Jean-Paul Sartre reviews

Jean-Paul Sartre (1905 to 1980) was a French philosopher, playwright, novelist, screenwriter, political activist, biographer, literary critic and, eventually, cultural icon. He was a defining figure in the Continental philosophy of existentialism and is widely considered a leading figure in 20th-century French philosophy and Marxism.

At school we studied ‘Les Mains Sales’ for French A-level so I read all the other Sartre books I could get my hands on for context, and they had a profound and very negative effect on me. Forty years later I’m able to revisit his works with a much more objective and dispassionate eye.

Jean-Paul Sartre reviews

  • The Flies (1943) A play retelling the Greek myth of Orestes to dramatise Sartre’s existentialist ideas about freedom, responsibility, and guilt, written during the Nazi occupation of France.
  • Huis Clos (1944) Sartre’s most famous play: three characters are locked in a room in hell – there are no tortures, flames etc but they cannot leave the room. Gradually the character reveal the cowardly or cruel actions that led them there and realise that they are trapped not to be physically tortured, but to torment one another indefinitely through judgment, accusation, desire, and emotional dependence.
  • The Age of Reason (1945) First novel in ‘Roads To Freedom’ trilogy, a third-person narrative set in Paris in 1938 which focuses on two days in the life of Mathieu Delarue, a 34-year-old, tall, gangly philosophy teacher who spends a lot of time mooching round the streets of Paris feeling sorry for himself, worrying about his pregnant mistress and his radical friends.
  • The Reprieve (1945) Second novel in the ‘Roads To Freedom’ trilogy, a long, panoramic account of the lives of some 130 characters during the week in September 1938 of the Munich Crisis, twice as long as the first one, fragmented and experimental, a riveting read.
  • Existentialism is a Humanism (1945) Text of a public lecture Sartre gave in 1945 to explain his theory of existentialism and rebut various criticisms.
  • The Respectful Prostitute (1946) A slight play set in the American South, demonstrating that country’s appalling racism and a testament to the vitriolic anti-Americanism of 1950s French intellectuals.
  • Dirty Hands (1948) The longest and most satisfying of the Sartre plays I’ve reviewed, it’s set in a fictional Balkan country in the late stages of the war and dramatises the agonising of Hugo Barine, an idealistic communist, about whether or not to assassinate the leader of the national communist party, Hoederer, who he idolises but becomes persuaded is about to betray the movement. Just to complicate things. Hugo has an intelligent strong-willed wife, Jessica, who falls in love with the leader leading to impassioned arguments about freedom, commitment and so on.
  • Iron In The Soul (1949) Third novel in the ‘Roads To Freedom’ trilogy, covering far fewer characters than its predecessor, over four intense days at the end of the Battle of France i.e. the German invasion, in June 1940, leading up to a dramatic last-ditch battle in a French town where the central figure, Mathieu Delarue, appears to be killed.
  • The Last Chance (1) The Roads To Freedom trilogy was originally intended to comprise four novels but Sartre only published a few chapters of the fourth one before abandoning it. Only in the 1980s were these published in France in a scholarly edition with introduction and notes, and only in 2009 was this given an English translation. This first blog post is a comprehensive summary of all the apparatus surrounding the texts, including context, introductions and interviews.
  • The Last Chance (2) This second blog post is a plot summary of the two parts of the unfinished novel: in the first we meet Brunet, Schneider and thousands of other French POWs imprisoned in a German prison camp in freezing winter conditions in January 1941 (much as Sartre was himself) before they make a bid to escape. In the second fragment we are reunited with Mathieu Delarue who we thought died at the end of the third book, but turns out to have survived.

Context

At The Existentialist Café by Sarah Bakewell (2016)

A writer is a person who describes, and thus a person who is free – for a person who can exactly describe what he or she experiences can also exert some control over those events.
(At The Existentialist Café, page 104)

Brilliant

Suffice to say this is the only book I’ve ever read which not only explains what phenomenology was, but makes you understand how cool and revolutionary it felt in the 1920s.

It also provides, better than anything I’ve ever read, an intellectual biography of Martin Heidegger, explaining his initial devotion to the founder of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl, then their growing estrangement, in terms of their diverging philosophies and worldviews.

I thought the book would be mostly about Sartre, Camus and de Beauvoir, and they certainly appear at the beginning and then feature in the second half – but the central achievement of At The Existentialist Café is to embed them among a) the broader strands of existentialist thought of the 1920s, 30s and 40s b) among a whole range of other thinkers who emerge as at least, if not more, interesting than the famous three, namely:

  • Husserl and Heidegger, who are worth reading about again and again
  • their disciples, like Karl Jaspers or Emmanuel Levinas
  • French colleagues, especially the fascinating figure of Maurice Merleau-Ponty
  • and related writers – there’s a section on Black American émigrés to post-war Paris such as Richard Wright and James Baldwin, which is very enlightening

Bakewell has the priceless gift of being able to weave together biography, cultural context and summaries of (sometimes very difficult) philosophical writings, to dazzling effect. She doesn’t just summarise the philosophy but – in the classic existentialist style – makes you feel the force and excitement of the ideas of Husserl or Heidegger.

Thus the chapter on Simone de Beauvoir’s feminist classic, The Second Sex, makes it sound like not just another long old dusty tome languishing on your to-do list – but an intellectually thrilling, world-changing book which is still completely relevant to our contemporary situation.

Similarly, her description of Heidegger takes full account of his personal weirdness, his obsessions and narrowness, his impenetrable home-made jargon and, of course, his notorious Nazi sympathies – but nonetheless argues strongly for the sheer beauty of many passages in his strange disorientating philosophy, and actually manages to convey this.

Her description of Richard Wright immediately made me want to run out and grab a copy of his novel, Native Son. The same for the works of Merleau-Ponty – until this book just a name I’d come across in biographical sketches of Sartre, but who now emerges as a fascinating thinker in his own right – and for Emmanuel Levinas and Karl Jaspers, and so on.

Edmund Husserl (1859 to 1938)

At the turn of the twentieth century Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) thought that philosophy had become too technocratic, too dominated by bloodless, calculating scientific attitudes, by grand theories starting from over-familiar axioms or philosophical cruxes. But it is obvious that humans – even philosophers – are already in the world, engaged in all kinds of ways with eating, drinking, sleeping, and managing innumerable encounters with other people.

Edmund Husserl

Edmund Husserl

Husserl advocated stripping away, ‘bracketing out’, all the philosophical, rational, technical and scientific terminology from our thoughts (in a move known as the ‘phenomenological reduction’) and then trying to describe what it feels like to think, to see, to perceive, to encounter others – in other words, to be. Husserl’s war cry was ‘To the things themselves!’

The word ‘phenomenon’ is used because it’s an ancient Greek word meaning appearances; generations of philosophers have got hung up on the fundamental question of whether what we (seem to) perceive reflects an actual world ‘out there’. Who cares, says Husserl. If what all of us perceive of the world is the phenomena which fill our minds, so be it: Describe them! Describe the phenomena!

Successive generations of students came to study with him in Freiburg, nicknamed by Levinas ‘the city of phenomenology’, through the 1910s and ’20s. But, unfortunately, they all tended to then go off and develop their own versions of phenomenology. Some were atheist (Heidegger), some were Christian (Jaspers), or at least spiritual – all can be interpreted as part of the anti-rational reaction between the wars which included, in the broadest perspective, movements like Surrealism or Fascism.

Martin Heidegger (1889 to 1976)

Martin Heidegger grew up in a small German village, helped out with church chores, admired traditional local craftsmen, went for long walks in the huge Black Forest. As a student he went to study under Husserl in Freiburg and for three years was his assistant, many thought he was the chosen heir and successor.

Martin Heidegger

Martin Heidegger

But Heidegger grew apart from the master, considering that phenomenology applied itself too promiscuously to all kinds of areas of mental perception and experience, while all the time missing the key, fundamental issue: the nature of existence itself.

For Heidegger all previous philosophy, since the time of Plato and Aristotle, concentrated on knowing, with two thousand years of thinkers elaborating vast superstructures and generating thousands of terms describing theories of sense perception and knowledge and so on.

Heidegger thought this was all a mistake. Every previous philosopher had been in a sense too complex, and had missed the most fundamental thing, the thing right in front of their noses – the fact that we exist at all. What is existence? What the hell is being?

Where Husserl had developed the ‘phenomenological reduction’ as a manoeuvre designed to focus the area of study, Heidegger spoke of the ontological difference. This is the distinction between beings of which there are, of course, an almost infinite number and a vast number of ways of studying – and Being itself, the fundamental bedrock of all lesser beings.

‘Forgetting’ the difference between Being and beings allows traditional philosophers to ‘fall’ into well-worn habits of doing psychology or sociology or any of scores of human sciences, i.e. studying the myriad individual entities in the world: but what of Being itself, the deep ocean which underpins all of existence? What do we know of that? How do we go about understanding the most fundamental aspect of the universe – the simple fact that it exists.

Heidegger wanted to single-handedly overthrow the existing tradition and replace it with a philosophy which systematically explores the nature and consequences of Being. Since no-one else had done this, he naturally had to make up his own terminology for the rapidly proliferating series of ideas and concepts this point of view generated.

Dasein is probably the single most important new term: rather than refer to mankind, or humanity, or people, Heidegger uses Dasein (literally ‘there-be’, more loosely ‘being-there’) to denote the presence of the human in the world. Dasein can then be examined from various perspectives, in relation to other Dasein, to the inanimate world, and to death.

The scale of Heidegger’s ambition – working through a completely new way of seeing and understanding human existence – explains why his work is so often seen as a momentous revolution in philosophy and he is often credited with being the most important 20th century philosopher.

Many readers then and now are put off by his tendency to generate long portmanteau words to try and describe the slippery concepts he’s noticing and explaining. Bakewell comes up with the characteristically useful suggestion that Heidegger (whose work she knows very well, having begun a PhD on him) can sometimes be thought of as a Modernist, experimental writer. His aim is to defamiliarise the world, to constantly make us aware of the strangeness of existence. This is a generally accepted technique in a wide range of literary writers; why not in a philosopher, too?

Existentialism

According to Sartre in Being and Nothingness, there are two types of being: being-in-itself (être-en-soi) describes all inanimate objects and animals; they just persist in their pre-ordained, unthinking selfhood. And this is contrasted with being-for-itself (être-pour-soi) i.e. human beings.

We can think and, above all, choose. We are thrown into the world, interacting with objects and other people, from earliest consciousness and, at countless moments, can choose what to do. We may well be constrained by biology, culture, history and so on, but – deep down and fundamentally – human beings are free as no other entities in the universe are. Free to choose and, when you reflect on it for a moment, this means that the accumulation of all our choices amounts to who we are.

Thus, human beings are unique in that we are continually inventing and creating ourselves through our choices, as no other entities in the world seem to.

Jean-Paul Sartre

Jean-Paul Sartre

This is the meaning of the catch-phrase, ‘Existence preceded essence’. We are born, thrown into the world, grow, exist and then we choose what we want to be. We exist first – and then we create our essence. There is (on this reading) no pre-existing human nature, or not enough to interfere with the radical uniqueness each of us possesses.

This explains existentialism’s thrilling sense of liberation and freedom for a whole generation of young people after the war.

For sure, Sartre also emphasises the weight of responsibility anyone who really acknowledges their freedom must consequently feel; he bandies around words like anguish and angst quite freely. But the reward for fully acknowledging your freedom and responsibility, is a sense that you are living an ‘authentic’ life, true to yourself, making conscious choices to be what you want to be.

This idea – whether the life you’re living is ‘authentic’ or ‘inauthentic’ – in popular phraseology whether you’re being true to yourself or are a ‘phoney’ – became a dominant idea in pop culture for decades. ‘Phoniness’ is a central issue in the classic teen novel of angst and alienation, Catcher in the Rye (1951).

In fact all these key terms – existentialism, essence, freedom, anguish, authenticity – were widely popularised through newspapers, magazines, radio and so on to become key ideas, feelings, subjects of debate and rules for living among young people in the decades after the war.

Levinas, Merleau-Ponty et al

Bakewell explains how this radical new way of thinking about philosophy (and the drastic new ideas it threw up about human beings, life, society and ethics) opened up all sorts of new perspectives, which were followed up and worked out by slightly more peripheral figures such as Karl Jaspers, Emmanuel Levinas, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and many others.

Thus Bakewell paints a really broad and deep and engaging picture of the philosophical tides surging around between-the-wars Western Europe into which keen young, clever young intellectuals like Jean-Paul Sartre and Simon de Beauvoir arrived. Her accounts of their early works make sooooo much sense because she locates them as dialogues and divergences from the writings of these other, earlier, figures who she has spent the first half of the book so thoroughly explaining.

Weil, Arendt, de Beauvoir

Bakewell’s book embodies, for me, the best kind of feminism, which is that she doesn’t nag and complain about all the men being sexists or misogynists (as they probably were); instead she accentuates the positive and devotes a lot of space to showing how many women thinkers of the time more than held their own against the men, and made valuable contributions in their own right.

Simone de Beauvoir is mentioned throughout, as she reacted to the developments in phenomenology and developed her own brand of existentialist thought. She emerges as more nuanced, subtle and life-affirming than Sartre with his queasy hallucinations of being. Bakewell’s passage summarising The Second Sex not only places it among, but makes it sound just as exciting as, the masterworks of Darwin, Freud and Einstein.

Simone de Beauvoir

Simone de Beauvoir

But Bakewell also devotes a long, sympathetic section to the strange, passionate, mystical figure of Simone Weil who achieved a staggering amount in her short life (she died from self-induced starvation Emmanuel presumably some form of anorexia Emmanuel aged just 34).

And she spends some time explicating the biography and changing ideas of Hannah Arendt (1906-75) who, in the 1920s, studied with all three of Heidegger, Husserl and Jaspers, before pursuing her own, definitive, explorations of power and violence.

Her book made me realise how pitifully ignorant I am of the writing of all three of these women, but then it made me realise how ignorant I am of the entire Continental tradition she’s describing. Must try harder.

Summary

If you’re at all interested in the intellectual life of mid-twentieth-century Europe, this book is absolutely vital. It is one of the best, most thorough, capable, calm and lucid, but exciting and motivating books of intellectual history I’ve ever read.


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A Rebours by Joris-Karl Huysmans (1884)

Artifice was considered by Des Esseintes to be the distinctive mark of human genius. Nature has had her day; she has finally and utterly exhausted the patience of sensitive observers by the revolting uniformity of her landscapes and skyscapes…with her never-ending platitudes the old crone has exhausted the good-humoured admiration of all true artists and the time has surely come for artifice to take her place whenever possible.
(À rebours, chapter 2)

It was to him that this voice, as mysterious as an incantation, was addressed; it was to him that it spoke of the feverish desire for the unknown, the unsatisfied longing for an ideal, the craving to escape from the horrible realities of life, to cross the frontiers of thought, to grope after a certainty, albeit without finding one, in the misty upper regions of art!
(Chapter 9 cf p.117)

The title, the French phrase ‘A Rebours’, translates into English as ‘Against the Grain’ or ‘Against Nature’.

Joris-Karl Huysmans, born in 1848 to a French mother and Dutch father (hence his unfrench surname) supported himself with a steady job as a minor civil servant in Paris (where his colleagues knew him as simply ‘Georges’), while he wrote novels to amuse himself.

His first three novels followed the school of Naturalism led by the great Émile Zola. But he bridled at the documentary grimness and the extensive sociological research demanded by this style and so, in his fourth novel, A rebours, struck out in a new direction.

He was as surprised as anyone when it took Paris by storm. Its depiction of a neurasthenic aristocrat who retires to a house of his own design to experiment with an exquisite life of the senses immediately struck a chord with members of the Aesthetic movement, not only in France but Britain and across Europe. The poet Paul Valéry called it his ‘Bible and his bedside book’.

In the 1890s the Aesthetic movement intensified into what came to be known as the Decadence, the conscious exploration of the darker, morbid side of life, exaggerated into fantastic visions. Literature took on the tones of melodrama in British works like Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde, Bram Stoker’s Dracula, in a consciously literary work like Heart of Darkness, even in fairly ‘straight’ works like the more melodramaticSherlock Holmes stories, and, of course, in Oscar Wilde’s ‘scandalous’ contribution to the genre, The Picture of Dorian Grey.

In France with its strong counter-revolutionary Catholic tradition, they took these things more seriously and intensely. Words like ‘blasphemy’ and ‘sin’ in the mouths of Oscar Wilde characters were little more than a style accessory; but in the minds of genuine Catholics they denoted real and soul-threatening facts. Anyway, A Rebours became a kind of handbook for the Decadent Movement, a breviary, a missal, a set of instructions.

Arguably, ‘the Decadence’ is best understood via key paintings in the parallel style of Symbolism, particularly the over-ripe paintings of Gustave Moreau and the strange works of Odilon Redon. In England, maybe the most ‘decadent’ products in any form were the amazing drawings of Aubrey Beardsley and the notorious Yellow Book (1894 to 1897).

A rebours

So what is À rebours about?

Prologue [early years and fast living in Paris] (8 pages)

Well, it starts with a brief prologue limning the personality of the central character, Jean des Esseintes. The book is going to be about him and him alone. Des Esseintes is the weak and weary, worn-out, last scion of a once-great aristocratic house, an eccentric, reclusive, ailing aesthete. His childhood was plagued with illnesses. His parents hated each other. His father was absent most of the time. His mother spent most of her time lying in a darkened bedroom, subject to nervous attacks if exposed to even the slightest light or noise. Abandoned and crushingly lonely, the young Jean spent most of his time in the library, living through books.

In fact the Prologue is unexpectedly funny in a savage satirical way, taking the mickey out of de Esseintes’ wretchedly unhappy parents, the teachers at his Jesuit school who don’t know what to do with the bright unfocused boy and then his various attempts, as an adult, to find his tribe, to find a group of people to fit in with. He tries four or five different types (his actual family, starting with tedious cousins; sensible but dull men his own age; fast-living aristos; the literary set; so-called ‘freethinkers’) and finds them all unbearably boring. He has become ‘a jaded sophisticate’ (p.111).

During his Paris years Des Esseintes:

  • wears a suit of white velvet with a gold-laced waistcoat, and a bunch of palma violets in his shirt front instead of a cravat
  • holds a black-themed funeral dinner, held in honour of his dead virility, described in a page which is worth reading and rereading for its (literally) black humour

Des Esseintes tries sex: he attends unconventional dinner parties where the women strip off; he beds singers and actresses; he takes mistresses already famed for their depravity; he pays for call girls with specialist skills; eventually he seeks satisfaction in the gutter, among the filthy proles. The effort was making him weak and shaky but still he tried ‘unnatural love affairs and perverse pleasures’ but, in the end, he emerged disgusted with the whole thing and himself, and ill with boredom.

The key thing to emphasise is that the excesses of these bachelor debaucheries have made him ill, exacerbating his many boyhood ailments:

The excesses of his bachelor days and the abnormal strains put on his brain had aggravated his neurosis to an astonishing degree and still further diluted the blood of his race. (p.94)

He has become:

a feeble, broken-down, short-winded creature (p.111)

And so it is that, utterly worn out, trembling with nervous exhaustion and disgusted by people and contemporary society, by ‘the money grubbing ignominy of the age’ (p.194), Des Esseintes sells the big ancestral home, the Chateau de Lourps, selling off the setting of his bored miserable childhood, and retires to a house he has had completely redesigned and refurbished to his tastes on the outskirts of Paris (‘on the hillside above Fontenay-aux-Roses’). He seeks a solitude and silence which are ‘a well merited compensation for the years of rubbish he’s had to listen to’ (p.132).

Now the narrative proper begins and turns out to be a series of chapter in each of which Des Esseintes explores, in obsessive detail, aspects of the worlds of sensual pleasure, esoteric knowledge, the exquisite and beautiful and perversely tasteful, carrying out a syllabus of ‘delicious, atrocious experiments’ (p.129). The narrative is, in other words, ‘almost entirely a catalogue of the neurotic Des Esseintes’s aesthetic tastes, musings on literature, painting, and religion, and hyperaesthesic sensory experiences.’

Des Esseintes’ weakness

The key thing to emphasise is that Des Esseintes is no swaggering Byronic buccaneer. He is pale and wasted. He is ill. He is weak:

sapped by disillusionment, depressed by hypochondria and weighed down by spleen.

All he wants is absolute peace and quiet. All his pleasures are solitary, slow and virtually silent. He is the extreme opposite of the sex and drugs and rock and roll lifestyle. He brings the two old servants from the ancestral home with him but makes them wear felt slippers, all the doors are oiled and all the rooms soundproofed because his nerves are so poor. It is not a lusty virile decadence, but the exquisite mental pleasures of someone on their last legs. The house really is a retreat from the world.

You might expect Des Esseintes would organise riotous feasts packed with elaborate dishes, but that is to mistake his mental and physical frailty. In reality, his stomach is so done in by his previous fast living (referred to and dismissed in the Prologue) that he can only manage the plainest of fare: breakfast consists of two boiled eggs, toast and tea. (Mind you, he has breakfast at 5pm, lunch at 11pm, and toys with a simple dinner at dawn; decadents, like symbolists, being unhealthily attracted to the night.)

Not exuberant sensuality, but boredom and spleen, and underneath everything, profound ill health, are the keynotes of the whole thing.

Chapter 1 (7 pages)

The decoration of the house, its fabrics, colours and designs, the walls lined with leather, the mouldings and plinths painted deep indigo, the massive 15th century money-changers’ table, the tall lectern, the windows of blue-ish glass dressed with curtains cut out of old ecclesiastical stoles

Chapter 2 (8 pages)

Describes the pipes, ducts, aquarium and dim windows Des Esseintes rigs up in his dining room so as to feel like he’s in a steamship on a grand cruise. This leads into a dithyramb in praise of artifice and artificiality:

Travel struck him as a waste of time since he believed that the imagination can provide a more-than-adequate substitution for the vulgar reality of actual experience.

