Agatha Christie: An English Mystery by Laura Thompson (2007)

Key facts

Agatha Christie was born Agatha Mary Clarissa Miller on 15 September 1890. So just add a ten to the year of publication of any of her books to get her age when it was published – ‘Murder on the Orient Express’ 1934: 34 + 10 = 44 (in fact 43, as it was published in January and she was born in September, but you get the basic idea).

The surname Christie derives from her first husband, Archie Christie, who she married on Christmas Eve 1914, as the First World War was settling in for the long haul (p.94).

In total Agatha Christie published 66 detective novels and 14 short story collections, as well as six non-detective novels under the pseudonym Mary Westmacott.

She created the famous fictional detectives Hercule Poirot and Miss Marple who have featured in countless movie and TV adaptations, not to mention radio, video games and graphic novels. Over 30 movies have been based on her works.

She wrote the world’s longest-running play, the murder mystery ‘The Mousetrap’, which has been performed in the West End of London since 1952.

She is the best-selling fiction writer of all time, her novels having sold more than two billion copies.

Her novel ‘And Then There Were None’ is the world’s best-selling mystery novel and one of the best-selling books of all time, and with over 100 million copies sold.

Childhood

Christie was born into a wealthy upper middle-class family in Torquay, Devon, and was largely home-schooled.

Frederick and Mary Boehmer

Her parents were an odd couple. Her mother, Clarissa ‘Clara’ Margaret Boehmer was born in Dublin in 1854 to British Army officer, Frederick Boehmer, and his wife Mary Ann West. Boehmer died in Jersey in 1863, leaving Mary to raise Clara and her brothers on a small income.

Nathaniel and Margaret Miller

Two weeks after Boehmer’s death, Mary’s sister, Margaret West, married the widowed American dry-goods merchant, Nathaniel Frary Miller.

Foster Clara

To help her impoverished widowed sister, Margaret and Nathaniel agreed to foster nine-year-old Clara Boehmer. In other words, at a very early age Clara was taken away from her mother and brothers and raised by her aunt and never ceased to regret it.

Frederick Miller

Now Nathaniel had a son, Frederick from his previous marriage. Fred was born in New York City and travelled extensively after leaving his Swiss boarding school, returned for visits as Clara grew up. In 1969 i.e. six years into this fostering arrangement, Nathaniel Miller, like Frederick Boehmer before him, died young, leaving Margaret a widow.

Frederick Miller marries Clara Boehmer

Fifteen years after Clara’s father died and nine years after Nathaniel Miller died, in 1878, this Frederick Miller, now 32, proposed to Clara, now 24, and she accepted. They were married in London in 1878.

Madge and Monty

Their first child, Margaret ‘Madge’ Frary, was born in Torquay in 1879. The second, Louis Montant ‘Monty’, was born in Morristown, New Jersey, in 1880, while the family was on an extended visit to the United States.

Fred and Clara buy Ashfield

When Fred’s father (and Clara’s foster father), Nathaniel, had died in 1869, he had left Clara £2,000, something like a quarter of a million in today’s money. In 1881 Fred and Clara used this to buy a villa in Torquay named Ashfield. It was here that their third and last child, Agatha, was born in 1890. Note the age difference between her elder siblings: Madge was 11 years older, Monty 10 years older.

Home schooling

Clara actively prevented Agatha from going to school, believing she should be home schooled. The result was Agatha largely taught herself, not least by voraciously reading everything in her father’s library.

Fred Miller dies

In 1901 Agatha’s cheerful, lazy father Fred died from pneumonia and chronic kidney disease. Christie later said that her father’s death when she was 11 marked the end of her childhood. Two points about this:

1) Fred never worked a day in his life and cheerfully lived off investments. However, income from these had steadily declines, with suspicions of embezzlement or sharp dealing by his American trustees. Whatever the precise reason, Fred’s death left Clara severely straitened for funds. Not that impoverished – she could still afford the upkeep of Ashfield and some servants but could no longer afford to entertain or maintain the traditional upper middle class lifestyle (p.58).

The matriarchy

The other point is The Matriarchy. All these men died young, and the womenfolk lived on with the result that Agatha was raised in a household of women (Clara and Madge), and made regular visits to her great-aunt the ‘magnificent’ (p.77) Margaret Miller in Ealing and maternal grandmother Mary Boehmer in Bayswater.

Nice old ladies

There are dashing young chaps in her novels, older professional men such as judges and police and so on, but I think Agatha’s upbringing in a matriarchy left a strong impression on her fictional world. Her novels abound with highly enjoyable older women, Miss Marple just being the most obvious. The utterly conventional values attributed to characters like Miss Marple or Miss Peabody or numerous others, have such warm-hearted authority because they are, in fact, the values of the utterly conventional Agatha.

  • Miss Jane Marple – elderly spinster who lives in the village of St. Mary Mead
  • Mrs Price Ridley, Miss Wetherby, Miss Hartnell – Miss Marple’s three friends who make up the quartet of old ladies in St. Mary Mead, in the first Miss Marple book, ‘Murder at the Vicarage’
  • Mrs Harfield – who Katherine Grey is a companion to (The Mystery of the Blue Train)
  • Miss Lavinia Pinkerton – suspects there is a murderer at work in the village of Wychwood under Ashe (Murder Is Easy)
  • Miss Caroline Peabody – tubby, sharp and witty spinster lives at Morton Manor, and is the oldest resident of Market Basing (Dumb Witness)

Laura Thompson on Agatha’s childhood

It’s Agatha’s childhood, girlhood and teenage years, mostly spent at the women’s family home of Ashfield, which Laura Thompson’s biography really dwells on. It gives a vivid and sympathetic portrait of a late-Victorian childhood and a girl growing into a young woman during the Edwardian decade, raised with traditional values which Thompson clearly sympathises with.

Music

Music for a while was a passion. Agatha learned piano as a girl and as a teenager took singing lessons to a very high standard. Thompson has page after page quoting Agatha’s diary and letters and the autobiography she wrote at the end of her life to describe her intoxication with music. She had a classic late-Victorian sensibility, with lots of vapouring about beauty, fancy dress balls where people dressed as characters out of Tennyson, she had a lifelong love of Wagner’s music (Wagner died in 1883, so by the 1910s when she was in love with it, it was 30 or more years out of date) (p.61).

Paris

In 1905, Clara sent Agatha to Paris, where she was educated in a series of pensionnats (boarding schools), focusing on voice training and piano playing. She was very good at both but not good enough to take them up professionally. Agatha stayed in Paris for nearly two years. Presumably this influenced the nationality of her greatest creation, Hercule Poirot – not the fact that he’s Belgian so much as Agatha’s confidence in rendering his French speech patterns.

Conventional

Thompson tried to make much of her heroine’s intelligence and Agatha was fluent and articulate and thoughtful, there’s lots of works and autobiography to quote from –but all of it is second rate. There is nothing about ideas or challenging books she read or intellectual pursuits. Instead, as she hit 18 and ‘came out’ to society, Agatha spent all her time going to parties and dances and concerts, amateur theatricals and attending fox hunts (p.64), flirting with large numbers of eligible young men, endlessly discussing their merits with her watchful mother, Clara.

As to her beliefs, she was a run of the mill, ordinary, devout Anglican. As to feminism and women’s rights, Agatha thought it was her role and fate in life to get married. That’s what women of her age and class did, and she never changed her view.

So it’s no surprise to learn that she was a lifelong Conservative voter (p.353).

The Mary Westmacott novels

In describing Agatha’s early years, Thompson draws heavily on the set of six Westmacott novels. Christie was so unstoppably prolific that alongside her murder mysteries she wrote six ‘ordinary’ non-detective novels, about love and relationships etc, sometimes described as ‘romantic’ novels’. They gave her ‘the chance to better explore the human psychology she was so intrigued by, freed from the expectations of her mystery fans’ as her grand-daughter explained.

To distinguish them from the murder mysteries she came up with a nom be plume based on her own middle name (Mary), Westmacott being the blandly English name of some distant relatives. The six Westmacott novels are:

  • Giant’s Bread (1930)
  • Unfinished Portrait (1934)
  • Absent in the Spring (1944) – she wrote this in less than a week!
  • The Rose and the Yew Tree (1947)
  • A Daughter’s a Daughter (1952)
  • The Burden (1956)

Thompson quotes from them extensively. Thus ‘Giant’s Bread’ concerns a sensitive young musician named Vernon Deyre, and Thompson reckons Christie poured into it a lot of her own feelings for classical music, for studying, practicing and performing; and similarly with autobiographical elements of the other books.

Marrying off Agatha

Clara had successfully married Madge off in 1902 to James Watt who had taken her off to his family home in the Midlands. Monty had joined the army and was posted overseas. What about Agatha? For Clara, and Agatha herself, adulthood meant marriage.

1907 to 1908: Trip to Egypt

Clara decided to spend the winter of 1907 to 1908 in the warm climate of Egypt, which was then a regular tourist destination for wealthy Britons. They stayed for three months at the Gezirah Palace Hotel in Cairo. Christie attended many dances and other social functions; she particularly enjoyed watching amateur polo matches.

First story

At 18 Agatha wrote her first short story, ‘The House of Beauty’, while recovering in bed from an illness. It was 6,000 words about ‘madness and dreams’. Her imagination had a decidedly Gothic turn. Subsequent stories dealt with spiritualism and the paranormal. Some of this lingered on into her mature novels, such as the powerful séance scene at the start of The Sittaford Mystery (p.78).

