizens felt deprived of the civic framework which previously gave their lives meaning. To fill this void there arose two competing ‘salvation ideologies, Stoicism and Epicureanism. Each offered their devotees a meaningful way of life plus a rational and fully worked out account of the world as a whole. In both cases the worldview is the groundwork for ‘the therapy of dislocated and unhappy souls’. In each, the sick soul of the initiate must first of all learn the nature of reality before it can take steps towards leading the good life.

Lucretius’ long poem is by way of leading the novice step by step deeper into a worldview which, once adopted, is designed to help him or her conquer anxiety and achieve peace of mind by abandoning the chains of superstitious religious belief and coming to a full and complete understanding of the scientific, materialistic view of the way things are.

There’s no good life
No blessedness, without a mind made clear,
A spirit purged of error.

(Book V, lines 23 to 25)

Very didactic

Hence the poem’s extreme didacticism. It is not so much a long lecture (thought it often sounds like it) as a prolonged initiation into the worldview of the cult of Epicurus, addressed to one person, Lucretius’s sponsor Gaius Memmius, but designed to be used by anyone who can read.

Pay attention!…
Just remember this…

(Book II, lines 66 and 90)

Hence the didactic lecturing tone throughout, which tells the reader to listen up, pay attention, focus, remember what he said earlier, lays out a lesson plan, and then proceeds systematically from point to point.

I shall begin
With a discussion of the scheme of things
As it regards the heaven and powers above,
Then I shall state the origin of things,
The seeds from which nature creates all things,
Bids them increase and multiply; in turn,
How she resolves them to their elements
After their course is run.

(Book I, lines 54 to 57)

The poem is littered with reminders that it is one long argument, that Lucretius is making a case. He repeatedly tells Memmius to pay attention, to follow the thread of his argument, not to get distracted by common fears or misapprehensions, and takes time to rubbish the theories of rivals.

Now pay heed! I have more to say…

(Book III, line 136)

The poem amounts to a very long lecture.

If you know this,
It only takes a very little trouble
To learn the rest: the lessons, one by one,
Brighten each other, no dark night will keep you,
Pathless, astray, from ultimate vision and light,
All things illumined in each other’s radiance.

And it’s quite funny, the (fairly regular) moments when he insists that he’s told us the same thing over and over again, like a schoolteacher starting to be irritated by his pupils’ obtuseness:

  • I have said this many, many times already
  • I am almost tired of saying (III, 692)
  • as I have told you all too many times (IV, 673)
  • Be attentive now. (IV, 878)
  • I have said this over and over, many times. (IV, 1,210)
  • This I’ve said before (VI, 175)
  • Don’t be impatient. Listen! (VI, 244)
  • Remember/Never forget this! (VI, 653 to 654)
  • As I have said before… (VI, 770)
  • Once again/I hammer home this axiom… (VI, 938)

The good life

Contrary to popular belief the Epicureans did not promote a hedonistic life of pleasure. Their aim was negative: the good life is one which is, as far as possible, free from bodily pains and mental anxiety. They deprecated the competitive and acquisitive values so prevalent in first century BC Roman society:

The strife of wits, the wars for precedence,
The everlasting struggle, night and day
To win towards heights of wealth and power.

(Book II, lines 13 to 15)

What vanity!
To struggle towards the top, toward honour’s height
They made the way a foul and deadly road,
And when they reached the summit, down they came
Like thunderbolts, for Envy strikes men down
Like thunderbolts, into most loathsome Hell…
…let others sweat themselves
Into exhaustion, jamming that defile
They call ambition…

(Book V, lines 1,124 to 1,130 and 1,134 to 1,136)

Instead the Epicureans promoted withdrawal from all that and the spousal of extreme simplicity of living.

Whereas, if man would regulate his life
With proper wisdom, he would know that wealth,
The greatest wealth, is living modestly,
Serene, content with little.

(Book V, lines 1,117 to 1,120)

This much I think I can, and do, assert:
That our perverse vestigial native ways
Are small enough for reason to dispel
So that it lies within our power to live
Lives worthy of the gods.

This kind of life is challenging to achieve by yourself which is why the Epicureans were noted for setting up small communities of shared values. (See what I mean by the disarmingly open but powerful eloquence of Humphries’ style.)

If man would regulate his life
With proper wisdom, he would know that wealth,
The greatest wealth, is living modestly,
Serene, content with little.

(Book V, 1,118 to 1,121)

Shortcomings of Latin

Lucretius repeatedly points out that it is difficult to write about philosophy in Latin because it doesn’t have the words, the terminology or the traditions which have developed them, unlike the Greeks.

I know
New terms must be invented, since our tongue
Is poor and this material is new.

