The Village in the Jungle by Leonard Woolf (1913)

The rule of the jungle is first fear, and then hunger and thirst. There is fear everywhere: in the silence and in the shrill calls and the wild cries, in the stir of the leaves and the grating of branches, in the gloom, in the startled, slinking, peering beasts. And behind the fear is always the hunger and the thirst, and behind the hunger and the thirst fear again.
(The Village in the Jungle, page 11)

It was a strange world, a world of bare and brutal facts, of superstition, of grotesque imagination; a world of trees and the perpetual twilight of their shade; a world of hunger and fear and devils, where a man was helpless before the unseen and unintelligible powers surrounding him.
(page 21)

They say the man first finds heaven in a woman, later in a field, and last in the temple. (p.101)

Where there is food, there is happiness.

‘The Village in the Jungle’ is a really brilliant feat of imaginative writing. I expected it to be like Kipling’s Jungle Book for adults but quickly realised it’s far more serious and intense than that. It is an unflinching and brutal depiction of the harshness and primitiveness of Singhalese peasant life. It reminded me of Chinua Achebe’s intense novels about tribal life in West Africa, Things Fall Apart and No Longer At Ease.

This is because it’s a completely unpatronising, utterly believable description of the very poorest of the poor, living a pre-industrial illiterate life in a small clearing in the primeval jungle, barely subsisting under the harshest conditions imaginable. Unlike sentimental western notions of The Noble Savage, their lives are characterised by fear, hunger, anger and violence. (Key words which recur on almost every page are evil, devil and anger.)

The novel is so fully imagined, so complete and deep and convincing, that you feel like you are there, and I got to know these strange, remote, utterly alien people far better than many of the English characters in other novels I’ve read. But Achebe started writing about 1960 whereas this novel dates all the way back to 1913, half a century earlier. The way it takes such a blunt unflinching view of ‘native’ life was pioneering in its day.

Leonard Woolf in Ceylon

Leonard Woolf (1880 to 1969) had taken the civil service exams straight after leaving Cambridge, in 1903, passed with not particularly flying colours, and was offered a post in the Diplomatic Service. His family not being affluent enough to subsidise any other career (lawyer, academic), he accepted and in October 1904 was posted to Ceylon (now Sri Lanka). Here he became a cadet in the Ceylon Civil Service, serving first in Jaffna and later in Kandy.

Woolf served in Ceylon for seven long, intense years, gaining promotion to become an assistant government agent in the Southern Province, where he administered the District of Hambantota, an area of 2,600 square kilometres with a population of 100,000 people.

Throughout his time in Sri Lanka Woolf kept a detailed daily diary which he drew on for the detail of this novel, for the stories which make up his 1921 collection ‘Stories of the East’, and in the relevant volume of his multi-volume autobiography, titled ‘Growing’, published half a century later in 1961.

In May 1911 Woolf returned to England for a year’s well-deserved leave. He quickly realised he didn’t want to go back and in 1912 resigned his post. Part of the reason was that he had proposed to his long-term friend Virginia Stephen and she had accepted him. They married on 10 August 1912, both quite old, Virginia being 30 and Leonard 31. Over the next year he continued work on this novel which he had begun in Sri Lanka and it was published in October 1913. The book is dedicated to his new wife. It would be two years before she published her first novel (‘The Voyage Out’, in 1915).

During his seven years in Sri Lanka, Woolf learned the language and travelled intensively in the regions he administered. As a magistrate he was daily called on to adjudicate disputes, often between the poorest of the poor, between illiterate villagers in remote areas. And it’s in just such a remote village, really a straggling settlement of ten meagre houses, among utterly poverty-stricken illiterate villagers, that this extraordinary novel is set.

The village in the jungle

The village is called Beddegama, meaning ‘the village in the jungle’, and Woolf immediately throws us into the harsh environment with five dense pages powerfully conveying the relentlessly dog-eat-dog nature of the all-enfolding jungle.

All jungles are evil, but no jungle is more evil than that which lay about the village of Beddagama.

Only barely do the villagers manage to scrape a living by every year cutting and burning clearings called chenas in which to plant grain and vegetables. Everything depends on the rain which only falls for a few months a year, allowing the villagers to grow just enough crops to live on for the remaining ten months. Very rarely one or other of them makes the thirty mile trek to the small town of Kamburupitiya, there to borrow more seed, buy curry stuff or clothes, at ruinous rates of interest.

But for most of the villagers the horizon of their lives is the jungle which is only with difficulty kept outside the perimeter of the village, and into which they only penetrate a mile at most, to find water.

Silindu

The central character is the bad-tempered loner Silindu. He keeps himself to himself, is slack and lazy when it comes to raising crops, prefers to go hunting in the jungle with a long muzzle-loading gas-pipe gun, lying for hours on end in the foliage near waterholes hoping to shoot deer or sambur. His aloofness leads the other villagers to call him tikak pissu meaning ‘slightly mad’. By his laziness and lack of respect he also alienates the village headman, Babehami. (Babehami is known as Punchi Arachchi meaning ‘the little Arachchi, where Arachchi means the lowest rank of headman, headman over a village.)

Slindu marries and has twin daughter

Silindu has a wife, Dingihami. He gets her pregnant and she bears twin girls, Punchi Menika and Hinnihami. Silindu is furious that his wife has borne him daughters and rushes into the hut (all the ‘houses’ are made of mud), yells at her and beats her round the head and breasts. Two days later Dingihami dies. No-one seems to blame him, no steps to punishment are taken, Instead he has his sister, Karlinahami, who lived in a house at the other end of the village and whose husband had died of fever two months before, move in to become the twins’ step-mother. They grow up with her as the only mother they’ve ever known.

The twins grow up

The years pass. Silindi ignores his daughters until they’re three and one of them comes poking around at which he sets the girl on her feet and tells her a long story of the jungle. From that moment onwards he tells them stories and legends about the jungle and its creatures. He takes them out hunting with them and they acquire more knowledge of jungle fare, more confidence in the dark undergrowth, than the other villagers, especially the girls.

Babun Appu marries daughter 1, Punchi Menika

Over ten years later, when Punchi Menika is an adolescent of 15, she comes to the notice of a young man of the village Babun Appu. He is 21 years old and has only recently, after the death of his father, moved in with his sister Nanchohami who is married to the village headman, Babehami.
and suddenly notices her budding breasts and soft skin. Babu:

was tall for a Sinhalese, broad-shouldered, and big-boned. His skin was a dark chocolate-brown, his face oval, his nose small, his lips full and sensual. His expression was curiously virile and simple; but his brown eyes, which were large and oval-shaped, swept it at moments with something soft, languorous, and feminine.

After encountering her in the jungle and, from what we can make out, forcibly having sex with her, this still isn’t enough so he tells his parents he wants to marry Punchi Menika. They tell him he’s mad because Silindu is a famous eccentric and poor. He should trek to the nearest village and find a girl with a good dowry. But Babun insists and goes to see her father, Silindu. Silndu fatalistically regards this as just the latest calamity in his life and laments that he will lose his daughter. But Punchi Menika hears everything, comes out the hut, throws herself at his feet and says she needn’t move out. Instead Babun can build his own hut within Silindu’s compound, so she’ll be his wife, but still be there for her father.

So Silindu acquiesces, Babun builds his own hut in the compound and lives there with Punchi Menika. Babun is a simple honest guy and his living there slowly dispels the bad odour surrounding Silindu. People visit and the whole family becomes more accepted into the little village community.

Punchirala fancies daughter 2, Hinnihami

Hinnihami resents her sister going over to a strange man like this but life is life. So, in her turn, she becomes the target of various proposals, chief among them from 38-year-old Punchirala, with a face ravaged by a bear, but a reputation as a witch doctor or vederala.

When Punchirala comes to ask Silindu for Hinnihami’s hand, Silindu reluctantly refuses, knowing his daughter is a wildcat who will never accept the scarred vederala. Very angry, Punchirala puts a curse on Silindu who immediately starts to sicken. When he next goes into the jungle he has a panic attack, gets lost, injures himself.

Back in his compound he sickens and weakens. When his sister, Karlinahami, begs Punchirala to stop his spell, Punchirala disclaims all knowledge and claims it is the work of some devil. There is only one cure, which is to go on a pilgrimage to the Buddhist shrine at Beragala, five days’ trek through the jungle to the East.

Pilgrimage to Beragala

And so the family group of sick Silindu, Karlinahami, Hinnihami and Babun set off on the hard journey to Beragala, a journey described in vivid detail. After a few days their path joins a wider track, and they encounter larger and larger groups of pilgrims all trekking the same way, including an old man who shares his food with them.

In Beragala

Beragala is something beyond most of their experience, a wide street lined with shops and proper houses, with temples at either end and huge crowds of pilgrims, overwhelming for people used to seeing no more than 30 fellow villagers from one year’s end to another.

But to their surprise they discover the vederala Punchirala has travelled to Beragala too, claiming to have come for the festival. In reality he has come as part of his scheme to win Hinnihami as wife. He now tells the surprised pilgrim that there is only one man who can save Silindu from the devil which is possessing him and making him ill, a sanyasi, a holy man, a Hindu seer.

So they go to see this holy man, who has an immense length of hair and is dressed in a filthy dirty gown. There’s a problem that he doesn’t speak Singhalese so they require an interpreter. There’s another problem which is that the holy man requires payment and they have little or no money. They have to cadge a rupee off Punchirala, who makes them promise to give him food in the dry season.

Long story short: the holy man chants spells and announces that the cause of Silindu’s sickness is that the family refused to marry Hinnihami to Punchirala. (Did Punchirala pay him to say so? It’s not clear.) Either the man will have to be given or the girl, meaning either Silindu will die of Hinnihami will have to be given to Punchirala (p.75).

So, very reluctantly, having finished their pilgrimage, the little team pack and leave and on their first day back in the jungle they encounter Punchirala at an agreed rendezvous, hand Hinnihami over to him. Once this disagreeable duty is performed, they simply turn and continue their 4-day trek through the jungle. And with every day Silindu recovers his health and is more or less back to normal by the time they reach the village.

Punchirala’s life with Hinnihama

What happens next, over the coming weeks and months, is that Punchirala discovers that Hinnihami is, as Silindu warned him, a wildcat who obeys nobody. She allows herself to be ‘taken’ but with utter frigidity, and spends her days mocking him, calling him devil and dog. Quite quickly he realises she is not going to be his cook and comforter (p.81). After one outburst from Hinnihami Punchirala lets her return to live in her father’s compound.

Months pass. That year there are abundant rains. Not for 40 years had it rained so abundantly and the harvest is bounteous. Punchi Menaka has had a baby who is now 18 months old. Now Hinnihami has a child (Punchirala’s child), a girl she names Punchi Nona. On the day she is born Silindu returns from the jungle carrying a baby fawn. He had shot and killed its mother for meat but couldn’t bring himself to harm the now helpless fawn. He hands it to Hinnihami as she is suckling her baby and the fawn suckles from the other breast. This feels like a departure from realism into magical realism or the realm of fable.

Thus Hinnihami’s little girl and the fawn grow up side by side, nurtured and cared for by Hinnihami. She calls the fawn Punchi Appu and cares for it as much or maybe more than her own daughter. Inevitably, the other villagers think this is strange and unnatural, although what you’d expect from the mad father, Silindu.

Disaster

The year of plenty is followed by a year of disastrous drought. The rains fail during the planting season but when they do come, bring disease. We learn that the village had a population of 41 but that no fewer than 16 villagers die of dysentery and fever. When the novel began the village had ten ‘houses’ i.e. mud huts within fenced compounds. Two had been abandoned earlier (one when Babun moved into Silindu’s compound). Now two entire families are wiped out, their compounds are abandoned, so the village is reduced to six ‘houses’.

Death of the granddaughters

Both Silindu’s grand-daughters die in the sickness. In fact it hits him harder as he’d grown to love the toddlers, than it affects the mothers.

The death of the child is what every mother must continually expect. They had seen it too long in the village to be surprised at their own suffering : the birth of children every year and then the coming of the fever to carry them off. Their grief was lightened by the feeling of resignation to the inevitable. (p.85)

Fate

A pause to say that all the villagers believe in a fate or destiny which is harsh and punitive. They have a saying about evil which comes from the jungle and repeat it whenever anything bad happens.

‘Always evil is coming into this house from the jungle…’

Silindu is particularly pessimistic. When his wife gives birth to girls, when Babun takes Punchi Menika from him, when Punchirala puts the curse on him, at more or less every event in his life Silindu bewails his harsh fate.

In addition, he doesn’t realise that the village headman, Babehami, has got it in for him, and carries out a long, underhand vendetta. Babehami never liked him but is offended when Silindu beats his wife for bearing daughters. Slyly Babehami works against him, for example refusing to loan Silindu rice to sow in the fallow season, claiming he doesn’t have enough for himself; or in the matter of Silindu’s gas-gun which Babehami reports to the authorities away in the nearest town, because Silindu needs a license for his gun but doesn’t have the money to pay for one so uses it illegally.

This vendetta of Babehami’s against Silindu adds to Silindu’s sense of an overwhelming black destiny bearing him down.

Murder of Hinnihami

Punchirala feeds the rumours about Hinnihami and her fawn. He says it is a devil and she is a devil woman which is why he kicked her out of his compound. The rumours become toxic when the headman’s little son dies suddenly, for no apparent reason, and words gets around that the boy was carrying leaves in the jungle when he encountered the fawn which bent forward to nibble them but the boy snatched them away. Rumour says the fawn and the woman then put a curse on the boy.

After much muttering and conferring in Babehami’s hut, one day Hinnihami and her fawn are ambushed on a jungle path. A mob of Babehami’s kin stone then beat the fawn, deliberately breaking its legs, then beating and stoning it more. When Hinnihami tries to intervene she is beaten, her clothes town off her to reveal her breasts, and she is dragged over to the dying fawn where they are both, eventually, abandoned.

She lies half conscious by the fawn as it slowly dies, then lies out night in the jungle chill. Next morning Silindu finds her half-delirious, and takes her back to his compound where, unwilling to live on, she dies.

Arrival of Fernando

Everyone is surprised when the headman, Babehami, arranges for an outsider known as Fernando, from the town of Kamburupitiya, to come and live on a new house built on land adjoining his compound. This man runs a boutique in the town but has also loaned money to all the villages. After the fallow year he risks losing all his loans. Instead he’s agreed a plan with Babehami, whereby the latter will assign larger than usual chenas to each villager, of four acres, but on condition they all assign to Fernando one fifth of their crops. Fernando will supervise the villagers’ work on their chenas and guarantee the return of his loans, with interest. He is accompanied by a boy servant of 8, and is regarded by all the villagers as a social superior, given the honorary title of Mahatmaya.

Fernando fancies Punchi Menika

He hasn’t been there long before sex rears its head again. Silindu’s daughter, Babun’s wife, Punchi Menika, has a ‘face and form’ more attractive than the other squalid village women, and Fernando decides to make her his. Slight problem of her husband, Babun, standing in the way. So Fernando hatches a plan. He decides to schmooze Punchi Menika’s husband, Babun, by offering him the role of gambaraya to oversee all the chenas.

Then he enacts part two of his plot: this is to approach Punchi Menika and blackmail her into having sex with him by threatening to not only take away the role of gambaraya from Babun, but to call in his debts and ruin him. Even under these direct threats, Punchi Menika refuses to give in.

Babehami and Fernando conspire

They take three steps. 1) First the headman invites Babun to his compound. This never normally happens so Babun is surprised. They amaze him by telling him that Punchi Menika came to Fernando and asked to leave her husband and become his woman. Therefore, Babehami very reasonably suggests that they let Punchi have her wish, the marriage ends, and Babun comes back to live at his (Babehami’s) compound. Babun refuses to believe it but is so simple and gullible that he is tempted, until Fernando gives the game away by bursting out laughing at the foolish look on his face. He goes home and Punchi of course confirms that it’s a lie, that it is Fernando who tried to lure her away.

2) Next Babehami and Fernando unfold another plan: they appoint an outsider over the chena which Silindu and Babun have spent several weeks clearing. When they go to see Babehami the latter tells them permits or licenses to cultivate chenas can only be given to ‘fit’ persons and neither of them is fit. This is obvious intimidation. Silindu and Babun confer and decide Babun must make the three days journey to the nearest town to present their case to the Assistant Government Agent. He hastens there but discovers the AGA is absent on his rounds and no-one can tell him when he’ll return.

Walking through the town he passes the shop of the Moorman (Muslim?) Cassim who calls him in. When Babun explains his trouble Cassim immediately sees what fernando is doing and laughs at the lengths he’s going to just to bed a village woman. For fun Cassim offers to help him and writes a petition to the government agent, which is signed and sent. Cassim tells Buban to come back to town in ten days’ time.

3) Meanwhile Babehami and Fernando cook up another plan. They put word about that Babehami’s house has been broken into and burgled. They call in the Korala, a fat , consequential, bullying man. He goes into Silindu’s compound and emerges with a bundle containing two cloths, a pair of gold ear-rings, and some other pieces of gold jewellery. They claim Babun and Silindu stole this. Then they get their goons to find in the undergrowth nearby a large box which everyone recognises as the headman’s. They have been framed for a robbery.

All this is bad but has one ‘good’ consequence which is that Silindu finally realises that Babehami has had it in for him all along. In a flash he realises the whole sequence of vengeful decisions Babehami has made against him, for years, in fact for decades. He realises the headman has been for years his implacable enemy, behind much of his long string of bad luck.

The trial

In a pretty low key way, they are ‘arrested’ i.e. the headman orders Silindu and Babun to spend the night on his verandah, then the next day they are told to accompany Babehami, Fernando and the Korala to the nearby town.

Here they stand trial in a court run and administered by the colonial authority (Britain) with a white judge.

At this point you begin to understand that this is where Woolf’s own personal experience comes in. He himself was a regional administrator and judge and oversaw hundreds of cases which consisted of petty arguments from little villages between illiterate peasants. He must have seen hundreds of cases which were just the tip of slow-burning vendettas and village feuds, just like the one this novel records.

The trial is described in excruciating detail and takes up 13 long pages. What comes over is how painfully useless the court process is. Everything is relayed to the judge through an interpreter. The innocent (Babun and Silindu) don’t have a clue what’s going on or how they’re expected to behave. The guilty (Babehami, Fernando and the Korala) are familiar with court protocol, take the stand one after the other and lie their head off, but are believed.

It’s notable that Woolf doesn’t ridicule or satirise the process. That would be an easy win. He does something subtler but much worse. He shows all the procedures being strictly adhered to and the judge having a pretty shrewd idea that something is wrong with the prosecution i.e. taking against the bad guys. But he can only act on the basis of the evidence placed before him and that is all in their favour, one eye witness after another queuing up to lie about seeing Babun break into the headman’s house then make off with the loot.

And so the judge finds Babun guilty and sentences him to six months ‘rigorous imprisonment’. (No one is charging Silindu with actual burglary and so he is dismissed without charge.)

Silindu plans revenge

Punchi Menika had been present in court throughout the trial and a fairly big plot hole is that neither Silindu nor Babun thought to call her as a witness to prove their central claim that Fernando was pursuing a vendetta against them because they refused to let him take Punchi away. After the verdict she staggers out into the street where she is joined by Silindu. He is muttering to himself and mutters and laughs all the days’-long trek back to their village.