And:

There can be no doubt that by transferring this ingenious trickery, this clever simulation to the intellectual plane, one can enjoy, just as easily as on the material plane, imaginary pleasures similar in all respects to the pleasures of reality. (p.35)

Which leads up to the declaration that, contrary to several thousand years of aesthetic theory, which has drummed home the message that the true artist needs to return to nature, that nature is truth etc etc, contrary to all this Des Esseintes insists that the artificial is always superior:

As a matter of fact, artifice was considered by Des Esseintes to be the distinctive mark of human genius. (p.36)

Which leads on to the amusing thought that Nature is a clapped-out old crone, a cliché, serving up the same stereotyped old special effects, red sunsets, glistening moonglow etc etc yawn. What is needed is the new aesthetic of complete artificiality.

(This passage amounts to a manifesto in praise of Artifice and, more than specific passages about jewels or flowers, is probably the ”Bible’ part of the book, the bit which other authors read again and again. It certainly lies behind, or is virtually repeated, in Oscar Wilde’s essays about the superiority of art over nature.)

Chapter 3 (13 pages)

A prolonged, descriptive and hilariously opinionated review of his encyclopedic collection of Latin literature, from Plautus to the tenth century. Particularly funny are his contemptuous dismissals of the classics, Virgil, Horace, Cicero et al, witness:

the disgust he felt for the elephantine Horace’s vulgar twaddle, for the stupid patter he keeps up as he simpers at his audience like a painted old clown… (p.41)

Later in the book, discussing French literature, he explains this at further length:

Imperfection itself pleased him, provided it was neither base nor parasitic, and it may be that there was a certain amount of truth in his theory that the minor writer of the decadence, the writer who is incomplete but none the less individual, distils a balm more irritant, more sudorific, more acid than the author of the same period who is truly great and truly perfect. In his opinion, it was in their confused efforts that you could find the most exalted flights of sensibility, the most morbid caprices of psychology, the most extravagant aberrations of language called upon in vain to control and repress the effervescent salts of ideas and feelings. (p. 185).

He prefers more heterogenous authors of the later, ‘Silver Age’ such as Petronius (he gives a plot summary of the Satyricon) and Apuleius (author of The Golden Ass) before moving on to consider numerous obscure works of early Christian literature.

Chapter 4 (10 pages)

Des Esseintes needs a centerpiece to bring out some of the colours in a rare oriental rug he owns and has the bright idea of gilding and then embedding the shell of a tortoise with gemstones and placing it on the rug. This leads in to a review of the colour and meaning of jewels, which is itself punctuated by a description of the ‘mouth organ’, a device for mixing amounts of expensive liqueurs so as to produce symphonies of flavour on his palate. He even devises mixes of flavours to mimic the effect and instrumentation of classical music (symphony, string quartet etc).

For some reason the chapter ends with a farcical anecdote about a raging toothache which kept him up all night till he rushed off at opening time to the first cheap dentist he could find who tugged and tugged at the septic molar like a fairground huckster. In its crude farce, this episode is oddly out of kilter with the solemn intensity of most of the book, but then Huysmans didn’t realise he was writing a book which would become a ‘Bible’.

Chapter 5 (15 pages)

A long description of, then meditation on, the painting of Salome Dancing before Herod by top Symbolist painter, Gustave Moreau. In his view Salome appears as ‘a great venereal flower, grown in a bed of sacrilege, reared in a hothouse of impiety’ (p.68). Then further analysis of Moreau’s watercolour of her, titled ‘The Apparition‘.

In his red boudoir des Esseintes has a series of engravings by Jan Luyken, titled ‘Religious Persecutions‘, a collection of the most disgusting and horrifying tortures humans can impose on each other, which make him choke with horror. Other works of art he loves include:

Plus numerous works by Odilon Redon which plunge deep ‘into the horrific realms of bad dreams and fevered visions…exceeding the bounds of pictorial art and creating a new type of fantasy, born of sickness and delirium’, reminding Des Esseintes of the many fever dreams of his own sick boyhood (p.73).

As a break from modern artists, he has a lurid Christ by El Greco which he loves gazing at.

This segues into a passage describing how he’s decorated his bedroom. Bedrooms come in 2 types, one for the pleasures of the flesh, the other restrained and monastic. Having got sex out of his system in Paris, Des Esseintes makes his bedroom into a chaste retreat. Characteristically, he seeks to mimic the effect of a plain and worn monastery but by using exquisite and expensive materials. This is dryly funny but what I took from the description is that:

like a monk he was overwhelmed by an immense weariness, by a longing for peace and quiet (p.76)

Chapter 6 (6 pages)

Sitting quietly in front of a quiet fire he has two memories, both satirically funny:

When one of his group of bachelors back in Paris, D’Aigurande, announces he intends to get married, Des Esseintes is the only one who supports him but not out of common goodwill. The reverse. When he hears that the bride-to-be plans to move into one of the circular flats in the new blocks of flats lining the new boulevards, he knows there’ll be comedy ahead and indeed there is, as the new couple struggle to find furniture to fit the shape and layout of the flat, leading to endless arguments, the wife eventually moving to a new normal-shaped flat where none of their rounded furniture fits, D’Aigurande spending more and more time out seeking distraction while she has an affair. This was precisely the cruel entertainment Des Esseintes had anticipated and then relishes.

The second memory is deliberately monstrous. Des Esseintes comes across a street urchin who asks him for a light. Instead Des Esseintes takes him to a high class brothel and pays for him to have sex with one of the whores. The madam of the house asks why. Des Esseintes shares his sadistic plan, which is to pay for the boy to have sex there every fortnight for a few months, and then abruptly cut him off. The idea is to get him addicted to the high life so that, when he’s suddenly deprived of it, it forces him into a life of crime, leading him eventually to murder some bourgeois householder returning home to find it being burgled by the boy. The madam is shocked, but then she has a lot of odd clients. Anyway, back in the present Des Esseintes is chagrined because although he scours the Police Gazette, he never sees a report about the boy. He feels cheated.

Chapter 7 (12 pages)

Living such a retired, solitary life, Des Esseintes is puzzled and discomfited to discover that many of the questions about life which he smothered during his Paris years, now return to haunt him. Although he was raised by Jesuits, he thought his scepticism secure, but now he’s starting to wonder. Creating the atmosphere of a monastic cell, living a chaste life, reading Christian writers in Latin, he finds his scepticism becoming wobbly.

He comes to realise that his tastes, for artificiality and eccentricity, stem from the subtle sophistical studies of his boyhood education. Weeks pass and he finds his head full of theological speculations, or, their converse, morbid fantasies of grotesque blasphemies.

(Only in Catholic countries is this kind of extremism possible. England with its tea party Church of England never inspired the same fanatacism or morbidness. Anger, yes, as in controversies about Tractarianism, Anglo-Catholicism etc. But no Anglican speculated about putting holy oil and wine to depraved sexual uses as Huysmans does.)

Then these moods leave him, he finds his feet again, reinforces his scepticism by reading (the philosopher) Schopenhauer, disgusted and appalled at the spectacle of a world of pain. The world isn’t guided by a benevolent Providence but is the mangled product of aimless, blind striving.

Now his illnesses come back to haunt him. Terrible headaches, a nervous cough which wakes him in the early hours, searing heartburns. He almost gives up eating, forces himself to go for long walks in the country, puts down his books but almost immediately falls prey to excruciating boredom. He has an idea: to fill the house with hothouse flowers.

Chapter 8 (11 pages)

The flower chapter. In Paris he collected fake flowers, exquisite copies. Now, tired of fake flowers that look like real ones, he wants to collect real flowers that look like fakes. Suffice to say he likes flowers with diseased perfervid colouring, as if stricken with syphilis or leprosy. Sounding very like Oscar Wilde, Des Esseintes declares that:

‘The horticulturalists are the only true artists left to us nowadays.’ (p.102)

That night he has an atrocious nightmare in which he is accompanying a working class woman somewhere when a horse gallops ahead of them, turns and reveals the rider to be a half skeleton, half blue and green demon, with red pustules round the mouth, the figure of Syphilis. The nightmare unfurls through many scenes until the climax when he finds himself embraced by a demon woman, covered in pustules and, as she pulls him (and his erection) closer, her vulva changes into a red wound in the shape of the Venus Flytraps delivered to his houses earlier, the sharp teeth, the glistening digestive juices as she pulls him closer…and he wakes up in a fearful sweat.

Chapter 9 (11 pages)

The nightmares continue, evidence of Des Esseinte’s mounting neuroses. He tries a variety of cures but nothing works. He is all the more irritated as most of the rare flowers he bought at such cost have died. To try and soothe his nerves he reviews his art collection, enjoying the savage skill of Goya’s Caprices, Rembrandt.

Iller than ever, he tries the novels of Charles Dickens, supposedly good for convalescents but is revolted by the stereotyped virginity and chasteness of its young people. This sets off an equal and opposite reaction, and he finds himself shaken by images of perverted lust. He has a small box of purple bonbons, improbably named Pearls of the Pyrenees, which trigger memories of female moments, french kisses, debauches, conquests, sex – ‘Morose delectations’.

He remembers his affair with an American trapeze artist who turned out not to be the agile athlete he hoped for in bed, but prim and Puritanical. The affair with a ventriloquist. One night he placed statues of the Sphinx and the Chimera in his bedroom and had her pitch voices into each, reading out a script from Flaubert. But all the time he is fighting a losing battle against his impotence. He tries having sex with children but their pained grimaces are too samey and boring (p.116). Lastly he remembers being picked up by an attractive young man with whom, apparently, he had a homosexual relationship for a few months.

Like everything else, these memories leave him ‘worn out, completely shattered, half dead’.

Chapter 10 (12 pages)

The chapter on perfumes, the most neglected art of all, displaying Des Esseintes’ usual encyclopedic knowledge and exquisite discriminations, as he sets out to educate himself in the ‘the syntax of smells’, ‘the idiom of essences’, until his sense of smell has ‘acquired an almost infallible flair’.

He gives a history of perfumes which accompany and match French history, certain scents associated with the reigns of Louis 14, 15 and 16, with Napoleon, the restored monarchy etc. Descriptions of his experiments, mixing and mingling rare scents and aromas to create landscapes of the senses, reams of poetic prose describing the aromas he creates on the bed of a vision of a great meadow and swaying linden trees.

Suddenly he has a blinding headache and has to throw open the window to clear the room of its stifling atmosphere. In a brisk mood he decides to sort out the tumble of cosmetics he owns, in his bathroom. Most of these were bought at the insistence of a woman he had an affair with, who loved her nipples to be scented, but couldn’t achieve climax unless she was having her hair combed, or when she could smell soot, wet plaster or the dust thrown up by a summer rainstorm.

One thing leads to another and now he quotes a 2-page-long prose poem he wrote inspired by a visit to this woman’s sister on a day of rain and mud and puddles, which sounds like this:

‘Under the lowering sky, in the humid atmosphere, the houses ooze black sweat and their ventilators breathe black odours; the horror of life becomes more apparent and the grip of spleen more oppressive; the seeds of iniquity that lie in every man’s heart begin to germinate; a craving for filthy pleasures takes hold of the puritanical, and the minds of respected citizens are visited by criminal desires.’ (p.127)

‘Decadent’ enough for you? In fact the prose poem reaches the rather complicated conclusion that invalids, worn out be their debauchery in Paris, often head to the countryside to recuperate, where they die of boredom. He suggests that with a little imagination, their doctors could use perfumes to create the atmosphere of Parisian brothels, thus giving their patients the pleasant impression of being back in their Parisian fleshpots without any of the enervating physical requirements!

But when he throws open the windows he smells again a strong scent of frangipani and, in his weakened state, wonders if he is possessed by some evil spirit, and falls fainting, ‘almost dying’, across the windowsill. It cannot be emphasised enough how the entire narrative is based on Des Esseintes’ almost complete mental and physical collapse.

Chapter 11 (14 pages)

As a result of this collapse his terrified servants call a doctor who declares there’s nothing wrong with Des Esseintes before our hero shoos him out of the house. Suddenly, on a whim, based on his earlier attempt to read the novels of Dickens, des Esseintes conceives the mad idea of going to London. He has the old servant pack his things and is off in a cab to the train station within hours. Next thing he knows he is at the station and engaging a cabbie to take him to a bookstore to buy a guide to London. But as they trot through the streets of Paris Des Esseintes has a vivid and very enjoyable vision of London, the London of fogs and non-stop rain, and soot and rumbling tube trains and miserable pedestrians.

At the bookshop he peruses guidebooks to London, mostly noting lists of paintings hanging in London galleries. He likes the most ‘modern’ works and it is interesting to see that, for a super aesthete like des Esseintes, this means John Everett Millais and George Frederick Watts.

Having bought a guide he goes to the Bodega, a big wine emporium, where he finds himself surrounded by Englishmen about whom he is entertainingly rude:

There were laymen with bloated pork-butcher faces or bulldog muzzles, apoplectic necks, ears like tomatoes, winy cheeks, stupid bloodshot eyes and whiskery collars as worn by some of the great apes. (p.137)

Drifting into a reverie he superimposes on all these faces the names and characters from Dickens’ novels, imagining the hooting of tugs behind the Tuileries are those of boats on the Thames. He then takes the cab through the filthy rainy Paris weather to a warm tavern near the station for the train to Dieppe and boat onto Newhaven.

Here Des Esseintes stuffs himself with an unusually large meal (thick greasy oxtail soup; smoked haddock; roast beef and potatoes; several pints of ale; stilton, then a rhubarb tart; a pint of porter followed by a cup of coffee laced with gin).

There are many English men in the tavern but also some English women, about whom he is also amusingly rude:

Robust Englishwomen with boyish faces, teeth as big as palette-knives, cheeks as red as apples, long hands and long feet. They were enthusiastically attacking helpings of rump-steak pie – meat served hot in mushroom sauce and covered with a crust like a fruit tart. (p.140)

Eventually the bad weather outside, the warmth inside, the effect of an unusually heavy dinner,  and being surrounded by English men and women contribute to the growing sense that there’s no need to go to London. In his imagination he’s already been.

After all, what was the good of moving, when a fellow could travel so magnificently sitting in a chair? Wasn’t he already in London whose smells, weather, citizens, food and even cutlery were all about him? (p.143)

Only a ninny can imagine it is necessary, interesting or useful to travel abroad. And so, with a certain inevitability, he takes the cab back to the Gare de Sceaux, and a train back to Fontenoy, arriving (comically) with:

all the physical weariness and moral fatigue of a man who has come home after a long and perilous voyage.

This is broadly funny. Des Esseintes barely seems the hero of a satanic novel of moral debauchery any more, but a figure of fun, a comically etiolated, knackered, degraded version of the dashing hero of many an adventure novel by his compatriot Jules Vernes.

Chapter 12 (22 pages)

The second longest chapter, a review of French Catholic prose literature.

Des Esseintes (slightly comically) returns to his books as if after a long absence when he has, in fact, been away for one day. It’s a return to the mode of hyperaesthetic review which we’ve seen in the preceding chapters.

Obviously, not only is his book collection of rare and tasteful books, but he insists on having them specially printed – on special paper, printed with hand-made fonts, bound in rare and precious bindings. It is an orgy of exquisite taste, requiring specialist vocabulary such as ‘mirific’ and ‘blind-tooling’.

It is here that he gives a page-long dithyramb to the patron saint of decadence, Charles Baudelaire, who went further than anyone before him to explore ‘the symptoms of souls visited by sorrow, singled out by spleen…[at the age when] the enthusiasms and beliefs of youth have drained away.’ (p.147)

In Des Esseintes’ opinion, few other writers compare; certainly, he is not impressed by the ‘classics’ such as Rabelais and Corneille, Voltaire, Diderot or Rousseau. Pascal he likes for his austere pessimism and ‘agonised attrition’.

When it comes to the nineteenth century literature, he divides it into two classes, Catholic and secular. Catholic writing is good for stating abstract concepts and intellectual distinctions but the general run of Catholic writers is dire.

He is humorously rude about a set of women Catholic writers for their banality (it’s worth mentioning that Huysmans drops casually insulting comments about women throughout the book). Catholic writers generally have fallen victim to a conventional and frozen idiom, drained of all originality – with the exceptions of Jean-Baptiste Henri Lacordaire, the Abbé Peyreyve, the Comte de Falloux, Louis Veuillot, Antoine-Frédéric Ozanam, the Abbé Lamennais, Comte Josephe de Maistre, Ernest Hello and others he singles out.

Reading about these priests and polemicists makes me eternally grateful that England is (or was) a Protestant country, untroubled by the bitter and savage arguments about the role of Catholicism in public life which divided France, and the bitter splits which divided French Catholicism (between Ultramontanists and Gallicists). The bitter divides and the spiteful bigotry underlying French society were to come spilling out in the grotesque Dreyfus Affair a decade after this book was published (1894) whose antagonisms reverberated on to the time of the Great War.

A Catholic writer who went too far for the Church authorities was Jules Barbey d’Aurevilly (1808 to 1889). Des Esseintes likes d’Aurevilly’s more extreme works because they feed his taste for ‘sickly books, undermined and inflamed by fever’ (p.160).

Discussion of d’Aurevilly’s novels A married priest and The devils leads into a meditation on the fact that sadism only really makes sense within the context of Catholic faith. Sadism is a form of sacrilegious rebellion, a spiritual as much as a physical debauch. Without a God and Church to defy, it’s just being cruel.

Des Esseintes shares the fruits of his investigations into the Malleus Maleficorum and the Black Mass, describing a naked woman on all fours whose naked rump has been ‘repeatedly soiled’, serving as the altar from which the anti-congregation take a demonic host printed with the image of a goat, and so on.

Yes, of the entire canon of French Catholic prose, d’Aurevilly is the only one des Esseintes really enjoys reading because his works offer:

those gamy flavours and unhealthy spots, that bruised skin and sleepy taste which he so loved to savour in the decadent writers, both Latin and monastic, of olden times. (p.165)

(See my review of d’Aurevilly’s best known collection of stories, Les Diaboliques.)

Chapter 13 (12 pages)

There’s a heatwave. Feeble Des Esseintes is prostrated. He can’t eat, is almost choking with nausea. He takes down a bottle of Benedictine liqueur which he describes in a half-page prose poem, visions of medieval monks at their alembics.

Going out into the garden to recover his strength he sees a bunch of working class boys fighting in the lane which triggers negative thoughts. What’s the point of the scrofulous little brats being born in the first place? Why does society sell the means of contraception but locks up anyone who has an abortion? Maybe fornication should be banned outright. Then ‘a dreadful feeling of debility came over him again’ (p.172).

He tinkers with a few more liqueurs but they sicken him. We learn that, during his florid Paris heyday he tried hashish and opium but they only made him sick. He would have to rely in his imagination to carry him to other worlds.

He goes back indoors to seek relief from the heat, slumps into a chair and plays with an astrolabe he bought on the Left Bank. Now his mind drifts, reminiscing about walks around Paris, it dawns on him that licensed brothels are slowly being closed down and invariably replaced with taverns. This suggests to him that men tire of walking in, paying, having sex and walking out again. Too easy. In a tavern, on the other hand, you encounter women who you have to banter with, overcome, barter with, in some kind of degraded joust. If you score, there’s more of a sense of achievement. What idiots men are! Des Esseintes reflects, and goes to find some food for his troubled stomach.

Chapter 14 (23 pages)

French secular literature. At one point Des Esseintes worshipped Balzac but, as his health failed, Balzac came to seem too healthy. He changed to Edgar Allen Poe. He wants to be lifted ‘into a sphere where sublimated sensations would arouse within him an unexpected commotion’ (p.180). Hating modern life, as he does, he comes to dislike books which record it, from Flaubert to Zola. Instead he turns more and more to the fantastical, to the artificiality of Flaubert’s Temptation of Saint Anthony. He wants to escape the dullness and stupidity of his age, and fancy himself in another era, another world.

Then begins his review of nineteenth century French literature, starting by admiring Flaubert’s Salammbô, then analysing Edmund de Goncourt. What he, Des Esseintes, seeks in a book is ‘dream-inducing suggestiveness’ (p.183). After considering Zola he makes a major point about the appeal of minor, lesser writers. They are less consistent, less predictable and so more likely to include quirks and oddities which reveal strange corners of psychology and style.

Then the poets. He has a page on Paul Verlaine, who he describes as mysterious, vague, eccentric. And so on to Tristan Corbieres, Theodore Hannon. He no longer likes Leconte de Lisle and even Gautier no long appeals: they don’t make him dream any more, they no longer up vistas of escape. Hugo and Stendhal no. Nobody comes close to the pleasure given him by Edgar Allen Poe. The closest anyone comes is the Contes cruels of Auguste Villiers de l’Isle-Adam, a few of which he summarises (and which I recently reviewed).

Finally, his servant has filed his small collection of contemporary books on his shelves and leaves Des Esseintes with a specially printed selection of the finest poet of his times, Stéphane Mallarmé. Above all, des Esseintes loves the fineness of Mallarmé’s prose poems which is Des Esseintes’ favourite literary form. Verlaine, Mallarmé, represented the delicious decadence of the French language.

It is very symptomatic that Des Esseintes associates aesthetic excellence with illness, decline and collapse. Thus a little hymn celebrating the idea that the French language itself has finally reached the end of the road, is in terminal decay, since decay, decadence and death are his standard trope.

The truth of the matter was that the decadence of French literature, a literature attacked by organic diseases, weakened by intellectual senility, exhausted by syntactical excesses, sensitive only to the curious whims that excite the sick, and yet eager to express itself completely in its last hours, determined to make up for all the pleasures it had missed, afflicted on its death-bed with a desire to leave behind the subtlest memories of suffering, had been embodied in Mallarmé in the most consummate and exquisite fashion…this was the death-agony of the old tongue which, after going a little greener every century, had now reached the point of dissolution… (p.199)

All this is, in my opinion, actually a very suburban prejudice. Every generation likes to think it is the last one, that things are going to the dogs, can’t carry on this way, everything’s collapsing – whereas, in fact, rather disappointingly, things do just keep carrying on. It is a very common prejudice.

