This PR cleans up the git command spawning by wrapping everything in
GitBinary instead to follow a builder/factory pattern. It also extends
trusted workspace support to git commands.

I also added a `clippy.toml` configuration to our git crate that warns
against using `Command` struct to spawn git commands instead of going
through `GitBinary`. This should help us maintain the factory pattern in
the future

Before you mark this PR as ready for review, make sure that you have:
- [x] Added solid test coverage and/or screenshots from doing manual
testing
- [x] Done a self-review taking into account security and performance
aspects

Release Notes:

- git: Add trusted workspace support for Zed's git integration

This reverts commit 50c4005.

Will cherry pick to stable in a couple of days.

follow up on: #50649

When committing in a restrictive workspace we avoid running git hooks
instead of failing the commit because hooks aren't allowed. I also
passed in more git cli hardening configurations to use when Zed spawns
git commands

Before you mark this PR as ready for review, make sure that you have:
- [ ] Added a solid test coverage and/or screenshots from doing manual
testing
- [x] Done a self-review taking into account security and performance
aspects
- [ ] Aligned any UI changes with the [UI
checklist](https://github.com/zed-industries/zed/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#uiux-checklist)

Release Notes:

- N/A

…#50649)

This PR cleans up the git command spawning by wrapping everything in
GitBinary instead to follow a builder/factory pattern. It also extends
trusted workspace support to git commands.

I also added a `clippy.toml` configuration to our git crate that warns
against using `Command` struct to spawn git commands instead of going
through `GitBinary`. This should help us maintain the factory pattern in
the future

Before you mark this PR as ready for review, make sure that you have:
- [x] Added solid test coverage and/or screenshots from doing manual
testing
- [x] Done a self-review taking into account security and performance
aspects

Release Notes:

- git: Add trusted workspace support for Zed's git integration

…ternal diff (#51323)

When on a untrusted project, if one was to try and use the commit
generation functionality, the command would fail because of the `-c
diff.external` configuration provided in `GitBinary::build_command`, as
git would interpret this as `""` and try to run that command.

This `-c diff.external` is a good safeguard to have on untrusted
repositories because it prevents random commands, configured in
`.git/config` from being run. For example, if one uses `git config
diff.external "touch bananas.txt"` and then run `git diff`, a new
`bananas.txt` file would be created.

However, it was still possible to bypass this safeguard using the
following strategy:

1. Specify a custom diff for a specific file format. For example, for
markdown files, with `printf '*.md diff=pwned\n' > .gitattributes`
2. Update the command run by the `pwned` diff, for example, `git config
diff.pwned.command "touch bananas.txt"`
3. Open Zed and attempt to generate a commit message in an untrusted
repository and check that a new `bananas.txt` file was created

This is only prevented by using the `--no-ext-diff` flag on the `diff`
command, so a new `GitBinary::build_diff_command` has been introduced
which simply wraps `GitBinary::build_command` and adds the
`--no-ext-diff` flag, if necessary.

As a side-effect, this also makes it so that generating a commit message
in an untrusted repository works again, which was accidentally broken on
#50649 .

Before you mark this PR as ready for review, make sure that you have:
- [X] Added a solid test coverage and/or screenshots from doing manual
testing
- [X] Done a self-review taking into account security and performance
aspects
- [X] Aligned any UI changes with the [UI
checklist](https://github.com/zed-industries/zed/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#uiux-checklist)

Release Notes:

- Fixed commit message generation in untrusted repositories

…ternal diff (#51323)

When on a untrusted project, if one was to try and use the commit
generation functionality, the command would fail because of the `-c
diff.external` configuration provided in `GitBinary::build_command`, as
git would interpret this as `""` and try to run that command.

This `-c diff.external` is a good safeguard to have on untrusted
repositories because it prevents random commands, configured in
`.git/config` from being run. For example, if one uses `git config
diff.external "touch bananas.txt"` and then run `git diff`, a new
`bananas.txt` file would be created.

However, it was still possible to bypass this safeguard using the
following strategy:

1. Specify a custom diff for a specific file format. For example, for
markdown files, with `printf '*.md diff=pwned\n' > .gitattributes`
2. Update the command run by the `pwned` diff, for example, `git config
diff.pwned.command "touch bananas.txt"`
3. Open Zed and attempt to generate a commit message in an untrusted
repository and check that a new `bananas.txt` file was created

This is only prevented by using the `--no-ext-diff` flag on the `diff`
command, so a new `GitBinary::build_diff_command` has been introduced
which simply wraps `GitBinary::build_command` and adds the
`--no-ext-diff` flag, if necessary.