1909: first novel

Around the same time, in 1909 Christie wrote on her first novel, ‘Snow Upon the Desert’ based, predictably enough, on the winter she’d just spent in Egypt (p.67).

Conventional

Agatha was utterly conventional. About everything she had ‘the conventional, sensible attitude’ (p.116). As she came out, aged 18, she took to a life of country house parties, riding, hunting and countless dances, and numerous flirtations with eligible men.

‘Cairo meant nothing to me – girls between eighteen and twenty-one seldom thought of anything but young men’ (Agatha’s Autobiography, quoted p.68)

She had short-lived relationships with four men and an engagement to another (p.74). And Laura Thompson comes over as every bit as conventional, expecting no depths or insights from her heroine. She writes so well about Agatha’s life because she functions at the same shallow, Readers’ Digest level.

It was delight, all of it; the life that any normal, healthy, attractive, young girl would want to live (p.60)

1912: Archie Christie

In October 1912 she was introduced to Archibald ‘Archie’ Christie at a dance given by Lord and Lady Clifford at Ugbrooke, 12 miles from Torquay (p.73). The son of a barrister in the Indian Civil Service and an Irishwoman Ellen, known as Peg, Archie was a year older than Agatha (born September 1880). He was a Royal Artillery officer who was seconded to the Royal Flying Corps in April 1913.

Archie proposes

The couple quickly fell in love. Three months after their first meeting, Archie proposed marriage, and Agatha accepted. (She was something of a pro at all this, having already received three proposals of marriage, and actually being engaged to someone else when Archie proposed, to one Reggie Lucy, p.79.)

Anti-feminism

‘I hate a slobbering female,’ said Miss Percehouse. ‘I like one who gets up and does things.’
(The Sittaford Mystery, Chapter 17)

A naive feminist like Lucy Worsley thinks Agatha is a feminist heroine, but Christie was expressly anti feminist in both the tendency of her characters and stories, and explicitly, in her letters and autobiography – in fact anywhere and everywhere she could express an opinion.

Satirising feminist characters

The novels feature a number of loud-mouthed feminists who Agatha heartily satirises, boomingly women’s libbers like Lady Westholme in ‘Appointment with Death’ or the pretentious (and alcoholic) feminist author Salome Otterbourne in ‘Death on the Nile’. Rather:

[Christie] had a deep regard for working women. Not the strident ones who waved the feminist flag, like the politician Lady Westholme in ‘Appointment with Death’, proclaiming that ‘If anything is to be accomplished, mark my words, it is women who will do it’… (p.85)

Agatha’s anti-feminist attitudes

Pages 83 to 84 are just some of the many where Thompson makes crystal clear how utterly conventional Agatha was in her notions of gender roles. It was a woman’s responsibility to get married. She never considered a career of any kind. I’m going to quote from these pages to really convey the flavour.

To Agatha [marrying Archie] was fate; it was her female destiny. Having been brought up to express herself in any way she chose, she expected only to marry. This was her upbringing, which she had no urge to question. Girls of her sort did not have careers. They had husbands.

Agatha, despite her extraordinary achievements, would always assert that a career was a man’s job – ‘Men have much better brains than women, don’t you think?’ was a typical comment – and that the true value of a woman lay within the personal arena.

‘It makes me feel that, after all, I have not been a failure in life – that I have succeeded as a wife,’ she wrote to her second husband, Max, in 1943.

So as a girl she never chafed against the limits of her life: the conventions, the corsets, the need to speak low or sing to a teddy bear. Unlike her near-contemporary Dorothy L. Sayers – who, at the time of Agatha’s entry into the marriage market, was chewing the intellectual fat over cocoa at Somerville [college] – she had no desire to break free. She felt free anyway.

For all that she loved the novels of May Sinclair, she shared none of her feminist concerns. The frustrations of a girl like Vera Brittain, then at Oxford with Sayers, whose Testament of Youth rages against the male-dominated conventions of the time, would have been utterly remote from her.

The truth is that she liked a man’s world. She saw beyond it, although not in a political sense; later she would live beyond it, with her success and self-sufficiency; yet she loved being female and never felt circumscribed by her sex. She had grown up in a matriarchy after all. And she understood – as ‘cleverer’ girls perhaps do not – that female strength could show itself in many different ways… (pages 83 to 84)

Romantic love

Thompson has page after page after page describing Agatha’s initial love for Archie. Although her mother instantly saw the danger that he was a) selfish and b) attractive to other women, Agatha (who Thompson repeatedly tells us was immature and still basically ‘a girl’) saw the whole situation in Victorian terms, as something out of Tennyson, she as the pure-hearted lady Elaine cleaving to her handsome Sir Lancelot etc etc. He was ‘her dream come true’.

1914: VAD

When the war broke out Archie was sent to France almost immediately and Agatha hastened to join up as a nurse in a VAD:

Voluntary Aid Detachments (VADs) were organizations that provided support to the military during World War I. These detachments, formed by the British Red Cross and the Order of St. John, played a vital role in staffing hospitals and providing various services like nursing, cooking, and general aid.

Doctors

Dr Lord approached the bed, Nurse O’Brien fluttering behind him. Mrs Welman said with a twinkle: ‘Going through the usual bag of tricks, Doctor: pulse, respiration, temperature? What humbugs you doctors are!’
(Sad Cypress, part 1, chapter 5)

As a nurse Agatha saw at first hand how pompous and incompetent many doctors are. There’s a police doctor in most of the murder mysteries, but some doctor characters play larger roles and, by and large, they’re pretty unflattering characters.

  • The Mysterious Affair at Styles – Dr Bauerstein, sinister
  • The Murder of Roger Ackroyd – Dr Sheppard, the murderer
  • Why Didn’t They Ask Evens? – Dr Nicholson, a sinister drug addict
  • Murder is Easy – Dr Thomas
  • Cards on the Table – Dr Donaldson
  • The Sittaford Mystery – Dr Warren
  • And Then There Were None – Dr Armstrong, the murderer

Thompson describes Agatha as being as unflappable and sound in her work as a nurse, calmly describing the amputations, the severed limbs, the crying men, briskly getting on with the work (p.94). This is very much of a piece with the attitude which comes over in the books, brisk and no-nonsense, ‘Stop crying, girl! There’s a job to be done! Pull yourself together!’

And with her extraordinary ability to be interrupted at any point of writing a novel, go out for lunch or dinner, go to a party, come back and pick up exactly where she left off, and carrying on writing. Extraordinarily nerveless and anxiety-free (p.129). What a gift!

1916: The dispensary

In 1916 a drug dispensary was opened at Torquay hospital and Agatha switched to it from nursing. The hours were shorter and the pay better (p.103). The detailed knowledge of drugs, medicines and poisons she acquired her was to stand her in good stead for the rest of her life. The murder in her first detective novel, The Mysterious Affair at Styles, is entirely premised on professional knowledge of the action of poisons.

Twenty-four years later, in ‘One, Two, Buckle My Shoe’, the feel for drugs and poisons acquired in Torquay hospital dispensary, along with the relationships between the processions involved, was still underpinning the storyline of a dentist who appears (for a little while at least) to have poisoned a patient with a combination of adrenaline and prococaine.

‘These things happen—they happen to doctors—they happen to chemists…Careful and reliable for years, and then—one moment’s inattention—and the mischief’s done and the poor devils are for it. Morley was a sensitive man. In the case of a doctor, there’s usually a chemist or a dispenser to share the blame—or to shoulder it altogether. In this case Morley was solely responsible.’
(‘One, Two, Buckle My Shoe’, Chapter 2, section 1)

Unintellectual

Thompson tries to persuade us how imaginative Agatha was and yet what comes over is how utterly unimaginative she was, uninterested in politics, uninterested in suffragettes or feminism, uninterested in any social issues, in philosophy or any of the humanities – but with a vivid sense of her class of people, conceived as stock types.

Surely that’s one of the secrets of her success, is how utterly unthreatening her books are; how populated they are by reassuringly conventional jolly good chaps and plucky chapesses, stern judges, reassuring police inspectors, and so on. Everyone observes the decencies and common courtesies. It’s their lovely manners and good behaviour which are so attractive, reassuring and comforting. Seen from this angle the murders almost don’t register.

Readability

And this goes a long way towards explaining probably the biggest single explanation of her success, which is her immense readability.

The invention of Poirot

Poirot arrived fully formed in her first novel. Later she at various times tried to explain his creation but couldn’t because she was a deeply unreflective, unintellectual writer. Belgian refugees during the war provided the nationality, the rest she plucked from circumstances around her and voilà, he was fully formed. A miracle. What’s so impressive about Poirot is how much he doesn’t change over the next 40 years.

The feature which struck me most about Poirot from his first appearance is that he is old, in fact he has retired from being a detective on his first appearance. And he is old like Miss Marple. So Christie’s two great characters are outwith any concern for sex, outside relationships, the marriage market, the whole thing. Outsiders to the fierce competition over sex, mates, children, resources, jobs, reputations, money. It’s because of this that the books they appear in can observe the silliness of human sex lives – and family rivalries and bitterness about money – with such detachment and amusement.

Yes, amusement, that’s the watchword, the key quality of Christie’s novels and the main reason I like them. I don’t care that much about the murders and the silly clues and the ludicrous explanations; I enjoy the humour of the characters and, above all, the amused, smiling tone of her narrative voice.

1919: Parenthood

The war ended, Archie was demobilised fairly quickly and got a job at the Air Ministry. The couple took to living together as man and wife, something they hadn’t actually done during the war. Within a year Agatha was pregnant and delivered of a baby girl. Like everything else in her life, Agatha accepts pregnancy as the fate of a young wife here, as in everything, adopting the conventional, sensible attitude.