Then again, in the context of the narrative, you could argue that Des Esseintes’ opinion of the collapse of the French language really only reflects his own physical collapse. Like all his other opinions, it is highly subjective and self-referential.

Chapter 15 (11 pages)

Des Esseintes had had his servants install a food digester to cater to his sensitive stomach. It works for a while then wears off and symptoms of illness return – eye trouble, hacking cough, throbbing arteries, cold sweats, and now aural delusions i.e. he starts hearing things which aren’t there. He hears the school bell and then the hymns he learned at his Jesuit school.

Which segues into lyrical praise of medieval plainsong and Gregorian chant. As he himself notes quite a few times, not least in the passage about sadism, quite a few of the things Des Esseintes likes are meaningless without the context of Roman Catholicism. Sometimes he is deliberately rebelling against it, as in his fondness for blasphemous writers, but other times he is very sensitive to the true Christian spirit, with no irony.

And so it is here, where he deprecates almost all classical music as showy and straining for ‘popular success’ (a thought designed to make any true aristocrat shudder); only plainchant is the true ‘idiom of the ancient church, the very soul of the Middle Ages’ (p.202).

The only religious music he really approved of was the monastic music of the Middle Ages, that emaciated music which provoked an instinctive nervous reaction in him, like certain pages of the old Christian Latinists. (p.203)

He is hilariously rude about public concerts where:

you can see a hulking brute of a man waving his arms about and massacring disconnected snatches of Wagner to the huge delight of an ignorant crowd. (p.204)

Or you are forced to listen to:

contemptible cavatinas and objectionable quadrilles, sung with full orchestra accompaniment, in churches converted into boudoirs, by barnstormers bellowing away up in the roof, while down below the ladies waged a war of fashions and went into raptures over the shrieks of the mountebanks. (p.203)

The only ‘modern’ composers he can bear are Schumann, but above all the songs of Schubert which speak to his high-strung nerves, which wake a host of forgotten sorrows and thrill him to the marrow.

One day he sees his face in the mirror and is appalled. His face is shrunken, covered in wrinkles, hollow cheeks, big burning watery eyes. He is not at all like the image chosen for the cover of the Penguin Classics edition, the painting by Giovanni Boldini of the dashing, dapper Le Comte Robert de Montesquiou – that gives a completely misleading image of a dandy at the height of his powers, whereas the whole point is that Des Esseintes is a man utterly at the end of his rope.

He has his man rush to Paris to fetch an eminent and expensive doctor then falls to hypochondriac fretting and then into a doze. The doctor enters his bedroom unannounced, inspects him, writes out a simple prescription and leaves with barely a word.

Turns out the doctor has prescribed peptone enemas which appear to require the servant to place a tube or syringe up his anus and inject nutrition. Des Esseintes is overcome with hilarious glee, regarding this as the acme of the artificial way of life he has been seeking all his life. What could be more ‘against nature’ and a rejection of the whole messy way of stuffing our faces and chewing revolting foodstuffs which nature has condemned humanity to?

True to form, it crosses Des Esseintes’ mind that the ideal connoisseur could create dishes and combinations of flavours to be included in the mixture of nutrients being injected up his bottom – a thought which surely anticipates the Surreal blasphemies of a writer like Georges Bataille.

Slowly Des Esseintes recovers his strength till he can walk about his house unaided, though with a stick. As his health revives he renews his interest in interior decoration, coming up with ever-more byzantine new combinations. However, on his next visit his doctor informs him he must give up this reclusive, super-nervous, anxious way of living, return to Paris and live like other people, take his pleasures in ‘normal’ enjoyments, to which he whines:

‘But I just don’t enjoy the pleasures other people enjoy.’

Tough. It’s life or death. Keep on living as he is, and he’ll lose strength, go mad and die.

Chapter 16 (9 pages)

The doctor insists he needs a change of scene, to mix with society, to have friends. And so with great reluctance, Des Esseintes has his precious belongings packed up ready to ship back to a new apartment he is to rent in Paris.

This triggers a review of possible companions: all the young squires he used to run with will be married by now and having affairs; the money-grubbing bourgeoisie are beneath contempt, spreading all around them ‘the tyranny of commerce’; the aristocracy as a whole is dying out, ‘sunk into imbecility or depravity’, selling off their ancestral homes, their vices and crimes all too often leading them to court and then onto gaol like common criminals. He is disgusted by the way the Church, also, has caught the commercialism of the age, advertising all kinds of tacky products in Sunday supplements, Trappist beer, Cistercian chocolates.

He wants to believe, he wants to have faith, but the modern writings and even practices of the Church have been corrupted and adulterated. And so – after a bilious and very funny diatribe against the revolting bourgeoisie – the last pages of the book turn into a plea to God.

‘Lord, take pity on the Christian who doubts, on the unbeliever who would fain believe, on the galley-slave of life who puts out to sea alone, in the night, beneath a firmament no longer lit by the consoling beacon-fires of the ancient hope!’ (Final sentence, p.220)

So the book ends in such a way as to drive home the simple idea that the entire Decadence is a kind of disappointed Catholic faith, so angry with its disillusion that it turns to childish debaucheries and blasphemies in order to spite its disappointing parent. Unable to escape its firm foundation in Catholicism, À rebours ends with a surprisingly sincere prayer.

More incidents than you’d expect

From this summary you can see that the text is emphatically not simply a series of encyclopedia entries on a set of luxury topics (art, literature, jewels, perfumes etc), but that Huysmans goes to some lengths to shake his narrative up and vary it with real-world actions and events.

In the the ‘present’ of the narrative this includes the visits of various tradesmen and a doctor, and the big episode of the trip to Paris in chapter 11. A bit more subtly, the narrative is broken up with plenty of memories of active events: such as relationships with various lovers (trips to the circus to see the acrobat), the farcical trip to the dentist, memories of the visit to the sister-in-law of a lover which inspired his prose poem, the time he took the street urchin to the brothel, and so on.

Decadent rhetoric

Obviously the book is drenched in the rhetoric of ‘decadence’, with liberal use of classic adjectives and phrases from the genre. I made a list, curious to see how many times he could recycle the same basic ideas, and the answer is, quite a few times:

  • horror
  • spleen
  • filthy pleasures
  • tortured
  • fiendish
  • diabolical
  • voluptuous pleasure
  • licentious obsessions
  • new and original ecstasies
  • paroxysms celestial and accursed
  • atrocious
  • drunk with fantasy
  • abominable
  • ghastly screams
  • glaring infamies
  • delights
  • hideous hues
  • spine-chilling nightmare
  • foul uncontrollable desires
  • dark and odious schemes
  • fear
  • morbid depravities
  • monstrous vegetations of the sick mind
  • diseases of the mind
  • the burning fever of lust
  • the typhoids and yellow fevers of crime
  • self-torment
  • bitterness of mind
  • incest
  • disillusion and contempt
  • weary spirits and melancholy souls
  • gloomy ecstasies
  • melancholy madness
  • sacrilegious profanities
  • secret longings
  • atrocious delusions
  • insane aspirations
  • disgust
  • mystic ardours
  • cruel revulsives
  • secret reveries
  • occult passion
  • monstrous depravities
  • anxiety
  • anguish
  • terror
  • nightmares of a fevered brain
  • delicious miasmas
  • dream-like apparitions
  • inexorable nightmare
  • sexual frenzy
  • painful ecstasy
  • new intoxications
  • despairing appeal
  • stifled sob
  • mystical debauch
  • a dying love affair in a melancholy landscape
  • exquisite funereal laments
  • steeped in bitterness and filled with disgust
  • obstinate distress
  • tormented by anxiety
  • torrent of anguish
  • this hairy death’s head
  • incoherent dreams
  • dark venereal pleasures
  • subtly depraved and perverse type of mysticism

Of Moreau:

He himself remained downcast and sorrowful, haunted by the symbols of superhuman passions and superhuman perversities, of divine debaucheries perpetrated without enthusiasm and without hope. (p.69)

So an impressive collection of over-ripe and melodramatic language. But two other themes stand out and are less remarked on:

1. Decadence = exhaustion

Overcome with infinite fatigue, he slumped helplessly against the table. (p.167)

The keynote for me, is not the perversities and damned thoughts etc etc so much as the relentless tone of exhaustion. Des Esseintes only goes into retirement because his nerves have been shredded by his fast-living Paris lifestyle, and our hero is continually trembling on the brink of passing out, when he’s not having nightmares, night sweats, trembling and shaking as he lifts a cup of weak tea to his white lips.

And this air of exhaustion is something he seeks out in art and literature. The painter Luykens was, he tells us, a fervent Calvinist who:

composed and illustrated religious poems, paraphrased the Psalms in verse, and immersed himself in Biblical study, from which he would emerge haggard and enraptured, his mind haunted by bloody visions, his mouth twisted by the maledictions of the Reformation, by its songs of terror and anger. (p.71)

Obviously a lot is going on in that passage but for me, the key word is haggard. And what he likes in the later Latin literature which he collects is the sense of breakdown and decay. Half way through the book I started making a separate collection of key words on this theme

  • feeble
  • broken-down
  • short-winded
  • fainting
  • feverish
  • weeping
  • choking
  • spluttering
  • sick room routine
  • ailing
  • anaemic
  • debility
  • alarming weakness
  • apathy
  • bored inactivity
  • exhaustion
  • organic diseases
  • intellectual senility
  • last stammerings
  • exhausted by fever

In his discussion of the author Barbey d’Aurevilly Des Esseintes makes the candid remark that he is ‘really interested only in sickly books, undermined and inflamed by fever’ (p.160). It’s not too much of a stretch to call Decadence the aesthetic of illness.

Comedy

Given the book’s reputation as the Bible of Decadence, it’s unexpectedly funny.

He is savagely funny about his dull cousins in the Prologue. He is ferociously snobbish about the bourgeoisie, about shop-keepers and butcher’s wives and their meretricious, banal tastes.

He doesn’t just carry out a survey of Latin literature from Plautus to the tenth century, he massacres some of the most famous names in the classical canon, rubbishing Virgil and Horace very amusingly, and in a manner which must have been designed to render traditional Latinists apoplectic.

In a deliberately offensively funny section, the passage in praise of The Artificial, he first of all states that surely the most exquisite creation of nature is woman (‘the most perfect and original beauty’) but then goes on to say that, has not Man now produced something more dazzling beautiful than the most beautiful woman, being…’the two locomotives recently put into service on the Northern Railway’ (p.37), a deliberately offensive notion which anticipates the posturing of Marinetti’s Futurists 30 years later.

Then there are the hilarious descriptions of ugly English men and women in the aborted journey to London chapter (‘Robust Englishwomen with boyish faces, teeth as big as palette-knives’) and the thumping contempt the ignorati who attend public concerts, in chapter 15.

Maybe the one central theme of the French literature which is now regarded as canonical, from Flaubert and Baudelaire, through writers like Huysmans, through the Surrealists and on into the Existentialists, is their hatred of the bourgeoisie. Witness the diatribe against the filthy middle classes on almost the last page of the book. French authors will do anything to escape the taint or accusation of having bourgeois tastes. Whereas the same hatred of the middle classes just isn’t in evidence in English literature, lots of which is written virtually in praise of the middle and upper middle classes – Dickens, Thackeray, Trollope, Henry James, E.M. Foster.

Robert Baldick’s translation (brings out the comedy)

The translation I read is pretty old, the 1959 Robert Baldick one published by Penguin Books. However, unlike many translations of nineteenth century classics, it is immediately likeable and entertaining. Apparently:

Huysmans’s work was known for his idiosyncratic use of the French language, extensive vocabulary, detailed and sensuous descriptions, and biting, satirical wit

and this is exactly what comes over in Baldick’s translation. He uses a wider vocabulary than you might expect – I mean I was entertained by his unusual and out-of-the-way words – and certainly brings out Huysman’s biting wit. I laughed out loud at several places in the short Prologue, where he describes young men of his own age as ‘docile, good-looking ninnies, congenital dunces who had worn their masters’ patience thin’. In addition Des Esseintes:

discovered the freethinkers, those bourgeois doctrinaires who clamoured for absolute liberty in order to stifle the opinions of other people, to be nothing but a set of greedy, shameless hypocrites whose intelligence he rated lower than a village cobbler’s.

And the venom of his contempt is funny. Or the snobbishness. Like his refusal to use any of the obvious jewels on the tortoise because they are the kind worn by vulgar businessmen or upon ‘the tubulous fingers of butcher’s wives’ (p.55).

This snobbery is also evident in the passages about Goya and Rembrandt who he is embarrassed at liking because the rest of the world likes them too, and there is nothing worse than sharing the same taste as the ghastly bourgeoisie and having to listen to their inane praise of works of which, as an initiate, as a superior being, you have such a better grasp and appreciation (p.108).

If the mob start liking something, Des Esseintes hastily drops it and worries that his ‘taste’ (i.e. aristocratic superiority) is failing him. Throughout the book the adjective ‘aristocratic’ is a word of unqualified praise. Among other things, the Decadence was deeply elitist.

I bought this paperback when I was 17, alongside my edition of Baudelaire’s poems, desperate to enliven my humdrum suburban existence with the Flowers of Evil. Forty years later, some of Des Esseintes’ passages, like the rant against Virgil, his amusing abuse of middle-class taste, and even more in the farcical toothache scene, made me smile or even laugh out loud. When I was a stricken teenager I thought life was a tragedy and books like this fed that feeling. Now I know it’s a comedy and mostly what I find in them is different flavours of comedy.

French literature is more sexually open than English

Quite apart from anything else, the novel demonstrates the vast difference between French and English literature of this time in regard to women and sex. Huysmans doesn’t describe the sexual act itself, but he freely describes going to brothels, the charms of the different ladies, of attending parties where women strip off, he mentions breasts and nipples and even, apparently, what one of his lovers required in order to climax.

Absolutely none of this could have been written by or even hinted at by English authors, who subjected themselves to a ferocious self censorship. Same with Americans, possibly even more Puritanical. It’s significant that of the many lovers des Esseintes reminisces about, by far the most frigid and unsexual was American (the disappointingly prudish and passive acrobat, page 112).

I’m not sure when English writers caught up with French ones in terms of candour and honesty about sex: would it have been the 1960s, maybe? On a deeper level, it seems to me the English still haven’t caught up with the best Continental authors in capturing a genuinely relaxed, at-ease-with-themselves attitude towards bodies and sex.


Credit

À Rebours by Joris-Karl Huysmans was published in French, in Paris, in 1884. All references are to the English translation by Robert Baldick published by Penguin paperback in 1973.

Related reviews

Chattering Courtesans and Other Sardonic Sketches by Lucian

‘He’s a mouthy, brazen individual. Maybe he’s a philosopher.’
(Zeus commenting on Timon the Misanthrope’s rantings, in the dialogue of that name, page 112)

Introduction

Lucian of Samosata was the ancient world’s king of sarcastic humour. He lived from about 125 to about 200 AD, under the Roman Emperors: Antoninus Pius; Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus; Commodus; and perhaps Pertinax (193 AD). He was born at Samosata on the River Euphrates in the Roman province of Syria. Although his native language was probably Syriac, all of his extant works are written entirely in ancient Greek. Although his works are crammed with literary allusions, there is not a single mention of any Latin author.

Lucian was a rhetorician and pamphleteer best known for his tongue-in-cheek style, which he used to ridicule rulers, superstitions, religious practices and belief in the paranormal. He tells us that up to the age of 40 he practiced rhetoric, which meant all or any of the following: (1) speaking in court on behalf of a client; (2) writing speeches for a client to deliver; (3) teaching pupils; (4) giving public displays of his skill.

But after the age of 40 he tells us that he switched to writing dialogues. Dialogue, since the times of Plato (427 to 348 BC), had been associated with serious philosophy. Lucian wrote one or two dialogues in the serious Platonic mode but then switched to a new mode, a literary innovation which he’s most associated with and made him famous – comic dialogue. His piece ‘A Literary Prometheus’ explicitly states that what Lucian himself regarded as his claim to the title of an original writer was the fusing of Comedy and Dialogue. He wrote about 35 of these dialogues.

Most of his masterpieces are in this form. The comic dialogues can be sub-divided into three further groups according to whether they took their inspiration from:

  • the Old Comedy (or Comedy of fantastic imagination) like Aristophanes
  • the New Comedy (or Comedy of ordinary life) like Menander
  • the satires of Menippus

Sidwell explains that a text like ‘The journey down to Hades’ combines a) the dialogue form of Plato with b) the Attic language and fondness for fantasy of Old Comedy with c) the Cynic alienation of Menippus. Menippus (Sidwell’s glossary tells us) lived in the first half of the 3rd century BC. Later Lucian was associated with two literary innovations: ‘Menippean’ satire refers to the mixture of prose and verse; 2) the serio-comic i.e. the deployment of humour for moralising purposes.

Lucian wrote a vast amount – some 88 works have been attributed to him. These include: introductions to philosophers; panegyrics on good rulers or philosophers; various types of autobiography; biographies of writers and philosophers; art criticism; moral advice; satires on superstition, false religion and bad literature, and collections of mini dialogues.

This 527-page Penguin Classic edition, translated and introduced by Keith Sidwell, is big solid and heavy but it is just a selection. It only contains just 18 of the possible 70 to 80 works attributed to Lucian. In fact, on closer examination, it contains only a little over 300 pages of Lucian. The rest is given over to Introduction, Translator’s note, Note on the texts, three maps, a List of works, 90 pages of Notes, a 42-page Glossary of classical names, 4 pages of academic references and a 33-page index of names and places.

Sidwell adds clarity or clutter (depending on opinion) by not just translating the works but arranging them in groups which he gives his own titles and each of which features a little introduction of their own. Since these introductions have their own notes that’s two sets of notes to be alert to.

In defence of originality

1. The Prometheus of the literary world

A throwaway remark by a friend or critic leads Lucian to a consideration of the ways he is a literary pioneer.

2. Two charges of literary assault (n/r)

Favourite philosophers

1. Demonax the philosopher

In praise of this philosopher who may or may not have existed.

2. The philosopher Nigrinus (n/r)

Damning diatribes

1. Slander

Interesting essay on the nature of ‘slander’. Lucian sees it from a very different perspective, a very legalistic one. He criticises slander because, in a court of law, a trial isn’t finished until both sides (prosecution and defence) have presented their case, whereas the chief thing he has against slander is that only one side is presented: the slanderer makes an accusation against the slandered person and the hearer of the slander never gets to hear the other side.

2. A few words about mourning

A cynical satirical view at the practices surrounding mourning but even more so the absurd beliefs the ancients had about it, the whole mythography around washing the body and placing a coin in its mouth so it can cross the Styx etc.

Old comic dialogues

1. The journey down to Hades, or The Tyrant

A lively short drama with speaking parts for 8 or 9 characters, including Clotho the Fate, Charon the ferryman and Hermes the shepherd of dead souls, whose aim is contrast the modest lifestyle and expectations of Micyllus and the rich man Megapenthes.

2. Timon the misanthrope

A philosophical dialogue featuring Timon, the legendary millionaire Athenian who generously gave gifts to his many hangers-on until at a stroke he lost everything and became a poor peasant, and other characters including Zeus, Hermes and the allegorical figure, Wealth himself.

As far as I understand, these are texts deriving from Greek Old Comedy because Old Comedy was imbued with The Fantastic, hence gods and allegorical figures.

3. The Ship, or prayers (n/r)

New comic dialogues

1. Chattering courtesans

There are 15 very short dialogues (generally a page and a half) in this set. These derive from Athenian New Comedy in the sense that the so-called new comedy (from about 320 to 250 BC) eschewed gods and legends, instead focusing on ordinary men and women, cast in stereotypical roles (repressive father, attractive young lovers, clever slave) who fret about the everyday realistic concerns of love, marriage, and money. Anyway, these dialogues are microplays, often featuring only 2, at most 4 characters, who exchange dialogue for barely two pages. The dialogues are named after the characters:

1. Glycerion and Thais

Glycerion is complaining to her friend Thais that her man till recently, ‘the Acarnanian’, the one who used to go about with Abrotonon, has dumped her and taken up with ‘that absolute witch Gorgona’.  Glycerion complains that Gorgona’s mother actually is a witch, accusing her of all the usual witchy tricks. But Thais tells her to relax, there are plenty more fish in the sea.

2. Myrtion, Pamphilus and Doris

Angry courtesan Myrtion accuses her former lover Pamphilus of being set to marry the daughter of the shipping magnate Philon, abandoning her (Myrtion) eight months pregnant. Pamphilus replies that this is rubbish, claiming he doesn’t know who Philon’s daughter is, anyway his father had a lawsuit against Philon a little while ago, in any case he’s really attached to Demeas’ daughter.

All this she has learned from her servant Doris who heard it from Lesbia who told her to check out all the garlanding and pipe girls and whatnot assembling in the alleyway behind Pamphilus’s gouse for a wedding.

Pamphilus laughs and says the report of celebrations and decorations is true but they’re for his neighbour’s wedding, not his. Myrtion is hugely relieved and Pamphilus promises that of course he would never abandon his pregnant mistress.

3. Mother and Philinna

Mother tells Philinna off for ignoring her boyfriend Diphilus and snogging his friend Lamprias, but Philinna explains she only did so to get back at Diphilus who had been kissing and joking with Lamprias’s ‘courtesan’ Thais before Lamprias arrived.

4. Melitta and Bacchis

Melitta has had a falling out with her boyfriend Charinus who, for his part, accuses her of having an affair with Hermotimus the shipbuilder, based on some scurrilous graffiti. Bacchis usefully provides the name of a Syrian witch who can do magic to win him back.

5. Clonarion and Leaena

Clonarion asks her friend if it’s true she’s having a lesbian affair with a woman from Lesbos, Megilla. If so, what do lesbians do? Leaena confirms it’s true and says it all happened one night when she’d been entertaining a party with the lyre and Megilla asked her to stay the night, in the same bed, then started to seduce her. Once she’s gotten aroused she took off her wig to reveal herself clean shaven like a male athlete and revealed that she was born with a man’s temperament and desires. When Leaena timidly asks whether she has a man’s thing Megilla says she doesn’t need one and starts to get passionate. When Clonarion asks for more details Leaena is too embarrassed to explain and the little dialogue stops there, though Sidwell points out in the notes that the implication is that Megilla uses a strap-on dildo (olisbos in Greek).

