Skip to content

xdp: add a new helper for dev map multicast support#13

Closed
kernel-patches-bot wants to merge 6 commits intobpf-nextfrom
series/186827
Closed

xdp: add a new helper for dev map multicast support#13
kernel-patches-bot wants to merge 6 commits intobpf-nextfrom
series/186827

Conversation

@kernel-patches-bot
Copy link

Pull request for series with
subject: xdp: add a new helper for dev map multicast support
version: 1
url: https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/netdev/list/?series=199872

tsipa and others added 6 commits September 7, 2020 12:23
used when we want to allow NULL pointer for map parameter. The bpf helper
need to take care and check if the map is NULL when use this type.

Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
---

v11: no update
v10: remove useless CONST_PTR_TO_MAP_OR_NULL and Copy-paste comment.
v9: merge the patch from [1] in to this series.
v1-v8: no this patch

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200715070001.2048207-1-liuhangbin@gmail.com/

---
 include/linux/bpf.h   |  1 +
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 14 +++++++++-----
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
before[0], The goal is to be able to implement an OVS-like data plane in
XDP, i.e., a software switch that can forward XDP frames to multiple ports.

To achieve this, an application needs to specify a group of interfaces
to forward a packet to. It is also common to want to exclude one or more
physical interfaces from the forwarding operation - e.g., to forward a
packet to all interfaces in the multicast group except the interface it
arrived on. While this could be done simply by adding more groups, this
quickly leads to a combinatorial explosion in the number of groups an
application has to maintain.

To avoid the combinatorial explosion, we propose to include the ability
to specify an "exclude group" as part of the forwarding operation. This
needs to be a group (instead of just a single port index), because a
physical interface can be part of a logical grouping, such as a bond
device.

Thus, the logical forwarding operation becomes a "set difference"
operation, i.e. "forward to all ports in group A that are not also in
group B". This series implements such an operation using device maps to
represent the groups. This means that the XDP program specifies two
device maps, one containing the list of netdevs to redirect to, and the
other containing the exclude list.

To achieve this, I re-implement a new helper bpf_redirect_map_multi()
to accept two maps, the forwarding map and exclude map. The forwarding
map could be DEVMAP or DEVMAP_HASH, but the exclude map *must* be
DEVMAP_HASH to get better performace. If user don't want to use exclude
map and just want simply stop redirecting back to ingress device, they
can use flag BPF_F_EXCLUDE_INGRESS.

As both bpf_xdp_redirect_map() and this new helpers are using struct
bpf_redirect_info, I add a new ex_map and set tgt_value to NULL in the
new helper to make a difference with bpf_xdp_redirect_map().

Also I keep the the general data path in net/core/filter.c, the native data
path in kernel/bpf/devmap.c so we can use direct calls to get better
performace.

[0] https://xdp-project.net/#Handling-multicast

Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
---

v11:
Fix bpf_redirect_map_multi() helper description typo.
Add loop limit for devmap_get_next_obj() and dev_map_redirect_multi().

v10:
Update helper bpf_xdp_redirect_map_multi()
- No need to check map pointer as we will do the check in verifier.

v9:
Update helper bpf_xdp_redirect_map_multi()
- Use ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR_OR_NULL for helper arg2

v8:
Update function dev_in_exclude_map():
- remove duplicate ex_map map_type check in
- lookup the element in dev map by obj dev index directly instead
  of looping all the map

v7:
a) Fix helper flag check
b) Limit the *ex_map* to use DEVMAP_HASH only and update function
   dev_in_exclude_map() to get better performance.

v6: converted helper return types from int to long

v5:
a) Check devmap_get_next_key() return value.
b) Pass through flags to __bpf_tx_xdp_map() instead of bool value.
c) In function dev_map_enqueue_multi(), consume xdpf for the last
   obj instead of the first on.
d) Update helper description and code comments to explain that we
   use NULL target value to distinguish multicast and unicast
   forwarding.
e) Update memory model, memory id and frame_sz in xdpf_clone().

v4: Fix bpf_xdp_redirect_map_multi_proto arg2_type typo

v3: Based on Toke's suggestion, do the following update
a) Update bpf_redirect_map_multi() description in bpf.h.
b) Fix exclude_ifindex checking order in dev_in_exclude_map().
c) Fix one more xdpf clone in dev_map_enqueue_multi().
d) Go find next one in dev_map_enqueue_multi() if the interface is not
   able to forward instead of abort the whole loop.
e) Remove READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE for ex_map.

v2: Add new syscall bpf_xdp_redirect_map_multi() which could accept
include/exclude maps directly.

---
 include/linux/bpf.h            |  20 +++++
 include/linux/filter.h         |   1 +
 include/net/xdp.h              |   1 +
 include/uapi/linux/bpf.h       |  27 +++++++
 kernel/bpf/devmap.c            | 132 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c          |   6 ++
 net/core/filter.c              | 118 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 net/core/xdp.c                 |  29 ++++++++
 tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h |  27 +++++++
 9 files changed, 356 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
packets between given interfaces.

Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
---

v10-v11: no update
v9: use NULL directly for arg2 and redefine the maps with btf format
v5: add a null_map as we have strict the arg2 to ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR.
    Move the testing part to bpf selftest in next patch.
v4: no update.
v3: add rxcnt map to show the packet transmit speed.
v2: no update.

---
 samples/bpf/Makefile                      |   3 +
 samples/bpf/xdp_redirect_map_multi_kern.c |  43 ++++++
 samples/bpf/xdp_redirect_map_multi_user.c | 166 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 212 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 samples/bpf/xdp_redirect_map_multi_kern.c
 create mode 100644 samples/bpf/xdp_redirect_map_multi_user.c
test we have 3 forward groups and 1 exclude group. The test will
redirect each interface's packets to all the interfaces in the forward
group, and exclude the interface in exclude map. We will also test both
DEVMAP and DEVMAP_HASH with xdp generic and drv.

For more test details, you can find it in the test script. Here is
the test result.
]# ./test_xdp_redirect_multi.sh
Pass: xdpgeneric arp ns1-2
Pass: xdpgeneric arp ns1-3
Pass: xdpgeneric arp ns1-4
Pass: xdpgeneric ping ns1-2
Pass: xdpgeneric ping ns1-3
Pass: xdpgeneric ping ns1-4
Pass: xdpgeneric ping6 ns2-1
Pass: xdpgeneric ping6 ns2-3
Pass: xdpgeneric ping6 ns2-4
Pass: xdpdrv arp ns1-2
Pass: xdpdrv arp ns1-3
Pass: xdpdrv arp ns1-4
Pass: xdpdrv ping ns1-2
Pass: xdpdrv ping ns1-3
Pass: xdpdrv ping ns1-4
Pass: xdpdrv ping6 ns2-1
Pass: xdpdrv ping6 ns2-3
Pass: xdpdrv ping6 ns2-4
Summary: PASS 18, FAIL 0

Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
---

v10-v11: no update
v9: use NULL directly for arg2 and redefine the maps with btf format
v2-v8: no update

---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/Makefile          |   4 +-
 .../bpf/progs/xdp_redirect_multi_kern.c       |  77 ++++++++
 .../selftests/bpf/test_xdp_redirect_multi.sh  | 164 +++++++++++++++++
 .../selftests/bpf/xdp_redirect_multi.c        | 173 ++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 417 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/xdp_redirect_multi_kern.c
 create mode 100755 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_xdp_redirect_multi.sh
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/xdp_redirect_multi.c
arg ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR and ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR_OR_NULL. Make sure the
map arg could be verified correctly when it is NULL or valid map
pointer.

Add devmap and devmap_hash in struct bpf_test due to bpf_redirect_{map,
map_multi} limit.

Test result:
 ]# ./test_verifier 702 705
 #702/p ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR: null pointer OK
 #703/p ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR: valid map pointer OK
 #704/p ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR_OR_NULL: null pointer for ex_map OK
 #705/p ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR_OR_NULL: valid map pointer for ex_map OK
 Summary: 4 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED

Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
---

v2-v11: no update

---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c   | 22 +++++-
 .../testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/map_ptr.c  | 70 +++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 91 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
@kernel-patches-bot
Copy link
Author

Master branch: e6054fc
series: https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/netdev/list/?series=199872
version: 1

patch https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/netdev/patch/20200907082724.1721685-2-liuhangbin@gmail.com/ applied successfully
patch https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/netdev/patch/20200907082724.1721685-3-liuhangbin@gmail.com/ applied successfully
patch https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/netdev/patch/20200907082724.1721685-4-liuhangbin@gmail.com/ applied successfully
patch https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/netdev/patch/20200907082724.1721685-5-liuhangbin@gmail.com/ applied successfully
Pull request is NOT updated. Failed to apply https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/netdev/patch/20200907082724.1721685-6-liuhangbin@gmail.com/, error message was:
Cmd('git') failed due to: exit code(1)
cmdline: git apply -3 /tmp/tmp1n5mi_r_
stderr: 'error: patch failed: tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/map_ptr.c:60
Falling back to three-way merge...
Applied patch to 'tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/map_ptr.c' with conflicts.
U tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/map_ptr.c'

@kernel-patches-bot
Copy link
Author

At least one diff in series https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/netdev/list/?series=199872 expired. Closing PR.

@kernel-patches-bot kernel-patches-bot deleted the series/186827 branch September 15, 2020 17:49
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 16, 2020
After commit 92cc68e ("drm/vblank: Use
spin_(un)lock_irq() in drm_crtc_vblank_on()") omapdrm locking is broken:

WARNING: inconsistent lock state
5.8.0-rc2-00483-g92cc68e35863 #13 Tainted: G        W
--------------------------------
inconsistent {HARDIRQ-ON-W} -> {IN-HARDIRQ-W} usage.
swapper/0/0 [HC1[1]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] takes:
ea98222c (&dev->event_lock#2){?.+.}-{2:2}, at: drm_handle_vblank+0x4c/0x520 [drm]
{HARDIRQ-ON-W} state was registered at:
  trace_hardirqs_on+0x9c/0x1ec
  _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x20/0x58
  omap_crtc_atomic_enable+0x54/0xa0 [omapdrm]
  drm_atomic_helper_commit_modeset_enables+0x218/0x270 [drm_kms_helper]
  omap_atomic_commit_tail+0x48/0xc4 [omapdrm]
  commit_tail+0x9c/0x190 [drm_kms_helper]
  drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x154/0x188 [drm_kms_helper]
  drm_client_modeset_commit_atomic+0x228/0x268 [drm]
  drm_client_modeset_commit_locked+0x60/0x1d0 [drm]
  drm_client_modeset_commit+0x24/0x40 [drm]
  drm_fb_helper_restore_fbdev_mode_unlocked+0x54/0xa8 [drm_kms_helper]
  drm_fb_helper_set_par+0x2c/0x5c [drm_kms_helper]
  drm_fb_helper_hotplug_event.part.0+0xa0/0xbc [drm_kms_helper]
  drm_kms_helper_hotplug_event+0x24/0x30 [drm_kms_helper]
  output_poll_execute+0x1a8/0x1c0 [drm_kms_helper]
  process_one_work+0x268/0x800
  worker_thread+0x30/0x4e0
  kthread+0x164/0x190
  ret_from_fork+0x14/0x20

The reason for this is that omapdrm calls drm_crtc_vblank_on() while
holding event_lock taken with spin_lock_irq().

It is not clear why drm_crtc_vblank_on() and drm_crtc_vblank_get() are
called while holding event_lock. I don't see any problem with moving
those calls outside the lock, which is what this patch does.

Signed-off-by: Tomi Valkeinen <tomi.valkeinen@ti.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20200819103021.440288-1-tomi.valkeinen@ti.com
Reviewed-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 16, 2020
…s metrics" test

Linux 5.9 introduced perf test case "Parse and process metrics" and
on s390 this test case always dumps core:

  [root@t35lp67 perf]# ./perf test -vvvv -F 67
  67: Parse and process metrics                             :
  --- start ---
  metric expr inst_retired.any / cpu_clk_unhalted.thread for IPC
  parsing metric: inst_retired.any / cpu_clk_unhalted.thread
  Segmentation fault (core dumped)
  [root@t35lp67 perf]#

I debugged this core dump and gdb shows this call chain:

  (gdb) where
   #0  0x000003ffabc3192a in __strnlen_c_1 () from /lib64/libc.so.6
   #1  0x000003ffabc293de in strcasestr () from /lib64/libc.so.6
   #2  0x0000000001102ba2 in match_metric(list=0x1e6ea20 "inst_retired.any",
            n=<optimized out>)
       at util/metricgroup.c:368
   #3  find_metric (map=<optimized out>, map=<optimized out>,
           metric=0x1e6ea20 "inst_retired.any")
      at util/metricgroup.c:765
   #4  __resolve_metric (ids=0x0, map=<optimized out>, metric_list=0x0,
           metric_no_group=<optimized out>, m=<optimized out>)
      at util/metricgroup.c:844
   #5  resolve_metric (ids=0x0, map=0x0, metric_list=0x0,
          metric_no_group=<optimized out>)
      at util/metricgroup.c:881
   #6  metricgroup__add_metric (metric=<optimized out>,
        metric_no_group=metric_no_group@entry=false, events=<optimized out>,
        events@entry=0x3ffd84fb878, metric_list=0x0,
        metric_list@entry=0x3ffd84fb868, map=0x0)
      at util/metricgroup.c:943
   #7  0x00000000011034ae in metricgroup__add_metric_list (map=0x13f9828 <map>,
        metric_list=0x3ffd84fb868, events=0x3ffd84fb878,
        metric_no_group=<optimized out>, list=<optimized out>)
      at util/metricgroup.c:988
   #8  parse_groups (perf_evlist=perf_evlist@entry=0x1e70260,
          str=str@entry=0x12f34b2 "IPC", metric_no_group=<optimized out>,
          metric_no_merge=<optimized out>,
          fake_pmu=fake_pmu@entry=0x1462f18 <perf_pmu.fake>,
          metric_events=0x3ffd84fba58, map=0x1)
      at util/metricgroup.c:1040
   #9  0x0000000001103eb2 in metricgroup__parse_groups_test(
  	evlist=evlist@entry=0x1e70260, map=map@entry=0x13f9828 <map>,
  	str=str@entry=0x12f34b2 "IPC",
  	metric_no_group=metric_no_group@entry=false,
  	metric_no_merge=metric_no_merge@entry=false,
  	metric_events=0x3ffd84fba58)
      at util/metricgroup.c:1082
   #10 0x00000000010c84d8 in __compute_metric (ratio2=0x0, name2=0x0,
          ratio1=<synthetic pointer>, name1=0x12f34b2 "IPC",
  	vals=0x3ffd84fbad8, name=0x12f34b2 "IPC")
      at tests/parse-metric.c:159
   #11 compute_metric (ratio=<synthetic pointer>, vals=0x3ffd84fbad8,
  	name=0x12f34b2 "IPC")
      at tests/parse-metric.c:189
   #12 test_ipc () at tests/parse-metric.c:208
.....
..... omitted many more lines

This test case was added with
commit 218ca91 ("perf tests: Add parse metric test for frontend metric").

When I compile with make DEBUG=y it works fine and I do not get a core dump.

It turned out that the above listed function call chain worked on a struct
pmu_event array which requires a trailing element with zeroes which was
missing. The marco map_for_each_event() loops over that array tests for members
metric_expr/metric_name/metric_group being non-NULL. Adding this element fixes
the issue.

Output after:

  [root@t35lp46 perf]# ./perf test 67
  67: Parse and process metrics                             : Ok
  [root@t35lp46 perf]#

Committer notes:

As Ian remarks, this is not s390 specific:

<quote Ian>
  This also shows up with address sanitizer on all architectures
  (perhaps change the patch title) and perhaps add a "Fixes: <commit>"
  tag.