But she wasn’t a natural mother for the simple reason that she herself was still a girl.

Agatha did not need a perfect child: she herself was perfect to Clara. So in love was she with being a daughter… that she was unable to find true fulfilment as a mother. (p.122)

It is a recurring theme in her later novels that mothers often don’t like or resent their daughters (p.123). Lots of evidence that she never really bonded with Rosalind.

Something about this marvellous, bright, sharp-edged child seems to have shrivelled Agatha’s maternal impulses in the bud’ (p.268)

Nonetheless, they came to have a respectful relationship, joshing bonhomie concealing the underlying tension. Thompson quotes a character from the novel ‘Five Little Pigs’:

Many children, most children, I should say, suffer from over attention on the part of their parents. There is too much love, too much watching over the child. It is uneasily conscious of this brooding, and seeks to free itself, to get away and be unobserved. With an only child this is particularly the case, and, of course, mothers are the worst offenders.

Or this from Dumb Witness:

‘What is she like, your cousin?’
‘Bella? Well, she’s a dreary woman. Eh, Charles?’
‘Oh, definitely a dreary woman. Rather like an earwig. She’s a devoted mother. So are earwigs, I believe.’

She was sometimes angry or frustrated that she would never be to her daughter what her mother, Clara, had been for her, her all-in-all.

Writing for money

Archie suggested she write another novel, in fact he actively supported her writing career. ‘The Mysterious Affair at Styles’ made her £25 for serialisation rights in the Weekly Times. Its sequel ‘The Secret Adversary’ made the grand total of £50 and sold better than Styles. There followed in quick succession ‘The Murder on the Links’, ‘The Man in the Brown Suit’ and a bunch of Poirot stories.

1922: tour of the white Empire

Archie was offered a job touring the white Empire nations (Canada, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand) to promote the upcoming 1924 Empire exhibition. He took Agatha and they were abroad travelling for most of 1922.

Thompson judges the novel she wrote during and about the trip, ‘The Man in the Brown Suit’, to be her most joyful and sexy. The heroine, Anne Beddingfield, falls madly in love with the tall adventurer Harry Rayburn and is given to bold idealistic speeches:

‘I shouldn’t dream of marrying any one unless I was madly in love with them. And of course there is really nothing a woman enjoys so much as doing all the things she doesn’t like for the sake of some one she does like. And the more self-willed she is, the more she likes it.’
‘I’m afraid I disagree with you. The boot is on the other leg as a rule.’ He spoke with a slight sneer.
‘Exactly,’ I cried eagerly. ‘And that’s why there are so many unhappy marriages. It’s all the fault of the men. Either they give way to their women—and then the women despise them, or else they are utterly selfish, insist on their own way and never say ‘thank you.’ Successful husbands make their wives do just what they want, and then make a frightful fuss of them for doing it. Women like to be mastered, but they hate not to have their sacrifices appreciated. On the other hand, men don’t really appreciate women who are nice to them all the time. When I am married, I shall be a devil most of the time, but every now and then, when my husband least expects it, I shall show him what a perfect angel I can be!’

Archie was often quite ill on the trip. On their return his job in the City had gone to someone else and he was unemployed and miserable for months. Their (relative) impecunity is turned to comic account of the start of the first Tommy and Tuppence novel, The Secret Adversary.

1924: Brown and money

In 1924 the Evening News offered Agatha £500 for the serialisation rights of ‘The Man in the Brown Suit’. This brought home to her and Archie (and her sister and mother, Clara) that Agatha was looking at the makings of a real career and serious money. With the money she bought her first car, a grey Morris Cowley (p.153).

Agatha always drove a hard bargain, as producers at the BBC were later to complain. Money is a central preoccupation of her books and their characters. Money is the motive in 36 of the 55 murder mystery novels.

There was a silence, and then Tuppence burst out:
‘Money, money, money! I think about money morning, noon and night! I dare say it’s mercenary of me, but there it is!’
‘Same here,’ agreed Tommy with feeling.
(The Secret Adversary, Chapter 1)

In 1924 she signed a three book deal with Collins, who were to remain her publisher for the rest of her life, having left Bodley Head after her initial five-book deal which she felt had taken advantage of her.

1925: Chimneys

In Thompson’s view ‘The Secret of Chimneys was perhaps the happiest book that Agatha ever wrote’ (p.143).

1926: Ackroyd

Her first book for Collins, ‘The Murder of Roger Ackroyd’, transformed her reputation. It is often described as the ‘ultimate detective story’. This is for the simple reason that the narrator, honest-sounding Dr Sheppard, turns out to be the murderer. That’s it.

In ‘Roger Ackroyd she revealed for the first time her natural quality of translucency: her ability to control every sentence of her books, yet allow them breathe free. Agatha did not impose. Nor did she interpose one atom of herself between her writing and her readers. Her words communicate exactly and only what is required; which is not the same as saying they have no life beyond what is on the page. They have, in fact, the mystery of simplicity. They are the conduits for her plots, which are ultimately simple. (p.156)

Agatha’s qualities

Agatha was not a naturally descriptive writer. (p.139)

‘She was by nature remarkably unobservant’ she wrote of herself in ‘Unfinished Portrait’ (quoted p.139)

Agatha was not an especially humorous woman. (p.143)

Chimneys is what nowadays would be called a snobbish book…Impossible to deny that Agatha lived in an enclosure, that of the upper middle class into which she was born. (p.145)

Archie and Agatha grow apart

In 1924 Archie finally got a job in the City and was happy. He was taking home £2,000 a year. He took up golf and slowly this became an obsession. Soon he played every weekend, and resented anyone coming to stay who didn’t play. Agatha tried her best but wasn’t very interested and wasn’t very good. She had thickened since having Rosalind. She was 35 and her young good looks had gone. She rarely drank alcohol (good) but her favourite drink became a mix of milk and cream, such as she had loved as a girl at Ashfield. She put on weight. Archie began to dislike her schoolgirl gushiness, her chunkiness, her resentment at his weekends at the golf course.

Clara dies

Then her mother, Clara, died, on 5 April 1926. Agatha (‘too much of a child herself’) was devastated and went down to Ashfield to spend months clearing out the house of her childhood. Archie reacted badly: he disliked illness and hadn’t wanted to hear about Clara’s decline and refused to go down to comfort or help Agatha. It was the end of the marriage though she didn’t realise it.

Agatha disappears

The most famous incident in Agatha Christies life was when she went missing for 11 days and sparked a nationwide frenzy. She left her car abandoned off a lane on the North Downs overlooking a quarry with a deep pool nearby. The Surrey police were convinced she had killed herself. Day after day more volunteers joined the search scouring the Surrey countryside and numerous people claimed to have sighted the missing woman all around the UK.

Thompson devoted pages a slightly staggering 72 pages to the incident, page 186 to 258. Frankly I find this kind of thing quite staggeringly boring, as it doesn’t really seem to have impacted her writing – certainly not as much as her projection of herself into upper middle class settings, her xenophobia, her ingenuity, and her thumpingly conventional view of human nature do – based on her ‘obtuse and childlike’ character (p.179).

In Thompson’s the whole thing was a ploy to win back Archie’s love. While Agatha was away in Torquay weeping over her lost childhood, Archie decisively fell in love with a younger, sexier woman, named Nancy Neele. Archie told Agatha about it in August 1926, and asked Agatha for a divorce. After many recriminations, they agreed on a three-month trial period to try and save the marriage, but the months passed and Archie continued to spend much time in London or at friends’ house parties with Nancy in attendance.

Finally, in December things came to a head. On 3 December 1926 they had a big argument after Archie announced his plan to spend the weekend with friends, unaccompanied by his wife, but in the presence of Nancy.

Late that evening Christie disappeared from their home in Sunningdale. The following morning, her car, a Morris Cowley, was discovered at Newlands Corner in Surrey, parked above a chalk quarry with an expired driving licence and clothes inside. It was feared that she might have drowned herself in the Silent Pool, a nearby beauty spot.

The disappearance quickly became a news story. One newspaper offered a £100 reward. Over 1,000 police officers, 15,000 volunteers, and several aeroplanes searched the rural landscape. Sir Arthur Conan Doyle gave a spirit medium one of Christie’s gloves to find her.

Christie’s disappearance made international headlines, including featuring on the front page of The New York Times. According to Thompson she wrote and posted a letter to Archie’s brother, Campbell Christie, i.e. her brother-in-law, explaining that she needed time away and was going to a spa in Yorkshire and she caught a train from London to Harrogate where she checked in under the name Mrs Neele. That, of course, was the name of his husband’s mistress.

In Thompson’s view, Campbell Christie was intended to get the letter on the Monday morning, ring up Archie who would have been distressed at her disappearance, and got on the next train to Yorkshire. Harrogate, according to Thompson, is the kind of Yorkshire equivalent of Sunningdale, very posh, and so it shouldn’t have taken Archie long to track her down.

According to eye witnesses (notably a Mr Pettelson, a cultivated Russian exile) she had a lovely time in the Swan Hydropathic Hotel where she checked in, spending the days sightseeing and the evening joining in singing and music making or billiards in the drawing room.

The main source of the delay and the escalation of a private marital squabble into a national manhunt appears to have been the obsession of the police officer in charge of the investigation, police Superintendent Kenward, that Agatha had killed herself. Even when (belatedly) informed of the letter in which she simply explained that she’d gone to stay in Yorkshire, he refused to believe it. Only when guests at the hotel approached the local police to claim that the mysterious Mrs Neele looked strikingly like the missing Agatha, did the cops intervene and invite Archie up. He walked into the hotel at dinner time on the tenth evening and simply identified Agatha, for himself and to a detective who’d accompanied him.