The poverty of our speech, our native tongue,
Makes it hard for me to say exactly how
These basic elements mingle…

(Book III, lines 293-295)

Interesting because this is the exact same point Cicero makes in the De rerum deorum. Cicero, in his books and letters made clear that his philosophical works as a whole have the aim of importing the best Greek thinking into Latin and, as part of the process, creating new Latin words or adapting old ones to translate the sophisticated philosophical terminology which the Greeks had spent centuries developing.

The really miraculous thing is that Humphries captures all this, or has written an English poem which is actually worth reading as poetry. ‘I

for your sake, Memmius,
Have wanted to explain the way things are
Turning the taste of honey into sound
As musical, as golden, so that I
May hold your mind with poetry, while you
Are learning all about that form, that pattern,
And see its usefulness.

(Book IV, lines 19 to 25)

Synopis

Book 1 (1,117 lines)

– Introduction

– hymn to Venus, metaphorical symbol of the creative urge in all life forms

– address to the poet’s patron, Memmius

– the two basic postulates of atomism, namely: nothing comes of nothing and the basic building blocks of the universe, atoms, cannot be destroyed

– the importance of void or space between atoms which allows movement

– everything else, all human history, even time itself, are by-products or accidents of the basic interplay of atoms and void

– on the characteristics of atoms

– a refutation of rival theories, of Heraclitus (all things are made of fire), Empedocles (set no limit to the smallness of things), the Stoics (who believe everything is made up of mixtures of the 4 elements) and Anaxagoras (who believed everything was made up of miniature versions of itself) – all comprehensively rubbished

– the infinity of matter and space

Book 2 (1,174 lines)

– the good life is living free from care, fear or anxiety

– varieties of atomic motion namely endless falling through infinite space; atoms travel faster than light

– the atomic swerve and its consequences i.e. it is a slight swerve in the endless downward fall of atoms through infinite space which begins the process of clustering and accumulation which leads to matter which leads, eventually, to the universe we see around us

– how free will is the result of a similar kind of ‘swerve’ in our mechanistic lives

– the conservation of energy

– the variety of atomic shapes and the effects of these on sensation

– atoms themselves have no secondary qualities such as colour, temperature and so on

– there is an infinite number of worlds, all formed purely mechanically i.e. no divine intervention required

– there are gods, as there are men, but they are serenely indifferent to us and our lives: in Epicurus’s worldview, the so-called gods are really just moral exemplars of lives lived with complete detachment, calm and peace (what the Greeks called ataraxia)

to think that gods
Have organised all things for the sake of men
Is nothing but a lot of foolishness. (II, 14-176)

– all things decay and our times are degraded since the golden age (‘The past was better, infinitely so’)

That all things, little by little, waste away
As time’s erosion crumbles them to doom.

Book III (1,094 lines)

– Epicurus as therapist of the soul – this passage, along with other hymns of praise to the great man scattered through the poem, make it clear that Epicurus was more than a philosopher but the founder of a cult whose devotees exalted him

– the fear of hell as the root cause of all human vices

– the material nature of mind and soul – their interaction and relation to the body – spirit is made of atoms like everything else, but much smaller than ‘body atoms’, and rarer, and finely intricated

– rebuttal of Democritus’s theory of how atoms of body and spirit interact (he thought they formed a chains of alternating body and spirit atoms)

– descriptions of bodily ailments (such as epilepsy) and mental ailments( such as fear or depression) as both showing the intimate link between body and spirit

– an extended passage arguing why the spirit or soul is intimately linked with the body so that when one dies, the other dies with it

– the soul is not immortal – therefore there is no ‘transmigration of souls’; a soul which was in someone else for their lifetime does not leave their body upon their death and enter that of the nearest newly-conceived foetus – he ridicules this belief by envisioning the souls waiting in a queue hovering around an egg about to be impregnated by a sperm and all vying to be the soul that enters the new life

– the soul is not immortal – being made of atoms it disintegrates like the body from the moment of death (in lines 417 to 820 Lucretius states no fewer than 26 proofs of the mortality of the soul: Strodach groups them into 1. proofs from the material make-up of the soul; proofs from diseases and their cures; 3. proofs from the parallelism of body and soul; 4. proofs from the various logical absurdities inherent in believing the soul could exist independently of the body)

– therefore, Death is nothing to us

– vivid descriptions of types of people and social situations (at funerals, at banquets) at which people’s wrong understanding of the way things are makes them miserable

Book IV (1,287 lines)

– the poet’s task is to teach

Because I teach great things, because I strive
To free the spirit, give the mind release
From the constrictions of religious fear…

(Book IV, lines 8 to 10)

– atomic images or films: these are like an invisible skin or film shed from the surfaces of all objects, very fine, passing through the air, through glass – this is his explanation of how sight and smell work, our senses detect these microscopic films of things which are passing through the air all around us

