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Sockmap iterator#2

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kernel-patches-bot wants to merge 7 commits intobpf-nextfrom
series/198206
Closed

Sockmap iterator#2
kernel-patches-bot wants to merge 7 commits intobpf-nextfrom
series/198206

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@kernel-patches-bot
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Pull request for series with
subject: Sockmap iterator
version: 3
url: https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/netdev/list/?series=199474

tsipa and others added 7 commits September 5, 2020 19:07
of sources, e.g. a bpf_iter for sk_storage maps receives one as
part of the context. It's desirable to be able to pass these to
functions that expect PTR_TO_SOCKET. For example, it enables us
to insert such a socket into a sockmap via map_elem_update.

Teach the verifier that a PTR_TO_BTF_ID for a struct sock is
equivalent to PTR_TO_SOCKET. There is one hazard here:
bpf_sk_release also takes a PTR_TO_SOCKET, but expects it to be
refcounted. Since this isn't the case for pointers derived from
BTF we must prevent them from being passed to the function.
Luckily, we can simply check that the ref_obj_id is not zero
in release_reference, and return an error otherwise.

Signed-off-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@cloudflare.com>
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
that returns NULL if the socket we just found is not a full socket.
However, this check is not necessary. On insertion we ensure that
we have a full socket (caveat around sock_ops), so request sockets
are not a problem. Time-wait sockets are allocated separate from
the original socket and then fed into the hashdance. They don't
affect the sockets already stored in the sockmap.

Suggested-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@cloudflare.com>
---
 net/core/sock_map.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
…age and

hashtable implementation. sockmap and sockhash share the same iteration
context: a pointer to an arbitrary key and a pointer to a socket. Both
pointers may be NULL, and so BPF has to perform a NULL check before accessing
them. Technically it's not possible for sockhash iteration to yield a NULL
socket, but we ignore this to be able to use a single iteration point.

Iteration will visit all keys that remain unmodified during the lifetime of
the iterator. It may or may not visit newly added ones.

Switch from using rcu_dereference_raw to plain rcu_dereference, so we gain
another guard rail if CONFIG_PROVE_RCU is enabled.

Signed-off-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@cloudflare.com>
---
 net/core/sock_map.c | 280 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 278 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
reference counting, and must therefore be prevented. Add a test which
ensures that this property holds.

Signed-off-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@cloudflare.com>
---
 .../bpf/prog_tests/reference_tracking.c       | 20 ++++++++++++++++++-
 .../bpf/progs/test_sk_ref_track_invalid.c     | 20 +++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sk_ref_track_invalid.c
…ked.

Pull this out into a helper function for use in other tests.

Signed-off-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@cloudflare.com>
---
 .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/sockmap_basic.c  | 50 +++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
…ter.

Signed-off-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@cloudflare.com>
---
 .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/sockmap_basic.c  | 88 +++++++++++++++++++
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_iter.h  |  9 ++
 .../selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_iter_sockmap.c    | 57 ++++++++++++
 .../selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_iter_sockmap.h    |  3 +
 4 files changed, 157 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_iter_sockmap.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_iter_sockmap.h
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At least one diff in series https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/netdev/list/?series=199474 expired. Closing PR.

kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 16, 2020
We have a number of "uart.port->desc.lock vs desc.lock->uart.port"
lockdep reports coming from 8250 driver; this causes a bit of trouble
to people, so let's fix it.

The problem is reverse lock order in two different call paths:

chain #1:

 serial8250_do_startup()
  spin_lock_irqsave(&port->lock);
   disable_irq_nosync(port->irq);
    raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&desc->lock)

chain #2:

  __report_bad_irq()
   raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&desc->lock)
    for_each_action_of_desc()
     printk()
      spin_lock_irqsave(&port->lock);

Fix this by changing the order of locks in serial8250_do_startup():
 do disable_irq_nosync() first, which grabs desc->lock, and grab
 uart->port after that, so that chain #1 and chain #2 have same lock
 order.

Full lockdep splat:

 ======================================================
 WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
 5.4.39 #55 Not tainted
 ======================================================

 swapper/0/0 is trying to acquire lock:
 ffffffffab65b6c0 (console_owner){-...}, at: console_lock_spinning_enable+0x31/0x57

 but task is already holding lock:
 ffff88810a8e34c0 (&irq_desc_lock_class){-.-.}, at: __report_bad_irq+0x5b/0xba

 which lock already depends on the new lock.

 the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

 -> #2 (&irq_desc_lock_class){-.-.}:
        _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x61/0x8d
        __irq_get_desc_lock+0x65/0x89
        __disable_irq_nosync+0x3b/0x93
        serial8250_do_startup+0x451/0x75c
        uart_startup+0x1b4/0x2ff
        uart_port_activate+0x73/0xa0
        tty_port_open+0xae/0x10a
        uart_open+0x1b/0x26
        tty_open+0x24d/0x3a0
        chrdev_open+0xd5/0x1cc
        do_dentry_open+0x299/0x3c8
        path_openat+0x434/0x1100
        do_filp_open+0x9b/0x10a
        do_sys_open+0x15f/0x3d7
        kernel_init_freeable+0x157/0x1dd
        kernel_init+0xe/0x105
        ret_from_fork+0x27/0x50

 -> #1 (&port_lock_key){-.-.}:
        _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x61/0x8d
        serial8250_console_write+0xa7/0x2a0
        console_unlock+0x3b7/0x528
        vprintk_emit+0x111/0x17f
        printk+0x59/0x73
        register_console+0x336/0x3a4
        uart_add_one_port+0x51b/0x5be
        serial8250_register_8250_port+0x454/0x55e
        dw8250_probe+0x4dc/0x5b9
        platform_drv_probe+0x67/0x8b
        really_probe+0x14a/0x422
        driver_probe_device+0x66/0x130
        device_driver_attach+0x42/0x5b
        __driver_attach+0xca/0x139
        bus_for_each_dev+0x97/0xc9
        bus_add_driver+0x12b/0x228
        driver_register+0x64/0xed
        do_one_initcall+0x20c/0x4a6
        do_initcall_level+0xb5/0xc5
        do_basic_setup+0x4c/0x58
        kernel_init_freeable+0x13f/0x1dd
        kernel_init+0xe/0x105
        ret_from_fork+0x27/0x50

 -> #0 (console_owner){-...}:
        __lock_acquire+0x118d/0x2714
        lock_acquire+0x203/0x258
        console_lock_spinning_enable+0x51/0x57
        console_unlock+0x25d/0x528
        vprintk_emit+0x111/0x17f
        printk+0x59/0x73
        __report_bad_irq+0xa3/0xba
        note_interrupt+0x19a/0x1d6
        handle_irq_event_percpu+0x57/0x79
        handle_irq_event+0x36/0x55
        handle_fasteoi_irq+0xc2/0x18a
        do_IRQ+0xb3/0x157
        ret_from_intr+0x0/0x1d
        cpuidle_enter_state+0x12f/0x1fd
        cpuidle_enter+0x2e/0x3d
        do_idle+0x1ce/0x2ce
        cpu_startup_entry+0x1d/0x1f
        start_kernel+0x406/0x46a
        secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0

 other info that might help us debug this:

 Chain exists of:
   console_owner --> &port_lock_key --> &irq_desc_lock_class

  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

        CPU0                    CPU1
        ----                    ----
   lock(&irq_desc_lock_class);
                                lock(&port_lock_key);
                                lock(&irq_desc_lock_class);
   lock(console_owner);

  *** DEADLOCK ***

 2 locks held by swapper/0/0:
  #0: ffff88810a8e34c0 (&irq_desc_lock_class){-.-.}, at: __report_bad_irq+0x5b/0xba
  #1: ffffffffab65b5c0 (console_lock){+.+.}, at: console_trylock_spinning+0x20/0x181

 stack backtrace:
 CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.4.39 #55
 Hardware name: XXXXXX
 Call Trace:
  <IRQ>
  dump_stack+0xbf/0x133
  ? print_circular_bug+0xd6/0xe9
  check_noncircular+0x1b9/0x1c3
  __lock_acquire+0x118d/0x2714
  lock_acquire+0x203/0x258
  ? console_lock_spinning_enable+0x31/0x57
  console_lock_spinning_enable+0x51/0x57
  ? console_lock_spinning_enable+0x31/0x57
  console_unlock+0x25d/0x528
  ? console_trylock+0x18/0x4e
  vprintk_emit+0x111/0x17f
  ? lock_acquire+0x203/0x258
  printk+0x59/0x73
  __report_bad_irq+0xa3/0xba
  note_interrupt+0x19a/0x1d6
  handle_irq_event_percpu+0x57/0x79
  handle_irq_event+0x36/0x55
  handle_fasteoi_irq+0xc2/0x18a
  do_IRQ+0xb3/0x157
  common_interrupt+0xf/0xf
  </IRQ>

Signed-off-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Fixes: 768aec0 ("serial: 8250: fix shared interrupts issues with SMP and RT kernels")
Reported-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Reported-by: Raul Rangel <rrangel@google.com>
BugLink: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=1114800
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHQZ30BnfX+gxjPm1DUd5psOTqbyDh4EJE=2=VAMW_VDafctkA@mail.gmail.com/T/#u
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200817022646.1484638-1-sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 16, 2020
With the conversion of the tree locks to rwsem I got the following
lockdep splat:

  ======================================================
  WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
  5.8.0-rc7-00165-g04ec4da5f45f-dirty #922 Not tainted
  ------------------------------------------------------
  compsize/11122 is trying to acquire lock:
  ffff889fabca8768 (&mm->mmap_lock#2){++++}-{3:3}, at: __might_fault+0x3e/0x90

  but task is already holding lock:
  ffff889fe720fe40 (btrfs-fs-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x39/0x180

  which lock already depends on the new lock.

  the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

  -> #2 (btrfs-fs-00){++++}-{3:3}:
	 down_write_nested+0x3b/0x70
	 __btrfs_tree_lock+0x24/0x120
	 btrfs_search_slot+0x756/0x990
	 btrfs_lookup_inode+0x3a/0xb4
	 __btrfs_update_delayed_inode+0x93/0x270
	 btrfs_async_run_delayed_root+0x168/0x230
	 btrfs_work_helper+0xd4/0x570
	 process_one_work+0x2ad/0x5f0
	 worker_thread+0x3a/0x3d0
	 kthread+0x133/0x150
	 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

  -> #1 (&delayed_node->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
	 __mutex_lock+0x9f/0x930
	 btrfs_delayed_update_inode+0x50/0x440
	 btrfs_update_inode+0x8a/0xf0
	 btrfs_dirty_inode+0x5b/0xd0
	 touch_atime+0xa1/0xd0
	 btrfs_file_mmap+0x3f/0x60
	 mmap_region+0x3a4/0x640
	 do_mmap+0x376/0x580
	 vm_mmap_pgoff+0xd5/0x120
	 ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x193/0x230
	 do_syscall_64+0x50/0x90
	 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

  -> #0 (&mm->mmap_lock#2){++++}-{3:3}:
	 __lock_acquire+0x1272/0x2310
	 lock_acquire+0x9e/0x360
	 __might_fault+0x68/0x90
	 _copy_to_user+0x1e/0x80
	 copy_to_sk.isra.32+0x121/0x300
	 search_ioctl+0x106/0x200
	 btrfs_ioctl_tree_search_v2+0x7b/0xf0
	 btrfs_ioctl+0x106f/0x30a0
	 ksys_ioctl+0x83/0xc0
	 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
	 do_syscall_64+0x50/0x90
	 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

  other info that might help us debug this:

  Chain exists of:
    &mm->mmap_lock#2 --> &delayed_node->mutex --> btrfs-fs-00

   Possible unsafe locking scenario:

	 CPU0                    CPU1
	 ----                    ----
    lock(btrfs-fs-00);
				 lock(&delayed_node->mutex);
				 lock(btrfs-fs-00);
    lock(&mm->mmap_lock#2);

   *** DEADLOCK ***

  1 lock held by compsize/11122:
   #0: ffff889fe720fe40 (btrfs-fs-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x39/0x180

  stack backtrace:
  CPU: 17 PID: 11122 Comm: compsize Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.8.0-rc7-00165-g04ec4da5f45f-dirty #922
  Hardware name: Quanta Tioga Pass Single Side 01-0030993006/Tioga Pass Single Side, BIOS F08_3A18 12/20/2018
  Call Trace:
   dump_stack+0x78/0xa0
   check_noncircular+0x165/0x180
   __lock_acquire+0x1272/0x2310
   lock_acquire+0x9e/0x360
   ? __might_fault+0x3e/0x90
   ? find_held_lock+0x72/0x90
   __might_fault+0x68/0x90
   ? __might_fault+0x3e/0x90
   _copy_to_user+0x1e/0x80
   copy_to_sk.isra.32+0x121/0x300
   ? btrfs_search_forward+0x2a6/0x360
   search_ioctl+0x106/0x200
   btrfs_ioctl_tree_search_v2+0x7b/0xf0
   btrfs_ioctl+0x106f/0x30a0
   ? __do_sys_newfstat+0x5a/0x70
   ? ksys_ioctl+0x83/0xc0
   ksys_ioctl+0x83/0xc0
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
   do_syscall_64+0x50/0x90
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

The problem is we're doing a copy_to_user() while holding tree locks,
which can deadlock if we have to do a page fault for the copy_to_user().
This exists even without my locking changes, so it needs to be fixed.
Rework the search ioctl to do the pre-fault and then
copy_to_user_nofault for the copying.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 16, 2020
I got the following lockdep splat while testing:

  ======================================================
  WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
  5.8.0-rc7-00172-g021118712e59 #932 Not tainted
  ------------------------------------------------------
  btrfs/229626 is trying to acquire lock:
  ffffffff828513f0 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: alloc_workqueue+0x378/0x450

  but task is already holding lock:
  ffff889dd3889518 (&fs_info->scrub_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_scrub_dev+0x11c/0x630

  which lock already depends on the new lock.

  the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

  -> #7 (&fs_info->scrub_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
	 __mutex_lock+0x9f/0x930
	 btrfs_scrub_dev+0x11c/0x630
	 btrfs_dev_replace_by_ioctl.cold.21+0x10a/0x1d4
	 btrfs_ioctl+0x2799/0x30a0
	 ksys_ioctl+0x83/0xc0
	 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
	 do_syscall_64+0x50/0x90
	 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

