The thinking and political/economic systems that Chinese people share has changed with unsettling speed over the past generation or two. This is reflected in changes in China’s science and technology system. — a difficult process involving many dependencies between scientific, technological and commercial institution and China’s changing economic and political system.
In brief:
1950 – 1980
Science was organized within a Soviet style academy of sciences system. The social sciences became superfluous and suspect products of bourgeois society and were replaced by the scientific socialist theories of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Mao.
1980
University research revives, 1978 university entrance examinations replace political selection for university entrance. Government programs boost funding for the sciences. The social sciences make a come back although some leading social scientists and historians are still being criticized and sanctioned for incorrect thinking.
1990s
Weak links between research workers in the science academies, universities and private enterprises seen as a key weakness. The 1995 national science conference “Science and Education for a Prosperous China” diagnoses the problem and call for reform. Funding becomes more effective as peer review is pushed by institutions such as the Chinese National Natural Science Foundation inspired in part by US models such as the National Science Foundation and the National Institutes of Health. See ‘Science Policy and Society’ archived on the old US Embassy Beijing website.
The article below, originally published in the Global Times, a national weekly newspaper in the Chinese Communist’s Party’s People’s Daily group, discusses problems in Chinese academia.
Breeding Academic ‘Garbage’: Overseas Chinese Scholars Critique the Restless Climate at China’s Universities
China’s universities must set their academic house in order
China Review News (Hong Kong), 3 September — “One snip with the scissors, one dab of paste, one big-name signature, and out comes a long paper. That’s how a lot of theses are manufactured.” When talking about the current state of higher education, a university professor recited this widely circulated jingle to a reporter.
The “bizarre phenomena” found in Chinese universities have long been a cause for concern within education circles. More recently, the criticism of Peking University by the overseas Chinese mathematician Shing-Tung Yau over the alleged falsification of “recruiting overseas talent” has once again sparked a lively debate across society about the “restless, impetuous academic climate” on campus. A Global Times reporter interviewed several Chinese scholars teaching at renowned universities abroad who also offered their views on the matter.
The “restless academic climate” is common worldwide.
Universities, once seen as ivory towers devoted to passing on knowledge, teaching skills and resolving doubts, are now carrying ever greater public expectations. Yet in China’s universities today, short-term, quick-payoff behaviour is everywhere, from professors doing business on the side to academic fraud.
On this topic, the Global Times UN correspondent interviewed Professor Liu Huihua of Harvard University’s Fairbank Center for East Asian Research. Liu graduated from Fudan University in Shanghai, becoming the first person to be awarded a PhD in international relations by the university. She later moved to the United States to study, and now conducts research on international affairs at Harvard. Professor Liu told the reporter that this “restless” phenomenon is also found in many other countries, only to a lesser degree.
In the United States, the biggest challenge to education is the ongoing division — and even mutual tension and opposition — between society, families and schools regarding cultural awareness and values. Ten years ago, some people referred to American schools as ‘war zones’, where an ongoing ‘war’ between school and broader social culture was constantly raging. This is reflected in higher education as a kind of restlessness on campus. For instance, American professors often enlist the help of students for research projects, particularly in laboratory-based fields, where it is not uncommon for students to ‘work for’ professors.
The average annual salary for American university professors is $68,000 (£51,000), while full-time professors at private universities can earn up to $130,000 (£100,000) and some public university professors earn $98,000 (£75,000). However, many professors’ salaries have to be “figured out” by the professors themselves — meaning they spend huge amounts of time applying for grants and raising funds, which naturally reduces the time they can devote to research or experiments. Professor Liu said that even at a well-funded institution such as Harvard Medical School, a tenured professor’s salary comes from the projects they secure. If you teach for three months, the university pays you for three months. If you are conducting experiments instead of teaching, your salary can only come from project funds. So American professors face intense pressure. If they are up for promotion, they also face pressure to publish books or papers in well-known journals.
Regarding the issue of professors exploiting graduate students, the reporter also interviewed a senior academic who graduated from Peking University and now works at the National University of Singapore. According to this scholar, graduate students ‘working for’ their advisers is an unspoken rule that exists at major universities around the world. While it may be less common among humanities students, it is very common in the sciences. Students help professors run experiments and then co-author articles with them. Some professors put the students’ names first, while others put their own names first. Generally speaking, if students were on their own, they might not have any chance of publishing in prestigious journals at all.
However, overall, because the US university system is strict and well regulated, the odds of successfully committing fraud are very low. Take publishing, for example: two experts first review and evaluate the paper, and then there is a one-month public comment period. With so many pairs of eyes on it, it is difficult to slip through the net. In addition, committees at every level within universities constantly exercise oversight, which also helps reduce an impetuous academic atmosphere.
‘Bizarre Phenomenon’ No. 1: Patchwork Plagiarism, Fraud and Exaggeration
Drawing on her own experience and observations, Professor Liu believes that education in China today is highly utilitarian. Such an environment makes it difficult to cultivate truly master-level talent. Professor Liu has learned through various channels that many Chinese universities now require faculty and researchers to secure a certain number of projects, publish a certain number of papers and win awards at specified levels within a year. These targets are tied to allowances and rank: if you fail to meet them, your stipend level automatically drops. Under this kind of pressure, some people submit half-finished papers just to meet the targets; some divide one long paper into several short ones; others ‘ride along’ on authorship, trade signatures, or even plagiarise and tamper with others’ work. Like many scholars who care deeply about China, Professor Liu finds this situation extremely worrying.
Regarding the debate between Harvard mathematics professor Shing-Tung Yau and Peking University over the past two months, Professor Liu said that we should ‘seriously reflect on the profound significance this dispute reveals’. We must recognise the differences between the Chinese and American systems, as well as the material conditions and practical difficulties, while also examining whether the education system and academic ethos have gone off track. Faking and plagiarism are not just a matter of ‘restlessness’; they also reflect overall moral standards. During China’s period of social transition, the temptation to adopt a quick-fix mindset — “seeking rapid results” and “prioritising money” — is hard to resist, and scholars may also engage in market-driven behaviour, such as “using knowledge to make money”. Against this broader backdrop, adopting preventive measures is entirely necessary.
However, another professor, Cheng, who did not want to reveal his full identity, pointed out that it is very difficult to require all universities to review research projects and researchers effectively. This is because the success of university administrative systems and research projects is intertwined: universities want high rankings and “comprehensive strength” evaluations, and leaders need research results and renowned scholars to enhance the institution’s image. Under these circumstances, it becomes even harder to distinguish between real and fake research outputs. Professor Cheng argued: ‘Ultimately, educational restlessness is rooted in the restlessness of society as a whole. The most obvious overseas example is the Hwang Woo-suk scandal in South Korea. The Korean government, from top to bottom, threw its full support behind scientific innovation — an ambition to catch up that is not necessarily a bad thing. However, amid an anxious mindset across society, administrative interference and urgent public expectations placed enormous pressure on researchers, and fraud often occurs under those circumstances.”
‘Bizarre Phenomenon’ No. 2: Social Networking Mania and Revenue-Chasing
A Chinese professor at Heidelberg University in Germany, who also requested anonymity, told the reporter that he had graduated from the physics department at Tsinghua University and still had extensive ties to academic circles in China. Many internationally renowned scholars praise the abilities of Chinese middle school students in maths, physics and chemistry. Yet China has produced relatively few master-level figures who enjoy global prestige in these fields. While China’s funding and hardware for mathematical research can already compare to that of developed countries, not many people can afford to take the time to conduct research. “Many people around me are desperate to produce results. Quite a few are even willing to pay one million yuan for a PhD. They’ve long treated academic research as a business.” ‘When recruiting overseas talent, universities describe part-time appointments as full-time. To lure an academician to relocate, universities don’t hesitate to offer sky-high salaries.”
Professor Hu’an of the University of Munich believes that professors themselves should bear some responsibility for the impetuous academic climate. Today, many professors at Chinese universities spend their days rushing from conference to conference. The president of a university he knows, which made it into the national ‘211 Project’, even travelled with 30 master’s and doctoral students — practically an entire class. Many presidents and professors have no time for scholarship, but they have access to ample research funding, so they recruit more graduate students to complete the projects. The outcome is easy to imagine.
Professor Zhang previously taught at Hitotsubashi University, a renowned national institution specialising in the humanities and social sciences. He specialises in business studies and has now returned to teach at a university in Shanghai. In his view, the most fundamental aspect of business studies is corporate field research. Only by conducting detailed investigations into a company’s finances can one make theoretical recommendations about its operations. “But I rarely see our university faculty doing corporate field research,” he says. Instead, he sees professors constantly going out to lecture on management theories translated from the United States, while their ‘case analyses’ are clipped from Chinese magazines. ‘With that approach, our professors may become economically well-off, but it’s very hard for them to become scholars who make real contributions recognised by the international academic community.’
A scholar at the National University of Singapore explained that the phenomenon of teachers lecturing privately to make extra money does not exist in Singapore. Singapore’s universities have strict management systems: First, teachers are considered full-time employees and cannot teach elsewhere without approval. Second, there are strict limits on how much time faculty can spend serving as consultants for other institutions. They can spend no more than 20% of their total working time on these activities, and they must apply to the university for approval. Part of the compensation must also be shared with the university. Third, faculty must request leave to attend conferences and cannot go without authorization. Singapore has a strict leave management system, and teachers are allotted only 28 days of leave per year. By comparison, U.S. universities differ in that they pay professors for nine months, so professors must find other income sources for the remaining months—hence the many visiting scholars and experts from the U.S. who come to China as guest professors.
Professor Zhang, who now works in the Department of Bioengineering at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, told a reporter, “In any society, only a few people can genuinely conduct academic research. But in China now, everyone talks about academics as if anyone can do scientific research. This should be stopped.” Currently, the “industrialization” and “marketization” of graduate and degree education in Chinese universities is in full swing. The phenomenon of high-level officials “earning” doctorates and tycoons “donating” their way to doctorates is repeatedly banned yet repeatedly reappears. Once such fake diplomas flood society, they will inevitably damage the value and credibility of Chinese higher education degrees.
“Bizarre Phenomenon” No. 3: Teachers and Students in Cahoots—Mutual “Ride-Sharing”
Using students as cheap labor is common in Chinese universities, but students also need professors’ protection and support, so this mutual “ride-sharing” is also widespread. Professor Zhang, who once taught at Hitotsubashi University in Japan, had many thoughts on this topic. He told the reporter, “When reviewing students’ graduation theses, sometimes you don’t know what to do. It’s not that graduate students don’t read—they do. But they lack some of the basic skills of scholarship. At Hitotsubashi University’s standard, I’m afraid not a single one would pass.” He mentioned that graduate theses often have a very long list of references, many of which are irrelevant to the thesis. “How can such references be listed so openly at the end? Did the adviser even read the thesis?”
Professor Yang Hong, a scholar in Berlin, also described what she has seen. The Ministry of Education conducts undergraduate teaching evaluations. One well-known university spent an entire year busy with this. Failing exam papers were simply given back to the students for them to fill in once again. Master’s students had no real conditions for doing research, yet enrollment expanded year after year. Publishing articles required paying fees. Some teachers skipped entire classes, leaving students waiting in vain. In that bloated, chaotic atmosphere, students also failed to take their studies seriously, slacking off in ordinary times and cheating on exams. Some undergraduate theses require translating a self-selected English article, yet almost none of the students translated the English title correctly, so teachers had to do it for them.
In response to these various “bizarre phenomena,” overseas Chinese scholars offered ideas and suggestions. Many believe the underlying causes are a lack of education in academic norms and ethics and an absence of standardized degree and publication mechanisms. Therefore, universities should restore a pure cultural soil and academic atmosphere, and society as a whole should foster a climate of respect for scholarship.
In response to these “bizarre phenomena,” overseas Chinese scholars offered ideas and suggestions. Many believe the underlying causes are a lack of education in academic norms and ethics and an absence of standardized degree and publication mechanisms. Therefore, universities should restore a pure cultural soil and academic atmosphere, and society as a whole should foster a climate of respect for scholarship.
“For scientific researchers, especially those in basic research, it is inappropriate to use overly mechanical indicators to evaluate them on a timetable that is too short compared to the research cycle. For academicians and famous professors who have made special contributions, universities should trust them fully and exempt them from assessments, allowing them to devote themselves to scholarship and research.
Many scholars believe that fundamentally changing the unhealthy climate in higher education requires a coordinated effort from the government, society, and universities. For example, in Germany, professors cannot take outside part-time jobs, and their work is evaluated by students. Every year, auditing departments review how school funds are used, and the government allocates funds to academic organizations that democratically recommend outstanding talent for election to academies.
Professor Jin Fei, who has worked at the University of Tokyo for many years, told the reporter, “The University of Tokyo has a relatively long history among Asian universities—about 130 years. However, higher education in Asia was imported from the West. It did not grow out of local culture. After growing through a century of wind and rain, it’s only natural that problems would emerge. It’s not only China’s universities that have problems—Japan’s universities have many problems, too. Only the nature of the problems and how they manifest differ.” In Professor Jin’s view, Asia originally had its own approach to scholarship. However, after encountering Western educational methods, the old approach could no longer be used, and the new approach was not implemented effectively. “Especially in the past two years, as university education has become more widespread, many accumulated problems have begun to surface. How could solving universities’ problems in a few years be easy? The key is to find a path of higher education that fits us through exploration and trial and error. Along the way, you can’t avoid paying some tuition.”
At the end of the interview, the reporter asked one final question: If academic conditions at home and abroad were equally good, would they be willing to return to China to conduct research and teach? Every answer was: “Yes.”
Chapter 15 of The Logic of Politics: Principles of Marxist Political Science
Chapter 15 argues that the “overall pattern” of international politics is always in the end shaped by the defining characteristics of its historical era. The Marxist theory of international relations systematically traces those characteristics in the development of capitalism, imperialism, class relations, and state power. Setting out from a portrayal of modern international society as a world system spawned by capitalist commodity production: the rise of modern nation-states, the formation of an international division of labor in a world market, and the tightening of cross-border interdependencies. Early modern international relations began not as mutually beneficial exchanges but by colonial expansion and commercial wars that violently integrated peripheral regions into a global order run by capitalist, imperialist powers at its center.
International alignments and conflicts cannot be understood as merely relations among nations; they are also structured by class polarization and the way that ruling classes pursue their interests through the states they have shaped to serve themselves. International conflict and cooperation have a class character. Capitalist states compete but they can also coordinate to suppress revolutionary movements that threaten them all. National liberation movements got a heightened class significance in the imperialist era. With the world divided into oppressor and oppressed nations, the anti-colonial struggle becomes intertwined with broader fights against capitalist domination both within and without the capitalist states at the center of the world system. Yet international politics cannot be reduced entirely to “international class politics.” States remain the main actors in international relations. State interests and strategies must be analyzed as a concrete historical reality especially as socialist states confront the practical tasks of survival and development in a hostile world.