– all our sensations are caused by these atomic images

all knowledge is based on the senses; rejecting the evidence of the senses in favour of ideas and theories leads to nonsense, ‘a road to ruin’. Strodach calls this ‘extreme empiricism’ and contrast it with the two other ancient philosophies, Platonism which rejected the fragile knowledge of the senses and erected knowledge on the basis of maths and logic; and Scepticism, which said both mind and body can be wrong, so we have to go on probabilities and experience

– his explanations of sight, hearing and taste are colourful, imaginative, full of interesting examples, and completely wrong

– how we think, based on the theory of ‘images’ derived by the impression of atomic ‘skins’ through our senses; it seems wildly wrong, giving the impression that ‘thought’ is the almost accidental combination of these atomistic images in among the finer textured atoms of the mind

– a review of related topics of human experience, including movement, sleep and dreams, the latter produced when fragments of atomistic images are assembled by the perceiving mind when it is asleep, passive and undirected

– an extended passage ridiculing romantic love which moves on to theory about sex and reproduction, namely that the next generation are a mix of material from each parent, with a load of old wives’ tales about which position to adopt to get pregnant, and the sex or characteristics of offspring derive from the vigour and other characteristics of the parents. Lucretius tries to give a scientific explanation of the many aspects of sex and reproduction which, since he lacked all science, come over as folk myths. But he is a card carrying Epicurean and believes the whole point of life is to avoid anxiety, stress and discombobulation and so, logically enough, despises and ridicules sex and love.

Book V (1,457 lines)

– Epicurus as revealer of philosophical wisdom and healer

– the world is mortal, its origin is mechanical not divine

– astronomical questions

– the origin of vegetable, animal and human life

– an extended passage describing the rise of man from lying under bushes in a state of nature through the creation of tribes, then cities – the origin of civilisation, including the invention of kings and hierarchies, the discovery of fire, how to use metals and weave clothes, the invention of language and law and, alas, the development of Religion to awe and terrify ourselves with

This book is the longest and also the weakest, in that Lucretius reveals his woeful ignorance about a whole raft of scientific issues. He thinks the earth is at the centre of the universe and the moon, sun, planets and stars all circle round it. He thinks the earth is a flat surface and the moon and the sun disappear underneath it. He thinks the sun, moon and stars are moved by the wind. He thinks all animals and other life forms were given birth by the earth, and that maggots and worms are generated from soil. In her early days the earth gave birth to all kinds of life forms but this no longer happens because she is tired out. Lucretius is anti-evolutionary in the way he thinks animals and plants and man came into being with abilities fully formed (the eye, nose, hand) and only then found uses for them, rather than the modern view that even slight, rudimentary fingers, hands, sense of smell, taste, sight, would convey evolutionary advantage on their possessors which tend to encourage their development over successive generations.

I appreciate that Lucretius was trying his best to give an objective, rational and unsupernatural account of all aspects of reality. I understand that although his account of the origins of lightning and thunder may be wildly incorrect (clouds contain particles of fire) his aim was worthy and forward looking – to substitute a rational materialistic account for the absurdly anthropocentric, superstitious, god-fearing superstitions of his day, by which people thought lightning and thunder betokened the anger of the gods. He had very good intentions.

But these good intentions don’t stop the majority of his account from being ignorant tripe. Well intention and asking the right questions (what causes rain, what causes thunder, what is lightning, what is magnetism) and trying hard to devise rational answers to them. But wrong about almost everything.

Reading it makes you realise what enormous events the invention of the telescope and the microscope were, both around 1600, Galileo’s proof that the earth orbits round the sun a decade later, the discovery of the circulation of the blood in the 1620s, Newton’s theory of gravity in the 1680s, the discovery of electricity around 1800, the theory of evolution in the 1850s, the germ theory of the 1880s and, well, all of modern science.

Reading Lucretius, like reading all the ancients and medieval authors, is to engage with intelligent, learned, observant and sensitive people who knew absolutely nothing about how the world works, what causes natural phenomena, how living organisms came about and evolved, next to nothing about astronomy, geography, geology, biology, physics, chemistry or any of the natural sciences. Their appeal is their eloquence, the beauty of their language and the beguilingness of their fairy tales.

And of course, the scientific worldview is always provisional. It may turn out that everything we believe is wrong and about to be turned upside down by new discoveries and paradigm shifts., It’s happened before.

Book VI (1,286 lines)

– another hymn to Epicurus and his godlike wisdom

…he cleansed
Our hearts by words of truth; he put an end
To greed and fears; he showed the highest good
Toward which we all are aiming, showed the way…

(Book VI, lines 22 to 25)

– meteorology: thunder, lightning because the clouds contain gold and seeds of fire, waterspouts

– geological phenomena: earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, clouds, rain, why the sea never overflows considering all the rivers running into it, the inundation of the Nile

– why noxious things oppress humanity; pigs hate perfume but love mud!