  -> #6 (&fs_devs->device_list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
	 __mutex_lock+0x9f/0x930
	 btrfs_run_dev_stats+0x49/0x480
	 commit_cowonly_roots+0xb5/0x2a0
	 btrfs_commit_transaction+0x516/0xa60
	 sync_filesystem+0x6b/0x90
	 generic_shutdown_super+0x22/0x100
	 kill_anon_super+0xe/0x30
	 btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20
	 deactivate_locked_super+0x29/0x60
	 cleanup_mnt+0xb8/0x140
	 task_work_run+0x6d/0xb0
	 __prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x1cc/0x1e0
	 do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x90
	 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

  -> #5 (&fs_info->tree_log_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
	 __mutex_lock+0x9f/0x930
	 btrfs_commit_transaction+0x4bb/0xa60
	 sync_filesystem+0x6b/0x90
	 generic_shutdown_super+0x22/0x100
	 kill_anon_super+0xe/0x30
	 btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20
	 deactivate_locked_super+0x29/0x60
	 cleanup_mnt+0xb8/0x140
	 task_work_run+0x6d/0xb0
	 __prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x1cc/0x1e0
	 do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x90
	 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

  -> #4 (&fs_info->reloc_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
	 __mutex_lock+0x9f/0x930
	 btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x43/0x70
	 start_transaction+0xd1/0x5d0
	 btrfs_dirty_inode+0x42/0xd0
	 touch_atime+0xa1/0xd0
	 btrfs_file_mmap+0x3f/0x60
	 mmap_region+0x3a4/0x640
	 do_mmap+0x376/0x580
	 vm_mmap_pgoff+0xd5/0x120
	 ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x193/0x230
	 do_syscall_64+0x50/0x90
	 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

  -> #3 (&mm->mmap_lock#2){++++}-{3:3}:
	 __might_fault+0x68/0x90
	 _copy_to_user+0x1e/0x80
	 perf_read+0x141/0x2c0
	 vfs_read+0xad/0x1b0
	 ksys_read+0x5f/0xe0
	 do_syscall_64+0x50/0x90
	 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

  -> #2 (&cpuctx_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
	 __mutex_lock+0x9f/0x930
	 perf_event_init_cpu+0x88/0x150
	 perf_event_init+0x1db/0x20b
	 start_kernel+0x3ae/0x53c
	 secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0

  -> #1 (pmus_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
	 __mutex_lock+0x9f/0x930
	 perf_event_init_cpu+0x4f/0x150
	 cpuhp_invoke_callback+0xb1/0x900
	 _cpu_up.constprop.26+0x9f/0x130
	 cpu_up+0x7b/0xc0
	 bringup_nonboot_cpus+0x4f/0x60
	 smp_init+0x26/0x71
	 kernel_init_freeable+0x110/0x258
	 kernel_init+0xa/0x103
	 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

  -> #0 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}:
	 __lock_acquire+0x1272/0x2310
	 lock_acquire+0x9e/0x360
	 cpus_read_lock+0x39/0xb0
	 alloc_workqueue+0x378/0x450
	 __btrfs_alloc_workqueue+0x15d/0x200
	 btrfs_alloc_workqueue+0x51/0x160
	 scrub_workers_get+0x5a/0x170
	 btrfs_scrub_dev+0x18c/0x630
	 btrfs_dev_replace_by_ioctl.cold.21+0x10a/0x1d4
	 btrfs_ioctl+0x2799/0x30a0
	 ksys_ioctl+0x83/0xc0
	 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
	 do_syscall_64+0x50/0x90
	 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

  other info that might help us debug this:

  Chain exists of:
    cpu_hotplug_lock --> &fs_devs->device_list_mutex --> &fs_info->scrub_lock

   Possible unsafe locking scenario:

	 CPU0                    CPU1
	 ----                    ----
    lock(&fs_info->scrub_lock);
				 lock(&fs_devs->device_list_mutex);
				 lock(&fs_info->scrub_lock);
    lock(cpu_hotplug_lock);

   *** DEADLOCK ***

  2 locks held by btrfs/229626:
   #0: ffff88bfe8bb86e0 (&fs_devs->device_list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_scrub_dev+0xbd/0x630
   #1: ffff889dd3889518 (&fs_info->scrub_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_scrub_dev+0x11c/0x630

  stack backtrace:
  CPU: 15 PID: 229626 Comm: btrfs Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.8.0-rc7-00172-g021118712e59 #932
  Hardware name: Quanta Tioga Pass Single Side 01-0030993006/Tioga Pass Single Side, BIOS F08_3A18 12/20/2018
  Call Trace:
   dump_stack+0x78/0xa0
   check_noncircular+0x165/0x180
   __lock_acquire+0x1272/0x2310
   lock_acquire+0x9e/0x360
   ? alloc_workqueue+0x378/0x450
   cpus_read_lock+0x39/0xb0
   ? alloc_workqueue+0x378/0x450
   alloc_workqueue+0x378/0x450
   ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x52/0x80
   __btrfs_alloc_workqueue+0x15d/0x200
   btrfs_alloc_workqueue+0x51/0x160
   scrub_workers_get+0x5a/0x170
   btrfs_scrub_dev+0x18c/0x630
   ? start_transaction+0xd1/0x5d0
   btrfs_dev_replace_by_ioctl.cold.21+0x10a/0x1d4
   btrfs_ioctl+0x2799/0x30a0
   ? do_sigaction+0x102/0x250
   ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xca/0x160
   ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x30
   ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1c/0xe0
   ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x30
   ? do_sigaction+0x102/0x250
   ? ksys_ioctl+0x83/0xc0
   ksys_ioctl+0x83/0xc0
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
   do_syscall_64+0x50/0x90
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

This happens because we're allocating the scrub workqueues under the
scrub and device list mutex, which brings in a whole host of other
dependencies.

Because the work queue allocation is done with GFP_KERNEL, it can
trigger reclaim, which can lead to a transaction commit, which in turns
needs the device_list_mutex, it can lead to a deadlock. A different
problem for which this fix is a solution.

Fix this by moving the actual allocation outside of the
scrub lock, and then only take the lock once we're ready to actually
assign them to the fs_info.  We'll now have to cleanup the workqueues in
a few more places, so I've added a helper to do the refcount dance to
safely free the workqueues.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 16, 2020
…s metrics" test

Linux 5.9 introduced perf test case "Parse and process metrics" and
on s390 this test case always dumps core:

  [root@t35lp67 perf]# ./perf test -vvvv -F 67
  67: Parse and process metrics                             :
  --- start ---
  metric expr inst_retired.any / cpu_clk_unhalted.thread for IPC
  parsing metric: inst_retired.any / cpu_clk_unhalted.thread
  Segmentation fault (core dumped)
  [root@t35lp67 perf]#

I debugged this core dump and gdb shows this call chain:

  (gdb) where
   #0  0x000003ffabc3192a in __strnlen_c_1 () from /lib64/libc.so.6
   #1  0x000003ffabc293de in strcasestr () from /lib64/libc.so.6
   #2  0x0000000001102ba2 in match_metric(list=0x1e6ea20 "inst_retired.any",
            n=<optimized out>)
       at util/metricgroup.c:368
   #3  find_metric (map=<optimized out>, map=<optimized out>,
           metric=0x1e6ea20 "inst_retired.any")
      at util/metricgroup.c:765
   #4  __resolve_metric (ids=0x0, map=<optimized out>, metric_list=0x0,
           metric_no_group=<optimized out>, m=<optimized out>)
      at util/metricgroup.c:844
   #5  resolve_metric (ids=0x0, map=0x0, metric_list=0x0,
          metric_no_group=<optimized out>)
      at util/metricgroup.c:881
   #6  metricgroup__add_metric (metric=<optimized out>,
        metric_no_group=metric_no_group@entry=false, events=<optimized out>,
        events@entry=0x3ffd84fb878, metric_list=0x0,
        metric_list@entry=0x3ffd84fb868, map=0x0)
      at util/metricgroup.c:943
   #7  0x00000000011034ae in metricgroup__add_metric_list (map=0x13f9828 <map>,
        metric_list=0x3ffd84fb868, events=0x3ffd84fb878,
        metric_no_group=<optimized out>, list=<optimized out>)
      at util/metricgroup.c:988
   #8  parse_groups (perf_evlist=perf_evlist@entry=0x1e70260,
          str=str@entry=0x12f34b2 "IPC", metric_no_group=<optimized out>,
          metric_no_merge=<optimized out>,
          fake_pmu=fake_pmu@entry=0x1462f18 <perf_pmu.fake>,
          metric_events=0x3ffd84fba58, map=0x1)
      at util/metricgroup.c:1040
   #9  0x0000000001103eb2 in metricgroup__parse_groups_test(
  	evlist=evlist@entry=0x1e70260, map=map@entry=0x13f9828 <map>,
  	str=str@entry=0x12f34b2 "IPC",
  	metric_no_group=metric_no_group@entry=false,
  	metric_no_merge=metric_no_merge@entry=false,
  	metric_events=0x3ffd84fba58)
      at util/metricgroup.c:1082
   #10 0x00000000010c84d8 in __compute_metric (ratio2=0x0, name2=0x0,
          ratio1=<synthetic pointer>, name1=0x12f34b2 "IPC",
  	vals=0x3ffd84fbad8, name=0x12f34b2 "IPC")
      at tests/parse-metric.c:159
   #11 compute_metric (ratio=<synthetic pointer>, vals=0x3ffd84fbad8,
  	name=0x12f34b2 "IPC")
      at tests/parse-metric.c:189
   #12 test_ipc () at tests/parse-metric.c:208
.....
..... omitted many more lines

This test case was added with
commit 218ca91 ("perf tests: Add parse metric test for frontend metric").

When I compile with make DEBUG=y it works fine and I do not get a core dump.

It turned out that the above listed function call chain worked on a struct
pmu_event array which requires a trailing element with zeroes which was
missing. The marco map_for_each_event() loops over that array tests for members
metric_expr/metric_name/metric_group being non-NULL. Adding this element fixes
the issue.

Output after:

  [root@t35lp46 perf]# ./perf test 67
  67: Parse and process metrics                             : Ok
  [root@t35lp46 perf]#

Committer notes:

As Ian remarks, this is not s390 specific:

<quote Ian>
  This also shows up with address sanitizer on all architectures
  (perhaps change the patch title) and perhaps add a "Fixes: <commit>"
  tag.

  =================================================================
  ==4718==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow on address
  0x55c93b4d59e8 at pc 0x55c93a1541e2 bp 0x7ffd24327c60 sp
  0x7ffd24327c58
  READ of size 8 at 0x55c93b4d59e8 thread T0
      #0 0x55c93a1541e1 in find_metric tools/perf/util/metricgroup.c:764:2
      #1 0x55c93a153e6c in __resolve_metric tools/perf/util/metricgroup.c:844:9
      #2 0x55c93a152f18 in resolve_metric tools/perf/util/metricgroup.c:881:9
      #3 0x55c93a1528db in metricgroup__add_metric
  tools/perf/util/metricgroup.c:943:9
      #4 0x55c93a151996 in metricgroup__add_metric_list
  tools/perf/util/metricgroup.c:988:9
      #5 0x55c93a1511b9 in parse_groups tools/perf/util/metricgroup.c:1040:8
      #6 0x55c93a1513e1 in metricgroup__parse_groups_test
  tools/perf/util/metricgroup.c:1082:9
      #7 0x55c93a0108ae in __compute_metric tools/perf/tests/parse-metric.c:159:8
      #8 0x55c93a010744 in compute_metric tools/perf/tests/parse-metric.c:189:9
      #9 0x55c93a00f5ee in test_ipc tools/perf/tests/parse-metric.c:208:2
      #10 0x55c93a00f1e8 in test__parse_metric
  tools/perf/tests/parse-metric.c:345:2
      #11 0x55c939fd7202 in run_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:410:9
      #12 0x55c939fd6736 in test_and_print tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:440:9
      #13 0x55c939fd58c3 in __cmd_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:661:4
      #14 0x55c939fd4e02 in cmd_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:807:9
      #15 0x55c939e4763d in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:313:11
      #16 0x55c939e46475 in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:365:8
      #17 0x55c939e4737e in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:409:2
      #18 0x55c939e45f7e in main tools/perf/perf.c:539:3

  0x55c93b4d59e8 is located 0 bytes to the right of global variable
  'pme_test' defined in 'tools/perf/tests/parse-metric.c:17:25'
  (0x55c93b4d54a0) of size 1352
  SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow
  tools/perf/util/metricgroup.c:764:2 in find_metric
  Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
    0x0ab9a7692ae0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x0ab9a7692af0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x0ab9a7692b00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x0ab9a7692b10: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x0ab9a7692b20: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  =>0x0ab9a7692b30: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00[f9]f9 f9
    0x0ab9a7692b40: f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9
    0x0ab9a7692b50: f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9
    0x0ab9a7692b60: f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x0ab9a7692b70: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x0ab9a7692b80: f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9
  Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
    Addressable:           00
    Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
    Heap left redzone:	   fa
    Freed heap region:	   fd
    Stack left redzone:	   f1
    Stack mid redzone:	   f2
    Stack right redzone:     f3
    Stack after return:	   f5
    Stack use after scope:   f8
    Global redzone:          f9
    Global init order:	   f6
    Poisoned by user:        f7
    Container overflow:	   fc
    Array cookie:            ac
    Intra object redzone:    bb
    ASan internal:           fe
    Left alloca redzone:     ca
    Right alloca redzone:    cb
    Shadow gap:              cc
</quote>

I'm also adding the missing "Fixes" tag and setting just .name to NULL,
as doing it that way is more compact (the compiler will zero out
everything else) and the table iterators look for .name being NULL as
the sentinel marking the end of the table.

