Prof. Philipp Kircher

with Michèle Belot and Paul Muller, Economic Journal, 2025, accepted. In a randomized field experiment, we provide personalized suggestions about suitable alternative occupations to long-term unemployed job seekers in the UK. Effects on the primary pre-registered outcomes of "finding a stable job" and "reaching a cumulative earnings threshold" are positive and large (between 20% to 40% after 9 months). Go to paper

With Michèle Belot and Paul Muller. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2025, 17 (1): 130–170. We propose a simple method to elicit time preferences at the individual level even when income and consumption varies over time. We validate the method and apply it to correlate individuals' impatience with job search behavior and success. Go to paper

Journal of the European Economic Association, 2022,  20(6), 2317–2352. This paper showcases studies that illustrate the potential of analyzing online job search data and of intervening in the online job search process, and highlights conditions under which some of the recent interventions are likely to improve market outcomes overall, rather than improving only the outcomes for the treated individuals. Go to paper

American Economic Journal - Macroeconomics, 2022, 14(4), 1-97, with Michèle Belot and Paul Muller. In a field experiment, we study how job seekers respond to posted wages by randomly assigning wages randomly to pairs of otherwise similar vacancies in a large number of professions, which generates significantly more but not exclusive interest at higher wages. Go to paper

Journal of Economic Literature, 2021 59(1): 90-148. With R. Wright,B. Julien, and V. Guerrieri. This survey presents a comprehensive overview of the directed/competitive search literature. Go to paper

Economic Journal, 2021 131: 713-744. With Ericson, Spinnewijn &, Starc Demand for insurance can be driven by high risk aversion or high risk, and we show how to separate the two using observed market shares. Go to paper

Review of Economic Studies, 2019 86(4): 1411-1447.  With Michèle Belot and Paul Muller. We develop and evaluate experimentally a novel tool that redesigns the job search process by providing tailored online advice about related occupations. Go to paper

Econometrica, 2019 87(4): 1081-1113. With J. Greenwood, C. Santos and M. Tertilt A calibrated equilibrium search model of an HIV/AIDS epidemic is developed to analyze the direct impact and the behavioral adjustment to policies. Go to paper

Econometrica. 2018 86(1): 85-132. With Jan Eeckhout. When heterogeneous firms can choose both how many and which workers to hire, we illustrate consequences for firm-size and wage inequality. Note a correction for the condition with capital: corrigendum. Go to paper

American Economic Review P&P, 2017, 107(5): 158–162 With J. Greenwood, C. Santos & M. Tertilt. In a quantitative equilibrium model of sexual behavior and HIV/AIDS transmission we study policies that encourage long-term partnerships. Go to paper

Journal of Political Economy, 2017, 124(1), 224-264. With G. Grossman & E. Helpman. (simulations, matlab). We introduce two-sided heterogeneity into a Hecksher-Ohlin-style trade model to study factor reallocation and wage inequality within and across sectors. Go to paper

Econometrica, 2015, Vol 83 (5), 1849-1875. With K. Kim. [online appendix] We introduce cheap-talk into a market game and study if the equilibrium can replicate the constraint efficient allocation under (reserve) price posting. Go to paper

American Economic Review, 2015, Vol 105 (10), 3030-3060. With Leo Kaas. We propose a tractable competitive search model with heterogeneous multi-worker firms, and investigate firm growth and business cycles. Go to paper

Review of Economic Studies, 2015, Vol 82 (2), 659-692. With Fane Groes and Iourii Manovskii. Occupational mobility is highest for high and low earners, and the former move “up” and the latter “down” as in models of vertical re-sorting. Go to paper

B.E. Journals of Theoretical Economics, 2013, Vol 13 (1). With S. Ludwig and A. Sandroni. We document a revealed preference for randomization for “social goods”, while such non-standard behavior is not present for private consumption goods. Go to paper

International Economic Review, 2012, Vol 53 (1), 1-21. With M. Galenianos. We study a finite directed-search wage posting game among heterogeneous firms (allowing for risk aversion, moral hazard,…), including limit theorems. Go to paper

Review of Economic Studies, 2011, Vol. 78 (3), 872-906. With Jan Eeckhout. Wage and employment data can identify the strength of sorting in search models, though two-sided fixed effects are always mis-specified. Go to paper