– four pages about magnetism, noticing and describing many aspects of it but completely wrong about what it is and how it works

– disease, plague and pestilence, which he thinks derive from motes and mist which is in the right ballpark

The odd thing about the entire poem is that it leads up, not to an inspiring vision of the Good Life lived free of anxiety in some ideal Epicurean community, but to a sustained and harrowing description of the great plague which devastated Athens during the second year of the Peloponnesian War (430 BC). For four pages the poet lays on detail after detail of the great plague, the symptoms, the horrible suffering and death, its spread, social breakdown, streets full of rotting corpses. And then – it just ends. Stops. Not quite in mid-sentence, but certainly in mid-flow.

The abruptness of this unexpected ending has led many commentators to speculate that Lucretius intended to write a seventh book, which would have been devoted to religion, theology, ethics and led up to the hymn to the Good Life everyone was expecting. I agree. Throughout the poem he is chatty, badgering the reader, telling us he’s embarking on a new subject, repeating things he’s said before, haranguing and nagging us. For the text to just end in the middle of describing men fighting over whose family members will be burned on funeral pyres is macabre and weird. Here are the very last lines:

Everyone in grief
Buried his own whatever way he could
Amid the general panic. Sudden need
And poverty persuaded men to use
Horrible makeshifts; howling, they would place
Their dead on pyres prepared for other men’
Apply the torches, maim and bleed and brawl
To keep the corpses from abandonment.

(Book VI, lines 1,279 to 1,286)

It must be unfinished.

Thoughts

1. The philosophy

I’m very attracted by Epicurus’s thought, as propounded here and in Cicero’s De natura deorum. After a long and sometimes troubled life I very much want to achieve a state of ataraxia i.e. freedom from mental disturbances. However, there seems to me a very big flaw at the heart of Epicureanism. One of the two cardinal fears addressed is fear of the gods, in the sense of fear of their arbitrary intervention in our lives unless we endlessly propitiate these angry entities with sacrifices and processions and whatnot. This fear of punishment and retribution is said to be one of the principle sources of anxiety in people.

Except that this isn’t really true. I live in a society, England, which in 2022 is predominantly godless. Real believers in actual gods are in a distinct minority. And yet mental illnesses, including depression and ‘generalised anxiety disorder’, are more prevalent than ever before, afflicting up to a quarter of the population annually.

It felt to me throughout the poem that accusing religious belief in gods as the principle or sole cause of anxiety and unhappiness is so wide of the mark as to make it useless. Even in a godless world, all humans are still susceptible to utterly random accidents, to a whole range of unfortunate blows, from being diagnosed with cancer to getting hit by a bus, losing your job, losing your house, losing your partner. We are vulnerable to thousands of incidents and accidents which could affect us very adversely and it is not at all irrational to be aware of them, and it is very hard indeed not to worry about them, particularly if you actually do lose your job, your house, your partner, your children, your parents etc.

The idea that human beings waste a lot of time in fear and anxiety and stress and worry is spot on. So the notion that removing this fear and anxiety and stress and worry would be a good thing is laudable. And Epicurus’s argument against the fear of death (death is the end of mind and body both; therefore it is pointless worrying about it because you won’t feel it; it is less than nothing) is still relevant, powerful and potentially helpful.

But the idea that you can alleviate anxiety do that by disproving the existence of ‘gods’ is, alas, completely irrelevant to the real causes of the problem, which have endured long after any ‘fear of the gods’ has evaporated and so is of no practical help at all. All Epicurus and Lucretius’s arguments in this area, fluent and enjoyable though they are, are of purely academic or historical interest. Sadly.

2. The poem

Cicero’s De rerum natura was a hard read because of the unrelentingness of the arguments, many of which seemed really stupid or petty. The way things are, on the contrary, is an amazingly enjoyable read because of the rhythm and pacing and phrasing of the poem.

Lucretius is just as argumentative as Cicero i.e. the poem is packed with arguments following pell mell one after the other (‘Moreover…one more point…furthermore…In addition…’) but this alternates with, or is embedded in, descriptions of human nature, of the world and people around us, and of the make-up of the universe, which are both attractive and interesting in themselves, and also provide a sense of rhythm, changes of subject and pace, to the poem.

Amazingly, although the subject matter is pretty mono-minded and Lucretius is banging on and on about essentially the same thing, the poem itself manages never to be monotonous. I kept reading and rereading entire pages just for the pleasure of the words and phrasing. This is one of the, if not the, most enjoyable classical text I’ve read. And a huge part of that is, I think, down to Humphries’s adeptness as a poet.

Comparison with the Penguin edition

As it happened, just after I finished reading the Humphries translation I came across the 2007 Penguin edition of the poem in a local charity shop and snapped it up for £2. It’s titled The Nature of Things and contains a translation by A.E. Stallings with an introduction and notes by Richard Jenkyns.