6. Crobyle and Corinna

Her mother, Crobyle, congratulates Corinna on losing her virginity the night before and so earning a mina (enough, the text tells us) to live on for a year. What comes over is the way the two women were forced into it by the complete lack of any other way of earning a living once Crobyle’s husband died. And Crobyle’s description of how to be a successful courtesan which has nothing to do with sex and everything to do with accompanying the man’s who’s paid for her to dinners or parties, not eating or drinking too much, not speaking too much, having only eyes for the client: making him feel special.

In exchange he’ll pay her handsomely and her mother will be proud and people will point to them wearing fine clothes etc. In other words, on the evidence of this text, it was a socially acceptable and even respectable way for a mother and marriageable daughter to make a living. I’m just imagining all those mothers in E.M. Forster novels having heart attacks.

7. Mother and Musarion

As a deliberate contrast, the mother in this one berates her daughter for being useless because she has fallen for a good-looking man, Chaereas, who’s full of promises and swears he’ll give her lots of lovely things when his father dies and yet, to date, has not only given them nothing, but has actually taken gifts from them and pawned them – a definite failure at ‘the courtesan business’ (p.169). She needs to hurry up and find a profitable lover: ‘Do you think you’re always going to be eighteen?’ (p.170)

8. Ampelis and Chrysis

Ampelis, with 20 years in the courtesan trade, advises young Chrysis that the key way to keeping a man, and making him pay you handsomely, is to excite his jealousy, make him so jealous that he beats you. Being beaten is always a good sign (!)

9. Dorcas, Pannychis, Philostratus and Polemon

Broad comedy as the woman Pannychis is told by her servant, Dorcas, that her long-absent boyfriend, the blowhard soldier Polemon is back from the wars and coming to see his true love. Only problem is his true love, Pannychis, has let herself be bought by the wealthy merchant, Philostratus, with one talent (the Greek coin). Both now approach the house at the same time causing Pannychis to wish the ground would open up and swallow her. But when the two men meet outside her house they have a standoff with Polemon the soldier threatening to martial all his troops while the phlegmatic merchant by saying he’s probably never even killed a cockerel and was in charge of guarding a fence. And with th is comic standoff it ends.

10. Chelidonion and Drosis

Drosis complains to wiser, older Chelidonion that her lover, Cleinias, doesn’t come round any more. It’s because he’s taken up with the philosopher Aristaenetus, who they both roundly condemn as a fraud. Drosis then gives a letter Cleinias has written her (in secret) saying his Dad got wind of their relationship and apprenticed him to Aristaenetus, who has promised the usual philosophical benefits of virtue and peace of mind. They discuss the rumour that Aristaenetus only professes the company of young men because he’s gay, and Chelodonion then promises to write to some graffiti on the wall ‘in the Ceramicus’ to that effect.

11. Tryphaena and Charmides

A young man, Charmides, is in bed with the courtesan he’s just bought for five drachmas, Tryphaena, but to her bafflement all he’s done is cry all evening and once they were in bed, laid a cloak between them as if scared of touching her? What the devil is wrong? So Charmides explains that he’s hopelessly in love with Philemation. At which Tryphaena tells him that Philemation is definitely not the woman he thinks she is, being the wrong end of her 40s, wearing a wig to hide her grey hair, and as ‘spotty as a leopard’.

12. Ioessa, Pythis and Lysias

Ioessa delivers a 2-page rebuke to her lover Lysias for a whole litany of ways he’s ignored her and flirted with every other woman in sight. Her friend Pythias says it’s her own fault for loving him unconditionally and letting him realise it. So he took her for granted. At that point Lysias returns and says it’s not fault, he’s spurned Ioessa because five nights earlier, he snuck out of his house (where his father had grounded him) and crept into Ioessa’s, into her bedroom, and discovered her in bed with another man (both fast asleep), knowing it was a man from his bald head. Both the girls fall about laughing and explain that it was Pythias in bed with Ioessa: she had had a disease and her hair had fallen out. She only looks haired during the day because she wears a wig. They all laugh and share a drink to make peace.

13. Leontichus, Chenidas and Hymnis

Leontichus is a braggart who delivers a great long account of his gory fights and killings in battle, egged on by his sidekick Chenidas. Unfortunately this has a disastrous effect on the girl he’s trying to chat up, Hymnis, who says he’s a revolting murderer and walks off.

14. Dorion and Myrtale

Dorion (man) complains that Myrtale (woman) has locked him out of her house and is sleeping with a Bithynian merchant. She’s cross and insists he lists all the gifts he’s claimed he’s given her. What emerges is that he’s a poor sailor and (his gifts are loaves, dried figs, sandals) whereas her new lover has given her a tunic, earrings and a carpet. Angry, Dorion turns to abuse of the Bithynian merchant, claiming he’s 50, bald and got skin like a prawn. Myrtale sarcastically points out how lucky his next lover is going to be, treated to onions from Cyprus, cheese from Gythium and ‘rubbish like that’ (p.187).

15. Cochlis and Parthenis

Cochlis asks Parthenis why she’s crying. Parthenis says it’s because she was hired to play the pipes at a party at Crocale’s house. She was hired by Crocale’s new lover, Gorgus. Unfortunately, in the middle of the party Crocale’s old lover, the Aetolian soldier Deinomachus, burst in with a bunch of soldier friends, badly beat up Gorgus, slapped Cochlis and broke her pipes.

Fascinating to learn that Crocale had demanded two talents (the Greek coin) from Deinomachus to commit to being his exclusive lover and, when he couldn’t pay, slammed the door in his face and switched her allegiance to Gorgus, a rich farmer and a nice man.

Cochlis (clearly a fellow courtesan) moralises that this is what you get if you get involved with soldiers, violence and trouble. What’s more they always boast about being in command of a thousand troops etc but if you ask for presents make excuses about having to wait for payday etc. No, give her someone more her equal in social rank, a fisherman or sailor or farmer, who offers less boasting and flattery and simply brings nice presents.

Thoughts

1. Surprisingly modern, aren’t they, in subject matter and mentality.

2. The obvious question is whether the 15 little scenes were conceived systematically i.e. whether they were intended to build up into a synoptic exploration or portrait of the subject, or a random fragments.

3. This is one of four sets of mini dialogues by Lucian which have come down to us: the others are Dialogues of the Gods, Dialogues of the Sea Gods and Dialogues of the Dead.

Scythians

1. The Scythian or the Honorary Consul (n/r)

2. Toxaris, or Friendship (n/r)

The longest piece in the book on the hackneyed subject of friendship, so dear to humanists, which was to be revived and done to death at the Renaissance and after (Montaigne, Bacon etc etc).

The art of eulogy

Sidwell has chosen these to demonstrate different types of:

  • eulogy (from eulogia, Classical Greek, eu for ‘well’, logia for ‘words’ – taken together to mean ‘praise’) is a speech or writing in praise of a person
  • encomium –a Latin word deriving from the Ancient Greek enkomion meaning ‘the praise of a person or thing’

1. An encomium of fatherland

Unlike Lucian in that it is direct, straight, unironic piece of standard praise for the patria to show us what a normal sensible encomium sounds like.

2. Praising a fly

Example of a ‘paradoxical encomium’ i.e. praising something small or ignoble which doesn’t merit such literary labour. This kind of ironic encomium became a literary genre in its own right, and lasts down to our day. There’s nothing funny at all in the 4-page text, it is a gathering together of what was known about the fly in his day and then a series of quotes from Homer and the classics showing how the fly has featured in great poetry. No laughs at all. The humour comes from the basic idea or conceit, of treating such a traditionally paltry creature to such an elaborate gathering of information and heavyweight literary quotes.

3. Images (n/r)

4. In defence of images (n/r)

5. About the parasite: proof that parasitic is an art

A full-blown Socratic dialogue which uses the Socratic technique ironically to prove a paradoxical, socially unacceptable point, namely that being a parasite is an art form, in fact the highest possible art a person can aspire to. Again, this is surprisingly unfunny. Instead it really does use the techniques of Socratic dialogue, which are earnest and serious, but for an absurd end.

The gist of the argument is that a parasite, by battening onto a rich man, by singing for his supper, by being amusing and entertaining, knows where his next meal is coming from and so lives in the peace  of mind and certainty which the philosophers claim to be the True Aim of Philosophy – unlike many of the famous philosophers who ended up being put on trial, burned to ashes, exiled or other unfortunate ends.

I can see that this is more crafted and clever than, say, the Dialogues of the Courtesans, but it is a cleverness devoted to a futile end. The Platonic dialogues are hard enough to read because the modern reader knows that their premise, or the conclusion they’re funneling the reader towards – that there exists a world of archetypes overseen by a Divine Creator of which this world and everything in it are mere copies – is pointlessly irrelevant to any modern thinking about the world and humanity’s place in it. Producing a brilliant pastiche of a clever Platonic dialogue devoted to a deliberately silly end requires a special kind of academic patience to plough through and I registered the clever-cleverness but didn’t really enjoy it.

Instead I found the courtesan dialogues the best things in the book because they are so short and quick and modern in their effect. You are dropped into the middle of an argument or conversation about someone’s love life, they tell you just enough about the situation to make you smile or nod in agreement or be amazed at the social conventions of ancient Greece, and then they end. Incredibly focused, to-the-point, bite-sized insights into another world.

The art of the lie

1. True Histories

This might be Lucian’s most famous work because, unlike most of the other pieces, which are stuck in the ghetto of classical studies, this 38-page text has crossed over into the modern genre of science fiction. Many scholars and fans claim it as ‘the first science fiction story’ which obviously gives it an interest and notoriety which none of his other works can match.

Regardless of what posterity has made if it, Lucian clearly states his intention which is to mount a comprehensive attack on fictions which masquerade as truth. He has in mind the fantastical elements found in the works of Homer (the primal fantasist), Herodotus and even Plato (with things like his famous myth of the cave). His aim is to take down fantasy fiction by producing his own fantastically nonsensical fiction, a kind of reduction ad absurdum.

He explicitly introduces it as made-up in every aspect, but then goes on to relate with the plausibility of a real account. It is a very post-modern, self-deconstructing artefact. In his brief introduction Sidwell says its Greek title might more accurately be translated as ‘True Fictions’.

True Histories plot

The storyline can be briskly summarised as: Lucian and 50 companions set sail on an adventure and get to the Pillars of Hercules where they encounter a land of vine-women, kiss them and become instantly drunk, have sex with them and you are turned into a vine.

Sailing on their ship is caught in a mighty storm and whirled into the air, into the sky, and then into space. they land on the moon which they discover is ruled by Endymion and populated by strange men. They discover the Selenites are at war with the men who inhabit the sun about who is going to set up a colony on the morning star. There is an extended description of a huge battle featuring units of weird and wonderful made-up animals and fantastical beings. After much fighting a peace treaty is signed, Endymion entertains them more and they find out more about weird lunar life before being allowed to return through the heavens back to earth, landing in the sea.

Soon afterwards they are swallowed by a giant whale only to discover people living inside it who have erected temples and get on with an ordinary life though their diet is dominated by fish. Here they witness another epic battle fought between peoples with names like the Turbotfeet, the Crabbies and the Triton-pans. Eight months later, through the open mouth of the whale they witness another battle, a sea battle between giants with flaming hair who steer moving islands.

After spending a year in the whale they want to escape and light a fire on one of the islands which takes 12 days to kill the whale. They’ve taken the precaution of propping its mouth open and now lower the ship into the sea and sail away from the vast corpse. After a few days there’s a drop in temperature and the sea freezes over. At first they create a hole in the ice to hole up and eat frozen fish. Then they haul the ship onto the ice sheet and go skimming across it.

The temperature rises and the ice disappears. Next they come to a sea of milk and land on an island which turns out to be an enormous round of cheese, so they say there living off milk and cheese for five days, then sail on. They see men skimming over the surface of the sea because their feet are made of cork.

Soon after they reach the famous Isle of the Blessed which they can smell before they see it. Upon landing they are lightly bound with garlands of flowers and taken before the legendary judge Rhadamanthys who listens to the story of their wanderings and decides they can stay, triggering a description of the famous Elysian Fields (women are held in common and the boys ‘never say no’)

Then onto a ‘catalogue’ of the famous heroes there. This is a standard spacefiller and timewasting tactic, interesting in a nerdy way but not as much fun as the pure fantasy (an island made of cheese!). There’s a battle with the impious who try to break in but all the usual Greek heroes lead an army which wins.

After they’ve been there five months there’s some drama when a man named Cinyras steals Helen and elopes with her, prompting Menelaus to wake all the Greeks and Rhadamanthys to authorise a ship to track down the miscreants, which it does, capturing them at the edge of the sea of milk.

Soon after they are kicked out of the Isle of the Blessed and are on their wanderings once more. They come to an island like Hell, with rivers of fire and the damned being tormented. Lucian jokes that the worst punishments are reserved for those who tell lies or write down things which aren’t true.

Next they sail on to the Isle of Sleep which has a city and gates and forest etc all given allegorical attributes reminiscent of many a medieval allegory. They stay there 30 days and nights asleep and dreaming.

Then they sail on to the island of Ogygia ruled by Circe who kept Odysseus so long. In fact, on the Isle of the Blest Odysseus gave Lucian a letter to give to Circe which says he regretted ever leaving her and wishes to return. She feasts them and they rest.

Next day they sail on till they bump into the Pumpkin Pirates who attack them until they themselves are assaulted by the Nut Sailors which turns into a big naval battle. They are attacked by men riding dolphins who they fight off. They go aground on an island made of tree trunks which turns out to be the nest of a giant halcyon (sea bird) whose eggs are just hatching.

They come to a kind of sea forest, hoist the ship up to and ‘sail’ across the canopies of leaves. Then they come to a chasm in the sea where the water just stops on both sides giving rise to a sheer cliff of water going down thousands of yards. There’s a water ‘bridge’ which they row across to the other side.

They come to the island of Oxheads, people like the Minotaur who attack them, but they counter-attack and capture several as hostages which they release back to their people on payment of food and water.

They sail on coming close to land but seeing giant who are their own ships, who lie on their backs with big erections to which they tie sails. Others sitting on corks tied to dolphins which pull them through the waves.

They arrive at an island inhabited by beautiful young women with gowns down to their feet who kindly invite them to their homes. But Lucan, knowing his Odyssey, is sceptical and discovers the one hosting him has in fact the legs of a donkey. When he ties her up and questions her she reveals that the plan to kill and eat his men. He leaps onto the roof of the house and yells out to warn his men who come running. When they try to question his ‘asswoman’ again she turns to water.

Finally they arrive at ‘the land which lies opposite the one you inhabit’ which has been foretold several times on their adventure. Here a storm blows up and wrecks their ship leaving them stranded. At this point the narrator promises he will tell all the adventures which befell them on this strange continent in more books to come. These, of course, were never written and so the book ends with what commentator calls ‘the biggest lie of all.’

Thoughts

The most interesting thing about this deliberately fantastical narrative is that, despite the preface explicitly stating it’s all lies, and his periodic reminders in the text itself, you find yourself quite gripped by it, following the absurd details and wondering what’s going to happen next. Obviously not on the Rational Level which Lucian wants us all to live on but on the much more important imaginative level. It turns out that you can tell everyone that your fiction is a preposterous pack of made-up lies but they’ll still enjoy it. We are addicted to stories, we relate to stories far more than to rational discourse. Makes you wonder why we even bother with ‘rational discourse’.

To put it another way, the stories we like and the things we remember have nothing to do with The Truth, in fact you can almost guarantee they will be the opposite. (See my review of Irrationality: The Enemy Within by Stuart Sutherland.)

Thoughts

I think Lucian is one of those classic authors who it’s more interesting to read about than to actually read. I enjoyed reading Sidwell’s introduction and enjoyed dipping into the extensive glossary to remind myself who people like Clotho or Anaxagoras are. I enjoyed reading the gracious olde worlde introduction to the Fowler brothers edition (see link below). I enjoyed rereading explanations of Old Comedy, New Comedy, Platonic dialogue etc, all that felt empowering. I enjoyed very much the Dialogues of the Courtesans and the True Histories adventure. But unfortunately found almost all the other works I read or started and gave up to be disappointing. It’s not the fault of Sidwell’s translation, – he makes a big effort to be popular, accessible and slangy, to catch the immediacy of the dialogues and the gripping pace of True Histories.

I think it’s the subject matter of the more arcane and moralising pieces: the ‘morals’ they are pointing are just too obvious. ‘Timon’ shows that a rich man often attracts not real friends but hangers-on and parasites. The ‘Journey to Hades’ shows that rich men are often greedy and self-centred while the honest poor have a quiet dignity. The ‘Prise of Parasitism’ makes obvious hits at the selfishness of the rich and the unfairness of contemporary society. These are not ‘insights’ or morals which the effort of reading the sometimes convoluted texts really justify.


Credit

‘Chattering Courtesans and Other Sardonic Sketches’ by Lucian, translated with an introduction and notes by Keith Sidwell, was published by Penguin Classics in 2004.

Related links

Roman reviews

Conclusion by Walter Pater

Walter Pater

Walter Pater was born in 1839 in the East End of London where his father was a doctor. At the age of 14 he was sent to private school in Canterbury where he was influenced by the soaring beauty of the cathedral and the stylish art criticism of John Ruskin. Aged 19 he went up to Oxford where he took a degree in Literae Humaniores in 1862. Within a few years he began writing essays about poets and artists, including ground-breaking essays about Leonardo da Vinci (1869), Sandro Botticelli (1870) and Michelangelo (1871). He gathered these in his 1873 volume, Studies in the History of the Renaissance.

The Renaissance had a big impact on the literary world because of 1) the length and thoroughness of the essays and 2) the exquisitely sensitive prose they were written in, prose which delicately describes the psychological impact of interacting with great works of art.

It is also a goldmine of literary quotes, for example the Leonardo essay contains the famous line that the Mona Lisa is ‘older than the rocks among which she sits’. The essay on ‘The School of Giorgione’, originally published in 1877 and added to the third edition of The Renaissance (in 1888), features Pater’s much-quoted saying that: ‘All art constantly aspires towards the condition of music.’

The Conclusion

Studies in the History of the Renaissance ended with a so-called Conclusion. As Pater’s biographer Michael Levey points out in his edition of Pater’s novel, ‘Marius the Epicurean’, the Conclusion is not really a conclusion at all, certainly not to a book of essays about the Renaissance. It is a free-standing essay in its own right.

The Conclusion is a miniature work of philosophy which takes as its starting point the swirl of impressions which make up the conscious mind: a drift of perceptions, feelings, thoughts and memories, reduced to impressions ‘unstable, flickering, inconstant’, ‘ringed round for each one of us by that thick wall of personality’ and ‘with the passage and dissolution of impressions…a continual vanishing away, that strange, perpetual weaving and unweaving of ourselves’.

Having described the weaving and unweaving of sensory information for a couple of paragraphs, Peter goes on to propose an ideal for living. Given the never-ending flux of sense data and the perceptions which they prompt in us and the impossibility of bursting through this flux to find any permanent structures or resting places, then it makes sense to live this life of sensations to the max: to seek to live where ‘the greatest number of vital forces unite in their purest energy’.

He uses half a dozen phrases to describe the same basic idea – the quest to live and experience the most vivid sensations possible, but the one that is most quoted is To burn always with this hard, gemlike flame, to maintain this ecstasy, is success in life.

We should seek to have a ‘quickened, multiplied consciousness’ and the best way to achieve this is through a life of artistic appreciation, ‘the desire of beauty, the love of art for its own sake‘.

Quite obviously this is a deeply amoral and asocial idea. For most of recorded history, art and literature have been created with deeply moral messages in mind, reinforcing the values and norms of the society which produced it. The literature of ancient Greece and ancient Rome was fiercely judged by critics in terms of its social and moral impact and so was every literature up to and including the Victorians.

Pater’s very short essay is proposing a radical alternative, that art has no moral or social message whatsoever, and that the best way to live is simply to enjoy art for its own sake, enjoy beauty for beauty’s sake alone.

Here’s the full text of the Conclusion. I have added to it my own numbered headings and the bold (neither are in Pater’s original text) mainly to help me remember the structure and key points of the argument.

The Conclusion by Walter Pater (1868)

1. The external life

To regard all things and principles of things as inconstant modes or fashions has more and more become the tendency of modern thought. Let us begin with that which is without – our physical life. Fix upon it in one of its more exquisite intervals, the moment, for instance, of delicious recoil from the flood of water in summer heat. What is the whole physical life in that moment but a combination of natural elements to which science gives their names? But those elements, phosphorus and lime and delicate fibres, are present not in the human body alone: we detect them in places most remote from it. Our physical life is a perpetual motion of them – the passage of the blood, the waste and repairing of the lenses of the eye, the modification of the tissues of the brain under every ray of light and sound – processes which science reduces to simpler and more elementary forces. Like the elements of which we are composed, the action of these forces extends beyond us: it rusts iron and ripens corn. Far out on every side of us those elements are broadcast, driven in many currents; and birth and gesture and death and the springing of violets from the grave are but a few out of ten thousand resultant combinations. That clear, perpetual outline of face and limb is but an image of ours, under which we group them – a design in a web, the actual threads of which pass out beyond it. This at least of flamelike our life has, that it is but the concurrence, renewed from moment to moment, of forces parting sooner or later on their ways.