So it appears to have been a pitiful cock-up by the police, egged on by a tabloid press always keen for a scandal. To the members of the press who quickly flooded the hotel, and the railway stations on the route to her sister’s house outside Manchester, then back at their home in Surrey – Archie gave out the same rather desperate story that Agatha had suffered a breakdown accompanied by complete amnesia. The press and most of the public didn’t believe this and Thompson thinks it’s a lie.

Failure and divorce

As an attempt to win Archie back by sparking panic and regret, it was a miserable failure.

Having, as she thought, helped to destroy her marriage by leaving Archie alone while she grieved for her mother, she had now delivered its death blow by making herself an object of public ridicule, and Archie an object of public loathing. (p.256)

Archie lived at the unhappy family home in Sunningdale while he tried to sell it, Agatha lived in a flat in London with her daughter. They met once in 1927, where she begged him again to return but he simply stated he was in love with Nancy and only waiting for her to return from the round the world cruise her family had packed her off on to get her out of the limelight, before he wanted to marry her. So in spring 1928 Agatha petitioned for divorce and was granted a decree nisi against her husband in April 1928. This was made absolute in October 1928 and two weeks later Archie married Nancy Neele. Game over.

(Incidentally Archie remained married to Nancy for the next 20 years, till her death from cancer in 1958. It wasn’t just a flash in the pan.)

(Also incidentally, Agatha, up till then a fairly devout Anglican, never attended communion again after her divorce, p.290.)

The relevance of Agatha’s disappearance for her books

Thompson cites a shrewd quotation from P.D. James who says that Archie’s betrayal and desertion was the first real trauma she’d ever faced in her pampered protected life, that she never really recovered from it – and that this shaped her fiction.

Anybody who’s written about Christie’s novels makes the same point which is that, no matter how brutal the murder(s) and how byzantine the plot and backstories, in the end, everything comes out right: the guilty party is identified, everyone else is vindicated, surprisingly often one or more couples who we’ve met during the narrative end up getting married; and Poirot makes everything better, by tying up all the loose ends and leaving us with one of his little quips, very much like the Afterword to an Elizabethan play craving their audience’s indulgence.

On this reading, every single one of her detective stories does the same thing, which is throw us into death, disorder and ever-more bewildering confusion before… slowly, slowly leading us back up into the light. Thus every one of the novels can be seen as a cathartic experience. Almost every one leaves us with a jaunty smile on our faces.

For Thompson, the failure of her marriage represented Agatha finally growing up after 38 years of pampered privilege: not financially (the couple had been hard-up after the war, and Agatha had independent income from her writing) but in psychological terms. Her mother and her husband abandoned her, within a matter of months. No longer young or attractive or living a life of dreamy illusions, Agatha changed character, buckled down, and became a really professional writer.

The comment about no longer good-looking may sound sexist but it’s Thompson’s view that it came as a liberation.

Without the burden of normal female expectations, she found herself free. There was no longer an obligation to be a certain kind of woman: slim, pleasing, feminine. She could absent herself from these restraints. She could formulate a persona and wear it like a suit of armour – present it to the world in place of herself – and inside she could be whoever she chose. That was the freedom of the creator.

And so she became the staggeringly prolific professional writer. Between 1930 and 1939 Agatha produced 17 full-length novels, plus short stories. Although ‘Agatha Christie’ was her legal name, after the divorce it became a pen-name, a fictional name, a persona. And she used it to create radical reinventions of the detective novel:

  • the murderer who pretends to be a victim
  • the murderer who pretends to be a serial killer
  • the murderer who is also the investigating policeman
  • the cast of suspects who are all innocent
  • the cast of suspects who are all guilty

Mary Westmacott

But while she addressed the murder mystery novel with a kind of cold-blooded forensic experimentalism, at the same time she embarked what became a series of six novels under the alter ego of Mary Westmacott. See the section above. Knowing that they were written soon after her life-changing divorce sheds a different light on them and explains why Thompson mines them so heavily to depict the ‘real’ Agatha.

Travels and Max

In 1928 Christie left England and took the (Simplon) Orient Express to Istanbul and then onto Baghdad. Obviously the Orient Express trip provided the material for the book of the same name.

In Iraq she became friends with archaeologist Leonard Woolley and his wife, Katherine. They stayed with her at her new London home and then invited her to return to their dig in February 1930. On that second trip, she met archaeologist Max Mallowan, 13 and a half years her junior. She was 39, he was just 25 (Max b. 6 May 1904; Agatha b. 15 September 1890) (p.284). The precise occasion was when he took her and a group of tourists on a tour of his expedition site in Iraq.

By the standards of the day it was a fairly quick romance. Christie and Mallowan married in Edinburgh in September 1930. Unlike her first marriage, and like Archie and Nancy, Agatha and Max’s marriage lasted the rest of their lives, until Christie’s death in 1976.

Agatha accompanied Mallowan on all his subsequent archaeological expeditions, and her travels with him contributed background to several of her novels set in the Middle East, notably ‘Murder in Mesopotamia’, ‘Death on the Nile’ and ‘Appointment with Death’. His last trip back to Ur, the ancient city being excavated by Woolley was in 1931.

According to Thompson, Woolley’s wife, Katherine Woolley appears only thinly disguised in ‘Appointment with Death’ as the murderee, Mrs Leidner, a cold woman who enjoyed trifling with all the men around her – a rare instance of Agatha basing a character on an identifiable real life person.

Critics accused young Max of being a gold-digger and Agatha certainly funded his expeditions, notably one to Arpachiyah in Iraq in 1933. In 1935 he took Agatha to Chagar Bazar in Syria. Max wasn’t a brilliant excavator but he was brilliant at organising digs and keeping up to 200 local workmen under discipline. Agatha wasn’t that interested in the finds, but happily played the loyal wife and was also very interested in exotic wildflowers.

It was also, often, extremely uncomfortable, but Agatha was tough and healthy, and always despised complaining women. (p.314)

It’s true she featured archaeologists in some of her books: in ‘Murder in Mesopotamia’ but most critically in ‘Death in the Clouds’ where the narrator mocks the pretensions of the father and son team of archaeologists.

Thompson analyses the relationship at length but what it boiled down to was that Max restored her faith and trust and allowed her to return to a kind of state of pampered childhood, the state she enjoyed with her beloved mother and, at first, with Archie, till he got fed up of her gushing girliness: Max restored it to her and, thus liberated, her imagination was set free to roam far and wide, taking the detective story genre to pieces, and putting it back together in all kinds of interesting forms.

Buying houses

During the 1930s Agatha bought a number of houses with her earnings. At one point Thompson mentions properties at:

  • Sheffield Terrace
  • Campden Street
  • Half Moon Street
  • Park Place
  • a mews cottage at 22 Cresswell Place, Chelsea, SW1 (1929)
  • Lawn Road (p.344)

She finally, reluctantly, allowed beloved Ashfield to be sold but she had bought a comfortable home at Wallington near Oxford (Winterbrook; 1934) abut her romantic purchase was of the grand white house named Greenway, which overlooked the banks of the River Dart in Devon (also 1934).

On page 348, Thompson states that Agatha owned four houses: so presumably that’s Winterbrook, Greenway and two in London, so the other properties must have been flats.

Second World War

Max had a distinguished war career. According to his Wikipedia entry:

After the beginning of the Second World War he served with the Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve in North Africa, being based for part of 1943 at the ancient city of Sabratha in Libya. He was commissioned as a pilot officer on probation in the Administrative and Special Duties Branch on 11 February 1941, promoted flying officer on 18 August 1941, flight lieutenant on 1 April 1943 and for some time he also had the rank of wing commander. His first role with the RAF was as a liaison officer with allied forces and, later in the war, as a civilian affairs officer in North Africa.

Thompson summarises Max’s career rather differently on page 319, emphasising the initial struggle he had to find a post.

Peripatetic

Greenway was commandeered by the military before being handed over to the American navy in 1942.(Naval officers billeted there painted a mural round the cornices of the library, celebrating their feats, which sounds like a bit of a liberty).

So Agatha spent the war years in London, moving between her half dozen properties, but mostly at Lawn Road Flats in Hampstead.

Agatha’s prolific war years

Agatha kept on writing at a prodigious rate. Between September 1939 and August 1945, she published:

  • And Then There Were None (1939)
  • Sad Cypress (1940)
  • One, Two, Buckle My Shoe (1940)
  • Evil Under the Sun (1941)
  • N or M? (1941)
  • The Body in the Library (1942)
  • Five Little Pigs (1942)
  • The Moving Finger (1943)
  • Towards Zero (1944)
  • Absent in the Spring (1944)
  • Death Comes as the End (1945)
  • Sparkling Cyanide (1945)

And this doesn’t include the plays she adapted from her own novels, sometimes radically rewriting the endings. Prodigious output, eh?

Five Little Pigs

Of all of these, Thompson singles out ‘Five Little Pigs’ as the masterpiece. This is because of the unusually intense and real feeling with which she describes a marriage on the rocks, as the husband falls for a much younger woman (although, typically, the situation turns out not to be quite as straightforward as it seems for the first three-quarters of the book). It has a ‘lived’ quality, which most of her novels don’t, really.

Stephen Glanville

During the war, while Max was away, Agatha had a brief flirtation, of sorts, with Stephen Glanville, a historian and Egyptologist ten years her junior. He helped her write her strangest novel, a murder mystery set in ancient Egypt, ‘Death Comes as the End’ (pages 330 to 335).