  =================================================================
  ==4718==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow on address
  0x55c93b4d59e8 at pc 0x55c93a1541e2 bp 0x7ffd24327c60 sp
  0x7ffd24327c58
  READ of size 8 at 0x55c93b4d59e8 thread T0
      #0 0x55c93a1541e1 in find_metric tools/perf/util/metricgroup.c:764:2
      #1 0x55c93a153e6c in __resolve_metric tools/perf/util/metricgroup.c:844:9
      #2 0x55c93a152f18 in resolve_metric tools/perf/util/metricgroup.c:881:9
      #3 0x55c93a1528db in metricgroup__add_metric
  tools/perf/util/metricgroup.c:943:9
      #4 0x55c93a151996 in metricgroup__add_metric_list
  tools/perf/util/metricgroup.c:988:9
      #5 0x55c93a1511b9 in parse_groups tools/perf/util/metricgroup.c:1040:8
      #6 0x55c93a1513e1 in metricgroup__parse_groups_test
  tools/perf/util/metricgroup.c:1082:9
      #7 0x55c93a0108ae in __compute_metric tools/perf/tests/parse-metric.c:159:8
      #8 0x55c93a010744 in compute_metric tools/perf/tests/parse-metric.c:189:9
      #9 0x55c93a00f5ee in test_ipc tools/perf/tests/parse-metric.c:208:2
      #10 0x55c93a00f1e8 in test__parse_metric
  tools/perf/tests/parse-metric.c:345:2
      #11 0x55c939fd7202 in run_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:410:9
      #12 0x55c939fd6736 in test_and_print tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:440:9
      #13 0x55c939fd58c3 in __cmd_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:661:4
      #14 0x55c939fd4e02 in cmd_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:807:9
      #15 0x55c939e4763d in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:313:11
      #16 0x55c939e46475 in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:365:8
      #17 0x55c939e4737e in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:409:2
      #18 0x55c939e45f7e in main tools/perf/perf.c:539:3

  0x55c93b4d59e8 is located 0 bytes to the right of global variable
  'pme_test' defined in 'tools/perf/tests/parse-metric.c:17:25'
  (0x55c93b4d54a0) of size 1352
  SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow
  tools/perf/util/metricgroup.c:764:2 in find_metric
  Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
    0x0ab9a7692ae0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x0ab9a7692af0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x0ab9a7692b00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x0ab9a7692b10: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x0ab9a7692b20: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  =>0x0ab9a7692b30: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00[f9]f9 f9
    0x0ab9a7692b40: f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9
    0x0ab9a7692b50: f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9
    0x0ab9a7692b60: f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x0ab9a7692b70: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x0ab9a7692b80: f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9
  Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
    Addressable:           00
    Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
    Heap left redzone:	   fa
    Freed heap region:	   fd
    Stack left redzone:	   f1
    Stack mid redzone:	   f2
    Stack right redzone:     f3
    Stack after return:	   f5
    Stack use after scope:   f8
    Global redzone:          f9
    Global init order:	   f6
    Poisoned by user:        f7
    Container overflow:	   fc
    Array cookie:            ac
    Intra object redzone:    bb
    ASan internal:           fe
    Left alloca redzone:     ca
    Right alloca redzone:    cb
    Shadow gap:              cc
</quote>

I'm also adding the missing "Fixes" tag and setting just .name to NULL,
as doing it that way is more compact (the compiler will zero out
everything else) and the table iterators look for .name being NULL as
the sentinel marking the end of the table.

Fixes: 0a507af ("perf tests: Add parse metric test for ipc metric")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Richter <tmricht@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Sumanth Korikkar <sumanthk@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200825071211.16959-1-tmricht@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 24, 2020
The aliases were never released causing the following leaks:

  Indirect leak of 1224 byte(s) in 9 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7feefb830628 in malloc (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x107628)
    #1 0x56332c8f1b62 in __perf_pmu__new_alias util/pmu.c:322
    #2 0x56332c8f401f in pmu_add_cpu_aliases_map util/pmu.c:778
    #3 0x56332c792ce9 in __test__pmu_event_aliases tests/pmu-events.c:295
    #4 0x56332c792ce9 in test_aliases tests/pmu-events.c:367
    #5 0x56332c76a09b in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:410
    #6 0x56332c76a09b in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:440
    #7 0x56332c76ce69 in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:695
    #8 0x56332c76ce69 in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:807
    #9 0x56332c7d2214 in run_builtin /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:312
    #10 0x56332c6701a8 in handle_internal_command /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:364
    #11 0x56332c6701a8 in run_argv /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:408
    #12 0x56332c6701a8 in main /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:538
    #13 0x7feefb359cc9 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308

Fixes: 956a783 ("perf test: Test pmu-events aliases")
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200915031819.386559-11-namhyung@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 24, 2020
The evsel->unit borrows a pointer of pmu event or alias instead of
owns a string.  But tool event (duration_time) passes a result of
strdup() caused a leak.

It was found by ASAN during metric test:

  Direct leak of 210 byte(s) in 70 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7fe366fca0b5 in strdup (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x920b5)
    #1 0x559fbbcc6ea3 in add_event_tool util/parse-events.c:414
    #2 0x559fbbcc6ea3 in parse_events_add_tool util/parse-events.c:1414
    #3 0x559fbbd8474d in parse_events_parse util/parse-events.y:439
    #4 0x559fbbcc95da in parse_events__scanner util/parse-events.c:2096
    #5 0x559fbbcc95da in __parse_events util/parse-events.c:2141
    #6 0x559fbbc28555 in check_parse_id tests/pmu-events.c:406
    #7 0x559fbbc28555 in check_parse_id tests/pmu-events.c:393
    #8 0x559fbbc28555 in check_parse_cpu tests/pmu-events.c:415
    #9 0x559fbbc28555 in test_parsing tests/pmu-events.c:498
    #10 0x559fbbc0109b in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:410
    #11 0x559fbbc0109b in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:440
    #12 0x559fbbc03e69 in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:695
    #13 0x559fbbc03e69 in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:807
    #14 0x559fbbc691f4 in run_builtin /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:312
    #15 0x559fbbb071a8 in handle_internal_command /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:364
    #16 0x559fbbb071a8 in run_argv /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:408
    #17 0x559fbbb071a8 in main /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:538
    #18 0x7fe366b68cc9 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308

Fixes: f0fbb11 ("perf stat: Implement duration_time as a proper event")
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200915031819.386559-6-namhyung@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 24, 2020
The test_generic_metric() missed to release entries in the pctx.  Asan
reported following leak (and more):

  Direct leak of 128 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7f4c9396980e in calloc (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x10780e)
    #1 0x55f7e748cc14 in hashmap_grow (/home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf+0x90cc14)
    #2 0x55f7e748d497 in hashmap__insert (/home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf+0x90d497)
    #3 0x55f7e7341667 in hashmap__set /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/util/hashmap.h:111
    #4 0x55f7e7341667 in expr__add_ref util/expr.c:120
    #5 0x55f7e7292436 in prepare_metric util/stat-shadow.c:783
    #6 0x55f7e729556d in test_generic_metric util/stat-shadow.c:858
    #7 0x55f7e712390b in compute_single tests/parse-metric.c:128
    #8 0x55f7e712390b in __compute_metric tests/parse-metric.c:180
    #9 0x55f7e712446d in compute_metric tests/parse-metric.c:196
    #10 0x55f7e712446d in test_dcache_l2 tests/parse-metric.c:295
    #11 0x55f7e712446d in test__parse_metric tests/parse-metric.c:355
    #12 0x55f7e70be09b in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:410
    #13 0x55f7e70be09b in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:440
    #14 0x55f7e70c101a in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:661
    #15 0x55f7e70c101a in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:807
    #16 0x55f7e7126214 in run_builtin /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:312
    #17 0x55f7e6fc41a8 in handle_internal_command /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:364
    #18 0x55f7e6fc41a8 in run_argv /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:408
    #19 0x55f7e6fc41a8 in main /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:538
    #20 0x7f4c93492cc9 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308

Fixes: 6d432c4 ("perf tools: Add test_generic_metric function")
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200915031819.386559-8-namhyung@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 24, 2020
The metricgroup__add_metric() can find multiple match for a metric group
and it's possible to fail.  Also it can fail in the middle like in
resolve_metric() even for single metric.

In those cases, the intermediate list and ids will be leaked like:

  Direct leak of 3 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7f4c938f40b5 in strdup (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x920b5)
    #1 0x55f7e71c1bef in __add_metric util/metricgroup.c:683
    #2 0x55f7e71c31d0 in add_metric util/metricgroup.c:906
    #3 0x55f7e71c3844 in metricgroup__add_metric util/metricgroup.c:940
    #4 0x55f7e71c488d in metricgroup__add_metric_list util/metricgroup.c:993
    #5 0x55f7e71c488d in parse_groups util/metricgroup.c:1045
    #6 0x55f7e71c60a4 in metricgroup__parse_groups_test util/metricgroup.c:1087
    #7 0x55f7e71235ae in __compute_metric tests/parse-metric.c:164
    #8 0x55f7e7124650 in compute_metric tests/parse-metric.c:196
    #9 0x55f7e7124650 in test_recursion_fail tests/parse-metric.c:318
    #10 0x55f7e7124650 in test__parse_metric tests/parse-metric.c:356
    #11 0x55f7e70be09b in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:410
    #12 0x55f7e70be09b in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:440
    #13 0x55f7e70c101a in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:661
    #14 0x55f7e70c101a in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:807
    #15 0x55f7e7126214 in run_builtin /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:312
    #16 0x55f7e6fc41a8 in handle_internal_command /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:364
    #17 0x55f7e6fc41a8 in run_argv /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:408
    #18 0x55f7e6fc41a8 in main /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:538
    #19 0x7f4c93492cc9 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308

Fixes: 83de0b7 ("perf metric: Collect referenced metrics in struct metric_ref_node")
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200915031819.386559-9-namhyung@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 24, 2020
The following leaks were detected by ASAN:

  Indirect leak of 360 byte(s) in 9 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7fecc305180e in calloc (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x10780e)
    #1 0x560578f6dce5 in perf_pmu__new_format util/pmu.c:1333
    #2 0x560578f752fc in perf_pmu_parse util/pmu.y:59
    #3 0x560578f6a8b7 in perf_pmu__format_parse util/pmu.c:73
    #4 0x560578e07045 in test__pmu tests/pmu.c:155
    #5 0x560578de109b in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:410
    #6 0x560578de109b in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:440
    #7 0x560578de401a in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:661
    #8 0x560578de401a in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:807
    #9 0x560578e49354 in run_builtin /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:312
    #10 0x560578ce71a8 in handle_internal_command /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:364
    #11 0x560578ce71a8 in run_argv /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:408
    #12 0x560578ce71a8 in main /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:538
    #13 0x7fecc2b7acc9 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308

Fixes: cff7f95 ("perf tests: Move pmu tests into separate object")
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200915031819.386559-12-namhyung@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 24, 2020
Ido Schimmel says:

====================
mlxsw: Refactor headroom management

Petr says:

On Spectrum, port buffers, also called port headroom, is where packets are
stored while they are parsed and the forwarding decision is being made. For
lossless traffic flows, in case shared buffer admission is not allowed,
headroom is also where to put the extra traffic received before the sent
PAUSE takes effect. Another aspect of the port headroom is the so called
internal buffer, which is used for egress mirroring.

Linux supports two DCB interfaces related to the headroom: dcbnl_setbuffer
for configuration, and dcbnl_getbuffer for inspection. In order to make it
possible to implement these interfaces, it is first necessary to clean up
headroom handling, which is currently strewn in several places in the
driver.

The end goal is an architecture whereby it is possible to take a copy of
the current configuration, adjust parameters, and then hand the proposed
configuration over to the system to implement it. When everything works,
the proposed configuration is accepted and saved. First, this centralizes
the reconfiguration handling to one function, which takes care of
coordinating buffer size changes and priority map changes to avoid
introducing drops. Second, the fact that the configuration is all in one
place makes it easy to keep a backup and handle error path rollbacks, which
were previously hard to understand.

Patch #1 introduces struct mlxsw_sp_hdroom, which will keep port headroom
configuration.

Patch #2 unifies handling of delay provision between PFC and PAUSE. From
now on, delay is to be measured in bytes of extra space, and will not
include MTU. PFC handler sets the delay directly from the parameter it gets
through the DCB interface. For PAUSE, MLXSW_SP_PAUSE_DELAY is converted to
have the same meaning.

In patches #3-#5, MTU, lossiness and priorities are gradually moved over to
struct mlxsw_sp_hdroom.

In patches #6-#11, handling of buffer resizing and priority maps is moved
from spectrum.c and spectrum_dcb.c to spectrum_buffers.c. The API is
gradually adapted so that struct mlxsw_sp_hdroom becomes the main interface
through which the various clients express how the headroom should be
configured.

Patch #12 is a small cleanup that the previous transformation made
possible.

In patch #13, the port init code becomes a boring client of the headroom
code, instead of rolling its own thing.

Patches #14 and #15 move handling of internal mirroring buffer to the new
headroom code as well. Previously, this code was in the SPAN module. This
patchset converts the SPAN module to another boring client of the headroom
code.
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 16, 2020
…ertion-and-removal'

Ido Schimmel says:

====================
mlxsw: spectrum: Prepare for XM implementation - prefix insertion and removal

Jiri says:

This is a preparation patchset for follow-up support of boards with
extended mezzanine (XM), which is going to allow extended (scale-wise)
router offload.

XM requires a separate PRM register named XMDR to be used instead of
RALUE to insert/update/remove FIB entries. Therefore, this patchset
extends the previously introduces low-level ops to be able to have
XM-specific FIB entry config implementation.

Currently the existing original RALUE implementation is moved to "basic"
low-level ops.

Unlike legacy router, insertion/update/removal of FIB entries into XM
could be done in bulks up to 4 items in a single PRM register write.
That is why this patchset implements "an op context", that allows the
future XM ops implementation to squash multiple FIB events to single
register write. For that, the way in which the FIB events are processed
by the work queue has to be changed.

The conversion from 1:1 FIB event - work callback call to event queue is
implemented in patch #3.

Patch #4 introduces "an op context" that will allow in future to squash
multiple FIB events into one XMDR register write. Patch #12 converts it
from stack to be allocated per instance.

Existing RALUE manipulations are pushed to ops in patch #10.

Patch #13 is introducing a possibility for low-level implementation to
have per FIB entry private memory.

The rest of the patches are either cosmetics or smaller preparations.
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201110094900.1920158-1-idosch@idosch.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 20, 2020
This fix is for a failure that occurred in the DWARF unwind perf test.

Stack unwinders may probe memory when looking for frames.

Memory sanitizer will poison and track uninitialized memory on the
stack, and on the heap if the value is copied to the heap.

This can lead to false memory sanitizer failures for the use of an
uninitialized value.

Avoid this problem by removing the poison on the copied stack.