Because at last he understands the nature of the ‘fate’ which has been doing him down and has a plan. He is a hunter, a well-known hunter, with a gas-gun.

So they all arrive back in the village. The next day Silindu goes to call on Babehami. The latter is understandably nervous about what’s happened but Silindu lures him into a fall sense of security by telling him that he now understands that the Bad Guy, the bad influence in his life for years, has been Babun Appu. Silindu goes on to say there is nothing now to stop Punchi Menika being given to Fernando. This is what Babehami wants to hear though he is still unnerved. He has to tell Silindu to slow down, that Punchi Menika can only slip into Fernando’s house at night, secretly, in order to keep up appearances.

Then Silindu says he wants to sort out the misunderstanding whereby another man has been assigned his chena. Since Babun was at fault and has been imprisoned can this not now be reversed? Again he forces the pace and wants Babehami to go with him and tell the usurper, Appu, that he’s got to relinquish the chena. Again Babehami is suspicious, he doesn’t like being rushed into anything. But on the other hand it would be better to get everything sorted as soon as possible and specially to keep Silindu onside.

So he lets himself be persuaded to set off on the long trek to the chena, during which Silindu becomes more and more excited, telling increasingly pertinent stories about how the hunters might wound and corner the old buffalo who will wait till the very last minute, when the hunter thinks he’s won, and then charge. And as Babehami finally realises something is up, he turns just in time to see Silindu racing towards him, virtually foaming at the mouth, and then shoot him at point-blank range, ripping a hole in his chest.

Silindu kicks the corpse then hurries back to the village. Here he finds Fernando in his compound and simply walks over to him with his gun levelled. As Fernando tries to duck behind the fence Silindu fires between the slats and rips his guts out.

Silindu walks calmly back to his house, neatly leans his gun in a corner, comes out again and sees the crowd gathering round the headman’s compound, before walking into the jungle and making for the track which leads to Kamburupitiya.

Walking to Kamburupitiya

Silindu doesn’t know exactly what he wants to do and Woolf shows us his thoughts, that he doesn’t realise just how much trouble he’s in. He thinks he might be able to go back to the village and live a normal life, the worst happening that the other villagers might bully him a bit. On the evening of the third day he arrives at Kamburupitiya and goes straight to the house of the local administrator, the Ratemahatmaya, a Sinhalese.

This man is fussy and nervous. At first he says it’s late but he sits up when Silindu tells him he’s committed a murder. When Silindu goes on to calmly explain that he is the murderer and has killed two men, the official is at first scared.

The light of the lamp fell upon the dark, livid face. It was the face of the grey monkeys which leap above the jungle among the tree-tops, and peer down at you through the branches; a face scarred and pinched by suffering and weariness and fear. It was as if something evil from the darkness, which he did not understand, had suddenly appeared in his quiet verandah. (p.140)

This is good, isn’t it? It reminds me of the fear expressed in many of Rudyard Kipling’s Indian stories, some of which are out-and-out horror stories.

Anyway, the Ratemaharatmaya is a nervous and ineffectual man. Not knowing what to do he officiously demands that Silindu should stand, even though he’s exhausted from trekking through the jungle for three days. When Silindu is slow to react the Ratemaharatmaya gets his servant to kick him.

After some hesitation he forces Silindu to accompany him in a bullock cart three-quarters of a mile to the residence of the white British magistrate. This is the same man who tried and sentenced Bupan. Silindu has never seen such a clean room before, full of so much furniture. The narrator explains that it’s just a cheap rug on the floor, a table with pens and papers on it, and an old bookshelf, but Silindu is dazzled by it, and in this moment the reader very vividly feels the difference between the two worlds, the urban colonial world and the incredibly primitive world of the village.

As in the courtroom scene, the magistrate is painted sympathetically. For example, unlike the Ratemaharatmaya he sees that Silindu is exhausted and lets him sit down. Still, he insists the formalities are gone through, so he thoroughly questions Silindu, who freely and openly gives a complete account of how he murdered Babehami and Fernando.

Back to Beddegama

Having done so, Silindu naively expects to be punished straightaway. He vaguely hopes that, having explained that he just wanted to eliminate the source of evil in the village and bring peace, he’ll be allowed to go back home. Instead he is, of course, consigned to a cage-like lockup overnight.

Next day a procession of the magistrate, the Ratemaharatmaya and various servants set off with Silindu on the trek back to the village, to make a formal enquiry. Here they find the two corpses, still lying untouched where they fell, examine them, make notes etc. Then the magistrate sets up base in the shade of a tree and interviews a series of witnesses. Everyone corroborates Silindu’s story but the facts were never in doubt, just how they are interpreted.

For now we see the grand design of the novel as a whole, which is to juxtapose the two completely different value systems, of town and village, of literate and illiterate, above all of colonial law and jungle culture – and observe in detail how they fail to match or comprehend each other.

The magistrate is given a speech in which he shows a surprising understanding of Silindu’s mentality. He understands that the villagers just want to be left alone to live their miserable lives in peace. In this they’re like the animals of the jungle which the magistrate hunts, something he shares with Silindu. They both know that jungle animals are dangerous when injured or cornered, as Silindu was after his family was attacked by Fernando and Babehami.

The mad old Buddhist wanderer

After the afternoon of questioning, Silindu spends the night locked up, then is taken back to Kamburupitiya, and from there sent west to Tangala. Silindu is taken there by a simple peon who loves talking. Along the way they fall in with other travellers. The first night they sleep, along with other travellers, in a shop by the roadside. There are two traders and a filthy old man, a wanderer who is generally considered mad. The peon has mocked Silindu to the other travellers but the old man sees his case is right: he was defending himself when he was attacked. That said, he is a Buddhist and keeps repeating the Buddhist dogma that all killing, of anything, is a sin, including all the animals Silindu has spent his entire life hunting in the jungle.

Suddenly something in Silindu snaps, and he throws himself at the feet of the old man saying that, Yes, yes, now he understands: all the animals of the jungle live in fear, there is no end to the killing, he thought he could find peace by killing his two antagonists but all he did was increase the killing and the fear. Surprised, the Buddhist old man tells him it is never too late to acquire merit to improve your next rebirth, tells him to spend his last days in holy thoughts and teaches him a Buddhist scripture, a sentence from the Pali to memorise and repeat.

This conversion to Buddhism is important. Maybe it allowed Woolf to make some points about what was and still is the main religion in Sri Lanka. But within the narrative it indicates a new and different attitude to his life. Previously Silindu had thought a dark fate was out to get him with evil continually coming out of the jungle and he felt beaten down and defeated by it, which led to his outbursts of anger. Now he has accepted his fate, he finally finds the peace and rest he has been seeking all his life. In a sense, the novel has a Buddhist message in how it shows that fighting back or revenge multiply the causes of unrest and disquiet. Only complete acceptance can bring real peace to the spirit.

Trial at Tangala

Sindilu is locked up in the town gaol for 3 weeks. One day he spots Babun but the latter is a changed man, sickly and yellow, his fine muscle tone wasted and all the sparkle gone from his eyes. When Silindu yells at him from his cell that he has killed Fernando and Babehima so now everything will be alright, Babun replies that he is mad, he knows he will die in this prison, nothing is alright, and he makes a point of avoiding Sindilu thereafter.

After three weeks, the date of his trial arrives and Silindu goes through the motions, once again answering what he takes to be repetitive pointless questions. His defence lawyer tries to get him off on account of his madness, but Silindu answers the questions clearly and logically, explaining how he cold-bloodedly planned the murder of the two men, and so the jury quickly finds him guilty of murder, and the judge sentences him to be hanged in two weeks’ time.

With four days left to go a smartly dressed Sinhalese official arrives at Sindilu’s cells and announces that his hanging has been commuted to 20 years hard labour, and his part of the narrative ends with a short, blunt, brutal indication of what this will mean.

A jail guard came and unlocked the cell gate. Silindu was taken out and made to squat down in the long shed which ran down the centre of the courtyard. A wooden mallet was put into his hand and a pile of cocoanut husk thrown down in front of him. For the remainder of that day, and daily for the remainder of twenty years, he had to make coir by beating cocoanut husks with the wooden mallet. (p.167)

Aftermath

When Silindu had been brought by the magistrate to the village to take part in the inquiries, he had been met by his daughter Punchi Menika, Buban Appu’s wife, the proximate cause of all the trouble insofar as it was Fernando’s infatuation with her that triggered the series of events.

She asks Silindu if it’s true that he killed Babehim and Fernando and he says yes. She says it would have been better if she had voluntarily gone to Fernando but that makes Silindu angry and he says, Never, he would never have allowed it, and she shouldn’t think like that. He tells her Babun will be released from prison in a matter of months and he will return to look after her. He tells her to wait.

After Silindu is taken away what that waiting entails is carrying on sharing the manless house with Silindu’s sister, Karlinahami. At fifty, Karlinahami is a very old woman, in terms of jungle life. Maybe it’s worth giving this description in full, because it gives a clear indication how unsentimentally Woolf describes this harsh subject matter. And how utterly convincing it is, written with all the depth of first hand experience.

Karlinahami was nearly fifty years old now, and in a jungle village a woman — and especially a woman without a husband — is very old, very near the grave at fifty. The sun and the wind, the toil, the hunger, and the disease sap the strength of body and mind, bring folds and lines into the skin, and dry up the breasts. A woman is old at forty or even thirty. No one, man or woman, in the jungle, lives to the term of years allotted to man. It would have been difficult to say whether Karlinahami looked nearer eighty than ninety, nearer ninety than a hundred. The jungle had left its mark on her. Her body was bent and twisted, like the stunted trees which the south-west wind had tortured into grotesque shapes. The skin, too, on her face and thin limbs reminded one of the bark of the jungle trees; it was shrunken against the bones, and wrinkled, and here and there flaking off into whitish brown scales, as the bark flakes off the kumbuk-trees. The flesh of the cheeks had dried and shrunk; the lips seemed to have sunk into the toothless mouth, leaving a long line damp with saliva under the nose. And under the lined forehead were the eyes, lifeless and filmy, peering out of innumerable wrinkles. The eyes were not blind, but they seemed to be sightless — the pupil, the iris, and even the white had merged — because the mind was dying. It is what usually happens in the jungle — to women especially— the mind dies before the body. Imperceptibly the power of initiative, of thought, of feeling, dies out before the monotony of life, the monotony of the tearing hot wind, the monotony of endless trees, the monotony of perpetual hardship. It will happen at an age when in other climates a man is in his prime, and a woman still bears children. The man will still help at the work in the chena, cutting down the undergrowth and sowing the crop; but he will do so unthinking, without feeling, like a machine or an animal; and when it is done he will sit hour after hour in his compound staring with his filmy eyes into nothing, motionless, except when he winds one long thin arm round himself, like a grey monkey, and scratches himself on the back. And the woman still carries the waterpot to the muddy pool to fetch water; still cooks the meal in the house. While they still stand upright, they must do their work; they eat and they sleep; they mutter frequently to themselves; but they do not speak to others, and no one speaks to them. They live in a twilight, where even pain is scarcely felt. (p.167)

The objective narrator dispassionately describes the impact of all these tragic events on the village. At a stroke the village loses one more house (reducing the number to five) and seven of its 25 inhabitants, for the headman’s wife, Nanchohami, decides to leave, taking her two children with her. Two dead, two in prison, three left.

Woolf explains how the headman’s house is ill-omened, associated with devils. No-one wanted to live there, well-made though it was. And so Woolf gives a bravura description of how the abandoned house is slowly recolonised by the jungle, low bushes taking over the fence, the walls developing holes, the branches it was made of taking root and growing, plants on the rooftiles – after three years the whole thing has reverted to the wild.

The new headman is the witch doctor, the vederala, Punchirala, the one who cast the spell of sickness on Sindilu when he refused to hand Punchi Menika over to him.

As to Punchi Menika, she partakes of the vagueness of the peasant, and so she has little or no sense of time. She was told to wait for Babun Appu to be freed but doesn’t know how to count time and so when to expect his return. They all hear the news that Sindilu’s sentence was commuted but all ‘life imprisonment’ means to her is that she’ll never see him again, so he drops out of her life and thinking.

Instead she has to work like a dog, scavenging roots and berries from the jungle in the fallow season, working on other people’s chenas and living on charity. But she hopes that Babun Appu will return and the evil will end, she will have closure and peace. She and the villagers debate, sometimes bad-temperedly, whether the six months have passed or not.

Eventually Punchi Menika decides she must find out for herself. Punchirala explains that she will have to go to the prison which is in Tangalla. First she must do the two-days’ walk along a trail to Kamburupitiya, and then join the bigger road which heads west to Tangalla. So Punchi Menika makes some kurakkan cakes and wraps some uncooked grain, and sets off.

The path to Kamburupitiya is alright, she’s used to it, but she hates the wide straight road to Tangalla, packed with carts and bullocks and traders. She is terrified of the strange villages she passes through and feels all the strangers are looking and laughing at her. She arrives in Tangalla on market day which feels like chaos to her, stumbles through the tangle of streets to arrive in the market place at its busiest, before felling to the hill on the outskirts of town.

There’s one big building in isolation at the top of the hill. In a consciously artistic passage Woolf describes how Punchi Menika goes to the top of the hill and there finds an exhausted old man tending a pathetic herd of five cows. He confirms that the building is the prison but warns her, in heavily fatalistic tones, that nobody ever comes out, especially if they come from a village such as hers (and his, he originally came from a village not far from Beddegama). When she tells him she’s come to discover the fate of her husband Babun Appu, the old man says he’ll be dead.

She taps on the huge door of the prison but so diffidently that the sound doesn’t carry inside then sits down with vast resignation. Hours later a guard opens the gate and sees her. She asks to know the fate of her husband. He, like all low ranking officials, demands money but she pleads she is far too poor to have any. So the guard tells her, yes, he knew the man Babun, and he died two months earlier.

Punchi Menika is too tired and fatalistic to cry and beat her breast, She just walks away, down the hill to where the old man is sitting and confirms he hunch that her man is dead, then she sets straight off to walk back to her village. There she will be safe and have peace.

The end

Two years pass. The rains fail, the crops fail and more people die or move away. Silindu’s sister, Karlinahami, fades and dies. After two years there are only two houses left, one containing just Punchi Menilak and the other belonging to the vederala Punchirala. No-one bothers to visit the village any more, and the track to it from the outside world itself grows over. The jungle, described at such length with such power in the opening pages, is reclaiming its own.

The narrative picks up speed, covering more time from a detached distant point of view. Woolf describes how Punchirala grows old and sickly, eventually too old to care for himself and moves into Punchi Menilak’s hut. Now she has to forage for two, since they don’t have the strength to clear chanaks any more and, anyway, the rains keep failing.

Instead of being grateful Punchirala, now an old man in his 40s, becomes more spiteful and hateful with age. Hunger and fever eventually give him release.

And then, on the last two pages, the jungle surges forward to reclaim its own, the ceaseless plant life, bushes and trees moving right up to the perimeter of her compound, then over it and up to the door of her hut.

In an ending which feels like a fairy tale or a legend, but without any sentiment, Punchi Menilak becomes one with the beasts of the jungle. Her feeble foraging expeditions no longer scare the wild pigs or deer. When she was small, Sindilu had told her that you have to live many years before you understand the beasts of the jungle. Now she understands them. She has become one of them.

Perpetual hunger wastes her away. Eventually, in her last few days, she is bedbound with fever. The fire between its three stones which has burned for generations goes out. One night, in her last moments, she wakes from fever to see two small eyes shining in the doorway. Suddenly terrified she calls out to her long-distant father that the devil has come for her, Save me, save me!

But as Punchi Menilak falls backward the animal moves through the doorway into her hut. It is a wild boar and it closes in. The last sentence reads:

As she fell back, the great boar grunted softly, and glided like a shadow towards her into the hut.

I assume the boar is going to eat her, possibly while she is still conscious. The circular shape of the narrative, returning here at the end to the triumph of the all-conquering jungle which was so extensively described at the start, now that the story has dwindled down to one last human survivor on the brink of being extinguished, has a fairy tale feel. But it is not a fairy tale for children.


Descriptions of village people

The spirit of the jungle is in the village, and in the people who live in it. They are simple, sullen, silent men. In their faces you can see plainly the fear and hardship of their lives. They are very near to the animals which live in the jungle around them. They look at you with the melancholy and patient stupidity of the buffalo in their eyes, or the cunning of the jackal. And there is in them the blind anger of the jungle, the ferocity of the leopard, and the sudden fury of the bear.

People who live in towns can hardly realise how persistent and violent are the desires of those who live in villages like Beddagama. In many ways, and in this beyond all others, they are very near to the animals; in fact, in this they are more brutal and uncontrolled than the brutes; that, while the animals have their seasons, man alone is perpetually dominated by his desires. (p.48)

The minds of most villagers are extraordinarily tortuous and suspicious.

Why I write summaries

I give such detailed summaries of the novels I read for two reasons. 1) As notes to myself about what happens and what I found noteworthy. 2) Because just using the generic terms we have to describe books, such as ‘realist’ or ‘sentimental’, in a general description, is always inadequate. Giving a synopsis of the plot is the best way to convey the complex reality of engaging with a long narrative, much more effective than stock phrases. And in many cases a full summary of the plot shows that the standard descriptions are actually wrong.

Plus 3) I do summaries because they allow me to record my reactions to narratives as they unfold in real time – reactions of surprise or excitement or boredom – and some readers have commented that they enjoy following me on this journey of discovery and understanding rather than reading the flat factual summaries you can get on Wikipedia or Sparks Notes. Wikipedia summaries are never shocked or surprised but I frequently am, as well as delighted, bored, irritated and so on. I record my honest responses. Sometimes, later, on reflection, I moderate or even retract my opinions, but the summary remains of my initial responses and some readers find that useful.

Anyway, this summary is designed to be 1) helpful for anyone who’s never read and is never going to read ‘The Village in the Jungle’, and 2) to give a really detailed sense of what the book is about.

Glossary

I make glossaries of unusual words I encounter in books partly for their own interest, but also because odd or unusual words shed light on a text from a different angle. They offer a kind of different route into and through a text. They are like threads in a complicated tapestry, gleaming for a moment, linking disparate moments; especially in a novel like this which is trying to inhabit a completely different culture, with its own language, and so uses them very freely.

Part of the verisimilitude of the novel is Woolf’s concern not just to capture customs, modes of life and speech of his Sri Lankans, but to use their own terminology. In fact the book contains numerous footnotes, one every few pages, giving the meaning of the many native words he deploys (most but not all in Sinhala) as well as explaining other factual elements, such as the native titles given to different ranks in the social hierarchy, the difference between Tamils and Sinhalese, the likely origins of different religious rituals and so on. It kind of overflows with authenticity.