Shakespeare

She developed an intense passion for Shakespeare, attended numerous productions, and adapted her novel, ‘Ten Little N******’ for the stage, in 1943.

Hospital volunteering

In 1940 Agatha began to give a few days a week to voluntary work at University College Hospital, in the dispensary, the same kind of work she’d done during the first war.

Rosalind comes of age and marries

Thompson uses her war chapter to bring us up to speed with the life of Agatha’s difficult daughter Rosalind. Born in 1919, she ‘came out’ in 1937. In 1940, aged just 21, after a brief courtship, she surprised Agatha and Max by marrying a soldier, Major Hubert de Burr Prichard, in Wales. In 1943 they had a child, Mathew Prichard. A year later Major Prichard was killed in the invasion of Normandy. Five years later (in 1949) she married the lawyer Anthony Hicks and kept the married name Rosamond Hick to the end of her life.

Fat as a psychological defence

According to Thompson it was really during the war years that Agatha completely lost her youth and figure and became the stout middle-aged woman we know from the photos. Becoming fat made her sad but ‘she loved to eat’ (p.328). Thompson has a lyrical paragraph describing the change in Agatha’s self image:

It was a long way from the slender, fairy-like girl who had married Archie Christie: between those two there had been the mystery of physical allure, which Agatha still conjured in her books but had deliberately destroyed for herself. She had, indeed, coarsened. She did not merely his behind the public persona of ‘Agatha Christie’; she sheltered within a shroud of flesh, dense and unwieldy, a symbolic defence against the sharp agonies of the past. (p.328)

And even more so after the war:

Her large comfortable physicality was a defence against wounds, and after the war it grew more massive still. She lost the last trace of the attractions she had held, until her early fifties, for a man like Stephen Glanville. Her weight rose to nearly fifteen stone, her legs swelled immensely and she became extraordinarily sensitive about photographs.

And quotes a friend of Stephen Glanville’s daughter who met her in Cambridge in the 1950s:

‘I thought the sight of her surprising, with a fat, somewhat uncoordinated body and messily applied lipstick.’ (p.364)

It made her unhappy but this was the course she had adopted.

Tax troubles

To the amazement of Agatha, her agents in both the UK (Edward Cork of Hughes Massie) and the States (Harold Ober), towards the end of the 1930s she got into trouble with the tax authorities in both countries, trouble with ramified and complexified and ending up dogging her for decades. Thompson’s account begins on page 345 and then the theme recurs for the rest of the book.

As far as I can make out, the problem had two causes. Until the later 1930s Agatha had been categorised by the US tax authorities as a ‘non-resident alien author’ and so didn’t have to pay tax on income earned through the sale of her copyrights in the US, plus the increasing amount of movie and theatrical rights sales. All this changed when the US authorities decided that the wildly successful popular British novelist, Rafael Sabatini, did have to pay tax on the income he earned in the States. In 1938 the US tax authorities began to pry into Agatha’s affairs, quickly revealing how much she earned in the Sates and backdating her tax liability to the start of her career (in 1920). They started impounding her US earnings while the case went through the courts.

But in the meantime, back in the UK Agatha continued to live an upper middle class life, maintain her half dozen properties, with staff etc, and enjoy the high life, but with no income coming in from the States (p.359). She began to go into debt and borrowed to maintain her lifestyle. But at the same time, although she continued to be prolific and popular, wartime conditions in Britain also hit sales, revenue and publishers payments.

Then in 1945, the new Labour government put up tax thresholds to fund the welfare state and other policies, and people like Agatha, well off but not rich, were penalised.

A combination of all these factors means that the war years were marked by growing concerns about her income, her tax, and her lifestyle, worries which dogged her for decades to come.

The impact of war

Several novels Agatha published just after the war deal with its impact:

  • The Hollow (1946)
  • Taken at the Flood (1948)
  • The Rose and the Yew Tree (1948)

With their mood of restlessness and dissatisfaction (p.351).

The post-war

Thompson commences her account of Agatha’s post-war years with a couple of generalisations:

It was in the middle of the century that the phenomenon of ‘Agatha Christie’ really took off. In 1945 she was a popular and successful author whose new books always sold out a print run of 25,000. But by 1950 she was a global brand estimated to have sold 50 million books! And receiving increasing amounts of fan mail (p.361).

Two paradoxes about this:

1. It is generally agreed that this huge popularity came just as the quality of her novels began to fall away. In the 30 years from 1945 to 1976 she wrote a handful of outstanding books, but most of them war solid, reliable, formulaic. Not many matched the brilliance of the 20 or so year before (1926 to 1945) and especially ‘the period of intense, sustained creativity around the war which marks the high point of her achievement’ (p.356).

2. The other paradox is that her fame became truly enormous more from the adaptations of the books than the books themselves. Thus movie versions of:

  • Love From A Stranger (1937)
  • And Then there Were None (1945)

And theatrical adaptations of:

  • And Then there Were None (1943)
  • Hidden Horizon (adaptation of Murder on the Nile; 1944)
  • Murder at the Vicarage (1949)
  • The Hollow (1951)
  • The Mousetrap (1952)
  • Witness for the Prosecution (1953)

Not to mention radio, for example a series of weekly adaptations of the Poirot stories on American radio.

Goodbye

And with that, with Agatha having married off her daughter, undergone a period of prolific productivity, had a brief flirtation but remained fundamentally true to the man who rescued her wounded heart (Max), settling into middle-age and overweight, becoming a global brand but sinking into ever-murkier disputes with the tax authorities in two countries – I’m going to leave this biography. Maybe, when I’ve read the later books, I’ll pick it up and review the post-war years. But not now.


Credit

‘Agatha Christie: An English Mystery’ by Laura Thompson was published in 2007 by Headline Review. Page references are to the 2008 paperback edition.

Related reviews

Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq by Thomas E. Ricks (2006)

Perhaps the worst war plan in American history.
(Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, page 115)

‘It failed utterly.’
(Verdict of Marek Belka, Prime Minister of Poland which contributed troops to the coalition, describing the entire American project to invade and ‘liberate’ Iraq, p.347)

Bad assumptions

The US Army invaded Iraq on 20 March 2003. The moving forces behind the invasion – Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz and Under Secretary of Defence for Policy, Douglas Feith – said the war would be over in a matter of months, would require the bare minimum number of troops and would pay for itself out of Iraq’s increased oil revenue. They based these conclusions on the assumptions that:

  1. large numbers of Iraqi security forces would be willing to change sides and help the occupiers
  2. the ‘international community’ would pick up a lot of the task of reconstruction, meaning other Western countries, NGOs etc
  3. a provisional Iraqi government would spring into being within months which the US could hand interim authority over to i.e.  they could stop being responsible for everything
  4. the war would not cost much ($1.7 billion, the head of the US Agency for International development, Andrew Natsios, told Ted Koppel on the Nightline TV show, p.109) and this would all be paid for out of the new democratic and grateful Iraqi government’s oil revenues

All four of these premises, along with most of the other assumptions made by the invasion’s planners, turned out to be completely fallacious. To take one very specific example, the advance units of the American Army were told to expect the Iraqi forces they faced to quickly surrender or maybe even desert to them. In the event, none did. Everything else was like that – completely wrong and unexpected.

The US-led invasion was launched recklessly, with a flawed plan for war and a worse approach to occupation. (p.3)

There were plenty of critics who warned of the probable consequences:

  • Michael O’Hanlon from the Brookings Institute
  • Pentagon official Alina Romanowski (p.65)
  • Marine Corps General Anthony Zinni (p.51)
  • a conference of 70 national security and Middle East experts (p.72)
  • General ‘Stormin” Norman Schwartzkopf (p.82)
  • Air Force strategist Colonel John Warden (p.108)
  • defence consultant Gary Anderson (p.137)

and plenty of others, predicted that the Americans would be entering an ethnic and religious minefield and get drawn into a country which was likely to collapse and split along ethnic or religious lines, requiring US forces to be there for 5 years or more. All correct predictions, all ignored or rubbished by the hawks, Cheney, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Feith.

More than one critic assigns the consistent errors of the neo-con Republican hawks to ‘intellectual arrogance’ (p.99). Like Liz Truss and Kwazi Kwarteng, they knew they were right and all the critics, all the academics, regional experts, and senior army officers were dismissed as unduly negative, lacking vision, enemies of growth or America, anti-patriotic pessimists. ‘Rumsfeld’s self-confident stubbornness made him a big part of the problem’ (p.169).

They think it’s all over

The most profound mistake was thinking that once they had seized Baghdad, the Americans would have won the war. In fact, as they quickly found out, it was only the start of the conflict. The Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz clique thought they would be greeted like an army of liberation, like the Allied armies who liberated France in 1944. Instead, almost all Iraqis quickly came to regard them as an army of occupation, and many of the soldiers behaved like one, bullying, abusing and threatening all the locals they met. Aide to Rumsfeld, Lawrence Di Rita, told the press that US forces would be in Iraq for 120 days, tops (p.106). In fact US forces were to remain in Iraq for over 8 years.

No phase IV plan

And here’s where the greatest fiasco occurred. The Americans had no plan for what to do once they had overthrown Saddam Hussein, no planning at all for what was called, in military terms, Phase IV of the invasion i.e. the aftermath (p.151). Ricks, with his typically forensic and cerebral approach, cites two of the most famous theorists of war on just this subject:

  • The first requirement in war is not to take the first step without considering the last (Karl von Clausewitz)
  • To win victory is easy; to preserve its fruits, difficult (Sun Tzu) (p.59)

For the crucial months of April, May and June 2003, after they had won the actual war, the Americans delayed and prevaricated while they tried to cobble together a plan for the reconstruction of the country and installation of interim government. It was, as Captain David Chastain, a 3rd Infantry Division officer put it, ‘a clusterfuck’ of chaos (p.151).