Fixes: 0a507af ("perf tests: Add parse metric test for ipc metric")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Richter <tmricht@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Sumanth Korikkar <sumanthk@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200825071211.16959-1-tmricht@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 16, 2020
Luo bin says:

====================
hinic: BugFixes

The bugs fixed in this patchset have been present since the following
commits:
patch #1: Fixes: 00e57a6 ("net-next/hinic: Add Tx operation")
patch #2: Fixes: 5e126e7 ("hinic: add firmware update support")
====================

Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 16, 2020
…arnings

Since commit 845e0eb ("net: change addr_list_lock back to static
key"), cascaded DSA setups (DSA switch port as DSA master for another
DSA switch port) are emitting this lockdep warning:

============================================
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
5.8.0-rc1-00133-g923e4b5032dd-dirty #208 Not tainted
--------------------------------------------
dhcpcd/323 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff000066dd4268 (&dsa_master_addr_list_lock_key/1){+...}-{2:2}, at: dev_mc_sync+0x44/0x90

but task is already holding lock:
ffff00006608c268 (&dsa_master_addr_list_lock_key/1){+...}-{2:2}, at: dev_mc_sync+0x44/0x90

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0
       ----
  lock(&dsa_master_addr_list_lock_key/1);
  lock(&dsa_master_addr_list_lock_key/1);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

 May be due to missing lock nesting notation

3 locks held by dhcpcd/323:
 #0: ffffdbd1381dda18 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: rtnl_lock+0x24/0x30
 #1: ffff00006614b268 (_xmit_ETHER){+...}-{2:2}, at: dev_set_rx_mode+0x28/0x48
 #2: ffff00006608c268 (&dsa_master_addr_list_lock_key/1){+...}-{2:2}, at: dev_mc_sync+0x44/0x90

stack backtrace:
Call trace:
 dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1e0
 show_stack+0x20/0x30
 dump_stack+0xec/0x158
 __lock_acquire+0xca0/0x2398
 lock_acquire+0xe8/0x440
 _raw_spin_lock_nested+0x64/0x90
 dev_mc_sync+0x44/0x90
 dsa_slave_set_rx_mode+0x34/0x50
 __dev_set_rx_mode+0x60/0xa0
 dev_mc_sync+0x84/0x90
 dsa_slave_set_rx_mode+0x34/0x50
 __dev_set_rx_mode+0x60/0xa0
 dev_set_rx_mode+0x30/0x48
 __dev_open+0x10c/0x180
 __dev_change_flags+0x170/0x1c8
 dev_change_flags+0x2c/0x70
 devinet_ioctl+0x774/0x878
 inet_ioctl+0x348/0x3b0
 sock_do_ioctl+0x50/0x310
 sock_ioctl+0x1f8/0x580
 ksys_ioctl+0xb0/0xf0
 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x28/0x38
 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x7c/0x180
 do_el0_svc+0x2c/0x98
 el0_sync_handler+0x9c/0x1b8
 el0_sync+0x158/0x180

Since DSA never made use of the netdev API for describing links between
upper devices and lower devices, the dev->lower_level value of a DSA
switch interface would be 1, which would warn when it is a DSA master.

We can use netdev_upper_dev_link() to describe the relationship between
a DSA slave and a DSA master. To be precise, a DSA "slave" (switch port)
is an "upper" to a DSA "master" (host port). The relationship is "many
uppers to one lower", like in the case of VLAN. So, for that reason, we
use the same function as VLAN uses.

There might be a chance that somebody will try to take hold of this
interface and use it immediately after register_netdev() and before
netdev_upper_dev_link(). To avoid that, we do the registration and
linkage while holding the RTNL, and we use the RTNL-locked cousin of
register_netdev(), which is register_netdevice().

Since this warning was not there when lockdep was using dynamic keys for
addr_list_lock, we are blaming the lockdep patch itself. The network
stack _has_ been using static lockdep keys before, and it _is_ likely
that stacked DSA setups have been triggering these lockdep warnings
since forever, however I can't test very old kernels on this particular
stacked DSA setup, to ensure I'm not in fact introducing regressions.

Fixes: 845e0eb ("net: change addr_list_lock back to static key")
Suggested-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <olteanv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 16, 2020
syzbot reported twice a lockdep issue in fib6_del() [1]
which I think is caused by net->ipv6.fib6_null_entry
having a NULL fib6_table pointer.

fib6_del() already checks for fib6_null_entry special
case, we only need to return earlier.

Bug seems to occur very rarely, I have thus chosen
a 'bug origin' that makes backports not too complex.

[1]
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
5.9.0-rc4-syzkaller #0 Not tainted
-----------------------------
net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1996 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage!

other info that might help us debug this:

rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
4 locks held by syz-executor.5/8095:
 #0: ffffffff8a7ea708 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ppp_release+0x178/0x240 drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:401
 #1: ffff88804c422dd8 (&net->ipv6.fib6_gc_lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: spin_trylock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:414 [inline]
 #1: ffff88804c422dd8 (&net->ipv6.fib6_gc_lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: fib6_run_gc+0x21b/0x2d0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2312
 #2: ffffffff89bd6a40 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __fib6_clean_all+0x0/0x290 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2613
 #3: ffff8880a82e6430 (&tb->tb6_lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:359 [inline]
 #3: ffff8880a82e6430 (&tb->tb6_lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: __fib6_clean_all+0x107/0x290 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2245

stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 8095 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.9.0-rc4-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x198/0x1fd lib/dump_stack.c:118
 fib6_del+0x12b4/0x1630 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1996
 fib6_clean_node+0x39b/0x570 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2180
 fib6_walk_continue+0x4aa/0x8e0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2102
 fib6_walk+0x182/0x370 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2150
 fib6_clean_tree+0xdb/0x120 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2230
 __fib6_clean_all+0x120/0x290 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2246
 fib6_clean_all net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2257 [inline]
 fib6_run_gc+0x113/0x2d0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2320
 ndisc_netdev_event+0x217/0x350 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:1805
 notifier_call_chain+0xb5/0x200 kernel/notifier.c:83
 call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0xb5/0x130 net/core/dev.c:2033
 call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:2045 [inline]
 call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:2059 [inline]
 dev_close_many+0x30b/0x650 net/core/dev.c:1634
 rollback_registered_many+0x3a8/0x1210 net/core/dev.c:9261
 rollback_registered net/core/dev.c:9329 [inline]
 unregister_netdevice_queue+0x2dd/0x570 net/core/dev.c:10410
 unregister_netdevice include/linux/netdevice.h:2774 [inline]
 ppp_release+0x216/0x240 drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:403
 __fput+0x285/0x920 fs/file_table.c:281
 task_work_run+0xdd/0x190 kernel/task_work.c:141
 tracehook_notify_resume include/linux/tracehook.h:188 [inline]
 exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:163 [inline]
 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1e1/0x200 kernel/entry/common.c:190
 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x7e/0x2e0 kernel/entry/common.c:265
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Fixes: 421842e ("net/ipv6: Add fib6_null_entry")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 16, 2020
Ido Schimmel says:

====================
net: Fix bridge enslavement failure

Patch #1 fixes an issue in which an upper netdev cannot be enslaved to a
bridge when it has multiple netdevs with different parent identifiers
beneath it.

Patch #2 adds a test case using two netdevsim instances.
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 13, 2020
The conf_mutex is not use and lead below deadlock, remove it to solve
the deadlock issue.

[   44.967496] NET: Registered protocol family 42
[   45.119629] ath11k_pci 0000:06:00.0: WARNING: ath11k PCI support is experimental!
[   45.120087] ath11k_pci 0000:06:00.0: BAR 0: assigned [mem 0xdc000000-0xdc0fffff 64bit]
[   45.120108] ath11k_pci 0000:06:00.0: enabling device (0000 -> 0002)
[   45.206525] ath11k_pci 0000:06:00.0: aspm 0x42 changed to 0x40
[   45.207430] mhi 0000:06:00.0: Requested to power ON
[   45.208609] mhi 0000:06:00.0: Power on setup success
[   46.190711] ath11k_pci 0000:06:00.0: chip_id 0x0 chip_family 0xb board_id 0x101 soc_id 0xffffffff
[   46.190729] ath11k_pci 0000:06:00.0: fw_version 0x306a70f fw_build_timestamp 2000-01-01 00:00 fw_build_id
1]: Starting Load/Save RF Kill Switch Status...
[   46.385118] ath11k_pci 0000:06:00.0 wlp6s0: renamed from wlan0
1]: Started Load/Save RF Kill Switch Status.
[   53.566669] wlp6s0: authenticate with 00:03:7f:48:dd:bf
[   53.809092] wlp6s0: send auth to 00:03:7f:48:dd:bf (try 1/3)
[   53.816490] wlp6s0: authenticated
[   53.818618] wlp6s0: associate with 00:03:7f:48:dd:bf (try 1/3)
[   53.820839] wlp6s0: RX AssocResp from 00:03:7f:48:dd:bf (capab=0x1 status=0 aid=2)
[   53.834859]
[   53.834861] ======================================================
[   53.834862] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[   53.834863] 5.9.0-rc5-wt-ath+ #198 Not tainted
[   53.834864] ------------------------------------------------------
[   53.834865] kworker/u16:3/166 is trying to acquire lock:
[   53.834866] ffff8c4b37184f78 (&ar->conf_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ath11k_mac_op_config+0x16/0x30 [ath11k]
[   53.834875]
[   53.834875] but task is already holding lock:
[   53.834876] ffff8c4b37182808 (&local->iflist_mtx){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ieee80211_set_associated+0x167/0x360
[   53.834879]
[   53.834879] which lock already depends on the new lock.
[   53.834879]
[   53.834880]
[   53.834880] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[   53.834881]
[   53.834881] -> #1 (&local->iflist_mtx){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[   53.834884]        __lock_acquire+0x3bf/0x6e0
[   53.834886]        lock_acquire+0xb6/0x270
[   53.834887]        __mutex_lock+0x88/0x8e0
[   53.834890]        ieee80211_set_hw_80211_encap+0x3e/0x1f0
[   53.834895]        ath11k_mac_op_add_interface+0x348/0x7f0 [ath11k]
[   53.834897]        drv_add_interface+0x7c/0x190
[   53.834899]        ieee80211_do_open+0x552/0x9a0
[   53.834901]        __dev_open+0xe5/0x190
[   53.834902]        __dev_change_flags+0x1c6/0x230
[   53.834903]        dev_change_flags+0x1c/0x50
[   53.834905]        do_setlink+0x246/0xc60
[   53.834906]        __rtnl_newlink+0x607/0x990
[   53.834907]        rtnl_newlink+0x3f/0x60
[   53.834908]        rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x174/0x490
[   53.834910]        netlink_rcv_skb+0x42/0x100
[   53.834911]        netlink_unicast+0x18c/0x250
[   53.834912]        netlink_sendmsg+0x227/0x460
[   53.834914]        sock_sendmsg+0x59/0x60
[   53.834915]        ____sys_sendmsg+0x1f5/0x230
[   53.834916]        ___sys_sendmsg+0x70/0xb0
[   53.834917]        __sys_sendmsg+0x54/0xa0
[   53.834919]        do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
[   53.834920]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[   53.834921]
[   53.834921] -> #0 (&ar->conf_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[   53.834923]        check_prev_add+0x98/0x9f0
[   53.834925]        validate_chain+0x404/0x6c0
[   53.834926]        __lock_acquire+0x3bf/0x6e0
[   53.834927]        lock_acquire+0xb6/0x270
[   53.834929]        __mutex_lock+0x88/0x8e0
[   53.834934]        ath11k_mac_op_config+0x16/0x30 [ath11k]
[   53.834935]        ieee80211_hw_config+0xb3/0x270
[   53.834937]        ieee80211_set_associated+0x17c/0x360
[   53.834938]        ieee80211_assoc_success.constprop.0+0x5a2/0xc80
[   53.834940]        ieee80211_rx_mgmt_assoc_resp+0x16a/0x350
[   53.834941]        ieee80211_sta_rx_queued_mgmt+0xca/0x410
[   53.834943]        ieee80211_iface_work+0x1f3/0x350
[   53.834945]        process_one_work+0x265/0x5d0
[   53.834946]        worker_thread+0x49/0x300
[   53.834948]        kthread+0x135/0x150
[   53.834949]        ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
[   53.834950]
[   53.834950] other info that might help us debug this:
[   53.834950]
[   53.834951]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[   53.834951]
[   53.834952]        CPU0                    CPU1
[   53.834952]        ----                    ----
[   53.834953]   lock(&local->iflist_mtx);
[   53.834954]                                lock(&ar->conf_mutex);
[   53.834955]                                lock(&local->iflist_mtx);
[   53.834956]   lock(&ar->conf_mutex);
[   53.834957]
[   53.834957]  *** DEADLOCK ***
[   53.834957]
[   53.834958] 4 locks held by kworker/u16:3/166:
[   53.834959]  #0: ffff8c4b37c22948 ((wq_completion)phy0){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1d3/0x5d0
[   53.834961]  #1: ffffa98300abfe70 ((work_completion)(&sdata->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1d3/0x5d0
[   53.834963]  #2: ffff8c4b371e4cd0 (&wdev->mtx){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ieee80211_sta_rx_queued_mgmt+0x4b/0x410
[   53.834965]  #3: ffff8c4b37182808 (&local->iflist_mtx){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ieee80211_set_associated+0x167/0x360
[   53.834968]
[   53.834968] stack backtrace:
[   53.834969] CPU: 1 PID: 166 Comm: kworker/u16:3 Not tainted 5.9.0-rc5-wt-ath+ #198
[   53.834970] Hardware name: Intel(R) Client Systems NUC8i7HVK/NUC8i7HVB, BIOS HNKBLi70.86A.0049.2018.0801.1601 08/01/2018
[   53.834972] Workqueue: phy0 ieee80211_iface_work
[   53.834974] Call Trace:
[   53.834976]  dump_stack+0x77/0xa0
[   53.834978]  check_noncircular+0x15d/0x180
[   53.834980]  check_prev_add+0x98/0x9f0
[   53.834982]  ? add_chain_cache+0x143/0x440
[   53.834984]  validate_chain+0x404/0x6c0
[   53.834986]  __lock_acquire+0x3bf/0x6e0
[   53.834988]  lock_acquire+0xb6/0x270
[   53.834993]  ? ath11k_mac_op_config+0x16/0x30 [ath11k]
[   53.834999]  ? ath11k_mac_op_config+0x16/0x30 [ath11k]
[   53.835001]  __mutex_lock+0x88/0x8e0
[   53.835006]  ? ath11k_mac_op_config+0x16/0x30 [ath11k]
[   53.835007]  ? sched_clock_cpu+0xc/0xb0
[   53.835009]  ? __lock_release+0x179/0x2c0
[   53.835014]  ath11k_mac_op_config+0x16/0x30 [ath11k]
[   53.835016]  ieee80211_hw_config+0xb3/0x270
[   53.835018]  ieee80211_set_associated+0x17c/0x360
[   53.835019]  ieee80211_assoc_success.constprop.0+0x5a2/0xc80
[   53.835021]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare.part.0+0x9f/0x140
[   53.835023]  ? cmpxchg_double_slab.constprop.0+0x185/0x1a0
[   53.835025]  ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1c/0x100
[   53.835027]  ? __slab_free+0x8f/0x330
[   53.835029]  ? slab_free_freelist_hook+0xf8/0x150
[   53.835031]  ? ieee802_11_parse_elems_crc+0x147/0x1d0
[   53.835032]  ? kfree+0x2b0/0x2d0
[   53.835034]  ? ieee802_11_parse_elems_crc+0x147/0x1d0
[   53.835036]  ieee80211_rx_mgmt_assoc_resp+0x16a/0x350
[   53.835041]  ieee80211_sta_rx_queued_mgmt+0xca/0x410
[   53.835043]  ? __lock_acquire+0x3bf/0x6e0
[   53.835045]  ? lock_acquire+0xb6/0x270
[   53.835046]  ? skb_dequeue+0x13/0x70
[   53.835048]  ? find_held_lock+0x32/0x90
[   53.835049]  ? sched_clock_cpu+0xc/0xb0
[   53.835051]  ? mark_held_locks+0x50/0x80
[   53.835053]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare.part.0+0x9f/0x140
[   53.835054]  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x34/0x40
[   53.835056]  ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1c/0x100
[   53.835058]  ieee80211_iface_work+0x1f3/0x350
[   53.835060]  process_one_work+0x265/0x5d0
[   53.835062]  worker_thread+0x49/0x300
[   53.835063]  ? process_one_work+0x5d0/0x5d0
[   53.835065]  kthread+0x135/0x150
[   53.835066]  ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x60/0x60
[   53.835068]  ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
[   53.835075] wlp6s0: associated
[   53.835132] IPv6: ADDRCONF(NETDEV_CHANGE): wlp6s0: link becomes ready