A central dynamic in this process is explained by the theory of “uneven development” — a general law of historical development. Under monopoly capitalism, leapfrogging shifts in relative power among competing capitalist states drives imperial rivalries, the formation and dissolution of colonial empires and world war. War and peace are continuations of politics—both rooted in specific historical conditions and class structures. Just wars can be distinguished from unjust wars by looking at their social content and political aims.
“Peaceful Coexistence” is the basic principle for managing international relations in the transitional epoch in which different social systems coexist, highlighting its scope (inter-state relations rather than domestic class relations). It is tied to the struggle against coercive power politics and extends to relations among socialist states as well. This principle, based on sovereignty, equality, and non-interference, culminated in the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence advanced by China and, in the post–World War II context, strategic formulations such as the “Three Worlds” perspective propounded by Comrade Mao Zedong.
Chapters Eleven and Fifteen of The Logic of Politics was written by Liu Huihua 刘慧华 and edited by Wang Huning. Liu Huihua’s research focused on China’s Foreign Aid, International Development Cooperation, and Diplomacy and International Relations. Liu Huihua is the co-author of the 2017 book 中國對外援助：理論與實踐 [China’s Foreign Assistance: Theory and Practice]. Liu Huihua was one of Fudan University’s first PhDs in international relations. She later went to the United States to do research at the Fairbank Center at Harvard.
The Logic of Politics: Principles of Marxist Political Science translated in full with citations to sources and context to sources added:
Sources of quoted text are usually not provided in the Chinese text. Source citations have been found and added to the translated English text.
The Chinese text of Chapter Fifteen follows the English translation.
Chapter 15: The Characteristics of the Era Determine the International Politics of the Day
The works of classic Marxist writers contain a rich set of principles and methodological approaches to international politics. From Marxist theories of primitive accumulation, colonialism, national liberation, proletarian revolution, and imperialism, we can summarize several basic principles of Marxist international political theory. One of these fundamental viewpoints is that the characteristics of a given historical era determine the overall configuration of international politics. This perspective is essential for examining international relations from a Marxist viewpoint.
Before capitalism, international society lacked tight connections, and international relations were underdeveloped. Capitalist commodity production spurred the formation of the modern nation-state and an international division of labor, leading to the emergence of a world market. This made international relations closer than ever before and ushered international politics into a new historical period. Colonial expansion and commercial wars marked the beginning of modern international relations.
Section One: Modern international society is a world system
I. Capitalism prompted the formation of modern nation-states
Before capitalism, the world was loosely connected. Households and villages existed as independently as possible without frequent, large-scale, stable communications among them. Medieval or feudal states were formed by combining these similarly structured units, much like a sack of potatoes is made up of individual potatoes. The socioeconomic structures of Western European states, which were characterized by aristocratic, estate-based absolutism, and Eastern European states, which were characterized by centralized bureaucratic rule, were both of this kind. These traditional states constituted the main body of pre-capitalist international society. If traditional states were loosely structured internally, international society was even more isolated and separated. The main forms of relations among states were war, missionary activity, pilgrimages in search of scriptures, travel, and ancient commercial activity, namely the long-distance transport of luxury goods. Even these activities were small-scale, infrequent, and regional. At this point, international relations were still in a natural, primitive, and underdeveloped state.
The emergence of capitalism led to an unprecedented level of international integration. Traditional forms of state organization evolved into modern nation-states. The establishment of an international division of labor and the formation of the world market bound the world together as an organic whole, giving rise to a global system of international relations. Thus, the development of international politics entered a new historical era.
The nation-state is the principal actor in modern international relations. Its rise propelled international politics into a new stage and transformed international society. Marxism’s most significant contribution to the theory of international politics is its explanation of the formation of the nation-state because the characteristics of the primary actors in international affairs influence the nature of international social relations. The modern nation-state emerged alongside the formation of nations and the development of capitalist commodity exchange. It first appeared in Western Europe, where capitalism arose earlier than elsewhere. Studying the characteristics of states in two different historical periods is significant for analyzing their respective times’ international social relations.
First, the traditional state in the pre-capitalist era was loose and static, determined by the self-sufficient natural economy of the time. Marx argued that serfdom in Western Europe had already ceased to exist on the eve of the capitalist revolution: the majority of the population were free smallholding peasants, although their ownership was concealed behind feudal facades. These peasants were numerous and had similar living conditions, but they did not interact with one another. Their mode of production did not bring them into mutual interaction; rather, it isolated them from one another. This isolation was further intensified by the time’s poor communication systems and peasant poverty. The terrain on which they produced—the small plot—did not allow for division of labor in cultivation or application of science.
Thus, there was no multifarious development, diversity of talents, or rich network of social relations. Almost every peasant household was self-sufficient, producing most of what it consumed directly; consequently, it obtained its means of subsistence largely through exchange with nature rather than society. The landscape consisted of small plots of land, each with a peasant and a family. A number of these units formed a village, and villages combined into larger administrative units, thus constituting the state. In short, on the eve of capitalism, the principal unit of production in Western Europe—the small peasant household—existed like scattered grains of sand, each on its own and encompassed by the state machine. Tracing back to earlier periods of slavery and serfdom, society was fragmented by an even more self-contained manorial economy.
Pre-capitalist production focuses on creating products rather than commodities. Its aim is concrete material satisfaction and enjoyment, not abstract exchange value.
“In a given socio-economic formation where use-value rather than exchange-value predominates, surplus labor is restricted by a narrow circle of wants. The nature of production itself does not call forth unlimited desire for surplus labor.”
Therefore
“in the southern states of the American union, when the purpose of production was mainly to satisfy local needs, black labor was mildly patriarchal. However, as soon as the export of cotton became of vital interest to those states, the overworking of the Negro and the consumption of his life through seven years of labor became a factor in a calculated and calculating system. The goal was no longer to obtain a certain quantity of useful products from him, but rather to produce surplus value itself.”
The self-sufficiency, simple repetition, and pursuit of use-value of economic activity determine the social features of the pre-capitalist state: dispersion, stagnation, and conservatism. There is little internal impetus pushing small producers’ operations beyond the limits of the village community, local market, region, or state, which would link them together and integrate the world.
The looseness and immobility of traditional states also mean that the international environment is isolated and static. There is no indispensable, interdependent relationship among states. Wars are waged to plunder goods and extract tribute rather than to compete for markets and raw materials. Commercial activity mainly consists of trading luxury goods consumed by the ruling classes rather than continuing production. The few contacts that did occur were mostly regional and partial. International relations in the modern sense did not yet exist.
Second, the development of the capitalist commodity economy facilitated the establishment of the modern nation-state. The capitalist commodity economy aims to pursue exchange and surplus value, providing a perpetual driving force for commodity exchange and the continuous expansion of markets. This expansion compels the capitalist mode of production to repeatedly refashion itself and expand production without limit. As Marx and Engels wrote in The Communist Manifesto,
wherever the bourgeoisie has taken power, it has shattered “feudal, patriarchal, idyllic” relations, leaving “cash payment” as the dominant tie between people. Yet, this kind of economic tie has linked people together more tightly than any other.
The capitalist system of commodity production is opposed to the feudal natural economy and personal status hierarchy. The further development of commodity production necessarily demands the abolition of the status hierarchy and the elimination of class privileges, while destroying the natural economy. Abolishing feudal institutions and the guild system, which obstruct the development of commodity production, requires the free buying and selling of labor and commodities.
The abolition of feudal and guild institutions is reflected in economic policy as liberalism, the opposite of feudal and guild arrangements. The democratic ideology advanced by the bourgeoisie led to a bourgeois democratic revolution that eliminated the privileges of the feudal estates. As liberal economic policies developed, they used laws and decrees to dismantle feudal and guild institutions, allowing a domestic capitalist market to emerge and grow.
As the domestic market formed and expanded, people of different races came to live within a unified economic territory. They developed a unified language and shared a common economic life and psychological dispositions. A community constituted by such a population was no longer formed on the basis of bloodline. Instead, it became a modern nation. Based on nation formation and the nation’s territory, the demand arose to establish a nation-state, or political nationalism. The core issue is that the nation possesses sovereignty and the right to establish itself as an independent state. The purpose of the nation-state is to develop capitalist commodity production, open and protect the domestic market, and prevent interference from other forces.
The formation of the nation-state marks the transition from the underdeveloped international relations of ancient political societies to the more developed international relations of modern political societies. The nation-state nurtured the growth of the capitalist commodity economy. However, as capitalism developed further, relations of commodity exchange inevitably crossed national borders and moved toward the global market.
“capitalism arises only from widely developed commodity circulation that transcends state boundaries. Thus, a capitalist nation without foreign trade is inconceivable.”
Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, The DEVELOPMENT of CAPITALISM in RUSSIA Chapter I. The Theoretical Mistakes of the Narodnik Economists VIII. Why Does the Capitalist Nation Need a Foreign Market?
The constant need to expand product markets drives the bourgeoisie across the globe. They must establish enterprises and connections everywhere. After breaking through the barriers of old states and promoting the formation of nation-states, the capitalist commodity economy accumulated the power to integrate the world under the protection of the nation-state.
II. Capitalism’s development has integrated the world into a single economic organism
The constant aim of capitalist commodity production is to invest the least amount of capital possible in order to generate the greatest amount of surplus value (or surplus product). In practice, this “greatest possible amount” has no real limit. Lenin summed it up as follows:
“The law of capitalist production, on the contrary, is the constant transformation of modes of production and the unrestricted growth of production scale.”
Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, The DEVELOPMENT of CAPITALISM in RUSSIA Chapter I. The Theoretical Mistakes of the Narodnik Economists VIII. Why Does the Capitalist Nation Need a Foreign Market?
After establishing nation-states (both single-nation and multiethnic) on a national foundation, the further development of commodity production and exchange—together with the transformation of a country’s currency into world money—transformed bourgeois commodity producers into cosmopolitans. They had to transcend the boundaries of the nation-state, expand, and seize larger markets to secure greater sales and profits.
First, in the 14th and 15th centuries, as capitalism began to emerge, the northern Italian city-states had already become Europe’s trading center. By the end of the fifteenth century, the discovery of sea routes to the Americas and the East Indies meant that the market had become a reality and was growing into a global market. During this period, Europe’s commercial center shifted from the Mediterranean region to the Atlantic seaboard, and trade extended as far as Asia, Africa, and the Americas.
The world market is the historical precondition and outcome of the capitalist mode of production. The formation of the new world market created the conditions for the establishment of capitalism: it hastened the collapse of feudalism and promoted the consolidation of capitalist relations. Thus,
“the modern history of capital dates from the creation of a world-embracing commerce and market in the 16th century.”
From the 1760s to the 1860s, Britain and other advanced countries successively completed the Industrial Revolution, transitioning from manufacturing to large-scale machinery. Industrial and agricultural production, along with transportation, developed at an unprecedented pace, and the capitalist mode of production won a worldwide victory. As Marx and Engels observed:
“The bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce one hundred years, has created more massive and colossal productive forces than have all preceding generations together.”
Second, the widespread adoption of machinery and the rapid growth of productive forces during the Industrial Revolution further expanded the social division of labor. This expansion quickly extended into the international arena, forming an international division-of-labor system suited to the capitalist mode of production. This system turned one part of the globe into an agricultural region that served an industrial region. This division arose because industrially advanced countries could produce industrial goods more cheaply, while industrially backward countries could produce agricultural products more cheaply. Essentially, the relationship between “industrial countries” and “agricultural countries” is that of capitalist metropoles to colonies because the formation of this international division of labor was a process of capitalist economic expansion into which vast numbers of underdeveloped countries and regions were forced.
With the rapid improvement of all instruments of production and the immense convenience of transportation, the bourgeoisie drew all nations into civilization. The low price of its commodities was the heavy artillery with which it overcame every “Great Wall” and conquered the most stubborn xenophobia of the peoples of backward countries and regions. As advanced countries’ manufactured goods destroyed foreign handicraft production, they compelled foreign lands to become their sources of raw materials. To achieve this, they first had to dismantle the socioeconomic structure of colonial and dependent countries, which combined small-scale agriculture with household handicrafts.
Third, under the new international division of labor system, every country’s production and consumption became global. Large-scale industries no longer processed local raw materials, but rather, raw materials from distant regions. Their products were consumed not only at home, but also around the world. Old needs that were met by domestic products were replaced by new needs that had to be met by products from faraway countries and regions. The former state of local and national self-sufficiency and isolation was replaced by multifaceted intercourse and interdependence among nations. This was true of material production and spiritual (cultural) production. The intellectual products of all nations became common property. National one-sidedness and narrow limitations became increasingly impossible, and a world literature arose from many national and local literatures.
The world became ever more tightly knit into a single whole. Large-scale industry
“produced world history for the first time because it made the satisfaction of the needs of every civilized country and every individual within those countries dependent on the whole world. It abolished the previously natural condition of isolation among countries.”
Over a century ago, Marx clearly and unambiguously pointed to the trend that the world would become increasingly interdependent. For a long time, Western academia neglected this idea, but in the second half of the 20th century, when interdependence became more apparent, people recognized the theoretical value of Marx’s argument. Today, interdependence theory is a popular topic in Western international political studies.
The capitalist mode of production has spread triumphantly across the world. The formation of the international division of labor and the world market has tied the world together as a single economic entity—a significant historical development. Yet, this progress was achieved amid bloodshed and chaos.
III. The colonial system and commercial wars marked the beginning of modern international relations
Driven by competition and the pursuit of surplus value, the scale of capitalist production and business activity is bound to surpass the boundaries of the nation-state.
“Large-scale industry links the peoples of all countries together, merging all local markets into one world market. It clears the ground everywhere for civilization and progress and ensures that whatever happens in the civilized countries necessarily affects all other countries.”
For those “other countries,” however, this influence is passive—imposed by the industrial powers.
In agrarian countries and regions that were still in a pre-capitalist stage of development, basic production was organized around the household, combining agriculture with handicrafts. Such societies could not produce the raw materials demanded by industrial countries on a large scale as commodities, nor could they absorb the mass of manufactured goods produced by machine-based large industry in industrial countries. These societies remained at a stage of self-sufficient, product-based economies with neither the capacity nor the need for large-scale commodity exchange.
Accordingly, the early capitalist pattern of international relations was as follows: advanced capitalist industrial countries stood on one side. Their commodity-exchange economy, based on large-scale machine industry, greatly accelerated the development of productive forces. Their industrial goods were inexpensive, and they required vast quantities of industrial raw materials and grain. On the other side were agrarian countries that were still in a pre-capitalist stage. There, production was closed, static, and locked into a simple cycle of reproduction. Little surplus product was available for exchange. Yet the bourgeoisie’s faith in carrying out its “civilizing mission” was unwavering.
“Just as it has made the countryside subordinate to the town, so it has made barbarian and semi-barbarian countries dependent on civilized ones, nations of peasants dependent on nations of bourgeois, the East dependent on the West.”