The full msan failure with track origins looks like:

==2168==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value
    #0 0x559ceb10755b in handle_cfi elfutils/libdwfl/frame_unwind.c:648:8
    #1 0x559ceb105448 in __libdwfl_frame_unwind elfutils/libdwfl/frame_unwind.c:741:4
    #2 0x559ceb0ece90 in dwfl_thread_getframes elfutils/libdwfl/dwfl_frame.c:435:7
    #3 0x559ceb0ec6b7 in get_one_thread_frames_cb elfutils/libdwfl/dwfl_frame.c:379:10
    #4 0x559ceb0ec6b7 in get_one_thread_cb elfutils/libdwfl/dwfl_frame.c:308:17
    #5 0x559ceb0ec6b7 in dwfl_getthreads elfutils/libdwfl/dwfl_frame.c:283:17
    #6 0x559ceb0ec6b7 in getthread elfutils/libdwfl/dwfl_frame.c:354:14
    #7 0x559ceb0ec6b7 in dwfl_getthread_frames elfutils/libdwfl/dwfl_frame.c:388:10
    #8 0x559ceaff6ae6 in unwind__get_entries tools/perf/util/unwind-libdw.c:236:8
    #9 0x559ceabc9dbc in test_dwarf_unwind__thread tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:111:8
    #10 0x559ceabca5cf in test_dwarf_unwind__compare tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:138:26
    #11 0x7f812a6865b0 in bsearch (libc.so.6+0x4e5b0)
    #12 0x559ceabca871 in test_dwarf_unwind__krava_3 tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:162:2
    #13 0x559ceabca926 in test_dwarf_unwind__krava_2 tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:169:9
    #14 0x559ceabca946 in test_dwarf_unwind__krava_1 tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:174:9
    #15 0x559ceabcae12 in test__dwarf_unwind tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:211:8
    #16 0x559ceabbc4ab in run_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:418:9
    #17 0x559ceabbc4ab in test_and_print tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:448:9
    #18 0x559ceabbac70 in __cmd_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:669:4
    #19 0x559ceabbac70 in cmd_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:815:9
    #20 0x559cea960e30 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:313:11
    #21 0x559cea95fbce in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:365:8
    #22 0x559cea95fbce in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:409:2
    #23 0x559cea95fbce in main tools/perf/perf.c:539:3

  Uninitialized value was stored to memory at
    #0 0x559ceb106acf in __libdwfl_frame_reg_set elfutils/libdwfl/frame_unwind.c:77:22
    #1 0x559ceb106acf in handle_cfi elfutils/libdwfl/frame_unwind.c:627:13
    #2 0x559ceb105448 in __libdwfl_frame_unwind elfutils/libdwfl/frame_unwind.c:741:4
    #3 0x559ceb0ece90 in dwfl_thread_getframes elfutils/libdwfl/dwfl_frame.c:435:7
    #4 0x559ceb0ec6b7 in get_one_thread_frames_cb elfutils/libdwfl/dwfl_frame.c:379:10
    #5 0x559ceb0ec6b7 in get_one_thread_cb elfutils/libdwfl/dwfl_frame.c:308:17
    #6 0x559ceb0ec6b7 in dwfl_getthreads elfutils/libdwfl/dwfl_frame.c:283:17
    #7 0x559ceb0ec6b7 in getthread elfutils/libdwfl/dwfl_frame.c:354:14
    #8 0x559ceb0ec6b7 in dwfl_getthread_frames elfutils/libdwfl/dwfl_frame.c:388:10
    #9 0x559ceaff6ae6 in unwind__get_entries tools/perf/util/unwind-libdw.c:236:8
    #10 0x559ceabc9dbc in test_dwarf_unwind__thread tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:111:8
    #11 0x559ceabca5cf in test_dwarf_unwind__compare tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:138:26
    #12 0x7f812a6865b0 in bsearch (libc.so.6+0x4e5b0)
    #13 0x559ceabca871 in test_dwarf_unwind__krava_3 tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:162:2
    #14 0x559ceabca926 in test_dwarf_unwind__krava_2 tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:169:9
    #15 0x559ceabca946 in test_dwarf_unwind__krava_1 tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:174:9
    #16 0x559ceabcae12 in test__dwarf_unwind tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:211:8
    #17 0x559ceabbc4ab in run_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:418:9
    #18 0x559ceabbc4ab in test_and_print tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:448:9
    #19 0x559ceabbac70 in __cmd_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:669:4
    #20 0x559ceabbac70 in cmd_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:815:9
    #21 0x559cea960e30 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:313:11
    #22 0x559cea95fbce in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:365:8
    #23 0x559cea95fbce in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:409:2
    #24 0x559cea95fbce in main tools/perf/perf.c:539:3

  Uninitialized value was stored to memory at
    #0 0x559ceb106a54 in handle_cfi elfutils/libdwfl/frame_unwind.c:613:9
    #1 0x559ceb105448 in __libdwfl_frame_unwind elfutils/libdwfl/frame_unwind.c:741:4
    #2 0x559ceb0ece90 in dwfl_thread_getframes elfutils/libdwfl/dwfl_frame.c:435:7
    #3 0x559ceb0ec6b7 in get_one_thread_frames_cb elfutils/libdwfl/dwfl_frame.c:379:10
    #4 0x559ceb0ec6b7 in get_one_thread_cb elfutils/libdwfl/dwfl_frame.c:308:17
    #5 0x559ceb0ec6b7 in dwfl_getthreads elfutils/libdwfl/dwfl_frame.c:283:17
    #6 0x559ceb0ec6b7 in getthread elfutils/libdwfl/dwfl_frame.c:354:14
    #7 0x559ceb0ec6b7 in dwfl_getthread_frames elfutils/libdwfl/dwfl_frame.c:388:10
    #8 0x559ceaff6ae6 in unwind__get_entries tools/perf/util/unwind-libdw.c:236:8
    #9 0x559ceabc9dbc in test_dwarf_unwind__thread tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:111:8
    #10 0x559ceabca5cf in test_dwarf_unwind__compare tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:138:26
    #11 0x7f812a6865b0 in bsearch (libc.so.6+0x4e5b0)
    #12 0x559ceabca871 in test_dwarf_unwind__krava_3 tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:162:2
    #13 0x559ceabca926 in test_dwarf_unwind__krava_2 tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:169:9
    #14 0x559ceabca946 in test_dwarf_unwind__krava_1 tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:174:9
    #15 0x559ceabcae12 in test__dwarf_unwind tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:211:8
    #16 0x559ceabbc4ab in run_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:418:9
    #17 0x559ceabbc4ab in test_and_print tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:448:9
    #18 0x559ceabbac70 in __cmd_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:669:4
    #19 0x559ceabbac70 in cmd_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:815:9
    #20 0x559cea960e30 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:313:11
    #21 0x559cea95fbce in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:365:8
    #22 0x559cea95fbce in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:409:2
    #23 0x559cea95fbce in main tools/perf/perf.c:539:3

  Uninitialized value was stored to memory at
    #0 0x559ceaff8800 in memory_read tools/perf/util/unwind-libdw.c:156:10
    #1 0x559ceb10f053 in expr_eval elfutils/libdwfl/frame_unwind.c:501:13
    #2 0x559ceb1060cc in handle_cfi elfutils/libdwfl/frame_unwind.c:603:18
    #3 0x559ceb105448 in __libdwfl_frame_unwind elfutils/libdwfl/frame_unwind.c:741:4
    #4 0x559ceb0ece90 in dwfl_thread_getframes elfutils/libdwfl/dwfl_frame.c:435:7
    #5 0x559ceb0ec6b7 in get_one_thread_frames_cb elfutils/libdwfl/dwfl_frame.c:379:10
    #6 0x559ceb0ec6b7 in get_one_thread_cb elfutils/libdwfl/dwfl_frame.c:308:17
    #7 0x559ceb0ec6b7 in dwfl_getthreads elfutils/libdwfl/dwfl_frame.c:283:17
    #8 0x559ceb0ec6b7 in getthread elfutils/libdwfl/dwfl_frame.c:354:14
    #9 0x559ceb0ec6b7 in dwfl_getthread_frames elfutils/libdwfl/dwfl_frame.c:388:10
    #10 0x559ceaff6ae6 in unwind__get_entries tools/perf/util/unwind-libdw.c:236:8
    #11 0x559ceabc9dbc in test_dwarf_unwind__thread tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:111:8
    #12 0x559ceabca5cf in test_dwarf_unwind__compare tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:138:26
    #13 0x7f812a6865b0 in bsearch (libc.so.6+0x4e5b0)
    #14 0x559ceabca871 in test_dwarf_unwind__krava_3 tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:162:2
    #15 0x559ceabca926 in test_dwarf_unwind__krava_2 tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:169:9
    #16 0x559ceabca946 in test_dwarf_unwind__krava_1 tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:174:9
    #17 0x559ceabcae12 in test__dwarf_unwind tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:211:8
    #18 0x559ceabbc4ab in run_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:418:9
    #19 0x559ceabbc4ab in test_and_print tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:448:9
    #20 0x559ceabbac70 in __cmd_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:669:4
    #21 0x559ceabbac70 in cmd_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:815:9
    #22 0x559cea960e30 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:313:11
    #23 0x559cea95fbce in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:365:8
    #24 0x559cea95fbce in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:409:2
    #25 0x559cea95fbce in main tools/perf/perf.c:539:3

  Uninitialized value was stored to memory at
    #0 0x559cea9027d9 in __msan_memcpy llvm/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/msan/msan_interceptors.cpp:1558:3
    #1 0x559cea9d2185 in sample_ustack tools/perf/arch/x86/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:41:2
    #2 0x559cea9d202c in test__arch_unwind_sample tools/perf/arch/x86/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:72:9
    #3 0x559ceabc9cbd in test_dwarf_unwind__thread tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:106:6
    #4 0x559ceabca5cf in test_dwarf_unwind__compare tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:138:26
    #5 0x7f812a6865b0 in bsearch (libc.so.6+0x4e5b0)
    #6 0x559ceabca871 in test_dwarf_unwind__krava_3 tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:162:2
    #7 0x559ceabca926 in test_dwarf_unwind__krava_2 tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:169:9
    #8 0x559ceabca946 in test_dwarf_unwind__krava_1 tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:174:9
    #9 0x559ceabcae12 in test__dwarf_unwind tools/perf/tests/dwarf-unwind.c:211:8
    #10 0x559ceabbc4ab in run_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:418:9
    #11 0x559ceabbc4ab in test_and_print tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:448:9
    #12 0x559ceabbac70 in __cmd_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:669:4
    #13 0x559ceabbac70 in cmd_test tools/perf/tests/builtin-test.c:815:9
    #14 0x559cea960e30 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:313:11
    #15 0x559cea95fbce in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:365:8
    #16 0x559cea95fbce in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:409:2
    #17 0x559cea95fbce in main tools/perf/perf.c:539:3

  Uninitialized value was created by an allocation of 'bf' in the stack frame of function 'perf_event__synthesize_mmap_events'
    #0 0x559ceafc5f60 in perf_event__synthesize_mmap_events tools/perf/util/synthetic-events.c:445

SUMMARY: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value elfutils/libdwfl/frame_unwind.c:648:8 in handle_cfi
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: clang-built-linux@googlegroups.com
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sandeep Dasgupta <sdasgup@google.com>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20201113182053.754625-1-irogers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 5, 2021
In __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch(), hash buckets are iterated over
to count the number of elements in each bucket (bucket_size).
If bucket_size is large enough, the multiplication to calculate
kvmalloc() size could overflow, resulting in out-of-bounds write
as reported by KASAN.

[...]
[  104.986052] BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
[  104.986489] Write of size 4194224 at addr ffffc9010503be70 by task crash/112
[  104.986889]
[  104.987193] CPU: 0 PID: 112 Comm: crash Not tainted 5.14.0-rc4 #13
[  104.987552] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
[  104.988104] Call Trace:
[  104.988410]  dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x44
[  104.988706]  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x21/0x140
[  104.988991]  ? __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
[  104.989327]  ? __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
[  104.989622]  kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x11b
[  104.989881]  ? __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
[  104.990239]  kasan_check_range+0x17c/0x1e0
[  104.990467]  memcpy+0x39/0x60
[  104.990670]  __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
[  104.990982]  ? __wake_up_common+0x4d/0x230
[  104.991256]  ? htab_of_map_free+0x130/0x130
[  104.991541]  bpf_map_do_batch+0x1fb/0x220
[...]

In hashtable, if the elements' keys have the same jhash() value, the
elements will be put into the same bucket. By putting a lot of elements
into a single bucket, the value of bucket_size can be increased to
trigger the integer overflow.

Triggering the overflow is possible for both callers with CAP_SYS_ADMIN
and callers without CAP_SYS_ADMIN.

It will be trivial for a caller with CAP_SYS_ADMIN to intentionally
reach this overflow by enabling BPF_F_ZERO_SEED. As this flag will set
the random seed passed to jhash() to 0, it will be easy for the caller
to prepare keys which will be hashed into the same value, and thus put
all the elements into the same bucket.

If the caller does not have CAP_SYS_ADMIN, BPF_F_ZERO_SEED cannot be
used. However, it will be still technically possible to trigger the
overflow, by guessing the random seed value passed to jhash() (32bit)
and repeating the attempt to trigger the overflow. In this case,
the probability to trigger the overflow will be low and will take
a very long time.

Fix the integer overflow by casting 1 operand to u64.

Fixes: 0579963 ("bpf: Add batch ops to all htab bpf map")
Signed-off-by: Tatsuhiko Yasumatsu <th.yasumatsu@gmail.com>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 5, 2021
In __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch(), hash buckets are iterated over
to count the number of elements in each bucket (bucket_size).
If bucket_size is large enough, the multiplication to calculate
kvmalloc() size could overflow, resulting in out-of-bounds write
as reported by KASAN.

[...]
[  104.986052] BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
[  104.986489] Write of size 4194224 at addr ffffc9010503be70 by task crash/112
[  104.986889]
[  104.987193] CPU: 0 PID: 112 Comm: crash Not tainted 5.14.0-rc4 #13
[  104.987552] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
[  104.988104] Call Trace:
[  104.988410]  dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x44
[  104.988706]  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x21/0x140
[  104.988991]  ? __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
[  104.989327]  ? __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
[  104.989622]  kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x11b
[  104.989881]  ? __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
[  104.990239]  kasan_check_range+0x17c/0x1e0
[  104.990467]  memcpy+0x39/0x60
[  104.990670]  __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
[  104.990982]  ? __wake_up_common+0x4d/0x230
[  104.991256]  ? htab_of_map_free+0x130/0x130
[  104.991541]  bpf_map_do_batch+0x1fb/0x220
[...]

In hashtable, if the elements' keys have the same jhash() value, the
elements will be put into the same bucket. By putting a lot of elements
into a single bucket, the value of bucket_size can be increased to
trigger the integer overflow.

Triggering the overflow is possible for both callers with CAP_SYS_ADMIN
and callers without CAP_SYS_ADMIN.

It will be trivial for a caller with CAP_SYS_ADMIN to intentionally
reach this overflow by enabling BPF_F_ZERO_SEED. As this flag will set
the random seed passed to jhash() to 0, it will be easy for the caller
to prepare keys which will be hashed into the same value, and thus put
all the elements into the same bucket.

If the caller does not have CAP_SYS_ADMIN, BPF_F_ZERO_SEED cannot be
used. However, it will be still technically possible to trigger the
overflow, by guessing the random seed value passed to jhash() (32bit)
and repeating the attempt to trigger the overflow. In this case,
the probability to trigger the overflow will be low and will take
a very long time.

Fix the integer overflow by casting 1 operand to u64.

Fixes: 0579963 ("bpf: Add batch ops to all htab bpf map")
Signed-off-by: Tatsuhiko Yasumatsu <th.yasumatsu@gmail.com>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 6, 2021
In __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch(), hash buckets are iterated over
to count the number of elements in each bucket (bucket_size).
If bucket_size is large enough, the multiplication to calculate
kvmalloc() size could overflow, resulting in out-of-bounds write
as reported by KASAN.

[...]
[  104.986052] BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
[  104.986489] Write of size 4194224 at addr ffffc9010503be70 by task crash/112
[  104.986889]
[  104.987193] CPU: 0 PID: 112 Comm: crash Not tainted 5.14.0-rc4 #13
[  104.987552] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
[  104.988104] Call Trace:
[  104.988410]  dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x44
[  104.988706]  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x21/0x140
[  104.988991]  ? __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
[  104.989327]  ? __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
[  104.989622]  kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x11b
[  104.989881]  ? __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
[  104.990239]  kasan_check_range+0x17c/0x1e0
[  104.990467]  memcpy+0x39/0x60
[  104.990670]  __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
[  104.990982]  ? __wake_up_common+0x4d/0x230
[  104.991256]  ? htab_of_map_free+0x130/0x130
[  104.991541]  bpf_map_do_batch+0x1fb/0x220
[...]

In hashtable, if the elements' keys have the same jhash() value, the
elements will be put into the same bucket. By putting a lot of elements
into a single bucket, the value of bucket_size can be increased to
trigger the integer overflow.

Triggering the overflow is possible for both callers with CAP_SYS_ADMIN
and callers without CAP_SYS_ADMIN.

It will be trivial for a caller with CAP_SYS_ADMIN to intentionally
reach this overflow by enabling BPF_F_ZERO_SEED. As this flag will set
the random seed passed to jhash() to 0, it will be easy for the caller
to prepare keys which will be hashed into the same value, and thus put
all the elements into the same bucket.

If the caller does not have CAP_SYS_ADMIN, BPF_F_ZERO_SEED cannot be
used. However, it will be still technically possible to trigger the
overflow, by guessing the random seed value passed to jhash() (32bit)
and repeating the attempt to trigger the overflow. In this case,
the probability to trigger the overflow will be low and will take
a very long time.

Fix the integer overflow by calling kvmalloc_array() instead of
kvmalloc() to allocate memory.