Textual apparatus

As you’d expect from Penguin, it’s a much more traditional layout, including not only the translation but an introduction, further reading, an explanation of the style and metre of the translation, 22 pages of factual notes at the end (exactly the kind of fussy, mostly distracting notes the Humphries edition avoids), and a glossary of names.

In addition it has two useful features: the text includes line numberings, given next to every tenth line. It’s a feature of the Humphries version that it’s kept as plain and stripped down as possible with no indication of lines except at the top of the page, so if you want to know which line you’re looking at you have to manually count from the top line downwards. Trivial but irritating.

The other handy thing about the Penguin edition is it gives each of the books a title, absent in the original and Humphries. Again, no biggy, but useful.

  • Book I – Matter and Void
  • Book II – The Dance of Atoms
  • Book III – Mortality and the Soul
  • Book IV – The Senses
  • Book V – Cosmos and Civilisation
  • Book VI – Weather and the Earth

New things I learned from Richard Jenkyns’ introduction were:

Epicurus’s own writings are austere and he was said to disapprove of poetry. Lucretius’s achievement, and what makes his poem so great, was the tremendous depth of lyric feeling he brought to the, potentially very dry, subject matter. He doesn’t just report Epicurus’s philosophy, he infuses it with passion, conviction and new levels of meaning.

This, for Jenkyns, explains a paradox which has bugged scholars, namely why a poem expounding a philosophy which is fiercely anti-religion, opens with a big Hymn to Venus. It’s because Venus is a metaphor for the underlying unity of everything which is implicit in Epicurus’s teaching that there is no spirit, no soul, nothing but atoms in various combinations and this means we are all united in the bounty of nature.

The opponents of Epicureanism commonly treated it as a dull, drab creed; Lucretius’ assertion is that, rightly apprehended, it is beautiful, majestic and inspiring. (p.xviii)

Lucretius’s was very influential on the leading poet of the next generation, Virgil, who assimilated his soaring tone.

The passages praising Epicurus are strategically place throughout the poem, much as invocations of the muses open key books in the traditional classical epic.

Jenkyns points out that Lucretius’s tone varies quite a bit, notable for much soaring rhetoric but also including invective and diatribe, knockabout abuse of rival philosophers, sometimes robustly humorous, sometimes sweetly domestic, sometimes focusing on random observations about everyday life, then soaring into speculation about the stars and the planets. But everything is driven by and reverts to, a tone of impassioned communication. He has seen the light and he is desperate to share it with everyone. It is an evangelical poem.

Stalling’s translation

Quite separate from Jenkyns’s introduction, Stalling gives a 5-page explanation of the thinking behind her translation. The obvious and overwhelming differences are that her version rhymes, and is in very long lines which she calls fourteeners. To be precise she decided to translate Lucretius’s Latin dactylic hexameters into English rhyming heptameters, where heptameter means a line having seven ‘feet’ or beats. What does that mean in practice? Well, count the number of beats in each of these lines. The first line is tricky so I’ve bolded the syllables I think need emphasising:

Life-stirring Venus, Mother of Aeneas and of Rome,
Pleasure of men and gods, you make all things beneath the dome
Of sliding constellations teem, you throng the fruited earth
And the ship-freighted sea – for every species comes to birth
Conceived through you, and rises forth and gazes on the light.
The winds flee from you, Goddess, your arrival puts to flight
The clouds of heaven. For you, the crafty earth contrives sweet flowers,
For you, the oceans laugh, the sky grows peaceful after showers…

(Book I, lines 1 to 8)

Stalling concedes that the standard form for translating foreign poetry is probably loose unrhymed pentameters, with five beats per line – exactly the metre Humphries uses:

Creatress, mother of the Roman line,
Dear Venus, joy of earth and joy of heaven,
All things that live below that heraldry
Of star and planet, whose processional
Moves ever slow and solemn over us,
All things conceived, all things that face the light
In their bright visit, the grain-bearing fields,
The marinered ocean, where the wind and cloud
Are quiet in your presence – all proclaim
Your gift, without which they are nothingness.

Clearly Humphries’ unrhymed pentameters have a much more light and airy feel. They also allow for snazzy phrasing – I like ‘marinered ocean’, a bit contrived, but still stylish. Or take Humphries’ opening of Book III:

O glory of the Greeks, the first to raise
The shining light out of tremendous dark
Illumining the blessings of our life
You are the one I follow. In your steps
I tread, not as a rival, but for love
Of your example. Does the swallow vie
With swans? Do wobbly-legged little goats
Compete in strength and speed with thoroughbreds?