As the bourgeoisie carried out this “civilizing mission” around the world, the barbaric and cruel atrocities they inflicted on enslaved peoples were unmatched in any era by any savage taste for blood or brutality. In its homeland, the bourgeoisie puts on a respectable face. But once it reaches the colonies, it no longer bothers to hide anything.
In the seventeenth century, the Dutch Republic was the model capitalist country. Its history of running colonies is “one of the most extraordinary tales of treachery, bribery, massacre, and meanness.” Most notably, the Dutch operated a kidnapping system on the island of Sulawesi to supply Java with slaves. To this end, they trained a group of kidnappers. These kidnappers, interpreters, and sellers were the main agents of this trade, with native princes serving as the chief sellers. The abducted young people were held in secret prisons on Sulawesi until they were old enough to be loaded onto slave ships.
To seize Malacca, the Dutch bribed the Portuguese governor, who let them into the city in 1641. To “save” the £21,875 bribe, they immediately went to the governor’s residence and killed him. Wherever they went, devastation and depopulation followed. For example, in 1750, the Banyuwangi region of Java had more than 80,000 inhabitants, but by 1811, that number had dwindled to only 8,000. That is sweet commerce! [Translator’s note: Some exaggerations in this account drawn from Karl Marx. Capital Volume One, Chapter Thirty-One: Genesis of the Industrial Capitalist]
Besides holding political power in the East Indies, the British East India Company also held monopolies over the tea trade, trade with China, and shipping goods to and from Europe. Meanwhile, the Company’s senior employees monopolized coastal shipping in India, inter-island shipping, and inland trade. Monopolies on prawns, opium, betel nuts, and other goods became inexhaustible sources of wealth. These employees set their own prices and extorted the unfortunate Indians at will. The governor-general also participated in this private trade. Between 1769 and 1770, the British engineered a famine by buying up all the rice and refusing to sell it except at outrageous prices.
The colonial system greatly promoted trade and shipping development, becoming a powerful means of capital accumulation. The colonies provided markets for rapidly growing manufactures and guaranteed accelerated accumulation through monopoly control of those markets. Wealth seized outside of Europe through straightforward plunder, enslavement, and murder streamed back to the mother country, where it was transformed into capital.
Marx said:
“The discovery of gold and silver deposits in the Americas, the extermination and enslavement of the continent’s indigenous peoples, the conquest and plundering that began in the East Indies, and the transformation of Africa into a preserve for the commercial hunting of its people all signaled the dawn of the capitalist era.” Close on its heels came the commercial war of the European nations, with the globe as its theater. That war began with the Netherlands’ revolt from Spain, grew to enormous proportions in the Anti-Jacobin War in Britain, and continued in the Opium Wars against China.”
Thus, the colonial system and commercial wars of capitalism marked the beginning of modern international relations.
Section Two: The international political configuration is shaped by class division
I. The polarization of class relations changes the defining features of the international political configuration
Marxism holds that the international political configuration is ultimately divided along class lines rather than nation-state lines because class divisions run deeper than those between nation-states. In capitalist countries, as class relations become increasingly simplified, the class character of the nation-state becomes ever more pronounced, making class a new and more decisive unit of action in international society. Analyzing international political affairs from the standpoint of class is a defining characteristic of Marxist international political theory.
One striking feature of the capitalist era is the simplification of class antagonisms. Society increasingly splits into two hostile camps: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. All intermediate classes will eventually differentiate and join one of these two camps. Just as the emergence of the nation-state dramatically altered the nature of traditional international politics, the growing polarization of class relations in capitalist society reshapes the international political landscape and distribution of power. Class becomes a major actor in international society, and the national character of the state yields to its class character. Class-based states carry more decisive significance and substantive content than nationally defined states.
This is because class belonging has more immediate material stakes for every member of human society than national belonging does. Class determines living conditions and individual fate, placing individuals under its sway. Members of a dominant nation may be ruled, but members of a ruling class certainly rule. A nation is composed of classes, with one class oppressing another. The concept of “nation” does not reflect each person’s actual social position; rather, it conceals the essence of the opposition between the two classes. According to Marxism, once the world has become an economic organism and class antagonisms have become more apparent, international society will increasingly divide along class lines into two opposing political forces. Therefore, the international political configuration will undergo profound change.
II. International Conflict and Cooperation Have a Class Character
From a Marxist perspective, conflicts between class societies are not conflicts between entire nations; rather, they are conflicts between the ruling classes that dominate each country. This is especially evident in capitalist societies, where class relations are more explicit. In essence, conflict between capitalist states is conflict between the bourgeoisies of the two countries. As mentioned earlier, once the bourgeoisie becomes the ruling class, it becomes the nation’s class. The bourgeoisies of the world are divided into British, French, German, and so on. The bourgeoisie in each country has its own class interests, which are concealed beneath “national interests.” Conflict arises when the interests of one country’s bourgeoisie harm—or even surpass—the interests of another country’s bourgeoisie. The drive to continuously expand markets for products and sources of raw materials compels the bourgeoisie to range across the globe and extend the scope of economic activity as far as possible. This makes conflict among capitalist countries frequent and recurrent.
However, not all conflicts among capitalist countries are caused by an intensification of clashes between the interests of the bourgeoisies of two states. Some are triggered by a sharpening of conflict within a country between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Because the bourgeoisie, as the ruling class, can use conflict among nations to divert the public’s attention at home, ease the tension of domestic class antagonisms, and try to find “common ground” with the resisting class through an external confrontation—thereby postponing class struggle and preserving its rule. In that sense, such international conflict also has a pronounced class character. Engels said:
“To this day, the aim of all maneuvering and activity by all rulers and their diplomats can be reduced to one thing: to prolong the life of absolutist rule, they incite nations to slaughter one another and use one nation to oppress another.”
Bourgeois parties understand and exploit this. For that reason, Marxism repeatedly stresses:
“Proof of what the true social nature of the war is—or, more precisely, what its true class nature is—is naturally to be found not in the diplomatic history of the war, but in an analysis of the objective position of the ruling classes in all the belligerent countries.”
Only by seeing the class character of international conflict clearly can one grasp its essence.
Additionally, when bourgeois rule in a given country is in imminent danger or a bourgeois regime has been overthrown, the bourgeoisies of different countries temporarily cooperate to stifle the emerging proletarian power. The bourgeoisie experiences both conflict and cooperation because it must confront the common threat of proletarian revolution and jointly uphold the domination of capitalism worldwide. This common interest provides the basis for their temporary cooperation. In his speech “On Poland,” Marx said:
“The brotherhood of nations—this is at present a catchword on the lips of all parties, especially the bourgeois free traders. Indeed, a sort of brotherhood of nations of the bourgeoisie now exists. It is the brotherhood of the oppressors against the oppressed, of the exploiters against the exploited.” Although individual bourgeois compete with each other within one country, the bourgeoisie always unites against the proletariat of its own country. Likewise, although the bourgeoisies of different countries clash and compete with each other on the world market, they always unite against the proletariat of all countries.”
“All the powers of old Europe—the Pope, the Tsar, Metternich, Guizot, French radicals, and German police—formed a holy alliance to drive out this specter: the specter of communism.”
The bourgeoisie’s joint repression of the proletarian revolution was most evident during the Paris Commune. In 1871, France’s leaders started the Franco-Prussian War to distract from the revolutionary movement at home. The French army’s defeat left Paris in immediate peril. To defend Paris, the hastily assembled Government of National Defense had only one choice: to arm the Paris working class, forge them into a real military force, and harden their ranks through the experience of war. However, arming Paris meant arming the revolution.
Defeating the Prussian invaders would effectively mean that French workers had defeated French capitalists and the state parasites that served them. When “national duty” conflicted with class interest, the Government of National Defense did not hesitate: it became a government of national betrayal. Its first step was to send Thiers to lobby the European governments, begging them to intervene. After the most dreadful war of the modern era had ended, the victorious and defeated armies joined hands to slaughter the proletariat with equal brutality. When class rule could no longer be concealed beneath the cloak of “the nation,” governments revealed the international character of class domination. The Paris Commune was crushed by the combined forces of the international bourgeoisie and reactionaries.
The defeat of the Paris Commune did not put an end to the international struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. In fact, this great clash between the two major classes once again became the focal point of international politics in the early twentieth century. In 1917, the October Socialist Revolution in Russia succeeded, establishing Soviet power. Preoccupied with World War I, the imperialist powers adopted a unified hostile stance toward Soviet Russia. They rejected its peace initiatives, plotted anti-Soviet schemes, and backed uprisings by Russia’s counterrevolutionary forces in an attempt to strangle Soviet power in its cradle.
No sooner had the war ended than the Allied powers organized three armed attacks on Soviet Russia. Germany, battered to the brink of collapse during the war, violated the Brest-Litovsk Treaty it had signed with Soviet Russia, sending troops to occupy Crimea and the Baltic coast. Nevertheless, the proletarian regime demonstrated extraordinary vitality. It defeated the bourgeois world alliance and grew and consolidated relying on its own strength.
This shows that profound class causes exist not only in conflicts among capitalist states but also in their cooperation. The unity and opposition of bourgeois class interests determine both conflict and collaboration among capitalist countries.
The emergence of Soviet Russia fundamentally altered the landscape of international politics. For the first time in history, a state based on the dictatorship of the proletariat appeared, and the proletariat achieved political rule, rising to become
Workers now had a homeland of their own, and class conflict in international politics took the form of conflict between states for the first time.
III. National liberation movements have class significance
From the standpoint of international politics, the historical period of capitalist free competition was a relatively “peaceful” era. During this time, capitalism had fully replaced feudalism in the advanced countries of Western Europe, allowing it to develop in a relatively stable and smooth manner. Capitalism expanded “peacefully” into vast regions that had not yet been occupied and into countries not yet fully drawn into the capitalist system. Of course, even during this period, the conditions created by “peaceful” capitalism—whether in a military sense or a broader class sense—were far from genuine “peace.” However, compared to the next era, which was marked by greater turbulence, abrupt change, catastrophe, and conflict, that earlier period was “peaceful enough.”
During this era of free competition, commodity exports and exchange were the main focus of the world market, and free trade was the primary external economic policy of many countries. The colonies held by capitalist metropoles existed separately. Although the metropoles exploited their colonies, this relationship appeared primarily as colonialism rather than imperialism because the metropole and the colony were not politically joined and did not form a colonial empire politically. Consequently, their relationship was characterized more by economic exploitation than political oppression.
Of course, national oppression did not vanish during the stage of free competition. It mainly existed within multiethnic states. During the rise of capitalism, a number of multiethnic states emerged in Eastern Europe. This was the result of the uneven and inadequate development of capitalist commodity production. Within traditional states, more advanced communities formed nations earlier and demanded the creation of nation-states.
By contrast, less developed communities had not yet formed nations, and capitalism had either not yet arisen or remained underdeveloped there. Advanced nations often used their greater strength to force less developed, surrounding communities into multiethnic states with themselves. Thus, the emergence of multiethnic states meant that the “central” nation oppressed the surrounding nations and that the advanced nations oppressed the backward ones. In short, national oppression existed before imperialism but only in limited, regional forms.
From the late nineteenth to the early twentieth century, imperialism divided the world into oppressor and oppressed nations, one of the defining features of the international political landscape in the imperialist era. As capitalism developed further, free competition was interrupted as large-scale production expanded and squeezed out small producers. Production and capital became highly concentrated, leading to the formation of monopoly organizations, such as cartels, syndicates, and trusts. These monopolies formed monopoly alliances.
First, they divided up the domestic market, and then they fully seized control of a country’s production. Domestic monopolies inevitably moved toward international monopolies because, under capitalism, the domestic market is necessarily connected to foreign markets. Capitalism had long since created a world market. As the export of capital increased and the largest monopoly alliances expanded their foreign and colonial connections, aggressively extending their “spheres of influence,” these alliances inevitably reached worldwide agreements, forming international cartels. Thus, the partition of the world shifted from colonial expansion into unoccupied territories to monopolistic possession of a world whose territories had already been carved up.
Monopoly leads to imperialism. Competition among imperialist powers caused metropoles to establish political ties with their colonies and dependent territories, forming colonial empires. The largest capitalist states had already divided up the entire world; a few colonial empires now encompassed every region. For the first time, the world was politically interconnected in the form of colonial empires, creating a monopolistic capitalist world system.
Each colonial empire consisted of a developed capitalist state at the center and a vast periphery of underdeveloped countries and regions. The relationship between the center and the periphery was that of oppressor versus oppressed nations. From the standpoint of international society as a whole, the world was divided into two groups: oppressor and oppressed nations. The contradiction between these groups constituted a major dimension of international politics at the time.
Perhaps more importantly, the national movements acquired a new, positive class meaning at this point. Liberation movements of oppressed nations became part of the proletariat’s socialist revolution. The imperialist era transformed national oppression from a partial, domestic problem into a global, universal phenomenon. The monopoly bourgeoisie exploits and oppresses not only other nations, but also the broad masses of its own people, above all the proletariat. A proletarian revolution aims to overthrow the domestic bourgeoisie’s rule. On the surface, a revolution of an oppressed nation aims to overthrow the rule of the oppressing nation. In reality, however, it aims to overthrow the oppression and exploitation carried out by the ruling class within the oppressing nation.
Thus, both the proletarian revolution and the national liberation movement target the bourgeoisie. These shared goals unite the proletariat with the oppressed masses, creating a single, coordinated force.
Typically, the interests of the national liberation movement and the revolutionary movement of the proletariat align. During the imperialist era, national movements were an indispensable force for the proletarian revolution’s victory. When a national movement conflicts with the proletariat’s socialist movement, the national movement should subordinate itself to the proletariat because only when all of humanity attains fundamental emancipation can national liberation and equality be fully realized. Only the proletariat’s socialist revolution can achieve this goal.
Thus, Marxism imbues questions of national oppression and liberation with deeper historical meaning and a distinct class character. Marxism links these issues to the interests of the proletarian revolution, incorporating them into the revolutionary proletariat. This shows that even in the imperialist era, class divisions in the international political landscape have profound real-world significance.
IV. The relationship between class and the state in the context of international politics
From a Marxist perspective, the state is a historical category. It is the product of irreconcilable class antagonisms, described as
because modern industrial labor and capitalist oppression have stripped the proletariat of any genuine nationality. They have not yet risen to become a “national class.” These propositions reveal the state’s fundamental essence, providing a basis for analyzing its status and role in international society. Since international political relations transcend the boundaries of any single state, they cannot be studied using a completely “neutral” method that disregards their class content as if they were a natural science.
However, in the study of international politics, class subjectivity cannot be exaggerated without limit nor wholly replace the state as subject. Both the nature of the object being studied and the historical demands posed by the era require this.
First, international politics is not the same as international class politics. When studying states in international politics, one must not only consider the class character of different types of states but also analyze the characteristics and conduct of states as the basic units that comprise international society. As the primary actors in international relations, the external strategies and diplomatic activities of states generally represent the interests of the ruling class and, to a certain extent, the interests of other classes within the country. States in international politics have a class character and much more—it is precisely this “more” that constitutes the object of research in international politics.