  • Aiyo! – common exclamation or cry
  • amma – mother
  • Appochchi – Father
  • chatty – earthenware bowl for carrying water
  • chena – patch of jungle cleared and sown
  • dagoba – the shrines built by kings long ago to hold the relics of the Lord Buddha
  • gama – village, hence Beddegama, ‘the village in the jungle’
  • gambaraya – oversees the cultivation of rice fields for their owners
  • ge – house
  • goiya – caste of cultivators
  • Kachcheri – government offices
  • kapurala – persons who perform services in temples
  • kunji – rice gruel
  • kurrakan – a grain
  • punchi – little
  • mudalali – rich trader
  • poya day – day of the change of the moon, kept as a holiday
  • Ralahami – respectful form of address
  • Rodiyas – lowest Sri Lankan caste
  • sanyasi – Hindu holy man
  • veddas – aboriginal inhabitants of Sri Lanka before the Singhalese arrived; a term often associated with devils and used as an insult
  • vederala – native ‘doctor’
  • yakko – male devil, common insult
  • yakkini – female devil, common insult

Thoughts

‘The Village in the Jungle’ won very good reviews, not only in Britain but also in Sri Lanka, where colonial officials testified to its accuracy and the island’s small literary community recognised a milestone account of their own culture.

As the years went by Woolf was delighted when it came to be a set text in Sri Lankan schools. In her biography of Leonard Woolf, Victoria Glendinning describes it as ‘a foundational novel in the Sri Lankan literary canon’. Christopher Ondaatje in his Afterword says that it ‘has become an essential part of the literary culture of Sri Lanka’.

Part of what made it so unique is the way it is written entirely from the native rather than the colonial point of view. My summary makes that pretty obvious without needing much additional comment. Various blurbs describe how the British colonial system is not directly criticised but just shown to be largely irrelevant to, and at odds with, the actual lives and values of the locals.

The main and obvious comment is how amazingly authentic it appears. It’s a miracle of imaginative projection. There isn’t a single false note. You are utterly transported into the mindset of the jungle, the village and its illiterate peasant inhabitants, in all the superstitious wretchedness of their conditions and lives. It’s an absolutely amazing achievement.


Credit

‘The Village in the Jungle’ by Leonard Woolf was published by Edward Arnold in 1913. Page references are to the 2008 Eland Publishing paperback edition, though the text is freely available online.

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Burma to Myanmar @ the British Museum

Burma to Myanmar is the first major exhibition in the UK to give a good cultural history of the country widely known as Burma until the military junta changed its name to Myanmar in 1989. Burma achieved independence from the British Empire in January 1948, so the exhibition marks the 75th anniversary of Myanmar’s independence.

Seated Buddha, acquired by Captain Frederick Marryat during the First Anglo-Burmese War, 1824 to 1826. Made of lacquer, wood, gold, textile and shell. From central or lower Myanmar. British Museum. Photo by the author

It’s a smallish exhibition, by British Museum standards, up in the Rotunda exhibition space, and bringing together some 130 objects – but it still manages to be pretty confusing. This is for at least two reasons. As with other countries we don’t hear much about in the news and whose cultural products we almost never see, almost everything about the exhibition is UNFAMILIAR. Therefore, there’s a lot of information to take in and process.

The second reason is that the history of Burma is genuinely complicated and confusing. To be very simplistic, you can divide Burma’s history into four parts.

4. Post-independence

Working backwards, there’s the period from independence in 1948 to the present day, mostly marked by military dictatorship, rebellions and repression. This is reasonably understandable because we’re talking about one defined country with fixed borders, and the pattern of military dictatorship is familiar from countless other developing countries, while the rise of Aung San Suu Kyi as leader of the opposition and a sort of Nelson Mandela figure, is reasonably familiar from the news.

3. Second World War

The Second World War devastated the country, loosened colonial control and hastened independence from Britain in 1948. Japan seized Burma from the British and the latter only slowly fought back, fighting with many Burmese nationalists who were promised independence, in what at the time and ever since has often been dubbed ‘the forgotten war’. This, also, is fairly familiar from British wartime books, histories, memoirs etc.

2. British colonial period

Before that came the colonial period, from Britain’s first involvement in 1826 through to the granting of independence in 1948. There were three Anglo-Burma Wars:

  • First Anglo-Burmese War (March 1824 to February 1826)
  • Second Anglo-Burmese War (April 1852 to January 1853)
  • Third Anglo-Burmese War (November 1885)

In each of these small wars Britain seized control of more territory (the exhibition features about a dozen wall labels with useful maps, including one showing Britain’s steady encroachment through the nineteenth century).

For most of that period Burma was not a separate political entity but was ruled as a province of British India. During that long period the British invested in developing the Burmese economy, encouraging arts and crafts to be made for the international market etc.

The British abolished the monarchy and imposed new administrative systems. For the kinds of artists and craftsmen represented here, the British introduced new techniques and materials and encouraged new clienteles. The introduction of the census led to ethnic stereotyping that helped set the stage for the conflicts of today.

Again, this all follows a recognisable pattern and invokes ideas familiar from all the other colonies we managed.

1. Pre-1826: rising and falling ethnic kingdoms

What makes the exhibition challenging is what came before the Brits, the 2,000 years or more from the earliest recorded artefacts through to the first British war. Burma sits at a sort of crossroads of India to the west, China to the east, Thailand to the south and, over its long history, has absorbed influences from all these countries and ones further afield.

But the biggest factor or reason, which I struggled to get my head around, is that the final borders of Burma were only settled at independence in 1948 (even under the British not all the territory within the nominal borders was effectively ruled by the Brits, with the mountains in the north never fully pacified) –and that for over 2,000 years before that, there was no country called Burma, there was a succession of kingdoms and empires which rose and fell, some entirely in the borders of modern Burma, some straddling them, kingdoms based on ethnic groups which fought among themselves or with Indian kingdoms to the west, Chinese peoples to the East, Thai and Laos people to the east, and so on.

From the 14th century numerous kingdoms jostled for power. These kingdoms extended fluctuating control over resources, people and religious authority, and expanded their links with Thailand, China, Sri Lanka, and traders from the Middle East and Europe, creating a fertile ground for diverse cultures to flourish.

Nowadays there are reckoned to be over 100 languages and dialects spoken in Myanmar, a legacy of its extraordinarily complicated, shifting, kaleidoscopic history. There is also religious variety. Although nearly 90% of Myanmar’s inhabitants practise Buddhism, the country is also home to many Christians, Hindus, Muslims and animists.

Examples

Here are some examples from the exhibition wall labels which indicate the detail and complexity of Burma’s changing kingdoms and peoples.

In the 1300s and 1400s, other political centres appeared, including the Hanthawaddy kingdom in lower Myanmar, and Mrauk U in present-day Rakhine State. Shan states dominated regions in the north and east. Highland chiefdoms, linked by complex kinship networks, existed between these various centres. Frontiers and cultures were fluid and political control depended on personal loyalties.

The earliest urban centres in Southeast Asia were occupied by the Pyu peoples from about 200 BC. They had cultural links to Indian kingdoms, the Himalayas, Sri Lanka, China and Dvaravati in Thailand. The Pyu peoples were succeeded in central Myanmar by the Bagan (Pagan) kingdom, which flourished from the 11th to the 13th centuries.

After Bagan’s decline, central Myanmar’s kingdoms (with capitals at Ava, Amarapura, Toungoo and Mandalay), waxed and waned until the late 1800s. Their political sway could stretch from Ahom (Assam) and Manipur in the west, to Ayutthaya, Lan Na and Lan Xang in the east, and extend down the Thai-Malay peninsula, periodically making successive kingdoms the largest empires in mainland Southeast Asia. Warfare and the colonisation of surrounding regions led to the relocation of people into central Myanmar. These population influxes brought new ideas and skills and produced a diverse cultural environment.

Lower Myanmar’s kingdoms: associated with the Mon peoples, kingdoms emerged in lower Myanmar at Thaton, Mottama (Martaban) and Bago (Pegu). Made wealthy from trade, the region’s ports teemed with Chinese, Indian and Southeast Asian traders, and later European, Persian and Abyssinian (Ethiopian) merchants. The area had strong links with Thai kingdoms and Sri Lanka. Invasions from Arakan, Ayutthaya (central Thailand), and central Myanmar resulted in the frequent movement of peoples. Bago briefly defeated the central Burmese kingdom in the 1740s, but was quickly reconquered and its distinct history marginalised.

The kingdom of Bago’s ‘Golden Age’ occurred under Queen Shin Saw Bu (reigned 1453 to 1472) and her successor King Dhammazedi (reigned 1472 to 1492). During this time, the kingdom developed strong ties with Sri Lanka and became an important Buddhist centre.

You get the idea. A blizzard of peoples, kingdoms, maps and history to process and understand, all of which is completely new to the average visitor.

Natural resources

Early on the exhibition shows us that Myanmar has always been rich in natural resources including jade, rubies and teak, cotton and oil. Thus the opening room or space has an impressive teak ‘steering chair’, a heavily lacquered mirror, and some amber earplugs (!).

That’s why the exhibition features, early on, an oil worker’s helmet – not because it is a beautiful object but it symbolises Myanmar’s abundance of resources. Myanmar is one of Southeast Asia’s oldest oil producers, with Chinese records dating Burmese oil wells to the 1200s (!). Originally monopolised by Burmese kings, oil became a major export under British colonial rule. During the Second World War, the retreating British army destroyed oil fields to prevent them from falling into the hands of the invading Japanese. The oil industry has still not recovered from this damage.

Talking of teak, the exhibition has been beautifully designed to convey a Burmese vibe, with each ‘room’ or exhibition space separated not by solid walls but by bannister partitions of dark brown teak wood. Not very obvious in my photo is the way empty parts of wall have projected onto them abstract patterns and designs of, presumably, Burmese origin. Then there’s the tinkling of the zither (see below) – all contributing to a gently subtle Burmese vibe.

Installation view of Burma to Myanmar @ the British Museum. Photo by the author

The name

Before British colonial rule (1826 to 1948), what we know as Myanmar today consisted of many different kingdoms, one of which was called ‘Myanma’ or ‘Bama’. ‘Burma’ became the country’s official unified name under the British. In 1989 the new military regime adopted the name ‘Union of Myanmar’.

Selected objects

King Dhammaraja Hussain’s coin

For instance, a coin shown in the exhibition issued by King Dhammaraja Hussain (reigned 1612 to 1622) of the Mrauk U kingdom in Arakan (now Rakhine State), is inscribed in Arakanese, Bengali and Persian and so shows the wide reach of that kingdom’s trade and political networks.

Silver coin issued by Dhammaraja Hussain, Myanmar (1612 to 1622) © 2023 The Trustees of the British Museum

King Alaungpaya’s golden letter

Rulers in central Myanmar came to dominate parts of the region between the 16th and 19th centuries, founding the largest empire in mainland Southeast Asia. King Alaungpaya (ruled 1752 to 1760) was the founder of the last Burmese dynasty in the Konbaung kingdom. Alaungpaya sent this letter to King George II of Great Britain as a royal diplomatic gesture between equal heads of state. It is made of gold, set with 24 rubies, and was housed in an elephant-tusk case, indicating the power and wealth of his expanding empire. It also graciously permits the British to use a local coastal port. Despite the importance the letter’s sumptuous materials conveyed, George viewed it as a curiosity and never replied, causing great offense. Today this is the only known letter of its kind. The letter is now a UNESCO ‘memory of the world’ object.

The Golden Letter of Alaungpaya (Konbaung period, 18th century) © Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Bibliothek – Niedersächsische Landesbibliothek, Hannover, Ms IV 751a

Ramayana wall hanging

Wall hanging (shwe-chi-doe or kalaga) illustrating scenes from the Ramayana The vibrant scenes exquisitely embroidered on this wall hanging are episodes from the Ramayana, an epic tale that originated in India and was adapted in parts of Southeast Asia. The Ramayana became popular at the Burmese court after the forced relocation of Thai theatre troupes there in 1767 and was performed around the country. Panels like this would have been hung as room dividers or backdrops.

Scenes from the Ramayana, Myanmar (detail) early 1900s © 2023 The Trustees of the British Museum

Shell letter

A shell ‘letter’ requesting the development of local infrastructure from 1907 written to the colonial government. The letter, written on pages of silk bound in a large shell and held in place by silver supports, is from the townspeople of Myeik (Mergui) to Lieutenant-Governor Herbert Thirkell White, asking for better infrastructure, including clean water, improved transport links, a bi-lingual science school and a hospital.

Buddhist reliquary

A gold Buddhist reliquary from the 1400s that demonstrates the religious connections between the kingdom of Hanthawaddy in lower Myanmar and Sri Lanka.

Blanket

An exceptional late 19th or early 20th century blanket from the Nung-Rawang people (one of the Kachin groups) of northern Myanmar. Its materials, patterning and weaving techniques demonstrate both the Nung-Rawang’s links with other Kachin groups, as well as their distinct cultural attributes.

Court robes

In a big display case are two striking court robes. One is the high-ranking Burmese military robe for the Atwinwun (Secretary of State). Its ‘cloud collar’ is an adaptation of Thai theatrical costumes based on court dress. In turn, the Thai court had based this collar on Chinese formal robes. The gold and silver embroidery seen here was a technique adapted from Indian textiles, which were a popular luxury import in Myanmar.

The other one dates from the period when kings from central Myanmar repeatedly attacked the kingdom of Ayutthaya (central Thailand), beginning in the 1560s. In 1767 the Burmese destroyed Ayutthaya, and thousands of people were forcibly relocated to central Myanmar, including artists, musicians, and dancers. At the Burmese court, Thai theatre troupes’ performances were greatly admired. Their costumes were copied as a new type of formal court dress, like this robe which includes Thai-style swags on the front-piece and flourishes at the shoulder.

You can see the second of these, along with numerous other examples, on this Pinterest page.

Shan map

A stunning map of several Shan states from the 1880s made to assist the British in the process of drawing hard borders with China. The states of Selan (black) and Nam Kham (red) became part of British Burma, while China’s Yunnan province absorbed Mong Mao (yellow).

Shan Map (about 1889) Reproduced by kind permission of the Syndics of Cambridge University Library

Modern green Burmese python

This iridescent ceramic serpent was produced by Soe Yu Nwe (born 1989), a Chinese-Myanmar artist, during her residency at the famous Jingdezhen kilns in China. The sculpture combines the artist’s Chinese zodiac sign with the Burmese belief that pythons are protectors of the Buddha, visually symbolising her unified identity.

Green Burmese Python (2018) © 2023 The Trustees of the British Museum courtesy of the artist, Soe Yu Nwe

A bust of General Aung San

General Aung San (1915 t o1947), was leader of the Burma Independence Army. He initially supported Japan to hasten independence from Britain, but after Japanese colonial intentions became clear, he agreed to fight with the Allies, provided talks for independence began after the war. Aung San is regarded as the founder of modern Burma, although he was assassinated by a political opponent just before independence.

Cartoons

In the colonial section is a selection of the kinds of crafts the British encouraged local craftspeople to make with a view to a steadily more international, globalising market, chairs and such. I was much more intrigued by a sequence of more modern works:

  • some watercolours by U Ba Nyan (1897–1945)
  • a poster advertising Sunlight Soap from an original painting by U Ba Nyan

And some Burmese cartoons! Apparently, cartooning became a highly appreciated art form in Burma in the early 20th century. Two of the main cartoonists were U Ba Gyan and the Muslim artist U Bagale, who satirised British and Burmese alike, while commenting on the unsettled period of the 1920s and 30s which saw rebellions against colonial rule, strikes and boycotts.

Find out more about Ba Gyan on Wikipedia.

Crocodile zither

The Mon people of lower Myanmar had strong cultural links with central Thailand, one expression of which is the crocodile zither. Although zithers exist across Southeast Asia, the reptilian shape is mostly found from lower Myanmar across to Cambodia. In Thailand and Cambodia, these zithers are highly stylised and abstracted. Only in lower Myanmar do they realistically resemble crocodiles. The zither would have had strings that ran the length of the crocodile’s back.

You can see it on the Royal Collection Trust website.

The exhibition features a one-minute audio loop of someone playing one of these zithers accompanied by a clapper and cymbals – the instruments that usually accompany it – performed by Saya Nai Kon Ha Ti from Duya Village, Ye Township, Mon State. To be perfectly honest, after about an hour in the presence of this endlessly looping 1-minute snippet, it began to get on my nerves.

Standing Buddha

Because of religious changes across the Buddhist world, the appearance, hand gestures and body positions of Burmese Buddha images shifted from about the 1840s. They became less elaborate and more naturalistic, and many were inlaid with coloured glass. Seated images in the gesture of enlightenment remained important, but new standing and reclining poses recalled other events in the Buddha’s life.

Standing Buddha (late nineteenth century) © 2023 The Trustees of the British Museum

Storage jar

The kingdom of Bago’s ports handled products like gems, teak, sugar, cotton, rice and cloth from across the region. By the 1500s, their trade networks had extended to Europe and Japan. Sturdy ceramic jars like this, produced for export in lower Myanmar, were used on trading ships, including Middle Eastern and European ones, to store goods, water and food. Major kilns making such stoneware were based at Mottama (Martaban) and Twante near Yangon.

Ceramic storage jar, Myanmar (1200 to 1500) © 2023 The Trustees of the British Museum

Thoughts

Challenging if not impossible to follow the convoluted pre-colonial history, but a fascinating and worthwhile overview of a country which remains a mystery to most of us in the West. Well done, British Museum.


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The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006 to 2008 (2009)

“All armies get it wrong at the beginning; the question is who adapts fastest.”
(British military historian Michael Howard quoted by Elliot Cohen, page 100)

‘All Americans make promises but nothing ever happens.’
Iraqi housewife complaining why there was still sewage in the street outside her house 5 years after the Americans invaded and promised to fix it (p.175)

Fiasco, a brief recap

Thomas E. Ricks won acclaim with his award-winning book, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, published in 2006. That book gave an extraordinarily detailed, high-level account of the mind-bogglingly stupid, arrogant, ignorant and incompetent decisions made by senior American officials (Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and under secretary of Defense for Policy, Douglas Feith) in the run-up to the March 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq.

Within a year it had been conclusively proven that a) Saddam had no weapons of mass destruction and b) had no links with al Qaeda, the Islamic terrorist organisation which carried out the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington. In other words, the instigators of the invasion (Cheney et al) had grossly misled the US political system, the media, the American public, and the world at large, via its utterly incorrect briefings at the United Nations.

Not just that, though. Ricks’s book is named Fiasco because he shows in excruciating detail, and with extraordinary access to senior officials in the Defence Department, State Department and, above all, the US military, how catastrophically bad decisions were taken all down the line, misjudgements and bad calls which led to the post-invasion ‘reconstruction’ of Iraq quickly degenerating into chaos out if which emerged the anti-occupation insurgency, alongside a civil war which developed between militias from the Sunni and Shia communities.

The stupidity can be boiled down to two main errors:

  1. Rumsfeld’s insistence that the invasion and occupation be carried out with far, far too few US troops on the ground; Ricks shows him consistently paring back Army estimates of how many troops on the ground would be needed
  2. the complete absence of a detailed plan for the reconstruction’ of Iraq, or even for the aftermath of the war, because the idiots in charge (Cheney et al) thought the Iraqi people would pick themselves up, return to work, set up a functioning government and rebuild their country using their own oil revenue, all within a couple of months of the overthrow of Saddam

These key assumptions and all the individual tactics and plans which were based on them – ‘the botched handling of the first three years of the war’ (p.116) – turned out to be disastrously wrong (p.102), but the entire situation was turned toxic when the man appointed as America’s viceroy in Iraq, head of the Coalition Provisional Authority L. Paul Bremer, took the intemperate (i.e. against a barrage of opposition and informed criticism) and catastrophic decisions:

  1. to deprive any member of Saddam’s ruling Ba’ath Party of their jobs, on the analogy of the denazification process applied to post-war Germany
  2. to disband the Iraqi Army, police and security services, with the naive idea that US forces would then train new ones, starting from scratch, inculcating democratic values etc

Thus, with the stroke of a pen, over 500,000 highly trained and motivated men and women lost their jobs, their careers and their incomes. After initial protests and appeals many of them went to form the core of the insurgent forces and militias which were to attack US forces and each other for the next 8 years.