Fixes: 0579963 ("bpf: Add batch ops to all htab bpf map")
Signed-off-by: Tatsuhiko Yasumatsu <th.yasumatsu@gmail.com>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 6, 2021
In __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch(), hash buckets are iterated over
to count the number of elements in each bucket (bucket_size).
If bucket_size is large enough, the multiplication to calculate
kvmalloc() size could overflow, resulting in out-of-bounds write
as reported by KASAN.

[...]
[  104.986052] BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
[  104.986489] Write of size 4194224 at addr ffffc9010503be70 by task crash/112
[  104.986889]
[  104.987193] CPU: 0 PID: 112 Comm: crash Not tainted 5.14.0-rc4 #13
[  104.987552] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
[  104.988104] Call Trace:
[  104.988410]  dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x44
[  104.988706]  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x21/0x140
[  104.988991]  ? __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
[  104.989327]  ? __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
[  104.989622]  kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x11b
[  104.989881]  ? __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
[  104.990239]  kasan_check_range+0x17c/0x1e0
[  104.990467]  memcpy+0x39/0x60
[  104.990670]  __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
[  104.990982]  ? __wake_up_common+0x4d/0x230
[  104.991256]  ? htab_of_map_free+0x130/0x130
[  104.991541]  bpf_map_do_batch+0x1fb/0x220
[...]

In hashtable, if the elements' keys have the same jhash() value, the
elements will be put into the same bucket. By putting a lot of elements
into a single bucket, the value of bucket_size can be increased to
trigger the integer overflow.

Triggering the overflow is possible for both callers with CAP_SYS_ADMIN
and callers without CAP_SYS_ADMIN.

It will be trivial for a caller with CAP_SYS_ADMIN to intentionally
reach this overflow by enabling BPF_F_ZERO_SEED. As this flag will set
the random seed passed to jhash() to 0, it will be easy for the caller
to prepare keys which will be hashed into the same value, and thus put
all the elements into the same bucket.

If the caller does not have CAP_SYS_ADMIN, BPF_F_ZERO_SEED cannot be
used. However, it will be still technically possible to trigger the
overflow, by guessing the random seed value passed to jhash() (32bit)
and repeating the attempt to trigger the overflow. In this case,
the probability to trigger the overflow will be low and will take
a very long time.

Fix the integer overflow by calling kvmalloc_array() instead of
kvmalloc() to allocate memory.

Fixes: 0579963 ("bpf: Add batch ops to all htab bpf map")
Signed-off-by: Tatsuhiko Yasumatsu <th.yasumatsu@gmail.com>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 6, 2021
In __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch(), hash buckets are iterated over
to count the number of elements in each bucket (bucket_size).
If bucket_size is large enough, the multiplication to calculate
kvmalloc() size could overflow, resulting in out-of-bounds write
as reported by KASAN.

[...]
[  104.986052] BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
[  104.986489] Write of size 4194224 at addr ffffc9010503be70 by task crash/112
[  104.986889]
[  104.987193] CPU: 0 PID: 112 Comm: crash Not tainted 5.14.0-rc4 #13
[  104.987552] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
[  104.988104] Call Trace:
[  104.988410]  dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x44
[  104.988706]  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x21/0x140
[  104.988991]  ? __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
[  104.989327]  ? __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
[  104.989622]  kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x11b
[  104.989881]  ? __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
[  104.990239]  kasan_check_range+0x17c/0x1e0
[  104.990467]  memcpy+0x39/0x60
[  104.990670]  __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
[  104.990982]  ? __wake_up_common+0x4d/0x230
[  104.991256]  ? htab_of_map_free+0x130/0x130
[  104.991541]  bpf_map_do_batch+0x1fb/0x220
[...]

In hashtable, if the elements' keys have the same jhash() value, the
elements will be put into the same bucket. By putting a lot of elements
into a single bucket, the value of bucket_size can be increased to
trigger the integer overflow.

Triggering the overflow is possible for both callers with CAP_SYS_ADMIN
and callers without CAP_SYS_ADMIN.

It will be trivial for a caller with CAP_SYS_ADMIN to intentionally
reach this overflow by enabling BPF_F_ZERO_SEED. As this flag will set
the random seed passed to jhash() to 0, it will be easy for the caller
to prepare keys which will be hashed into the same value, and thus put
all the elements into the same bucket.

If the caller does not have CAP_SYS_ADMIN, BPF_F_ZERO_SEED cannot be
used. However, it will be still technically possible to trigger the
overflow, by guessing the random seed value passed to jhash() (32bit)
and repeating the attempt to trigger the overflow. In this case,
the probability to trigger the overflow will be low and will take
a very long time.

Fix the integer overflow by calling kvmalloc_array() instead of
kvmalloc() to allocate memory.

Fixes: 0579963 ("bpf: Add batch ops to all htab bpf map")
Signed-off-by: Tatsuhiko Yasumatsu <th.yasumatsu@gmail.com>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 6, 2021
In __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch(), hash buckets are iterated over
to count the number of elements in each bucket (bucket_size).
If bucket_size is large enough, the multiplication to calculate
kvmalloc() size could overflow, resulting in out-of-bounds write
as reported by KASAN.

[...]
[  104.986052] BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
[  104.986489] Write of size 4194224 at addr ffffc9010503be70 by task crash/112
[  104.986889]
[  104.987193] CPU: 0 PID: 112 Comm: crash Not tainted 5.14.0-rc4 #13
[  104.987552] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
[  104.988104] Call Trace:
[  104.988410]  dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x44
[  104.988706]  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x21/0x140
[  104.988991]  ? __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
[  104.989327]  ? __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
[  104.989622]  kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x11b
[  104.989881]  ? __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
[  104.990239]  kasan_check_range+0x17c/0x1e0
[  104.990467]  memcpy+0x39/0x60
[  104.990670]  __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
[  104.990982]  ? __wake_up_common+0x4d/0x230
[  104.991256]  ? htab_of_map_free+0x130/0x130
[  104.991541]  bpf_map_do_batch+0x1fb/0x220
[...]

In hashtable, if the elements' keys have the same jhash() value, the
elements will be put into the same bucket. By putting a lot of elements
into a single bucket, the value of bucket_size can be increased to
trigger the integer overflow.

Triggering the overflow is possible for both callers with CAP_SYS_ADMIN
and callers without CAP_SYS_ADMIN.

It will be trivial for a caller with CAP_SYS_ADMIN to intentionally
reach this overflow by enabling BPF_F_ZERO_SEED. As this flag will set
the random seed passed to jhash() to 0, it will be easy for the caller
to prepare keys which will be hashed into the same value, and thus put
all the elements into the same bucket.

If the caller does not have CAP_SYS_ADMIN, BPF_F_ZERO_SEED cannot be
used. However, it will be still technically possible to trigger the
overflow, by guessing the random seed value passed to jhash() (32bit)
and repeating the attempt to trigger the overflow. In this case,
the probability to trigger the overflow will be low and will take
a very long time.

Fix the integer overflow by calling kvmalloc_array() instead of
kvmalloc() to allocate memory.

Fixes: 0579963 ("bpf: Add batch ops to all htab bpf map")
Signed-off-by: Tatsuhiko Yasumatsu <th.yasumatsu@gmail.com>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 6, 2021
In __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch(), hash buckets are iterated over
to count the number of elements in each bucket (bucket_size).
If bucket_size is large enough, the multiplication to calculate
kvmalloc() size could overflow, resulting in out-of-bounds write
as reported by KASAN.

[...]
[  104.986052] BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
[  104.986489] Write of size 4194224 at addr ffffc9010503be70 by task crash/112
[  104.986889]
[  104.987193] CPU: 0 PID: 112 Comm: crash Not tainted 5.14.0-rc4 #13
[  104.987552] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
[  104.988104] Call Trace:
[  104.988410]  dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x44
[  104.988706]  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x21/0x140
[  104.988991]  ? __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
[  104.989327]  ? __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
[  104.989622]  kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x11b
[  104.989881]  ? __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
[  104.990239]  kasan_check_range+0x17c/0x1e0
[  104.990467]  memcpy+0x39/0x60
[  104.990670]  __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
[  104.990982]  ? __wake_up_common+0x4d/0x230
[  104.991256]  ? htab_of_map_free+0x130/0x130
[  104.991541]  bpf_map_do_batch+0x1fb/0x220
[...]

In hashtable, if the elements' keys have the same jhash() value, the
elements will be put into the same bucket. By putting a lot of elements
into a single bucket, the value of bucket_size can be increased to
trigger the integer overflow.

Triggering the overflow is possible for both callers with CAP_SYS_ADMIN
and callers without CAP_SYS_ADMIN.

It will be trivial for a caller with CAP_SYS_ADMIN to intentionally
reach this overflow by enabling BPF_F_ZERO_SEED. As this flag will set
the random seed passed to jhash() to 0, it will be easy for the caller
to prepare keys which will be hashed into the same value, and thus put
all the elements into the same bucket.

If the caller does not have CAP_SYS_ADMIN, BPF_F_ZERO_SEED cannot be
used. However, it will be still technically possible to trigger the
overflow, by guessing the random seed value passed to jhash() (32bit)
and repeating the attempt to trigger the overflow. In this case,
the probability to trigger the overflow will be low and will take
a very long time.

Fix the integer overflow by calling kvmalloc_array() instead of
kvmalloc() to allocate memory.

Fixes: 0579963 ("bpf: Add batch ops to all htab bpf map")
Signed-off-by: Tatsuhiko Yasumatsu <th.yasumatsu@gmail.com>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 6, 2021
In __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch(), hash buckets are iterated over
to count the number of elements in each bucket (bucket_size).
If bucket_size is large enough, the multiplication to calculate
kvmalloc() size could overflow, resulting in out-of-bounds write
as reported by KASAN.

[...]
[  104.986052] BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
[  104.986489] Write of size 4194224 at addr ffffc9010503be70 by task crash/112
[  104.986889]
[  104.987193] CPU: 0 PID: 112 Comm: crash Not tainted 5.14.0-rc4 #13
[  104.987552] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
[  104.988104] Call Trace:
[  104.988410]  dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x44
[  104.988706]  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x21/0x140
[  104.988991]  ? __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
[  104.989327]  ? __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
[  104.989622]  kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x11b
[  104.989881]  ? __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
[  104.990239]  kasan_check_range+0x17c/0x1e0
[  104.990467]  memcpy+0x39/0x60
[  104.990670]  __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
[  104.990982]  ? __wake_up_common+0x4d/0x230
[  104.991256]  ? htab_of_map_free+0x130/0x130
[  104.991541]  bpf_map_do_batch+0x1fb/0x220
[...]

In hashtable, if the elements' keys have the same jhash() value, the
elements will be put into the same bucket. By putting a lot of elements
into a single bucket, the value of bucket_size can be increased to
trigger the integer overflow.

Triggering the overflow is possible for both callers with CAP_SYS_ADMIN
and callers without CAP_SYS_ADMIN.

It will be trivial for a caller with CAP_SYS_ADMIN to intentionally
reach this overflow by enabling BPF_F_ZERO_SEED. As this flag will set
the random seed passed to jhash() to 0, it will be easy for the caller
to prepare keys which will be hashed into the same value, and thus put
all the elements into the same bucket.

If the caller does not have CAP_SYS_ADMIN, BPF_F_ZERO_SEED cannot be
used. However, it will be still technically possible to trigger the
overflow, by guessing the random seed value passed to jhash() (32bit)
and repeating the attempt to trigger the overflow. In this case,
the probability to trigger the overflow will be low and will take
a very long time.

Fix the integer overflow by calling kvmalloc_array() instead of
kvmalloc() to allocate memory.

Fixes: 0579963 ("bpf: Add batch ops to all htab bpf map")
Signed-off-by: Tatsuhiko Yasumatsu <th.yasumatsu@gmail.com>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 6, 2021
In __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch(), hash buckets are iterated over
to count the number of elements in each bucket (bucket_size).
If bucket_size is large enough, the multiplication to calculate
kvmalloc() size could overflow, resulting in out-of-bounds write
as reported by KASAN.

[...]
[  104.986052] BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
[  104.986489] Write of size 4194224 at addr ffffc9010503be70 by task crash/112
[  104.986889]
[  104.987193] CPU: 0 PID: 112 Comm: crash Not tainted 5.14.0-rc4 #13
[  104.987552] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
[  104.988104] Call Trace:
[  104.988410]  dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x44
[  104.988706]  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x21/0x140
[  104.988991]  ? __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
[  104.989327]  ? __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
[  104.989622]  kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x11b
[  104.989881]  ? __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
[  104.990239]  kasan_check_range+0x17c/0x1e0
[  104.990467]  memcpy+0x39/0x60
[  104.990670]  __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
[  104.990982]  ? __wake_up_common+0x4d/0x230
[  104.991256]  ? htab_of_map_free+0x130/0x130
[  104.991541]  bpf_map_do_batch+0x1fb/0x220
[...]

In hashtable, if the elements' keys have the same jhash() value, the
elements will be put into the same bucket. By putting a lot of elements
into a single bucket, the value of bucket_size can be increased to
trigger the integer overflow.

Triggering the overflow is possible for both callers with CAP_SYS_ADMIN
and callers without CAP_SYS_ADMIN.

It will be trivial for a caller with CAP_SYS_ADMIN to intentionally
reach this overflow by enabling BPF_F_ZERO_SEED. As this flag will set
the random seed passed to jhash() to 0, it will be easy for the caller
to prepare keys which will be hashed into the same value, and thus put
all the elements into the same bucket.

If the caller does not have CAP_SYS_ADMIN, BPF_F_ZERO_SEED cannot be
used. However, it will be still technically possible to trigger the
overflow, by guessing the random seed value passed to jhash() (32bit)
and repeating the attempt to trigger the overflow. In this case,
the probability to trigger the overflow will be low and will take
a very long time.

Fix the integer overflow by calling kvmalloc_array() instead of
kvmalloc() to allocate memory.

Fixes: 0579963 ("bpf: Add batch ops to all htab bpf map")
Signed-off-by: Tatsuhiko Yasumatsu <th.yasumatsu@gmail.com>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 6, 2021
In __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch(), hash buckets are iterated over
to count the number of elements in each bucket (bucket_size).
If bucket_size is large enough, the multiplication to calculate
kvmalloc() size could overflow, resulting in out-of-bounds write
as reported by KASAN.

[...]
[  104.986052] BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
[  104.986489] Write of size 4194224 at addr ffffc9010503be70 by task crash/112
[  104.986889]
[  104.987193] CPU: 0 PID: 112 Comm: crash Not tainted 5.14.0-rc4 #13
[  104.987552] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
[  104.988104] Call Trace:
[  104.988410]  dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x44
[  104.988706]  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x21/0x140
[  104.988991]  ? __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
[  104.989327]  ? __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
[  104.989622]  kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x11b
[  104.989881]  ? __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
[  104.990239]  kasan_check_range+0x17c/0x1e0
[  104.990467]  memcpy+0x39/0x60
[  104.990670]  __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
[  104.990982]  ? __wake_up_common+0x4d/0x230
[  104.991256]  ? htab_of_map_free+0x130/0x130
[  104.991541]  bpf_map_do_batch+0x1fb/0x220
[...]

In hashtable, if the elements' keys have the same jhash() value, the
elements will be put into the same bucket. By putting a lot of elements
into a single bucket, the value of bucket_size can be increased to
trigger the integer overflow.

Triggering the overflow is possible for both callers with CAP_SYS_ADMIN
and callers without CAP_SYS_ADMIN.

It will be trivial for a caller with CAP_SYS_ADMIN to intentionally
reach this overflow by enabling BPF_F_ZERO_SEED. As this flag will set
the random seed passed to jhash() to 0, it will be easy for the caller
to prepare keys which will be hashed into the same value, and thus put
all the elements into the same bucket.

If the caller does not have CAP_SYS_ADMIN, BPF_F_ZERO_SEED cannot be
used. However, it will be still technically possible to trigger the
overflow, by guessing the random seed value passed to jhash() (32bit)
and repeating the attempt to trigger the overflow. In this case,
the probability to trigger the overflow will be low and will take
a very long time.

Fix the integer overflow by calling kvmalloc_array() instead of
kvmalloc() to allocate memory.