President Bush realised the need for some kind of post-war administration late in the day and, just a month before the invasion, appointed retired Lieutenant General Jay Garner to post of Director of the hurriedly cobbled together Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance for Iraq (ORHA).

In the event Garner’s term in post lasted less than a month, from 21 April to his abrupt replacement by L. Paul Bremer on 11 May. In fact the entire ORHA was abruptly closed down and replaced by another hastily cobbled organisation, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). Neither ORHA nor CPA were properly staffed or organised, with new staffers being hired and flown out to Baghdad in a mad hurry, with minimum or zero qualifications, handed roles they were woefully inexperienced for, throughout the spring.

‘No clear strategy, very little detailed planning, poor communications, high personnel turnover, lots of young and inexperienced political appointees, no well-established business processes,’ (Colonel Ralph Hallenbeck who worked at the CPA, p.203)

Crucially – decisively – with no actual plan to hand, the Americans’ delay meant they lost the initiative, which passed over to the various types of religious, political and ethnic opposition groups or allowed these groups to come into existence and establish themselves. These groups seized abandoned government arms, organised, made plans, and commenced the ‘insurgency’ which was to bring havoc, violence and death across Iraq for the next 8 years.

Thomas E. Ricks

Thomas E. Ricks was a reporter for the Wall Street Journal for 17 years, latterly a specialist in the US military, until he joined the Washington Post in 2000 as senior Pentagon correspondent. His extremely detailed and thorough account of the invasion and its aftermath was published in 2006, three years into the painful and protracted unravelling of America’s plans.

Far from…

Far from being over in a few months with minimal casualties, the war in Iraq was to drag on until December 2011, lasting 8 years and nearly 9 months.

Paul Wolfowitz predicted the locals would welcome the Americans, there would be no ethnic fighting and that within a few months of victory, the troop numbers would be down to 34,000 (pages 97, 98 and 106). However, far from requiring a minimal army of 130,000 the troop numbers rose to a peak of 200,000 which most commentators still thought wasn’t enough. The Rand Corporation published a report claiming the task the US set itself would have required 500,000 troops. According to Army Central Command planner Colonel Agoglia, Wolfowitz suffered from ‘a complete and total lack of understanding’ of what was need to invade Iraq and create a new, independent state (p.128).

Far from costing a few billion dollars which would be paid for by the country’s own oil revenue, the US Congressional Budget Office has estimated the total cost of the war in Iraq to the United States will be around $1.9 trillion.

Legacy of the Gulf War

Many people thought Bush Jnr wanted to complete what his dad, George Bush Senior, began with his ejection of Saddam from Kuwait in 1991. Republicans and foreign policy hawks came to regret how the father ended the 100-hours war as soon as the Iraqi forces were expelled back onto Iraqi soil. Specially when Saddam went out of his way to prove what a bastard he was by massacring the Marsh Arabs who Bush Senior had encouraged to rise up against their dictator, and then turned his wrath on the Kurds in the north, who he drove from their towns and villages into the freezing mountains where many perished before the ‘international community’ stepped in to enforce a no-fly zone (Operation Northern Watch, p.13).

Throughout the 1990s the Allies maintained this no-fly zone despite Saddam’s policy of continually nagging and provoking them, and also enacted strong sanctions against the regime. He remained a thorn in the side of successive American administrations. Foreign policy hawks became obsessed with the idea that Saddam was moving heaven and earth to build facilities for creating weapons of mass destruction i.e. chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.

In response to these provocations and paranoia, in October 1998 removing the Iraqi government became official US foreign policy with the enactment of the Iraq Liberation Act. This followed the creation of an advocacy group of neo-conservative Republicans, the Project for a New American Century, set up in January 1998 to lobby then-President Clinton for regime change in Iraq. Members included Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Richard Armitage, future UN ambassador John Bolton and other hawks, who were to come into power when George W. Bush was elected president in November 2000.

Choosing to attack Iraq on a false prospectus

Hence, within days of the 9/11 attacks, President Bush and senior figures in his administration (vice-president Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld) began soliciting opinions from State Department officials and the military about the feasibility of completing the job of getting rid of Saddam.

Little over a month after 9/11 the US attacked Afghanistan whose Taliban rulers had refused to surrender Osama bin Laden who had emerged as the culprit for the 9/11 attacks. But alongside the Afghan plan, a definitive assault on Saddam’s Iraq was being planned.

Throughout 2002 the administration ramped up the pressure with an escalating series of deadlines for Saddam to surrender his weapons of mass destruction, obey sanctions and so on. Saddam’s truculence and mishandling of UN weapons inspectors played with into the US hawks’ plans.

Colin Powell’s day of shame

Early in 2003, on 5 February, Bush sent Secretary of State Colin Powell to the UN to make America’s case, to present ‘evidence’ that Iraq was hiding unconventional weapons. His presentation to the UN was later shown to be wrong and misleading in every single detail (pages 90 to 93). The Americans were warned by British and other security services, at the time, that this ‘evidence’ was very flaky, based, for example, on the claims of an Iraqi emigrant living in Germany who later admitted having falsified his testimony (p.91). The monitoring efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency had found no evidence of WMD at all – but the Bush administration ignored anything which stood in the way of their determination to overthrow Saddam.

The Bush White House case was based on the claims that a) there was a direct link between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda and b) that Saddam had ‘weapons of mass destruction’ that posed a serious threat to the West. Whereas:

  • in 2004, the 9/11 Commission concluded there was no evidence of any relationship between Saddam’s regime and al-Qaeda
  • and no stockpiles of WMDs or active WMD program were ever found in Iraq (p.375)

Has any US president ever told such a pack of lies with such catastrophic consequences? Ricks doesn’t hold back.

  • Blame must lie foremost with President Bush himself, but his incompetence and arrogance are only part of the story. It takes more than one person to make a mess as big as Iraq. (p.4)
  • President Bush’s response to the growing violence in Iraq was even more painfully wrong than Rumsfeld’s. (p.172)

Ricks’s intelligence and authority

What makes Fiasco such a blistering record of the intellectual arrogance, blinkered ignorance, chaotic mismanagement, wishful thinking and stupidity which characterised the American invasion of Iraq is the supreme intelligence and incisive analysis Ricks deploys on every page. He is an extremely clever guy, a deep thinker, with the added huge advantage of managing to get pretty much all the key players, all the senior people at the State Department (America’s Foreign Office) and Pentagon (the military), to talk to him and give often scathing and bitterly critical insights into the chaos and mismanagement which operated at every level of the US administration.

But it wasn’t just the US government and key figures in the US army who made terrible mistakes and miscalculations. The press was shamefully complicit in this slack, badly planned wishful thinking. Ricks names and shames the cheerleaders for the invasion in the American press and TV, some of whom saw their careers destroyed for recklessly supporting the administration (Ricks singles out New York Times reporter Judith Miller for particular criticism, p.35).

And Congress pitifully failed in its duty to review the executive’s plans, especially war plans. Members of Congress were intimidated by the great wave of patriotic rhetoric flooding the airwaves. In the feverish mood after 9/11 Congress didn’t want to seem unpatriotic and so subjected the administrations plans to pitifully inadequate questioning, and failed in its duty of overseeing the Executive branch of government (p.88 and p.387). Fail fail fail.

Ricks subjects specific each of the main players, in the White House, State Department, Pentagon and Army to detailed and authoritative profiles and then withering analysis of their failures, which leave virtually none of their reputations intact.

General Tommy Franks, the man given overall charge of the invasion, was widely thought to have no grasp of strategy; he was a tactical, operations man incapable of seeing the big picture.

  • ‘[Franks] ran an extremely unhappy headquarters’ (p.33)
  • ‘the intellectually shoddy atmosphere that characterised war planning under Franks’ (p.34)

Thus it was that Franks fell in with Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz, who both continually demanded a smaller force, chipped away at the proposals, demanding that army commanders reduce their numbers to a size which was to prove completely inadequate for the task ahead. As late as April 28 Wolfowitz was insisting the Americans only needed the 135,000 troops they had so far deployed, even as the evidence came in that this was completely inadequate. Ricks’s description of the shambolic office run by Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Douglas Jay Feith, beggars belief:

  • The owlish Feith was a management disaster who served as a bottleneck on decision making. (p.76)
  • ‘the dumbest fucking guy on the planet’ according to Tommy Franks (p.78)
  • ‘incredibly dangerous’, according to general Jay Garner (p.78)

Franks announced his retirement very soon after combat operations finished, on 22 May 2003. He was replaced by General Ricardo Sanchez who, according to the sources Ricks speaks to, struggled with the scope of the role. Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Holshek: ‘He was in over  his head. He was a fulfilment of the Peter principle’ (p.173).

‘Historians will remember Sanchez as the William Westmoreland of the Iraq War – the general who misunderstood the nature of the conflict he faced and thereby played into the enemy’s hands,’ retired army Colonel Andrew Bacevich (p.392)

Who would have suspected so many senior administration officials were so incompetent and divisive?

Strategy versus tactics

Quite apart from the riveting and mind-boggling stories on every page, two big concepts underpin Ricks’s account. One is the difference between strategy and tactics. He explains that to ascertain strategy you must ask four questions:

  1. who are we?
  2. what are we trying to do here?
  3. how will we do it?
  4. what resources and means do we need to do it?