2. The internal world

Or if we begin with the inward world of thought and feeling, the whirlpool is still more rapid, the flame more eager and devouring. There it is no longer the gradual darkening of the eye, the gradual fading of colour from the wall – movements of the shore-side, where the water flows down indeed, though in apparent rest – but the race of the mid-stream, a drift of momentary acts of sight and passion and thought. At first sight experience seems to bury us under a flood of external objects, pressing upon us with a sharp and importunate reality, calling us out of ourselves in a thousand forms of action. But when reflexion begins to play upon these objects they are dissipated under its influence; the cohesive force seems suspended like some trick of magic; each object is loosed into a group of impressions – colour, odour, texture – in the mind of the observer. And if we continue to dwell in thought on this world, not of objects in the solidity with which language invests them, but of impressions, unstable, flickering, inconsistent, which burn and are extinguished with our consciousness of them, it contracts still further: the whole scope of observation is dwarfed into the narrow chamber of the individual mind. Experience, already reduced to a group of impressions, is ringed round for each one of us by that thick wall of personality through which no real voice has ever pierced on its way to us, or from us to that which we can only conjecture to be without. Every one of those impressions is the impression of the individual in his isolation, each mind keeping as a solitary prisoner its own dream of a world. Analysis goes a step farther still, and assures us that those impressions of the individual mind to which, for each one of us, experience dwindles down, are in perpetual flight; that each of them is limited by time, and that as time is infinitely divisible, each of them is infinitely divisible also; all that is actual in it being a single moment, gone while we try to apprehend it, of which it may ever be more truly said that it has ceased to be than that it is. To such a tremulous wisp constantly re-forming itself on the stream, to a single sharp impression, with a sense in it, a relic more or less fleeting, of such moments gone by, what is real in our life fines itself down. It is with this movement, with the passage and dissolution of impressions, images, sensations, that analysis leaves off – that continual vanishing away, that strange, perpetual weaving and unweaving of ourselves.

3. Philosophy as observation

‘Philosophiren,’ says Novalis, ‘ist dephlegmatisiren, vivificiren.’ The service of philosophy, of speculative culture, towards the human spirit, is to rouse, to startle it to a life of constant and eager observation. Every moment some form grows perfect in hand or face; some tone on the hills or the sea is choicer than the rest; some mood of passion or insight or intellectual excitement is irresistibly real and attractive to us – for that moment only. Not the fruit of experience, but experience itself, is the end. A counted number of pulses only is given to us of a variegated, dramatic life. How may we see in them all that is to be seen in them by the finest senses? How shall we pass most swiftly from point to point, and be present always at the focus where the greatest number of vital forces unite in their purest energy?

4. Therefore, we must burn with ecstatic perceptions

To burn always with this hard, gemlike flame, to maintain this ecstasy, is success in life. In a sense it might even be said that our failure is to form habits: for, after all, habit is relative to a stereotyped world, and meantime it is only the roughness of the eye that makes any two persons, things, situations, seem alike. While all melts under our feet, we may well grasp at any exquisite passion, or any contribution to knowledge that seems by a lifted horizon to set the spirit free for a moment, or any stirring of the senses, strange dyes, strange colours, and curious odours, or work of the artist’s hands, or the face of one’s friend. Not to discriminate every moment some passionate attitude in those about us, and in the very brilliancy of their gifts some tragic dividing of forces on their ways, is, on this short day of frost and sun, to sleep before evening. With this sense of the splendour of our experience and of its awful brevity, gathering all we are into one desperate effort to see and touch, we shall hardly have time to make theories about the things we see and touch. What we have to do is to be for ever curiously testing new opinions and courting new impressions, never acquiescing in a facile orthodoxy of Comte, or of Hegel, or of our own. Philosophical theories or ideas, as points of view, instruments of criticism, may help us to gather up what might otherwise pass unregarded by us. ‘Philosophy is the microscope of thought.’ The theory or idea or system which requires of us the sacrifice of any part of this experience, in consideration of some interest into which we cannot enter, or some abstract theory we have not identified with ourselves, or of what is only conventional, has no real claim upon us.

5. The aim of life is not to ‘learn’ or ‘mature’ or find The Truth, but to cram as many sensations as possible into our short span, purely for their own sake

One of the most beautiful passages of Rousseau is that in the sixth book of the Confessions, where he describes the awakening in him of the literary sense. An undefinable taint of death had clung always about him, and now in early manhood he believed himself smitten by mortal disease. He asked himself how he might make as much as possible of the interval that remained; and he was not biased by anything in his previous life when he decided that it must be by intellectual excitement, which he found just then in the clear, fresh writings of Voltaire. Well! we are all condamnés, as Victor Hugo says: we are all under sentence of death but with a sort of indefinite reprieve – ‘les hommes sont tous condamnés a mort avec des sursis indefinis‘ – we have an interval, and then our place knows us no more. Some spend this interval in listlessness, some in high passions, the wisest, at least among ‘the children of this world’, in art and song. For our one chance lies in expanding that interval, in getting as many pulsations as possible into the given time. Great passions may give us this quickened sense of life, ecstasy and sorrow of love, the various forms of enthusiastic activity, disinterested or otherwise, which come naturally to many of us. Only be sure it is passion – that it does yield you this fruit of a quickened, multiplied consciousness. Of such wisdom, the poetic passion, the desire of beauty, the love of art for its own sake, has most. For art comes to you proposing frankly to give nothing but the highest quality to your moments as they pass, and simply for those moments’ sake.

******************

Upon the essay’s publication, four things happened:

1) Pater was a tutor at Oxford and this slender essay was adopted as a manifesto and a creed by some of his students and their friends and quickly ramified out into the doctrine and critical theory known as Art for Art’s Sake which was then also christened ‘Aestheticism’.

2) This produced a backlash in Oxford’s authorities and Pater was deprived of a promised position as proctor of Balliol (although more recent scholarship suggests this was as a result of a scandal caused when a student handed over to the authorities homosexual love letters between Pater and a student).

3) Pater himself was dismayed by the impact his essay had on the rising generation (and on his career) and adopted radio silence. For the next 12 years he published nothing except a few discreet essays. And in the second edition of Studies in the History of the Renaissance he quietly omitted the Conclusion altogether, hoping nobody would notice.

4) But, also, Pater grew up. He came to think of the fervid promotion of a life of sensations as immature. He calmed down. He came to see life more as a question of carefully perceiving and distinguishing between perceptions rather then feverishly cramming in as many sensations as you can manage. When you think about it this is rather a schoolboy-let-loose-in-a-sweetshop philosophy of life. This maturity and sobriety may have mirrored a movement in his personal beliefs from an apparent amoral epicureanism back towards the Christian faith of his pious boyhood.

Whatever precisely it was that prompted the long silence, Pater finally broke it when, in 1885 he published a long novel, ‘Marius the Epicurean’. In the same year he published a new, third edition of The Renaissance, as he now called his collection of essays, and this time he allowed the Conclusion to be reincluded, but with a note:

This brief ‘Conclusion’ was omitted in the second edition of this book, as I conceived it might possibly mislead some of those young men into whose hands it might fall. On the whole, I have thought it best to reprint it here, with some slight changes which bring it closer to my original meaning. I have dealt more fully in Marius the Epicurean with the thoughts suggested by it.

Does ‘Marius the Epicurean’ deal more fully with the issues raised in the Conclusion? Sounds like an A-level English question. Read my review of ‘Marius the Epicurean’ (which I’m publishing on Wednesday) to find out.


Related links

On Transience by Sigmund Freud (1916)

Written during the Great War, this little essay is a useful outline of the psychology of atheism. Many adolescents, troubled by the world, realising for the first time the fact of their mortality, ask what’s the point of being alive? This short essay is by way of being Freud’s existentialist response.

Freud tells us he was out walking with a poet (not named in the piece but, in fact, the eminent Austrian poet Rainer Maria Rilke) who said: ‘Everything will die and pass away, what’s the point of even being alive?’ Freud, solid, sensible, stoic, replied: The brevity of life is all the more reason to value things, flowers, friends, works of art – to appreciate and value them properly while they’re here.

The proneness to decay of all that is beautiful and perfect can, as we know, give rise to two different impulses in the mind. The one leads to the aching despondency felt by the young poet, while the other leads to rebellion against the fact asserted. ‘No! It is impossible that all this loveliness of Nature and Art, of the world of our sensations and of the world outside, will really fade away into nothing. It would be too senseless and too presumptuous to believe it. Somehow or other this loveliness must be able to persist and to escape all the powers of destruction.’

But this demand for immortality is a product of our wishes too unmistakeable to lay claim to reality: what is painful may nonetheless be true. I could not see my way to dispute the transience of all things, nor could I insist upon an exception in favour of what is beautiful and perfect. But I did dispute the pessimistic poet’s view that the transience of what is beautiful involves any loss of its worth.

On the contrary, an increase! Transience value is scarcity value in time. Limitation in the possibility of an enjoyment raises the value of an enjoyment. It was incomprehensible, I declared, that the thought of the transience of beauty should interfere with our joy in it. As regards the beauty of Nature, each time it is destroyed by winter it comes again next year, so that in relation to the length of our lives it can in fact be regarded as eternal. The beauty of the human form and face vanish forever in the course of our own lives, but their evanescence only lends them a fresh charm. A flower which blossoms only for a single night does not seem to us on that account less lovely. Nor can I understand any better why the beauty and perfection of a work of art or of an intellectual achievement should lose its worth because of its temporal limitation.

A time may indeed come when the pictures and statues which we admire today will crumble to dust, or a race of men may follow us who no longer understand the works of our poets and thinkers, or a geological epoch may even arrive when all animate life upon the earth ceases; but since the value of all this beauty and perfection is determined only by its significance for our own emotional lives, it has no need to survive us and is therefore independent of absolute duration.

So: enjoyment of life is an act of the will, is a choice. Freud’s calm defence of enjoyment (not just of the body, but of the mind) looks back to the calm, sensible hedonism of Horace (Epistles) and anticipates the willed leap of faith into positive action taken by the existentialists.

For my money the best, the most practical and least politically compromised of those post-war European thinkers was Albert Camus. His early essay The Myth of Sisyphus (1939) starts from a meditation on suicide (‘What’s the point of living in a world without God or meaning?’) works its way round to affirming man’s rebellion against a world without God or meaning, and ends up by describing the physical, sensual pleasure of being alive, swimming and sunbathing and smoking by the sea and drinking wine and laughing with friends, sensations which were to be marvellously captured in many of his later novels and stories.


Credit

The history of the translations of Freud’s many works into English form a complicated subject in their own right. The very short essay ‘On Transience’ was first translated into English in 1957 as part of The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. My quote is from the version included in Volume 14 of the Pelican Freud Library, ‘Art and Literature’, published in 1985.

Related link

More Freud reviews

Virtual War: Kosovo and beyond by Michael Ignatieff (2000)

Michael Ignatieff (born 1947) is a public intellectual, academic, journalist and, at one point, back in his native Canada, a high profile politician. Back when I was a student in the 1980s he was all over the British media, fronting thoughtful documentaries and high-end discussion programmes on Channel 4.

Ignatieff’s written a lot – novels, memoirs, histories, countless articles. One consistent strand of his output has been a series of books meditating on the nature and meaning of contemporary warfare. This began in 1993 with Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism and was followed by The Warrior’s Honour: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience in 1998.

In the introduction to this volume, written in December 1999, Ignatieff says Virtual War is, in effect, the third in a trilogy about the nature of modern war – but this statement has been rendered redundant by the fact that he’s gone on to publish several more. As far as I can make out the sequence now runs:

  1. 1993: Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism
  2. 1998: The Warrior’s Honour: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience
  3. 2000: Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond
  4. 2003: Empire Lite: Nation-Building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan
  5. 2004: The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror
  6. 2017: The Ordinary Virtues: Moral Order in a Divided World

His books contain extensive descriptions of contemporary conflict zones, fighting, wars and aftermaths. The first book in the series (‘Blood and Belonging’) contains riveting eye-witness reporting from the conflicts in former Yugoslavia; the second one has a chapter where he accompanies the head of the United Nations to Rwanda, Zaire and Angola; and the fourth one adds scenes from the conflict in Afghanistan. This one contains reportage from a Kosovar refugee camp and a description of a Kosovar village, Celine, where a disgusting massacre was carried out by Serb paramilitaries.

But Ignatieff is not a war reporter; there are plenty of those, filing daily reports from the front line of conflicts around the world. And similarly, he is not a military analyst; there are thousands of those, publishing papers in specialist journals analysing this or that aspect of the hardware or strategy involved in the world’s many conflicts.

Ignatieff stands aside from both those genres because his stance can perhaps best be summarised as ‘a moral philosopher considers modern conflict’. He goes into military and technical detail where necessary – for example, in this book he gives a detailed description of the command and control centres running the NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999, an extended explanation of how targets were established, confirmed and then the complex bureaucracy planners had to go through in order to get permission to bomb them. Very detailed, very informative.

But that isn’t where Ignatieff’s interest lies. He is interested in what this kind of conflict tells us about the nature of modern warfare and, above all, about the moral and political attitudes of the West – what it tells us about ourselves and the modern societies we live in. He is interested in trying to unpick the complex moral issues which the conflicts he covers raise or have created or are evolving or distorting. His aim is:

exploring the new technology of war and the emerging morality governing its use. (p.7)

Maybe it’ll help if I summarise the short introduction in which Ignatieff unpacks the different senses of the word ‘virtual’ which underpin this book and give it its title.

(If you want to know the historic and geopolitical background to the war in Kosovo read the relevant section of my review of Anthony Loyd’s book, Another Bloody Love Letter. Ignatieff devotes a fascinating chapter, ‘Balkan Physics’, to a detailed account of the recent history and complex power politics which led up to the conflict, paying special attention to the failure of American diplomacy in the region and then to the change of tone brought by new Secretary of State, Madeline Allbright, pages 39 to 67.)

Virtual warfare

Ignatieff thinks the Big New Thing about the war in Kosovo was that it was a virtual war. What does he mean? Well, he uses the word ‘virtual’ in quite a few senses or contexts.

1. The public

It was a war which most people in the West watched on their screens, in which they had little or no investment or commitment. For Ignatieff this is a worrying new development. For example, will ‘war’ slowly morph into a particularly gruesome spectator sport? Does this mean that the populations of the West no longer believe in their causes enough to slug it out face to face? Will this, over the long run, weaken our resolve to mount wars when we need to?

2. Air force screens

It was a ‘virtual war’ in at least two further senses. The ‘war’ consisted mostly of NATO’s 78-day-long bombing campaign carried out against Serbian forces inside Kosovo and against crucial infrastructure in Serbia itself, especially in the capital Belgrade. No ground forces were sent into Kosovo and this, apparently, confused NATO’s air force, whose doctrine and training leads all of them, from air commodores down to pilots, to be expect to co-ordinate air attacks with ground forces, to be called in by radio to support ground attacks. They were unused to an army-less war.

Instead, the pilots, and their controllers back in control and command centres in locations in the West (Italy, Germany, Belgium, the US, the UK) worked via computer readouts of target information and then by sharing the view of the in-plane cameras which the pilots were using.

Thus the people choosing the targets and guiding the pilots towards them had pretty much the same view as the viewers at home (who got to see selected plane or missile-based footage which NATO released to the press). Obviously they were deeply involved in actually making it happen, identifying, assessing, instructing and so on. But nonetheless, it was, for these technicians, also a ‘virtual’ war, fought or, more accurately, experienced, via screens.

3. No army

Let’s go back to that point about no army. There was no NATO presence at all in Kosovo during the 78-day bombing campaign. There had been Western observers and peacekeepers in Kosovo but overnight they became enemies of Serbia, liable to be arrested and used as hostages, and so they were all withdrawn. So there were no NATO soldiers on the ground at all. Which is why Ignatieff very reasonably asks, What kind of war is it which involves no army at all on our side?

And furthermore, no casualties. None of the pilots of the thousand or so NATO planes which flew nearly 100,000 sorties were lost. A couple were downed by ejected. So Ignatieff further asks, What does it mean that the West can now go to war without fielding an army and without risking the life of a single combatant? Surely this is the kind of war fought by people who don’t want any casualties, a kind of war without the physical risk.

Previously, wars have involved loss of life on both sides. Western leaders have been slow to commit to war (British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain being maybe the most famous example) because they knew the bloody horror it entailed. But now there is no bloody horror. There is no risk. What, Ignatieff asks, does that do to the very definition and concept of war?

How does that change everyone’s perception of what a war is? How does it effect:

1. Policy makers Does it make them more liable to intervene if they think they’re risking less – financially, but above all in terms of casualties, with consequent minimal damage to their domestic reputation and ratings?

2. The public in Western nations Will it teach the public to become so risk-averse that as and when a serious commitment of soldiers on the ground is required, it will be unacceptably unpopular? Will old-style fighting become less and less acceptable to a public acculturated to watching everything happen on a video screen? Will we refuse to countenance any conflict in which we lose soldiers?

3. The enemy On the face of it, the use of laser-guided precision weapons ought to scare adversaries so much that they are put off ever triggering the intervention of the West and its high-tech weapons. In fact, as he reports in detail, the reality in Kosovo turned out to be the exact opposite: President of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević, cannily triggered the West and then, in defiance of all our best efforts, carried out his nation-scale ethnic cleansing.

Because Milošević knew that as soon as the bombing started NATO would withdraw its ground forces and so he would be free to do what he wanted to the Kosovar population. He intended to drive them right out of their own country using exemplary terror i.e. using his army and paramilitaries to massacre entire villages and burn them to the ground, thus terrorising populations nearby to flee across the border into Macedonia or Albania – and that is exactly what happened. Hundreds of thousands of Kosovar refugees were harried out of their own country, even as the NATO bombing campaign proceeded. According to Human Rights Watch, by early June 1999, more than 80 percent of the entire population of Kosovo and 90 percent of Kosovar Albanians had been displaced from their homes. Amnesty International estimated that nearly one million people were forced to flee Kosovo by the Serb terror campaign.

On the face of it, then, this new kind of hi-tech gee-whiz ‘virtual’ war let the bad guys get away with it, with genocide and ethnic cleansing. In other words, the first ‘virtual’ war undermined its own rationale: it seemed very much as if what was needed to force the Serbs to end their ethnic cleansing was precisely what had been so carefully avoided i.e. face-to-face clashes between NATO forces and Serb forces. In other words, traditional warfare.

4. No mandate

Lastly, Ignatieff claims it was also a virtual war in the sense that the forces involved weren’t technically at war. The NATO forces who bombed the Serbs for 78 days never actually declared war on Serbia, no UN resolution was passed to justify this attack on a sovereign state, and none of the legislatures of the European countries who went to war were called on to vote for it.

NATO lawyers cobbled together a justification in law but, like everything to do with the law, it is subject to endless interpretation and debate. Even the outcome was unorthodox, a so-called ‘military technical agreement’ which didn’t settle any of the issues but merely allowed the entrance of NATO ground forces into Kosovo to protect the population while the diplomats went back to the negotiating table. But the fundamental issue is simple: Was NATO’s bombing campaign against Serbia legal or illegal under international law?

I’m no lawyer but what I took from Ignatieff’s account was that the campaign was technically illegal but was morally and politically justified. NATO used force as a last resort, after all attempts at mediation and conflict resolution – mainly at the talks held between NATO, the Kosovo Liberation Army and Milošević at Rambouillet in France – failed to find a solution.

NATO’s aim was to save lives, to put an end to Serbia’s low-level policy of massacre and ethnic cleansing. But does a worthy aim – saving the lives of a defenceless population – justify breaking one of the fundamental principles of the UN and the post-war international consensus, namely that the integrity of the nation state is sacrosanct; that nobody has a right to intervene militarily in the affairs of another state. This is one of the central moral-political-legal questions which Ignatieff returns to again and again.

To intervene or not intervene?

Like its two predecessors and its successor, Virtual War is a) short and b) not so much one consistent through-written book, but a collection of articles, published at different times in different magazines, but with enough thematic unity to work as a book. And each article or chapter focuses on particular aspects of the Kosovo war which I’ve itemised above.

Thus the issue I just described – whether the West was justified in attacking Serbia – is dealt with in chapter three, which consists entirely of an exchange of letters between Ignatieff and the British lawyer and politician, Robert Skidelsky, three from each of them.

The chapter may be short (16 pages) but it gets straight to the point and is packed with argumentation on both sides. Skidelsky argues that respecting the integrity of states has (more or less) kept the peace since the Second World War. If we alter that fundamental premise, if – like UK Prime Minister Tony Blair – we argue that we are so convinced of our moral rectitude and our case that we are justified in intervening in other countries wherever minorities are threatened by oppressive governments – then the world will descend into chaos.

Ignatieff politely but firmly disagrees. He describes himself as an ‘internationalist’, meaning that he agrees that the basis of the international system is the integrity of the nation state, but he also believes in the human rights of individuals and of communities, and that this second principle can clash with the first and, in Kosovo, trumps it.

He’s our author, so the weight of evidence from the other chapters tends to bolster Ignatieff’s argument. But Ignatieff tries to present a fair fight, giving Skidelsky’s objections as much air time as his own views. I very much took Skidelsky’s point that the notion Tony Blair was promoting in various public speeches (particularly, apparently, one given in Chicago on 22 April 1999, pages 72 and 74), that the West not only has the power to intervene in rogue regimes, but is obligated to intervene, is a terrible precedent. The road to hell is paved with good intentions (p.73).

And indeed, we know what happened next, which is that, after the 9/11 attacks, the US, under President George W. Bush, bolstered by Tony Blair and his interventionist stance, decided to intervene in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Overthrowing the absolutely awful dictator, Saddam Hussein, sounded like a great idea. Liberating Iraq and rebuilding it as a modern democracy sounded like a great idea. And how did those interventions turn out? Catastrophic wastes of time, money and lives, which left the region more unstable than before.