Second, studying the role of the state in international politics is a historical requirement. Lenin had a famous line:
“The categorical requirement of Marxist theory in investigating any social question is that it be examined within definite historical limits.”
Likewise, a historical perspective is a basic requirement for our study of international politics.
When Marx founded scientific socialism, he aimed to guide the oppressed in finding liberation and establishing a superior social system. Therefore, when analyzing international events, he emphasized class more. History has proven that scientific socialism promotes social progress by awakening exploited classes and oppressed nations to rise up in revolutionary struggle against capitalism. Since the beginning of the 20th century, this revolution has made enormous advances worldwide. In some underdeveloped countries and regions, the proletariat has even seized state power.
New historical conditions made it difficult to achieve a socialist world revolution in the short run. Newly established proletarian regimes were faced with arduous tasks: developing the economy, raising living standards, and consolidating state power. The main internal conflict was no longer class struggle, but rather the development of underdeveloped productive forces and the resolution of the conflict between productive forces and relations of production. For a fairly long period, socialist countries had to coexist with capitalist countries. Formulating correct strategic guidelines and a foreign policy—safeguarding a peaceful international environment and learning from, drawing on, and absorbing the outstanding achievements of advanced countries (especially developed capitalist countries) as quickly as possible—became the foremost task for newly formed socialist states. Handling international relations rather than class relations became the primary issue.
In the arena of international politics, class relations transform into relations among states, and the state’s status as the primary actor becomes increasingly prominent. States with different social systems cannot replace state relations with class relations, and even socialist states, where the proletariat is in power, cannot replace state relations with “class fraternity.”
Most socialist states were founded on the basis of underdeveloped productive forces, and they differ in economic level, national characteristics, and historical legacy issues involving territory and religion. Mishandling relations between states will inevitably endanger unity among the proletariat of different countries. Following the October Revolution, Lenin’s policies of peaceful diplomacy and national self-determination made significant contributions to the Marxist theory of international politics.
In short, international politics and class politics are not completely identical. When researching international politics, merely pointing out the class character of the state is not enough. As the primary actor in international politics, we must analyze the state’s interests as a whole, its external strategy, and its participation in international cooperation, competition, and conflict.
Section Three: Uneven Development in International Economic and Political Development
Uneven development is a general law of human social evolution
Marxism’s dynamic theory for analyzing changes in the international political configuration, uneven development is an important component of Marxist international political theory. According to this theory, uneven international economic and political development is a general law of human social development that exists in all historical periods. However, its intensity differs across social formations and stages of development within them, as do the political significance and international consequences it produces. In the imperialist era, this law manifests itself particularly saliently: its political significance and international consequences are to trigger an imperialist war and redivide the scope of colonial empires according to a new balance of forces.
First, the law of uneven development in international economic and political development is not unique to the capitalist era. Rather, it is a general law of human social evolution that existed in pre-capitalist historical development as well. Initially, nature was the dominant force shaping economic development and social progress:
“Nature first appears as an entirely foreign, omnipotent, and impregnable force, standing in opposition to humans. Their relationship with it is purely animalistic, as they submit to its power like beasts.”
Because different races or nations lived in different natural environments, they formed different social organizational structures, developed different modes of production, and progressed unevenly. This planted the “seeds” of later uneven development. These different social structures and modes of production generate different speeds of development and tempos of evolution, further intensifying uneven development among different races and countries. If we take a cross-section of any historical moment, we will see multiple social formations and modes of production coexisting—stone tools alongside bronze tools, iron tools, and even machines. Uneven development among countries and societies is an absolute law of historical progress.
Although international economic and political development was uneven before capitalism, these disparities did not have significant political or international consequences. This was because international relations were relatively independent and isolated. There were no large-scale, regular organic links among states, so a country’s internal economic and political activity was minimally affected by international society. Although countries developed at different speeds, this did not prevent them from continuing to exist in their own ways and at their own pace. For this reason, the law of uneven international economic and political development did not play a significant historical role from the standpoint of international politics. It simply existed as an objective phenomenon.
Second, the capitalist mode of production exacerbates uneven international economic and political development. Capitalist production is commodity production, and uneven development is an inherent characteristic of commodity production. Commodities are exchanged according to their value, which is determined by the amount of socially necessary labor required to produce them. Consequently, commodities that meet social needs and have relatively high labor productivity expand in production more rapidly.
In a capitalist system,the law of surplus value regulates proportional relations among production sectors. However, the operation of the law of surplus value causes the sector producing capital goods to develop fastest, the sector producing consumer goods for production to develop at a moderate pace, and the sector producing consumer goods to develop slowest. During periods of technological change, sectors burdened with old fixed capital develop more slowly, while sectors not burdened with old fixed capital develop more quickly. When these three principles are applied to different capitalist countries, they generate different rates of development, intensifying the degree of uneven development internationally.
However, the operation of the law of surplus value causes the sector producing capital goods to develop fastest, the sector producing consumer goods for production to develop at a moderate pace, and the sector producing consumer goods to develop slowest. During periods of technological change, sectors burdened with old fixed capital develop more slowly, while sectors not burdened with old fixed capital develop more quickly. When these three principles are applied to different capitalist countries, they generate different rates of development, intensifying the degree of uneven development internationally.
In short, uneven development among capitalist countries does intensify, but in the free-competition stage it intensifies gradually rather than in leaps. That is one side of the issue. On the other side, the emergence of capitalism widened the gap between capitalist and non-capitalist countries.
First, because the capitalist mode of production is more advanced, capitalist countries develop far more rapidly than non-capitalist countries.
Second, ever since the industrial revolution turned capitalist countries into industrial countries and non-capitalist countries into agricultural countries, the former have developed faster both because they exchange a small amount of labor for a large amount of labor and because they produce more “means of production for producing means of production,” whereas the latter develop more slowly for the opposite reasons.
Capitalism has brought about an international division of labor, created a world market, and integrated the world into a single economic and political entity. In this kind of environment, uneven development among countries has corresponding political consequences.
During this period, some parts of the globe had not yet been seized by advanced capitalist powers. Therefore, when late-developing capitalist countries rose and expanded, they could generally do so peacefully without triggering wars between states. Even when wars occurred, such as the Anglo-French wars of the eighteenth century and the Franco-Prussian War of the nineteenth century, they were essentially wars between two countries, not world wars fought by blocs of states. Their effects were limited and regional.
Colonialist expansion and commercial wars emerged between the capitalist countries and non-capitalist countries outside of Western Europe. Japan and the United States later developed into major capitalist powers. The former became capitalist metropoles and the latter became colonies. The relationship between them was one of exploitation and being exploited.
II. The Formation of Monopolies Accelerates Uneven Development
The shift in capitalism from free competition to monopoly accelerated the pace of development. The emergence of monopolies is the result of the self-regulation and partial qualitative change of capitalist production relations; their appearance conformed to the historical needs of large-scale socialized production.
(1) In the form of joint-stock companies, monopoly organizations accelerated the accumulation and concentration of capital. They met the socialized scale of investment demanded by the Second Industrial Revolution and made it possible to build gigantic industries, such as automobiles, shipbuilding, chemicals, steel, and rail transport, in a relatively short time. Marx said:
“If we had to wait for accumulation to make certain individual capitals grow to the point where they could build railways, there would be no railways to this day. But centralization, through joint-stock companies, accomplished this in the twinkling of an eye”,
(2) Monopolies that grow out of free competition do not eliminate competition; rather, they coexist with it. Competition among monopoly firms is more intense and longer-lasting. They cannot maintain a monopoly position forever simply by buying up inventions or shelving technology. Ultimately, under competitive pressure, monopoly firms must develop technology, and high monopoly profits provide the financial guarantee for sustained, in-depth scientific and technological research.
(3) One of the main characteristics of capitalism in its monopoly stage is capital export. It inevitably affects the capitalist development of receiving countries, greatly accelerating it and, in turn, deepening and expanding the development of capitalism worldwide. As Lenin pointed out,
“To think that this tendency toward decay rules out the rapid growth of capitalism would be a mistake.” In the era of imperialism, certain industries, sectors of the bourgeoisie, and countries reveal this tendency to one degree or another. Taken as a whole, capitalism is developing far more rapidly than before.”
In other words, when viewed as an integrated world system, capitalism in the monopoly stage develops faster than in any earlier period.
However, although monopoly capitalism has developed faster than in any earlier period, the tendencies toward stagnation and decay distinctive of monopoly continue to operate. In certain periods, these tendencies can gain the upper hand in particular industries or countries. This uneven tendency is especially evident in the decay of countries with the greatest concentration of capital. During this time, the law of uneven development operates in a leap-like manner: Late-developing countries surpass advanced countries in a relatively short period, resulting in dramatic changes to the international political and economic landscape.
In economic competition, the most developed countries exhibit relative stagnation mainly for the following reasons:
First, the most developed capitalist countries have the highest degree of monopoly.
This monopoly inevitably gives rise to a tendency toward stagnation and decay. Once monopoly prices are established, even temporarily, the motive force of technical progress—and thus, to some extent, all other progress—disappears. Moreover, it becomes economically possible to deliberately retard technical progress.
Second, the richest countries have accumulated enormous amounts of capital and have become “overripe”; there are insufficient “profitable” outlets for investment given the backward state of agriculture and the poverty of the masses. Consequently, a large amount of “surplus capital” emerges, and exporting capital to more profitable, less developed countries becomes a natural progression. Lenin pointed out:
“The export of goods was typical of old capitalism, when free competition held undivided sway. Typical of the latest stage of capitalism, when monopolies rule, is the export of capital.”
For developed countries, exporting capital has two adverse effects:
First, exporting capital reduces domestic investment in social reproduction. This undermines the maintenance of national economic vitality and expansion of the economic scale, causing the entire economy to develop a tendency toward stagnation. Conversely, the capital-importing country’s capitalist development is strengthened.
Second, unlike the export of commodities, the export of capital often comes with the most advanced production technology of the time. This allows the technology to take root in the capital-importing country. Some new technologies are not adopted even in the most advanced countries, often because older fixed capital gets in the way. Thus, the economic structure of the capital-importing country can advance rapidly, potentially surpassing the most advanced countries.
Based on the law of uneven development, Lenin predicted that, as the twentieth century began, world capitalism would advance at a faster pace, but countries would still develop at different rates. Among those with the greatest concentration of capital, he predicted that Britain’s economic stagnation would be the most pronounced. History has proven the scientific accuracy of this prediction.
III. The impact of modern uneven development on international politics
The uneven development of monopoly capitalism has significant implications for international politics. During this era, the sporadic nature of uneven international economic and political development impacted international politics in two ways.
First, this type of development drove capitalist metropoles and their colonies to become politically linked, forming colonial empires. Before the 1880s, modern colonial empires had not yet emerged. By that time, many Western European countries had been practicing colonialism since the period of primitive accumulation and had many colonies. However, these colonies existed independently and were not politically bound to the metropole to form a colonial empire. Even Britain, which had the largest number of colonies, was no exception.
Prior to 1875, Britain was far ahead in industrial production, foreign trade, and maritime shipping, occupying a position with no real rivals. Politically binding the colonies to the metropolis would have been superfluous.
Second, sharp changes in the balance of power among monopoly-capitalist states sparked imperialist wars. As colonial empires emerged, the world’s territory was divided among the various capitalist countries and fixed in place through political and military institutions. This formed exclusive international political entities. The partition of the world among capitalist countries was carried out according to their relative strength, and the resulting international political configuration corresponded to the configuration of international power.
Yet, during the imperialist era, the law of uneven economic and political development asserted itself in an even more violent manner. Over comparatively short periods, the balance of power among the major capitalist powers often changed dramatically. Latecomer powers caught up with and surpassed the earlier leading powers. Meanwhile, the strongest powers with the deepest capital resources could fall into stagnation.
“Once the balance of power shifts, what solution to the contradictions can capitalism offer besides force?”
Each country had already “managed” its colonies and dependent states through political domination and military occupation. Colonial empires are exclusive; late-rising powers cannot overcome this division merely through economic strength. To repartition the world, they must resort to force.
In wartime, countries typically form two kinds of blocs: one that seeks to preserve the existing world order and one that seeks to alter it. Each side then drags its colonies and dependent states into the war. For this reason, imperialist wars arising from uneven development tend to be world wars. Before the imperialist era, wars were localized and could not reach a global scale. During the imperialist period, the worldwide nature of the rule pursued by major capitalist powers caused imperialist wars to expand to a global scale.
These theories are all somewhat plausible, and from different angles, they can help people understand the uneven development of the international political economy during a given period. However, they all have one shortcoming: they lack a historical perspective. They do not analyze how the law of uneven development manifests differently in various historical periods. These theories cannot explain how these uneven shifts unfolded in the past or will unfold in the future. Only an approach like Marxism, which penetrates to the level of relations of production and analyzes their differing characteristics in different social formations, can do so.
Section Four: War and Peace as the Continuation of Politics
There is no such thing as an abstract war or peace. They always reflect the specific historical circumstances, fundamental developmental trends, and objective patterns of a given era. War and peace are closely connected; they are two opposing states of society. Both have profound economic roots and a class nature, and both are the international continuation of domestic politics. This is the basic Marxist view of war and peace, succinctly expressed in Lenin’s statement:
“War is the continuation of policy by violent means. The ruling class of belligerent countries had already been pursuing this policy long before the war. A peace treaty is also a continuation of that policy, recording changes in the relations of hostile forces brought about by military operations. War itself does not alter the direction in which prewar policy develops; it only accelerates that development.”
First, consider the class character of war. Although international war refers to a state of armed conflict between two or more countries, it is closely bound up with domestic politics. Marxism holds that the state is built on the opposition between the oppressing and the oppressed classes. The existence of the state only brings class struggle under a certain degree of control; it does not end class struggle. The state is an instrument by which the ruling class oppresses the ruled. Accordingly, the state’s activity represents the interests of the ruling class and embodies the ruling class’s will. International war is an external expression of domestic class politics and therefore has a profound class character.
More specifically, war is a broad and complex social phenomenon that does not refer only to organized combat operations. The course of armed conflict is interwoven with countless factors, but the class factor is the most important. The ruling class mobilizes the army, determines war aims, directs the war’s conduct, and uses its results to achieve its own class purposes. Therefore, to understand war, it is crucial to understand
“what kind of class character this war has, what gave rise to it, what classes are waging it, and what historical and historiographic conditions produced it.”
This is true of international war and civil war, the latter of which often reveals the nature of class struggle more starkly.
Politics is the concentrated expression of economics. Therefore, war, as a means of political struggle, has an economic foundation, and every war is rooted in that foundation. With the advent of the capitalist era, the economic factors that induce war have steadily become more acute.
On the one hand, the worldwide character of capitalist production has greatly shortened distances among peoples and tightened their connections.