Answering those questions completely and correctly gives you your strategy (p.127). Once you have established this, tried and tested it against the evidence, then you are in a position to start developing the tactics which you will apply in specific situations or areas which will all work towards achieving your overall goals.

Ricks shows in fascinating detail how the general in overall command of the war, Tommy Franks, was great at working out detailed tactics but completely failed to grasp the overall strategy, which was itself laughably unrealistic, the ambition not only to overthrow Saddam but to re-engineer the entire Middle East to suit America and Israel’s convenience. The result was that the US effort more closely resembled a coup in a banana republic than a deeply through-through, carefully worked out, large-scale, long-term plan to alter the politics of a crucial part of the globe (p.128).

The neo-conservative Republicans who drove the invasion thought there was no need for a phase IV because the Iraqi population would greet the Americans with flowers and kisses (p.96), Iraqi politicians would quickly set up their own government, and their army and police would manage the transformation of Iraq into a shiny new democracy. They were completely and utterly wrong (p.170).

The looting

Before the invasion phase of the war (19 March to 30 April) had even finished, Iraqi society began to fall apart. The TV cameras caught the pulling down of the massive statue of Saddam at the centre of Baghdad on 9 April 2003 (I remember watching it live on TV; it took ages). But even as they did so the epidemic of looting, burning and destruction of the country was beginning. The French, liberated from their Nazi occupiers carried on with their civic duties. The Iraqis, liberated from Saddam’s totalitarian rule, went mad with a spectacular outburst of civil disorder and chaos on the streets.

And did the Americans have the manpower to enforce security, law and order? No, because Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz and their creature at the Pentagon, Douglas Feith, and the many other true believers, had moved heaven and earth to have the smallest possible supply of boots on the ground.

Interviewed on TV Rumsfield famously dismissed the looting by saying freedom is messy (p.136). In other words, he was a cretin. He and his fellow believers didn’t realise that it was in those early days that America lost the respect of the nation they had conquered, that an entire people saw American soldiers standing by idly while ministry buildings were comprehensively sacks, looted and set on fire, criminal gangs roamed the streets, cars were hijacked, civilians kidnapped, women raped. Not my problem, said Rumsfeld.

Excellent at sending laser-directed bombs at infrastructure targets, the American Army turned out to be useless at enforcing law and order. Within days many Iraqis began to pine for the good old days under Saddam. At least under the tyrant the streets were safe to walk or drive through. It is vital for an invading force to gain the population’s trust and to display competence and command. During the orgy of looting the US forces lost all this and never regained it (p.136).

Mission accomplished?

On 1 May Bush made his Mission Accomplished speech aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln cruising off the coast of California (p.145). Ricks goes out of his way to say that Bush never used the phrase ‘mission accomplished’, it was just the words on a huge banner hanging behind him. But even to an informed amateur like myself it was obvious what a stupid, short-sighted and profoundly ignorant speech it was. The Americans’ problems were just starting, as anybody who knew anything about the Middle East or the Arab world could have told the hawks for the price of a pint.

Weapons of mass distraction

It is amusing to learn how, during these crucial first days and weeks, US forces wasted an immense amount of time and resources searching for the non-existent weapons of mass destruction instead of policing the streets, which is what a country descending into chaos needed (p.146).

What’s more, in the quest for phantom WMD, American forces left hundreds of thousands of conventional weapons untouched, partly for fear that detonating them might blow up gas or chemicals, mostly because they were looking for the phantom factories and warehouses. And so they allowed insurgents-in-the-making to walk in and loot vast amounts of arms and munitions and walk off with them at their leisure. Breath-taking, amazing stupidity.

hence the jokey phrase that the non-existent weapons of mass destruction in practice turned out to be weapons of mass distraction, distracting US forces from the more straightforward and useful task of securing Iraq’s armouries. Not only were WMDs a fake reason for the invasion but they then significantly contributed to the arming of the insurgencies which were to bedevil the American occupation.

Definition of ‘the initiative’

In late April and early May the Americans, with no clear plan in place and insufficient personnel to secure the country, lost the initiative. In most people’s hands this would be a phrase, but what makes the book outstanding is the way Ricks gives these terms careful definitions, often within the specific context of military doctrine. Thus he defines ‘the initiative’ as ‘the ability to choose the time and location of battle, a key and often decisive factor in any military engagement’. Instead, the Americans’ drift and lack of direction handed the initiative over to countless angry insurgents.

According to the Pentagon, 250,000 tons of ordnance was looted, providing a significant source of ammunition to the future insurgents. In addition, the Iraqi army and Republican Guard had created hundreds of hidden weapons caches before the invasion in preparation for prolonged resistance.

There weren’t enough US troops:

  • to stop the looting which wrecked then occupiers reputation and damaged important infrastructure
  • to secure the borders, specially in the west with Syria, across which streamed zealous jihadis
  • to train new Iraqi police, a task delegated to contractors
  • to supervise detainees who swiftly filled the gaols to overflowing

Chronic lack of personnel in each of these areas – on the direct personal orders of Rumsfeld – was have catastrophic consequences (p.147).

The scandal of Abu Ghraib

The most florid and attention-grabbing was the complete failure to prepare to handle the large number of detainees the army soon started rounding up and sending to prison to be interrogated. Which prisons? The same ones Saddam had used such as Abu Ghraib just west of the capital, only even more degraded and squalid than during his time. So much for ‘liberation’.

There weren’t enough trained interrogators who could speak Arabic, so interrogation often ended up as a lot of slapping and shouting, plus the new techniques of waterboarding and other forms of abuse and torture. What was required was Military Police but large units of these had been deliberately and specifically dropped from the invasion plan by Rumsfeld in person. And it was this Rumsfeld-created shortage of Military Police or soldiers trained to run such facilities meant they were run by the likes of the badly trained and inadequately supervised junior soldiers who took all those photographs of terrorising Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib which leaked out with a catastrophic loss of reputation for America, for all time. A reputation for holding the moral high ground, around the developing world, which it will never really capture (pages 197 to 200 and 290 to 293, 296 to 297).

The notorious photos from Abu Ghraib prison showing untrained low-ranking American soldiers abusing Iraqi prisoners

One of the keys to winning a counterinsurgency is to treat enemy captives well; if won over with leniency and understanding, today’s captive may be converted to tomorrow’s mayor or council member, a useful ally in reconstructing civil society (p.421). So how did America treat its prisoners? Worse than animals. Hence 8 years of war.

Bremer’s historic mistakes

Within a week of taking over command of the Coalition Provisional Authority, L. Paul Bremer made his two infamous decisions (pages 158 to 165):

  • Coalition Provisional Authority Order 1 banned the Ba’ath party in all forms and banned from public life anyone who had been a member of the party, no matter how lowly
  • Coalition Provisional Authority Order 2 dismantled the Iraqi Army, 23 May 2003

The first one deprived over100,000 generally honest Iraqi citizens of their livelihoods. The second did the same to about 400,000 members of the armed forces. Both were overnight deprived of their livelihoods, income and the respect so important in an Arab country. Some were angry and protested outside the newly established Green Zone. Others took steps to join the nascent insurgencies, many of which offered them cash to join.

Ricks quote numerous army officers such as Major General Renuart, saying things like: ‘That was the day that we snatched defeat from the jaws of victory’ (p.163) or Colonel Alan King: ‘May was the turning point. When we disbanded the military and announced that we were occupiers, that was it’ (p.164); Colonel Paul Hughes: ‘When we disbanded the Iraqi army we created a significant part of the Iraqi insurgency’ (p.191) and many more like them.

More strategically, in a country riven by ethnic and religious divisions, the army had (as in so many developing countries) been one of the few unifying national institutions. Not only did abolishing it turn hundreds of thousands of angry and well-trained soldiers into insurgents, it hugely exacerbated ethnic division (p.163).

Counter-insurgency

The other Big Idea which increasingly comes to dominate Ricks’s accountt is that of counter-insurgency. In brief, it became more and more obvious to intelligent observers (i.e. nobody in the Bush administration) that the Americans were fighting the wrong kind of war. The army had been briefed from top to bottom to fight a conventional war, advancing in formation, accompanied by tanks and air support overhead, against conventional forces arrayed in trenches or battle formation etc.

First of all the military was blindsided when, having won the conventional war in a matter of weeks, it turned out that they were being called on to maintain the peace, enforce law and order, manage the never-ending influx of detainees, something none of them had been trained for (Abu Ghraib).

But then the situation took a further turn, as the insurgents, taking advantage of the Americans’ complete lack of a plan, began to launch an insurgency. It took the people in charge, in the Pentagon and State Department months and months to realise this was what was happening. The conflict changed from the quick, easy war they’d been bragging about into another Vietnam-style, prolonged, small-scale, low-level insurgency, precisely the kind of thing they’d sworn blind would never happen.

What is counter-insurgency?

In a conventional war your aim is to kill as many of the enemy as necessary until they surrender and cease to be combatants. The civilian population are uninvolved bystanders to the clash between two uniformed, centrally organised armies. In an insurgency the opposition does not wear uniform, blends in with the civilian population, launches small attacks on vulnerable targets (police stations, foot patrols) before disappearing back into the population.

Therefore, the key plank of counterinsurgency warfare is to win the population. The population are the battle space and the goal of counter-insurgency. Only with the passive assistance of the general population can an insurgency survive. If you win over the population, the insurgents have no background to slip back into. The general population is the goal and therefore you do everything in your power to win them over.