International Economic Review, 2011, 52(1), pp 85-104. With M. Galenianos and G. Virag. [technical appendix] In directed search with a finite population, minimum wages improve employment but reduce output and efficiency, and reverse for unemployment benefits. Go to paper

Econometrica, 2010, Vol. 78(2), 539–574. With Jan Eeckhout. In search models with price competition the sorting of heterogeneous buyers and sellers depends on complementarities both in output and in search. Go to paper

Journal of Economic Theory, 2010/145, 1354-1385. With Jan Eeckhout. Search affects competing mechanisms: if meetings with low types reduce those of high types, price posting and market separation replace auctions. Go to paper

Journal of Political Economy, 2009, Vol. 117(5), pp. 861- 913. In a directed search where workers apply for multiple jobs and are then allocated via a stable matching, efficiency arises at all stages. Go to paper

Journal of Economic Theory, 2009, 114(2), pp. 445-471. With Manolis Galenianos. We study wage dispersion and (in)efficiency in directed search when workers can strategically apply for multiple jobs but firms can only make one offer. Go to paper

Journal of Monetary Economics, 2008, Vol. 55, pp. 1054-1066. With M. Galenianos. We characterize price dispersion and welfare in a monetary model with private information: inflation is regressive even though the rich hold more money. Go to paper

Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2008/123(2), pp. 621-661. With A. Postlewaite. [technical appendix] In a model of social learning, the better informed (wealthier) consumers get preferential service because their consumption signals high quality to others. Go to paper

With Michèle Belot, Bart de Koning, Yvonne Engels, Didier Fouarge, Mario Keer, Paul Muller and Sandra Phlippen. We design an online platform to connect unemployed job seekers with ‘buddies’: former job seekers who recently found employment. We focus on job seekers who search in occupations with poor prospects and buddies who successfully switched occupations. In a randomized controlled trial we find sizable effects: 13-18 after getting access, initially unemployed job seekers are 6 percentage points (11%) more likely to be employed and earn Euro 226 more per month than those without access. The positive impact is concentrated among the long-term unemployed. Go to paper

With Michèle Belot, Bart de Koning, Didier Fouarge, Paul Muller and Sandra Phlippen. In a large-scale field experiment we study the impact of online information about alternative occupations for unemployed job seekers who are looking for work in occupations in very few vacancies per job seeker. Initial survey evidence suggests that job seekers have a poor understanding of their chances in alternative occupations, and the effects of our suggestions are large: their employment, hours of work and labor income all improve by 5\% to 6\% after 18 months. Go to paper

joint with L.Brotherhood, C. Santos and M. Tertilt, (new version 2025) R&R at Review of Economic Studies. This paper investigates the importance of the age composition for pandemic policy design in a framework with age heterogeneity, individual choice, and incomplete information, emphasizing the value of testing and testing capacity buildup. Optimal social policy follows an asymmetric approach by locking down the young relatively more than the old, and testing substantially lowers economic costs and laxer lockdown. We use the framework to provide systematic insights into pandemics caused by different viruses. Go to paper

with Jan Eeckhout and Cristina LaFuente (LIDAM discussion paper 2024/17). In a heterogeneous-firm macro model with worker sorting, we investigate the implications of technological change that allows firms to supervise larger number of workers. Implications for firm size but also for wage inequality are substantial, even when compared to traditional channels such as skill-biased technological change. Go to paper

joint with Max Bres and David Koll (LIDAM discussion paper 2014/19). This paper provides causal evidence on the impact of subsidy re-allocation, exploiting European-level policy changes in France. In response to more laisser-faire, policy makers re-allocate subsidies away from research and development to mainly low-skilled manufacturing and service sectors, triggering persistent improvement of employment, mainly through increased low-skilled manufacturing employment and at the expense of R&D related occupations. In the long term, though, labor income and productivity decrease. Go to paper  

with John Horton and Ramesh Johari (LIDAM discussion paper 2014/13) When heterogeneous employers can send cheap-talk messages about the quality of candidates they would like, this improves sorting, increases wages at high firms and lowers them at low firms, and improves efficiency. In a field experiment we indeed see significant changes in labor allocations and wages in these directions. Go to paper  

with David Dorn and Oliver Salzmann (LIDAM discussion paper 2023/25). We investigate the mapping between local employment changes predicted by national industry trends and actual employment changes. Actual employment changes over-react relative to predictions, which is driven especially by overreactions when employment changes are already predicted to be positive and large. Go to paper