Now Stalling:

You, who first amidst such thick gloom could raise up so bright
A lantern, bringing everything that’s good in life to light,
You I follow, Glory of the Greeks, and place my feet,
Within your footsteps. Not because I would compete
With you, but for the sake of love, because I long to follow
And long to emulate you. After all, why would a swallow
Strive with swans? How can a kid with legs that wobble catch
Up with the gallop of a horse? – the race would be no match.

Stalling makes the point that the heptameter has, since the early Renaissance, been associated with ballads and with narrative and so is suited to a long didactic poem. Arthur Golding used it in his 1567 translation of Ovid’s Metamorphoses and George Chapman in his 1611 translation of the Iliad. Stalling hopes the ‘old fashioned rhythm and ring’ of her fourteeners will, implicitly, convey ‘something of the archaic flavour of Lucretius’s Latin’ (p.xxvi).

OK, let’s look at the little passage which I noticed crops up no fewer than four times in the poem. Here’s Stalling’s version:

This dread, these shadows of the mind, must thus be swept away
Not by rays of the sun or by the brilliant beams of day,
But by observing Nature and her laws. And this will lay
The warp out for us – her first principle: that nothing’s brought
Forth by any supernatural power out of naught
.

(Book I, lines 146 to 153)

That use of ‘naught’ transports us back to the 1850s and Tennyson. It is consciously backward looking, in sound and meaning and connotation. I can see why: she’s following through on her stated aim of conveying the original archaism of the poem. But, on the whole, I just don’t like the effect. I prefer Humphries’ more modern-sounding diction.

Also, despite having much longer lines to play with, something about the rhythm and the requirement to rhyme each line paradoxically end up cramping Stalling’s ability to express things clearly and simply. Compare Humphries’ version of these same lines:

Our terrors and our darknesses of mind
Must be dispelled, not by the sunshine’s rays,
Not by those shining arrows of the light,
But by insight into nature, and a scheme
Of systematic contemplation. So
Our starting point shall be this principle:
Nothing at all is ever born from nothing
By the gods’ will
.

‘Insight into nature’ and ‘systematic contemplation’ are so much more emphatic and precise than ‘by observing Nature and her laws’ which is bland, clichéd and flabby.

Humphries’ ‘Our starting point shall be this principle’ is a little stagey and rhetorical but has the advantage of being crystal clear. Whereas Stalling’s ‘And this will lay/The warp out for us – her first principle…’ is cramped and confusing. Distracted by the odd word ‘warp’, trying to visualise what it means in this context, means I miss the impact of this key element of Lucretius’s message.

In her translator’s note Stalling refers to earlier translations and has this to say about Humphries:

Rolfe Humphries’ brisk, blank verse translation The way things are (1969) often spurred me to greater vigour and concision. (p.xxviii)

Precisely. I think the Stalling is very capable, and it should be emphasised that the fourteeners really do bed down when you take them over the long haul. If you read just a few lines of this style it seems silly and old fashioned, but if you read a full page it makes sense and after several pages you really get into the swing. It is a good meter for rattling through an extended narrative.

But still. I’m glad I read the poem in the Humphries’ version. To use Stalling’s own phrase, it has ‘greater vigour and concision’. Humphries much more vividly conveys Lucretius’s urgency of tone, his compulsion to share the good news with us and set us free:

…all terrors of the mind
Vanish, are gone; the barriers of the world
Dissolve before me, and I see things happen
All through the void of empty space. I see
The gods majestic, and their calm abodes
Winds do not shake, nor clouds befoul nor snow
Violate with the knives of sleet and cold;
But there the sky is purest blue, the air
Is almost laughter in that radiance,
And nature satisfies their every need,
And nothing, nothing mars their peace of mind.

(Book III, lines 15 to 25)

I’m with him, I’m seeing the vision of the passionless gods with him, and I’m caught up in his impassioned repetition of ‘nothing, nothing‘. All of which, alas, is fogged and swaddled in the long fustian lines of Stalling’s version:

…The gods appear to me
Enthroned in all their holiness and their serenity,
And where they dwell, wind never lashes them, cloud never rains,
And snowfall white and crisp with biting frost never profanes.
The canopy of aether over them is always bright
And unbeclouded, lavishing the laughter of its light.
And there they want for nothing; every need, nature supplies;
And nothing ever ruffles their peace of mind. Contrariwise…

The key phrase about the gods’ peace of mind should conclude the line; instead it ends mid-line and is, as a result, muffled. Why? To make way for the rhyme, which in this case is supplied by another heavily archaic word ‘contrariwise’ which has the unintended effect of trivialising the preceding line.

Stalling’s translation is skilful, clever, immensely rhythmic, a fascinating experiment, but…no.

Online translations

Now let me extend my argument. I’ll try
To be as brief as possible, but listen!

(Book IV, lines 115 to 116)

There have been scores of translations of De rerum natura into English. An easy one to access on the internet is William Ellery Leonard’s 1916 verse translation. Compared to either Stalling or Humphries, it’s dire, but it’s free.