How? By providing what they need: bringing security, enforcing law and order, getting the electricity and drinking water working. Above all you are polite and respectful. A country like Iraq gives great importance to personal dignity, especially of the male head of households or the elders of communities, villages and tribes. Therefore extreme respect must be shown at all times. The army must go out of its way to win the respect and trust of the civilian population. That is the only way to slowly, patiently, strangle an insurgency, by steadily reducing the pool or recruits and the places it can hire.

Did the Americans practice counter-insurgency?

No, they did the exact opposite. Hence the 50 page-section Ricks ironically titles ‘How to create an insurgency’ (pages 149 to 200).

The Americans stood by while the country collapsed into chaos, the Americans did nothing as criminal gangs roamed the streets. The Americans allowed government ministries, museums, schools and hospitals to be looted and destroyed.

On a personal level, the Americans were extremely rude and aggressive with Iraq civilians. They forced other road users off the roads. They drove round pointing their guns at everyone. They shot first and asked questions later, killing unarmed civilians in the process, on several notorious occasions killing Iraqi policemen who they themselves had helped to train (by accident and incompetence, rival night patrols opening fire on each other, that sort of thing).

And the Americans carried out systematic abuse of prisoners or ‘persons under control’ (PUC). Ordinary soldiers developed an attitude called ‘Fuck a PUC’ (p.278), yelling and abuse was the start which often escalated to beating, punching, up to breaking bones, threatening with guns etc.

As the insurgency ramped up, US forces took to raiding entire quarters of any town or city where an insurgent attack took place, kicking open the doors of domestic houses, waving guns around, chucking hand grenades into cellars, corralling women and children screaming with terror into the main room and telling them to shut the fuck up. Very often they deliberately humiliated the man of the house in front of his women and children, forcing him to the floor, kneeling on his neck, yelling abuse, letting off pistols right by his ear. Ricks tells the story of the soldier who told an older man he was going to execute one of his two sons and to pick which one to save and which one to condemn to death before taking one of them outside, out of sight and firing his gun, reducing the father to tears of hysteria (p.273).

At a higher, operational level, the Americans made the bad mistake of regularly rotating troops back to the States. This meant that individual commanders and soldiers on the ground were just beginning to establish relationships with local communities, civic leaders and so on, building trust and respect, when they were moved on and a new bunch of soldiers came in who had to start all over from scratch (p.142).

In short, the Americans broke every rule in the counter-insurgency guidebook and did everything they possibly could to turn the entire population against them.

Ricks makes the specific point that men who had been publicly humiliated in the way I’ve described, were compelled by their culture’s sense of honour, to redeem their manhood. Even if they didn’t particularly want to, or weren’t naturally violent, their culture demanded they strike back to redeem themselves and so hundreds of thousands of men were recruited to give active or passive assistance to the insurgency.

It took over a year for the Americans to realise they were fighting the wrong kind of war. Ricks’s book is absolutely riveting as he describes the way some military leaders (Major General David Petraeus, Marine Corps General James Mattis) always knew this or learned it and promulgated it to the divisions under their command.

Classic guides to counter-insurgency

Ricks’s description of counter-insurgent warfare is so insightful and clear and useful partly because he cites classic works on the theme. These include:

Galula’s book lays out four principles:

  1. The aim of the war is to gain the support of the population rather than control of territory.
  2. Most of the population will be neutral in the conflict; support of the masses can be obtained with the help of an active friendly minority.
  3. Support of the population may be lost. The population must be efficiently protected to allow it to cooperate without fear of retribution by the enemy.
  4. Order enforcement should be done progressively by removing or driving away armed opponents, then gaining the support of the population, then strengthening positions by building infrastructure and setting long-term relationships with the population. This must be done area by area, using a pacified territory as a basis of operation to conquer a neighbouring area.

These echo the four principles laid out by a British soldier, Sir Charles Gwynne, who wrote in his 1939 textbook ‘Imperial Policing’ that, because counter-insurgency is primarily a political strategy (p.266):

  1. the civil power must be in charge
  2. civilian and military powers must cooperate closely in everything to ensure one chain of command and unified approach
  3. if required, action must be firm and prompt
  4. but force should always be kept to an absolute minimum to avoid losing the population

Or to put it another way:

  • A lesson of every successful modern counterinsurgency campaign [is that] violence is the tool of last resort, especially for troops foreign to the local population (p.225)
  • The great body of successful counterinsurgency practice…holds that firepower should be as restrained as possible. (p.234)
  • One of the most basic concepts of counterinsurgency campaigns, that they succeed when a minimum of firepower is employed. (p.250)

For in counterinsurgency warfare, the population is the prize (p.318):

  • Classic counterinsurgency doctrine…holds that the objective is first to gain control of the population and then win their support. (p.250)
  • ‘The population…becomes the objective for the counterinsurgent as it was for his enemy’ Galula, quoted p.266)
  • ‘Success in a counterinsurgency environment is based on winning popular support, not on blowing up people’s houses’ (p.315)

The immensely complicated effort required for modern warfare

Obviously the US invasion and occupation of Iraq was catastrophic in all sorts of ways which Ricks’s book describes in excruciating detail. But what really comes over is a sense of how complicated it is a mount a modern military campaign, at how many levels or aspects you have to manage to manage so many people with so many conflicting priorities and opinions.

At the very least there’s the international diplomatic scene to be managed, relationships with NATO partners as well as with the usual antagonists at the United Nations, Russia and China.

There’s public opinion which has to be managed and, in this case, lied to about weapons of mass destruction, in order to psych it for war.

But Ricks’s book makes abundantly clear that the real struggle comes within your own administration itself, where you need a) the right person as minister of war and b) the right person in charge of the Army; you need c) both to be in charge of functioning, well-managed organisations, and d) the two top guys to be able to communicate and work together to a shared goal.

One small criticism

Obviously the book only goes up to early 2006, when it was published, whereas the conflict continued on until 2011. My 2007 paperback edition has an afterword in which Ricks gives several scenarios to how he thinks the conflict might play out.

It’s not really a criticism but the one big thing I wish the book had contained was more about the contemporaneous situation in Afghanistan. Given the tremendous detail Ricks goes into about the structure and bureaucracy and funding and planning and key personnel of the US military in Iraq, it feels like a big piece of the jigsaw is missing in that he only occasionally mentions that the US was fighting a whole other war, in Afghanistan, at the same time.

I would expect that the commitment to Afghanistan caused all kinds of problems for the Army planners mapping out the plans for Iraq, but you don’t get any detail on that. I would also have expected lessons learned in one place to be applied to the other i.e. there must have been dialogue between the occupying forces in both countries, but Ricks gives no sign of it.

Relevance to Ignatieff’s theories

The aim of Michael Ignatieff’s 2003 book Empire Lite is to argue that, given the chaos which has engulfed numerous weak and failing states in the light of the withdrawal of the two superpowers from their imperial dominance at the end of the Cold War, America, if it wants to achieve geopolitical security, needs to really commit to imperial intervention in the worst of these failing states and to ‘state building’ there.

Some countries, Ignatieff argues, can only conceivably be saved by imperial intervention, by which he means long-running and deep commitment to put troops on the ground and stay the course, to establish peace between warring ethnic groups and build the apparatus of a state, not just the usual guff about ‘internationally supervised democratic elections’, but the infrastructure stuff which really counts, from education to clean water.

My reply to Ignatieff is that the Americans tried to do this – in a reasonably planned way in Afghanistan, for a good 20 years, in a far more chaotic, make-it-up-as-they-went-along way in Iraq. And the point is that they failed in both. America’s engagement in both countries amount to two different but extended and very expensive attempts to implement Ignatieff’s proposal for longer, deeper Western involvement in developing countries riven by ethnic conflict and civil war. Surely the conclusion of both experiments is that such extensive and expensive commitment by the West does not work.

In reality America, and her half-hearted allies in NATO, are committed to trying to control situations in a huge number of countries round the world:

  • the US controls about 750 bases in at least 80 countries
  • in 2020 the US had around 173,000 troops deployed in 159 countries (source: al Jazeera)

But never again will the US and its allies invade a country with the blithe confidence that it can impose western norms of law, politics and democracy.

Iran triumphans

According to a 2019 US Army study, the only country to emerge as victor of the Iraq war was America’s long-time nemesis, Iran. Although they make up a majority of the population of Iraq, Shia Muslims were liable to repression and imprisonment under the rule of Saddam, a Sunni Muslim, especially in light of the terrible Iran Iraq war (1980 to 1988). The overthrow of Saddam and American promises to implement democracy immediately placed Shia parties in a commanding position. This led to internecine fighting between Shias and Sunnis with entire areas of Baghdad ethnically cleansed at the cost of much torture and bloodshed. It led to the sudden rise to prominence of Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.

But above all it meant that, whichever party won power, which ever government ran Iraq, would include figures who had been in exile in Iran, were mentored by Iran, were under the control of the Iranian government. Twenty years later Iraqi politics remain fraught and complex but the one unqualified winner to emerge from the whole shambles was Iran. And it was the increased ‘threat’ from Shia Iran which hardened hawkish attitudes in Sunni Saudi Arabia, and which explains why Iran and Saudi Arabia are fighting proxy wars against each other in Yemen and Syria.

Back to Ricks who cites an unnamed US intelligence officer drolly commenting that:

‘The difference between Tommy Franks and Tehran was that the Iranians had a good Phase IV plan.’ (p.123)


Credit

Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq by Thomas E. Ricks was published by Penguin Books in 2006. References are to the 2007 paperback edition.

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