More subtly, the Iraqi Army had provided a unifying force in a country made up of fractious ethnic and religious groups, namely (from south to north) Shia and Sunni Muslims, and the Kurds in the north. Removing one of Iraq’s core unifying institutions made the country’s collapse into disparate regions and ethnic civil war far more likely.

Add in the fact that Rumsfeld’s obstinate insistence on sending far fewer US troops than were required led, in the first days and weeks after the invasion, to Iraqi army barracks and ammunition dumps all over the country being left wide open to be looted by would-be terrorists, insurgents and militias, and you could hardly have created a more perfect recipe for a complete shitstorm.

And the shit really hit the fan when the steadily worsening security situation (i.e. widespread lawlessness, robberies, murders, rapes, attacks on occupation forces on a daily basis etc) crystallised into two contemporaneous uprisings: one among the followers of ‘radical’ Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, at first in the eastern slums of Baghdad and then spreading across the Shia south; at the same time as the mostly Sunni city of Falluja to the west of Baghdad was the scene of a massive uprising – both occurring in April and May 2004.

Suddenly the mostly US occupying forces were thrown into more intense urban fighting, with higher casualties, than in the initial invasion back in March and April 2003. And that was the point in the story – with the Fallujah and Sadr City risings – where Ricks ended his first book.

The Gamble

This book is by way of being the sequel to Fiasco, picking up exactly where its predecessor left off. It covers a very specific time period, from autumn 2005 to autumn 2008 – three years – and, although it is, like Fiasco, staggeringly detailed, with extraordinary access to senior military figures who talk with astonishing candour about the political and military foul-up the Americans had landed themselves in – it is, in a sense, a fairly simple story.

It describes the agonisingly slow process whereby senior figures in the US Army slowly came to realise that they were fighting the wrong kind of war. The occupying forces were continuing to fight a conventional war in which the aim is to identify your enemy (hopefully wearing a nice identifiable uniform) and kill as many of them, and degrade their military or civilian infrastructure to such an extent, that their leaders are forced to sign a peace treaty, and then You Have Won.

Only slowly, during the course of 2004 and 2005, did senior officers in the large unwieldy Army bureaucracy and the Pentagon, come to heed the voices that had been advising that the army was in fact fighting a completely different kind of conflict: it was battling an insurgency and thus had to completely switch tactics in order to implement a counterinsurgency.

The last 100 or so pages of Fiasco had, in fact, already expressed this idea at some length, repeatedly, and so there is quite a strong feeling of repetition about the start of The Gamble. Once again we are introduced to the gurus of counterinsurgency, from Lawrence of Arabia with his 27 Articles (1917), to the counterinsurgency manual of Frenchman David Galula, ‘Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice’ (1964), and John Nagl’s ‘Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam’ (2002) and then the 2007 paper, ‘Countering Global Insurgency’, by Australian soldier, David Kilcullen, which, amazingly enough, persuaded Petraeus to invite Kilcullen to come and work for him in Iraq as his counterinsurgency adviser.

Ricks repeats (and repeats again) the simple insight at the core of counterinsurgency theory which is that the population is the prize. Insurgents wear no uniforms, move freely among the general population, choose their own opportunities to emerge from the general population to mount ambushes, plant bombs and so on, before melting back into the crowd. They are able to do this in part because they terrorise the general population, often spending as much time killing their own fellow citizens for speaking against them or in any way helping the hated occupier.

So the only way to crush an insurgency is to separate the insurgents from the population and the only way to do that is to win over the general population to your side; and the way you do that is to break up the super-barracks the Americans had built around Iraq, and instead create scores of smaller posts embedded throughout the cities and towns; to patrol regularly and visibly; to create law and order on the streets. It is emphatically not to kick down the doors of then houses of suspected insurgents, terrify everyone inside and humiliate the man of the house in front of all his relatives; that merely adds one more fighter to the insurgency. The way to behave is with elaborate respect for all citizens, assure them of your protection, respect their culture (especially the sacrosanct nature of hospitality and the respect due to male heads of households, communities or tribes). Ditto detainees, who must be treated according to the Geneva Convention and legality.

Above all try to restore the sense of law and order on the streets – which the Americans had so decisively lost in the first few days of wild looting after the conquest of Baghdad – and protection for everyday citizens from violent criminals and homicidal militias.

Ricks’s narrative describes how these ideas were expressed by scattered officers, academics and teachers within the huge Army bureaucracy, and then were taken up by General David Petraeus who, through a series of complex political manoeuvres, was appointed commanding general of the Multi-National Force Iraq in February 2007 and then wangled the resources – i.e. extra money and five brigades of extra troops – to try and implement this complete turnaround in the Army’s policy.

The notable increase in soldiers on the ground came to be referred to, in the media and then more widely, as ‘the Surge’ and an awful lot, from President George Bush’s political career to the reputation of the US Army throughout the Middle East and around the world, came to rest on it.

That’s what the title refers to and the book describes: the enormity of the stakes involved in what amounted to a humongous gamble to try and wrest back control of an Iraq policy and an armed occupation which had spiralled out of control.

Failed hopes of handing over

My summary so far doesn’t refer to two other important points. From the end of the invasion phase in May 2003 onwards the administration (Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz) came to cling more and more desperately to two shibboleths: 1) that once the Americans had supervised elections and gotten a democratically elected government in place, the Iraqis would take over their own country; and 2) that this would be done via the Iraqi Army and police force which the Americans were training up. The mantra Bush kept repeating to the press was ‘We step down as they [the Iraqi security forces] step up’.

But both policies hit big snags. Not one but two elections were held in Iraq in 2005, in January and December, but had almost entirely negative consequences: The January one was to create a transitional government which would draft a constitution for a successive vote. But in January 1) much of the minority Sunni population boycotted them (voter turnout was as low as 2% in the Sunni Triangle of Al Anbar province) thus confirming what was likely anyway, which was that most elected officials and the government itself was dominated by Iraq’s Shia majority; 2) which, instead of defusing, crystallised and exacerbated sectarian divisions (and violence) across the country (p.32). Just during the January election there were more than 100 armed attacks on polling places including nine suicide bombers, killing at least 44 people.

(Reading statistic like this again and again and again and again makes you marvel at the Iraqis’ dedication and commitment to murdering as many of their fellow citizens, fellow Arabs and fellow Muslims as possible, and utterly screwing up their country as much as they could. It was the scale of the mayhem which prompted Petraeus’s adviser Emma Sky in 2007 to call Iraq a failing state, p.147.)

The same level of violence accompanied the December 2005 election, alongside accusations of fraud and vote-rigging, and extremist language from countless clerics denouncing democracy as an evil alien ideology. Just a few months later, on 22 February 2006, the bombing of the Golden Dome Mosque in Samarra, an important Shia shrine, really kicked off the hyper-violent sectarian conflict (p.32).

But while a violent civil war was kicking off, 3) it took Iraq’s squabbling political class five months to cobble together a ‘government of national unity’ under Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. a) The excruciating slowness of the process, while car bombs and murders and kidnappings ran out of control across the country disillusioned many with the concept of democracy, which just seemed to be a synonym for inaction and corruption, and b) al-Maliki was in hock to his Shia supporters and, in Ricks’s narrative, becomes part of the problem for protecting the Shia militias carrying our murderous ethnic cleansing of Baghdad’s Sunni districts.

In Sunni neighbourhoods that had been ethnically cleansed, patrolling soldiers often found piles of executed bodies and vacant houses with blood smeared on the walls.(p.166)

Far from solving the problem, the Shia-dominated government turned out to compound the problem. One example: the Ministry of Health employed Shia militiamen who murdered Sunnis who applied for medical care (p.156). Another example: American officials meeting Iraqi government ministers could never be sure whether the ministers had tipped off the militias who would then try to assassinate the Americans en route to the meeting (p.158). Not really the beacon of democracy Cheney and Rumsfeld swore Iraq would become in a matter of months.

The neo-conservatives’ other hope was that ‘as they stand up, we can stand down’ i.e. as the Iraqi Army and police were trained and began serving, the Americans could reduce their involvement and begin to draw down their forces i.e. leave. This assumption (like all the neo-cons’ assumptions) turned out to be grotesquely flawed because the Iraqi Army and police force turned out to be useless. Army units refused to deploy anywhere but their home district – Ricks describes several occasions on which newly qualified Army units mutinied, tore off their uniforms and deserted their barracks rather than be shipped to another part of the country to support or replace American forces. And they were caught up in the sectarian division of the country i.e. were Sunni or Shia first and Iraqis second. And the police in particular, as well as turning a blind eye to militias from their own ‘side’ were breath-takingly corrupt. In Baghdad US forces found they had to ban the Shia-dominated police from even entering Sunni areas where they were regarded as murderers (p.168), reminiscent of Northern Ireland and Yugoslavia where the security forces ceased to operate above the conflict but became completely identified with one side.

Both these strategies came, by the new boys (Petraeus and his commander in chief Ray Ordieno and their council of advisers) to be referred to pejoratively as ‘rushing to failure’. They had to be dropped.

So George Bush’s decision to acquiesce to mounting calls to change strategy in Iraq referred not only to a change of narrow military doctrine (from war to counterinsurgency) but a wider acknowledgement that the policy of waiting for Iraqi politicians and security forces to take charge of their own country was also not working.

Fastabend’s essay

General David Petraeus was appointed senior military leader Iraq early in 2007. Lt General Ray Ordieno was appointed his number 2, in charge of day to day operations. Major-General David Fastabend was appointed director of strategic operations to Petraeus. He wrote an essay listing some of the complete turnarounds in American policy which were required:

  • there was a hole in the centre of the Iraqi state where the government should be, providing law and order but wasn’t; the militias had stepped in to provide it but the Americans had to occupy that space
  • eliminate extremists not by killing them (more will spring up) but working with them; convert them from terrorists and militia into neighbourhood watches – this was pursued by putting over 100,000 former Sunni insurgents onto the US payroll as ‘the Sons of Iraq’ (p.204)
  • reach out to the radical firebrand oppositionist Shia leader Moqtada al-Sadr – this succeeded when al-Sadr declared a ceasefire in mid-2007 (p.201)
  • ignore the national politicians; work at regional and local level to reconcile Sunni and Shia

Another way of conceptualising the US failure in Iraq is that it fought the war it wanted and not the war that was needed. Dazzled by their status as sole superpower and shiny weaponry and sexy drones and laser-guided missiles and supercomputers, the Yanks thought their technological superiority guaranteed victory in any war. I.e. they lost sight of the fact that war is about people. And war in a catastrophically failed state is about working with the people, over the very long term, to rebuild the state one village, one town, one tribe, one region at a time. Long-term, low-tech, high manpower commitment. ‘Slow, ambiguous operations built not around technology but around human interactions’ (p.162).

America’s reluctance to commit troops and resources, its reluctance to lose even one soldier in combat, its reluctance to admit to itself that it is now an empire, is the subject of Michael Ignatieff’s incisive criticism in Empire Lite.

Points of interest

‘There are two kinds of plan, those that fail and those that just might work’ (p.159).

Rather than recap the entire narrative, I’ll select points of interest:

Ethnic cleansing

I hadn’t realised that in 2005, 2006 and 2007 the Iraqis were practicing ethnic cleansing identical to that in former Yugoslavia: in Baghdad in early 2006 Shia militias carried out car bomb attacks and massacres on Sunni communities and Sunni militias struck back on a daily basis killing 20, 30, 40 civilians every day.

Abbreviations

The group within the National Security Council lobbying for an increase in US troops in Iraq called themselves ‘the surgios‘.

MAMs = middle-aged males, an army category of detainee or prisoner (p.107).

AQI = al-Qaeda in Iraq.

Wasta – Iraqi term for clout, pull, connections, the power to get things done, which in turn generates respect.

Communitarian values

The Americans at all levels were obsessed with their own Western mindset of one-man, one-vote democracy based on the primacy of the atomised individualism produced by advanced capitalist societies. Iraqi society, on the contrary, was based around communitarian values based on respect and dignity, ‘dignity and respect, the core values of Iraqi culture’ (p.213). It took the Americans four years to understand this.

Stability over democracy

Part of the rethink was recalibrating the goals; instead of the Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz aim of setting up Iraq as a beacon of democracy and transforming the entire Middle East, the new Petraeus doctrine was to stop Iraq disintegrating into civil war which spilled over into a regional bloodbath (explained on p.164 and p.224).

Victory and Liberty were replaced as goals by stability and accommodation. Realistic minimalism of the army versus the maximalist rhetoric of the poltroon politicians. (Ahead of his April 2008 testimony to Congress Petraeus referred to himself as a ‘minimalist’, p.287.)

Stability became the goal. Controversially, this involved assessing whether ‘democracy’ contributed to or undermined ‘stability’ and it turned out to be the latter. In other words, the Americans talked their way round to understanding why a failing state like Iraq needs a strong, Saddam-like leader. In fact, American tacticians consulted with Iraqi leaders on just how Saddam had controlled his unruly population and began to borrow his techniques, for example siting many of the troops just outside Baghdad, which is where Saddam based his Revolutionary Guards. Odierno asks himself: ‘What would Saddam do?’ (p.165)

Doing deals

Similarly, a central plank of the surge, and prime cause why violence against US forces fell off, is because the Americans did deals with local Sunni leaders. Many were sick to death of the violence of (Sunni) al Qaeda in Iraq. Interrogations or just conversations with many former insurgents revealed that most of them were hard-up and planted bombs etc for as little as $10 a day. Petraeus organised schemes to take Sunni insurgents onto the payroll which eventually were costing $30 million a month.

But a criticism was that this was also a tactic undertaken by Saddam, who bought off tribal opponents with bribes, allowing sheikhs to create their own tribal armies complete with RPGs, AK47s and so on (p.216). Insoluble problems of Iraqi society.

Examples of Iraqi on Iraqi violence on pages 32, 180, 185, 186, 221, 228, 241.

Contractors

Ricks barely mentions the tens of thousands of security contractors who made a tidy living in Iraq, because they are outside the military and therefore his frame of reference. It is bleakly funny to learn that many contractors paid hefty bribes to local militias to ensure the safety of themselves and those they were protecting, and that the militias then used this money to buy more weapons and ammo to attack the conventional US army – Americans paying militias to kill Americans; terrific system (p.168). At the peak of the surge there were some 156,000 US troops in Iraq but this was beaten by the 180,000 contractors (p.187).

The JAMsters

JAM = Jaysh al-Mahdi, the militia of radical cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, responsible for widespread ethnic cleansing i.e. massacring Sunnis; its members nicknamed JAMsters by many Americans (p.173). Being Arabs, or Muslims, or Iraqis, or just angry young men, JAM factions often fought among themselves. Ricks describes a situation in the Hurriyah neighbourhood of Baghdad when four factions of Jaysh were fighting each other, being Noble JAM, Golden JAM, criminal JAM and ordinary JAM. The Americans called JAM HQ in Najaf and asked them to come and sort it out. This worked because they were paying the JAM authorities respect.

Fear is the key

In Blood and Belonging Michael Ignatieff explains how ethnic nationalism arises when you no longer trust the police or security services to protect you but instead start to fear they will persecute you. Fear is the key motivator, as when, in Iraq, the national police became indistinguishable from the Shiite militias. Who can you turn to to protect you? People like you, ‘your people’, from your tribe or clan or ethnicity or religion. Once this starts to happen it is a downward spiral into tit for tat killings which push communities further apart. Eventually all you can do is physically partition the rival sides to stop them killing each other. Ricks describes the Americans building high concrete blast walls around the remaining Sunni communities in Baghdad to stop Shiite militias carrying out attacks. Peace walls. He appears not to have heard of the similar walls built in Northern Irish cities in the 1980s, the policed checkpoints needed between Serb and Muslim parts of Kosovo (p.173).

Asked in November 2008 what one word best describes Iraq [Ambassador Ryan Crocker] didn’t hesitate: ‘Fear.’ (p.310)

The Brits

The British are only mentioned 3 or 4 times, in the most striking instance when a senior American officer says they’ve basically ‘lost’ in the South i.e. Basra (p.177). As of 28 February 2014 the number of UK personnel deployed to Iraq was 141,640. 179 British Armed Forces personnel or MOD civilians died. Yet by the summer of 2008 Ricks says the Brits had just 4,100 troops at Basra airport ‘doing almost nothing’ (p.268). The dismal British performance is analysed pages 277 to 289.

Darwinian evolution of the insurgents

The insurgents and militias were smart, learned American tactics and behaviours and how and when best to attack. US troops liked to joke that all the stupid and amateurish fighters had been killed off early in the insurgency, leaving the smartest and most adaptive to fight on, becoming steadily smarter and more effective (p.180).

Iraqification

In the kind of high-level conceptualisation which makes his journalism so enjoyable, Ricks suggests that the ‘surge’ (and deals with Sunni insurgents) of 2007 represented the Iraqification of the war. For four years the Americans had been trying to Americanise Iraq; now, at last, they realised they had to let Iraq be Iraq (bloody, tribal, violent) and let themselves be Iraqified (p.219).

Murder board

Petraeus prepared for his September 2007 appearance before Congress by having his inner team submit him to a ‘murder board’ i.e. hit him with the hardest, weaselest questions they could think of (p.245).

Sayings

Good tactics can’t fix a bad strategy (p.160).

An old military aphorism has it that amateurs talk tactics but professionals talk logistics (p.197).

Andrew Krepinevich’s law of the conservation of enemies: Never make more enemies at one time than you absolutely need to (p.223).

It is axiomatic in military affairs that every strength carries its own weakness (p.255).

The cost

By early 2008 the Iraq War, which Cheney, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz had said would pay for itself, had cost the United States $650 billion, at minimum (p.292).

Afterwards

There are two problems, not so much with the book itself as its place in modern history. The obvious one is that Ricks’s account stops at the end of 2008 (with an 8-page epilogue taking us up to late 2009) and with the whole situation in Iraq profoundly unresolved.

US forces were, in the event, to remain in the country until the very end of 2011 – but even then they left a country in crisis, with the supposedly democratically elected Shia government alienating much of the Sunni population. And this in any case proved to be a brief hiatus since, in summer 2014, US forces had to return to Iraq to combat the new threat of the Islamic State group, which declared a caliphate across parts of north-west Iraq and Syria. US forces were to remain in Iraq for a further seven years (!), from 2014 to 2021.

Written and published so close to the events it’s describing, I had the gnawing sense that The Gamble had been superseded by 15 years of subsequent events, and that therefore many of its judgments might have been rendered obsolete.

This seems particularly true of the second problem which is that, if you Google ‘counterinsurgency+iraq’ you get quite a few articles referring to the whole doctrine Ricks praises being discredited. This is a bummer because the final third of Fiasco is devoted to describing and praising counterinsurgency (COIN) as the way forward, and The Gamble is entirely premised on this military doctrine. If COIN has, indeed, been discredited, then so has the basis of both Ricks’s books.