As a side-effect, this also makes it so that generating a commit message
in an untrusted repository works again, which was accidentally broken on
#50649 .

Before you mark this PR as ready for review, make sure that you have:
- [X] Added a solid test coverage and/or screenshots from doing manual
testing
- [X] Done a self-review taking into account security and performance
aspects
- [X] Aligned any UI changes with the [UI
checklist](https://github.com/zed-industries/zed/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#uiux-checklist)

Release Notes:

- Fixed commit message generation in untrusted repositories

…ternal diff (#51323) (cherry-pick to preview) (#51492)

Cherry-pick of #51323 to preview

----
When on a untrusted project, if one was to try and use the commit
generation functionality, the command would fail because of the `-c
diff.external` configuration provided in `GitBinary::build_command`, as
git would interpret this as `""` and try to run that command.

This `-c diff.external` is a good safeguard to have on untrusted
repositories because it prevents random commands, configured in
`.git/config` from being run. For example, if one uses `git config
diff.external "touch bananas.txt"` and then run `git diff`, a new
`bananas.txt` file would be created.

However, it was still possible to bypass this safeguard using the
following strategy:

1. Specify a custom diff for a specific file format. For example, for
markdown files, with `printf '*.md diff=pwned\n' > .gitattributes`
2. Update the command run by the `pwned` diff, for example, `git config
diff.pwned.command "touch bananas.txt"`
3. Open Zed and attempt to generate a commit message in an untrusted
repository and check that a new `bananas.txt` file was created

This is only prevented by using the `--no-ext-diff` flag on the `diff`
command, so a new `GitBinary::build_diff_command` has been introduced
which simply wraps `GitBinary::build_command` and adds the
`--no-ext-diff` flag, if necessary.

As a side-effect, this also makes it so that generating a commit message
in an untrusted repository works again, which was accidentally broken on
#50649 .

Before you mark this PR as ready for review, make sure that you have:
- [X] Added a solid test coverage and/or screenshots from doing manual
testing
- [X] Done a self-review taking into account security and performance
aspects
- [X] Aligned any UI changes with the [UI

checklist](https://github.com/zed-industries/zed/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#uiux-checklist)

Release Notes:

- Fixed commit message generation in untrusted repositories

Co-authored-by: Dino <dinojoaocosta@gmail.com>

…ternal diff (zed-industries#51323)

When on a untrusted project, if one was to try and use the commit
generation functionality, the command would fail because of the `-c
diff.external` configuration provided in `GitBinary::build_command`, as
git would interpret this as `""` and try to run that command.

This `-c diff.external` is a good safeguard to have on untrusted
repositories because it prevents random commands, configured in
`.git/config` from being run. For example, if one uses `git config
diff.external "touch bananas.txt"` and then run `git diff`, a new
`bananas.txt` file would be created.

However, it was still possible to bypass this safeguard using the
following strategy:

1. Specify a custom diff for a specific file format. For example, for
markdown files, with `printf '*.md diff=pwned\n' > .gitattributes`
2. Update the command run by the `pwned` diff, for example, `git config
diff.pwned.command "touch bananas.txt"`
3. Open Zed and attempt to generate a commit message in an untrusted
repository and check that a new `bananas.txt` file was created

This is only prevented by using the `--no-ext-diff` flag on the `diff`
command, so a new `GitBinary::build_diff_command` has been introduced
which simply wraps `GitBinary::build_command` and adds the
`--no-ext-diff` flag, if necessary.

As a side-effect, this also makes it so that generating a commit message
in an untrusted repository works again, which was accidentally broken on
zed-industries#50649 .

Before you mark this PR as ready for review, make sure that you have:
- [X] Added a solid test coverage and/or screenshots from doing manual
testing
- [X] Done a self-review taking into account security and performance
aspects
- [X] Aligned any UI changes with the [UI
checklist](https://github.com/zed-industries/zed/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#uiux-checklist)

Release Notes:

- Fixed commit message generation in untrusted repositories