On the other hand, it opened the first act of modern international relations: colonial expansion and commercial wars.
Under imperialism, contradictions on a global scale intensify as never before. Competition among monopoly bourgeoisies led to two world wars, resulting in the unprecedented destruction of resources and mass slaughter. In short, the social nature of war is clarified by studying its causes and the class politics within it. The study of class politics must not be isolated. One must look at its longer-term expression, which is tightly linked to the era’s developmental tendencies. A deep analysis of the entire system of economic and political relations on a global scale is necessary. The nature of war is class-based.
Second, wars fall into two categories: just and unjust. This distinction is extremely important. As long as there are exploitative classes that rely on armed force to suppress oppressed peoples, and as long as there are oppressed nations or classes that are struggling to win independence or build a new society, we cannot oppose all wars. Throughout history, war has played both reactionary and progressive roles.
Thus Marxism distinguishes between just and unjust wars, and between wars waged by progressive classes and those waged by reactionary, decaying classes. Marxism resolutely opposes unjust wars, such as those fought for imperialist aggression. At the same time, Marxism supports the just actions of oppressed classes taking up arms in struggle and the peoples of all countries defending their national freedom and independence.
Marxism provides a profound analysis of the relationship between imperialism and modern war and points to a methodology for addressing modern armed conflicts, including a way of classifying wars.
First, Lenin revealed the connection between the First World War (1914–1918) and the economic foundation of imperialism. He argued that the war’s outbreak arose from uneven capitalist development, the struggle of monopoly capitalists to redivide the world, and attempts to crush revolutionary movements. Based on this class analysis, he concluded that the First World War was an imperialist war from the standpoint of both sides in the conflict.
Second, Lenin carried out an in-depth study of wars to defend a socialist state and established the doctrine of defending proletarian state power. A war to defend a proletarian state is a just war. It arises under new historical conditions and is compelled by the totality of economic and political relations formed in the course of historical development. Since capitalist development is uneven in the imperialist stage, socialism cannot triumph simultaneously in all countries; it will first win in one or several countries.
Thus, once the proletariat takes power in one country, the others will remain bourgeois or pre-bourgeois for some time. This creates not only friction but also direct attempts by the bourgeoisie of other countries to crush the victorious proletariat of the socialist state. In such cases, a war on our part would be legitimate and just. It would be a war for socialism and the liberation of other peoples from the bourgeoisie.
According to Marxism, the most notable feature of a war fought to defend a socialist state is its just and progressive nature from beginning to end. While the bourgeoisie may occasionally wage just wars, once a just war conflicts with their class interests, they betray the national interest and may compromise with their own enemies. A war to defend a socialist state can maintain its justice throughout because it is a revolutionary war. Revolutionary forces oppose worldwide reaction and align with the direction of historical development. Lenin said:
“Our war is a continuation of revolutionary policy, a continuation of the policy of overthrowing the exploiters—capitalists and landowners.”
Finally, while Marxism distinguishes between just and unjust wars, it also classifies types and forms of war. The basis for distinguishing types and forms of modern war lies in the fundamental economic and political relations between the opposing sides. In the imperialist world system, the struggle mainly appears as one of the following:
(1) the struggle between imperialism and socialism,
(2) the struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat,
(3) the struggle between imperialism and the peoples of colonies and developing countries, and
(4) struggles among capitalist states. These contradictions and struggles give rise to the major types of modern war. Since the opposing sides in different wars have different political goals and desired outcomes, every type of war can be classified as either just or unjust.
In the modern era, the main types of just wars are wars to defend the socialist motherland, revolutionary wars of the working class, wars of the laboring people in exploited countries against the ruling classes, national liberation wars, and wars by capitalist countries to defend sovereignty and resist imperialist aggression. The basic forms of unjust war include wars by imperialist states against socialist states, wars by the ruling classes in capitalist countries against workers and other laborers, colonialist and neocolonialist wars, and imperialist wars of aggression within the capitalist system.
II. Peace is also a continuation of politics
Marxism provides a comprehensive account of the problem of war and explains the problem of peace before and after wars in a scientific way. Before each war, the causes and aims gradually take shape, and the war’s essence and characteristics gradually become evident. These determine the postwar peace. In 1887, Engels scientifically foresaw the possibility of a world-scale armed conflict, as well as its possible scope and consequences, on the basis of a thorough analysis of the peace that emerged in Europe after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, the regional balance of forces, and Europe’s already-formed development trends. Lenin called this great foresight a “genius” prediction, primarily because Engels provided a clear, brief, scientific class analysis of the development of capitalism at the end of the nineteenth century.
Similarly, postwar peace resulted from settling political and social problems through military means and from changes in the balance of power during and after the war. At the same time, it contains features that foreshadow future political events, including future wars. Lenin foresaw the budding possibility of new armed clashes between the two major opposing blocs of imperialist great powers from the “peace” that emerged after World War I. He argued that the Versailles–Washington system, as embodied in the treaties, was unreliable because it reflected the imperialist nature of World War I and the unjust “peace” that followed. The system merely suppressed irreconcilable contradictions temporarily and ultimately led to a new world war.
In short, the relationship between war and the peace that precedes it and follows it is always class-based. History shows that the end of a war of aggression is always accompanied by an unjust peace, whereas a just war creates the preconditions for a just peace. In the age of imperialism, an unjust, coercive peace built on plunder is its typical hallmark. Only in the era of socialism’s victory can a lasting and just peace be established worldwide. Marx discerned a future prospect of social peace in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. He said that, in that war,
“The English working class stretched out the hand of friendship to the French and German working classes. They were deeply convinced that, however this abominable war might end, the unity of workers throughout the world would ultimately eradicate all wars. While official France and official Germany were locked in a fratricidal struggle, French and German workers were exchanging messages of peace and friendship. This unprecedented and great fact alone allows people to look ahead to a brighter future. It shows that, in contrast to the old society of economic misery and political darkness, a new society is being born—and the international principle of that new society will be peace, because every nation will have the same ruler: labor!”
Additionally, peace cannot be understood as merely an abstract condition in which states, nations, and peoples are not at war with one another. Marxism holds that peace is also characterized by specific social and political aspects. Peace is not merely the absence of war; rather, it is a unique state of society and international relations. The fundamental difference between peace and war is that in peacetime, all issues among states, nations, and peoples are resolved through nonviolent or nonmilitary means. However, the absence of war does not necessarily mean the absence of violence or armed coercion. In societies marked by class antagonism—such as slave societies, feudal societies, and capitalist societies—nonviolent cooperation among peoples and states is impossible. Under these conditions, any peace is antagonistic, coercive, and ultimately grounded in violence. From the standpoint of one part of society ruling another, it is also unjust. History shows that peace is usually achieved to realize certain political objectives and does not rule out the possibility of armed violence being used again at any moment.
Lenin firmly opposed the abstract way bourgeois scholars talked about “peace” in vague generalities. Discussing how to speed up the achievement of peace and end World War I, Lenin wrote:
“The peace slogan can be advanced either in connection with definite peace terms, or without any conditions at all, as a struggle, not for a definite kind of peace, but for peace in general (Frieden ohne weiters). In the latter case, we obviously have a slogan that is not only non-socialist but entirely devoid of meaning and content.”
Genuine nonviolent cooperation among states and among peoples can be realized only after socialism has triumphed worldwide.
III. War and social revolution are fundamentally different
Marxism holds that there is no inevitable causal relationship between the two. The development of the class struggle and the emergence of a revolutionary situation are necessary for a social revolution. While war can accelerate the revolutionary process, it can also hinder it. However, the revolutionary process develops according to its own laws, which operate in both peacetime and wartime. Specifically, the essential differences between war and social revolution are as follows:
First, the causes of social revolution and war are fundamentally different. At its core, a social revolution results from the intensification of the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production. It also requires a revolutionary situation. War, by contrast, arises from other causes. A revolution is a confrontation between two antagonistic classes, whereas war (except for civil war) is a confrontation between states or alliances of states. War does not necessarily involve classes as the two opposing sides. Sometimes, however, a civil war can resemble a social revolution in form, though a social revolution is deeper and more enduring. A civil war cannot resolve all the problems that a social revolution must resolve, including economic, sociopolitical, and ideological issues. A social revolution fundamentally transforms the existing social system, while a civil war can only complete the first step of a revolution by smashing the old world.
Second, the primary issue in a social revolution is the issue of state power, and resolving it does not necessarily require violence. All the objectives of war, however, must be pursued through violence. For the belligerents, destroying the enemy’s regime or installing a regime dependent on oneself is a core aim of war. But the “state power” issue here is completely different from the state power issue in a social revolution. In the former case, control over the other side’s government is used to exploit and enslave the opponent; in the latter case, state power is used to thoroughly remake society and drive it forward. Only when the question of state power in a civil war coincides with the question of state power in a revolution can the civil war itself be the continuation of a social revolution. Otherwise, wars such as national liberation struggles—though they also involve seizing political power—result only in a change of government and do not bring about social transformation, because the aim of such wars is to expel foreign invaders and defend territorial integrity and sovereign independence.
Third, a social revolution is led and carried out by progressive classes, whereas war includes participants from both progressive and reactionary classes and forces. The latter are chiefly responsible for every war. Therefore, social revolution is the “locomotive of history”: it represents progress. Only just wars can propel history forward; unjust wars always impede social progress.
In short, Marxism offers a distinctive analysis of war, peace, and social revolution that is fundamentally different from the corresponding bourgeois ideological system. Since the twentieth century, Western countries have also developed various theories about war and peace. These theories tend to view questions of war, peace, and revolution generally, abstractly, and in isolation, treating these phenomena as eternally existing. They view war and peace as two opposing stages with no profound connection and conflate war with revolution, claiming that revolution inevitably triggers war.
In the West, Kenneth Waltz’s analysis of the origins of war in his book Man, the State, and War is considered a classic. Waltz explains the origins of all wars on three levels—human nature, state institutions, and the international system—seemingly constructing a theory of war that “holds everywhere.” However, this theory does not analyze the different economic bases and class natures of wars under specific historical conditions, nor does it evaluate wars from the standpoint of humanity’s progressive development. Marxist theory of war and peace surpasses the bourgeois theoretical system in these respects, demonstrating its unique depth and scientific character.
Marxist theory on peaceful coexistence went through a process of development. Marx and Engels did not provide a detailed exposition of the idea of peaceful coexistence, because they believed that
“the communist revolution will not merely be a revolution in one country, but will occur simultaneously in all civilized countries, that is, at least in England, America, France, and Germany,”
This is to say: they were convinced that proletarian revolution would break out simultaneously in all civilized countries. Even if victories came earlier in some places and later in others, socialism’s replacement of capitalism on a world scale would be a very short period. Once
“class antagonisms within nations disappear, the hostility between nations will disappear along with them,”
peaceful coexistence would not present itself as a problem.
Based on a scientific analysis of the laws governing the economic and political development of monopoly capitalism, Lenin predicted that a socialist revolution would first occur in the weakest links of imperialist rule, rather than simultaneously. This would produce a world situation in which socialist states would coexist with capitalist and pre-capitalist states. During this transitional period, the principle of peaceful coexistence among states is determined by the essential nature of the socialist system and the survival and development needs of newly formed socialist states. Among states, especially those with different social systems, peaceful coexistence is an objective reality, independent of anyone’s will; it is a historical necessity. This is Lenin’s significant contribution to Marx and Engels’ thinking on international politics.
First, the principle of peaceful coexistence is a policy idea that guides socialist foreign affairs and handles relations between states, especially those with different social systems. This principle applies only to the adjustment of international relations. It applies to relations between states with different social systems, as well as between states with the same social system. However, it does not apply to the adjustment of relations within a country between the oppressing and oppressed classes. Therefore, it is a policy concept with specific preconditions and a specific scope. The main purpose of carrying out a policy of peaceful coexistence is
“to defeat the exploiters and win over the waverers—this is a worldwide task. Many bourgeois states are waverers. As bourgeois states, they hate us; as oppressed states, they would rather live in peace with us.”
The concept of peaceful coexistence has broad appeal in the international community. It unites socialist countries with other peace-loving states, safeguards global stability, and secures a peaceful environment for economic development and increased productivity. However, when fighting against domestic exploiters and hostile forces, one cannot apply the principle of peaceful coexistence. Instead, one must uphold the principle of proletariat dictatorship because it aligns with the fundamental interests of the proletariat and the general populace.
Second, peaceful coexistence does not exclude a tit-for-tat struggle. Lenin repeatedly stressed that the Soviet state was able to coexist peacefully with imperialist states only because it fought for that outcome. Peaceful coexistence aims to promote peace, coexistence, and friendly cooperation among states, especially those with different social systems. It seeks to establish close contacts and exchanges, and to resolve international disputes through negotiation and coordinate international relations. However, due to the nature of imperialism, peaceful coexistence is inevitably connected with struggle—with opposition to imperialist power politics and policies of war. Struggle between states will not disappear.
On the contrary, the existence of such struggle is the very premise on which peaceful coexistence rests. When Soviet power emerged in Russia, it would have been impossible to establish a new era of peaceful coexistence had it not successfully fended off three armed interventions by the Entente powers. Likewise, without a justified, advantageous, and restrained diplomatic struggle, it would have been impossible to break the deadlock of blockade and encirclement.
Second, peaceful coexistence does not exclude a tit-for-tat struggle. Lenin repeatedly stressed that the Soviet state was able to coexist peacefully with imperialist states only because it fought for that outcome. Lenin put it vividly:
“That’s how it usually is—when you hurt the enemy, he comes to talk peace.”
In terms of its concrete requirements, peaceful coexistence aims for peace, coexistence, and friendly cooperation among states—especially among states with different social systems—along with close contacts and exchanges; it seeks to resolve international disputes through negotiation and to coordinate international relations. But because of the nature of imperialism, peaceful coexistence is inevitably connected with struggle—with opposition to imperialist power politics and policies of war. Struggle between states will not disappear; on the contrary, the existence of such struggle is the very premise, and struggle is the foundation on which peaceful coexistence rests.
When Soviet power was born in Russia, it would have been impossible to open a new situation of peaceful coexistence if it had not successfully beaten back three armed interventions by the Entente powers. Likewise, without struggle on the diplomatic stage that was justified in principle, advantageous in outcome, and restrained in measure, it would have been impossible to break the deadlock of blockade and encirclement. Therefore, during the transition period, peaceful coexistence is only relative: peaceful coexistence without struggle is impossible. Tit-for-tat struggle is also an important component of the Marxist conception of peaceful coexistence.