Whatever detailed, modern (2023) assessments of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq conclude, there’s no doubt that they didn’t work in the sense of securing long-term security for their countries, especially Afghanistan, where we all saw the US-trained army and security forces collapse and the Taliban surge back to power in little more than a week in August 2021.

Four thoughts

1. The complexity of the US military machine

As Ricks introduces us to members of the US Army at all levels, of all ranks, in Iraq, back in the States, to serving generals and retired generals, members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to educators at West Point and Fort Leavenworth School of Advanced Military Studies, to officials within the White House, the Pentagon, the National Security Council and the State Department, to members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, all kinds of other bodies such as the Defence Policy Board, the American Enterprise Institute, the Iraq Study Group, as well as to academic experts on military history and strategy at place like the John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, to commentators and specialist journalists — he builds up a picture of the extraordinarily complicated ecosystem which makes up the US political-military machine. And that’s without mentioning the other two services, the air force and the navy which, of course, have their own vast bureaucracies and hierarchies.

Ricks’s narrative shows that, not only is the US military establishment huge and complex and byzantine, but it is riven with politics and personalities, arguments and ambition, rivalries and debates, which add elements of complication and confusion at every level from the White House downwards.

Reading Rick’s portrait of this vast, lumbering, multi-faceted behemoth helps you really understand how difficult it is to mount a campaign in the first place, and then helps explain the manifold failings and setbacks and false promises and crap strategies which the army of the richest country in the world keeps experiencing.

2. PhDs in the US military

As a footnote to the above, it is also a bit staggering how well educated a lot of these army types are. A lot of the army officers have degrees (impressive) but a surprising number also have PhDs (very impressive). Ricks lists the PhDs in the team Petraeus built around him on page 135. Reminding me of Michael Ignatieff’s comment in ‘The Lesser Evil’ that the US Army is overflowing with frustrated intellectuals. Who’d have thought.

So how does an organisation bulging with over-educated, cleverclogs manage to foul up so often? See point 1. I’ve worked for a number of UK government departments and agencies and have seen at first hand the magical, almost supernatural way in which, the more you fill a room with clever medium and senior-level managers, the dumber the discussion and the worse the outputs.

I personally have sat in a meeting of board members and the chief executive and watched them discussing results which I, the most junior person in the room, charged with monitoring the stats and producing weekl reports, knew to be factually incorrect or were being distorted for political reasons, both internal and external (I mean real politics, deriving from Cabinet and the government).

Should I, the lowliest person in the room, interrupt the presentation being given by the Head of Strategy to the Board and the Chief Executive, and thus embarrass my boss and his boss and his boss; be put on the spot in front of the entire board of the organisation; and with no alternative strategy to propose, just negatively pointing out errors and inaccuracies? Am I likely to speak up in that situation? No, and so I repeatedly watched decisions being boldly taken based on incorrect data and misleading stats.

This is why I enjoyed both Ricks’s books so much, because they really dig down into the psychological reasons behind clichéd expressions such as ‘bureaucratic inertia’ to show why that kind of thing arises and is so hard to combat in practice. It boils down to people being scared of stepping out of the groupthink, being the only one in the room to point out that the emperor is naked, of any sane person preferring to avoid ridicule and rejection, and so going along with decisions they know to be wrong.

3. Iraqi voices but no Iraqi perspective

It’s an obvious point, but this is the account of a man who has for decades been a leading journalist on the Pentagon and the US military. His contacts, his quotes, his grasp of the internal politics and debates within the US Army, the Defence Department, the State Department, the White House, are exceptional.

So there’s lots and lots and lots about the situation in Iraq and America’s military strategy in Iraq and bringing democracy to Iraq and making Iraq a free nation and rebuilding Iraq and the history of Iraq and the religious and ethnic groups of Iraq – all seen from an American point of view, by lots and lots and lots of well-educated US military – but actual voices of actual Iraqis?

Well, it would be false to say there aren’t any, there are – a fair number, in fact, al-Maliki is quoted a lot, as are his advisers, other politicians, al-Sadr, and numerous sheikhs. BUT they are all quoted commenting on American initiatives and American plans and American shortcomings. For a real sense of the Iraqi experience, Iraqi history, Iraq’s political, religious and ethnic challenges, how the Iraqis see it – you’d have to go elsewhere. At the moment I’ve no idea where.

4. Ethnic nationalism

Ricks’s narrative is about the Big Shift within the extended behemoth which is the US political-military machine from a mindset based on winning a war to the mindset of counterinsurgency, which he repeats again and again and again. But my reading of the situation he’s describing is heavily influenced by having just reread Michael Ignatieff’s books about ethnic nationalism and Anthony Loyd’s books about the wars in former Yugoslavia. So what I see is that, while Ricks is praising his heroes for turning the supertanker of American policy in a completely new direction, from 1. a strategy of war-winning to a completely different 2. strategy of counterinsurgency; in the meantime the situation had already passed that point into 3. a civil war between ethnic or religious groups (Sunni versus Shia).

You know the old joke about the late-Victorian British government’s attempts to solve ‘the Irish Question’, that every time the British government thought it had found an answer, the Irish changed the question. Same here. It’s more complicated than that, and Ricks knows more about Iraq than I ever will, but I wonder whether, while he praises Petraeus et al for moving from approach 1 to approach 2, the Iraqis had outmanoeuvred them by moving on to zone 3.

And the thing can be posited about civil wars, especially when they reflect profound ethnic or religious divisions – as in Bosnia or Northern Ireland or Sri Lanka or Sudan – that they are very, very difficult to end, not without partition of the country (as in Ireland and Sudan) or extermination of one party (as when the Sri Lankan government wiped out the Tamil Tigers).

Obviously a huge factor is the well-known leftist position that most of the countries in the Middle East, as in Africa, are the impractical creation of ignorant bureaucrats back in the capital cities of European Empires (especially the British and French) who drew arbitrary borders dividing homogeneous groups and forcing together into new ‘states’ ethnic and religious groups who have nothing in common.

Classically, such naturally fissiparous ‘states’ have to be held together by authoritarian leaders and, when those strongmen are removed, show a strong tendency to collapse into smaller units dominated by one or other ethnic or religious group. Thus Yugoslavia after Tito died. Thus Iraq after Saddam was overthrown. Thus Libya after Qaddafi’s ouster.

Part of the arrogant ignorance of Bush Junior, Cheney and Rumsfeld was thinking Iraq was like Nazi-occupied France; all you had to do was kick out the Nazis and an integrated European nation with a strong secular identity, a citizenry with advanced awareness of their civic rights and responsibilities, would revert to being a peaceful democracy.

But Michael Ignatieff’s visits to the trouble spots he chronicles in his books highlight the problem with this assumption. Ignatieff’s investigations show that such a sophisticated sense of political rights and duties, a widespread sense of civic responsibility, the complex matrix of what development experts call ‘civil society’, take centuries to develop and simply don’t exist in many, probably most, countries in the world.

The Americans removed the dictator and instead of getting a generation of keen young citizens springing up to create a vibrant democracy they got hundreds of thousands of angry militiamen, insurgents and terrorists whose main aim became to massacre as many of the infidel invader or their fellow citizens as possible, in an escalating cycle of tit-for-tat terrorist atrocities.

This sounds exactly like the Bosnia and Kosovo described so vividly by Ignatieff and Anthony Loyd, except so much worse, because exacerbated by the deeply tribal and clan-based nature of Arab culture. It isn’t just the Bosnians against the Serbs as in Yugoslavia; Ricks portrays Iraq as a land with thousands of tribes who all have feuds and vendettas against each other, where tribal or clan loyalty, religious and ethnic allegiance come a long, long way before any thought of the ‘democracy’ or ‘civil rights’ spouted by the invader and their corrupt politicians in faraway Baghdad.

  • ‘One of the mistakes we made early on was not understanding the importance of the tribes,’ Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno (p.110)
  • ‘Tribal society makes up the tectonic plates in Iraq on which everything rests,’ Brigadier General John Allen (p.219)
  • ‘the most powerful socio-cultural dynamic in Iraq, the tribal system…’ Adam Silverman, political adviser to a brigade of the 1st Armoured Division (p.329)

Which begs the really basic question: can such a society ever become a peaceful democracy, as we in the West know it? To which my short answer is, no. Ricks ends his book with a string of first-person testimony from US officers who worked closely with Iraqi politicians, senior police or army officers. Without exception they describe individuals steeped in intimidation, fear and violence who were just waiting for the Americans to leave so they could set about exterminating their enemies. Many of the experts he spoke to predicted a return to civil war, a military coup, or the rise of a Saddam-like dictator.

Here’s highlights of the current Foreign Office advice about travel to Iraq:

The Foreign Office advises against all travel to Iraq and all but essential travel to the Kurdish provinces…Protests [in Baghdad] can, and sometimes do, escalate into violence…Iraq remains subject to regional tensions…You should remain vigilant, have robust security arrangements and contingency plans in place…Terrorists are still very likely to try to carry out attacks in Iraq. You should remain vigilant…There’s also a high threat of kidnapping throughout the country, including from both Daesh and other terrorist and militant groups, which can be motivated by criminality or terrorism.

In a 2006 Senate debate conservative Republican Lindsey Graham said: ‘The American people are beginning to wonder if the Iraqi people can get this right.’ (quoted on page 59). The police chief of Fallujah, a former insurgent named Faisal Ismail al-Zobaie put it simply: ‘No democracy in Iraq. Ever.’ (p.209). Were they right?

Since then

So where is Iraq today? This article gives a brief overview of the current situation. Twenty years after the coalition invasion there are some 2,500 U.S. troops still in Iraq. According to the article this is for two reasons:

  1. to help Iraqi forces in ongoing conflict with the remnants of ISIL in the north-west
  2. to disrupt supply lines from Iran in the east through Iraq, to Lebanon and its ally there, Hezbollah, where Iranian arms could be used in Hezbollah’s ongoing conflict against Israel

Maybe it’s just an awful part of the world and people born in Iraq are condemned to live their entire lives in a violent country, plagued by terrorist atrocities, criminality and continual, low-level religious conflict. So far from the naive imaginings of Cheney, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz as to be surreal.

Iran

The darkly funniest thing about the whole sorry story is that Saddam’s Iraq had up till the invasion provided a strong, Sunni, Arab bulwark against the power of Shia Iran. With Iraq greatly weakened by the American invasion, Iran has been able to extend its power into Iraq (via tame Shiite politicians and militias) and onwards throughout the region. The biggest single outcome of the American invasion of Iraq has been the empowering of one of America’s bitterest enemies, Iran.

International affairs is undertaken by utopian idiots (Bush, Blair), sorted out by embattled realists (Petraeus), and provides endless black humour to armchair ironists (us).

Humanity

These are the best products of the richest, most powerful nation the world has ever known. Their net achievement? Stupidity leading to mind-boggling violence leading to complete strategic failure.

After immersing yourself in this swamp of arrogant incompetence I don’t see how anyone can believe the rhetoric you hear all the time about ‘combating climate change’ or ‘building a better, fairer world’. The richest, most powerful country in the world spent over a trillion dollars, lost thousands of lives, spent nearly 20 years, and still couldn’t even fix one medium-sized nation among the world’s 200 countries. Nobody is going to save us from our own stupidity.


Credit

The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006 to 2008 by Thomas E. Ricks was published by Penguin Books in 2009.

Related links

New World Disorder reviews

The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror by Michael Ignatieff (2004)

How should democracies respond to terrorist attacks? In particular, How much violence, secrecy and violations of human rights should a Western government deploy in order to safeguard a democratic state which, ironically, claims to deplore violence, secrecy and loudly promotes human rights?

How far can a democracy resort to these means without undermining and to some extent damaging the very values it claims to be defending?

How far can it go to deploy the lesser evil of abrogating some people’s human rights in order to ensure the greater good of ensuring the security and safety of the majority? These are the questions Ignatieff sets out to address in this book.

The book is based on a series of six lectures Ignatieff gave at the University of Edinburgh in 2003. Obviously the context for the lectures and their starting point was the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on America.

Historical context – the War on Terror

It’s difficult now to recreate the mood of hysteria which gripped so much public discourse in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. US President George W. Bush declared a War on Terror (18 September 2001) which justified major military attacks on Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom starting 7 October 2001), then Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom starting 20 March 2003), alongside combat operations in a number of other Muslim countries (the Philippines, Sudan et al). The US Congress passed a law allowing the President to declare war on anyone he thought was a threat. In his State of the Union speech, 29 January 2002, Bush singled out three likely contenders as the so-called ‘Axis of Evil’, being Iran, Iraq and North Korea.

Apart from the mismanagement of the two major wars, in Afghanistan and Iraq, the most contentious aspect of the so-called War on Terror became what many perceived to be the egregious breaches of human rights which a newly bullish America began to practice. Critics claimed the so-called war was in reality an excuse for creating a hi-tech surveillance state, for reducing civil liberties and infringing human rights.

Within a month of the 9/11 attacks the US government passed the Patriot Act which included three main provisions:

  • expanded surveillance abilities of law enforcement, including by tapping domestic and international phones
  • easier inter-agency communication to allow federal agencies to more effectively use all available resources in counter-terrorism efforts
  • increased penalties for terrorism crimes and an expanded list of activities which would qualify for terrorism charges

The law upset human rights groups on various grounds, for example, the powers given law enforcement agencies to search property and records without a warrant, consent, or even knowledge of the targets. But the single most contentious provision was its authorisation of indefinite detention without trial, which became associated with the notorious detention centre at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba,

Ignatieff’s approach

The lectures were given at the heart of this period (2003), 18 months into the War on Terror, as the Patriot Act was still being rolled out, just after the US government launched its invasion of Iraq (March 2003).

In his introduction Ignatieff makes the point that already, by 2003, there was a well-developed legalistic literature on all these issues. He is not going to add to that (he isn’t a lawyer). He wants to take a broader moral point of view, bringing in philosophical and even literary writers from the whole Western tradition, to try and set the present moment in a much broader cultural context.

My purpose is…to articulate what values we are trying to save from attack. (p.xvii)

It’s worth noting that at the time he wrote and delivered these lectures, Ignatieff was the director of the Carr Center for Human Rights at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. I.e. he didn’t have an amateur, journalistic interest in these issues, but was a senior academic expert in them.

Contents

The text is full of Ignatieff’s trademark complex, subtle and often agonised moral reflections, mixing reportage on contemporary politics with references to writers of the past, continually teasing out subtle and often very illuminating insights. At the same time, as I worked my way through the rather laborious networks of arguments, I began to have less and less confidence in his arguments. Fine words butter no parsnips and seminars on moral philosophy can go on forever. What were his practical conclusions and recommendations?

Chapter 1. Democracy and the Lesser Evil

Democracies have often deployed coercive measures, seeing them as the lesser evil deployed to avert the greater evil of terrorism, civil conflict and so on. But it requires that the measures can be justified publicly, subject to judicial review, and have sunset clauses i.e. fixed lengths so they don’t become permanent features of the society.

Government infringement of its citizens’ rights must be tested under adversarial review. This idea recurs again and again in the text. The defining feature of democracies is intricate sets of checks and balances. If some rights have to be abrogated during emergencies, these suspensions can still be independently tested, by judges, by independent advisers, and they will eventually have to be revealed to the citizens for ultimate approval.

There is a spectrum of opinions on suspending civil liberties. At one end, pure civil libertarians maintain that no violations of rights can ever be justified. At the other end, pragmatists eschew moral principles and judge restrictive legislation purely on practical outcomes. Ignatieff is somewhere in the middle, confident that actions which breach ‘foundational commitments to justice and dignity – torture, illegal detention, unlawful assassination’ – should be beyond the pale. But defining precisely what constitutes torture, which detentions are or are not legal, where killing is or is not justified, that’s the problem area.

If lawyers and politicians and intellectuals are going to bicker about these issues forever i.e. there will never be fixed and agreed definitions, the one thing all good democrats can rally round is ‘to strengthen the process of adversarial review‘ i.e. to put in place independent review of government measures.

Chapter 2. The Ethics of Emergency

If laws can be abridged and liberties suspended during an ’emergency’, what remains of their legitimacy in times of peace? If laws are rules, and emergencies make exceptions to theses rules, how can their authority survive once exceptions are made? (p.25)

Chapter 2 examines the impact the emergency suspensions of civil liberties has on the rule of law and civil rights. Does the emergency derogation of normal rights strengthen or weaken the rule of law which we pride ourselves on in the Western democracies?

Ignatieff takes the middle ground that suspension of rights does not destroy them or undermine the normal practice of them, indeed helps to preserve them – provided they are ‘temporary, publicly justified, and deployed only as a last resort.’

Chapter 3. The Weakness of the Strong

Why do liberal democracies to habitually over-react to terrorist threats? Why do we seem so quick to barter away our liberties? One way to explain it is that majorities (i.e. most of us) are happy to deprive small and relatively powerless minorities (in the War against Terror, Muslims and immigrants) of their rights in order to achieve ‘security’.

But our opponents have rights, too. Just as in the debate over freedom of speech, any fool can approve free speech which they agree with, it’s harder to fight for the right of people to say things you dislike or actively think are wrong. But that is the essence of free speech, that is its crucial test – allowing the expression of opinions and views you violently disagree with, believe are wrong and immoral. It is precisely these kinds of views we should make every effort to allow free expression. ‘I may not agree with what you have to say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it,’ as Voltaire famously put it.

It’s easy and uncontroversial to defend the human rights of poets and activists who protested against apartheid or communist oppression. Much harder to insist that detainees being grabbed in Iraq or Syria or anywhere else in the Arab world and flown half way round the world and who might well be members of al Qaeda or ISIL, are provided just the same level of legal representation and rights as you and me. But that is exactly the test of our commitment to human rights: whether we extend them to our bitterest enemies.

Same goes for the other elements in the system of checks and balances, namely the other wings of government, the courts and the media. The temptation and the tendency is for everybody to ‘rally round the flag’ but this is exactly the opposite of what ought to happen. The American constitution vests power in the Presidency to take extraordinary steps in times of crisis or war but that is precisely the moment when the other elements in the division of power should increase their oversight of executive actions.

In his searing indictment of America’s mismanagement of the war in Iraq, Thomas E Ricks makes just this point. The build-up to the war involved questionable evidence (about weapons of mass destruction), wrong assumptions (about the response of the Iraqi population to foreign invasion), criminal mismanagement and the complete absence of a plan for the aftermath. While describing all this in forensic detail, Ricks points out that this is precisely the point when the administration’s plans should have been subjected to intense and critical scrutiny, something which might have saved tens of thousands of lives, billions of money, untold materiel. Instead, in the atmosphere of hysterical patriotism which gripped America, Congress rolled over and approved the plans with little serious examination and the press turned into bombastic cheerleaders. Both miserably failed to live up to the roles assigned to them in a free democratic society.

In fact most of this chapter is taken up with a useful and informative history of terrorism as a political tactic, starting with the Nihilists in nineteenth century Russia, then onto the two great loci of political violence, in revolutionary Russia and Weimar Germany, before turning to post-war terrorism in Latin America (Chile, Colombia, Peru), in Sri Lanka, in Israel, before cycling back to Europe and the 1970s terrorism of the Baader-Meinhof Gang and the Red Brigades, before a brief consideration of the separatist/nationalist terrorism faced by Britain in Northern Ireland and Spain in the Basque Country.