Roman reviews

The Time Machine by H.G. Wells (1895)

Why is this, Wells’s first novella, such a classic? At least in part because it is short, pacy and vivid.

Short 

Barely 90 pages in the Pan paperback version, at 33,000 words The Time Machine is comparable in length and ‘grip’ to the first Sherlock Holmes novels or The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde (25,000 words). It gets in, makes its sensational statement, and is all over while you’re still reeling. It takes as long to read as the average movie to watch.

Pacy 

Not only is it short, but it moves at a cracking pace, the opening words introducing us to the (anonymous) Time Traveller in conversation with his dinner guests. We are plunged straight into a discussion of the theory of time before, a few pages later, he shows them a small time machine (p.13), before then (p.16) exhibiting the nearly completed full-size machine itself, and then – a mere week, and three pages, later (p.19), his friends, assembled for the usual Thursday evening dinner, gasp as he staggers dramatically through the door, and tells the assembled guests his extraordinary story.

Given that the Pan paperback text starts on page seven, it’s gone from nothing to details of his time travelling adventures in twelve swift pages.

Vivid 

And nobody who’s read it can forget the tremendous scenes he conjures up –

  • the idyllic, sunny world of the Eloi
  • the horror of the underground world inhabited by the filthy, white ape-like Morlocks
  • the Time Traveller wandering, accompanied by the elfin Weena, through the ruins of a vast abandoned Natural History Museum
  • the fire in the forest as the Morlocks attack him and Weena
  • and then the climactic scene as the Morlocks swarm all over him as he struggles to reattach the levers to the time machine which make it work and let him escape

And I have never forgotten being entranced, as a boy, by the coda to the main adventure, his visions of the world millions of years hence, when the dying sun has stopped rising or setting, the moon has disappeared, and the world is a vast beach lapped by a thick oily sea, inhabited only by monstrous crabs.

‘I stopped very gently and sat upon the Time Machine, looking round. The sky was no longer blue. North-eastward it was inky black, and out of the blackness shone brightly and steadily the pale white stars. Overhead it was a deep Indian red and starless, and south-eastward it grew brighter to a glowing scarlet where, cut by the horizon, lay the huge hull of the sun, red and motionless. The rocks about me were of a harsh reddish colour, and all the trace of life that I could see at first was the intensely green vegetation that covered every projecting point on their south-eastern face. It was the same rich green that one sees on forest moss or on the lichen in caves: plants which like these grow in a perpetual twilight.

‘The machine was standing on a sloping beach. The sea stretched away to the south-west, to rise into a sharp bright horizon against the wan sky. There were no breakers and no waves, for not a breath of wind was stirring. Only a slight oily swell rose and fell like a gentle breathing, and showed that the eternal sea was still moving and living. And along the margin where the water sometimes broke was a thick incrustation of salt—pink under the lurid sky. There was a sense of oppression in my head, and I noticed that I was breathing very fast. The sensation reminded me of my only experience of mountaineering, and from that I judged the air to be more rarefied than it is now.

‘Far away up the desolate slope I heard a harsh scream, and saw a thing like a huge white butterfly go slanting and fluttering up into the sky and, circling, disappear over some low hillocks beyond. The sound of its voice was so dismal that I shivered and seated myself more firmly upon the machine. Looking round me again, I saw that, quite near, what I had taken to be a reddish mass of rock was moving slowly towards me. Then I saw the thing was really a monstrous crab-like creature. Can you imagine a crab as large as yonder table, with its many legs moving slowly and uncertainly, its big claws swaying, its long antennæ, like carters’ whips, waving and feeling, and its stalked eyes gleaming at you on either side of its metallic front? Its back was corrugated and ornamented with ungainly bosses, and a greenish incrustation blotched it here and there. I could see the many palps of its complicated mouth flickering and feeling as it moved.’

Wow. Just wow. What a scene! How many teenage imaginations have been inflamed by Well’s vivid vision of a bleak and otherworldly futurity.

The scientific perspective

Underpinning the grip of the narrative is Wells’s aura of scientific knowledgeability. The idea of a world divided into gladsome nymphs cavorting in the sunshine and vile cannibal apes living underground is one thing. What gives it depth is the narrator’s thought-provoking speculations about why this future world has come about. His initial theory is proven wrong, but is interesting nonetheless. He speculates that intelligence is required by creatures that have to cope with changing and dangerous circumstances.