II. Peaceful Coexistence as a Requirement for Socialism’s Survival and Development
The international environment in which the socialist system emerged dictates that peaceful coexistence be a fundamental principle of socialist states’ foreign policy. Socialism emerged within the global imperialist system. It is an advanced social system whose mission is to dismantle the imperialist world system and replace capitalism worldwide. Therefore, from the moment these two types of states coexist, they are destined to oppose and struggle against each other. This opposition includes not only conflicts of national interest, but also class antagonism. Any country that breaks through the imperialist system will inevitably face unified hostility, encirclement, and strangulation by the bourgeoisie. Soviet Russia confronted exactly this kind of international environment when it first appeared. At that time, the primary focus of Soviet domestic and foreign policy was defending socialist public ownership to ensure the survival of the new regime. If the Soviets lost state power, the working class would lose its economic interests and position. Thus, the ruling socialist party and government had to base their foreign policy on the fundamental issue of defending the independence and sovereignty of the socialist state. Lenin profoundly pointed out:
“Marxism requires that objective conditions and their changes be taken into account; problems must be posed concretely on the basis of these conditions. Now the fundamental change is that the Russian Soviet Republic has been established: whether from our point of view or from the standpoint of international socialism, defending this republic, which has already begun the socialist revolution, is above all else.”
At that time, Soviet Russia’s diplomatic activity sometimes advanced and sometimes retreated and compromised. Whether it sat down to negotiate or was compelled to wage a defensive war; whether it developed friendly relations or issued protests or even delivered ultimatums—everything was done to safeguard national independence and national dignity, so that the working-class state power could survive, be consolidated, and develop. Safeguarding sovereignty and independence is the foremost problem socialist states face, and peaceful coexistence is the only effective policy for defending national sovereignty and independence.
In addition, the foreign policy principle of peaceful coexistence is necessary for the economic development of socialist countries. Experience has shown that the socialist system will not emerge simultaneously across the entire world; rather, it can only first arise in individual countries. Furthermore, these countries are not the most advanced capitalist countries, but rather, countries where capitalism is less developed.
Once the proletariat takes power, they must defend their political power and shoulder the tasks of restoring and developing the economy and improving the people’s standard of living. In the long run, accomplishing the latter is more difficult because a country can only defend its security effectively with economic development and stronger national power.
To develop the economy rapidly, a country cannot seal itself off and become a closed, self-contained system. As Marx and Engels emphasized, one should absorb all outstanding achievements created by humanity, including learning from developed capitalist countries. In order to bring in technology and management experience, as well as foreign capital, it is necessary to expand overseas markets, open up the domestic market, and strengthen international economic relations. This requires a peaceful and friendly international environment. Peaceful coexistence is the primary precondition.
In 1922, Soviet Russia was invited to attend the Genoa Conference convened to discuss Europe’s economic recovery. At the conference, the Soviet delegation issued a statement saying:
“While the Russian delegation adheres to the principled standpoint of communism, it believes that in the present historical era—when the old social system and the new social system now growing up may coexist—the economic cooperation among countries representing these two systems of ownership is absolutely necessary for a general economic revival.”
During the conference, Soviet Russia and Germany concluded the Treaty of Rapallo, providing for the immediate restoration of diplomatic and consular relations and, on the basis of mutual benefit, the adjustment of commercial and economic relations, with most-favored-nation treatment granted to each other. Lenin emphasized that what was essential was
“to insist unconditionally on concluding an equal treaty between two systems of property.”
In 1924, a wave of diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union emerged internationally. Soviet Russia finally won “peaceful coexistence” with capitalist countries, creating a peaceful international environment for national economic construction. This shows that peaceful coexistence is essential both to the survival of a newly established proletarian regime and to socialist economic development.
Moreover, peaceful coexistence is also determined by the nature of the socialist system itself. In socialist countries, class oppression and class exploitation have been eliminated; the proletariat and the broad masses of the people become masters of the country; and the class interests of the proletariat are unified with the interests of the nation and the state.
“When the exploitation of one individual by another is ended, the exploitation of one nation by another will also be ended.”
The proletariat, as the ruling class of its own nation, not only does not oppress or exploit other nations, but also opposes all national oppression and hegemonism, thereby safeguarding world peace. The thorough liberation of oppressed nations worldwide aligns with the proletariat’s fundamental interests because it breaks imperialism’s global domination and accelerates the elimination of the capitalist system.
In a socialist public-ownership economy, the purpose of production is not to pursue surplus value and monopoly profits, but rather to continuously improve living standards and raise productivity. Socialist expanded reproduction is not based on the plunder and exploitation of other nations; therefore, it lacks an economic motive for external aggression and conquest. Therefore, the political and economic characteristics of the socialist system determine that the basic foreign-policy principle of socialist states is peaceful coexistence.
III. Peaceful coexistence is the guideline for relations among socialist countries
From the standpoint of the revolutionary process, the socialist cause is first and foremost the cause of a nation and the cause of a state. No socialist country may interfere in another country’s internal affairs by “exporting revolution,” thereby undermining the principles of independence, self-determination, and equality.
To be sure, Marx and Engels held that capital is an international force: in exploiting and repressing workers in every country, the bourgeoisies of different countries and their governments always act in concert. Therefore, the proletariat’s class position is international, the conditions for its emancipation are international, and the socialist cause is a worldwide cause. But when Marx and Engels emphasized that the proletariat must unite in struggle to achieve world revolution, they did not ignore the principles of independence, self-determination, and equality among workers’ parties in different countries. On the contrary, they regarded those principles as an important component of proletarian internationalism.
“Though not in substance, yet in form, the struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie is at first a struggle within the bounds of one country. The proletariat of each country must, of course, first of all overthrow its own bourgeoisie.”
In other words, the primary arena of the working class’s immediate struggle is, first of all, its own country.
Due to differences in historical conditions, the international socialist movement contains large and small parties, old and new parties, and parties with more or less influence. Therefore, their roles and positions in the international workers’ movement are not identical. However, all parties are equal; there is no relationship of leadership and being led.
Under imperialist conditions, the proletarian world revolution is inseparable from the liberation struggle of oppressed nations. Engels predicted that a victorious proletariat could guide colonial peoples through stages of development toward socialism. However, Engels immediately added a warning:
“One thing is certain: the victorious proletariat cannot force any ‘benefits’ upon foreign peoples without jeopardizing its own victory.”
Lenin also engaged in self-criticism regarding the Soviet Russian campaign of 1920. In pursuit of the Polish landlords’ and bourgeoisie’s army, the Red Army advanced to the outskirts of Warsaw in the “well-intentioned” hope of helping the Polish revolution succeed. Lenin judged this to be a mistake. This does not accord with respect for sovereignty and the principle of self-determination. Still less can a revolution be exported or carried out by others in one’s place. Therefore, although the proletariat of the world should support one another in each country’s socialist cause, the communist party of any one country must not interfere in the internal affairs of another country’s communist party. Nor should it use party-to-party ties to meddle in another country’s domestic politics or damage normal relations between states. Likewise, the principle of peaceful coexistence must be observed in handling relations among socialist states governed by communist parties.
Second, the actual development of the socialist cause also requires that relations among socialist countries be handled according to the principles of peaceful coexistence. Social development did not unfold the way Marx and Engels expected—namely, that proletarian revolutions would first erupt in the advanced capitalist countries and bring socialism to victory. Instead, through two imperialist world wars, proletarian revolutions broke out first in several economically backward countries, and socialist states were established there. Historically, these socialist countries were still far from achieving full national integration; national characteristics and differences remained widespread. Because their stages of development and foundations differed, there existed de facto inequalities among them in economic, political, and cultural terms; territorial boundaries, differences in national character, and language continued to play important social roles, and national contradictions and conflicts were unavoidable. In addition, the state in the traditional sense would continue to exist for a long time.
Because countries differ in their levels of economic development, the tasks they face and the development goals they pursue also differ; each country has its own distinctive national interests and the policies and strategies it formulates to achieve them. Any attempt to impose one’s own experience and model on other countries harms both sides, and it also harms the development of the socialist cause worldwide. In this special transitional period, the proletariat in socialist countries has only just risen to become a “national class”; it bears deep national and state imprints. The universal form of socialist revolution should be to integrate the basic principles of Marxism with a country’s specific conditions and to develop the national economy. If a country’s economy is put in good order and proletarian political power is consolidated, that is the greatest contribution it can make to the international communist cause.
If one fails to respect differences of interest and differences in levels of economic, cultural, and political development, and tries to resolve these problems by inappropriate means, the result will inevitably be contradictions, conflict, and even war. At the present stage of development of socialist countries, the internationalist interests of the proletariat are expressed through the national interests of socialist states. If one leaps over the historical era and ignores the real material foundations of the state and the nation, one will bring losses to the world’s progressive cause. In sum, peaceful coexistence is the most advantageous means and path for regulating relations among socialist countries.
Moreover, Chinese Communists also made important contributions to the further development of the principle of peaceful coexistence. In the early period after the founding of New China, the Chinese Communist Party, represented by Mao Zedong, declared:
“Any foreign government, provided it is willing to break off relations with the Chinese reactionaries, stops conspiring with them or helping them, and adopts an attitude of genuine, and not hypocritical, friendship toward People’s China, we are willing to discuss with it the establishment of diplomatic relations on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual benefit, and mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty. The Chinese people are willing to carry on friendly cooperation with the peoples of all countries, to restore and develop international trade in order to develop production and prosper the economy.”
This was the policy expression of the principle of peaceful coexistence. Not only that: in diplomatic practice Chinese Communists further developed and enriched the content of peaceful coexistence, giving it a complete formulation as the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence —mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. From the day these Five Principles were proposed, through the joint efforts of all peace-loving countries and peoples worldwide, they were accepted by more and more states; their influence in international politics steadily expanded, and they gradually developed into a general principle guiding relations between states.
DeepSeek noticeably strives to be politically correct 政治合格, sometimes refusing to answer or answering but erasing the answer that does not meet political requirements a few seconds later. The adherence of ChatGPT5.2 to capitalist class ideology is assured more subtly by the GIGO principle — garbage in – garbage out.
Currently my favorite tools and workflow for Chinese – English translation are ChatGPT5.2/Thinking inserting the text two-three paragraphs at a time. If I put in an overly large stretch of source text, ChatGPT can switch subtly into summary mode and leave out some details. Then I use the DeepL Write tool (free for stretches of text of 2000 words or less) to make the result more readable. DeepL Write will often change the passives common in Chinese paragraphs to active voice where appropriate. Then I check the translation for accuracy and readability. I often break up long paragraphs (more common in Chinese it seems) and lists within paragraphs into bullet points where appropriate to make the English text easier to read.
ChatGPT used to be much better than DeepL, the gap has closed considerably over the past few years. One DeepL strength is that the quality of the translation and the English text output doesn’t decline like it does for ChatGPT.
That is to say, I find ChatGPT better overall but it falls down for longer passages — it moves subtly into summarizing and drops details. DeepL does not have this problem yet the overall quality of the translation and the English text is not quite as good as ChatGPT. Although the gap between the two has closed considerably over the past two years. I read somewhere that that is because of DeepL’s design philosophy — I don’t remember the details.
Classical Chinese – English translation is an interesting comparison case. The DeepSeek model I have been using is the free one while the ChatGPT model I use is the $20/month version ChatGPT5.2/Thinking so my experience may not permit me a fair comparison. From my modest understanding of Large Language Model black boxes, performance depends upon the model’s capacity (they use the term ‘tokens’) and the extent and quality of the text data input and the quality of the training. The ratio of text available in various languages has a lot to do with what is available online — that means a heavy bias towards English. I wonder if that might be true of a Chinese-made model too but I don’t know. The Way that can be Followed of is not the true Way. 道可道非常道。
A 2023 Phoenix TV interview noted that the relative paucity of Chinese language in training data limits performance in Chinese text output compared with English — 黄铁军：ChatGPT训练只用了百分之几的中文数据.
The vast expense of training these Large Language Models is national-economy distorting and may even lead to a short term bust (like the late 1990s Internet boom and bust that disappointed early investors but did built out lots of infrastructure that was very useful later like the worldwide net of fiber optic cables). I wonder if progress depends as much on the financial depth of national economies almost as much as on technology smarts. But this is getting out of my depth too.
I asked ChatGPT and DeepSeek how they compare. They agree that DeepSeek could be better on Classical Chinese but weren’t sure. As for myself, I haven’t been using the more expensive pay-to-play version of DeepSeek so I can’t make a far comparison.I enjoyed exploring the million RMB/million dollar question nonetheless.
Far below is a ChatGPT5.2 recommended workflow for translated Classical Chinese 文言文 into English that may interest translation geeks.
You may want to query you favorite AI on this topic. AIs are a good source of information on AIs especially on the best way to pose queries to AIs. They can give you some recommended reading lists and suggest some websites to peruse.
This related posting I revised last year may be helpful for the cyber translation tool perplexed.
Copied below are the responses to the query I gave to DeepSeek and ChatGPT5.2/Thinking.
Response gives ten sources. I am using the free version of DeepSeek. It appears that I can’t share a URL to sources.
First from DeepSeek:
How does ChatGPT5.2 compare with DeepS for translating classical Chinese into English? What are their strengths and weaknesses? Does DeepS offer a higher level of service on a subscription basis as does OpenAI’s ChatGPT? If so, it it reasonable to compare the open version of DeepS to an advanced version of ChatGPT5.2? Is DeepS trained with much more Chinese language material than is ChatGPT which I understand gets several times more English than Chinese text in its training? If so what are the implications for their performance?
Comparing ChatGPT and DeepSeek for translating classical Chinese into English is a fascinating and complex question. Based on recent academic research and comparative studies, they each possess distinct strengths and weaknesses. The short answer is that neither model is definitively “better” overall; their suitability depends heavily on your specific goals—whether you prioritize scholarly precision, literary fluency, or creative adaptation.
Here is a detailed comparison based on the available information.
Strengths and Weaknesses in Classical Chinese Translation
Recent academic studies have put both models to the test, revealing a clear division of strengths.
DeepSeek
Strengths: Superior in precise literal translation and capturing formal aspects like tonal patterns and rhyme in poetry. Demonstrates strong “reasoning” through self-correction, potentially leading to more contextually aware translations in complex scenarios. Excels in information retrieval and detailed analysis within a Chinese context .
Weaknesses: Significantly slower processing times due to its complex reasoning mechanisms. Its “thinking” process can be inefficient. Like all AI, it suffers from “hallucinations” (inventing facts) and cultural biases .
ChatGPT
Strengths: Highly proficient in producing fluent, creative, and readable translations. Excels at “dynamic equivalence” by making the text flow naturally for an English reader, even if it means deviating from the strict literal meaning . Much faster response times .
Weaknesses: Can produce “translations” that read like a foreigner’s interpretation, lacking deep cultural nuance. May miss subtle cultural allusions or simplify them excessively. Its creative paraphrasing can sometimes stray too far from the original .
Key Feature Comparison: Service Models and Training Data
The differences in their outputs are largely rooted in their fundamental design, service models, and training data.
DeepSeek
Pricing/Service Model: Primarily uses a pay-as-you-go, usage-based pricing for its API (e.g., $0.28 per 1M input tokens). There is no monthly subscription plan for premium access. A free consumer app is available .