Ignatieff’s summary from this brief conspectus is that terrorism never works, it never achieves its political aims. The Russian and Weimar regimes weren’t undone by political violence but by the cataclysm of World War One and the Great Depression, respectively. Marxist terrorism in 1970s Germany and Italy aimed to create media spectaculars and psychological tipping points whereby the population would be woken from their slumber, rise up and overthrow the repressive bourgeois state etc. Complete failure with the terrorists either committing suicide or publicly recanting.

In Latin America political terrorism either produced the exact opposite of what was intended, for example in Argentina, where it helped a repressive military junta into power. Or, as in Sri Lanka and some extent Israel, it became a stalemate that extended over such a long period of time that it became the social reality of the country, giving rise to a society characterised by random atrocities, intimidation of local populations by the terrorists, and repressive state apparatuses. The host society wasn’t liberated and transformed but permanently degraded.

Ignatieff then considers how the British, on the whole, managed the Northern Ireland situation successfully by abrogating various civil rights but under the aegis of government and judicial review.

But part of the reason his review of traditional terrorism is so enjoyable is because it’s so familiar from decades of print and TV journalism – but this itself highlights, I think, a weakness of the whole book: which is that the campaign of al Qaeda and related groups was not to achieve political change (like the Marxist terrorist groups of the 1970s) or to achieve constitutional change / nationalist independence (as with the Basques or, at the other end of the Europe, the Kurdish terrorist groups in Turkey). Those aims could both be handled in Ignatieff’s model i.e. carefully incorporated into the existing political structures.

By contrast Al Qaeda wanted to destroy the West not only as a goal in itself but as part of an even grander aim which was to undermine the contemporary world order of nation-states and re-create the historical umma, the worldwide community of Muslims that was once held together under the caliphate of the prophet Mohammed. Osama bin Laden identified America as the chief bulwark of the existing world order, especially in the Arab world, where it subsidised and underpinned repressive states. So as a first step to remodelling the world, bin Laden ordered his followers to attack Western targets anywhere, at any time.

Ignatieff was writing in 2003. We had yet to have the 2004 Madrid train bombings (193 dead), the 7/7 2005 attacks in London (56 dead), the Boston Marathon bombing on 15 April 2013 (3 dead), the 18 March 2015 attack on a beach in Tunisia (21 dead), the 13 November 2015 attack at the Bataclan theatre in Paris (90 dead), the Manchester Arena bombing on 22 May 2017 (23 dead), plus numerous other Islamist atrocities in countries further afield.

If the central aim of al Qaeda and its affiliates is to kill and maim as many Westerners as possible, it’s difficult to see how this can be incorporated into any kind of political process. And in the next chapter Ignatieff indeed concludes that the organisation itself can only be defeated militarily.

Chapter 4. The Strength of the Weak

An examination of terrorism itself.

In this chapter I want to distinguish among forms of terrorism, identify the political claims terrorists use to justify violence against civilians, and propose political strategies to defeat them (p.82)

Ignatieff considers terrorism the resort of groups who are suppressed and oppressed, who have no voice and no say in the power structures which rule over them. He gives a handy categorisation of six types of terrorism:

  1. insurrectionary terrorism aimed at the revolutionary overthrow of a state
  2. loner or issue terrorism, aimed at promoting a single cause
  3. liberation terrorism, aimed at the overthrow of a colonial regime
  4. separatist terrorism, aiming at independence for a subordinate ethnic or religious group within a state
  5. occupation terrorism, aimed at driving an occupying force from territory acquired through war or conquest
  6. global terrorism, aimed not at the liberation of a particular group, but at inflicting damage and humiliation on a global power

With the last one sounding like it’s been made up to describe al Qaeda-style hatred of America.

Terrorism presents a classic challenge for liberals, who have traditionally been on the side of the underdog and oppressed minorities, from the early trade unions to blacks under apartheid, and so often have an instinctive sympathy for the social or political or economic causes of terrorism but who, obviously, want to stop short of supporting actual acts of violence. Where do you draw the line?

Ignatieff says the only practical solution is to ensure that the oppressed always have peaceful political means to address their grievances. Purely military means cannot solve terrorism. It requires political solutions, above all bringing the voiceless into peaceful political processes. He doesn’t mention it but I think of how the warring factions in Northern Ireland were cajoled into joining a political ‘peace process’ which promised to take seriously the concerns of all sides and parties, to listen to all grievances and try to resolve them in a peaceful, political way.

Mrs Thatcher said ‘we do not talk to terrorists’ but, rather as with free speech, it is precisely the terrorists that you should be talking to, to figure out how their grievances can be addressed and the violence be brought to an end.

Thus even if al Qaeda’s values come from completely outside the modern framework of human rights, even if they base themselves on Islamic traditions of jihad and unrelenting war against the infidel, even if they cannot be reasoned with but only crushed militarily, this doesn’t prevent Ignatieff making the obvious point that we in the West can still bring pressure to bear on many authoritarian Arab regimes to try and remove the causes of grievance which drive young men into these causes. These would include overt American imperialism; repressive police policies which enact brutal violence and deny human rights; lack of pluralistic political systems i.e. which allow subaltern voices a say and some influence. And so on (pages 99 to 101).

The weak and oppressed must be given a peaceful political alternative that enables them to rise up against the violence exercised in their name. (p.106)

The Arab future

Trouble is, a lot of this kind of hopeful rhetoric was claimed for the movements of the so-called Arab Spring of 2011, when authoritarian regimes were overthrown in Libya, Egypt and nearly in Syria. Just a few years later it was clear that the ‘spring’ comprehensively failed: an even more authoritarian regime was in place in Egypt, Libya had split into warlord-run areas and a ruinous civil war had bedded down in Syria which would pave the way for the rise of ISIS.

Personally, I think the countries in that part of the world which aren’t lucky enough to be sitting on vast reserves of oil will be condemned to perpetual poverty and conflict, because of:

  • the lack of traditions of individual civic responsibility and the complex matrix of civil society organisations which make the Western countries stable as politically stable as they are;
  • as the main offshoot of the above – universal corruption
  • the entrenched political tradition of strong rulers invoking ethnic nationalism or Islamic models of rule or both (Nasser, Gaddafi, Saddam)
  • what Ignatieff calls ‘the corruption and decay of the Arab and Islamic political order’ (p.152)
  • the economic backwardness of most Arab countries i.e. preponderance of subsistence agriculture
  • widespread lack of education
  • marginalisation / lack of education or political rights for women
  • the extraordinary population explosion (when I first visited Egypt in 1981 it had a population of 45 million; now it’s 110 million) which ensures widespread poverty
  • and now, the speedy degradation of the environment by climate change (loss of water and agricultural land)

One or two of these would be tricky challenges enough. All of them together will ensure that most countries in the Arab world will remain breeding grounds for angry, aggrieved and unemployed young men who can be persuaded to carry out atrocities and terrorist acts against domestic or Western targets, for the foreseeable future.

Chapter 5. The Temptations of Nihilism

This chapter addresses the way that, in the absence of peaceful talks, terrorist campaigns tend to degenerate into destruction and killing for their own sake, as does the behaviour of the authorities and security services set to combat them. Tit-for-tat killing becomes an end in itself. Violence begets violence in a downward spiral.

This is the most serious ethical trap lying in wait in the long war on terror that stretches before us. (p.115)

Ignatieff realises that this well-observed tendency can be used by opponents of his notion of ‘the lesser evil’ i.e. the moderate and constantly scrutinised, temporary abrogation of human rights. Their argument goes that what begins as a high-minded, carefully defined and temporary ‘abrogation’ of human rights law has so often in the past degenerated into abuse, which then becomes standard practice, becomes institutionalised, and then causes permanent damage to the democracies which implemented it.

As you’d expect, Ignatieff meets this claim by breaking the threat down into categories, and then analysing them and the moral problems and issues they throw up.

First, though, he starts the chapter with some low-pressure, enjoyably colourful discussion of Dostoyevsky’s novel, The Possessed – which describes a terrorist group which takes over a remote Russian town – and then of Joseph Conrad’s novel, The Secret Agent, which features a nihilistic character named the Professor, who walks round London with an early version of a suicide vest.

Part of the chapter addresses the practical, administrative problem of preventing anti-terrorist campaigns from descending into violence. But, as mention of the novels suggest, he also explores (as far as anyone can) the psychology of the nihilistic terrorist i.e. people who just want to destroy, for no purpose, with no political aim, for destruction’s sake.

It can be an individual who wants to make a name for themselves through a spectacular, for example Timothy McVeigh who carried out the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing that killed 168 people and injured 680. Lone actors like this are always going to be very difficult to detect or deter.

Then he discusses the Japanese doomsday cult known as Aum Shinrikyo which carried out the deadly Tokyo subway sarin attack in 1995, killing 13 commuters, seriously injuring 54 and affecting 980 more. Terrorists who (claim to) represent an ethnic or nationalist cause can, in principle, be negotiated with for at least two reasons: one is that negotiations may hold out the hope that some at least of their goals may be achieved; the other, is that, insofar as they represent an ethnic group, a population, this population can be worked on to reject the group or moderate its behaviour.

With single actors or death cults, levers of negotiation and bargaining are obviously absent. Having established the key characteristics of these kinds of actors, Ignatieff moves on to a detailed consideration of al Qaeda. In his view it has twisted Islamic teachings so completely as to become a death cult. The 9/11 bombers didn’t leave demands or any way to negotiate – they just wanted to strike a blow at the West, specifically America, and that meant killing as many Americans as possible.

His analysis is on the brief side (there are, obviously, hundreds of books about bin Laden and al Qaeda) but, as usual, throws up fascinating insights and ideas. a) It is impossible to negotiate with a suicide bomber because being negotiated out of detonating is, by definition, a failure of the mission they’ve taken on.

b) More subtly, an organisation that sets out to use suicide bombing as a strategy cannot fail because it has no defined, workable political goals or aims. Bin Laden’s aim of clearing Westerners out of Arab lands, overthrowing the existing Arab states, recreating the 7th century caliphate and implementing Sharia law in full, is not a practical programme, it is a utopian millennarian vision. It is so impractical, it is such a long-term and enormous goal, that true believers can’t, in a sense, be demoralised.

c) And this is where the promise of immortality comes in. Once true believers are promised direct entry into heaven, they have ceased to be political actors and, in this narrow sense, Ignatieff defines them as fanatics.

He adds a distinct and fascinating idea which is that all death cults, and most terrorist groups, have to have a theory which discredits the idea of civilian innocence. Obviously blowing up a load of people going to work in their offices is murder. So, just as obviously, terrorists who do it have been re-educated or indoctrinated not to see it that way. The most basic route is for their ideological leaders to persuade them that nobody is innocent; that so-called ‘civilians’ are as guilty as the acts of repression or infidelity or murder as the armies or forces of their countries.

The Algerian National Liberation Front used this defence to justify blowing up cafes full of civilians as part of their ‘war’. Scores of other terrorist groups use the same justification, erasing the difference between the soldier (a figure defined and attributed specific rights and responsibilities under international convention going back at least as far as the Geneva Conventions) and the civilian (who, under human rights law, is not responsible in warfare and should not be a target).

But this works both ways. For when terrorists are embedded in local populations, emerging to ambush soldiers then disappearing back into the crowd, a tendency develops for those soldiers to come to hate the civilian population and take out their anger and frustration on them. Happened in Vietnam (My Lai etc), happened in Iraq (Haditha etc). And of course all such breakdowns of military discipline it play into the terrorists’ hands by getting the population to move over to support them. That’s why terrorists work hard to trigger them.

So, blurring the difference between soldier and civilian can be practiced by both terrorist and security forces and always heads in the same direction, towards ever-growing atrocity and massacre. Eventually both sides are murdering unarmed civilians, as happened in Bosnia and Kosovo.

Something which distinguishes us from the terrorists is that liberal democracies put huge value on human life, and this particularly applies to civilian human life. Therefore the kinds of massacres which US troops carried out in Vietnam and Iraq sully the reputation and undermine the meaning of liberal democracy itself. I.e. they drag us closer to the indiscriminate violence of our enemies.

These pictures of fanatical death cults are by way of preparing the way for the second half of the chapter which moves on to try and define precisely when two anti-human rights tactics may be used, namely selective assassination and torture. Ignatieff is not an absolutist or civil libertarian i.e. he reluctantly admits that, in addressing the kind of nihilistic fanatics he has described, assassination may be the only way to eliminate people you can’t bargain with, and that extremely ‘coercive’ interrogation may be necessary to extract information from fanatics which may save lives.

This is a detailed discussion of contentious issues, but the bottom line is Ignatieff things they may be permitted, but so long as his basic criteria are fulfilled, namely that they are a) approaches of last resort, after all else has been tried b) and that some kind of independent judicial review or oversight is in place. It is when these kind of policies turn into secret death squads that a rules-based liberal democracy starts to be in trouble.

Ignatieff repeats some familiar objections to torture, namely that it simply doesn’t work, that it produces intense hatred which can motivate those who survive and are released into going on to carry out atrocities, and it degrades those tasked with carrying it out. There’s evidence of post-traumatic stress disorder suffered by American operatives tasked with torturing during the War on Terror.

Typically, Ignatieff adds another point I’d never considered which is that there is a slippery slope from torture to plain murder. This may be for two reasons: the tortured may be converted by the process into such inveterate enemies of the state that their interrogators realise they will never be rehabilitated; and, more sinisterly, the torturers realise they can never release their victims because they themselves, will eventually be implicated i.e. the truth will out. Therefore it’s easier all round just to bump them off. Hence the ‘disappeared’ in South American dictatorships, all those detainees who, after extensive torture, were taken out in helicopters and thrown into the sea. Torture doesn’t just not work, create new enemies and degrade the torturers – it creates a problem of what to do with the tortured? A downward spiral all the way.

Chapter 6. Liberty and Armageddon

The book ends with a bleak discussion of what may happen as and when terrorists acquire weapons of mass destruction i.e. terror attacks on a devastating scale. Are our democracies strong enough to withstand such attacks? How can we strengthen our institutions to ensure that they are?

Ignatieff has a number of suggestions about how to prevent the proliferation of terrifying WMDs. But he comes back to his fundamental position which is that the way to defend and strengthen liberal democracies in the face of increased terrorist threats is to make them more liberal and democratic, not less.

Other thoughts

1. Internecine killing

The text is continually spinning off insights and ideas which I found distracted me from the main flow. For example, the notion that every terror campaign, sooner or later, with complete inevitability, ends up terrorising and killing people on their own side – moderates and ‘sell-outs’ and anybody in their ethnic group or repressed minority who threatens to engage in political discussion with the oppressors. In a sense, moderates are more threatening to a terrorist group than their overt enemy, the repressive state, which is why so many terrorist groups end up killing so many people on their own side (p.104).

2. The threshold of repugnance

The savagery of the Algerian fighters for independence in the 1950s left a permanent scar on the national psyche of all concerned so that when, 30 years after independence (1962) in 1992, the ruling elite disallowed an election which would have given power to the new radical Islamist party, the country very quickly descended into a savage civil war, with Islamic terrorists and government security forces both murdering unarmed civilians they considered guilty of aiding their opponents.

Both sides, with generational memories of the super-violence of the struggle for independence, invoked it and copied it in the new struggle. There was little or no threshold of repugnance to deter them (p.105). Violent civil wars set new lows of behaviour with after-comers can then invoke. The whole process ratchets ever downwards.

3. The world is watching

There’s plenty of evidence that if a movement judges that it needs the help of the outside world (of the ‘international community’ which Ignatieff is so sceptical about in his previous books) then it will tailor its behaviour accordingly. It will, in other words, try to restrain violence.

The African National Congress knew it had strong support across the Western world and put its faith in international pressure eventually bringing a settlement, so that its political leaders (and its defenders in the West) chose to play down the violence of the movement’s activist wings (which, as per rule 1, above, were mostly directed against their own i.e. the black community, witness the invention and widespread use of ‘necklacing).

In other words, the international community counts. It can exert pressure. It can use its leverage to turn liberation movements away from terrorist methods. Up to a point. As long as the movement is well organised, as the ANC was and is. At the other extreme is the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), little more than a rag-tag band of psychopaths, who led an 11-year ‘civil war’, little more than a campaign of terror against their own populations (as described in stomach-churning detail in Anthony Loyd’s book, ‘Another Bloody Love Letter’). They had nothing whatsoever to gain from outside influence except being shut down. So with nothing to lose, they continued their killing sprees for 11 long years (1991 to 2002).

At the other end of the organisational scale, Russia was able to carry out atrocities and conduct a war of total destruction in Chechnya because they know no-one was looking (it was almost impossible for foreign journalists to get in) and nobody cared (it wasn’t a location of strategic significance, no oil, none of the racial discrimination the West gets so worked up about) so mass murder proceeded with barely a ripple in the Western press.

These examples prove a general rule which is that the ‘international community’ can have some moderating influence on some insurgences, terrorist campaigns and wars (p.98).

Notes and thoughts

This is a complex and sophisticated book. The language of human rights often segues into discussion of particular conventions and international declarations in such a way that to really follow the discussion you have to be pretty familiar with these documents and laws and rules.

I also found some of the political concepts which Ignatieff routinely throws around quite obscure and unfamiliar – communitarianism, the conservative principle, adversarial justification, the decision cycle and so on.

I got along with his first political book, ‘Blood and Belonging’, very well. Ignatieff began his discussions with detailed descriptions of the political situations in half a dozen countries, giving plenty of colour and a good feel for the place, its history and issues and people, before getting on to the philosophical discussion, and only applied a handful of relatively simple ideas in order to shed light on the nationalist conflict he was covering.

This book is the opposite. It is sustained at a high academic level, continually introducing new concepts and making fine distinctions and drawing subtle conclusions, with only passing reference to real world examples. It sustains a level of abstraction which I eventually found exhausting. I wasn’t clever enough, or educated enough in the concepts which Ignatieff routinely throws around, to really make the most of it. Probably the best way to read it is one chapter at a time, going back and working through the logic of his argument, chewing over the tumble of clever conclusions. It’s certainly the most demanding of Ignatieff’s half dozen politics books.

Seven days later

Having pondered and revisited the book for a week, maybe I can offer a better description of how the text works. The best bits of ‘Blood and Belonging’ were where Ignatieff shed light on the psychology of different types of nationalism (especially the crude sort of ethnic nationalism which so quickly degenerates into violence).

The same is true here, as well. The best bit about, say, the chapter on nihilism, is Ignatieff’s categorisation of different types of terrorist psychology, and then his exploration of what each psychology is, how it comes about and works in practice. This is fascinating and hugely increases the reader’s understanding, especially when he applies the categories to real historical examples.

What I found harder going, where I think the book comes adrift, is when he moves on to discuss how ‘we’ in liberal democracies ought to deal with the new post-9/11 terrorism threat. It’s at this point, throughout the book, that he keeps using his concept of ‘the lesser evil’ i.e. we should, temporarily, and with supervision by some kind of objective person like a judge, abrogate some of our treasured human rights in some circumstances, where it’s absolutely necessary – it’s these passages, and the entire concept of ‘the lesser evil’, which I sometimes struggled to understand and never found completely clear or convincing.