In this respect, Virtual War is a snapshot in time, capturing a moment when the interventionist mindset was new and still being explored and worked through. This is a fancy way of saying that quite a lot of it feels out of date. Ignatieff’s subtle premonitions about a new type of warfare have been completely superseded by subsequent events in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Content

As mentioned, the book consists of chapters which bear a strong resemblance to standalone magazine articles. In his previous books these had each been based around particular issues or countries. Here each chapter revolves around a central figure. These are:

  • Richard Holbrooke, impresario of the 1995 Dayton Agreement which ended the Bosnian War, architect of US policy in the Balkans, who Ignatieff follows and interviews as he mounts frantic shuttle diplomacy in the runup to the outbreak of hostilities (December 1998).
  • Robert Skidelsky, British economic historian, crossbench peer in the House of Lords, and vocal opponent of the bombing campaign against Serbia who Ignatieff debates the legality of the NATO bombing offensive with (May 1999).
  • General Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) from 1997 to 2000, who commanded Operation Allied Force during the Kosovo War, and is profiled as part of an extended description of how the bombing campaign was managed, not only technically in terms of selecting targets etc but at a diplomatic level (June 1999).
  • Louise Arbour, a Canadian, who was Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in Arusha, and of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague. In this role she indicted then-Serbian President Slobodan Milošević for war crimes on 27 May 1999, the first time a serving head of state was called to account before an international court. Ignatieff interviews her at length on the tribulations of setting up the Tribunal and especially of getting enough evidence to prosecute Milošević (July 1999).
  • Aleksa Djilas, Yugoslav writer and dissident, friend of Ignatieff’s, opponent of the bombing campaign not only on general humane grounds but because he is a Serb and so imprisoned by the propaganda of the regime. He flatly denies that the massacres of civilians, whose bodies Ignatieff saw with his own eyes, were carried out by Serbs. claiming they must have been caught in the crossfire of battles with the KLA. He couldn’t accept the fact that his nation was carrying out a genocide using Nazi tactics. Refusal. Denial.

As in The Warrior’s Code, Ignatieff has fantastic access to the top dogs: he accompanies leading figures such as Holbrook and his cohort of other US negotiators (ambassador Richard Miles; liaison officer with the KLA fighters, Shaun Byrnes) in the fraught weeks leading up to the bombing campaign; he has lunch with US ambassador to Macedonia, Chris Hill; he is part of the press pack covering a visit of Arbour’s to the Kosovar village of Celine, scene of a typical Serb massacre of unarmed civilians (lined up and machine gunned in cold blood). He interviews Arbour at her headquarters in the Hague, a conversation he reports at length.

Ignatieff vividly conveys what life is like for these jet-setting international politicians and lawyers: 1) the hectic lives, the endless mobile phone calls, dashing for planes or helicopters, setting up meetings, taking more calls. He 2) acutely dissects the issues they have to grapple with. But where Ignatieff comes into his own is with his 3) insightful analysis of the themes or issues or moral problems arising from the challenges they face; the general issues which arise from trying to resolve ethnic conflict, from intervening in a sovereign state, from trying to achieve some kind of justice for the victims.

Critique

1. The idea of a screen war not so novel

For me the weakest part of the book was Ignatieff’s claim that watching a war via a TV screen was somehow a) new, b) morally degrading, c) fraught with perilous consequences. It shares the same tone of moral panic as the chapter in The Warrior’s Code about the ever-increasing power of television. Looking back from 2023 both concerns seem out of date and overblown. Since Ignatieff was writing (in 1999) screens have come to dominate our lives to an unimaginable extent, and this has had many social consequences which impact Ignatieff’s ideas and interpretations.

But I disagree that watching a war on the telly was something radically new in 1999. People in the UK had been watching war footage on telly at teatime ever since the TV news was established in the 1960s. I remember listening to punk songs taking the mickey out of it in the 1970s (5.45 by Gang of Four, 1979).

And, of course, in the UK we had a war of our own, in Northern Ireland, which was on the TV news almost every night for decades before Ignatieff started worrying about it. So I question Ignatieff’s claim that watching the Kosovo conflict on the telly was a radically new departure with worrying social implications.

2. Kosovo’s ‘virtual’ war in no way replaced conventional conflict

At a more serious level, the ‘virtuality’ Ignatieff wants to make such an innovation of Kosovo hasn’t changed the face of war as much as he claims. In his long final chapter Ignatieff claims the West is living through a revolution in warfare, and that the new technology of cruise missiles, laser-guided bombs, and remote control will change warfare for good, and he sets off worrying about the implications for all of us.

But it wasn’t true. The American invasion of Iraq in 2003 wasn’t carried out entirely by remote control, it required a conventional army with tanks and armoured cars and all the rest of it, and then degenerated into a counterinsurgency which was even less remote, very much requiring boots on the ground (as described in excruciating detail in Thomas E. Ricks’s two books about the Iraq War, Fiasco and The Gamble).

OK, so was Iraq just a blip, have other wars continued the radical new ‘virtual’ path worries about? No. Take the war in the Ukraine. A conventional army (accompanied by its disgusting mercenaries) has invaded a neighbouring country and is being repelled by an entirely conventional army and air force. No doubt lots of screens are being used by everyone involved, maybe drones are being deployed and maybe some of the missiles are cleverly targeted, but most are not, and the whole thing feels like a traditional boots-on-the-ground conflict.

So not only have a lot of his concerns about war and society been superseded by the events of the last 23 years, but his central concern about the perilous consequences of ‘virtual war’ can now be seen to be exaggerated and unwarranted. He worries that war via screens will end up being no more than a spectator sport, emptied of meaning, and lacking engagement or understanding by the wider population. That is not at all what happened with the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Anticipations of ‘Empire Lite’

In scattered remarks through the book, and then more pithily in the introduction, Ignatieff draws the central conclusion which will go on to underpin the next book in the sequence, 2003’s ‘Empire Lite’.

It is based on the run of events during the 1990s in which the UN and the so-called ‘international community’ performed so abysmally. They let down the Marsh Arabs who revolted against Saddam Hussein in 1991 and were very slow to support the Kurds who Saddam drove up into the mountains to die of exposure. They abandoned the mission to Somalia after the Black Hawk Down incident in 1994; in the same year the member states of the UN failed to cough up enough troops to enable the peacekeeping force in Rwanda to prevent the fastest genocide in history. Then in July 1995 UN peacekeepers once again stood by helplessly while Serb militia rounded up some 7,000 boys and men in the Bosnian town of Srebrenica and murdered them all.

In his earlier books Ignatieff visited the sites of mass murder in Rwanda and of massacres in Bosnia. This book gives a stomach-turning description of the massacre of unarmed Kosovar women and children carried out by Serb paramilitaries at a village called Celine. Did those Serb soldiers think it was serving their country to shoot unarmed women and children point blank in the head? Did they think this is what soldiers do? That this is what makes you a man – murdering little children?

These experiences drive Ignatieff to his Big Conclusion, which is that the West needs to intervene more, more deeply, more extensively, with more troops and resources, and for longer, than it has hitherto done.

Sitting above the Stankovec 2 refugee camp, packed with Albanian Kosovars who have been hounded from their homes by the Serbian army, and reviewing the West’s dismal record of failing to prevent ethnic cleansing in Yugoslavia, Ignatieff’s conclusion is surprisingly blunt:

This must be stopped. Now. By persistent and precise military force. (p.45)

His humanitarian principles, his concern to protect the vulnerable, lead him to believe that the intervention of the West is vitally required, as here in Kosovo, to prevent yet another crime against humanity, and this is the nexus of his argument with Robert Skidelsky.

But he goes further. Ignatieff thinks that the only way to prevent these crimes happening in the first place is to help developing countries build stronger states. And the only way this can be done is by major intervention, supervisions and investment in failing states by the West. And that means, in practice, America. He shares the view he attributes to the roving American diplomat Richard Holbrook, that:

the Americans are the only people capable of replacing the Ottomans and the Austro-Hungarians – the only people with the character required for an imperial vocation. (p.35)

America needs to be more imperial, more prepared to intervene to stop states failing, to prevent genocides, to create more stable polities. And it’s this idea which was to be the central theme of the book which followed this one, Empire Lite, arguing for greater American commitment to places like Afghanistan and written on the eve of the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003.

In other words, Ignatieff’s fine and subtle humanitarian principles led him to support George Bush’s illegal invasion of Iraq, support he later came to bitterly regret. Seen from this perspective, Ignatieff’s books on foreign affairs are almost like a tragic novel, about a highly intelligent and deeply philosophical man who argues himself into supporting Bush and Blair’s idiotic invasion of Iraq.

The scale of the waste

Alongside Ignatieff’s brilliant descriptions and fascinating insights, one aspect which comes over really strongly is how extremely expensive it is to wage this, or any kind, of conflict in the modern world. The cost of one jet. The cost of maintaining it. The cost of training one pilot. The cost of training the small army of technicians and engineers required to maintenance the jets. The cost of housing and feeding them all somewhere far from home. And then the cost of the munitions, up to a million dollars per missile.

One of the problems which the bombing campaign encountered was that the Serbs turned out to be very good indeed at hiding from the planes. They were expert at camouflage, deception and the use of decoys. They learned to turn off the radar on their anti-aircraft guns so as not to be detected. They hid all their real armour and created fake tanks and trucks made of wood and canvas. Hence the accusation that NATO was dropping million-dollar missiles to blow up ten-thousand-dollar decoys (p.105).

But stepping back, for a moment, from the geopolitical, historical, military and diplomatic contexts which Ignatieff explains so well…My God, what a colossal, colossal waste of money! If a fragment of what the war cost had been invested in the economy of Kosovo and its million-strong population it could have been rich as Luxemberg by now. I know the waste of war is a cliché but given the extortionate cost of modern equipment, arms and infrastructure, modern war amounts to the expense of hyperwaste in a sea of need.

Pleasure

Hopefully, by now you can see where Ignatieff is coming from. As I said above, he is not a war reporter or a military analyst or a commentator on international affairs. He is fascinated by the moral issues thrown up by conflict in the modern age and by the way our understanding of those issues and their implications were changing and evolving during the 1990s and into the Noughties.

He is also a really beautiful writer. Ignatieff writes a clear, deceptively simple prose which fluently embodies his continual stream of sharp observations and acute analysis. The combination of lucid prose with measured analysis and thoughtful reflection makes him a tremendous pleasure to read.


Credit

Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond by Michael Ignatieff was published by Chatto and Windus in 2000. References are to the 2001 paperback edition.

New world disorder reviews

Why Seneca was wrong

In his ‘Letters to Lucilius’ Seneca expounds his version of Stoic philosophy. As I explain in my review of the letters, I think they consist more of a mix of moral exhortation and self-help advice than a fully worked-out ‘philosophy’. But on the occasions when he does set out to argue from first principles I find myself quite strongly disagreeing with just about every assertion and every argument Seneca makes. Letter 76 lays out the premises of Seneca’s philosophy with particular clarity (a ‘premise’ being defined as “a statement taken to be true and used as a basis for argument or reasoning”). From Letter 76 I extract the following sequence of assertions.

Seneca’s argument

Seneca says there is a God who made the universe and created man. Wrong.

Seneca says God planted a fragment of divine Reason in man. Wrong. No God, no divine Reason.

Seneca says every created thing has one particular merit or attribute which sets it apart – the fruit of the vine, the speed of the stag, the strong back of a pack animal, the hunting dog’s sense of smell and so on. The one distinctive attribute of human beings is Reason. Wrong:

a) This notion that every thing has just one peculiar merit is primitive and childish. Quite clearly all living organisms have multiple features and qualities. Study biology.

b) To say that the One Special Thing about humans is Reason is a wild underestimate of the numberless qualities which contribute to human survival and evolution. As one example, according to my son the biologist, humans can run for longer than any other animal, not a massively important attribute but a refutation of Seneca’s claim that there is just one thing which sets humans apart from other animals. Then there’s also the small factor of the opposable thumb, which gives us the ability to manipulate tools and develop the countless inventions and technologies we have devised – far more distinctive than ‘divine Reason’.

(As an indication of how malleable this argument is, I have just read in Tacitus’s Histories the stirring speech of Gaius Julius Civilis who tells his warriors that The One Distinctive Thing About Humans is Courage [Tacitus, Histories, book 4, chapter 17]. 1,900 years later, Jean-Paul Sartre would claim the One Distinctive Thing About Humans is our existentialist Freedom. It’s a parlour game. Anyone can join in. What do you think the One Distinctive Things About Human Beings is?)

c) Anyway, humans are emphatically not rational. Humans are wildly irrational. A book like Stuart Sutherland’s Irrationality, brings together a century of psychological study of how clumsily and irrationally all humans think, almost all the time, and demolishes the Rationalist argument forever.

d) The entire form of this argument is tendentious because it is clearly designed to justify what follows.

Seneca says all these animals are designed to ‘reach the goal of their nature’ i.e. they aspire to maximise the distinctive attribute given to them by God. Wrong. There is no God and this one, special attribute he claims for each species doesn’t exist. Seneca has invented it for the sake of his argument.

Seneca says that, seeing as man’s one special attribute is Reason, and that all beings find their greatest fulfilment when they maximise their one special attribute, it follows that man will be happiest and most fulfilled when he cultivates his Reason to the max.

Well:

a) It’s wrong to say that man’s one special attribute is ‘Reason’.

b) Humans are wildly irrational.

c) Since it doesn’t exist, this ‘Reason’ can’t be developed to the maximum.

d) If this notion of ‘Reason’ actually existed, surely all ‘philosophers’ would agree about it, whereas anyone who’s read a bit of philosophy immediately discovers that there are hundreds of ‘philosophies’ and philosophers who completely contradict each other.

e) Far from ‘philosophy’ making its practitioners calm and content, there’s plenty of evidence that some of the greatest philosophers were deeply unhappy individuals: characters as different as Nietzsche and Wittgenstein spring to mind. There is no evidence whatsoever that someone who practices ‘philosophy’ is more happy than the general run of the population.

(By this point it should be clear that although Seneca uses philosophical-sounding arguments to support his case, he isn’t really dealing in philosophy at all, but with lessons in mental resilience and moral uplift.)

Seneca goes on to say that when this ‘Reason’ is brought to ‘perfection’ through the study of ‘philosophy’, ‘this perfected reason is called virtue’ (Letter 76, section 10). This also is obviously wrong:

a) There is no such thing as ‘Reason’ with a capital R, instead:

i) Two and a half thousand years of philosophers can’t agree what ‘Reason’ is or how it works.

ii) According to psychologists like Sutherland, instead of One Universal Reason, humans use hundreds of different strategies for thinking and problem solving, which often overlap and contradict each other, hence the fact of the human world we actually live in which is quite obviously made up of endlessly conflicting opinions and plans.

b) What is this ‘virtue’? Seneca identifies ‘virtue’ with the perfection of human ‘Reason’ but, by now, we should be able to see that this is just playing with words, it’s like moving shiny counters around on a board game, it doesn’t relate to anything in the real world.

Seneca goes on to identify this maximised Reason with ‘virtue’ and ‘the good’ and ‘the honourable’. I appreciate that Seneca is engaging with the tradition of moral philosophy which is concerned with trying to define terms like ‘the good’, ‘honour’, ‘virtue’ but I believe that, mildly entertaining although these verbal games are, they have little or nothing to do with real people or the actual world we live in. Within the rules of the game called ‘moral philosophy’ these kinds of definitions and redefinitions may have meaning, but it is a niche activity with no impact on the real world.

Also, it often feels as if Seneca is using rhetorical tricks to prove that His Way is the Only Way to achieve these great goals i.e. it is less an open-ended enquiry designed to establish an objective truth than a tendentious distortion of arguments all designed to ‘prove’ a view of human nature and a way of life which he already subscribes to. It amounts to a wordy rationalisation of a personal lifestyle preference (to live a simple life and read books is best). And, quite obviously, most people do not want to live like this.

The counter-argument to Seneca

There is no God.

The universe came about in a big bang 13.7 billion years ago.

Certain laws and regularities emerge from the nature of the matter created by this cataclysm.

Stars form, galaxies form,  planets form around suns.

Conditions for life happened to occur on this planet as they probably have on countless others.

Primitive replicating structures come about as an inevitable product of chemistry, sunlight, energy.

As soon as even the most primitive replicating structures come about they are governed by evolution through natural selection, which dictates that some will be more effective than others, thus setting in train an endless process of diversity and selection.

Human beings are a random offshoot of mammals, themselves lucky to survive the last great extinction event 66 million years ago.

So there is no teleology or purpose or plan. Shit happens, whether it’s your valley flooding or a meteor hitting the earth, and some organisms survive to pass on their genes to their offspring.

Over vast distances of time – hundreds of millions of years – fast-breeding ever-evolving organisms have diverged to fill every available niche in countless different ecosystems across the planet, which themselves change and evolve all the time.

Modern archaeology shows that there is not one human race, but that over the past few hundred thousand years, many different forms of the genus Homo have sprung up, flourished for a time, then died out. Seneca and we happen to belong to the one branch or variety which happens to have survived. Others might have; we happened to. There was no God, providence or teleology involved.

To attribute this immensely long chain of chance and accident to the providence of some creator God is psychologically appealing but factually ludicrous. If there is a God behind it then he works so completely through accident and mass extinction as to be indistinguishable from randomness. His method is mass murder on an unimaginable scale.

Therefore humans do not possess some ‘divine Reason’ which can be cultivated to its maximum potential at which point it can grandly be called ‘virtue’. The exact opposite. Humans quite evidently employ hundreds, maybe thousands of different mental strategies, tricks and approaches to solve the problems thrown up by day-to-day existence, and struggle daily to implement our deep biological drives (to eat and drink, get shelter, find a mate, raise a new generation, find physical and psychological security) against the challenges of the hostile real world, leading to all kinds of florid, varied and unpredictable outcomes.

Summary

Seneca’s theistic rationalism looks for, and privileges, One Thing in every field: One God, One Human Race, One Reason, One Virtue, One Philosophy.

Although I can see the appeal of submitting to this One World point of view – I can see the comfort it brings to its adherents or even to modern readers who bathe in its simple-minded reassurance while they’re reading his text (and I can also see how so much of Stoicism was incorporated into the equally consoling and comforting One World Christian ideology) – nonetheless, I find it creepy, I detect in it authoritarian, even totalitarian tendencies. To genuinely believe that there is just One Way to Virtue which all people should submit themselves to…

And it also happens to be factually incorrect at every step.

By contrast, I believe in diversity, in manyness, in multitudes. In my worldview, humans have evolved over a very long period to possess incredibly complex mental and physical attributes, far too complex and multifaceted to encompass in one definition, in one ‘philosophy’, in one set of magic words like ‘Reason’, ‘good’ and ‘virtue’, even in words like ‘science’ or ‘biology’. The real world continually surprises us and overflows all human attempts at neat definitions, whether in philosophy, religion, science or any other system.

People are quite obviously capable of believing all kinds of things, struggle with all kinds of problems, use all manner of beliefs and faiths and rites and rituals and traditions and cultures to get them through their days and lives. All these belief systems and practices are themselves constantly evolving, added to, improved, fossilise, dumped, revived, you name it – with the result that human cultures are mind-bogglingly rich and diverse and many-sided – far too many to summarise or encapsulate in this prescriptive One World dogma.

Conclusion

Therefore it is my view that, although I can see why, narrowly appealing and comforting though Seneca’s teachings may appear at a first reading, they are nonetheless not only a) factually incorrect at every level, at every step or his argument, but b) derive from an incredibly narrow social caste (the Roman aristocracy) during an incredibly narrow moment in history (Nero’s tyranny).

Seneca’s letters are worth reading because they give a vivid insight into the mindset of a very clever man situated very close to a terrifyingly arbitrary tyrant and working out a philosophical tradition he inherited from Greek originators to fit his very specific (and very fraught) circumstances (hence the obsessive belief in suicide as an escape from tyranny which haunts his writings and, in the end, was his only way out).

Seneca circles around central Stoic beliefs, reviewing them from different angles in different contexts and this provides a very useful, panoramic view of this particular belief system – and a fascinating insight into a particular cultural moment.

And many of his recommendations – shorn of their theistical underpinning – are of value, at least to the kind of reader who is already predisposed to bookish aloofness. Advice such as: avoid the crowd, despise pleasure, cultivate the life of the mind, rise above the chaos of petty emotions and transient enjoyments – all this reads very well and flatters a certain kind of bookish reader who’s already like this and so temperamentally inclined to agree that these are world-shattering ‘truths’.

But then surely these precepts are taught by the high-minded in pretty much every major religion: surely this kind of advice can be found not only in the Christianity which incorporated so much of it, but in Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, Sikhism, Jainism, Shintoism and countless other religious traditions? Or expounded by high-minded secular humanists. Ignore the trashy entertainments of the masses, despise the vulgar trappings of wealth, be content with the simple life, concentrate on acquiring wisdom blah blah, standard rules of procedure for most high-minded traditions.

Widespread though his conclusions may be, because they speak to a certain character type which recurs across diverse cultures, and propose a type of psychological practice which clearly speaks to a certain type of person.

But to focus back on the specific arguments Seneca uses to justify and underpin his philosophy and the sequence of arguments which I summarised at the start of this post – I have explained why I believe why Seneca’s premises are factually incorrect and intellectually untenable from start to finish.


Related links

On the diversity of belief systems

Roman reviews

Moral letters by Seneca

What do you need to be a good man? Willpower.
(Letter 80, section 4)

Whatever you do, keep death in mind.
(Letter 114, section 27)

You must embed these thoughts deep in your heart, Lucilius.
(Letter 7, section 12)

Stoicism

The thing about Stoic philosophy is how wrong its premises are and how banal its teachings.

Stoics believed there is a God, that the universe or Nature is God, or God suffuses Nature. Human beings were created by God with a spark of Divine Reason within us. Our job is to clear away all the clutter of work, society, gossip, all relationships, friends and family, all the clamour which clogs up our lives, including all our own passions and emotions, love, anger and so on – in order to cultivate this fragment of the Divine Reason in each of is and, by doing so, bring our lives into alignment with the values of the universe/God. Then, by cultivating detachment from all earthly worries and passions, by strengthening our minds, we can prepare for the worst the world has to throw at us and defuse the ultimate terror, the fear of death.

That’s it. You can vary the wording and multiply the precepts with lots of specific examples (avoid gossip, avoid crowds, eat moderately, don’t get drunk, treat everyone with respect – ponder with the worst possible outcomes so nothing surprises you, analyse every situation with detachment), but it’s that simple and, after the initial novelty has worn off, that boring.