Training Data Focus: Trained with a significant emphasis on Chinese-language material. For example, its code-specialized model used 87% source code and 3% Chinese natural language corpus, but more importantly, it’s designed for deep “reasoning” that aligns well with the logic of classical Chinese .
Core Architectural Goal: “Reasoning” and logical self-verification.
ChatGPT
Pricing/Service Model: Operates on a tiered monthly subscription model (Free, Plus, Pro, Business, Enterprise). Higher tiers like Plus ($20/month) and Pro ($200/month) offer expanded access to its flagship models (like GPT-5.2 Pro), faster speeds, and more features .
Training Data Focus: Trained on a dataset estimated to be only a few percent Chinese, with the vast majority being English. This explains its tendency to produce translations that feel like an English-native interpretation .
Core Architectural Goal: “Fluency” and broad, creative generation.
Is it Reasonable to Compare the Free Versions?
No, it is not entirely reasonable to compare the open/free version of DeepSeek to an advanced, paid version of ChatGPT. They are different tiers of service with different access levels.
DeepS’s Free Version vs. ChatGPT’s Paid Version: The free version of DeepSeek is a powerful, fully-featured model. Comparing it to a paid tier of ChatGPT (like Plus or Pro) is an apples-to-oranges comparison. The paid ChatGPT tiers offer access to more advanced models (e.g., GPT-5.2 Pro) , which may perform differently on translation tasks than the free version. Academic studies, like the one from the Korean Citation Index, often compare the base capabilities of both, providing a fair benchmark for their core translation philosophies .
Open vs. Closed Weights: DeepSeek models are often open-weight, allowing for community scrutiny and adaptation, while ChatGPT’s models are proprietary. This difference in philosophy doesn’t directly impact a one-off translation, but it has implications for future development and customization.
Implications of Training Data Differences for Performance
The disparity in training data has profound implications for their performance with classical Chinese:
DeepSeek (The Native Speaker): Think of DeepSeek as a highly educated native Chinese speaker who learned English as a second language. It has an innate, deep understanding of the cultural, historical, and literary context of the original text. It knows the “why” behind the words. This allows it to produce translations that are often more accurate in terms of detail and cultural resonance, even if its English phrasing isn’t always perfectly idiomatic. Its ability to self-correct (“reasoning”) allows it to navigate the ambiguous logic of classical Chinese more effectively .
ChatGPT (The Brilliant Translator): Think of ChatGPT as a brilliant English-speaking translator who studied classical Chinese. It may not have the same lifelong cultural immersion, but it has learned the patterns and structures so well that it can produce incredibly fluent and natural-sounding English prose. It prioritizes the reading experience, ensuring the translation “sings” in English, even if that means occasionally sacrificing a minor cultural detail for the sake of readability .
In essence, DeepSeek excels at fidelity to the source, while ChatGPT excels at fluency in the target language. The “better” choice depends entirely on your goal: a rigorous academic paper might benefit from DeepSeek’s precision, while a published poetry anthology might favor ChatGPT’s lyrical flow.
Summary of Translation Approaches
Feature
DeepSeek
ChatGPT
Core Strength
Literal Precision & Cultural Detail
Fluent Readability & Creative Adaptation
Translation Style
“Native” understanding of Chinese logic
“Translator’s” fluency in English
Pacing/Rhythm
Accurate to the original, may feel dense
Adapted for English readers, natural flow
Cultural Nuance
High retention of original context
May simplify or generalize for clarity
Best Use Case
Academic analysis, research, deeply cultural texts
Published translations, creative works, general understanding
ChatGPT5.2’s Take on ChatGPT vs. DeepSeek
Link to ChatGPT5.2 response for this segment. Click on Source at the end of the URL presentation of this segment to see the 74 sources it references.
ChatGPT-5.2 vs DeepSeek for Classical Chinese → English
Where ChatGPT-5.2 tends to shine
English rendering quality and register control: Strong at producing readable, idiomatic English while preserving structure (and can reliably follow constraints like “no bold,” “keep line breaks,” “gloss key terms,” etc.).
Instruction-following & workflow: Better at multi-step translation workflows (variant readings, annotation layers, consistency rules, “translate + then justify choices,” etc.), especially in long contexts.
Tooling + product maturity: OpenAI offers multiple paid tiers (Go/Plus/Pro/Business/Enterprise) with different capability/usage limits.
Common weaknesses for Classical Chinese:
Confident-but-wrong classical parsing: If the passage is dense/elliptical, it may “resolve” ambiguity too aggressively unless you force a gloss/parse-first workflow.
Allusion + commentary gaps: Without prompting, it may miss that a phrase is a set allusion, or misidentify who is speaking in embedded discourse.
Where DeepSeek tends to shine
Chinese-first sensitivity: DeepSeek’s own technical reporting indicates its base training data are “mostly Chinese and English,” and many evaluations note its strength on Chinese-language tasks. Practical upshot: it can be very good at recognizing Chinese idiom, modern-to-classical continuities, and sometimes doing cleaner Chinese-side disambiguation before translating.
Cost/access for experimentation (via API): DeepSeek offers paid usage through an API pricing model.
Common weaknesses for Classical Chinese:
English output polish can be less consistent (stiffer phrasing, less controlled voice), depending on prompt and model/version.
Safety/policy and political sensitivity may intrude in some contexts (less relevant to pre-Qin prose, more relevant to historically/politically loaded modern commentary).
Privacy/regulatory concerns have been raised in some jurisdictions, which may matter if you’re translating sensitive documents.
Does DeepSeek offer a subscription tier like ChatGPT?
As of DeepSeek’s current positioning, it prominently markets free access to its chat product and paid API access (metered by tokens), rather than “Plus/Pro”-style consumer subscriptions. OpenAI, by contrast, very explicitly sells consumer subscription tiers (Go/Plus/Pro) and work tiers (Business/Enterprise).
Is it reasonable to compare “free DeepSeek” to “paid ChatGPT-5.2”?
It can be, but only if you’re clear what you’re comparing:
If you’re comparing raw model translation quality, then “free vs paid” is not the key issue—which model/version you’re actually using is.
If you’re comparing service level (availability, speed, context length, reliability, tooling, file handling, guarantees, support), then comparing a free tier to a paid tier is often not apples-to-apples, because the paid tier typically buys you more consistent access and product features. (OpenAI’s pricing pages make that product segmentation explicit.)
“Is DeepSeek trained on much more Chinese than ChatGPT?”
What we can say with sources:
DeepSeek: its own paper explicitly notes its base model training data are mostly Chinese + English.
ChatGPT / GPT-5.2: OpenAI does not publicly disclose a clean language-by-language training-data breakdown (at least not on the pricing/help pages), so any precise “X times more English than Chinese” claim is hard to verify from official sources.
So the safest conclusion is: DeepSeek is plausibly more China/Chinese-weighted than many US-origin general LLMs, but the exact ratio comparison to GPT-5.2 isn’t publicly pinned down.
Implications if a model has “more Chinese” (and why it’s not the whole story)
If DeepSeek has a higher Chinese proportion, you often see:
Better performance on Chinese comprehension, including tricky segmentation, classical particles, and terse ellipsis.
Potentially better handling of Chinese-centric cultural priors (names, institutions, common allusions).
But Classical Chinese → English is two hard problems:
Parsing Classical Chinese correctly (Chinese-side competence helps a lot), and
Writing excellent English while preserving ambiguity where appropriate (English-side competence and instruction-following helps a lot).
That’s why in practice:
DeepSeek can be excellent as a “parse + gloss” engine (produce a modern Chinese paraphrase, identify grammar/function words, propose 2–3 parses).
ChatGPT-5.2 can be excellent as the final English stylist/editor and for maintaining your house rules (terminology consistency, apparatus formatting, citation workflow, etc.).
A practical way to benchmark them for your use case
If you want a fair comparison for Classical Chinese, test both on the same 3–5 passages and require the same structured output:
Q: In typical AI training data, what is the proportion of English vs. Chinese and other languages. How does this affect performance?
There isn’t one single “typical” mix, but most large pretraining corpora are very English-heavy, because they draw heavily from web crawls where English dominates and because many widely used “clean” corpora are explicitly English-only.
What the proportions usually look like
1) Web crawls (e.g., Common Crawl) Common Crawl publishes language stats for each monthly crawl. In a recent crawl (CC-MAIN-2026-04), the primary language share of HTML pages is roughly: English ~41.7%, Chinese ~4.9%, Japanese ~5.8%, Russian ~6.3%, German ~6.0%, French ~4.7%, Spanish ~4.6% (others mostly < ~1% each). So even before any filtering/curation, English is already ~8× Chinese by share of pages in that crawl.
2) “Cleaned” pretraining datasets derived from web crawls These often become more skewed, depending on filtering and what the dataset targets.
C4 (English) is an English-only cleaned Common Crawl derivative (many English-first models used it).
FineWeb is explicitly an English dataset extracted from Common Crawl.
3) Multilingual mixtures (when people try to be multilingual) Even “multilingual” mixes can still be extremely English-dominant in raw volume. For example, the widely used mC4 release lists approximate uncompressed sizes: English 10,401 GB vs Chinese 186 GB (and Japanese 821 GB, etc.). That makes Chinese well under 1% of the total by bytes if you take the “~27TB” figure at face value, and English is ~56× larger than Chinese in that listing.
How this affects model performance
More data (and better data) → better performance in that language. In practice, English-heavy training tends to produce:
Stronger English capabilities: better instruction-following, writing quality, tool-use conventions, and general coverage, because the model sees far more English examples (and often higher-quality curated English subsets).
Weaker non-English (including Chinese) on the long tail: more grammar/idiom errors, more unnatural register, weaker domain coverage (law/medicine/technical writing), and more hallucination when prompts require culturally/localized knowledge or specialized vocabulary.
Cross-lingual transfer helps, but only partially: models do learn transferable reasoning and world knowledge, but style, idioms, and factual grounding tied to local sources degrade when the language is underrepresented.
Tokenizer + data-efficiency effects: the same “token budget” can represent languages differently (especially CJK vs alphabetic scripts), and filtering/quality heuristics built around English can disproportionately discard or damage non-English text—both of which can worsen non-English performance even beyond simple “percentage of data.”
The practical takeaway
If a model is trained on an English-centric corpus, expect English to be the “best language,” with other languages trailing roughly in proportion to (1) their representation and (2) their data quality.
Models that aim to be multilingual typically rebalance/oversample non-English during training; otherwise the default web distribution (English ~40–45%, Chinese ~5% in some crawls) plus English-only curated sets can leave Chinese comparatively undertrained.
ChatGPT5.2: Here’s the practical way to think about DeepSeek vs. ChatGPT in 2026: it’s less “which is smarter?” and more which tradeoffs fit your use case (cost, openness, reliability, safety controls, and language behavior).
Biggest differences
1) Openness and deployment control
DeepSeek: has released multiple open-weights models (e.g., R1 / V3 variants), which means you (or a vendor) can run/fine-tune them on your own infra and control data locality more directly.
ChatGPT: is a hosted product (closed weights) with strong app features and enterprise controls, but you’re not self-hosting the base model.
Why it matters: if you need on-prem / air-gapped / strict data residency, open-weights are a big lever.
2) Cost model
DeepSeek API is priced per token and is very inexpensive by published list prices (e.g., DeepSeek R1 “reasoner” and V3 pricing in their docs).
ChatGPT is mainly sold as per-user subscriptions (Free/Go/Plus/Pro/Business/Enterprise tiers).
Why it matters: if you’re running high-volume programmatic workloads, DeepSeek-style token pricing can be extremely cost-effective; if you’re optimizing for end-user productivity features, ChatGPT’s per-seat plans can be simpler.
3) Product ecosystem & UX
ChatGPT tends to win on “everything around the model”: polished chat UX, file handling, multimodal features, integrations, admin tooling on higher tiers, etc. (and it’s evolving quickly—e.g., plan structure and ad behavior on lower tiers has been changing).
DeepSeek is strong if your main goal is API + models (and/or running open weights), but the surrounding product layer may be less “one-stop” depending on how you access it.
4) Performance profile (what each is often “best at”)
A reasonable rule of thumb from published comparisons and commentary:
DeepSeek often shines on algorithmic coding + math/reasoning-style tasks, especially for the price.
ChatGPT often shines on broad knowledge coverage, instruction-following polish, and general writing/analysis workflows (and usually better “assistant-ness” end-to-end).
(Exact rankings depend heavily on which DeepSeek model, which ChatGPT model/tier, and your prompt/task.)
5) Chinese-language behavior & policy constraints
ChatGPT: generally strong in Chinese, but will follow OpenAI safety policies.
DeepSeek: some reporting/analysis notes that certain releases may align more tightly with PRC political/censorship constraints than earlier versions.
If your work includes sensitive political topics, you may see noticeably different refusal patterns.
Which should you pick?
Pick ChatGPT if you want the best general-purpose assistant experience (writing, analysis, summarization, iterative editing, broad knowledge) with strong product UX and team/enterprise options.
Pick DeepSeek if you want low-cost high-volume API usage, or you value open weights / self-hosting / customization, or you’re focused on coding + reasoning workloads on a budget.
ChatGPT5.2 Recommended Workflow for Classical Chinese to English Translation
If your goal is to translate ancient/classical Chinese (文言文) into good English, the biggest lever isn’t “which model,” it’s workflow + constraints. Here’s a setup that consistently produces publishable results (and avoids the usual AI failures: wrong referents, smoothing over particles, and anachronistic paraphrase).
A workflow that works
1) Establish the text
Paste the passage (and tell me the edition if you have it).
If punctuation is modern/editorial, note that—many translation errors come from trusting punctuation.
What I’ll do: produce a segmented text (by clause), and flag text-critical ambiguities.
2) Do a literal “gloss pass” first
You want a line-by-line that keeps:
particles (其、夫、盖、乃、则)
function words (以、而、于、之)
ellipses (omitted subjects/objects)
parallelism and rhyme/antithesis (esp. Han–Tang prose)
Output: a close translation + short grammar notes per clause.
Summary of Chapter Fourteen ofThe Logic of Politics: Principles of Marxist Political Science
Chapter 14, “Revolution Is the Locomotive of History,” builds on earlier chapters of “The Logic of Politics” written by a group of Shanghai-based political scientists led by current Politburo member and party ideologue Wang Huning in the early 1990s to argue that the coming of revolution is no accident. Revolution is a historically necessary form of political action when economic and social progress are blocked because the system of property and economic relations no longer suit new circumstances. Revolution liberates society from outdated constraints and frees it for further development. In class-based societies, this means overthrowing the ruling class tied to a particular system of economic relations. Thus “revolution as the locomotive of history” presents a strictly materialist: deep socioeconomic contradictions fuel political upheavals to create new relations of production. For the proletariat, this means ending exploitation and class divisions altogether.