Tested-on: QCA6390 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.HST.1.0.1-01740-QCAHSTSWPLZ_V2_TO_X86-1

Signed-off-by: Wen Gong <wgong@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1601463073-12106-4-git-send-email-kvalo@codeaurora.org
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 14, 2020
The 64-bit JEQ/JNE handling in reg_set_min_max() was clearing reg->id in either
true or false branch. In the case 'if (reg->id)' check was done on the other
branch the counter part register would have reg->id == 0 when called into
find_equal_scalars(). In such case the helper would incorrectly identify other
registers with id == 0 as equivalent and propagate the state incorrectly.
Fix it by preserving ID across reg_set_min_max().
In other words any kind of comparison operator on the scalar register
should preserve its ID to recognize:
r1 = r2
if (r1 == 20) {
  #1 here both r1 and r2 == 20
} else if (r2 < 20) {
  #2 here both r1 and r2 < 20
}

The patch is addressing #1 case. The #2 was working correctly already.

Fixes: 7574883 ("bpf: Propagate scalar ranges through register assignments.")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 15, 2020
The 64-bit JEQ/JNE handling in reg_set_min_max() was clearing reg->id in either
true or false branch. In the case 'if (reg->id)' check was done on the other
branch the counter part register would have reg->id == 0 when called into
find_equal_scalars(). In such case the helper would incorrectly identify other
registers with id == 0 as equivalent and propagate the state incorrectly.
Fix it by preserving ID across reg_set_min_max().

In other words any kind of comparison operator on the scalar register
should preserve its ID to recognize:

r1 = r2
if (r1 == 20) {
  #1 here both r1 and r2 == 20
} else if (r2 < 20) {
  #2 here both r1 and r2 < 20
}

The patch is addressing #1 case. The #2 was working correctly already.

Fixes: 7574883 ("bpf: Propagate scalar ranges through register assignments.")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20201014175608.1416-1-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 15, 2020
In the function node_lost_contact(), we call __skb_queue_purge() without
grabbing the list->lock. This can cause to a race-condition why processing
the list 'namedq' in calling path tipc_named_rcv()->tipc_named_dequeue().

    [] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
    [] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
    [] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
    [] PGD 7ca63067 P4D 7ca63067 PUD 6c553067 PMD 0
    [] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
    [] CPU: 1 PID: 15 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Tainted: G  O  5.9.0-rc6+ #2
    [] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS [...]
    [] RIP: 0010:tipc_named_rcv+0x103/0x320 [tipc]
    [] Code: 41 89 44 24 10 49 8b 16 49 8b 46 08 49 c7 06 00 00 00 [...]
    [] RSP: 0018:ffffc900000a7c58 EFLAGS: 00000282
    [] RAX: 00000000000012ec RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff88807bde1270
    [] RDX: 0000000000002c7c RSI: 0000000000002c7c RDI: ffff88807b38f1a8
    [] RBP: ffff88807b006288 R08: ffff88806a367800 R09: ffff88806a367900
    [] R10: ffff88806a367a00 R11: ffff88806a367b00 R12: ffff88807b006258
    [] R13: ffff88807b00628a R14: ffff888069334d00 R15: ffff88806a434600
    [] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888079480000(0000) knlGS:0[...]
    [] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
    [] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000077320000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
    [] Call Trace:
    []  ? tipc_bcast_rcv+0x9a/0x1a0 [tipc]
    []  tipc_rcv+0x40d/0x670 [tipc]
    []  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0xa/0x20
    []  tipc_l2_rcv_msg+0x55/0x80 [tipc]
    []  __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x8c/0xa0
    []  process_backlog+0x98/0x140
    []  net_rx_action+0x13a/0x420
    []  __do_softirq+0xdb/0x316
    []  ? smpboot_thread_fn+0x2f/0x1e0
    []  ? smpboot_thread_fn+0x74/0x1e0
    []  ? smpboot_thread_fn+0x14e/0x1e0
    []  run_ksoftirqd+0x1a/0x40
    []  smpboot_thread_fn+0x149/0x1e0
    []  ? sort_range+0x20/0x20
    []  kthread+0x131/0x150
    []  ? kthread_unuse_mm+0xa0/0xa0
    []  ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
    [] Modules linked in: veth tipc(O) ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel [...]
    [] CR2: 0000000000000000
    [] ---[ end trace 65c276a8e2e2f310 ]---

To fix this, we need to grab the lock of the 'namedq' list on both
path calling.

Fixes: cad2929 ("tipc: update a binding service via broadcast")
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hoang Huu Le <hoang.h.le@dektech.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 15, 2020
Commit 4fc427e ("ipv6_route_seq_next should increase position index")
tried to fix the issue where seq_file pos is not increased
if a NULL element is returned with seq_ops->next(). See bug
  https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206283
The commit effectively does:
  - increase pos for all seq_ops->start()
  - increase pos for all seq_ops->next()

For ipv6_route, increasing pos for all seq_ops->next() is correct.
But increasing pos for seq_ops->start() is not correct
since pos is used to determine how many items to skip during
seq_ops->start():
  iter->skip = *pos;
seq_ops->start() just fetches the *current* pos item.
The item can be skipped only after seq_ops->show() which essentially
is the beginning of seq_ops->next().

For example, I have 7 ipv6 route entries,
  root@arch-fb-vm1:~/net-next dd if=/proc/net/ipv6_route bs=4096
  00000000000000000000000000000000 40 00000000000000000000000000000000 00 00000000000000000000000000000000 00000400 00000001 00000000 00000001     eth0
  fe800000000000000000000000000000 40 00000000000000000000000000000000 00 00000000000000000000000000000000 00000100 00000001 00000000 00000001     eth0
  00000000000000000000000000000000 00 00000000000000000000000000000000 00 00000000000000000000000000000000 ffffffff 00000001 00000000 00200200       lo
  00000000000000000000000000000001 80 00000000000000000000000000000000 00 00000000000000000000000000000000 00000000 00000003 00000000 80200001       lo
  fe800000000000002050e3fffebd3be8 80 00000000000000000000000000000000 00 00000000000000000000000000000000 00000000 00000002 00000000 80200001     eth0
  ff000000000000000000000000000000 08 00000000000000000000000000000000 00 00000000000000000000000000000000 00000100 00000004 00000000 00000001     eth0
  00000000000000000000000000000000 00 00000000000000000000000000000000 00 00000000000000000000000000000000 ffffffff 00000001 00000000 00200200       lo
  0+1 records in
  0+1 records out
  1050 bytes (1.0 kB, 1.0 KiB) copied, 0.00707908 s, 148 kB/s
  root@arch-fb-vm1:~/net-next

In the above, I specify buffer size 4096, so all records can be returned
to user space with a single trip to the kernel.

If I use buffer size 128, since each record size is 149, internally
kernel seq_read() will read 149 into its internal buffer and return the data
to user space in two read() syscalls. Then user read() syscall will trigger
next seq_ops->start(). Since the current implementation increased pos even
for seq_ops->start(), it will skip record #2, #4 and #6, assuming the first
record is #1.

  root@arch-fb-vm1:~/net-next dd if=/proc/net/ipv6_route bs=128
  00000000000000000000000000000000 40 00000000000000000000000000000000 00 00000000000000000000000000000000 00000400 00000001 00000000 00000001     eth0
  00000000000000000000000000000000 00 00000000000000000000000000000000 00 00000000000000000000000000000000 ffffffff 00000001 00000000 00200200       lo
  fe800000000000002050e3fffebd3be8 80 00000000000000000000000000000000 00 00000000000000000000000000000000 00000000 00000002 00000000 80200001     eth0
  00000000000000000000000000000000 00 00000000000000000000000000000000 00 00000000000000000000000000000000 ffffffff 00000001 00000000 00200200       lo
4+1 records in
4+1 records out
600 bytes copied, 0.00127758 s, 470 kB/s

To fix the problem, create a fake pos pointer so seq_ops->start()
won't actually increase seq_file pos. With this fix, the
above `dd` command with `bs=128` will show correct result.

Fixes: 4fc427e ("ipv6_route_seq_next should increase position index")
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Suggested-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2020
…ped.

With highmem, pte_alloc_map() keep the level4 page table mapped using
kmap_atomic().  Avoid doing new memory allocation with page table mapped
like above.

[    9.409233] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at mm/page_alloc.c:4822
[    9.410557] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 1, name: swapper
[    9.411932] no locks held by swapper/1.
[    9.412595] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.9.0-rc3-00323-gc50eb1ed654b5 #2
[    9.413824] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014
[    9.415207] Call Trace:
[    9.415651]  ? ___might_sleep.cold+0xa7/0xcc
[    9.416367]  ? __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x14c/0x5b0
[    9.417055]  ? swap_migration_tests+0x50/0x293
[    9.417704]  ? debug_vm_pgtable+0x4bc/0x708
[    9.418287]  ? swap_migration_tests+0x293/0x293
[    9.418911]  ? do_one_initcall+0x82/0x3cb
[    9.419465]  ? parse_args+0x1bd/0x280
[    9.419983]  ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x36/0x60
[    9.420673]  ? trace_initcall_level+0x1f/0xf3
[    9.421279]  ? trace_initcall_level+0xbd/0xf3
[    9.421881]  ? do_basic_setup+0x9d/0xdd
[    9.422410]  ? do_basic_setup+0xc3/0xdd
[    9.422938]  ? kernel_init_freeable+0x72/0xa3
[    9.423539]  ? rest_init+0x134/0x134
[    9.424055]  ? kernel_init+0x5/0x12c
[    9.424574]  ? ret_from_fork+0x19/0x30

Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200913110327.645310-1-aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2020
The metadata buffer is no longer trusted after we read it from disk
again because it is not uptodate for some reasons (e.g. failed to write
back). Otherwise we may get below memory corruption problem in
ext4_ext_split()->memset() if we read stale data from the newly
allocated extent block on disk which has been failed to async write
out but miss verify again since the verified bit has already been set
on the buffer.

[   29.774674] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff88841949d000
...
[   29.783317] Oops: 0002 [#2] SMP
[   29.784219] R10: 00000000000f4240 R11: 0000000000002e28 R12: ffff88842fa1c800
[   29.784627] CPU: 1 PID: 126 Comm: kworker/u4:3 Tainted: G      D W
[   29.785546] R13: ffffffff9cddcc20 R14: ffffffff9cddd420 R15: ffff88842fa1c2f8
[   29.786679] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996),BIOS ?-20190727_0738364
[   29.787588] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88842fa00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   29.789288] Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn
[   29.790319] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   29.790321]  (flush-8:0)
[   29.790844] CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 00000004234f2000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[   29.791924] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[   29.792839] RIP: 0010:__memset+0x24/0x30
[   29.793739] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[   29.794256] Code: 90 90 90 90 90 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 f9 48 89 d1 83 e2 07 48 c1 e9 033
[   29.795161] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
...
[   29.808149] Call Trace:
[   29.808475]  ext4_ext_insert_extent+0x102e/0x1be0
[   29.809085]  ext4_ext_map_blocks+0xa89/0x1bb0
[   29.809652]  ext4_map_blocks+0x290/0x8a0
[   29.809085]  ext4_ext_map_blocks+0xa89/0x1bb0
[   29.809652]  ext4_map_blocks+0x290/0x8a0
[   29.810161]  ext4_writepages+0xc85/0x17c0
...

Fix this by clearing buffer's verified bit if we read meta block from
disk again.

Signed-off-by: zhangyi (F) <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200924073337.861472-2-yi.zhang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2020
With SO_RCVLOWAT, under memory pressure,
it is possible to enter a state where:

1. We have not received enough bytes to satisfy SO_RCVLOWAT.
2. We have not entered buffer pressure (see tcp_rmem_pressure()).
3. But, we do not have enough buffer space to accept more packets.

In this case, we advertise 0 rwnd (due to #3) but the application does
not drain the receive queue (no wakeup because of #1 and #2) so the
flow stalls.

Modify the heuristic for SO_RCVLOWAT so that, if we are advertising
rwnd<=rcv_mss, force a wakeup to prevent a stall.