Seneca

The Roman author, tutor, Stoic philosopher, politician and immensely rich man, Lucius Annaeus Seneca (4 BC to 65 AD) is called Seneca the Younger because his father (54 BC to 39 AD) – author of a collection of reminiscences about the Roman schools of rhetoric (which survives) and a history of Roman affairs from the beginning of the Civil Wars until the last years of his life (which is lost) – had the exact same name, so is known as Seneca the Elder.

Seneca the Younger, much more famous than his father, is sometimes just referred to as Seneca.

Seneca wrote a prodigious amount; later critics said too much. E.F. Watling, in his Penguin edition of Seneca’s plays, says that his best-loved works are the letters he wrote to one specific friend, Lucilius. Seneca himself titled these the Epistulae Morales ad Lucilium (‘Moral Letters to Lucilius’), also known in English as the ‘Letters from a Stoic’. Seneca wrote this collection of 124 letters at the end of his life, from approximately 63 to 65 AD, after he had largely retired as tutor and adviser to the Emperor Nero, a post he’d held since 49 – sixteen years.

The letters are addressed to Lucilius Junior who was then procurator of Sicily and is known to posterity only through Seneca’s writings. (Seneca also dedicated his dialogue On Providence and his encyclopedic Natural Questions to this same Lucilius.)

Scholars fret about whether these were ‘real’ letters, and what the structure of correspondence was – did Seneca only respond to questions sent him by Lucilius? Where is Lucilius’s half of the correspondence? etc. But whether or not they were ever part of a ‘real’ correspondence, it is clear that Seneca wrote these letters with a wider readership in mind. They contain numerous carefully crafted passages obviously aimed at posterity and are structured so as to cover a wide range of subjects dear to Stoics. The 124 letters were published grouped together into 20 ‘books’.

Philosophy as therapy

The letters amount to a series of short moral lessons, designed to help Lucilius achieve the wisdom and peace of mind (‘a calm and correct state of mind,’ Letter 4) promised by Stoic doctrine. In order to do this the letters focus on the traditional themes of Stoic philosophy such as removing oneself from the crowd; cultivating a contempt of death; learning to endure the ups and downs of life; acknowledging virtue as the supreme good, and so on.

The key point which the translator of the Oxford University Press edition, Elaine Fantham, makes in her introduction, is that the letters do not amount to a systematic exposition of Stoicism. Almost the reverse. They are like a series of lessons on ad hoc, specific topics, often beginning with an everyday experience and then extracting from it an insight or type of behaviour which Seneca tells Lucilius he can adopt in order to improve himself. Each letter contains ‘a little bit of profit’ (5) – like instalments in a self-help correspondence course.

Seneca wrote the letters not to promote a complete finished system of thought: he wasn’t necessarily interested in extrapolating a comprehensive system. As Fantham says, Seneca put moral impact before intellectual debate. He ‘puts the ability to avoid fear and desire ahead of any intellectual expertise’ (note, page 298). Seneca gave the work a new type of name, Epistulae Morales, and wrote them with a moral purpose to promote moral behaviour.

Philosophy is not a skill shaped for popular appeal or for display; it does not consist of words but of deeds…it moulds and shapes the mind, arranges one’s life, controls one’s actions, points out what is to be done and what to be avoided. (16)

Thus Seneca instructs Lucilius not about this or that point of abstract philosophical doctrine – but over and over again tells him that he must repeat certain thoughts in order to put them into practice, to make them part of his everyday waking thoughts.

Only Philosophy will wake us up, it alone will shake off our heavy sleep, so dedicate yourself wholly to it. (53.8)

Possibly the most consistent lesson (repeated so many times it gets a little boring) is cultivating a ‘contempt’ for death. When death comes it is over; it is nothing. We need to live with the idea of our death all the time, to get accustomed to it, so as to eliminate all fear and anxiety about it:

  • Let us order our minds so that we wish for whatever circumstances demand, and especially let us think about our ends without sadness. We need to be prepared for death before we are prepared for life. (61.3)
  • The more men have accustomed themselves to hardship, the more easily they will endure it. (76.34)
  • Whatever has been long anticipated comes as a lighter blow. (78.29)
  • Everyone approaches a hazard to which he has long squared himself with more courage and resists harsh events by contemplating them in advance. (107.4)

This accustoming to death takes effort so we must ‘practice thinking this over each day’ (4.5) and ‘ensure that what is now an urge becomes a lasting disposition’ (17.6).

Virtue does not come to a mind unless it is trained and taught and brought to its highest condition by constant exercise. (90.46)

Repeat, practice, memorise. The letters are lessons in how to think, in how to live life in order to maximise calm and reason, mental or psychological exercises which must be learned through constant repetition.

  • You must persist and build up strength by constant diligence until what is now a good intention becomes a good state of mind. (16.1)
  • These are things we must learn, in fact learn by heart. (123.17)

In this respect, the OUP is a good edition because Fantham precedes every letter with a short summary of its main topics, of its time and place of composition, and how it relates to other letters on the same topic. This is extremely useful. (Mind you, the 1917 translation by Richard Mott Gummere which is available online has something the Fantham edition hasn’t, which is attributing each letter a title such as ‘On saving time’, ‘On discursiveness in reading’ and so on. I imagine these titles aren’t in the original but they are extremely useful in remembering at a glance which letter is about what.)

There is some background information about Roman society, but not as much as you’d hope for, certainly nothing like the chatty detail you get in Cicero’s wonderful letters (Seneca consciously distances himself from Cicero’s style and gossipy subject matter in letter 118).

Like all Roman writers, Seneca now and then cites famous Roman heroes or historical figures as examples of ‘virtue’ (notably Marcus Porcius Cato, who committed suicide in 46 BC, as the example of fortitude in the face of death; or Gaius Mucius Cordus who unflinchingly put his hand into a fire to prove his bravery).

There is a description of the lives of the super-rich at Baiae (51), a fascinating portrait of the conditions of slaves (47), a vivid comparison of the spartan bathhouses of old with their modern luxurious equivalents (86), a description of the grand retinues of foreign slaves rich people insist on travelling with (123), a description of viticulture and grafting techniques (86). Mostly, though, the letters are disappointing from a social history point of view. Philosophy is drab.

This Oxford University Press edition does not contain all of the letters – it contains 80 out of 124 (introduction p.xxxv) – but still claims to be the largest selection available in print.

Epistolary traditions

In a throwaway remark, Fantham indicates that there were two types of letter, two epistolary traditions: the philosophical letter of advice (pioneered by Epicurus, born 341 BC, and into which these letters fall) and chatty personal correspondence (Cicero, born 106 BC). [She doesn’t mention a third type which occurs to me, which is the crafted verse epistle as epitomised by Horace’s Letters or Ovid’s Black Sea Letters.]

The problem of suicide

A major stumbling block is Seneca’s worldview, the classical Roman worldview, which promotes suicide as a noble, honourable and virtuous response to all kinds of social humiliations, setbacks, not least the threats from tyrannical power.

It is a noble thing to die honourably, prudently and bravely. (77)

Part of the reason for cultivating a contempt for death, for having death continually in your thoughts, is so that, when the moment comes, it will feel like only a small additional step to fall on your sword or open your veins in a hot bath.

How many people death has been useful to, how many it frees from torture, poverty, laments, punishment, weariness. We are not in any man’s power when death is in our power. (91.21)

The historical model Seneca invokes repeatedly is Cato, who committed suicide in 46 BC two years into the civil war, when he was governor of Utica, a city in North Africa, as Julius Caesar’s army was closing in. Cato killed himself to deprive Caesar of the power of either executing him or (more likely) humiliatingly pardoning him, meaning he would ignominiously owe the rest of his existence to a tyrant.

Desiring neither option, Cato stabbed himself. In the event failed to kill himself, a doctor was called who patched up his stomach wound, gave him medicine, put him to bed. In the night Cato placed his fingers into the stomach wound, ripped it open, and proceeded to pull out his intestines until he died of shock. This is held up by Seneca as exemplary behaviour.

This makes sense within the long Roman tradition of preferring honourable suicide to dishonour, but it is just not a worldview any modern person shares and Cato is not a role model any modern person would wish to copy. Of course, this strand in Seneca’s writings is magnified by the fact that Seneca himself did something similar, committing suicide on the orders of the emperor Nero, his one-time pupil, in an exemplary fashion, calmly dictating notes about Stoic resilience as he bled to death in a hot bath.

Thus he has gone down as a hero of high-minded Stoicism but there are numerous objections to this notion. One is that plenty, thousands, of other Roman notables killed themselves over the centuries, famous examples being Anthony and Cleopatra, and they weren’t Stoic philosophers. So Seneca’s high-minded end wasn’t unique, far from it, it was a very common behaviour among the aristocratic class in the ancient world, and not only under the Empire but the Republic, too.

So a) it was far from being an act unique to ‘philosophers’ but b) it is obviously something very remote indeed from modern society. Sure, people still kill themselves. But not many people kill themselves at the command of an emperor, or to demonstrate their high-minded command over their destiny and a Stoic rising above the petty concerns of life and death. This whole worldview is so remote as to be science fiction.

There seems to me something perverse, almost creepy, about a philosophy which is constantly preparing its followers for death and for suicide. The words ‘death’ or ‘die’ recur on every page. I infinitely prefer Horace’s encouragement to enjoy life to the full while we can.

Come, let’s
Go to the cave of love
And look for music in a jollier key.
(Horace Odes, book 2, poem 1)

Themes in the letters

Despise death

We start to die from the day we are born. When we die there is nothing. There was nothing before life and there will be nothing after. So be not afraid.

  • What I am recommending to you is not just a remedy for this disease but for your whole life: despise death. (78.5)
  • First free yourself from the fear of death. (80.5)

Freedom

Despising death means we are free from the threats of tyrants or society. What is the worst they can do to us if we despise the worst, consider it nothing? Nothing can harm the calm and virtuous mind. By welcoming whatever will happen, it creates its own freedom no matter what the external circumstances. With typical extremity of metaphor or rhetoric, Seneca continually contrasts freedom, not with being bogged down or caught up or hampered by obligations – such as most of us encounter in real life – but with full-on hardcore Roman slavery:

  • You ask what is liberty? To be enslaved to no object, no necessity, no chances, to reduce Fortune to a level field. (51.9)
  • We must busy ourselves with our studies and the sources of wisdom…this is how we should rescue our mind from a most wretched enslavement and restore it to liberty. (104.16)
  • We have enslaved our spirit to pleasure whose indulgence is the beginning of all evils. (110.10)

Now it makes sense that Seneca uses as metaphor the slavery which was, arguably, the central fact of Roman life. But as with the way his mind, when he wants to imagine examples of adversity, leaps straight towards images of torture and execution, it’s another example of the extremity of metaphor and argument which underpins his ‘philosophy’ and makes so much of it feel so alien to the modern mind.

True friendship

Gauge a man before making him a friend. Be cautious, test out friends. But once someone is a friend, bind them to you, share everything with them. True friends share everything, including misfortune. Seneca says you have to learn to be a friend to yourself.

Avoid crowds

‘Shun whatever pleases the common herd’ (8). One iniquitous example can adversely affect you. A crowd presents all kinds of bad examples. People are emboldened to behave badly in crowds. So withdraw into yourself and study philosophy, but not so conspicuously as to draw attention or criticism. Don’t draw attention to your retirement and quietism. Quietly disappear.

Your body

A great and cautious man separates his mind from his body and spends the better part of his time with his better and divine part. (78.10)

Provide it only as much as needed to preserve good health. Avoid excess. Consume as much plain drink as required to quench thirst, as much plain food as to quench hunger, the minimum clothes to protect you from the elements, a house sufficient to protect you from the weather.

Devote some days to eating as little as possible. Become familiar with the bare minimum needed to keep alive and healthy (so that if exile to a bare rock or sudden incarceration befall you, your body is ready for much reduced circumstances).

Don’t exercise to excess. Do as much as needed to keep healthy. Reserve your energy for cultivating the mind.

As to physical pleasures, avoid them like the plague; they enslave the body and then the mind.

  • Uproot pleasures and treat them with absolute loathing. (51.13)
  • First of all we must reject pleasures; they make men weak and effeminate and demand too much time and effort. (104.34)

Your house

Your house should be a size and contain only as much as needed to protect you from the elements. Despise ornament and decoration.

Possessions

Have as few as possible. ‘No one is worthy of God unless he despises possessions.’ (18.13) Have them, but adopt a mindset where you could happily dispense with all of them, where they are all taken from you and you don’t care a jot, because you are secure in the untroubled citadel of your mind.

Enough

Don’t overdo it: don’t mortify your body, don’t insist on eating bread and water, living in a hut, neglecting your body, like the Cynics who, following Diogenes, set out to punish their bodies. Live comfortably and sensibly, just not to excess.

  • So correct yourself, take off your burdens and shrink your desires within a healthy limit. (104.20)

How to be content

And cultivate contentment by being happy with what you’ve got.

  • I will tell you how you can recognise the healthy man: he is content with himself. (72.7)
  • This is what philosophy will guarantee you, something which nothing surpasses: you will never be dissatisfied with yourself. (115.18)

Excess

Similar to his thoughts about suicide and anger, in that it sounds reasonable of Seneca to tell his follower not live to excess, but what Seneca has in mind is Roman excess, the off-the-scale lavishness and baroque luxury of the Roman emperors and the richest in the known world (as described in the letters from the fashionable resort of Baiae, 49, 51).

  • Too many amenities make the spirit effeminate…The stricter discipline of a simpler place strengthens the mind and makes it fit for great undertakings. (51.10-11)

The general point is not so much that indulgence is morally bad in itself: but that people enslave themselves by indulging the pleasures of the senses, deform their minds, make themselves into addicts, by coming to rely on excessive behaviour, on excessive drinking, excessive eating, excessive sex, excessive gambling.

It’s not so much that moderation is good in itself but that it stops you developing addictions and so becoming enslaved to them. Moderation leaves your mind free to focus on more important, ‘higher’ things. Moderation sets you free from all the snares of the senses.

That is why:

We ought to concentrate on escaping as far as possible from the provocations to vice. One’s mind must be hardened and dragged away from the enticements of pleasure. (51.5)

Anger

Quite apart from the letters, Seneca wrote no fewer than three treatises on anger. Fantham makes a really profound point about this which depends, again, on the profound difference between us and Roman society. This is that Roman emperors had complete power over all citizens, and all citizens had complete power over huge numbers of slaves. In this society an angry citizen could order his slave to be tortured or killed, just as an angry emperor could order anyone he fancied to be exiled, thrown into gaol, tortured or executed. Therefore controlling anger was much, much more important than it is in our society. Anger is not a good emotion with us but could have catastrophic consequences in Seneca’s world.

The mind

‘Nothing deserves admiration except the mind’ (9). The mind alone is worth cultivating. No other skills, activities, pastimes are worth cultivating.

  • Control your mind so as to bring it to perfection in the most calm condition, a mind which feels neither what is taken from it nor added to it, but keeps the same disposition however affairs turn out. (36.6)
  • A great and cautious man separates his mind from the body and spends much of his time with his better and divine part. (78.10)

Moral behaviour

Imagine the most moral, honourable person you can. Then imagine they are watching everything you say or do.

Fear, anxiety, stress

All these are caused by worry that the worst is going to happen. Well, imagine the worst has happened. Live with the worst, imaginatively – prepare yourself for the worst. Once you dispel anxiety about unnamed and exaggerated fears, you can get rid of the panic and examine the issue rationally, restoring order and calm to the mind, allowing Reason to operate unhampered by over emotions.

Philosophy

Philosophy, for Seneca, isn’t the working out of a complex system or ideology: it is a psychological or spiritual practice. It is an exercise to attain an attitude, cultivated with the sole aim of making its practitioner mentally strong and resilient against tyranny, suffering and death.

Philosophy is not a skill shaped for popular appeal or for display; it does not consist of words but of deeds. It is not taken up to make sure the day passes with some enjoyment, to take the boredom out of leisure; it moulds and shapes the mind, arranges one’s life, controls one’s actions, points out what is to be done or avoided; it is seated at the helm and steers the course of those adrift among treacherous shoals. Without it no man can live without fear or anxiety; countless things occur each hour that need the advice which we must seek from philosophy. (16.3)

Philosophy may include technical aspects such as types of argument and syllogism (which he consistently ridicules and dismisses for its pedantry) but, far more importantly, Seneca sees ‘philosophy’ as a kind of mental fortress, a psychological redoubt:

So withdraw into philosophy as far as you may; she will protect you in her bosom and in her shrine you will be safe. (103.4)

In doing so, it can raise us above the level of mere mortals:

This is what philosophy promises me, to make me equal to a god. (48.11)

Slavery

As you might expect Seneca admonishes Lucilius to treat his slaves as equals because they are as human as you or I:

Kindly remember that he whom you call your slave sprang from the same stock, is smiled upon by the same skies, and on equal terms with yourself breathes, lives, and dies. It is just as possible for you to see in him a free-born man as for him to see in you a slave. (47.10)

But, just as predictably, Seneca doesn’t actually recommend actually freeing them. (In his introduction to the Penguin Classics edition of Juvenal’s Satires, Peter Green says this attitude was typical of Stoics: ‘[Juvenal] attacked wanton cruelty to slaves, but did not query the concept of slavery itself (another characteristically Stoic attitude.)] Introduction, page 23)

Letter 47 is fascinating for giving an extended description of the types of functions slaves performed in an aristocratic household and the brutal punishments they were liable to for the slightest infraction.

(It is a secondary consideration that in the long letter 90, a detailed list of the technical achievements and innovations which make up civilisation, Seneca despises them all and considers all of them – agriculture and irrigation and milling grain to make bread and architecture and glass windows and all the rest of it – only worthy of slaves and freedmen [who, apparently, largely made up the artisan class of Rome] and so far beneath an aristocrat like himself and his friend Lucilius. Aristocrats needed to rise above these slave occupations in order to practice the only thing worthwhile activity for humans, to cultivate the mind, perfect reason, acquire wisdom, so as to rise above passions and fear of death. That is the primary aim of the letter, but in order to make the point what comes over is a contempt for the artisan class, for engineers and innovators and craftsmen, which makes me dislike Seneca even more. His assumption is that all the achievements of the thousands of people who had perfected all aspects of civilisation and raised it to the luxurious heights of his day only matter insofar as they allow him to perfect his wonderful mind. It’s a privileged narcissism which is, in its own arrogant way, every bit as corrupt as the decadent court of the arch-egotist Nero.)

Self-help slogans

The book is stacked with improving and inspiring thoughts of the kind which have become over-familiar in the subsequent 2,000 years, particularly the last 50 years or so of self-help books.

  • I think it is the first proof of a stable mind to be able to pause and spend time with oneself. (2.1)
  • The best measure of wealth is to have what is necessary and the next best, is to have enough. (2.5)
  • The man at ease should take action, and the man at action should take ease. (5)
  • Who is well born? The man well set up by nature for virtue…it is the spirit that makes one noble. (44.5)
  • Nature made us teachable and gave us an imperfect reason but one which can be perfected. (50.11)

Although Seneca’s long porridgey paragraphs have the heavy feel of ‘philosophy’, the quality of the argumentation is often weak and many of the actual injunctions feel more like daytime TV, self-help guru-talk than Hegel or Hume. Once or twice he came close to the banal catchphrase mocked in the old TV sitcom, Some Mothers Do Have ‘Em: ‘Every day, in every way, I’m getting better and better.’

I rejoice that you are studying with perseverance and abandoning all else for this one thing, to make yourself a better man each day. (5.1)

Critique

As with all philosophy, and especially ‘moral’ philosophy, there is no end to the debate, discussion, critique and commentary which the Letters from a Stoic have spawned over the past 2,000 years. A handful of themes struck me:

1. Simplistic values

The most obvious, for me, is the extreme difference in the social context between Seneca and us and in particular his concept of negative life events. For Seneca a bad turn of events is an ever-present threat under the tyranny of imperial rule. It is associated with prison, torture, enslavement and all the other dire possibilities of life under arbitrary Roman emperors such as Nero. Thus there is a misleading simplicity to most of his meditations. When he imagines something bad, it’s being thrown into prison or tortured or executed by the emperor. The conception of negative life events which he uses to underpin his entire Stoic system is disconcertingly simple and extreme – exile, torture, death – and so the mental lesson he is teaching is concomitantly simplistic: prepare your mind to be strong and noble under torture or the threat of death (see the harping on about torture and death in letters 67 and 70).

But not many modern readers of the letters are going to have the same concerns – that they will thrown into prison, tortured or forced to commit suicide at the whim of a Roman emperor. The worst things I can imagine happening to me are: being in a life-changing accident i.e. becoming wheelchair-bound or having a stroke; being diagnosed with a terminal or life-changing illness; something bad happening to my loved ones, especially my children. But my day-to-day worries are more humdrum, recalcitrant, fiddly, frustrating: worried about my performance at work, this or that bit of the house needs maintenance, I’m worried about money, about not being able to pay my bills – fuel bills, heating bills, food bills.

I know Stoic thought can be applied to these modern circumstances i.e. I should try to cultivate mental detachment and resilience so I am ready to face bad events and rise above them. But the extremity and the simpleness of the situations Seneca describes and which form the basis of his entire philosophy (arbitrary arrest, torture, execution) rarely if ever occur in modern Western life and so all his much-repeated lessons rarely if at all apply to me. Modern life is more complex and multi-faceted than Seneca’s philosophy allows.

Seneca’s ‘philosophy’ is worth reading as an extremely vivid insight into the mindset of the Stoic classes during the tyranny of Nero but is, in my opinion, of limited use or value to modern readers leading modern lives.