Fixes: 0579963 ("bpf: Add batch ops to all htab bpf map")
Signed-off-by: Tatsuhiko Yasumatsu <th.yasumatsu@gmail.com>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 6, 2021
In __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch(), hash buckets are iterated
over to count the number of elements in each bucket (bucket_size).
If bucket_size is large enough, the multiplication to calculate
kvmalloc() size could overflow, resulting in out-of-bounds write
as reported by KASAN:

  [...]
  [  104.986052] BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
  [  104.986489] Write of size 4194224 at addr ffffc9010503be70 by task crash/112
  [  104.986889]
  [  104.987193] CPU: 0 PID: 112 Comm: crash Not tainted 5.14.0-rc4 #13
  [  104.987552] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
  [  104.988104] Call Trace:
  [  104.988410]  dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x44
  [  104.988706]  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x21/0x140
  [  104.988991]  ? __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
  [  104.989327]  ? __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
  [  104.989622]  kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x11b
  [  104.989881]  ? __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
  [  104.990239]  kasan_check_range+0x17c/0x1e0
  [  104.990467]  memcpy+0x39/0x60
  [  104.990670]  __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
  [  104.990982]  ? __wake_up_common+0x4d/0x230
  [  104.991256]  ? htab_of_map_free+0x130/0x130
  [  104.991541]  bpf_map_do_batch+0x1fb/0x220
  [...]

In hashtable, if the elements' keys have the same jhash() value, the
elements will be put into the same bucket. By putting a lot of elements
into a single bucket, the value of bucket_size can be increased to
trigger the integer overflow.

Triggering the overflow is possible for both callers with CAP_SYS_ADMIN
and callers without CAP_SYS_ADMIN.

It will be trivial for a caller with CAP_SYS_ADMIN to intentionally
reach this overflow by enabling BPF_F_ZERO_SEED. As this flag will set
the random seed passed to jhash() to 0, it will be easy for the caller
to prepare keys which will be hashed into the same value, and thus put
all the elements into the same bucket.

If the caller does not have CAP_SYS_ADMIN, BPF_F_ZERO_SEED cannot be
used. However, it will be still technically possible to trigger the
overflow, by guessing the random seed value passed to jhash() (32bit)
and repeating the attempt to trigger the overflow. In this case,
the probability to trigger the overflow will be low and will take
a very long time.

Fix the integer overflow by calling kvmalloc_array() instead of
kvmalloc() to allocate memory.

Fixes: 0579963 ("bpf: Add batch ops to all htab bpf map")
Signed-off-by: Tatsuhiko Yasumatsu <th.yasumatsu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210806150419.109658-1-th.yasumatsu@gmail.com
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 6, 2021
In __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch(), hash buckets are iterated
over to count the number of elements in each bucket (bucket_size).
If bucket_size is large enough, the multiplication to calculate
kvmalloc() size could overflow, resulting in out-of-bounds write
as reported by KASAN:

  [...]
  [  104.986052] BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
  [  104.986489] Write of size 4194224 at addr ffffc9010503be70 by task crash/112
  [  104.986889]
  [  104.987193] CPU: 0 PID: 112 Comm: crash Not tainted 5.14.0-rc4 #13
  [  104.987552] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
  [  104.988104] Call Trace:
  [  104.988410]  dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x44
  [  104.988706]  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x21/0x140
  [  104.988991]  ? __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
  [  104.989327]  ? __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
  [  104.989622]  kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x11b
  [  104.989881]  ? __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
  [  104.990239]  kasan_check_range+0x17c/0x1e0
  [  104.990467]  memcpy+0x39/0x60
  [  104.990670]  __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch+0x5ce/0xb60
  [  104.990982]  ? __wake_up_common+0x4d/0x230
  [  104.991256]  ? htab_of_map_free+0x130/0x130
  [  104.991541]  bpf_map_do_batch+0x1fb/0x220
  [...]

In hashtable, if the elements' keys have the same jhash() value, the
elements will be put into the same bucket. By putting a lot of elements
into a single bucket, the value of bucket_size can be increased to
trigger the integer overflow.

Triggering the overflow is possible for both callers with CAP_SYS_ADMIN
and callers without CAP_SYS_ADMIN.

It will be trivial for a caller with CAP_SYS_ADMIN to intentionally
reach this overflow by enabling BPF_F_ZERO_SEED. As this flag will set
the random seed passed to jhash() to 0, it will be easy for the caller
to prepare keys which will be hashed into the same value, and thus put
all the elements into the same bucket.

If the caller does not have CAP_SYS_ADMIN, BPF_F_ZERO_SEED cannot be
used. However, it will be still technically possible to trigger the
overflow, by guessing the random seed value passed to jhash() (32bit)
and repeating the attempt to trigger the overflow. In this case,
the probability to trigger the overflow will be low and will take
a very long time.

Fix the integer overflow by calling kvmalloc_array() instead of
kvmalloc() to allocate memory.

Fixes: 0579963 ("bpf: Add batch ops to all htab bpf map")
Signed-off-by: Tatsuhiko Yasumatsu <th.yasumatsu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210806150419.109658-1-th.yasumatsu@gmail.com
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 28, 2021
It's later supposed to be either a correct address or NULL. Without the
initialization, it may contain an undefined value which results in the
following segmentation fault:

  # perf top --sort comm -g --ignore-callees=do_idle

terminates with:

  #0  0x00007ffff56b7685 in __strlen_avx2 () from /lib64/libc.so.6
  #1  0x00007ffff55e3802 in strdup () from /lib64/libc.so.6
  #2  0x00005555558cb139 in hist_entry__init (callchain_size=<optimized out>, sample_self=true, template=0x7fffde7fb110, he=0x7fffd801c250) at util/hist.c:489
  #3  hist_entry__new (template=template@entry=0x7fffde7fb110, sample_self=sample_self@entry=true) at util/hist.c:564
  #4  0x00005555558cb4ba in hists__findnew_entry (hists=hists@entry=0x5555561d9e38, entry=entry@entry=0x7fffde7fb110, al=al@entry=0x7fffde7fb420,
      sample_self=sample_self@entry=true) at util/hist.c:657
  #5  0x00005555558cba1b in __hists__add_entry (hists=hists@entry=0x5555561d9e38, al=0x7fffde7fb420, sym_parent=<optimized out>, bi=bi@entry=0x0, mi=mi@entry=0x0,
      sample=sample@entry=0x7fffde7fb4b0, sample_self=true, ops=0x0, block_info=0x0) at util/hist.c:288
  #6  0x00005555558cbb70 in hists__add_entry (sample_self=true, sample=0x7fffde7fb4b0, mi=0x0, bi=0x0, sym_parent=<optimized out>, al=<optimized out>, hists=0x5555561d9e38)
      at util/hist.c:1056
  #7  iter_add_single_cumulative_entry (iter=0x7fffde7fb460, al=<optimized out>) at util/hist.c:1056
  #8  0x00005555558cc8a4 in hist_entry_iter__add (iter=iter@entry=0x7fffde7fb460, al=al@entry=0x7fffde7fb420, max_stack_depth=<optimized out>, arg=arg@entry=0x7fffffff7db0)
      at util/hist.c:1231
  #9  0x00005555557cdc9a in perf_event__process_sample (machine=<optimized out>, sample=0x7fffde7fb4b0, evsel=<optimized out>, event=<optimized out>, tool=0x7fffffff7db0)
      at builtin-top.c:842
  #10 deliver_event (qe=<optimized out>, qevent=<optimized out>) at builtin-top.c:1202
  #11 0x00005555558a9318 in do_flush (show_progress=false, oe=0x7fffffff80e0) at util/ordered-events.c:244
  #12 __ordered_events__flush (oe=oe@entry=0x7fffffff80e0, how=how@entry=OE_FLUSH__TOP, timestamp=timestamp@entry=0) at util/ordered-events.c:323
  #13 0x00005555558a9789 in __ordered_events__flush (timestamp=<optimized out>, how=<optimized out>, oe=<optimized out>) at util/ordered-events.c:339
  #14 ordered_events__flush (how=OE_FLUSH__TOP, oe=0x7fffffff80e0) at util/ordered-events.c:341
  #15 ordered_events__flush (oe=oe@entry=0x7fffffff80e0, how=how@entry=OE_FLUSH__TOP) at util/ordered-events.c:339
  #16 0x00005555557cd631 in process_thread (arg=0x7fffffff7db0) at builtin-top.c:1114
  #17 0x00007ffff7bb817a in start_thread () from /lib64/libpthread.so.0
  #18 0x00007ffff5656dc3 in clone () from /lib64/libc.so.6

If you look at the frame #2, the code is:

488	 if (he->srcline) {
489          he->srcline = strdup(he->srcline);
490          if (he->srcline == NULL)
491              goto err_rawdata;
492	 }

If he->srcline is not NULL (it is not NULL if it is uninitialized rubbish),
it gets strdupped and strdupping a rubbish random string causes the problem.

Also, if you look at the commit 1fb7d06, it adds the srcline property
into the struct, but not initializing it everywhere needed.

Committer notes:

Now I see, when using --ignore-callees=do_idle we end up here at line
2189 in add_callchain_ip():

2181         if (al.sym != NULL) {
2182                 if (perf_hpp_list.parent && !*parent &&
2183                     symbol__match_regex(al.sym, &parent_regex))
2184                         *parent = al.sym;
2185                 else if (have_ignore_callees && root_al &&
2186                   symbol__match_regex(al.sym, &ignore_callees_regex)) {
2187                         /* Treat this symbol as the root,
2188                            forgetting its callees. */
2189                         *root_al = al;
2190                         callchain_cursor_reset(cursor);
2191                 }
2192         }

And the al that doesn't have the ->srcline field initialized will be
copied to the root_al, so then, back to:

1211 int hist_entry_iter__add(struct hist_entry_iter *iter, struct addr_location *al,
1212                          int max_stack_depth, void *arg)
1213 {
1214         int err, err2;
1215         struct map *alm = NULL;
1216
1217         if (al)
1218                 alm = map__get(al->map);
1219
1220         err = sample__resolve_callchain(iter->sample, &callchain_cursor, &iter->parent,
1221                                         iter->evsel, al, max_stack_depth);
1222         if (err) {
1223                 map__put(alm);
1224                 return err;
1225         }
1226
1227         err = iter->ops->prepare_entry(iter, al);
1228         if (err)
1229                 goto out;
1230
1231         err = iter->ops->add_single_entry(iter, al);
1232         if (err)
1233                 goto out;
1234

That al at line 1221 is what hist_entry_iter__add() (called from
sample__resolve_callchain()) saw as 'root_al', and then:

        iter->ops->add_single_entry(iter, al);

will go on with al->srcline with a bogus value, I'll add the above
sequence to the cset and apply, thanks!

Signed-off-by: Michael Petlan <mpetlan@redhat.com>
CC: Milian Wolff <milian.wolff@kdab.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Fixes: 1fb7d06 ("perf report Use srcline from callchain for hist entries")
Link: https //lore.kernel.org/r/20210719145332.29747-1-mpetlan@redhat.com
Reported-by: Juri Lelli <jlelli@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 2, 2021
Attempting to defragment a Btrfs file containing a transparent huge page
immediately deadlocks with the following stack trace:

  #0  context_switch (kernel/sched/core.c:4940:2)
  #1  __schedule (kernel/sched/core.c:6287:8)
  #2  schedule (kernel/sched/core.c:6366:3)
  #3  io_schedule (kernel/sched/core.c:8389:2)
  #4  wait_on_page_bit_common (mm/filemap.c:1356:4)
  #5  __lock_page (mm/filemap.c:1648:2)
  #6  lock_page (./include/linux/pagemap.h:625:3)
  #7  pagecache_get_page (mm/filemap.c:1910:4)
  #8  find_or_create_page (./include/linux/pagemap.h:420:9)
  #9  defrag_prepare_one_page (fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:1068:9)
  #10 defrag_one_range (fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:1326:14)
  #11 defrag_one_cluster (fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:1421:9)
  #12 btrfs_defrag_file (fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:1523:9)
  #13 btrfs_ioctl_defrag (fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3117:9)
  #14 btrfs_ioctl (fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:4872:10)
  #15 vfs_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:51:10)
  #16 __do_sys_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:874:11)
  #17 __se_sys_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:860:1)
  #18 __x64_sys_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:860:1)
  #19 do_syscall_x64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:50:14)
  #20 do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:80:7)
  #21 entry_SYSCALL_64+0x7c/0x15b (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:113)

A huge page is represented by a compound page, which consists of a
struct page for each PAGE_SIZE page within the huge page. The first
struct page is the "head page", and the remaining are "tail pages".

Defragmentation attempts to lock each page in the range. However,
lock_page() on a tail page actually locks the corresponding head page.
So, if defragmentation tries to lock more than one struct page in a
compound page, it tries to lock the same head page twice and deadlocks
with itself.

Ideally, we should be able to defragment transparent huge pages.
However, THP for filesystems is currently read-only, so a lot of code is
not ready to use huge pages for I/O. For now, let's just return
ETXTBUSY.

This can be reproduced with the following on a kernel with
CONFIG_READ_ONLY_THP_FOR_FS=y:

  $ cat create_thp_file.c
  #include <fcntl.h>
  #include <stdbool.h>
  #include <stdio.h>
  #include <stdint.h>
  #include <stdlib.h>
  #include <unistd.h>
  #include <sys/mman.h>

  static const char zeroes[1024 * 1024];
  static const size_t FILE_SIZE = 2 * 1024 * 1024;

  int main(int argc, char **argv)
  {
          if (argc != 2) {
                  fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s PATH\n", argv[0]);
                  return EXIT_FAILURE;
          }
          int fd = creat(argv[1], 0777);
          if (fd == -1) {
                  perror("creat");
                  return EXIT_FAILURE;
          }
          size_t written = 0;
          while (written < FILE_SIZE) {
                  ssize_t ret = write(fd, zeroes,
                                      sizeof(zeroes) < FILE_SIZE - written ?
                                      sizeof(zeroes) : FILE_SIZE - written);
                  if (ret < 0) {
                          perror("write");
                          return EXIT_FAILURE;
                  }
                  written += ret;
          }
          close(fd);
          fd = open(argv[1], O_RDONLY);
          if (fd == -1) {
                  perror("open");
                  return EXIT_FAILURE;
          }

          /*
           * Reserve some address space so that we can align the file mapping to
           * the huge page size.
           */
          void *placeholder_map = mmap(NULL, FILE_SIZE * 2, PROT_NONE,
                                       MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
          if (placeholder_map == MAP_FAILED) {
                  perror("mmap (placeholder)");
                  return EXIT_FAILURE;
          }

          void *aligned_address =
                  (void *)(((uintptr_t)placeholder_map + FILE_SIZE - 1) & ~(FILE_SIZE - 1));

          void *map = mmap(aligned_address, FILE_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC,
                           MAP_SHARED | MAP_FIXED, fd, 0);
          if (map == MAP_FAILED) {
                  perror("mmap");
                  return EXIT_FAILURE;
          }
          if (madvise(map, FILE_SIZE, MADV_HUGEPAGE) < 0) {
                  perror("madvise");
                  return EXIT_FAILURE;
          }

          char *line = NULL;
          size_t line_capacity = 0;
          FILE *smaps_file = fopen("/proc/self/smaps", "r");
          if (!smaps_file) {
                  perror("fopen");
                  return EXIT_FAILURE;
          }
          for (;;) {
                  for (size_t off = 0; off < FILE_SIZE; off += 4096)
                          ((volatile char *)map)[off];

                  ssize_t ret;
                  bool this_mapping = false;
                  while ((ret = getline(&line, &line_capacity, smaps_file)) > 0) {
                          unsigned long start, end, huge;
                          if (sscanf(line, "%lx-%lx", &start, &end) == 2) {
                                  this_mapping = (start <= (uintptr_t)map &&
                                                  (uintptr_t)map < end);
                          } else if (this_mapping &&
                                     sscanf(line, "FilePmdMapped: %ld", &huge) == 1 &&
                                     huge > 0) {
                                  return EXIT_SUCCESS;
                          }
                  }

                  sleep(6);
                  rewind(smaps_file);
                  fflush(smaps_file);
          }
  }
  $ ./create_thp_file huge
  $ btrfs fi defrag -czstd ./huge

Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 6, 2021
When I do fuzz test for bonding device interface, I got the following
use-after-free Calltrace:

==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in bond_enslave+0x1521/0x24f0
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88825bc11c00 by task ifenslave/7365