Without this patch, setting tcp_rmem to 6143 and disabling TCP
autotune causes a stalled flow. With this patch, no stall occurs. This
is with RPC-style traffic with large messages.

Fixes: 03f45c8 ("tcp: avoid extra wakeups for SO_RCVLOWAT users")
Signed-off-by: Arjun Roy <arjunroy@google.com>
Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201023184709.217614-1-arjunroy.kdev@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 16, 2020
Edward Cree says:

====================
sfc: EF100 TSO enhancements

Support TSO over encapsulation (with GSO_PARTIAL), and over VLANs
 (which the code already handled but we didn't advertise).  Also
 correct our handling of IPID mangling.

I couldn't find documentation of exactly what shaped SKBs we can
 get given, so patch #2 is slightly guesswork, but when I tested
 TSO over both underlay and (VxLAN) overlay, the checksums came
 out correctly, so at least in those cases the edits we're making
 must be the right ones.
Similarly, I'm not 100% sure I've correctly understood how FIXEDID
 and MANGLEID are supposed to work in patch #3.
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/6e1ea05f-faeb-18df-91ef-572445691d89@solarflare.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 16, 2020
…/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD

KVM/arm64 fixes for v5.10, take #2

- Fix compilation error when PMD and PUD are folded
- Fix regresssion of the RAZ behaviour of ID_AA64ZFR0_EL1
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 20, 2020
While doing memory hot-unplug operation on a PowerPC VM running 1024 CPUs
with 11TB of ram, I hit the following panic:

    BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000007
    Faulting instruction address: 0xc000000000456048
    Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#2]
    LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS= 2048 NUMA pSeries
    Modules linked in: rpadlpar_io rpaphp
    CPU: 160 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Tainted: G      D           5.9.0 #1
    NIP:  c000000000456048 LR: c000000000455fd4 CTR: c00000000047b350
    REGS: c00006028d1b77a0 TRAP: 0300   Tainted: G      D            (5.9.0)
    MSR:  8000000000009033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE>  CR: 24004228  XER: 00000000
    CFAR: c00000000000f1b0 DAR: 0000000000000007 DSISR: 40000000 IRQMASK: 0
    GPR00: c000000000455fd4 c00006028d1b7a30 c000000001bec800 0000000000000000
    GPR04: 0000000000000dc0 0000000000000000 00000000000374ef c00007c53df99320
    GPR08: 000007c53c980000 0000000000000000 000007c53c980000 0000000000000000
    GPR12: 0000000000004400 c00000001e8e4400 0000000000000000 0000000000000f6a
    GPR16: 0000000000000000 c000000001c25930 c000000001d62528 00000000000000c1
    GPR20: c000000001d62538 c00006be469e9000 0000000fffffffe0 c0000000003c0ff8
    GPR24: 0000000000000018 0000000000000000 0000000000000dc0 0000000000000000
    GPR28: c00007c513755700 c000000001c236a4 c00007bc4001f800 0000000000000001
    NIP [c000000000456048] __kmalloc_node+0x108/0x790
    LR [c000000000455fd4] __kmalloc_node+0x94/0x790
    Call Trace:
      kvmalloc_node+0x58/0x110
      mem_cgroup_css_online+0x10c/0x270
      online_css+0x48/0xd0
      cgroup_apply_control_enable+0x2c4/0x470
      cgroup_mkdir+0x408/0x5f0
      kernfs_iop_mkdir+0x90/0x100
      vfs_mkdir+0x138/0x250
      do_mkdirat+0x154/0x1c0
      system_call_exception+0xf8/0x200
      system_call_common+0xf0/0x27c
    Instruction dump:
    e93e0000 e90d0030 39290008 7cc9402a e94d0030 e93e0000 7ce95214 7f89502a
    2fbc0000 419e0018 41920230 e9270010 <89290007> 7f994800 419e0220 7ee6bb78

This pointing to the following code:

    mm/slub.c:2851
            if (unlikely(!object || !node_match(page, node))) {
    c000000000456038:       00 00 bc 2f     cmpdi   cr7,r28,0
    c00000000045603c:       18 00 9e 41     beq     cr7,c000000000456054 <__kmalloc_node+0x114>
    node_match():
    mm/slub.c:2491
            if (node != NUMA_NO_NODE && page_to_nid(page) != node)
    c000000000456040:       30 02 92 41     beq     cr4,c000000000456270 <__kmalloc_node+0x330>
    page_to_nid():
    include/linux/mm.h:1294
    c000000000456044:       10 00 27 e9     ld      r9,16(r7)
    c000000000456048:       07 00 29 89     lbz     r9,7(r9)	<<<< r9 = NULL
    node_match():
    mm/slub.c:2491
    c00000000045604c:       00 48 99 7f     cmpw    cr7,r25,r9
    c000000000456050:       20 02 9e 41     beq     cr7,c000000000456270 <__kmalloc_node+0x330>

The panic occurred in slab_alloc_node() when checking for the page's node:

	object = c->freelist;
	page = c->page;
	if (unlikely(!object || !node_match(page, node))) {
		object = __slab_alloc(s, gfpflags, node, addr, c);
		stat(s, ALLOC_SLOWPATH);

The issue is that object is not NULL while page is NULL which is odd but
may happen if the cache flush happened after loading object but before
loading page.  Thus checking for the page pointer is required too.

The cache flush is done through an inter processor interrupt when a
piece of memory is off-lined.  That interrupt is triggered when a memory
hot-unplug operation is initiated and offline_pages() is calling the
slub's MEM_GOING_OFFLINE callback slab_mem_going_offline_callback()
which is calling flush_cpu_slab().  If that interrupt is caught between
the reading of c->freelist and the reading of c->page, this could lead
to such a situation.  That situation is expected and the later call to
this_cpu_cmpxchg_double() will detect the change to c->freelist and redo
the whole operation.

In commit 6159d0f ("mm/slub.c: page is always non-NULL in
node_match()") check on the page pointer has been removed assuming that
page is always valid when it is called.  It happens that this is not
true in that particular case, so check for page before calling
node_match() here.

Fixes: 6159d0f ("mm/slub.c: page is always non-NULL in node_match()")
Signed-off-by: Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang@gmail.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Scott Cheloha <cheloha@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201027190406.33283-1-ldufour@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 20, 2020
This fix is for a failure that occurred in the DWARF unwind perf test.

Stack unwinders may probe memory when looking for frames.

Memory sanitizer will poison and track uninitialized memory on the
stack, and on the heap if the value is copied to the heap.

This can lead to false memory sanitizer failures for the use of an
uninitialized value.

Avoid this problem by removing the poison on the copied stack.

The full msan failure with track origins looks like:

==2168==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value
    #0 0x559ceb10755b in handle_cfi elfutils/libdwfl/frame_unwind.c:648:8
    #1 0x559ceb105448 in __libdwfl_frame_unwind elfutils/libdwfl/frame_unwind.c:741:4
    #2 0x559ceb0ece90 in dwfl_thread_getframes elfutils/libdwfl/dwfl_frame.c:435:7
    #3 0x559ceb0ec6b7 in get_one_thread_frames_cb elfutils/libdwfl/dwfl_frame.c:379:10
    #4 0x559ceb0ec6b7 in get_one_thread_cb elfutils/libdwfl/dwfl_frame.c:308:17
    #5 0x559ceb0ec6b7 in dwfl_getthreads elfutils/libdwfl/dwfl_frame.c:283:17
    #6 0x559ceb0ec6b7 in getthread elfutils/libdwfl/dwfl_frame.c:354:14
    #7 0x559ceb0ec6b7 in dwfl_getthread_frames elfutils/libdwfl/dwfl_frame.c:388:10
    #8 0x559ceaff6ae6 in unwind__get_entries tools/perf/util/unwind-libdw.c:236:8
    #9 0x559ceabc9dbc in test_dwarf_unwind__thread tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:111:8
    #10 0x559ceabca5cf in test_dwarf_unwind__compare tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:138:26
    #11 0x7f812a6865b0 in bsearch (libc.so.6+0x4e5b0)
    #12 0x559ceabca871 in test_dwarf_unwind__krava_3 tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:162:2
    #13 0x559ceabca926 in test_dwarf_unwind__krava_2 tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:169:9
    #14 0x559ceabca946 in test_dwarf_unwind__krava_1 tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:174:9
    #15 0x559ceabcae12 in test__dwarf_unwind tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:211:8
    #16 0x559ceabbc4ab in run_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:418:9
    #17 0x559ceabbc4ab in test_and_print tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:448:9
    #18 0x559ceabbac70 in __cmd_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:669:4
    #19 0x559ceabbac70 in cmd_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:815:9
    #20 0x559cea960e30 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:313:11
    #21 0x559cea95fbce in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:365:8
    #22 0x559cea95fbce in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:409:2
    #23 0x559cea95fbce in main tools/perf/perf.c:539:3

  Uninitialized value was stored to memory at
    #0 0x559ceb106acf in __libdwfl_frame_reg_set elfutils/libdwfl/frame_unwind.c:77:22
    #1 0x559ceb106acf in handle_cfi elfutils/libdwfl/frame_unwind.c:627:13
    #2 0x559ceb105448 in __libdwfl_frame_unwind elfutils/libdwfl/frame_unwind.c:741:4
    #3 0x559ceb0ece90 in dwfl_thread_getframes elfutils/libdwfl/dwfl_frame.c:435:7
    #4 0x559ceb0ec6b7 in get_one_thread_frames_cb elfutils/libdwfl/dwfl_frame.c:379:10
    #5 0x559ceb0ec6b7 in get_one_thread_cb elfutils/libdwfl/dwfl_frame.c:308:17
    #6 0x559ceb0ec6b7 in dwfl_getthreads elfutils/libdwfl/dwfl_frame.c:283:17
    #7 0x559ceb0ec6b7 in getthread elfutils/libdwfl/dwfl_frame.c:354:14
    #8 0x559ceb0ec6b7 in dwfl_getthread_frames elfutils/libdwfl/dwfl_frame.c:388:10
    #9 0x559ceaff6ae6 in unwind__get_entries tools/perf/util/unwind-libdw.c:236:8
    #10 0x559ceabc9dbc in test_dwarf_unwind__thread tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:111:8
    #11 0x559ceabca5cf in test_dwarf_unwind__compare tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:138:26
    #12 0x7f812a6865b0 in bsearch (libc.so.6+0x4e5b0)
    #13 0x559ceabca871 in test_dwarf_unwind__krava_3 tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:162:2
    #14 0x559ceabca926 in test_dwarf_unwind__krava_2 tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:169:9
    #15 0x559ceabca946 in test_dwarf_unwind__krava_1 tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:174:9
    #16 0x559ceabcae12 in test__dwarf_unwind tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:211:8
    #17 0x559ceabbc4ab in run_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:418:9
    #18 0x559ceabbc4ab in test_and_print tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:448:9
    #19 0x559ceabbac70 in __cmd_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:669:4
    #20 0x559ceabbac70 in cmd_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:815:9
    #21 0x559cea960e30 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:313:11
    #22 0x559cea95fbce in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:365:8
    #23 0x559cea95fbce in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:409:2
    #24 0x559cea95fbce in main tools/perf/perf.c:539:3

  Uninitialized value was stored to memory at
    #0 0x559ceb106a54 in handle_cfi elfutils/libdwfl/frame_unwind.c:613:9
    #1 0x559ceb105448 in __libdwfl_frame_unwind elfutils/libdwfl/frame_unwind.c:741:4
    #2 0x559ceb0ece90 in dwfl_thread_getframes elfutils/libdwfl/dwfl_frame.c:435:7
    #3 0x559ceb0ec6b7 in get_one_thread_frames_cb elfutils/libdwfl/dwfl_frame.c:379:10
    #4 0x559ceb0ec6b7 in get_one_thread_cb elfutils/libdwfl/dwfl_frame.c:308:17
    #5 0x559ceb0ec6b7 in dwfl_getthreads elfutils/libdwfl/dwfl_frame.c:283:17
    #6 0x559ceb0ec6b7 in getthread elfutils/libdwfl/dwfl_frame.c:354:14
    #7 0x559ceb0ec6b7 in dwfl_getthread_frames elfutils/libdwfl/dwfl_frame.c:388:10
    #8 0x559ceaff6ae6 in unwind__get_entries tools/perf/util/unwind-libdw.c:236:8
    #9 0x559ceabc9dbc in test_dwarf_unwind__thread tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:111:8
    #10 0x559ceabca5cf in test_dwarf_unwind__compare tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:138:26
    #11 0x7f812a6865b0 in bsearch (libc.so.6+0x4e5b0)
    #12 0x559ceabca871 in test_dwarf_unwind__krava_3 tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:162:2
    #13 0x559ceabca926 in test_dwarf_unwind__krava_2 tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:169:9
    #14 0x559ceabca946 in test_dwarf_unwind__krava_1 tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:174:9
    #15 0x559ceabcae12 in test__dwarf_unwind tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:211:8
    #16 0x559ceabbc4ab in run_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:418:9
    #17 0x559ceabbc4ab in test_and_print tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:448:9
    #18 0x559ceabbac70 in __cmd_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:669:4
    #19 0x559ceabbac70 in cmd_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:815:9
    #20 0x559cea960e30 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:313:11
    #21 0x559cea95fbce in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:365:8
    #22 0x559cea95fbce in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:409:2
    #23 0x559cea95fbce in main tools/perf/perf.c:539:3