2. Hypocrisy

I’ve just read Tacitus’s Annals where Seneca is described as being one of the richest men in Rome, with mansions as big as Nero’s and gardens even bigger, hundreds of servants, immense wealth in gold and assets. (In fact Seneca’s extreme wealth became proverbial to later generations: Juvenal’s tenth satire describes how Seneca, ‘grown too wealthy’ lost his magnificent gardens.) So it’s pretty ironic, knowing the man was a byword for obscene wealth, to read Seneca’s continual recommendation of the plain, simple life, eschewing pleasure and cultivating virtue. It’s easy advice for the ridiculously rich to give. The hypocrisy is summed up by a character in John Marston’s 1603 play, The Malcontent, which Watling quotes:

Out upon him! He writ of temperance and fortitude, yet lived like a voluptuous epicure and died like an effeminate coward. (The Malcontent, Act 3, scene 1, line 28)

Not quite accurate (Seneca definitely did not die ‘like an effeminate coward’) but the first half, the epicure accusation, has force. This point was epitomised, for me, in a throwaway remark of Seneca’s in a letter which is intended to be about exercise and physical frailty:

I have just returned from my ride. I am just as tired as if I had walked as far as I have been sitting. It is an effort to be carried for a long time, and I rather think the effort is greater because riding is contrary to nature. (55.1)

It is an effort to be carried for a long time. (In a sedan chair, presumably.) Well, what about the slaves who were doing the carrying? Bet it was a bit of an effort for them, too. Seneca’s writings cannot escape from the taint of the astonishing level of privilege enjoyed by his class in general, and the extraordinarily privileged lifestyle enjoyed by him – according to Tacitus the richest man in Rome – in particular.

3. How Christians appropriated Stoic rhetoric

Many of the lessons Seneca spells out to Lucilius are very familiar from the long tradition of Western moralists, from Erasmus, through Montaigne, on into the Enlightenment and then diffused out into the broader culture by thousands of Victorian moralists.

My mum used to tell us kids, ‘Moderation in everything’. You don’t need to read Seneca to already know half of his nostrums and tags. I suggest that much of it seems so familiar because Stoic teachings were taken over wholesale by the early Christians and formed the basis of much Christian everyday morality. Obviously not the bits specific to Christian theology (the Fall, Original Sin, the Crucifixion, the Resurrection etc) but the fundamental theist worldview is often indistinguishable from Christianity:

  • No one is worthy of God unless he despises possessions. (18.13)
  • God is near you, he is with you, he is within you. (41.1)
  • What is enough for God is not too little for masters. (47.18)
  • The place which God occupies in this universe is the place which mind occupies in man. (65.24)
  • God comes to men. Indeed, what is actually nearer, he comes into men. No mind is good without God. (73.16)
  • Whatever is good for us our God and father placed at hand. (110.10)

My point is that in the advice about day-to-day living, the Christians appropriated Stoic teachings so completely that the advice to Lucilius to cultivate the mind, avoid the crowd and their superficial entertainments, practice virtue, despise the knocks of Fortune and cultivate a contempt for death – all these are the familiar background hum of Christian morality, the subjects of hundreds of thousands of Sunday sermons and public lectures, recycled on radio phone-ins and daytime TV and millions of self-help columns in magazines and newspapers and books. Which explains why when we moderns come to read Seneca we are so rarely surprised and so often find his nostrums familiar and reassuring.

4. Repetition

Above all, like any good teacher, he repeats the same key points again and again, in different formulations, approached from different angles, but coming back again and again to the same fundamental idea: rise above the fortuitous events of your life; rise above all emotions and attachments; cultivate ‘philosophy’, which means a Buddhist detachment from everyone else and even from yourself; live with the idea of death so continually that it eventually presents no fears. And then you will have conquered yourself, your fear of death and you will be…free.

  • I am forcing my mind to focus on itself and not be distracted by outside events…The real calm is when a good state of mind unfolds. (56.6)
  • The wise man is full of joy, cheerful and calm, undisturbed. He lives on equal terms with the gods…The wise man’s mind is like the universe beyond the moon: there it is always fine and calm. (59.14)
  • Abandon those distractions which men have rushed to enjoy; abandon riches, which are either a danger or a burden to their possessors; leave the pleasures of body and mind, which soften and weaken you; abandon ambition, which is a bloated, hollow and windy condition with no limit. (84.11)
  • There is only one way the dawn can come: if a man takes in this knowledge of things human and divine and does not just sprinkle it over himself but but steeps himself in it; if he goes over the same things repeatedly (110.8)

But repetition is not argumentation. Despite Seneca using the word ‘philosophy’ all the time, this isn’t really philosophy at all. It is, as I’ve said, more like exhortation to a good frame of mind, moral uplift, encouragement to develop a tough attitude, therapy for the anxious, a self-help manual. And incredibly repetitive.

Unvexed by terrors and uncorrupted by pleasures we shall dread neither death nor the gods. We shall know that death is not an evil and the gods do not exist for evil. What harms us is as weak as what is harmed; the best things lack the power to harm. What awaits us, if we ever emerge from these dregs to the sublime and lofty region, is peace of mind and liberty free from the errors which have been driven out. What does that liberty consist of? Not fearing men or gods; wanting neither what is base nor excessive; having the greatest power over oneself. It is an incalculable good to become one’s own master. (75.17-18)

5. Family and friends

In nearly 300 pages of relentless insistence that we rise above all attachments and emotions, nowhere does he mention family (in just one letter, 104, he mentions his wife, Paulina).

Family was a very big thing indeed for noble Romans, so it’s a striking absence in the context of Seneca’s own time. But regarded as instructions for modern readers, his insistence on boiling your life right down to a relentless focus on cultivating your virtue and your indifference to death completely ignores the scores of relationships most people have in their lives, starting with their family.

Most modern therapy involves getting to grip with your childhood experiences and your relationship with your parents. But parents, spouses or children are completely absent from Seneca’s teachings. His Stoicism is an impressively selfish concern, in which he endlessly exhorts Lucilius to forget about everyone but himself, to focus on his own mind and anxiety of death etc, to think about no-one but me me me.

This makes his ‘philosophy’ inapplicable, in practice, to anyone who has parents, partners or children and really cares for them, is involved in their day-to-day wellbeing and, especially when it comes to children, to their little triumphs or setbacks. None of that for Stoic Seneca. He is in his study toughening up his mind by envisaging torture in every detail so as to be able to rise above it, when the time comes.

But it struck me that this deliberate ignoring of family sheds light on and helps to explain the humanistic obsession with friendship. Seneca’s letters on the importance of having one, key soulmate-level friend are one of the sources for the obsession with friendship which is a central theme of humanist writings from the 15th century onwards.

Friends know that they have everything in common…the true friendship which neither hope nor fear nor self-interest can sever, the friendship with which men die and for which they die. (6.2)

It’s possible to interpret this obsession with Perfect friendship as the Stoic replacing the messy, uncontrollable web of family relationships, with all its unpredictable ups and downs, with One Relationship with One Special Friend. To use the modern buzzword, it’s a very controlling approach. When you read the great humanist works on this subject (Cicero, Montaigne, Bacon) what comes over is that you are only going to meet one or two soulmates in your life and that you will become identical in interests and affections with this one special person. In a science fiction kind of way, you and the True Friend of humanist tradition will become one person.

So, to put it crudely, humanist teaching about friendship a) is a way of ducking the uncontrollable mess of family ties and responsibilities and b) ends up with you looking in a mirror. Solipsistic narcissism.

Horace

As Roman ‘moralists’ go, I prefer Horace. He’s lighter, funnier, his affable tone is more persuasive, more inspiring for me, than Seneca’s dour and relentless lecturing. Seneca sounds like the tutor he was:

I hereby order you to be slow in speaking. (40.14)

Whereas Horace sounds like a friend offering gentle advice:

Try not to guess what lies in the future, but,
As Fortune deals days, enter them into your
Life’s book as windfalls, credit items,
Gratefully…
(Horace, Odes, book 1, poem 9)

Seneca thinks of himself as embattled – quick! time is short! the enemy is at the door! focus on the essentials!

  • I am being besieged right now…the enemy is at our backs…I need a heroic spirit (49.9)
  • Fortune is waging war with me but I will not do what she orders, I will not accept the yoke. (51.8)
  • A real man prefers his sleep to be broken by a bugle than a chorus. (51.12)

This sense of the world as a battlefield, a fight, a struggle against countless enemies all trying to seduce your God-given soul, was inherited by Christianity. It dominates the letters of St Paul who wrote the most influential letters in Christendom, and used rhetoric similar to Seneca when he urged his followers to ‘fight the good fight’ (First letter to Timothy).

To understand Paul, we must grasp that he is at war, with the angels of heaven at his back. The Acts of the Apostles is, at its base, a power-struggle between Christ and Satan, wrenching whole peoples away from Satan’s grasp. (Jesus Walk Bible Studies)

In contrast to this worldview of unrelenting embattled paranoia, Horace writes a letter to a friend inviting him to come round and try the new wine they’ve just bottled on his estate. There’ll be other friends there, and they’ll stay up late together laughing and joking. Seneca’s remedy for the fickleness of human existence is to be continually, constantly thinking about death all the time.

Give me courage to meet hardships; make me calm in the face of the unavoidable…Say to me when I lie down to sleep: ‘You may not wake again!’ And when I have waked: ‘You may not go to sleep again!’ Say to me when I go forth from my house: ‘You may not return!’ And when I return: ‘You may never go forth again!’

Well, you may win the lottery this weekend. You may run down the escalator and bump into the woman of your dreams. If you start speculating about things which may happen, the sky’s the limit. In which case – why focus only on the bad things which ‘may’ happen. Lovely things ‘may’ happen, too. Pondering Seneca’s use of the conditional to dwell only on the most extreme negative outcomes (torture, execution) makes the reader realise how much he is obsessed with the dark side of life, and so insists that we be brutally harsh with ourselves:

  • Cast out whatever desires are lacerating your heart and if they cannot be pulled out any other way then you must tear out your heart with them. In particular, uproot pleasures and treat them with absolute loathing. (51.13)
  • We believe pleasure is a moral failing…Pleasure is a shameful thing. (59.1-2)

What a stupid attitude. Horace has an equally frank acceptance of how time is limited and we are hurrying towards our deaths, but he draws the exact opposite conclusion, which is: carpe diem, enjoy the moment. Instead of considering yourself under siege from wicked temptations so that you have to harden your heart against all affection, think of life as a blessing, bless every moment it brings you, and savour the fleeting pleasures. Horace gets my vote.

Last word to Martial

Martial book 11, epigram 56, begins, in the translation by James Michie:

Because you glorify death, old Stoic,
Don’t expect me to admire you as heroic…

And ends ten lines later:

It’s easy to despise life when things go wrong;
The true hero endures much, and long.


Credit

Selected Letters of Seneca, translated and introduced by Elaine Fantham, was published as an Oxford University Press paperback in 2010. All quotes are from this edition.

Related links

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On Friendship by Montaigne

Michel de Montaigne (1533 to 1592) was one of the most significant philosophers of the French Renaissance, famous for popularising the essay as a literary genre. The final edition of the Essays was published posthumously in 1595. It was divided into three books containing 107 essays, featuring some of the most influential essays ever written. The first edition, published in 1580, was quickly translated into English and some scholars have detected the influence of Montaigne’s thoughts and phrasing in Shakespeare’s plays.

Essayer

I’ve always loved the fact that our English word, essay, comes direct from the French, essai, which is the noun form of the verb essayer meaning ‘to try’. So an essay is a try or trial, or attempt, to marshall your thoughts on a particular topic, to see if they make sense and hang together.

Thus Montaigne’s essays are the opposite of what most written texts up to his time had been, namely dogmatic and didactic. Instead they are tentative explorations, of what he knows or can find out on a particular topic. They are experiments in knowing.

A novel kind of autobiography

And this explains why he, Montaigne, is such a persistent presence in so many of the essays. They address not only the nominal subjects but continually shed light on “some traits of my character and of my humours.” They are experiments in what he knows or can understand. Or, as he admitted in the introduction, “I am myself the matter of this book”. As well as meditations on specific subjects, his essays build up to become a novel and innovative form of autobiography.

Que sais-je?

And the most attractive quality that comes over from the essays is Montaigne’s frank scepticism. As a devout Catholic he believed that whereas truth, like God, is infinite, the human capacity to grasp it is very finite, very limited. Chances are there’s nothing we can really know for sure. Hence the personal motto he adopted and had engraved on the medal he wore round his neck in the handful of portraits we have of him: ‘Que sais-je?’ – ‘What do I know?’

What, indeed. This scepticism is often generalised into commiseration for the plight of humans, endowed with a divine spark but trapped in a body fragile and finite and subject to a thousand afflictions, in a mind easily buffeted by emotions or pain.

In his own time Montaigne’s extensive inclusion of his own thoughts and reflections in his essays was criticised, but over the course of the centuries, as the essay’s factual knowledge or classical references have become outdated and antiquarian, it is the autobiographical element which has endured and continues to attract many readers.

All this is very well, but for most modern readers the most striking thing about these essays will probably be the way they contain blizzards of quotations from ancient Greek, Latin and Italian texts. In Montaigne’s day these classical quotes were what data and statistics are to modern essays – his evidence, his proof. Nowadays, they are mostly a pain to read (and a double pain because, since most of them are in Latin, most of us have to read them in translation, further undermining their utility) and the temptation is just to skip them.

To be precise, in these 13 pages Montaigne quotes from Horace (4 times), Cicero (3 times), Catullus (twice), Terence (twice), Ariosto, Plato and Virgil.

Montaigne on friendship

Montaigne’s essay on friendship forms chapter 28 of Book I. It is 13 pages long in the Penguin edition.

He commences with a self deprecating description of the essays themselves:

What are these things I scribble, other than grotesques and monstrous bodies, made of various parts, without any certain figure, or any other than accidental order, coherence, or proportion?

But it quickly becomes clear that the main body of the text is going to describe in some detail his friendship with an older writer named Étienne de la Boétie.

Montaigne starts by explaining how, some years earlier, a Latin satire against tyranny by de la Boétie came into his hands and was his first introduction to the man who would go on to become a friend of unique depth and unanimity. Which leads us into his theme:

There is nothing for which nature seems to have given us such a bent as for society.

Of a perfect society friendship is the peak.

Insofar as human relationships involve cause or aim or incentive, motives or calculation – they are not true friendships, which are pure and selfless.

The love between parents and children is nothing like it, for parents cannot confess their feelings and thoughts without showing inappropriate intimacy, and children cannot chastise their parents – but a good friend can.

Brothers ought to be friends but the fact that they have to make their same way in the world, from the same place, at the same time, inevitably gives rise to jostling and rivalry. Also, the connection between brothers is imposed by nature and fact, whereas the essence of friendship is that it is freely given.

Love binds strangers but it is reckless and changeable and fickle. Friendship, by contrast, is temperate and constant.

Sexual desire is the opposite of friendship. It is a burning flame which vanishes as soon as it is achieved whereas friendship doesn’t flame out but grows the more it is possessed. The more you are in company with a friend, talking, joking, the deeper the friendship becomes.

Marriages can be close but are built on legal and moral restraints, unlike friendship which encourages total freedom.

In a passage which eliminates half the population from his fan club, Montaigne asserts that women lack the depth and constancy required for friendship:

The normal capacity of women is unequal to the demands of that communion and intercourse on which the sacred bond [of friendship] is fed; their souls do not seem firm enough to bear the strain of so hard and lasting a tie. (p.95)

Homosexuality, even as practiced by the high-minded Greeks was, so far as we can tell, all about the external appearance of beautiful young men i.e. not about mature minds, like the friendship Montaigne is extolling. There is an inequality built into the love between an older man and a younger youth which, in the base and vulgar, often involves fishing for money or advancement.

And so, after this consideration of alternative social bonds, back to Montaigne’s friendship with Étienne de la Boétie. He feels it was fated by a ‘power of destiny’, because they knew of each other’s books before they met. And as soon as they met they had a complete mutual understanding. In fact De la Boétie wrote a work on the power of their attraction. It didn’t grow slowly through a hundred and one meetings and occurrences, but was the whole thing immediately. They lost themselves in each other and henceforth both were part of the other.

A digression to the story (told by Cicero in his essay on friendship) about Laelius questioning Gaius Blossius about his friendship with Gaius Gracchus, after the latter was arrested for sedition. ‘Would you have done anything for him?’ asks Laelius. ‘Even set the temples on fire?’ ‘He would never have asked such a thing,’ says Blossius. ‘Yes, but if he had, would you have?’ asks Laelius, and Blossius replies ‘Yes’. Cicero, the conservative patriot, thinks this is a disgraceful answer and uses it to establish a rule that we should do anything for a friend unless it leads us into immoral behaviour at which point we should immediately stop and drop the friend. Montaigne, on the other hand, admires Blossius’s answer. Friendship means total abandonment to each other’s wills and personalities.

It is a deliberate indication of the distance between Cicero’s stern Republican patriotism and Montaigne’s politically detached, sophisticated humanism.

Montaigne and de la Boétie’s souls and will were as one, they travelled together, read and talked together, they saw into each other’s hearts.

Montaigne draws a distinction between the Super Friendship he is describing, and all the other ‘commonplace and everyday’ friendships which most of us experience. With those one can never relax because you are never truly united with each other. One must ride with one hand on the bridle because at any moment this more superficial type of friend might do something unpredictable, questionable or immoral, and you must be ready to pull away.

By contrast the Super Friendship he is describing does not count help and gifts because there is a complete ‘fusion of wills’ and so helping your friend requires no more explanation than helping yourself. All concepts such as benefit, obligation, gratitude, request and thanks are inappropriate because they imply separation where there is no separation; there is a complete fusion of two souls.

He tells a story from antiquity about a man who draws up a will bequeathing his two friends, not money and goods, but the obligations (to look after his mother and marry off his daughter) which he left unfulfilled at his death. Bystanders thought this was hilarious, but it displays the quality of True Friendship which is that you are grateful to undertake obligations for your friend – you consider it an honour.

Mind you, the fact that the story names two friends to the dying man is an imperfection i.e. it depicts three friends. Friendship of the type Montaigne is describing is only possible between two men and no more.

Again he draws a distinction between ‘commonplace and everyday’ friendships, which are divisible i.e. you love one man for his beauty, another for his easy manner, another for his liberality and so on – and the grand True Friendship he is describing. This second type ‘dissolves all other obligations’. It is ‘absolutely single and indivisible’. A friendship like this is rare indeed and only comes along once in a lifetime, if then:

It is easy enough to find men fit for a superficial acquaintance, but here, where a man commits himself from the depths of his heart, keeping nothing back, it is essential that all the springs of action be perfectly clean and reliable. (p.101)

Compared with the four years during which Montaigne knew de la Boétie, the rest of his life seems like smoke, ‘but a dark and tedious night’ (p.103). He had grown so used to being completely united with him, that since his death he feels like half a man.

The text ends with a page explaining that he was minded to republish his friend’s essay against tyranny within his own book of essays except that it has recently been published by ‘those who wish to change the form of the French government’ (he means French Protestants who were engaged in a long low-level conflict with the Catholic authorities which periodically burst out into open civil war). And these enemies have published de la Boétie’s essay in a collection lumped in amid a load of their own tracts as if de la Boétie was one of theirs – which Montaigne strongly objects to. He goes on to emphasise that the essay was written when his friend was only 16, as a schoolboy exercise, and so doesn’t reflect his mature thought.

Finally, Montaigne concludes by emphasising that, contrary to the implication of the essay being published by Protestant subversives, his friend was a good Catholic and law-abiding patriot. This maxim was imprinted on his soul:

That he must most religiously obey and submit to the laws under which he was born. There was never a better citizen, nor one who cared more for his country’s peace; no one more hostile to the commotions and revolutions of his time. (p.105)

Hm. So although he was at pains to separate himself from Cicero’s moralising patriotism, Montaigne himself ends up doing something similar in the end, asserting, albeit a little more subtly, the value of true religion and patriotic feeling.

Thoughts

Having written a brief introduction to Montaigne which emphasised the modernity of his sceptical and experimental approach, I was, to be honest, surprised that the essay on friendship is so very much in thrall to ancient philosophy, to notions of Oneness and Uniqueness deriving from Plato and the Stoics in its depiction of the Super Friendship between him and de la Boétie.

Surprised and a dismayed. It felt much more medieval than I remembered Montaigne to be. He sounds more like Cicero, who died 1,600 years earlier, than Bacon, who was only a 28 years his junior, and gives frank, realistic advice which we can all relate to. A bit staggering that the droll, pithy Bacon overlaps with Cicero-quoting Montaigne and was writing his early, pithy essays as Montaigne was writing his final, wordy ones. They feel worlds apart.

Second reflection is that the essay should really be called ‘Super Friendship: On The One Unique Soul-Sharing Friendship Which Comes Only Once In A Lifetime’. It would be handy if that was more clearly explained at the start. And it would clarify that Montaigne doesn’t really touch on the practical aspects of ordinary friendship and acquaintance, such as you or I might experience them.

Third reflection is that the extenuation of de la Boétie which concludes the essay sheds light back on everything which preceded it. It makes you wonder whether Montaigne’s entire motivation for writing the essay was less an objective exploration of the quality of (super) friendship than to mount a spirited defence of his friend from posthumous accusations of treachery. A suspicion fortified when you learn that, instead of publishing his friend’s essay in the body of this volume, he published 29 sonnets by de la Boétie. I.e. that the essay is less a reflection about friendship than an embodiment of the obligations and responsibilities he felt towards a particular friend.

In that respect it exemplifies, it’s a contemporary embodiment, of the story about the Roman citizen who left his friends not his fortune but his obligations. It’s of a piece.

The essay is fairly interesting in its working through and conceptualisation of the type of Super Friendship he’s chosen to describe, but does feel rather airless and asphyxiating in the same kind of way that Cicero does, in circumscribed by a limiting agenda. I prefer being in the real world with Bacon and his practical maxims.

You could almost say that Montaigne demonstrates (in this essay at least) the kind of thralldom to ancient wisdom and to famous authors and dusty old poetry which Bacon thought needed to be chucked out of the intellectual world in order for us to really frankly assess who we are and how we live. Bacon was never able to describe this new world of knowledge since so little scientific discovery existed in his day: but his fervent belief that it was the right way to proceed turned out to be bang on the money.

Credit

All references are to the translation of Michel de Montaigne’s Essays by J.M. Cohen published by Penguin books in 1958.


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