CPU: 5 PID: 7365 Comm: ifenslave Tainted: G            E     5.15.0-rc1+ #13
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 dump_stack_lvl+0x6c/0x8b
 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x48/0x70
 kasan_report.cold+0x82/0xdb
 __asan_load8+0x69/0x90
 bond_enslave+0x1521/0x24f0
 bond_do_ioctl+0x3e0/0x450
 dev_ifsioc+0x2ba/0x970
 dev_ioctl+0x112/0x710
 sock_do_ioctl+0x118/0x1b0
 sock_ioctl+0x2e0/0x490
 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x118/0x150
 do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7f19159cf577
Code: b3 66 90 48 8b 05 11 89 2c 00 64 c7 00 26 00 00 00 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 78
RSP: 002b:00007ffeb3083c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffeb3084bca RCX: 00007f19159cf577
RDX: 00007ffeb3083ce0 RSI: 0000000000008990 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007ffeb3084bc4 R08: 0000000000000040 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00007ffeb3084bc0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffeb3083ce0
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffeb3083cb0

Allocated by task 7365:
 kasan_save_stack+0x23/0x50
 __kasan_kmalloc+0x83/0xa0
 kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x22e/0x470
 bond_enslave+0x2e1/0x24f0
 bond_do_ioctl+0x3e0/0x450
 dev_ifsioc+0x2ba/0x970
 dev_ioctl+0x112/0x710
 sock_do_ioctl+0x118/0x1b0
 sock_ioctl+0x2e0/0x490
 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x118/0x150
 do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Freed by task 7365:
 kasan_save_stack+0x23/0x50
 kasan_set_track+0x20/0x30
 kasan_set_free_info+0x24/0x40
 __kasan_slab_free+0xf2/0x130
 kfree+0xd1/0x5c0
 slave_kobj_release+0x61/0x90
 kobject_put+0x102/0x180
 bond_sysfs_slave_add+0x7a/0xa0
 bond_enslave+0x11b6/0x24f0
 bond_do_ioctl+0x3e0/0x450
 dev_ifsioc+0x2ba/0x970
 dev_ioctl+0x112/0x710
 sock_do_ioctl+0x118/0x1b0
 sock_ioctl+0x2e0/0x490
 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x118/0x150
 do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Last potentially related work creation:
 kasan_save_stack+0x23/0x50
 kasan_record_aux_stack+0xb7/0xd0
 insert_work+0x43/0x190
 __queue_work+0x2e3/0x970
 delayed_work_timer_fn+0x3e/0x50
 call_timer_fn+0x148/0x470
 run_timer_softirq+0x8a8/0xc50
 __do_softirq+0x107/0x55f

Second to last potentially related work creation:
 kasan_save_stack+0x23/0x50
 kasan_record_aux_stack+0xb7/0xd0
 insert_work+0x43/0x190
 __queue_work+0x2e3/0x970
 __queue_delayed_work+0x130/0x180
 queue_delayed_work_on+0xa7/0xb0
 bond_enslave+0xe25/0x24f0
 bond_do_ioctl+0x3e0/0x450
 dev_ifsioc+0x2ba/0x970
 dev_ioctl+0x112/0x710
 sock_do_ioctl+0x118/0x1b0
 sock_ioctl+0x2e0/0x490
 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x118/0x150
 do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88825bc11c00
 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024
The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of
 1024-byte region [ffff88825bc11c00, ffff88825bc12000)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea00096f0400 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x25bc10
head:ffffea00096f0400 order:3 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
flags: 0x57ff00000010200(slab|head|node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
raw: 057ff00000010200 ffffea0009a71c08 ffff888240001968 ffff88810004dbc0
raw: 0000000000000000 00000000000a000a 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff88825bc11b00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ffff88825bc11b80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff88825bc11c00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                   ^
 ffff88825bc11c80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
 ffff88825bc11d00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================

Put new_slave in bond_sysfs_slave_add() will cause use-after-free problems
when new_slave is accessed in the subsequent error handling process. Since
new_slave will be put in the subsequent error handling process, remove the
unnecessary put to fix it.
In addition, when sysfs_create_file() fails, if some files have been crea-
ted successfully, we need to call sysfs_remove_file() to remove them.
Since there are sysfs_create_files() & sysfs_remove_files() can be used,
use these two functions instead.

Fixes: 7afcaec (bonding: use kobject_put instead of _del after kobject_add)
Signed-off-by: Huang Guobin <huangguobin4@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 9, 2021
The exit function fixes a memory leak with the src field as detected by
leak sanitizer. An example of which is:

Indirect leak of 25133184 byte(s) in 207 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7f199ecfe987 in __interceptor_calloc libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154
    #1 0x55defe638224 in annotated_source__alloc_histograms util/annotate.c:803
    #2 0x55defe6397e4 in symbol__hists util/annotate.c:952
    #3 0x55defe639908 in symbol__inc_addr_samples util/annotate.c:968
    #4 0x55defe63aa29 in hist_entry__inc_addr_samples util/annotate.c:1119
    #5 0x55defe499a79 in hist_iter__report_callback tools/perf/builtin-report.c:182
    #6 0x55defe7a859d in hist_entry_iter__add util/hist.c:1236
    #7 0x55defe49aa63 in process_sample_event tools/perf/builtin-report.c:315
    #8 0x55defe731bc8 in evlist__deliver_sample util/session.c:1473
    #9 0x55defe731e38 in machines__deliver_event util/session.c:1510
    #10 0x55defe732a23 in perf_session__deliver_event util/session.c:1590
    #11 0x55defe72951e in ordered_events__deliver_event util/session.c:183
    #12 0x55defe740082 in do_flush util/ordered-events.c:244
    #13 0x55defe7407cb in __ordered_events__flush util/ordered-events.c:323
    #14 0x55defe740a61 in ordered_events__flush util/ordered-events.c:341
    #15 0x55defe73837f in __perf_session__process_events util/session.c:2390
    #16 0x55defe7385ff in perf_session__process_events util/session.c:2420
    ...

Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kajol Jain <kjain@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Martin Liška <mliska@suse.cz>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211112035124.94327-3-irogers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 25, 2022
Similar to commit b8d8436 ("drm/i915/gt: Hold RPM wakelock during
PXP suspend") but to fix the same warning for unbind during shutdown:

------------[ cut here ]------------
RPM wakelock ref not held during HW access
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 4139 at drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_runtime_pm.h:115
gen12_fwtable_write32+0x1b7/0
Modules linked in: 8021q ccm rfcomm cmac algif_hash algif_skcipher
af_alg uinput snd_hda_codec_hdmi vf industrialio iwl7000_mac80211
cros_ec_sensorhub lzo_rle lzo_compress zram iwlwifi cfg80211 joydev
CPU: 0 PID: 4139 Comm: halt Tainted: G     U  W
5.10.84 #13 344e11e079c4a03940d949e537eab645f6
RIP: 0010:gen12_fwtable_write32+0x1b7/0x200
Code: 48 c7 c7 fc b3 b5 89 31 c0 e8 2c f3 ad ff 0f 0b e9 04 ff ff ff c6
05 71 e9 1d 01 01 48 c7 c7 d67
RSP: 0018:ffffa09ec0bb3bb0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 12dde97bbd260300 RBX: 00000000000320f0 RCX: ffffffff89e60ea0
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000ffffdfff RDI: ffffffff89e60e70
RBP: ffffa09ec0bb3bd8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffa09ec0bb3950
R10: 00000000ffffdfff R11: ffffffff89e91160 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000028121969 R14: ffff9515c32f0990 R15: 0000000040000000
FS:  0000790dcf225740(0000) GS:ffff951737800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000058b25efae147 CR3: 0000000133ea6001 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
 intel_pxp_fini_hw+0x2f/0x39
 i915_pxp_tee_component_unbind+0x1c/0x42
 component_unbind+0x32/0x48
 component_unbind_all+0x80/0x9d
 take_down_master+0x24/0x36
 component_master_del+0x56/0x70
 mei_pxp_remove+0x2c/0x68
 mei_cl_device_remove+0x35/0x68
 device_release_driver_internal+0x100/0x1a1
 mei_cl_bus_remove_device+0x21/0x79
 mei_cl_bus_remove_devices+0x3b/0x51
 mei_stop+0x3b/0xae
 mei_me_shutdown+0x23/0x58
 device_shutdown+0x144/0x1d3
 kernel_power_off+0x13/0x4c
 __se_sys_reboot+0x1d4/0x1e9
 do_syscall_64+0x43/0x55
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x790dcf316273
Code: 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00
00 89 fa be 69 19 12 28 bf ad8
RSP: 002b:00007ffca0df9198 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a9
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000004321fedc RCX: 0000790dcf316273
RDX: 000000004321fedc RSI: 0000000028121969 RDI: 00000000fee1dead
RBP: 00007ffca0df9200 R08: 0000000000000007 R09: 0000563ce8cd8970
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007ffca0df9308
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000003
---[ end trace 2f501b01b348f114 ]---
ACPI: Preparing to enter system sleep state S5
reboot: Power down

Changes since v1:
 - Rebase to latest drm-tip

Fixes: 0cfab4c ("drm/i915/pxp: Enable PXP power management")
Suggested-by: Lee Shawn C <shawn.c.lee@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Juston Li <juston.li@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniele Ceraolo Spurio <daniele.ceraolospurio@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: John Harrison <John.C.Harrison@Intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20220106200236.489656-2-juston.li@intel.com
(cherry picked from commit 57ded5f)
Signed-off-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@intel.com>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 18, 2022
When bringing down the netdevice or system shutdown, a panic can be
triggered while accessing the sysfs path because the device is already
removed.

    [  755.549084] mlx5_core 0000:12:00.1: Shutdown was called
    [  756.404455] mlx5_core 0000:12:00.0: Shutdown was called
    ...
    [  757.937260] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at           (null)
    [  758.031397] IP: [<ffffffff8ee11acb>] dma_pool_alloc+0x1ab/0x280

    crash> bt
    ...
    PID: 12649  TASK: ffff8924108f2100  CPU: 1   COMMAND: "amsd"
    ...
     #9 [ffff89240e1a38b0] page_fault at ffffffff8f38c778
        [exception RIP: dma_pool_alloc+0x1ab]
        RIP: ffffffff8ee11acb  RSP: ffff89240e1a3968  RFLAGS: 00010046
        RAX: 0000000000000246  RBX: ffff89243d874100  RCX: 0000000000001000
        RDX: 0000000000000000  RSI: 0000000000000246  RDI: ffff89243d874090
        RBP: ffff89240e1a39c0   R8: 000000000001f080   R9: ffff8905ffc03c00
        R10: ffffffffc04680d4  R11: ffffffff8edde9fd  R12: 00000000000080d0
        R13: ffff89243d874090  R14: ffff89243d874080  R15: 0000000000000000
        ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
    #10 [ffff89240e1a39c8] mlx5_alloc_cmd_msg at ffffffffc04680f3 [mlx5_core]
    #11 [ffff89240e1a3a18] cmd_exec at ffffffffc046ad62 [mlx5_core]
    #12 [ffff89240e1a3ab8] mlx5_cmd_exec at ffffffffc046b4fb [mlx5_core]
    #13 [ffff89240e1a3ae8] mlx5_core_access_reg at ffffffffc0475434 [mlx5_core]
    #14 [ffff89240e1a3b40] mlx5e_get_fec_caps at ffffffffc04a7348 [mlx5_core]
    #15 [ffff89240e1a3bb0] get_fec_supported_advertised at ffffffffc04992bf [mlx5_core]
    #16 [ffff89240e1a3c08] mlx5e_get_link_ksettings at ffffffffc049ab36 [mlx5_core]
    #17 [ffff89240e1a3ce8] __ethtool_get_link_ksettings at ffffffff8f25db46
    #18 [ffff89240e1a3d48] speed_show at ffffffff8f277208
    #19 [ffff89240e1a3dd8] dev_attr_show at ffffffff8f0b70e3
    #20 [ffff89240e1a3df8] sysfs_kf_seq_show at ffffffff8eedbedf
    #21 [ffff89240e1a3e18] kernfs_seq_show at ffffffff8eeda596
    #22 [ffff89240e1a3e28] seq_read at ffffffff8ee76d10
    #23 [ffff89240e1a3e98] kernfs_fop_read at ffffffff8eedaef5
    #24 [ffff89240e1a3ed8] vfs_read at ffffffff8ee4e3ff
    #25 [ffff89240e1a3f08] sys_read at ffffffff8ee4f27f
    #26 [ffff89240e1a3f50] system_call_fastpath at ffffffff8f395f92

    crash> net_device.state ffff89443b0c0000
      state = 0x5  (__LINK_STATE_START| __LINK_STATE_NOCARRIER)

To prevent this scenario, we also make sure that the netdevice is present.

Signed-off-by: suresh kumar <suresh2514@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 5, 2022
Ido Schimmel says:

====================
HW counters for soft devices

Petr says:

Offloading switch device drivers may be able to collect statistics of the
traffic taking place in the HW datapath that pertains to a certain soft
netdevice, such as a VLAN. In this patch set, add the necessary
infrastructure to allow exposing these statistics to the offloaded
netdevice in question, and add mlxsw offload.

Across HW platforms, the counter itself very likely constitutes a limited
resource, and the act of counting may have a performance impact. Therefore
this patch set makes the HW statistics collection opt-in and togglable from
userspace on a per-netdevice basis.

Additionally, HW devices may have various limiting conditions under which
they can realize the counter. Therefore it is also possible to query
whether the requested counter is realized by any driver. In TC parlance,
which is to a degree reused in this patch set, two values are recognized:
"request" tracks whether the user enabled collecting HW statistics, and
"used" tracks whether any HW statistics are actually collected.

In the past, this author has expressed the opinion that `a typical user
doing "ip -s l sh", including various scripts, wants to see the full
picture and not worry what's going on where'. While that would be nice,
unfortunately it cannot work:

- Packets that trap from the HW datapath to the SW datapath would be
  double counted.

  For a given netdevice, some traffic can be purely a SW artifact, and some
  may flow through the HW object corresponding to the netdevice. But some
  traffic can also get trapped to the SW datapath after bumping the HW
  counter. It is not clear how to make sure double-counting does not occur
  in the SW datapath in that case, while still making sure that possibly
  divergent SW forwarding path gets bumped as appropriate.

  So simply adding HW and SW stats may work roughly, most of the time, but
  there are scenarios where the result is nonsensical.

- HW devices will have limitations as to what type of traffic they can
  count.

  In case of mlxsw, which is part of this patch set, there is no reasonable
  way to count all traffic going through a certain netdevice, such as a
  VLAN netdevice enslaved to a bridge. It is however very simple to count
  traffic flowing through an L3 object, such as a VLAN netdevice with an IP
  address.

  Similarly for physical netdevices, the L3 object at which the counter is
  installed is the subport carrying untagged traffic.

  These are not "just counters". It is important that the user understands
  what is being counted. It would be incorrect to conflate these statistics
  with another existing statistics suite.

To that end, this patch set introduces a statistics suite called "L3
stats". This label should make it easy to understand what is being counted,
and to decide whether a given device can or cannot implement this suite for
some type of netdevice. At the same time, the code is written to make
future extensions easy, should a device pop up that can implement a
different flavor of statistics suite (say L2, or an address-family-specific
suite).

For example, using a work-in-progress iproute2[1], to turn on and then list
the counters on a VLAN netdevice:

    # ip stats set dev swp1.200 l3_stats on
    # ip stats show dev swp1.200 group offload subgroup l3_stats
    56: swp1.200: group offload subgroup l3_stats on used on
	RX:  bytes packets errors dropped  missed   mcast
		0       0      0       0       0       0
	TX:  bytes packets errors dropped carrier collsns
		0       0      0       0       0       0

The patchset progresses as follows:

- Patch #1 is a cleanup.

- In patch #2, remove the assumption that all LINK_OFFLOAD_XSTATS are
  dev-backed.

  The only attribute defined under the nest is currently
  IFLA_OFFLOAD_XSTATS_CPU_HIT. L3_STATS differs from CPU_HIT in that the
  driver that supplies the statistics is not the same as the driver that
  implements the netdevice. Make the code compatible with this in patch #2.

- In patch #3, add the possibility to filter inside nests.