  Uninitialized value was stored to memory at
    #0 0x559ceaff8800 in memory_read tools/perf/util/unwind-libdw.c:156:10
    #1 0x559ceb10f053 in expr_eval elfutils/libdwfl/frame_unwind.c:501:13
    #2 0x559ceb1060cc in handle_cfi elfutils/libdwfl/frame_unwind.c:603:18
    #3 0x559ceb105448 in __libdwfl_frame_unwind elfutils/libdwfl/frame_unwind.c:741:4
    #4 0x559ceb0ece90 in dwfl_thread_getframes elfutils/libdwfl/dwfl_frame.c:435:7
    #5 0x559ceb0ec6b7 in get_one_thread_frames_cb elfutils/libdwfl/dwfl_frame.c:379:10
    #6 0x559ceb0ec6b7 in get_one_thread_cb elfutils/libdwfl/dwfl_frame.c:308:17
    #7 0x559ceb0ec6b7 in dwfl_getthreads elfutils/libdwfl/dwfl_frame.c:283:17
    #8 0x559ceb0ec6b7 in getthread elfutils/libdwfl/dwfl_frame.c:354:14
    #9 0x559ceb0ec6b7 in dwfl_getthread_frames elfutils/libdwfl/dwfl_frame.c:388:10
    #10 0x559ceaff6ae6 in unwind__get_entries tools/perf/util/unwind-libdw.c:236:8
    #11 0x559ceabc9dbc in test_dwarf_unwind__thread tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:111:8
    #12 0x559ceabca5cf in test_dwarf_unwind__compare tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:138:26
    #13 0x7f812a6865b0 in bsearch (libc.so.6+0x4e5b0)
    #14 0x559ceabca871 in test_dwarf_unwind__krava_3 tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:162:2
    #15 0x559ceabca926 in test_dwarf_unwind__krava_2 tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:169:9
    #16 0x559ceabca946 in test_dwarf_unwind__krava_1 tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:174:9
    #17 0x559ceabcae12 in test__dwarf_unwind tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:211:8
    #18 0x559ceabbc4ab in run_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:418:9
    #19 0x559ceabbc4ab in test_and_print tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:448:9
    #20 0x559ceabbac70 in __cmd_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:669:4
    #21 0x559ceabbac70 in cmd_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:815:9
    #22 0x559cea960e30 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:313:11
    #23 0x559cea95fbce in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:365:8
    #24 0x559cea95fbce in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:409:2
    #25 0x559cea95fbce in main tools/perf/perf.c:539:3

  Uninitialized value was stored to memory at
    #0 0x559cea9027d9 in __msan_memcpy llvm/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/msan/msan_interceptors.cpp:1558:3
    #1 0x559cea9d2185 in sample_ustack tools/perf/arch/x86/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:41:2
    #2 0x559cea9d202c in test__arch_unwind_sample tools/perf/arch/x86/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:72:9
    #3 0x559ceabc9cbd in test_dwarf_unwind__thread tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:106:6
    #4 0x559ceabca5cf in test_dwarf_unwind__compare tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:138:26
    #5 0x7f812a6865b0 in bsearch (libc.so.6+0x4e5b0)
    #6 0x559ceabca871 in test_dwarf_unwind__krava_3 tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:162:2
    #7 0x559ceabca926 in test_dwarf_unwind__krava_2 tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:169:9
    #8 0x559ceabca946 in test_dwarf_unwind__krava_1 tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:174:9
    #9 0x559ceabcae12 in test__dwarf_unwind tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:211:8
    #10 0x559ceabbc4ab in run_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:418:9
    #11 0x559ceabbc4ab in test_and_print tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:448:9
    #12 0x559ceabbac70 in __cmd_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:669:4
    #13 0x559ceabbac70 in cmd_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:815:9
    #14 0x559cea960e30 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:313:11
    #15 0x559cea95fbce in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:365:8
    #16 0x559cea95fbce in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:409:2
    #17 0x559cea95fbce in main tools/perf/perf.c:539:3

  Uninitialized value was created by an allocation of 'bf' in the stack frame of function 'perf_event__synthesize_mmap_events'
    #0 0x559ceafc5f60 in perf_event__synthesize_mmap_events tools/perf/util/synthetic-events.c:445

SUMMARY: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value elfutils/libdwfl/frame_unwind.c:648:8 in handle_cfi
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: clang-built-linux@googlegroups.com
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sandeep Dasgupta <sdasgup@google.com>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201113182053.754625-1-irogers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 20, 2020
Ido Schimmel says:

====================
mlxsw: Couple of fixes

Patch #1 fixes firmware flashing when CONFIG_MLXSW_CORE=y and
CONFIG_MLXFW=m.

Patch #2 prevents EMAD transactions from needlessly failing when the
system is under heavy load by using exponential backoff.

Please consider patch #2 for stable.
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201117173352.288491-1-idosch@idosch.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 30, 2020
Actually, burst size is equal to '1 << desc->rqcfg.brst_size'.
we should use burst size, not desc->rqcfg.brst_size.

dma memcpy performance on Rockchip RV1126
@ 1512MHz A7, 1056MHz LPDDR3, 200MHz DMA:

dmatest:

/# echo dma0chan0 > /sys/module/dmatest/parameters/channel
/# echo 4194304 > /sys/module/dmatest/parameters/test_buf_size
/# echo 8 > /sys/module/dmatest/parameters/iterations
/# echo y > /sys/module/dmatest/parameters/norandom
/# echo y > /sys/module/dmatest/parameters/verbose
/# echo 1 > /sys/module/dmatest/parameters/run

dmatest: dma0chan0-copy0: result #1: 'test passed' with src_off=0x0 dst_off=0x0 len=0x400000
dmatest: dma0chan0-copy0: result #2: 'test passed' with src_off=0x0 dst_off=0x0 len=0x400000
dmatest: dma0chan0-copy0: result #3: 'test passed' with src_off=0x0 dst_off=0x0 len=0x400000
dmatest: dma0chan0-copy0: result #4: 'test passed' with src_off=0x0 dst_off=0x0 len=0x400000
dmatest: dma0chan0-copy0: result #5: 'test passed' with src_off=0x0 dst_off=0x0 len=0x400000
dmatest: dma0chan0-copy0: result #6: 'test passed' with src_off=0x0 dst_off=0x0 len=0x400000
dmatest: dma0chan0-copy0: result #7: 'test passed' with src_off=0x0 dst_off=0x0 len=0x400000
dmatest: dma0chan0-copy0: result #8: 'test passed' with src_off=0x0 dst_off=0x0 len=0x400000

Before:

  dmatest: dma0chan0-copy0: summary 8 tests, 0 failures 48 iops 200338 KB/s (0)

After this patch:

  dmatest: dma0chan0-copy0: summary 8 tests, 0 failures 179 iops 734873 KB/s (0)

After this patch and increase dma clk to 400MHz:

  dmatest: dma0chan0-copy0: summary 8 tests, 0 failures 259 iops 1062929 KB/s (0)

Signed-off-by: Sugar Zhang <sugar.zhang@rock-chips.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1605326106-55681-1-git-send-email-sugar.zhang@rock-chips.com
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 30, 2020
When running test case btrfs/017 from fstests, lockdep reported the
following splat:

  [ 1297.067385] ======================================================
  [ 1297.067708] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
  [ 1297.068022] 5.10.0-rc4-btrfs-next-73 #1 Not tainted
  [ 1297.068322] ------------------------------------------------------
  [ 1297.068629] btrfs/189080 is trying to acquire lock:
  [ 1297.068929] ffff9f2725731690 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: btrfs_quota_enable+0xaf/0xa70 [btrfs]
  [ 1297.069274]
		 but task is already holding lock:
  [ 1297.069868] ffff9f2702b61a08 (&fs_info->qgroup_ioctl_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_quota_enable+0x3b/0xa70 [btrfs]
  [ 1297.070219]
		 which lock already depends on the new lock.

  [ 1297.071131]
		 the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
  [ 1297.071721]
		 -> #1 (&fs_info->qgroup_ioctl_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
  [ 1297.072375]        lock_acquire+0xd8/0x490
  [ 1297.072710]        __mutex_lock+0xa3/0xb30
  [ 1297.073061]        btrfs_qgroup_inherit+0x59/0x6a0 [btrfs]
  [ 1297.073421]        create_subvol+0x194/0x990 [btrfs]
  [ 1297.073780]        btrfs_mksubvol+0x3fb/0x4a0 [btrfs]
  [ 1297.074133]        __btrfs_ioctl_snap_create+0x119/0x1a0 [btrfs]
  [ 1297.074498]        btrfs_ioctl_snap_create+0x58/0x80 [btrfs]
  [ 1297.074872]        btrfs_ioctl+0x1a90/0x36f0 [btrfs]
  [ 1297.075245]        __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0
  [ 1297.075617]        do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80
  [ 1297.075993]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
  [ 1297.076380]
		 -> #0 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}:
  [ 1297.077166]        check_prev_add+0x91/0xc60
  [ 1297.077572]        __lock_acquire+0x1740/0x3110
  [ 1297.077984]        lock_acquire+0xd8/0x490
  [ 1297.078411]        start_transaction+0x3c5/0x760 [btrfs]
  [ 1297.078853]        btrfs_quota_enable+0xaf/0xa70 [btrfs]
  [ 1297.079323]        btrfs_ioctl+0x2c60/0x36f0 [btrfs]
  [ 1297.079789]        __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0
  [ 1297.080232]        do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80
  [ 1297.080680]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
  [ 1297.081139]
		 other info that might help us debug this:

  [ 1297.082536]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

  [ 1297.083510]        CPU0                    CPU1
  [ 1297.084005]        ----                    ----
  [ 1297.084500]   lock(&fs_info->qgroup_ioctl_lock);
  [ 1297.084994]                                lock(sb_internal#2);
  [ 1297.085485]                                lock(&fs_info->qgroup_ioctl_lock);
  [ 1297.085974]   lock(sb_internal#2);
  [ 1297.086454]
		  *** DEADLOCK ***
  [ 1297.087880] 3 locks held by btrfs/189080:
  [ 1297.088324]  #0: ffff9f2725731470 (sb_writers#14){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: btrfs_ioctl+0xa73/0x36f0 [btrfs]
  [ 1297.088799]  #1: ffff9f2702b60cc0 (&fs_info->subvol_sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_ioctl+0x1f4d/0x36f0 [btrfs]
  [ 1297.089284]  #2: ffff9f2702b61a08 (&fs_info->qgroup_ioctl_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_quota_enable+0x3b/0xa70 [btrfs]
  [ 1297.089771]
		 stack backtrace:
  [ 1297.090662] CPU: 5 PID: 189080 Comm: btrfs Not tainted 5.10.0-rc4-btrfs-next-73 #1
  [ 1297.091132] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
  [ 1297.092123] Call Trace:
  [ 1297.092629]  dump_stack+0x8d/0xb5
  [ 1297.093115]  check_noncircular+0xff/0x110
  [ 1297.093596]  check_prev_add+0x91/0xc60
  [ 1297.094076]  ? kvm_clock_read+0x14/0x30
  [ 1297.094553]  ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x5/0x10
  [ 1297.095029]  __lock_acquire+0x1740/0x3110
  [ 1297.095510]  lock_acquire+0xd8/0x490
  [ 1297.095993]  ? btrfs_quota_enable+0xaf/0xa70 [btrfs]
  [ 1297.096476]  start_transaction+0x3c5/0x760 [btrfs]
  [ 1297.096962]  ? btrfs_quota_enable+0xaf/0xa70 [btrfs]
  [ 1297.097451]  btrfs_quota_enable+0xaf/0xa70 [btrfs]
  [ 1297.097941]  ? btrfs_ioctl+0x1f4d/0x36f0 [btrfs]
  [ 1297.098429]  btrfs_ioctl+0x2c60/0x36f0 [btrfs]
  [ 1297.098904]  ? do_user_addr_fault+0x20c/0x430
  [ 1297.099382]  ? kvm_clock_read+0x14/0x30
  [ 1297.099854]  ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x5/0x10
  [ 1297.100328]  ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10
  [ 1297.100801]  ? sched_clock_cpu+0x12/0x180
  [ 1297.101272]  ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0
  [ 1297.101739]  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0
  [ 1297.102207]  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80
  [ 1297.102673]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
  [ 1297.103148] RIP: 0033:0x7f773ff65d87

This is because during the quota enable ioctl we lock first the mutex
qgroup_ioctl_lock and then start a transaction, and starting a transaction
acquires a fs freeze semaphore (at the VFS level). However, every other
code path, except for the quota disable ioctl path, we do the opposite:
we start a transaction and then lock the mutex.

So fix this by making the quota enable and disable paths to start the
transaction without having the mutex locked, and then, after starting the
transaction, lock the mutex and check if some other task already enabled
or disabled the quotas, bailing with success if that was the case.

Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 4, 2020
Ido Schimmel says:

====================
mlxsw: Add support for nexthop objects

This patch set adds support for nexthop objects in mlxsw. Nexthop
objects are treated as another front-end for programming nexthops, in
addition to the existing IPv4 and IPv6 front-ends.

Patch #1 registers a listener to the nexthop notification chain and
parses the nexthop information into the existing mlxsw data structures
that are already used by the IPv4 and IPv6 front-ends. Blackhole
nexthops are currently rejected. Support will be added in a follow-up
patch set.

Patch #2 extends mlxsw to resolve its internal nexthop objects from the
nexthop identifier encoded in the FIB info of the notified routes.

Patch #3 finally removes the limitation of rejecting routes that use
nexthop objects.

Patch #4 adds a selftest.

Patches #5-#8 add generic forwarding selftests that can be used with
veth pairs or physical loopbacks.
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201119130848.407918-1-idosch@idosch.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 4, 2020
Huazhong Tan says:

====================
net: hns3: misc updates for -next

This series includes some misc updates for the HNS3 ethernet driver.

 #1 adds support for 1280 queues
 #2 adds mapping for BAR45 which is needed by RoCE client.
 #3 extend the interrupt resources.
 #4&#5 add support to query firmware's calculated shaping parameters.
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1605863783-36995-1-git-send-email-tanhuazhong@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 4, 2020
This patch introduce a new globs attribute to define the subclass of the
glock lockref spinlock. This avoid the following lockdep warning, which
occurs when we lock an inode lock while an iopen lock is held:

============================================
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
5.10.0-rc3+ #4990 Not tainted
--------------------------------------------
kworker/0:1/12 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff9067d45672d8 (&gl->gl_lockref.lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: lockref_get+0x9/0x20

but task is already holding lock:
ffff9067da308588 (&gl->gl_lockref.lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: delete_work_func+0x164/0x260

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0
       ----
  lock(&gl->gl_lockref.lock);
  lock(&gl->gl_lockref.lock);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

 May be due to missing lock nesting notation

3 locks held by kworker/0:1/12:
 #0: ffff9067c1bfdd38 ((wq_completion)delete_workqueue){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1b7/0x540
 #1: ffffac594006be70 ((work_completion)(&(&gl->gl_delete)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1b7/0x540
 #2: ffff9067da308588 (&gl->gl_lockref.lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: delete_work_func+0x164/0x260

stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 12 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 5.10.0-rc3+ #4990
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014
Workqueue: delete_workqueue delete_work_func
Call Trace:
 dump_stack+0x8b/0xb0
 __lock_acquire.cold+0x19e/0x2e3
 lock_acquire+0x150/0x410
 ? lockref_get+0x9/0x20
 _raw_spin_lock+0x27/0x40
 ? lockref_get+0x9/0x20
 lockref_get+0x9/0x20
 delete_work_func+0x188/0x260
 process_one_work+0x237/0x540
 worker_thread+0x4d/0x3b0
 ? process_one_work+0x540/0x540
 kthread+0x127/0x140
 ? __kthread_bind_mask+0x60/0x60
 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30

Suggested-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Aring <aahringo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 4, 2020
Ido Schimmel says:

====================
mlxsw: Update adjacency index more efficiently

The device supports an operation that allows the driver to issue one
request to update the adjacency index for all the routes in a given
virtual router (VR) from old index and size to new ones. This is useful
in case the configuration of a certain nexthop group is updated and its
adjacency index changes.