Ignatieff’s categorisations and definitions of types of society or politics or terrorism, and his descriptions of the psychologies behind them, I found thrilling because they’re so incisive and instantly clarified my own thinking; whereas his discussions of the ‘morality’ of the political response to terrorism, I found confusing and unsatisfactory.


Credit

The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror by Michael Ignatieff was published by Vintage in 2004. All references are to the 2005 Edinburgh University Press paperback edition.

New world disorder reviews

The Age of Empire: 1875 to 1914 by Eric Hobsbawm (1987)

Summary

This is a very mixed bag of a book. The first quarter or so is a thrilling global overview of the main trends and developments in industrial capitalism during the period 1875 to 1914, containing a vast array of fascinating and often thrilling facts and figures. But then it mutates into a series of long, turgid, repetitive, portentous, banal and ultimately uninformative chapters about social change, the arts, sciences, social sciences and so on, which are dreadful.

And underlying it all is Hobsbawm’s unconcealed contempt for the nineteenth century ‘bourgeoisie’ and their ‘bourgeois society’, terms he uses so freely and with so little precision that they eventually degenerate into just being terms of abuse.

And in his goal of insulting the 19th century ‘bourgeoisie’ as much as possible, Hobsbawm glosses over a huge range of crucial differences – between nations and regions, between political and cultural and religious traditions, between parties and politicians, between classes and even periods, yoking a fact from 1880 to one from 1900, cherry-picking from a vast range of information in order to make his sweeping Marxist generalisations and support the tendentious argument that ‘bourgeois society’ was fated to collapse because of its numerous ‘contradictions’.

But when you really look hard at the ‘contradictions’ he’s talking about they become a lot less persuasive than he wants them to be, and his insistence that ‘bourgeois society’ was doomed to collapse in a welter of war and revolution comes to seem like the partisan, biased reporting of a man who is selective in his facts and slippery in his interpretations.

Eventually you feel like you are drowning in a sea of spiteful and tendentious generalisations. I would recommend literally any other book on the period as a better guide, for example:

It is symptomatic of Hobsbawm’s ignoring specificity, detail and precision in preference for sweeping generalisations about his hated ‘bourgeois society’, that in this book supposedly ‘about’ imperialism, he mentions the leading imperialist politician in the world’s leading imperialist nation, Joseph Chamberlain, precisely once, and the leading British cultural propagandist of imperialism, Rudyard Kipling, also only once. These feel like glaring omissions.

When I read this book as a student I was thrilled by its huge perspectives and confident generalisations and breezily Marxist approach. It was only decades later, when I read detailed books about the scramble for Africa, or late-imperial China, or really engaged with Kipling’s works, that I realised how little I actually understood about this period and how much I had been seriously misled by Hobsbawm’s fine-sounding but, in the end, inadequate, superficial and tendentiously misleading account.

Introduction

The Age of Empire is the third and final volume in Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm’s trilogy of books covering what he termed ‘the long nineteenth century’, from the outbreak of the French Revolution in 1798 to the start of the Great War in 1914. This third instalment covers the final 40 years, from 1875 to 1914.

In the previous book, The Age of Capital, Hobsbawm had amply demonstrated that he regards the third quarter of the nineteenth century as marking the triumph of the liberal ‘bourgeoisie’, of the ‘capitalist’ middle classes, in industry and technology and finance and politics and the arts.

Having seen off the attempt to overthrow existing regimes across continental Europe in the failed revolutions of 1848, the continent’s ruling classes experienced from 1850 onwards, a period of spectacular economic, technological, business and trade growth which continued on into the 1860s. This boom period was overseen by laissez-faire liberal governments in most countries and reflected in the widespread, optimistic belief that the steady stream of scientific, technological and industrial innovations would produce an endless progress upwards towards peace and prosperity. It was 25 years of what Hobsbawm insists on calling ‘liberal bourgeois triumph’.

It led to the confident conquest of the globe by the capitalist economy, carried by its characteristic class, the bourgeoisie, and under the banner of its characteristic intellectual expression, the ideology of liberalism. (p.9)

At the end of The Age of Capital he gave a short preview of what was coming up in the next era, and it is a major change in tone and subject. Whereas the pace of scientific and technological innovation accelerated, economically, politically and culturally the period which began around 1875 felt like a very different period, witnessing the collapse of much of the mid-century optimism.

Main features of the period

The Long Depression

The period witnessed a long depression, particularly in agriculture, which lasted from 1873 to 1896. A glut of agricultural produce led to a collapse in prices, rural poverty and loss of revenue for the landowning aristocracies. Cheaper food made life better for all those who lived in cities, so the overall impact was very mixed. Commentators at the time didn’t understand what had led to an apparent stalling in expansion and profits and historians have debated its precise causes ever since.

Protectionism

The Long Depression was the main trigger for many western governments to move rapidly from the mid-century free trade model associated with Liberalism towards protectionism, the imposition of protective tariffs on imports etc, especially by America.

New industries

The textile base of the first industrial revolution continued to be important (witness Britain’s huge exports of cotton to its captive markets in India) but the main industrial economies entered a new era driven by new sources of power (electricity and oil, turbines and the internal combustion engine), exploiting new, science-based materials (steel [which became a general index for industrialisation and modernisation, p.35], alloys, non-ferrous metals), accompanied by numerous discoveries in organic chemistry (for example, new dyes and ways of colouring which affected everything from army uniforms to high art).

Monopoly-capitalism

The depression and the consumer explosion led to small and medium-sized companies being replaced by large industrial corporations, cartels, trusts, monopolies (p.44).

New managerial class

The age of small factories run by their founders and family was eclipsed by the creation of huge industrial complexes themselves gathered into regions linked by communications and transport. Hobsbawm mentions the vast industrial conurbation taking shape in the Ruhr region of Germany or the growth of the steel industry around Pittsburgh in America. The point is that these operations became far too large for one man and his son to run; they required managers experienced at managing industrial operations at scale, and so this gave rise to a new class of high level managers and executives. And to the beginnings of management ‘theory’, epitomised by the work of Frederick Winslow Taylor (born 1865 in Pennsylvania) which introduced concepts like, to quote Wikipedia:

analysis; synthesis; logic; rationality; empiricism; work ethic; efficiency and elimination of waste; standardization of best practices; disdain for tradition preserved merely for its own sake or to protect the social status of particular workers with particular skill sets; the transformation of craft production into mass production; and knowledge transfer between workers and from workers into tools, processes, and documentation.

Population growth

Europe’s population rose from 290 million in 1870 to 435 million in 1910, America’s from 38.5 million to 92 million. (All told, America’s population multiplied over five times from 30 million in 1800 to 160 million by 1900.)

Consumer capitalism

This huge population explosion led to a rapid expansion of domestic consumer markets (p.53). There was still much widespread poverty in the cities, but there was also an ever-growing middle and lower-middle-class keen to assert its status through its possessions. This led to an fast-expanding market for cheap products, often produced by the new techniques of mass production, epitomised by the radical industrial organising of Henry Ford who launched his Model T automobile in 1907.

Department stores and chain stores

Another symbol of this explosion of consumer culture was the arrival of the department store and the chain store in the UK (p.29). For example, Thomas Lipton opened his first small grocery shop in Glasgow in 1871 and by 1899 had over 500 branches, selling the characteristic late-Victorian product, tea, imported from Ceylon (p.53; British tea consumption p.64).

Or take Whiteleys, which began as a fancy goods shop opened in 1863 at 31 Westbourne Grove by William Whiteley, employing two girls to serve and a boy to run errands. By 1867 it had expanded to a row of shops containing 17 separate departments. Whiteley continued to diversify into food and estate agency, building and decorating and by 1890 employed over 6,000 staff. Whiteleys awed contemporaries by its scale and regimentation: most of the staff lived in company-owned male and female dormitories, having to obey 176 rules and working 7 am to 11 pm, six days a week.

Mass advertising

The arrival of a mass consumer market for many goods and services led to an explosion in the new sector of advertising. Many writers and diarists of the time lament the explosion of ads in newspapers, magazines and, most egregious of all, on the new billboards and hoardings which started going up around cities.

The poster

Hoardings required posters. The modern poster was brought to a first pitch of perfection during what critics consider ‘the golden age of the poster’ in the 1890s (p.223) (something I learned a lot about at the current exhibition of the poster art of John Hassell at the Heath Robinson Museum in Pinner).

Hire purchase and modern finance

New ways for the financially squeezed lower middle classes to pay for all this were invented, notably hire-purchase or instalment payments (p.49).

New popular technologies

Entirely new technologies were invented during the 1880s and 1890s, the most notable being the internal combustion engine and the car, the bicycle, cinema, telephone, wireless and light bulb (pages 19 and 28 and 53).

Competition for resources

New discoveries in industrial chemistry and processes required more recherché raw materials – oil, rubber, rare metals such as manganese, tin and nickel (p.63). The booming consumer market also developed a taste for more exotic foodstuffs, specifically fruits, bananas, cocoa. (Apparently it was only during the 1880s that the banana became widely available and popular in the West.) Where was all this stuff found? In the non-European world.

Imperialism

Growing need for all these resources and crops led to increasing competition to seize territories which contained them. Hence the 1880s and 1890s are generally seen as the high point of Western imperialism, leading up to the so-called Scramble for Africa in the 1880s.

(Interestingly, Hobsbawm notes that the word ‘imperialism’, used in its modern sense, occurs nowhere in Karl Marx’s writings, and only became widely used in the 1890s, many commentators remarking [and complaining] about its sudden ubiquity, p.60.)

Globalisation

During the 1860s and 70s the world became for the first time fully ‘globalised’, via the power of trade and commerce, but also the physical ties of the Railway and the Telegraph (p.13).

The major fact about the nineteenth century is the creation of a single global economy, progressively reaching into the most remote corners of the world, an increasingly dense web of economic transactions, communications and movements of goods, money and people linking the developed countries with each other and with the undeveloped world. (p.62)

During the 1880s and 1890s this process was intensified due to the growth of direct competition between the powers for colonies and their raw materials. Until the 1870s Britain ruled the waves. During this decade international competition for territories to exploit for their raw resources and markets became more intense (p.51). Imperialism.

A world divided

The final mapping of the world, its naming and definitions, led inevitably to the division of the world into ‘developed’ and ‘undeveloped’ parts, into ‘the advanced and the backward’.

For contemporaries, the industrialised West had a duty to bring the benefits of civilisation and Christianity to the poor benighted peoples who lived in all the ‘undeveloped’ regions. Hobsbawm, with the benefit of hindsight, says that the representatives of the developed part almost always came as ‘conquerors’ to the undeveloped part whose populations thus became, in Hobsbawm’s phrase, ‘victims’ of international capitalism.

On this Marxist reading, the imperial conquerors always distorted local markets to suit themselves, reducing many populations to plantation labour reorganised to produce the raw materials the West required, and eagerly helped by the tiny minorities in each undeveloped country which were able to exploit the process and rise to the top as, generally, repressive local rulers (pages 31, 56, 59).

In the second half of the twentieth century, many nations which had finally thrown off the shackles of colonialism found themselves still ruled by the descendants of these collaborationist elites, who modelled themselves on their former western rulers and still ran their countries for the benefit of themselves and their foreign sponsors. Further, truly nationalist revolutions were required, of which the most significant, in my lifetime, was probably the overthrow of the American-backed Shah of Iran by Islamic revolutionaries in 1978.

New working class militancy

Working class militancy went into abeyance in the decades 1850 to 1875, politically defeated in 1848 and then made irrelevant by a general raising of living standards in the mid-century boom years, much to Marx and Engels’ disappointment.

But in the 1880s it came back with a vengeance. Across the developed world a new generation of educated workers led a resurgence in working class politics, fomented industrial unrest, and a significant increase in strikes. There was much optimistic theorising about the potential of a complete or ‘general’ strike to bring the entire system to a halt, preliminary to ushering in the joyful socialist paradise.

New socialist political parties, some established in the 1860s or 1870s, now found themselves accumulating mass membership and becoming real powers in the land, most notably the left-wing German Social Democratic Party, which was the biggest party in the Reichstag by 1912 (chapter 5 ‘Workers of the World’).

Incorporation of working class demands and parties into politics

The capitalist class and ‘its’ governments found themselves forced to accede to working class demands, intervening in industries to regulate pay and conditions, and to sketch out welfare state policies such as pensions and unemployment benefit.

Again, Germany led the way, with its Chancellor, Bismarck, implementing a surprisingly liberal series of laws designed to support workers, including a Health Insurance Bill (1883), an Accident Insurance Bill (1884), an Old Age and Disability Insurance Bill (1889) – although, as everyone knew, he did this chiefly to steal the thunder from the German socialist parties.

Whatever the motives, the increasing intervention by governments across Europe into the working hours, unemployment and pension arrangements of their working classes were all a world away from the laissez-faire policies of the 1850s and 60s. Classical liberalism thought the forces of the market should be left entirely to themselves and would ineluctably resolve all social problems. By the 1880s it was clear to everyone that this was not the case and had instead produced widespread immiseration and poverty which states needed to address, if only to ensure social stability, and to neutralise the growing threat from workers’ parties.

Populism and blood and soil nationalism

But the rise of newly class-conscious workers’ parties, often with explicit agendas to overthrow the existing ‘bourgeois’ arrangements of society, and often with an internationalist worldview, triggered an equal and opposite reaction: the birth of demagogic, anti-liberal and anti-socialist, populist parties.

These harnessed the tremendous late-century spread of a new kind of aggressive nationalism which emphasised blood and soil and national language and defined itself by excluding ‘outsiders. (Chapter 6 ‘Waving Flags: Nations and Nationalism’).

Some of these were harmless enough, like Cymru Fydd, founded in Wales in 1886. Some would lead to armed resistance, like the Basque National Party founded 1886. Some became embroiled in wider liberation struggles, such as the Irish Gaelic League founded 1893. When Theodor Herzl founded Zionism with a series of articles about a Jewish homeland in 1896 he can little have dreamed what a seismic affect his movement would have in the second half of the twentieth century.

But the point is that, from the time of the French Revolution through to the 1848 revolutions, nationalism had been associated with the political left, from La Patrie of the Jacobins through the ‘springtime of the peoples’ of the 1848 revolutionaries.

Somehow, during the 1870s and 80s, a new type of patriotism, more nationalistic and more aggressive to outsiders and entirely associated with the political Right, spread all across Europe.

Its most baleful legacy was the crystallisation of centuries-old European antisemitism into a new and more vicious form. Hobsbawm makes the interesting point that the Dreyfus Affair, 1894 to 1906, shocked liberals across Europe precisely because the way it split France down the middle revealed the ongoing presence of a stupid prejudice which bien-pensant liberals thought had been consigned to the Middle Ages, eclipsed during the Enlightenment, long buried.

Instead, here it was, back with a vengeance. Herzl wrote his Zionist articles partly in response to the Dreyfus Affair and to the advent of new right-wing parties such as Action Francaise, set up in 1898 in response to the issues of identity and nationhood thrown up by the affair. (In a way, maybe the Dreyfus Affair was comparable to the election of Donald Trump, which dismayed liberals right around the world by revealing the racist, know-nothing bigotry at the heart of what many people fondly and naively like to think of as a ‘progressive’ nation.)

But it wasn’t just the Jews who were affected. All sorts of minorities in countries and regions all across Europe found themselves victimised, their languages and dialects and cultural traditions under pressure or banned by (often newly founded) states keen to create their own versions of this new, late-century, blood and soil nationalism.

The National Question

In fact this late-nineteenth century, super-charged nationalism was such a powerful force that socialist parties all across Europe had to deal with the uncomfortable fact that it caught the imagination of many more members of the working classes than the socialism which the left-wing parties thought ought to be appealing to them.

Hobsbawm’s heroes Lenin and ‘the young Stalin’ (Stalin – yes, definitely a man to admire and emulate, Eric) were much concerned with the issue. In fact Stalin was asked by Lenin in 1913 to write a pamphlet clarifying the Bolsheviks’ position on the subject, Marxism and the National Question. Lenin’s concern reflected the fact that all across Europe the effort to unify the working class into a revolutionary whole was jeopardised by the way the masses were much more easily rallied in the name of nationalistic ambitions than the comprehensive and radical communist overthrow of society which the socialists dreamed of.

In the few years before Stalin wrote, the Social Democratic Party of Austria had disintegrated into autonomous German, Czech, Polish, Ruthenian, Italian and Slovene groupings, exemplifying the way what ought to be working class, socialist solidarity was increasingly undermined by the new nationalism.

Racism

Related to all these topics was widespread racism or, as Hobsbawm puts it:

  • Racism, whose central role in the nineteenth century cannot be overemphasised. (p.252)

This is the kind of sweeping generalisation which is both useful but questionable, at the same time. Presumably Hobsbawm means that racism was one of the dominant ideologies of the period, but where, exactly? In China? Paraguay? Samoa?

Obviously he means that racist beliefs grew increasingly dominant through all strands of ‘bourgeois’ Western ideology as the century progressed, but even this milder formulation is questionable. In Britain the Liberals consistently opposed imperialism. Many Christian denominations in all nations very powerfully opposed racism. For example, it was the incredibly dedicated work of the Quakers which underpinned Britain’s abolition of the slave trade in 1807.The missionaries who played such a vital role in funding expeditions into Africa did so to abolish the slave trade there and because they thought Africans were children of God, like us.

A key point of the Dreyfus Affair was not that it was a storming victory for antisemites but the reverse: it proved that a very large part of the French political and commenting classes, as well as the wider population, supported Dreyfus and condemned antisemitism.

It is one thing to make sweeping generalisations about the racism which underpinned and long outlasted the slave system in the American South, which Hobsbawm doesn’t hesitate to do. But surely, in the name of accuracy and real historical understanding, you have to point out the equal and opposite force of anti-racism among the well organised, well-funded and widely popular anti-slavery organisations, newspapers and politicians in the North.

I can see what Hobsbawm’s driving at: as the nineteenth century progressed two types of racism emerged ever more powerfully:

1. In Europe, accompanying the growth of late-century nationalism went an increasingly bitter and toxic animosity against, and contempt for, people identified as ‘outsiders’ to the key tenets nationalists included in their ideology (that members of the nation must speak the same language, practice the same religion, look the same etc), most obviously the Jews, but plenty of other ‘minorities’, especially in central and eastern Europe, suffered miserably. And the Armenians in Turkey, right at the end of Hobsbawm’s period.

2. In European colonies, the belief in the intrinsic racial superiority of white Europeans became increasingly widespread and was bolstered in the later period by the spread of various bastardised forms of Darwinism. (I’ve read in numerous accounts that the Indian Revolt of 1857 marked a watershed in British attitudes, with the new men put in charge maintaining a greater distance from their subjects than previously and how, over time, they came to rationalise this into an ideology of racial superiority.)

I don’t for a minute deny any of this. I’m just pointing out that Hobsbawm’s formulation is long on rousing rhetoric and short on any of the specifics about how racist ideology arose, was defined and played out in actual policies of particular western nations, in specific times and places – the kind of details which would be useful, which would aid our understanding.

And I couldn’t help reflecting that if he thinks racism was central to the 19th century, then what about the twentieth century? Surely the twentieth century eclipses the nineteenth on the scale of its racist ideologies and the terrible massacres it prompted, from the Armenian genocide, the Jewish Holocaust, the Nazi Ostplan to wipe out all the Slavs in Europe, the Japanese massacres in China, the anti-black racism which dominated much of American life, the Rwandan genocide, and so on.