  The filter_mask field of RTM_GETSTATS header determines which
  top-level attributes should be included in the netlink response. This
  saves processing time by only including the bits that the user cares
  about instead of always dumping everything. This is doubly important
  for HW-backed statistics that would typically require a trip to the
  device to fetch the stats. In this patch, the UAPI is extended to
  allow filtering inside IFLA_STATS_LINK_OFFLOAD_XSTATS in particular,
  but the scheme is easily extensible to other nests as well.

- In patch #4, propagate extack where we need it.
  In patch #5, make it possible to propagate errors from drivers to the
  user.

- In patch #6, add the in-kernel APIs for keeping track of the new stats
  suite, and the notifiers that the core uses to communicate with the
  drivers.

- In patch #7, add UAPI for obtaining the new stats suite.

- In patch #8, add a new UAPI message, RTM_SETSTATS, which will carry
  the message to toggle the newly-added stats suite.
  In patch #9, add the toggle itself.

At this point the core is ready for drivers to add support for the new
stats suite.

- In patches #10, #11 and #12, apply small tweaks to mlxsw code.

- In patch #13, add support for L3 stats, which are realized as RIF
  counters.

- Finally in patch #14, a selftest is added to the net/forwarding
  directory. Technically this is a HW-specific test, in that without a HW
  implementing the counters, it just will not pass. But devices that
  support L3 statistics at all are likely to be able to reuse this
  selftest, so it seems appropriate to put it in the general forwarding
  directory.

We also have a netdevsim implementation, and a corresponding selftest that
verifies specifically some of the core code. We intend to contribute these
later. Interested parties can take a look at the raw code at [2].

[1] https://github.com/pmachata/iproute2/commits/soft_counters
[2] https://github.com/pmachata/linux_mlxsw/commits/petrm_soft_counters_2

v2:
- Patch #3:
    - Do not declare strict_start_type at the new policies, since they are
      used with nla_parse_nested() (sans _deprecated).
    - Use NLA_POLICY_NESTED to declare what the nest contents should be
    - Use NLA_POLICY_MASK instead of BITFIELD32 for the filtering
      attribute.
- Patch #6:
    - s/monotonous/monotonic/ in commit message
    - Use a newly-added struct rtnl_hw_stats64 for stats transfer
- Patch #7:
    - Use a newly-added struct rtnl_hw_stats64 for stats transfer
- Patch #8:
    - Do not declare strict_start_type at the new policies, since they are
      used with nla_parse_nested() (sans _deprecated).
- Patch #13:
    - Use a newly-added struct rtnl_hw_stats64 for stats transfer
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 18, 2022
There is only one "goto done;" in set_device_flags() and this happens
*before* hci_dev_lock() is called, move the done label to after the
hci_dev_unlock() to fix the following unlock balance:

[   31.493567] =====================================
[   31.493571] WARNING: bad unlock balance detected!
[   31.493576] 5.17.0-rc2+ #13 Tainted: G         C  E
[   31.493581] -------------------------------------
[   31.493584] bluetoothd/685 is trying to release lock (&hdev->lock) at:
[   31.493594] [<ffffffffc07603f5>] set_device_flags+0x65/0x1f0 [bluetooth]
[   31.493684] but there are no more locks to release!

Note this bug has been around for a couple of years, but before
commit fe92ee6 ("Bluetooth: hci_core: Rework hci_conn_params flags")
supported_flags was hardcoded to "((1U << HCI_CONN_FLAG_MAX) - 1)" so
the check for unsupported flags which does the "goto done;" never
triggered.

Fixes: fe92ee6 ("Bluetooth: hci_core: Rework hci_conn_params flags")
Cc: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 29, 2022
In remove_phb_dynamic() we use &phb->io_resource, after we've called
device_unregister(&host_bridge->dev). But the unregister may have freed
phb, because pcibios_free_controller_deferred() is the release function
for the host_bridge.

If there are no outstanding references when we call device_unregister()
then phb will be freed out from under us.

This has gone mainly unnoticed, but with slub_debug and page_poison
enabled it can lead to a crash:

  PID: 7574   TASK: c0000000d492cb80  CPU: 13  COMMAND: "drmgr"
   #0 [c0000000e4f075a0] crash_kexec at c00000000027d7dc
   #1 [c0000000e4f075d0] oops_end at c000000000029608
   #2 [c0000000e4f07650] __bad_page_fault at c0000000000904b4
   #3 [c0000000e4f076c0] do_bad_slb_fault at c00000000009a5a8
   #4 [c0000000e4f076f0] data_access_slb_common_virt at c000000000008b30
   Data SLB Access [380] exception frame:
   R0:  c000000000167250    R1:  c0000000e4f07a00    R2:  c000000002a46100
   R3:  c000000002b39ce8    R4:  00000000000000c0    R5:  00000000000000a9
   R6:  3894674d000000c0    R7:  0000000000000000    R8:  00000000000000ff
   R9:  0000000000000100    R10: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b    R11: 0000000000008000
   R12: c00000000023da80    R13: c0000009ffd38b00    R14: 0000000000000000
   R15: 000000011c87f0f0    R16: 0000000000000006    R17: 0000000000000003
   R18: 0000000000000002    R19: 0000000000000004    R20: 0000000000000005
   R21: 000000011c87ede8    R22: 000000011c87c5a8    R23: 000000011c87d3a0
   R24: 0000000000000000    R25: 0000000000000001    R26: c0000000e4f07cc8
   R27: c00000004d1cc400    R28: c0080000031d00e8    R29: c00000004d23d800
   R30: c00000004d1d2400    R31: c00000004d1d2540
   NIP: c000000000167258    MSR: 8000000000009033    OR3: c000000000e9f474
   CTR: 0000000000000000    LR:  c000000000167250    XER: 0000000020040003
   CCR: 0000000024088420    MQ:  0000000000000000    DAR: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6ba3
   DSISR: c0000000e4f07920     Syscall Result: fffffffffffffff2
   [NIP  : release_resource+56]
   [LR   : release_resource+48]
   #5 [c0000000e4f07a00] release_resource at c000000000167258  (unreliable)
   #6 [c0000000e4f07a30] remove_phb_dynamic at c000000000105648
   #7 [c0000000e4f07ab0] dlpar_remove_slot at c0080000031a09e8 [rpadlpar_io]
   #8 [c0000000e4f07b50] remove_slot_store at c0080000031a0b9c [rpadlpar_io]
   #9 [c0000000e4f07be0] kobj_attr_store at c000000000817d8c
  #10 [c0000000e4f07c00] sysfs_kf_write at c00000000063e504
  #11 [c0000000e4f07c20] kernfs_fop_write_iter at c00000000063d868
  #12 [c0000000e4f07c70] new_sync_write at c00000000054339c
  #13 [c0000000e4f07d10] vfs_write at c000000000546624
  #14 [c0000000e4f07d60] ksys_write at c0000000005469f4
  #15 [c0000000e4f07db0] system_call_exception at c000000000030840
  #16 [c0000000e4f07e10] system_call_vectored_common at c00000000000c168

To avoid it, we can take a reference to the host_bridge->dev until we're
done using phb. Then when we drop the reference the phb will be freed.

Fixes: 2dd9c11 ("powerpc/pseries: use pci_host_bridge.release_fn() to kfree(phb)")
Reported-by: David Dai <zdai@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Tested-by: Sachin Sant <sachinp@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220318034219.1188008-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 9, 2022
Ido Schimmel says:

====================
net/sched: Better error reporting for offload failures

This patchset improves error reporting to user space when offload fails
during the flow action setup phase. That is, when failures occur in the
actions themselves, even before calling device drivers. Requested /
reported in [1].

This is done by passing extack to the offload_act_setup() callback and
making use of it in the various actions.

Patches #1-#2 change matchall and flower to log error messages to user
space in accordance with the verbose flag.

Patch #3 passes extack to the offload_act_setup() callback from the
various call sites, including matchall and flower.

Patches #4-#11 make use of extack in the various actions to report
offload failures.

Patch #12 adds an error message when the action does not support offload
at all.

Patches #13-#14 change matchall and flower to stop overwriting more
specific error messages.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20220317185249.5mff5u2x624pjewv@skbuf/
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 27, 2022
Use the actual length of volume coherency data when setting the
xattr to avoid the following KASAN report.

 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in cachefiles_set_volume_xattr+0xa0/0x350 [cachefiles]
 Write of size 4 at addr ffff888101e02af4 by task kworker/6:0/1347

 CPU: 6 PID: 1347 Comm: kworker/6:0 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.18.0-rc1-nfs-fscache-netfs+ #13
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.14.0-4.fc34 04/01/2014
 Workqueue: events fscache_create_volume_work [fscache]
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x45/0x5a
  print_report.cold+0x5e/0x5db
  ? __lock_text_start+0x8/0x8
  ? cachefiles_set_volume_xattr+0xa0/0x350 [cachefiles]
  kasan_report+0xab/0x120
  ? cachefiles_set_volume_xattr+0xa0/0x350 [cachefiles]
  kasan_check_range+0xf5/0x1d0
  memcpy+0x39/0x60
  cachefiles_set_volume_xattr+0xa0/0x350 [cachefiles]
  cachefiles_acquire_volume+0x2be/0x500 [cachefiles]
  ? __cachefiles_free_volume+0x90/0x90 [cachefiles]
  fscache_create_volume_work+0x68/0x160 [fscache]
  process_one_work+0x3b7/0x6a0
  worker_thread+0x2c4/0x650
  ? process_one_work+0x6a0/0x6a0
  kthread+0x16c/0x1a0
  ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
  ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
  </TASK>

 Allocated by task 1347:
  kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
  __kasan_kmalloc+0x81/0xa0
  cachefiles_set_volume_xattr+0x76/0x350 [cachefiles]
  cachefiles_acquire_volume+0x2be/0x500 [cachefiles]
  fscache_create_volume_work+0x68/0x160 [fscache]
  process_one_work+0x3b7/0x6a0
  worker_thread+0x2c4/0x650
  kthread+0x16c/0x1a0
  ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30

 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888101e02af0
 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8
 The buggy address is located 4 bytes inside of
 8-byte region [ffff888101e02af0, ffff888101e02af8)

 The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
 page:00000000a2292d70 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x101e02
 flags: 0x17ffffc0000200(slab|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
 raw: 0017ffffc0000200 0000000000000000 dead000000000001 ffff888100042280
 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080660066 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

 Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff888101e02980: fc 00 fc fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc fc
 ffff888101e02a00: 00 fc fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc fc 00
 >ffff888101e02a80: fc fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc fc 04 fc
                                                            ^
 ffff888101e02b00: fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc fc 00 fc fc
 ffff888101e02b80: fc fc 00 fc fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc
 ==================================================================

Fixes: 413a4a6 "cachefiles: Fix volume coherency attribute"
Signed-off-by: Dave Wysochanski <dwysocha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: linux-cachefs@redhat.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220405134649.6579-1-dwysocha@redhat.com/ # v1
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220405142810.8208-1-dwysocha@redhat.com/ # Incorrect v2
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 27, 2022
When CONFIG_DEBUG_KMAP_LOCAL is enabled __kmap_local_sched_{in,out} check
that even slots in the tsk->kmap_ctrl.pteval are unmapped.  The slots are
initialized with 0 value, but the check is done with pte_none.  0 pte
however does not necessarily mean that pte_none will return true.  e.g.
on xtensa it returns false, resulting in the following runtime warnings:

 WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 101 at mm/highmem.c:627 __kmap_local_sched_out+0x51/0x108
 CPU: 0 PID: 101 Comm: touch Not tainted 5.17.0-rc7-00010-gd3a1cdde80d2-dirty #13
 Call Trace:
   dump_stack+0xc/0x40
   __warn+0x8f/0x174
   warn_slowpath_fmt+0x48/0xac
   __kmap_local_sched_out+0x51/0x108
   __schedule+0x71a/0x9c4
   preempt_schedule_irq+0xa0/0xe0
   common_exception_return+0x5c/0x93
   do_wp_page+0x30e/0x330
   handle_mm_fault+0xa70/0xc3c
   do_page_fault+0x1d8/0x3c4
   common_exception+0x7f/0x7f

 WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 101 at mm/highmem.c:664 __kmap_local_sched_in+0x50/0xe0
 CPU: 0 PID: 101 Comm: touch Tainted: G        W         5.17.0-rc7-00010-gd3a1cdde80d2-dirty #13
 Call Trace:
   dump_stack+0xc/0x40
   __warn+0x8f/0x174
   warn_slowpath_fmt+0x48/0xac
   __kmap_local_sched_in+0x50/0xe0
   finish_task_switch$isra$0+0x1ce/0x2f8
   __schedule+0x86e/0x9c4
   preempt_schedule_irq+0xa0/0xe0
   common_exception_return+0x5c/0x93
   do_wp_page+0x30e/0x330
   handle_mm_fault+0xa70/0xc3c
   do_page_fault+0x1d8/0x3c4
   common_exception+0x7f/0x7f

Fix it by replacing !pte_none(pteval) with pte_val(pteval) != 0.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220403235159.3498065-1-jcmvbkbc@gmail.com
Fixes: 5fbda3e ("sched: highmem: Store local kmaps in task struct")
Signed-off-by: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 2, 2022
Sometimes it is necessary to use a PLT entry to call an ftrace
trampoline. This is handled by ftrace_make_call() and ftrace_make_nop(),
with each having *almost* identical logic, but this is not handled by
ftrace_modify_call() since its introduction in commit:

  3b23e49 ("arm64: implement ftrace with regs")

Due to this, if we ever were to call ftrace_modify_call() for a callsite
which requires a PLT entry for a trampoline, then either:

a) If the old addr requires a trampoline, ftrace_modify_call() will use
   an out-of-range address to generate the 'old' branch instruction.
   This will result in warnings from aarch64_insn_gen_branch_imm() and
   ftrace_modify_code(), and no instructions will be modified. As
   ftrace_modify_call() will return an error, this will result in
   subsequent internal ftrace errors.

b) If the old addr does not require a trampoline, but the new addr does,
   ftrace_modify_call() will use an out-of-range address to generate the
   'new' branch instruction. This will result in warnings from
   aarch64_insn_gen_branch_imm(), and ftrace_modify_code() will replace
   the 'old' branch with a BRK. This will result in a kernel panic when
   this BRK is later executed.

Practically speaking, case (a) is vastly more likely than case (b), and
typically this will result in internal ftrace errors that don't
necessarily affect the rest of the system. This can be demonstrated with
an out-of-tree test module which triggers ftrace_modify_call(), e.g.

| # insmod test_ftrace.ko
| test_ftrace: Function test_function raw=0xffffb3749399201c, callsite=0xffffb37493992024
| branch_imm_common: offset out of range
| branch_imm_common: offset out of range
| ------------[ ftrace bug ]------------
| ftrace failed to modify
| [<ffffb37493992024>] test_function+0x8/0x38 [test_ftrace]
|  actual:   1d:00:00:94
| Updating ftrace call site to call a different ftrace function
| ftrace record flags: e0000002
|  (2) R
|  expected tramp: ffffb374ae42ed54
| ------------[ cut here ]------------
| WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 165 at kernel/trace/ftrace.c:2085 ftrace_bug+0x280/0x2b0
| Modules linked in: test_ftrace(+)
| CPU: 0 PID: 165 Comm: insmod Not tainted 5.19.0-rc2-00002-g4d9ead8b45ce #13
| Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
| pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
| pc : ftrace_bug+0x280/0x2b0
| lr : ftrace_bug+0x280/0x2b0
| sp : ffff80000839ba00
| x29: ffff80000839ba00 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: ffff80000839bcf0
| x26: ffffb37493994180 x25: ffffb374b0991c28 x24: ffffb374b0d70000
| x23: 00000000ffffffea x22: ffffb374afcc33b0 x21: ffffb374b08f9cc8
| x20: ffff572b8462c000 x19: ffffb374b08f9000 x18: ffffffffffffffff
| x17: 6c6c6163202c6331 x16: ffffb374ae5ad110 x15: ffffb374b0d51ee4
| x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 3435646532346561 x12: 3437336266666666
| x11: 203a706d61727420 x10: 6465746365707865 x9 : ffffb374ae5149e8
| x8 : 336266666666203a x7 : 706d617274206465 x6 : 00000000fffff167
| x5 : ffff572bffbc4a08 x4 : 00000000fffff167 x3 : 0000000000000000
| x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff572b84461e00 x0 : 0000000000000022
| Call trace:
|  ftrace_bug+0x280/0x2b0
|  ftrace_replace_code+0x98/0xa0
|  ftrace_modify_all_code+0xe0/0x144
|  arch_ftrace_update_code+0x14/0x20
|  ftrace_startup+0xf8/0x1b0
|  register_ftrace_function+0x38/0x90
|  test_ftrace_init+0xd0/0x1000 [test_ftrace]
|  do_one_initcall+0x50/0x2b0
|  do_init_module+0x50/0x1f0
|  load_module+0x17c8/0x1d64
|  __do_sys_finit_module+0xa8/0x100
|  __arm64_sys_finit_module+0x2c/0x3c
|  invoke_syscall+0x50/0x120
|  el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xdc/0x100
|  do_el0_svc+0x3c/0xd0
|  el0_svc+0x34/0xb0
|  el0t_64_sync_handler+0xbc/0x140
|  el0t_64_sync+0x18c/0x190
| ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

We can solve this by consistently determining whether to use a PLT entry
for an address.