Currently, the driver does not use this operation in an efficient
manner. It iterates over all the routes using the nexthop group and
issues an update request for the VR if it is not the same as the
previous VR.

Instead, this patch set tracks the VRs in which the nexthop group is
used and issues one request for each VR.

Example:

8k IPv6 routes were added in an alternating manner to two VRFs. All the
routes are using the same nexthop object ('nhid 1').

Before:

 Performance counter stats for 'ip nexthop replace id 1 via 2001:db8:1::2 dev swp3':

            16,385      devlink:devlink_hwmsg

       4.255933213 seconds time elapsed

       0.000000000 seconds user
       0.666923000 seconds sys

Number of EMAD transactions corresponds to number of routes using the
nexthop group.

After:

 Performance counter stats for 'ip nexthop replace id 1 via 2001:db8:1::2 dev swp3':

                 3      devlink:devlink_hwmsg

       0.077655094 seconds time elapsed

       0.000000000 seconds user
       0.076698000 seconds sys

Number of EMAD transactions corresponds to number of VRFs / VRs.

Patch set overview:

Patch #1 is a fix for a bug introduced in previous submission. Detected
by Coverity.

Patches #2 and #3 are preparations.

Patch #4 tracks the VRs a nexthop group is member of.

Patch #5 uses the membership tracking from the previous patch to issue
one update request per each VR.
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201125193505.1052466-1-idosch@idosch.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 4, 2020
Ido Schimmel says:

====================
mlxsw: Add support for 802.1ad bridging

802.1ad, also known as QinQ, is an extension to the 802.1q standard,
which is concerned with passing possibly 802.1q-tagged packets through
another VLAN-like tunnel. The format of 802.1ad tag is the same as
802.1q, except it uses the EtherType of 0x88a8, unlike 802.1q's 0x8100.

Currently, mlxsw supports bridging with VLAN-unaware (802.1d) bridges
and with VLAN-aware bridges whose VLAN protocol is 802.1q. This set adds
support for VLAN-aware bridges whose VLAN protocol is 802.1ad.

From mlxsw perspective, 802.1ad support entails two main changes:

1. Ports member in an 802.1ad bridge need to be configured to classify
802.1ad packets as tagged and all other packets as untagged

2. When pushing a VLAN at ingress (PVID), its EtherType needs to be
0x88a8 instead of 802.1q's 0x8100

The rest stays the same as with 802.1q bridges.

A follow-up patch set will add support for QinQ with VXLAN, also known
as QinVNI. Currently, linking of a VXLAN netdev to an 802.1ad bridge is
vetoed and an error is returned to user space.

Patch set overview:

Patches #1-#2 add the registers required to configure the two changes
described above.

Patch #3 changes the device to only treat 802.1q packets as tagged by
default, as opposed to both 802.1q and 802.1ad packets. This is more
inline with the behavior supported by the driver.

Patch #4 adds the ability to configure the EtherType when pushing a PVID
at ingress.

Patch #5 performs small refactoring to allow for code re-use in the next
patch.

Patch #6 adds support for 802.1ad bridging and allows mlxsw ports and
their uppers to join such a bridge.

Patch #7 changes the bridge driver to notify about changes to its VLAN
protocol, so that these could be vetoed by mlxsw in the next patch.

Patches #8-#9 teach mlxsw to veto unsupported 802.1ad configurations and
add a corresponding selftest to make sure such configurations are indeed
vetoed.
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201129125407.1391557-1-idosch@idosch.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 14, 2020
While I was doing zram testing, I found sometimes decompression failed
since the compression buffer was corrupted.  With investigation, I found
below commit calls cond_resched unconditionally so it could make a
problem in atomic context if the task is reschedule.

  BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at mm/vmalloc.c:108
  in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 946, name: memhog
  3 locks held by memhog/946:
   #0: ffff9d01d4b193e8 (&mm->mmap_lock#2){++++}-{4:4}, at: __mm_populate+0x103/0x160
   #1: ffffffffa3d53de0 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __alloc_pages_slowpath.constprop.0+0xa98/0x1160
   #2: ffff9d01d56b8110 (&zspage->lock){.+.+}-{3:3}, at: zs_map_object+0x8e/0x1f0
  CPU: 0 PID: 946 Comm: memhog Not tainted 5.9.3-00011-gc5bfc0287345-dirty #316
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1 04/01/2014
  Call Trace:
    unmap_kernel_range_noflush+0x2eb/0x350
    unmap_kernel_range+0x14/0x30
    zs_unmap_object+0xd5/0xe0
    zram_bvec_rw.isra.0+0x38c/0x8e0
    zram_rw_page+0x90/0x101
    bdev_write_page+0x92/0xe0
    __swap_writepage+0x94/0x4a0
    pageout+0xe3/0x3a0
    shrink_page_list+0xb94/0xd60
    shrink_inactive_list+0x158/0x460

We can fix this by removing the ZSMALLOC_PGTABLE_MAPPING feature (which
contains the offending calling code) from zsmalloc.

Even though this option showed some amount improvement(e.g., 30%) in
some arm32 platforms, it has been headache to maintain since it have
abused APIs[1](e.g., unmap_kernel_range in atomic context).

Since we are approaching to deprecate 32bit machines and already made
the config option available for only builtin build since v5.8, lastly it
has been not default option in zsmalloc, it's time to drop the option
for better maintenance.

[1] http://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20201105170249.387069-1-minchan@kernel.org

Fixes: e47110e ("mm/vunmap: add cond_resched() in vunmap_pmd_range")
Signed-off-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Cc: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Harish Sriram <harish@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Uladzislau Rezki <urezki@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201117202916.GA3856507@google.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 15, 2020
Huazhong Tan says:

====================
net: hns3: updates for -next

There are some updates for the HNS3 ethernet driver.

promiscuous configuration more flexible, #2 adds ethtool
private flags to control whether enable tx unicast promisc.

previous version:
https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/cover/1606997936-22166-1-git-send-email-tanhuazhong@huawei.com/
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1607227575-56689-1-git-send-email-tanhuazhong@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 15, 2020
…me PM

The ch->lock is used to protect the whole enable() and read() of
sh_cmt's implementation of struct clocksource. The enable()
implementation calls pm_runtime_get_sync() which may result in the clock
source to be read() triggering a cyclic lockdep warning for the
ch->lock.

The sh_cmt driver implement its own balancing of calls to
sh_cmt_{enable,disable}() with flags in sh_cmt_{start,stop}(). It does
this to deal with that start and stop are shared between the clock
source and clock event providers. While this could be improved on
verifying corner cases based on any substantial rework on all devices
this driver supports might prove hard.

As a first step separate the PM handling for clock event and clock
source. Always put/get the device when enabling/disabling the clock
source but keep the clock event logic unchanged. This allows the sh_cmt
implementation of struct clocksource to call PM without holding the
ch->lock and avoiding the deadlock.

Triggering and log of the deadlock warning,

  # echo e60f0000.timer > /sys/devices/system/clocksource/clocksource0/current_clocksource
  [   46.948370] ======================================================
  [   46.954730] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
  [   46.961094] 5.10.0-rc6-arm64-renesas-00001-g0e5fd7414e8b #36 Not tainted
  [   46.967985] ------------------------------------------------------
  [   46.974342] migration/0/11 is trying to acquire lock:
  [   46.979543] ffff0000403ed220 (&dev->power.lock){-...}-{2:2}, at: __pm_runtime_resume+0x40/0x74
  [   46.988445]
  [   46.988445] but task is already holding lock:
  [   46.994441] ffff000040ad0298 (&ch->lock){....}-{2:2}, at: sh_cmt_start+0x28/0x210
  [   47.002173]
  [   47.002173] which lock already depends on the new lock.
  [   47.002173]
  [   47.010573]
  [   47.010573] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
  [   47.018262]
  [   47.018262] -> #3 (&ch->lock){....}-{2:2}:
  [   47.024033]        lock_acquire.part.0+0x120/0x330
  [   47.028970]        lock_acquire+0x64/0x80
  [   47.033105]        _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x7c/0xc4
  [   47.038130]        sh_cmt_start+0x28/0x210
  [   47.042352]        sh_cmt_clocksource_enable+0x28/0x50
  [   47.047644]        change_clocksource+0x9c/0x160
  [   47.052402]        multi_cpu_stop+0xa4/0x190
  [   47.056799]        cpu_stopper_thread+0x90/0x154
  [   47.061557]        smpboot_thread_fn+0x244/0x270
  [   47.066310]        kthread+0x154/0x160
  [   47.070175]        ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
  [   47.074390]
  [   47.074390] -> #2 (tk_core.seq.seqcount){----}-{0:0}:
  [   47.081136]        lock_acquire.part.0+0x120/0x330
  [   47.086070]        lock_acquire+0x64/0x80
  [   47.090203]        seqcount_lockdep_reader_access.constprop.0+0x74/0x100
  [   47.097096]        ktime_get+0x28/0xa0
  [   47.100960]        hrtimer_start_range_ns+0x210/0x2dc
  [   47.106164]        generic_sched_clock_init+0x70/0x88
  [   47.111364]        sched_clock_init+0x40/0x64
  [   47.115853]        start_kernel+0x494/0x524
  [   47.120156]
  [   47.120156] -> #1 (hrtimer_bases.lock){-.-.}-{2:2}:
  [   47.126721]        lock_acquire.part.0+0x120/0x330
  [   47.136042]        lock_acquire+0x64/0x80
  [   47.144461]        _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x7c/0xc4
  [   47.153721]        hrtimer_start_range_ns+0x68/0x2dc
  [   47.163054]        rpm_suspend+0x308/0x5dc
  [   47.171473]        rpm_idle+0xc4/0x2a4
  [   47.179550]        pm_runtime_work+0x98/0xc0
  [   47.188209]        process_one_work+0x294/0x6f0
  [   47.197142]        worker_thread+0x70/0x45c
  [   47.205661]        kthread+0x154/0x160
  [   47.213673]        ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
  [   47.221957]
  [   47.221957] -> #0 (&dev->power.lock){-...}-{2:2}:
  [   47.236292]        check_noncircular+0x128/0x140
  [   47.244907]        __lock_acquire+0x13b0/0x204c
  [   47.253332]        lock_acquire.part.0+0x120/0x330
  [   47.262033]        lock_acquire+0x64/0x80
  [   47.269826]        _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x7c/0xc4
  [   47.278430]        __pm_runtime_resume+0x40/0x74
  [   47.286758]        sh_cmt_start+0x84/0x210
  [   47.294537]        sh_cmt_clocksource_enable+0x28/0x50
  [   47.303449]        change_clocksource+0x9c/0x160
  [   47.311783]        multi_cpu_stop+0xa4/0x190
  [   47.319720]        cpu_stopper_thread+0x90/0x154
  [   47.328022]        smpboot_thread_fn+0x244/0x270
  [   47.336298]        kthread+0x154/0x160
  [   47.343708]        ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
  [   47.351445]
  [   47.351445] other info that might help us debug this:
  [   47.351445]
  [   47.370225] Chain exists of:
  [   47.370225]   &dev->power.lock --> tk_core.seq.seqcount --> &ch->lock
  [   47.370225]
  [   47.392003]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
  [   47.392003]
  [   47.405314]        CPU0                    CPU1
  [   47.413569]        ----                    ----
  [   47.421768]   lock(&ch->lock);
  [   47.428425]                                lock(tk_core.seq.seqcount);
  [   47.438701]                                lock(&ch->lock);
  [   47.447930]   lock(&dev->power.lock);
  [   47.455172]
  [   47.455172]  *** DEADLOCK ***
  [   47.455172]
  [   47.471433] 3 locks held by migration/0/11:
  [   47.479099]  #0: ffff8000113c9278 (timekeeper_lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: change_clocksource+0x2c/0x160
  [   47.491834]  #1: ffff8000113c8f88 (tk_core.seq.seqcount){----}-{0:0}, at: multi_cpu_stop+0xa4/0x190
  [   47.504727]  #2: ffff000040ad0298 (&ch->lock){....}-{2:2}, at: sh_cmt_start+0x28/0x210
  [   47.516541]
  [   47.516541] stack backtrace:
  [   47.528480] CPU: 0 PID: 11 Comm: migration/0 Not tainted 5.10.0-rc6-arm64-renesas-00001-g0e5fd7414e8b #36
  [   47.542147] Hardware name: Renesas Salvator-X 2nd version board based on r8a77965 (DT)
  [   47.554241] Call trace:
  [   47.560832]  dump_backtrace+0x0/0x190
  [   47.568670]  show_stack+0x14/0x30
  [   47.576144]  dump_stack+0xe8/0x130
  [   47.583670]  print_circular_bug+0x1f0/0x200
  [   47.592015]  check_noncircular+0x128/0x140
  [   47.600289]  __lock_acquire+0x13b0/0x204c
  [   47.608486]  lock_acquire.part.0+0x120/0x330
  [   47.616953]  lock_acquire+0x64/0x80
  [   47.624582]  _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x7c/0xc4
  [   47.633114]  __pm_runtime_resume+0x40/0x74
  [   47.641371]  sh_cmt_start+0x84/0x210
  [   47.649115]  sh_cmt_clocksource_enable+0x28/0x50
  [   47.657916]  change_clocksource+0x9c/0x160
  [   47.666165]  multi_cpu_stop+0xa4/0x190
  [   47.674056]  cpu_stopper_thread+0x90/0x154
  [   47.682308]  smpboot_thread_fn+0x244/0x270
  [   47.690560]  kthread+0x154/0x160
  [   47.697927]  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
  [   47.708447] clocksource: Switched to clocksource e60f0000.timer

Signed-off-by: Niklas Söderlund <niklas.soderlund+renesas@ragnatech.se>
Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201205021921.1456190-2-niklas.soderlund+renesas@ragnatech.se
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 15, 2020
When building with KASAN and LKDTM, clang may implictly generate an
asan.module_ctor function in the LKDTM rodata object. The Makefile moves
the lkdtm_rodata_do_nothing() function into .rodata by renaming the
file's .text section to .rodata, and consequently also moves the ctor
function into .rodata, leading to a boot time crash (splat below) when
the ctor is invoked by do_ctors().

