Another point is the term "phenomenal consciousness". I always thought that the adjective phenomenal served to make the phrase "phenomenal consciousness" unambiguous as opposed to just consciousness. I expect "phenomenal consciousness" to be about qualia; in materialism they are physically instantiated objects in the brain. But consciousness as a cognitive process need not involve qualia. It can be, in theory, implemented as software on hardware. Please disambiguate what you mean.
Phenomenal consciousness as opposed to access consciousness or creature consciousness. It is used to collectively refer to phenomenally conscious states, colloquially called experiences. This avoids the ambiguity in qualia, whether qualia are states (experiences) or properties.
Then it's an ontological distinction whether an abstract computational process is physically implemented in a way to create an entity called experience. But it's not a cognitive category because the same processes up to isomorphism can be experience or not. Right?
I mean that the chatbot and the human brain may be running the same algorithm at a certain level of abstraction and then it's cognitively the same event but not physically. One may be an experience the other may not. Therefore, talking about phenomenonal consciousness is about physics rather than cognition.
Another point is the term "phenomenal consciousness". I always thought that the adjective phenomenal served to make the phrase "phenomenal consciousness" unambiguous as opposed to just consciousness. I expect "phenomenal consciousness" to be about qualia; in materialism they are physically instantiated objects in the brain. But consciousness as a cognitive process need not involve qualia. It can be, in theory, implemented as software on hardware. Please disambiguate what you mean.
Phenomenal consciousness as opposed to access consciousness or creature consciousness. It is used to collectively refer to phenomenally conscious states, colloquially called experiences. This avoids the ambiguity in qualia, whether qualia are states (experiences) or properties.
Then it's an ontological distinction whether an abstract computational process is physically implemented in a way to create an entity called experience. But it's not a cognitive category because the same processes up to isomorphism can be experience or not. Right?
On my account, isomorphic processes are ontologically equivalent.
No way. A pen and pencil instantiation is ontologically equivalent to a computer program?
An instantiation is not a program. Pen and pencil are not equivalent to a silicon chip computer, but there is just one program.
I mean that the chatbot and the human brain may be running the same algorithm at a certain level of abstraction and then it's cognitively the same event but not physically. One may be an experience the other may not. Therefore, talking about phenomenonal consciousness is about physics rather than cognition.