‘It is a law of nature we overlook, that intellectual versatility is the compensation for change, danger, and trouble. An animal perfectly in harmony with its environment is a perfect mechanism. Nature never appeals to intelligence until habit and instinct are useless. There is no intelligence where there is no change and no need of change. Only those animals partake of intelligence that have to meet a huge variety of needs and dangers.’ (Chapter 13)

In other words he applies a purely Darwinian worldview to the world that he encounters. There is no Victorian sentimentality about God or religion or ‘the spirit’. From the get-go Wells is an adherent of Darwinian materialism and comes up with materialist explanations for everything he sees – lacking big animal predators or external threat, mankind has dwindled to four-foot, happy, brainless elves.

But when presented with new evidence, like a good scientist he abandons theory one and comes up with his theory two, although confessing to his listeners that it might still be wrong. Now he speculates that the two races – the Eloi and the Morlocks – represent the very long-term outcome of the trend already visible in Victorian times – the division of society into two classes, an insouciant, privileged upper class, and a grunting, toiling underclass, increasingly consigned, literally, to a subterranean existence.

This theory itself strikes me as being crude as an explanation for the society he finds in the year eight hundred and two thousand, seven hundred and one. The scientific worldview of the book is created less by this big speculation, than by his understanding of countless little details. For example, the way he speculates that the big, flat eyes and white coloration of the Morlocks are a result of living in underground darkness – and mentions the Victorian naturalists who had found the same qualities in fish which live in the depths of the oceans.

Or his knowledge of the solar system, of the movements of the earth, moon and other planets around the sun, which he brings to bear in his speculations about the way the night sky of earth in the far distant future, millions of years hence, is so radically different from our time.

George Orwell paid tribute to Wells by saying that he showed adolescents and young adults of his (Orwell’s) generation that the world was not going to be as their stuffy, hidebound, stiflingly Anglican parents thought it would be. It wasn’t going to be all boy scouts and British Empire forever. Wells showed that vastly bigger forces were at work on all humankind. The future was going to be something altogether weirder and more uncanny. It was going to be strange and wonderful. And this, Orwell says, was experienced as a huge imaginative liberation from the restrictions of Edwardian society.

Over and above this, Wells repeatedly hits the note, beloved of adolescents, of the futility of human life, especially of contemporary polite society. The perspectives he opens up, the vast realms of astronomy and evolution, the epochs and distances, dwarf out petty concerns.

I suppose this is one of the key notes and comforts of science fiction as a genre.

‘Looking at these stars suddenly dwarfed my own troubles and all the gravities of terrestrial life. I thought of their unfathomable distance, and the slow inevitable drift of their movements out of the unknown past into the unknown future. I thought of the great precessional cycle that the pole of the earth describes. Only forty times had that silent revolution occurred during all the years that I had traversed. And during these few revolutions all the activity, all the traditions, the complex organisations, the nations, languages, literatures, aspirations, even the mere memory of Man as I knew him, had been swept out of existence. Instead were these frail creatures who had forgotten their high ancestry, and the white Things of which I went in terror.’

Wonder 

And this, I think, accounts for the enduring success and influence of the early Wells science fantasias – their sense of wonder! They capture a profound sense of awe and amazement. They are astonishing and astounding. You can feel your imagination being stretched and extended in previously undreamed-of ways.

It’s that ability to amaze which marks Wells out, and the speed with which he gets to the amazing bits, with the minimum of Victorian etiquette and bombast and narrative machinery. Within minutes of opening the book we are there in the room as the time traveller tests his time machine, and all the early books are like that. Immediate.

The anchor of the mundane

The story was so fantastic and incredible, the telling so credible and sober. (Chapter 16)

I’d forgotten that The Time Machine is set in Richmond-upon-Thames. That’s where the house of the unnamed time traveller is situated, on a hill overlooking the river Thames, where a half dozen or so professional chaps meet up every Thursday for dinner and intelligent conversation.

Since the time machine doesn’t move in space but only in time, that means that the eerie statue of the sphinx, the ruined hall where the Eloi eat and sleep, and the nearby air shafts up which the Morlocks climb to seize their prey – all are, or more accurately, will be situated, in Richmond. Weird thought.

Similarly, the porcelain palace, as he calls it, an immense ruined building which turns out to be a kind of natural history museum, is off in the direction of Banstead, which he has to get to by passing through what was once Wimbledon. From the heights on which the palace is built he can look north-east and see a creek or inlet of the Thames where ‘Battersea must once have been’.

For a Londoner (and most of Wells’s early readers were from London’s literary circles and readerships) these incongruous references to banal and everyday locations add another layer of frisson and excitement – to see places you know and travel through and are thoroughly bored with, described as they will appear in an inconceivably distant future, is strange and marvellous.

The mundaneness of the settings – the glimpses of the traveller’s bustling servants and the dinner guests fussing with their pipes – and the drabness of these suburban place names, perform two functions:

  1. they anchor and root the stories in the real actual everyday world, lending the astonishing stories a patina of plausibility
  2. at the same time, the banality of place names and domestic habits are like velvet backgrounds against which he sets the wonderful jewels of his imagination

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