Let's prevent this by marking the function as noinstr rather than
notrace, and renaming the file's .noinstr.text to .rodata. Marking the
function as noinstr will prevent tracing and kprobes, and will inhibit
any undesireable compiler instrumentation.

The ctor function (if any) will be placed in .text and will work
correctly.

Example splat before this patch is applied:

[    0.916359] Unable to handle kernel execute from non-executable memory at virtual address ffffa0006b60f5ac
[    0.922088] Mem abort info:
[    0.922828]   ESR = 0x8600000e
[    0.923635]   EC = 0x21: IABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[    0.925036]   SET = 0, FnV = 0
[    0.925838]   EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[    0.926714] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00000000427b3000
[    0.928489] [ffffa0006b60f5ac] pgd=000000023ffff003, p4d=000000023ffff003, pud=000000023fffe003, pmd=0068000042000f01
[    0.931330] Internal error: Oops: 8600000e [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[    0.932806] Modules linked in:
[    0.933617] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.10.0-rc7 #2
[    0.935620] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
[    0.936924] pstate: 40400005 (nZcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--)
[    0.938609] pc : asan.module_ctor+0x0/0x14
[    0.939759] lr : do_basic_setup+0x4c/0x70
[    0.940889] sp : ffff27b600177e30
[    0.941815] x29: ffff27b600177e30 x28: 0000000000000000
[    0.943306] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: 0000000000000000
[    0.944803] x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000
[    0.946289] x23: 0000000000000001 x22: 0000000000000000
[    0.947777] x21: ffffa0006bf4a890 x20: ffffa0006befb6c0
[    0.949271] x19: ffffa0006bef9358 x18: 0000000000000068
[    0.950756] x17: fffffffffffffff8 x16: 0000000000000000
[    0.952246] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000
[    0.953734] x13: 00000000838a16d5 x12: 0000000000000001
[    0.955223] x11: ffff94000da74041 x10: dfffa00000000000
[    0.956715] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : ffffa0006b60f5ac
[    0.958199] x7 : f9f9f9f9f9f9f9f9 x6 : 000000000000003f
[    0.959683] x5 : 0000000000000040 x4 : 0000000000000000
[    0.961178] x3 : ffffa0006bdc15a0 x2 : 0000000000000005
[    0.962662] x1 : 00000000000000f9 x0 : ffffa0006bef9350
[    0.964155] Call trace:
[    0.964844]  asan.module_ctor+0x0/0x14
[    0.965895]  kernel_init_freeable+0x158/0x198
[    0.967115]  kernel_init+0x14/0x19c
[    0.968104]  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x30
[    0.969110] Code: 00000003 00000000 00000000 00000000 (00000000)
[    0.970815] ---[ end trace b5339784e20d015c ]---

Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201207170533.10738-1-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 15, 2020
Prarit reported that depending on the affinity setting the

 ' irq $N: Affinity broken due to vector space exhaustion.'

message is showing up in dmesg, but the vector space on the CPUs in the
affinity mask is definitely not exhausted.

Shung-Hsi provided traces and analysis which pinpoints the problem:

The ordering of trying to assign an interrupt vector in
assign_irq_vector_any_locked() is simply wrong if the interrupt data has a
valid node assigned. It does:

 1) Try the intersection of affinity mask and node mask
 2) Try the node mask
 3) Try the full affinity mask
 4) Try the full online mask

Obviously #2 and #3 are in the wrong order as the requested affinity
mask has to take precedence.

In the observed cases #1 failed because the affinity mask did not contain
CPUs from node 0. That made it allocate a vector from node 0, thereby
breaking affinity and emitting the misleading message.

Revert the order of #2 and #3 so the full affinity mask without the node
intersection is tried before actually affinity is broken.

If no node is assigned then only the full affinity mask and if that fails
the full online mask is tried.

Fixes: d6ffc6a ("x86/vector: Respect affinity mask in irq descriptor")
Reported-by: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87ft4djtyp.fsf@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 15, 2020
The quick check in tick_do_update_jiffies64() whether jiffies need to be
updated is not really correct under all circumstances and on all
architectures, especially not on 32bit systems.

The quick check does:

    if (now < READ_ONCE(tick_next_period))
    	return;

and the counterpart in the update is:

    WRITE_ONCE(tick_next_period, next_update_time);

This has two problems:

  1) On weakly ordered architectures there is no guarantee that the stores
     before the WRITE_ONCE() are visible which means that other CPUs can
     operate on a stale jiffies value.

  2) On 32bit the store of tick_next_period which is an u64 is split into
     two 32bit stores. If the first 32bit store advances tick_next_period
     far out and the second 32bit store is delayed (virt, NMI ...) then
     jiffies will become stale until the second 32bit store happens.

Address this by seperating the handling for 32bit and 64bit.

On 64bit problem #1 is addressed by replacing READ_ONCE() / WRITE_ONCE()
with smp_load_acquire() / smp_store_release().

On 32bit problem #2 is addressed by protecting the quick check with the
jiffies sequence counter. The load and stores can be plain because the
sequence count mechanics provides the required barriers already.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87czzpc02w.fsf@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 15, 2020
Ido Schimmel says:

====================
mlxsw: Introduce initial XM router support

This patch set implements initial eXtended Mezzanine (XM) router
support.

The XM is an external device connected to the Spectrum-{2,3} ASICs using
dedicated Ethernet ports. Its purpose is to increase the number of
routes that can be offloaded to hardware. This is achieved by having the
ASIC act as a cache that refers cache misses to the XM where the FIB is
stored and LPM lookup is performed.

Future patch sets will add more sophisticated cache flushing and
selftests that utilize cache counters on the ASIC, which we plan to
expose via devlink-metric [1].

Patch set overview:

Patches #1-#2 add registers to insert/remove routes to/from the XM and
to enable/disable it. Patch #3 utilizes these registers in order to
implement XM-specific router low-level operations.

Patches #4-#5 query from firmware the availability of the XM and the
local ports that are used to connect the ASIC to the XM, so that netdevs
will not be created for them.

Patches #6-#8 initialize the XM by configuring its cache parameters.

Patch #9-#10 implement cache management, so that LPM lookup will be
correctly cached in the ASIC.

Patches #11-#13 implement cache flushing, so that routes
insertions/removals to/from the XM will flush the affected entries in
the cache.

Patch #14 configures the ASIC to allocate half of its memory for the
cache, so that room will be left for other entries (e.g., FDBs,
neighbours).

Patch #15 starts using the XM for IPv4 route offload, when available.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20200817125059.193242-1-idosch@idosch.org/
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201214113041.2789043-1-idosch@idosch.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 7, 2021
Like other tunneling interfaces, the bareudp doesn't need TXLOCK.
So, It is good to set the NETIF_F_LLTX flag to improve performance and
to avoid lockdep's false-positive warning.

Test commands:
    ip netns add A
    ip netns add B
    ip link add veth0 netns A type veth peer name veth1 netns B
    ip netns exec A ip link set veth0 up
    ip netns exec A ip a a 10.0.0.1/24 dev veth0
    ip netns exec B ip link set veth1 up
    ip netns exec B ip a a 10.0.0.2/24 dev veth1

    for i in {2..1}
    do
            let A=$i-1
            ip netns exec A ip link add bareudp$i type bareudp \
		    dstport $i ethertype ip
            ip netns exec A ip link set bareudp$i up
            ip netns exec A ip a a 10.0.$i.1/24 dev bareudp$i
            ip netns exec A ip r a 10.0.$i.2 encap ip src 10.0.$A.1 \
		    dst 10.0.$A.2 via 10.0.$i.2 dev bareudp$i

            ip netns exec B ip link add bareudp$i type bareudp \
		    dstport $i ethertype ip
            ip netns exec B ip link set bareudp$i up
            ip netns exec B ip a a 10.0.$i.2/24 dev bareudp$i
            ip netns exec B ip r a 10.0.$i.1 encap ip src 10.0.$A.2 \
		    dst 10.0.$A.1 via 10.0.$i.1 dev bareudp$i
    done
    ip netns exec A ping 10.0.2.2

Splat looks like:
[   96.992803][  T822] ============================================
[   96.993954][  T822] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
[   96.995102][  T822] 5.10.0+ #819 Not tainted
[   96.995927][  T822] --------------------------------------------
[   96.997091][  T822] ping/822 is trying to acquire lock:
[   96.998083][  T822] ffff88810f753898 (_xmit_NONE#2){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x1f52/0x2960
[   96.999813][  T822]
[   96.999813][  T822] but task is already holding lock:
[   97.001192][  T822] ffff88810c385498 (_xmit_NONE#2){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x1f52/0x2960
[   97.002908][  T822]
[   97.002908][  T822] other info that might help us debug this:
[   97.004401][  T822]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[   97.004401][  T822]
[   97.005784][  T822]        CPU0
[   97.006407][  T822]        ----
[   97.007010][  T822]   lock(_xmit_NONE#2);
[   97.007779][  T822]   lock(_xmit_NONE#2);
[   97.008550][  T822]
[   97.008550][  T822]  *** DEADLOCK ***
[   97.008550][  T822]
[   97.010057][  T822]  May be due to missing lock nesting notation
[   97.010057][  T822]
[   97.011594][  T822] 7 locks held by ping/822:
[   97.012426][  T822]  #0: ffff888109a144f0 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: raw_sendmsg+0x12f7/0x2b00
[   97.014191][  T822]  #1: ffffffffbce2f5a0 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: ip_finish_output2+0x249/0x2020
[   97.016045][  T822]  #2: ffffffffbce2f5a0 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x1fd/0x2960
[   97.017897][  T822]  #3: ffff88810c385498 (_xmit_NONE#2){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x1f52/0x2960
[   97.019684][  T822]  #4: ffffffffbce2f600 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: bareudp_xmit+0x31b/0x3690 [bareudp]
[   97.021573][  T822]  #5: ffffffffbce2f5a0 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: ip_finish_output2+0x249/0x2020
[   97.023424][  T822]  #6: ffffffffbce2f5a0 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x1fd/0x2960
[   97.025259][  T822]
[   97.025259][  T822] stack backtrace:
[   97.026349][  T822] CPU: 3 PID: 822 Comm: ping Not tainted 5.10.0+ #819
[   97.027609][  T822] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[   97.029407][  T822] Call Trace:
[   97.030015][  T822]  dump_stack+0x99/0xcb
[   97.030783][  T822]  __lock_acquire.cold.77+0x149/0x3a9
[   97.031773][  T822]  ? stack_trace_save+0x81/0xa0
[   97.032661][  T822]  ? register_lock_class+0x1910/0x1910
[   97.033673][  T822]  ? register_lock_class+0x1910/0x1910
[   97.034679][  T822]  ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x91/0xc0
[   97.035697][  T822]  ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0xa0/0xa0
[   97.036690][  T822]  lock_acquire+0x1b2/0x730
[   97.037515][  T822]  ? __dev_queue_xmit+0x1f52/0x2960
[   97.038466][  T822]  ? check_flags+0x50/0x50
[   97.039277][  T822]  ? netif_skb_features+0x296/0x9c0
[   97.040226][  T822]  ? validate_xmit_skb+0x29/0xb10
[   97.041151][  T822]  _raw_spin_lock+0x30/0x70
[   97.041977][  T822]  ? __dev_queue_xmit+0x1f52/0x2960
[   97.042927][  T822]  __dev_queue_xmit+0x1f52/0x2960
[   97.043852][  T822]  ? netdev_core_pick_tx+0x290/0x290
[   97.044824][  T822]  ? mark_held_locks+0xb7/0x120
[   97.045712][  T822]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x12c/0x3e0
[   97.046824][  T822]  ? __local_bh_enable_ip+0xa5/0xf0
[   97.047771][  T822]  ? ___neigh_create+0x12a8/0x1eb0
[   97.048710][  T822]  ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x41/0x120
[   97.049626][  T822]  ? ___neigh_create+0x12a8/0x1eb0
[   97.050556][  T822]  ? __local_bh_enable_ip+0xa5/0xf0
[   97.051509][  T822]  ? ___neigh_create+0x12a8/0x1eb0
[   97.052443][  T822]  ? check_chain_key+0x244/0x5f0
[   97.053352][  T822]  ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0x56/0xa0
[   97.054317][  T822]  ? ip_finish_output2+0x6ea/0x2020
[   97.055263][  T822]  ? pneigh_lookup+0x410/0x410
[   97.056135][  T822]  ip_finish_output2+0x6ea/0x2020
[ ... ]

Acked-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com>
Fixes: 571912c ("net: UDP tunnel encapsulation module for tunnelling different protocols like MPLS, IP, NSH etc.")
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201228152136.24215-1-ap420073@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 8, 2021
Ido Schimmel says:

====================
nexthop: Various fixes

This series contains various fixes for the nexthop code. The bugs were
uncovered during the development of resilient nexthop groups.

Patches #1-#2 fix the error path of nexthop_create_group(). I was not
able to trigger these bugs with current code, but it is possible with
the upcoming resilient nexthop groups code which adds a user
controllable memory allocation further in the function.

Patch #3 fixes wrong validation of netlink attributes.

Patch #4 fixes wrong invocation of mausezahn in a selftest.
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210107144824.1135691-1-idosch@idosch.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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3 participants