Hobsbawm confidently writes about ‘the universal racism of the bourgeois world’ (p.289) but the claim, although containing lots of truth a) like lots of his other sweeping generalisations, tends to break down on closer investigation and b) elides the way that there were a lot of other things going on as well, just as there were in the twentieth century.

The New Woman

In 1894 Irish writer Sarah Grand used the term ‘new woman’ in an influential article, to refer to independent women seeking radical change and, in response, the English writer Ouida (Maria Louisa Rame) used the term as the title of a follow-up article (Wikipedia).

Hobsbawm devotes a chapter to the rise of women during the period 1875 to 1914. He makes a number of points:

Feminism

The number of feminists and suffragettes was always tiny, not least because they stood for issues which only interested middle-class women, then as now. The majority of British women were poor to very poor indeed, and most simply wanted better working and living conditions and pay. It was mostly upper-middle-class women who wanted the right to vote and access to the professions and universities like their fathers and brothers.

The more visible aspects of women’s emancipation were still largely confined to women of the middle class… In countries like Britain, where suffragism became a significant phenomenon, it measured the public strength of organised feminism, but in doing so it also revealed its major limitation, an appeal primarily confined to the middle class. (p.201)

Upper class feminism

It is indicative of the essentially upper-class nature of suffragism and feminism that the first woman to be elected to the UK House of Commons was Constance Georgine Gore-Booth, daughter of Sir Henry Gore-Booth, 5th Baronet, and Georgina, Lady Gore-Booth.

Nancy Astor

In fact, as an Irish Republican, Constance refused to attend Westminster, with the result that the first woman MP to actually sit in the House of Commons, was the American millionairess, Nancy Astor, who took her seat after winning a by-election for the Conservative Party in 1919. Formally titled Viscountess Astor, she lived with her American husband, Waldorf Astor, in a grand London house, No. 4 St. James’s Square, or spent time at the vast Cliveden House in Buckinghamshire which Waldorf’s father bought the couple as a wedding present. Hardly the stuff of social revolutions, is it? The exact opposite, in fact. Reinforcing wealth and privilege.

Rentier feminism

In the same way, a number of the most eminent women of the day lived off inherited money and allowances. They were rentiers, trustafarians aka parasites. When Virginia Woolf wrote that a woman writer needed ‘a room of her own’ what she actually meant was an income of about £500 a year, ideally provided by ‘the family’ i.e. Daddy. The long-running partnership of the founders of the left-wing Fabian Society, Beatrice and Sidney Webb, was based on the £1,000 a year settled on her by her father at her marriage i.e. derived from the labour of others, mostly working class men (p.185).

New secretarial jobs for women

Alongside the rise of a new managerial class, mentioned above, the 1880s and 1890s saw the rise of new secretarial and administrative roles, what Hobsbawm neatly calls ‘a tribute to the typewriter’ (p.201). In 1881 central and local government in Britain employed 7,000 women; by 1911 that number was 76,000. Many women went into these kinds of secretarial jobs, and also filled the jobs created by the spread of the new department and chain stores. So these years saw a broad social change as many middle-class and lower middle-class single women and wives were able to secure reasonable white collar jobs in ever-increasing numbers (p.200).

Women and education

Education began to be offered to the masses across Europe during the 1870s and 80s, with Britain’s patchy 1870 Education Act followed by an act making junior school education compulsory in 1890. Obviously this created a huge new demand for schoolteachers and this, also, was to become a profession which women dominated, a situation which continues to this day. (In the UK in 2019, 98% of all early years teachers are women, 86% of nursery and primary teachers are women, 65% of secondary teachers are women. Overall, 75.8% of all grades of school teacher in the UK are female).

Secretarial and admin, shop staff, and schoolteachers – the pattern of women dominating in these areas was set in the 1880s and 1890s and continues to this day (p.201).

Women and religion

Hobsbawm makes one last point about women during this period which is that many, many more women were actively involved in the Christian church than in feminist or left-wing politics: women were nuns, officiants in churches, and supporters of Christian parties.

Statistically the women who opted for the defence of their sex through piety enormously outnumbered those who opted for liberation. (p.210)

I was surprised to learn that many women in France were actively against the vote being given to women, because they already had a great deal of ‘soft’ social and cultural power under the existing system, and actively didn’t want to get drawn into the worlds of squabbling men, politics and the professions.

Even within the bourgeois liberal society, middle class and petty-bourgeois French women, far from foolish and not often given to gentle passivity, did not bother to support the cause of women’s suffrage in large numbers. (p.209)

Feminism, then as now, claimed to speak for all women, a claim which is very misleading. Many women were not feminists, and many women were actively anti-feminist in the sense that they devoutly believed in Christian, and specifically Catholic, values, which allotted women clear duties and responsibilities as wives and mothers in the home, but also gave them cultural capital, privileges and social power.

These anti-feminists were far from stupid. They realised that a shift to more secular or socialist models would actually deprive them of much of this soft power. Or they just opposed secular, socialist values. Just as more than 50% of white American women voted for Donald Trump in 2016 and did so again in 2020.

Sport

Hobsbawm mentions sport throughout the book. I knew that a lot of sports were given formal rules and their governing bodies founded during this era – the Football League founded in 1888, Rugby Football Union founded 1871, Lawn Tennis Association founded 1888. I knew that tennis and golf in particular quickly became associated with the comfortably off middle classes, as they still are to this day.

But I hadn’t realised that these sports were so very liberating for women. Hobsbawm includes posters of women playing golf and tennis and explains that clubs for these sports became acceptable meeting places for young women whose families could be confident they would be meeting ‘the right sort’ of middle class ‘people like them’. As to this day. The spread of these middle class sports significantly opened up the number of spaces where women had freedom and autonomy.

The bicycle

Another new device which was an important vehicle for women’s freedom was the bicycle, which spread very quickly after its initial development in the 1880s, creating bicycle clubs and competitions and magazines and shops across the industrialised world, particularly liberating for many middle class women whom it allowed to travel independently for the first time.

Victorian Women's Cyclewear: The Ingenious Fight Against Conventions - We Love Cycling magazine

The arts and sciences

I haven’t summarised Hobsbawm’s lengthy sections about the arts and literature because, as a literature graduate, I found them boring and obvious and clichéd (Wagner was a great composer but a bad man; the impressionists revolutionised art by painting out of doors etc).

Ditto the chapters about the hard and social sciences, which I found long-winded, boring and dated. In both Age of Capital and this volume, the first hundred pages describing the main technological and industrial developments of the period are by far the most interesting and exciting bits, and the texts go steadily downhill after that.


Credit

The Age of Empire: 1875 to 1914 by Eric Hobsbawm was published in 1975 by Weidenfeld and Nicholson. All references are to the 1985 Abacus paperback edition.

Hobsbawm reviews

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  • The Captive Mind by Czesław Miłosz (1953) A devastating indictment of the initial appeal and then appalling consequences of communism in Poland: ‘Mass purges in which so many good communists died, the lowering of the living standard of the citizens, the reduction of artists and scholars to the status of yes-men, the extermination of entire national groups…’

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  • The Battle for Spain by Antony Beevor (2006) Comprehensive account of the Spanish civil war with much detail on how the Stalin-backed Spanish communist party put more energy into eliminating its opponents on the Left than fighting the fascists, with the result that Franco won the civil war.
  • Homage to Catalonia by George Orwell (1938) Orwell’s eye-witness account of how the Stalin-backed communist party turned on its left-wing allies, specifically the Workers’ Party of Marxist Unification which Orwell was fighting with, and how he only just managed to escape arrest, interrogation and probable execution during the communist purges.

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Buddhism @ the British Library

Buddhism is a major exhibition at the British Library, bringing together objects and artefacts, folding books and scrolls and manuscripts, paintings and pictures, wall hangings early printed works, along with not one but two displays of the tools which have been used to make precious Buddhist scriptures for centuries, interspersed with half a dozen films (interviews with practicing Buddhists, demonstrations of chanting and praying, how the ancient texts are preserved nowadays), plus an enchanting video installation of a contemporary Buddhist artist painting holy texts on pavements and walls.

It’s a lot of information to take in at once. My review is in four parts:

  1. The life of the Buddha and Buddhism
  2. Myths and legends, preachings and practices
  3. The importance of numbers in Buddhism
  4. The exhibition itself

The life of Buddha and Buddhism

A copy of the Lotus Sūtra in a lavishly decorated scroll from Japan, written in gold and silver ink on indigo-dyed paper in 1636, one of the most popular and most influential Buddhist texts of Mahayana Buddhism © British Library Board

A brief outline of the Buddha and his teachings is relatively simple. Born into a royal family in what is now Nepal 2,500 years ago, young Prince Siddhārtha Gautama lived a coddled protected wife, which included undergoing an arranged marriage, and living entirely within the palace walls. However, he grew restless and managed to make several journeys into the big wide world where he was shocked for the first time to encounter poverty, hunger, decrepit old age and squalor.

He finally broke free from his gilded life and spent years wandering India, pondering the human condition and one day, seated under a bodhi tree, he achieved enlightenment.

‘Buddha’ is a title, which means ‘one who is awake’ in the sense of ‘having woken up to reality’.

He realised that the world is a bubble of transient appearances. Nothing lasts. All of us die and are reincarnated (here he was basing himself on far more ancient Hindu beliefs) back into this world of woe.

What causes all the pain and suffering? It is attachment to things of this world, it is desire, want, letting our physiological urges drive us to try and own or achieve things which are themselves only passing and delusory, which most of the time we fail to attain anyway.

Therefore, the secret of enlightenment, is to strive for a condition of complete detachment from the things of this world. One should begin by observing The Middle Way, not going to extremes of self-deprivation or sensual indulgence. But the techniques of the Middle Way will lead, ultimately, to complete detachment from the things of the world.

Only then will the enlightened one break free of the endless cycle of Samsara – of rebirth, suffering, death, and more rebirth – and their soul achieve nirvana.

Myths and legends surrounding the Buddha

The most comprehensive woodblock-printed work depicting and describing scenes from the life of the Buddha, including 208 beautiful hand-coloured illustrations from China, created in 1808 © British Library Board

If this is all there were to it, Buddhism really would be a simple belief system. But one of the most fascinating things about it is not its teachings per se, it is that so many teachings can be generated from such a simple premise.

An enormous number of legends grew up about Prince Gautama:

  • stretching back in time (for it turns out that he had been reincarnated many times before, hundreds of times before and each of those previous incarnations had had numerous adventures which are described in the Birth Stories or Jatakas
  • that he would be reincarnated in the future, in the figure called the Maitreya, to bring us all back to the True Way
  • and, moving away from the Prince himself, it turns out that the world has contained other holy ones, boddhisatvas, people are able to reach nirvana but delay doing so through compassion for suffering beings

Many texts were written about the Buddha’s sayings and teachings. These included a steadily growing number of his wonderful deeds and miracles. Monuments were built, stupas, where the relics of the Buddha himself or the lesser enlightened ones – effectively Buddhist saints – are buried, chief among the holy sites being the very Bodhi tree under which Siddhartha achieved enlightenment (where a vast temple complex was built in the third century BC, which is now a UNESCO World Heritage site).

There are four first-order holy sites related to the life of the Buddha (as there are a defined number of sites holy to the life of Mohamed and the life of Jesus) but countless others where various legendary events took place, as well as important events for the boddhisatvas, take the annual Procession of Buddha’s Tooth Relic in Sri Lanka.

The Hyakumantō darani or ‘One Million Pagoda Dharani,’ the oldest extant examples of printing in Japan and some of the earliest in the world, dating 764 to 770 CE © British Library Board

Monasteries were established, communal buildings for Buddhist monks. Elaborate ceremonies grew up to celebrate key dates in the Buddha’s life, and the monasteries required texts to guide and define the rituals as well as texts of teachings and doctrine for students to be taught and masters to meditate on (for example a long list of the Buddha’s many names which could be used for meditation). The monasteries also preserved and expanded on earlier written accounts of the Buddha’s life.

The exhibition includes a wall-sized animated map which shows the spread of Buddhism up into Afghanistan, east into China and then into south-east Asia. At the same time it developed into three major traditions which took flavour from the local cultures, and used the languages of the regions of Asia which they spread into:

  1. Theravada
  2. Mahayana
  3. Vajrayan

And by about this stage of the exhibition I had come a long way from the simple insight at the core of Buddhism and was beginning to feel overwhelmed by numbers.

The importance of numbers in Buddhism

A 7.6 metre-long 19th century Burmese illustrated manuscript detailing the early life of the Buddha, on display at the Library for the first time © British Library Board

The Buddha is one of the Three Jewels of Buddhism, the others being his teachings (Dharma) and the monastic order (Sangha).

The Buddha taught the Four Noble Truths:

  • life is unsatisfactory and there is suffering
  • the cause of suffering is desire
  • suffering can be overcome
  • this liberation is effected by following the Noble Eightfold Path

The Noble Eightfold Path consists of eight practices:

  • right view
  • right resolve
  • right speech
  • right conduct
  • right livelihood
  • right effort
  • right mindfulness
  • and right samadhi (meditative absorption)

The Noble Eightfold path is represented by the dharma wheel (dharmachakra) whose eight spokes represent the eight elements of the path (although a dharmachakra can also have 12, 24 or 31 spokes, representing other sets of holy values).

The Buddha’s first discourse was given in a deer park to five disciples who become the basis of the huge monastic orders which followed.

The Buddha had 547 previous lives all described in the Jataka tales.

The last ten Jatakas or Birth Stories about Buddha are popular in South-East Asia because they illustrate the ten perfections of a Buddha.

The Buddha’s footprint features 108 auspicious symbols such as royal insignia, mythical creatures, rivers, mountains and even continents.

Bodhisattva or Buddha-to-be is characterised by a set of paramita or perfections. The Pāli Canon, the Buddhavaṃsa of the Khuddaka Nikāya, lists ten perfections. Two of these virtues, mettā and upekkhā, also are brahmavihāras.

In Mahāyāna Buddhism, the Prajñapāramitā sūtras, the Lotus Sutra and a large number of other texts list a different list of six perfections.

The ‘pure illusory body’ is said to be endowed with six perfections (Sanskrit: ṣatpāramitā). The first four of these perfections are ‘skillful means’ practice while the last two are ‘wisdom’ practice.

In the Theravada tradition 28 Buddhas are believed to have appeared in the past and attained Nirvana. The Buddha we know about is the fourth Buddha of the present aeon.

Twenty four of these previous Buddhas gave advice to the Buddha we know about, and they are listed, quoted and depicted in countless manuscripts, illustrations and books.

Rebirths occur in the six realms of existence, three good realms (heavenly, demi-god, human) and three evil realms (animal, ghosts, hellish).

The six realms of rebirth are part of the 31 realms of existence. After death the soul passes through ten stages as described in the Sutra of the Ten Kings before entering the six realms of rebirth.

The mantra ‘Om Mani Padme Hum’ has six syllables, symbolising the six realms of rebirth.

There is a heavenly realm named Trayastrimsa with palaces, gardens and parks for the 33 gods who live there. Trayastrimsa is only one of the six heavens or celestial realms.

On Buddhist monasteries, of the Theravada tradition, a bhikkhu (male monk) is expected to follow all 227 rules of monastic disciple, while a bikkhuni (female monk) has to follow 311 rules.

The four dignities are ancient symbols that represent qualities of the windhorse, and are: Garuda, Dragon, Snow Lion, Tiger. Many prayer flags show the four dignities with a windhorse in the center.

The Pancharaksa identifies five female deities and includes spells and rituals to appease them. they are sometimes paired with the Five Wisdom Buddhas.

A monastic is allowed eight personal requisites: three robes in saffron or yellow, an alms bowl, a razor, a needle, a water strainer and a girdle.

Tibetan Buddhists make use of a particular set of eight auspicious symbols, ashtamangala, in household and public art, including the conch shell, the endless knot, a pair of fish, the lotus, the parasol, the vase, the Dharmachakra and the banner of victory.

Maybe you can appreciate why, by this point, I had begun to feel very confused. The basic idea of Buddhism, which I outlined at the top, had long gotten buried in a litter of legends and a bewildering variety of important numbers.

The exhibition itself

You have to like red. The high-ceilinged basement rooms of the Library’s gallery space have all been painted a deep blood red. It is like going down into a torture chamber or maybe a brothel in some red light district.

Installation view of Buddhism at the British Library. Very red

Except that the space is packed with display cases showing a very wide range of types of object – concertina books made of mulberry leaves and manuscripts and paintings and sculptures, bells and drinking bowls, manuscript writing tools and materials, a full calligraphy set, amulet boxes, offering bowls, manuscript cabinets, sacred scriptures written on tree bark, palm leaves, gold plates, illuminated texts and silk scrolls of the major sutras, a Buddhist protective jacket, a rare copy of the Tibetan Book of the Dead – it’s a feast of Buddhist texts and textures.

A rare Buddhist manuscript in the shape of a bar of gold from Thailand dated 1917, known as Sankhara bhajani kyam, going on display for the first time © British Library Board

TV monitors dot the exhibition showing interviews with current practicing Buddhists, techniques of manuscript conservation and a contemporary artist painting Buddhist texts in what I took to be Japanese letters.

At one point hidden loudspeakers are playing a loop which includes traditional Buddhist monk chanting interspersed with the sound of streams and birdsong.

I didn’t realise that the lotus is the symbol of the Buddha because lotus flowers often grow in pretty muddy, dirty ponds. So they symbolise a state of complete purity and calm which can be achieved despite the mind’s origins in the messy realities of the physical body.

The section on the physical technique of creating, writing, preserving and storing monastic texts was fascinating and set above or apart from the rather oppressive barrage of sacred numbers, a specialist sub-set of the overall subject which gave you interest and respect for the ancient craftspeople who dedicated their lives to preserving and beautifying the holy scriptures.

The display of materials and tools used to make the earliest Buddhist texts, at Buddhism at the British Library

Conclusion

I went intending to like this exhibition but, if I’m honest, I found it a bit difficult.

a) There’s so much factual content in it, from the outline of the core story, to the incredible profusion of legendary events which have accrued to it; the actual history of its spread and development throughout Asia, to over 20 countries.

b) A long and complicated history which is reflected in the sheer variety of items on display, from paintings, manuscripts and scrolls, through to the displays showing the tools used to make manuscript chests and so on.

But c) I think the thing which overwhelmed me was the sheer profusion of Holy Numbers and Perfections and Jatakas and the Three Jewels and the Eightfold Path, and so on. I quickly got lost and confused in the mathematical maze of Buddhist doctrine.

I felt overwhelmed by stuff when, ironically, I thought the whole point of Buddhism is to clear your head of clutter, and focus on your own existence, cleared of all distractions.

Still, if you’re at all interested in the subject, it is beautifully laid out, with its biography and legends and explanation of the teachings, its maps of Buddhism’s spread, its history, the techniques used to make its manuscripts, as well as beautiful objects like the metal statues of bodhisattvas, a monastery bell, and some exquisite carved chests.

As long as you like red!

Installation view of Buddhism at the British Library

The promo video


Related links

  • Buddhism continues at the British Library until 23 February 2020

Other British Library exhibitions