Note that since (the earlier) commit:

  f1a54ae ("arm64: module/ftrace: intialize PLT at load time")

... we can consistently determine the PLT address that a given callsite
will use, and therefore ftrace_make_nop() does not need to skip
validation when a PLT is in use.

This patch factors the existing logic out of ftrace_make_call() and
ftrace_make_nop() into a common ftrace_find_callable_addr() helper
function, which is used by ftrace_make_call(), ftrace_make_nop(), and
ftrace_modify_call(). In ftrace_make_nop() the patching is consistently
validated by ftrace_modify_code() as we can always determine what the
old instruction should have been.

Fixes: 3b23e49 ("arm64: implement ftrace with regs")
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Tested-by: "Ivan T. Ivanov" <iivanov@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Chengming Zhou <zhouchengming@bytedance.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220614080944.1349146-3-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 10, 2022
Ido Schimmel says:

====================
mlxsw: Unified bridge conversion - part 2/6

This is the second part of the conversion of mlxsw to the unified bridge
model. Part 1 was merged in commit 4336487 ("Merge branch
'mlxsw-unified-bridge-conversion-part-1'") which includes details about
the new model and the motivation behind the conversion.

This patchset does not begin the conversion, but rather prepares the code
base for it.

Patchset overview:

Patch #1 removes an unnecessary field from one of the FID families.

Patches #2-#7 make various improvements in the layer 2 multicast code,
making it more receptive towards upcoming changes.

Patches #8-#10 prepare the CONFIG_PROFILE command for the unified bridge
model. This command will be used to enable the new model in the last
patchset.

Patches #11-#13 perform small changes in the FID code, preparing it for
upcoming changes.
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 10, 2022
Ido Schimmel says:

====================
mlxsw: Unified bridge conversion - part 4/6

This is the fourth part of the conversion of mlxsw to the unified bridge
model.

Unlike previous parts that prepared mlxsw for the conversion, this part
actually starts the conversion. It focuses on flooding configuration and
converts mlxsw to the more "raw" APIs of the unified bridge model.

The patches configure the different stages of the flooding pipeline in
Spectrum that looks as follows (at a high-level):

         +------------+                +----------+           +-------+
  {FID,  |            | {Packet type,  |          |           |       |  MID
   DMAC} | FDB lookup |  Bridge type}  |   SFGC   | MID base  |       | Index
+-------->   (miss)   +----------------> register +-----------> Adder +------->
         |            |                |          |           |       |
         |            |                |          |           |       |
         +------------+                +----+-----+           +---^---+
                                            |                     |
                                    Table   |                     |
                                     type   |                     | Offset
                                            |      +-------+      |
                                            |      |       |      |
                                            |      |       |      |
                                            +----->+  Mux  +------+
                                                   |       |
                                                   |       |
                                                   +-^---^-+
                                                     |   |
                                                  FID|   |FID
                                                     |   |offset
                                                     +   +

The multicast identifier (MID) index is used as an index to the port
group table (PGT) that contains a bitmap of ports via which a packet
needs to be replicated.

From the PGT table, the packet continues to the multicast port egress
(MPE) table that determines the packet's egress VLAN. This is a
two-dimensional table that is indexed by port and switch multicast port
to egress (SMPE) index. The latter can be thought of as a FID. Without
it, all the packets replicated via a certain port would get the same
VLAN, regardless of the bridge domain (FID).

Logically, these two steps look as follows:

                     PGT table                           MPE table
             +-----------------------+               +---------------+
             |                       | {Local port,  |               | Egress
  MID index  | Local ports bitmap #1 |  SMPE index}  |               |  VID
+------------>        ...            +--------------->               +-------->
             | Local ports bitmap #N |               |               |
             |                       |          SMPE |               |
             +-----------------------+               +---------------+
                                                        Local port

Patchset overview:

Patch #1 adds a variable to guard against mixed model configuration.
Will be removed in part 6 when mlxsw is fully converted to the unified
model.

Patches #2-#5 introduce two new FID attributes required for flooding
configuration in the new model:

1. 'flood_rsp': Instructs the firmware to handle flooding configuration
for this FID. Only set for router FIDs (rFIDs) which are used to connect
a {Port, VLAN} to the router block.

2. 'bridge_type': Allows the device to determine the flood table (i.e.,
base index to the PGT table) for the FID. The first type will be used
for FIDs in a VLAN-aware bridge and the second for FIDs representing
VLAN-unaware bridges.

Patch #6 configures the MPE table that determines the egress VLAN of a
packet that is forwarded according to L2 multicast / flood.

Patches #7-#11 add the PGT table and related APIs to allocate entries
and set / clear ports in them.

Patches #12-#13 convert the flooding configuration to use the new PGT
APIs.
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220627070621.648499-1-idosch@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 10, 2022
Ido Schimmel says:

====================
mlxsw: Unified bridge conversion - part 6/6

This is the sixth and final part of the conversion of mlxsw to the
unified bridge model. It transitions the last bits of functionality that
were under firmware's responsibility in the legacy model to the driver.
The last patches flip the driver to the unified bridge model and clean
up code that was used to make the conversion easier to review.

Patchset overview:

Patch #1 sets the egress VID for known unicast packets. For multicast
packets, the egress VID is configured using the MPE table. See commit
8c2da08 ("mlxsw: spectrum_fid: Configure egress VID classification
for multicast").

Patch #2 configures the VNI to FID classification that is used during
decapsulation.

Patch #3 configures ingress router interface (RIF) in FID classification
records, so that when a packet reaches the router block, its ingress RIF
is known. Care is taken to configure this in all the different flows
(e.g., RIF set on a FID, {Port, VID} joins a FID that already has a RIF
etc.).

Patch #4 configures the egress VID for routed packets. For such packets,
the egress VID is not set by the MPE table or by an FDB record at the
egress bridge, but instead by a dedicated table that maps {Egress RIF,
Egress port} to a VID.

Patch #5 removes VID configuration from RIF creation as in the unified
bridge model firmware no longer needs it.

Patch #6 sets the egress FID to use in RIF configuration so that the
device knows using which FID to bridge the packet after routing.

Patches #7-#9 add a new 802.1Q family and associated VLAN RIFs. In the
unified bridge model, we no longer need to emulate 802.1Q FIDs using
802.1D FIDs as VNI can be associated with both.

Patches #10-#11 finally flip the driver to the unified bridge model.

Patches #12-#13 clean up code that was used to make the conversion
easier to review.

v2:
* Fix build failure [1] in patch #1.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20220630201709.6e66a1bb@kernel.org/
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 10, 2022
ASAN reports an use-after-free in btf_dump_name_dups:

ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0xffff927006db at pc 0xaaaab5dfb618 bp 0xffffdd89b890 sp 0xffffdd89b928
READ of size 2 at 0xffff927006db thread T0
    #0 0xaaaab5dfb614 in __interceptor_strcmp.part.0 (test_progs+0x21b614)
    #1 0xaaaab635f144 in str_equal_fn tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c:127
    #2 0xaaaab635e3e0 in hashmap_find_entry tools/lib/bpf/hashmap.c:143
    #3 0xaaaab635e72c in hashmap__find tools/lib/bpf/hashmap.c:212
    #4 0xaaaab6362258 in btf_dump_name_dups tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c:1525
    #5 0xaaaab636240c in btf_dump_resolve_name tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c:1552
    #6 0xaaaab6362598 in btf_dump_type_name tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c:1567
    #7 0xaaaab6360b48 in btf_dump_emit_struct_def tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c:912
    #8 0xaaaab6360630 in btf_dump_emit_type tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c:798
    #9 0xaaaab635f720 in btf_dump__dump_type tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c:282
    #10 0xaaaab608523c in test_btf_dump_incremental tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/btf_dump.c:236
    #11 0xaaaab6097530 in test_btf_dump tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/btf_dump.c:875
    #12 0xaaaab6314ed0 in run_one_test tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c:1062
    #13 0xaaaab631a0a8 in main tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c:1697
    #14 0xffff9676d214 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308
    #15 0xaaaab5d65990  (test_progs+0x185990)

0xffff927006db is located 11 bytes inside of 16-byte region [0xffff927006d0,0xffff927006e0)
freed by thread T0 here:
    #0 0xaaaab5e2c7c4 in realloc (test_progs+0x24c7c4)
    #1 0xaaaab634f4a0 in libbpf_reallocarray tools/lib/bpf/libbpf_internal.h:191
    #2 0xaaaab634f840 in libbpf_add_mem tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:163
    #3 0xaaaab636643c in strset_add_str_mem tools/lib/bpf/strset.c:106
    #4 0xaaaab6366560 in strset__add_str tools/lib/bpf/strset.c:157
    #5 0xaaaab6352d70 in btf__add_str tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:1519
    #6 0xaaaab6353e10 in btf__add_field tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:2032
    #7 0xaaaab6084fcc in test_btf_dump_incremental tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/btf_dump.c:232
    #8 0xaaaab6097530 in test_btf_dump tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/btf_dump.c:875
    #9 0xaaaab6314ed0 in run_one_test tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c:1062
    #10 0xaaaab631a0a8 in main tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c:1697
    #11 0xffff9676d214 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308
    #12 0xaaaab5d65990  (test_progs+0x185990)

previously allocated by thread T0 here:
    #0 0xaaaab5e2c7c4 in realloc (test_progs+0x24c7c4)
    #1 0xaaaab634f4a0 in libbpf_reallocarray tools/lib/bpf/libbpf_internal.h:191
    #2 0xaaaab634f840 in libbpf_add_mem tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:163
    #3 0xaaaab636643c in strset_add_str_mem tools/lib/bpf/strset.c:106
    #4 0xaaaab6366560 in strset__add_str tools/lib/bpf/strset.c:157
    #5 0xaaaab6352d70 in btf__add_str tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:1519
    #6 0xaaaab6353ff0 in btf_add_enum_common tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:2070
    #7 0xaaaab6354080 in btf__add_enum tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:2102
    #8 0xaaaab6082f50 in test_btf_dump_incremental tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/btf_dump.c:162
    #9 0xaaaab6097530 in test_btf_dump tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/btf_dump.c:875
    #10 0xaaaab6314ed0 in run_one_test tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c:1062
    #11 0xaaaab631a0a8 in main tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c:1697
    #12 0xffff9676d214 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308
    #13 0xaaaab5d65990  (test_progs+0x185990)

The reason is that the key stored in hash table name_map is a string
address, and the string memory is allocated by realloc() function, when
the memory is resized by realloc() later, the old memory may be freed,
so the address stored in name_map references to a freed memory, causing
use-after-free.

Fix it by storing duplicated string address in name_map.

Fixes: 351131b ("libbpf: add btf_dump API for BTF-to-C conversion")
Signed-off-by: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com>
kernel-patches-bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 10, 2022
ASAN reports an use-after-free in btf_dump_name_dups:

ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0xffff927006db at pc 0xaaaab5dfb618 bp 0xffffdd89b890 sp 0xffffdd89b928
READ of size 2 at 0xffff927006db thread T0
    #0 0xaaaab5dfb614 in __interceptor_strcmp.part.0 (test_progs+0x21b614)
    #1 0xaaaab635f144 in str_equal_fn tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c:127
    #2 0xaaaab635e3e0 in hashmap_find_entry tools/lib/bpf/hashmap.c:143
    #3 0xaaaab635e72c in hashmap__find tools/lib/bpf/hashmap.c:212
    #4 0xaaaab6362258 in btf_dump_name_dups tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c:1525
    #5 0xaaaab636240c in btf_dump_resolve_name tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c:1552
    #6 0xaaaab6362598 in btf_dump_type_name tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c:1567
    #7 0xaaaab6360b48 in btf_dump_emit_struct_def tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c:912
    #8 0xaaaab6360630 in btf_dump_emit_type tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c:798
    #9 0xaaaab635f720 in btf_dump__dump_type tools/lib/bpf/btf_dump.c:282
    #10 0xaaaab608523c in test_btf_dump_incremental tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/btf_dump.c:236
    #11 0xaaaab6097530 in test_btf_dump tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/btf_dump.c:875
    #12 0xaaaab6314ed0 in run_one_test tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c:1062
    #13 0xaaaab631a0a8 in main tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c:1697
    #14 0xffff9676d214 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308
    #15 0xaaaab5d65990  (test_progs+0x185990)

0xffff927006db is located 11 bytes inside of 16-byte region [0xffff927006d0,0xffff927006e0)
freed by thread T0 here:
    #0 0xaaaab5e2c7c4 in realloc (test_progs+0x24c7c4)
    #1 0xaaaab634f4a0 in libbpf_reallocarray tools/lib/bpf/libbpf_internal.h:191
    #2 0xaaaab634f840 in libbpf_add_mem tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:163
    #3 0xaaaab636643c in strset_add_str_mem tools/lib/bpf/strset.c:106
    #4 0xaaaab6366560 in strset__add_str tools/lib/bpf/strset.c:157
    #5 0xaaaab6352d70 in btf__add_str tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:1519
    #6 0xaaaab6353e10 in btf__add_field tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:2032
    #7 0xaaaab6084fcc in test_btf_dump_incremental tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/btf_dump.c:232
    #8 0xaaaab6097530 in test_btf_dump tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/btf_dump.c:875
    #9 0xaaaab6314ed0 in run_one_test tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c:1062
    #10 0xaaaab631a0a8 in main tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c:1697
    #11 0xffff9676d214 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308
    #12 0xaaaab5d65990  (test_progs+0x185990)

previously allocated by thread T0 here:
    #0 0xaaaab5e2c7c4 in realloc (test_progs+0x24c7c4)
    #1 0xaaaab634f4a0 in libbpf_reallocarray tools/lib/bpf/libbpf_internal.h:191
    #2 0xaaaab634f840 in libbpf_add_mem tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:163
    #3 0xaaaab636643c in strset_add_str_mem tools/lib/bpf/strset.c:106
    #4 0xaaaab6366560 in strset__add_str tools/lib/bpf/strset.c:157
    #5 0xaaaab6352d70 in btf__add_str tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:1519
    #6 0xaaaab6353ff0 in btf_add_enum_common tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:2070
    #7 0xaaaab6354080 in btf__add_enum tools/lib/bpf/btf.c:2102
    #8 0xaaaab6082f50 in test_btf_dump_incremental tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/btf_dump.c:162
    #9 0xaaaab6097530 in test_btf_dump tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/btf_dump.c:875
    #10 0xaaaab6314ed0 in run_one_test tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c:1062
    #11 0xaaaab631a0a8 in main tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs.c:1697
    #12 0xffff9676d214 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308
    #13 0xaaaab5d65990  (test_progs+0x185990)

The reason is that the key stored in hash table name_map is a string
address, and the string memory is allocated by realloc() function, when
the memory is resized by realloc() later, the old memory may be freed,
so the address stored in name_map references to a freed memory, causing
use-after-free.

Fix it by storing duplicated string address in name_map.

Fixes: 351131b ("libbpf: add btf_dump API for BTF-to-C conversion")
Signed-off-by: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com>
Sign up for free to join this conversation on GitHub. Already have an account? Sign in to comment

Projects

None yet

Development

Successfully merging this pull request may close these issues.

3 participants