Political and social revolutions have a dialectical relationship. Political revolution, centered on seizing state power, functions as a precondition that clears the way for social revolution by overthrowing the existing political “superstructure” protecting the old economic base. Only by transforming power relations can a new class dismantle the institutional defenses of old relations and protect new ones. Here it is stressed that “only social revolution is genuine,” as true revolution changes political, economic and social relations. Bourgeois revolutions, which can expand relations already germinating within the old order, must not be confused with proletarian revolutions that use newly won political power to establish socialist economic relations and deepen the transformation of society.
What then are the conditions for the success of a revolution? A revolution requires two kinds of conditions, objective and subjective. Objectively, a “revolutionary situation” produced by a systemic crisis and subjectively, mass revolutionary action capable of exploiting that situation Special emphasis is placed on organization, building a united front, and the guiding role of a highly disciplined party informed by the social scientific theory of Marxism. Revolution entails the transfer of state power.
As a rule, the new social order is established through violence. Engels thought it just barely possible that a peaceful path to proletarian rule might open under certain historical circumstances. Lenin thought with the age of imperialism the chance of peaceful transition had entirely disappeared. Either way, violent revolution is still the way to displace entrenched power and to replace with a new political order that will make social transformation possible.
The Logic of Politics: Principles of Marxist Political Science translated in full with citations to sources and context to sources added:
The Chinese text of Chapter Fourteen follows the English translation.
Chapter 14: Revolution Is the Locomotive of History
Revolution is an inevitable political action in the historical development of human society. The contradictory movement between the productive forces and the relations of production is the basic driving force of social development. When the old relations of production obstruct the development of the productive forces, it becomes a historical necessity for new relations of production to replace them. At such a time, revolution also becomes unavoidable. The ultimate aim of revolution is to break free from the constraints of the old relations of production and liberate the productive forces. In a class-based society, every form of class rule is based on specific relations of production. Therefore, a revolution that replaces old relations of production with new ones must first overthrow the old ruling class domination and seize political power.
Political power is the fundamental question of revolution, especially for a proletarian revolution, which aims to abolish private ownership and establish public ownership. A political revolution that overthrows the old class rule and seizes state power is a prerequisite for a social revolution.
In the final analysis, a political revolution is undertaken for the sake of a social revolution, whose purpose is to establish new relations of production. Revolution has its conditions, so if one wishes to achieve success, one must actively create the conditions necessary for a revolutionary situation to form. While violent revolution is the general rule, seizing power by peaceful means is still possible. The ultimate goal of the proletarian revolution is to abolish all systems of exploitation, classes, and class distinctions and realize communism.
Section One Revolution Means Emancipating the Productive Forces
I. Revolution is the highest form of political action
In the spring of 1845, Marx wrote in his notebook the famous Theses on Feuerbach. This concise yet profound set of theses was the crystallization of Marx’s long reflection and research, and a special milestone in the course of his intellectual development. In 1888, Engels, speaking of these theses, wrote that
“these notes… are very valuable as the first document containing the brilliant germ of the new world outlook.”
Therefore, these theses had decisive significance for the subsequent development of Marx’s thought and for the establishment of his scientific theory and doctrine. In the last of these theses, Marx clearly stated the mission of his own theory and doctrine. He said:
“The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it.”
This means that Marxist theory and doctrine do not merely explain the world. They are a doctrine that aims to change the world. Thus the question of revolution naturally is one the major issues that Marxist political science is concerned with. In the Marxist view, revolution is an important means and method of changing the world, and a driving force of historical development.
Revolution is an inevitable political action in the historical development of human society—that is to say, it is precisely through such political action that human society advances step by step from lower forms to higher forms. In On Contradiction, Mao Zedong held that dialectical materialism is the philosophical foundation for Marx and Engels’s view that revolution as an inevitable political act in the course of social development. Mao said:
“When Marx and Engels applied the law of contradiction in things to the study of the process of social history, they discovered the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production, the contradiction between the exploiting classes and the exploited classes, and the contradiction between the economic base arising from these contradictions and the superstructure—political, ideological, and so on—and how these contradictions inevitably, in various different class societies, bring about various different social revolutions.”
Therefore, Marxism regards revolution as an inevitable political act in the course of the development of society since this political act is determined not by people’s subjective will, but instead by the laws governing contradictions in society. Marxism praises as progressive every revolutionary period that appears in history since its revolutionary nature is determined by the laws of social contradictions,
“because it is precisely in such periods that the many contradictions are resolved that had slowly accumulated during so-called peaceful periods of development. It is precisely in such periods that the direct role of the various different classes in determining the forms of social life is most powerfully displayed. This lays the foundations for the political superstructure that will thereafter remain fixed for a long time on the basis of renewed relations of production.”
What is a revolution? Lenin offered a clear explanation. He said:
“From the Marxist point of view, what exactly does revolution mean? It means smashing the obsolete political superstructure by force—that superstructure which, because it has come into contradiction with the new relations of production, must collapse at a certain moment.”
The main target of a revolution is to destroy the old political superstructure, and
The purpose of a revolution is to ultimately establish new relations of production.
Smashing the old political superstructure means overthrowing the old state power, and establishing new relations of production means fundamentally changing the form of relations in society. Therefore, Marxism holds that there are two main kinds of revolution: political and social. Marx said:
“Every revolution dissolves the old order of society; to that extent, it is social. Every revolution brings down the old ruling power; to that extent, it is political.”
Clearly, a political revolution is a fundamental transformation of the political system, while a social revolution is a fundamental transformation of the social forms and system—i.e., one advanced social system replacing a decayed one.
According to Marxism, a revolution is a political act involving the overthrow of the existing regime and the destruction of old social relations. Because this act brings about profound changes in social, economic, political, and cultural life, Engels also considered it the ultimate form of political action. He urged the proletariat to engage in revolution to achieve class rule. According to Marxism, this highest form of political action is the key to any class’s final victory in establishing its rule. As early as 1844, when discussing how the proletariat would establish socialism, Marx pointed out:
“Socialism cannot be realized without revolution. Socialism needs this political act because it needs to abolish and destroy the old.”
The lessons of the European revolutions of 1848–1849 further solidified Marx’s belief in this idea. After summarizing the class struggles in France from 1848 to 1850, Marx proclaimed the slogan,
Because classes differ in their nature and in their historical mission, the revolutionary actions taken by various classes seeking rule have different meanings. After a systematic study of history, Marx concluded that the proletariat’s revolution to achieve thoroughgoing emancipation and establish communism has dual significance for the proletariat:
First, through revolution, the proletariat becomes the ruling class.
Second, through revolution, the proletariat becomes the foundation of the future society.
In other words,
“revolution is necessary not only because there is no other way to overthrow the ruling class, but also because the class that overthrows it can only succeed in ridding itself of all the old filth and become fit to found society anew in revolution.”
Although Marx mainly emphasized the first significance in later concrete revolutionary practice, he never forgot the latter. In The Communist Manifesto, he clearly states that
“the communist revolution is the most radical rupture with traditional property relations.”
The core of this second significance of revolution is “a universal transformation of in people.” Therefore, proletarian revolution includes not only political and social revolution but also a corresponding process of proletarian self-improvement—transforming itself into new people with a fully developed communist consciousness. This self-improvement is a prerequisite for achieving communism.
The ultimate purpose of revolution is to liberate the productive forces.
Although revolution is a political action, the real cause of revolution does not lie in politics itself. Rather, it lies in economic changes in society and particularly in the struggle between the productive forces and the current relations of production.
In the course of historical development, productive forces are the most revolutionary and dynamic factor. They are continually changing and undergoing revolution. Marx said,
“A society can no more cease to produce than it can cease to consume.”
Engels once used Austria as an example to illustrate the relationship between productive development and social transformation.
“The introduction of machinery and steam into industry in Austria (as elsewhere) transformed the old social relations and conditions of life of all classes. It turned serfs into free men and small proprietors into industrial workers. It destroyed the old feudal handicraft guilds and the means of existence of many of their members.”
The development of productive forces inevitably leads to social transformation. However, this process does not occur automatically; rather, it requires a revolution. There are two elements of productive forces: the means of production and human beings. The development of productive forces involves changes and increases in the means of production, as well as the formation and growth of new classes that represent these forces. This development occurs within specific relations of production and is not subject to human will.
Marx wrote that when the productive forces under a given set of relations of production have matured and attempt to break through them, a contradiction emerges between the two. Marx wrote,
“At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production—or, what is merely a legal expression for the same thing, with the property relations within which they have been at work. These relations, which were once a form of development of the productive forces, turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution.”
Marx indicates not only the historical inevitability of this contradiction, but also that it will lead to social revolution.
The contradiction between the development of productive forces and the current relations of production means that the existing relations no longer fit the development of the productive forces and must be transformed or replaced. However, historical facts show that resolving this contradiction by changing the relations of production is not a simple, natural process. Rather, it must be accomplished through revolutionary action. Engels said:
“All revolutions up to now have been revolutions to protect one kind of property against another. They cannot protect one kind of property without violating another. In the French Revolution, for example, feudal property was sacrificed to protect bourgeois property. In Solon’s revolution, the property of creditors should have been damaged to protect the property of debtors.”
Clearly, without a social revolution, the old relations of production cannot exit the historical stage, and new relations of production cannot be established. The purpose of a social revolution is to liberate the productive forces that are steadily developing, yet constrained by the old relations of production so they can flourish under new ones.
A society’s economic base is constituted by the totality of its relations of production. This economic base determines the political superstructure. As Marx wrote,
“The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness.”
Therefore, any given set of social relations of production has corresponding social relations (in class societies, these are chiefly expressed in relations between classes) and a corresponding political superstructure. When the development of the productive forces urgently requires a change in the old relations of production, the old political superstructure also faces a crisis. However, in class societies, the ruling class, which holds political power, will not readily allow changes to the relations of production that determine its political rule in order to maintain its political rule. On the contrary, it often uses its power to consolidate and preserve the old relations of production and its political domination.
In such circumstances, the conflict between the productive forces and the relations of production is concentrated in the struggle between the oppressed class, which emerges alongside the development of the productive forces and represents new productive forces, and the ruling class, which occupies the dominant position within the old relations of production. The core of this struggle is state power, and its final resolution is often achieved through revolutionary violence. A revolution that fundamentally changes the nature of state power is a political revolution. The purpose of a political revolution is to use the new political power established to eliminate the old relations of production and establish new ones. As Stalin put it:
“On the basis of the conflict between the new productive forces and the old relations of production, and the new economic requirements of society, new social ideas arise. These new ideas organize and mobilize the masses, who then rally into a new political army. This army establishes a new revolutionary power and uses it to abolish the old order by force and establish a new one in the sphere of relations of production.”
Changes in ownership relations enable a greater liberation of the productive forces.
The above analysis shows that the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production causes revolution. While the ultimate resolution of this contradiction requires social revolution, political revolution should initiate the overall revolutionary process. The ultimate goal of a political revolution is to spark a social revolution that will fundamentally alter the existing relations of production, transition society into a new social formation, and further liberate the productive forces.
Section Two: The Fundamental Question of Revolution is State Power.
I. Revolution is a political act that overthrows the ruling class.
The basic driving force of revolution lies in the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production. In a class-based society, this contradiction inevitably manifests as conflict and struggle between the oppressed class, which represents new productive forces, and the ruling class, which occupies the dominant position within the old relations of production. This class conflict and class struggle often becomes the immediate cause of revolution.
The development of the productive forces is expressed in advances in production technology, an increase in the total stock of means of production, and the emergence and growth of new classes suited to those forces. Under the old relations of production, this newly formed class is oppressed. Thus, when a contradiction arises between the productive forces and the relations of production, conflict and struggle between the oppressed and oppressing classes arise as well. Revolution then begins to germinate within that struggle. After examining and analyzing the laws of motion of capitalism, Marx and Engels reached the following conclusion:
“In the course of their development, the productive forces reach a stage at which the productive forces and means of intercourse that have been brought into being can only bring about disasters under the existing relations. These productive forces are no longer a force of production, but rather a force of destruction, exemplified by machinery and money. At the same time, a class emerges that bears all the burdens of society without enjoying its advantages. This class is excluded from society and forced into antagonism with all other classes. It comprises the majority of society and gives rise to the consciousness of the necessity of a fundamental revolution—the communist consciousness—which may also arise among the other classes through contemplation of this class’s situation.”
In this conclusion, Marx and Engels expressed four ideas:
1. The development of the productive forces will create a new class.
2. Under the existing relations of production, this class is oppressed.
3. The contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production will intensify the antagonism between this class and the other classes, especially the ruling class.
4..This class antagonism will generate revolutionary consciousness.
They stated the same idea more explicitly in The Communist Manifesto. They said that the proletariat is a product of large-scale industry itself.
“The industrial progress that the bourgeoisie has unintentionally promoted and is powerless to resist replaces the workers’ isolation due to competition with their revolutionary combination due to association.”
Thus, as large-scale industry develops, the very foundation on which the bourgeoisie produces and appropriates products is undermined beneath its feet. Above all, it produces its own grave diggers.”
Thus, the new oppressed class, born alongside the development of production, becomes the revolutionary force that overthrows the old ruling class.
As representatives of new productive forces, any oppressed class will try to break through the old relations of production and political rule formed on that basis in order to develop further and become the dominant class in society. The emancipation of an oppressed class means creating a new society. Therefore, if an oppressed class wants to liberate itself, it must take political action to overthrow the ruling class. Without such action, the oppressed class cannot be emancipated and a new society cannot be established. Marx made this point explicitly: socialism cannot be realized without revolution. Socialism requires this kind of political action because it must abolish and destroy the old order.
As Marx wrote,
“Of all the instruments of production, the greatest productive power is the revolutionary class itself.”
When the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production drives society into an all-around crisis, the revolutionary class inevitably takes revolutionary action for its own liberation. The revolution’s first objective is to overthrow the ruling class that formed on the foundation of the old relations of production. Marx also said:
“The conditions under which definite productive forces can be applied are the conditions of the rule of a definite class of society…and therefore, every revolutionary struggle is directed against a class that has been in power until then.”
In guiding the revolutionary struggle of the Russian proletariat, Lenin put it plainly:
“Our revolutionary program consisted of one general item: the removal of the yoke of landowners and capitalists, the overthrow of their power, and the emancipation of working people from those exploiters.”
Throughout history, revolutions have been political actions aimed at overthrowing a ruling class. England’s bourgeois revolution resulted in the execution of Charles I; the French bourgeoisie proclaimed the complete collapse of the old feudal order while storming the Bastille; and the October Revolution in Russia drove the bourgeoisie from power amid the roar of guns firing on the Winter Palace. These examples confirm Mao Zedong’s famous line:
“A revolution is an insurrection, an act of violence by which one class overthrows another.”
II. The question of political power is the revolution’s top priority.
In a class society, every form of political superstructure is established on a specific economic foundation and is determined by it. Once a political superstructure takes shape, it is bound to serve the economic relations that constitute its foundation, actively helping those relations take form and become consolidated. The dependable force through which the political superstructure performs this service is political power. When analyzing modern capitalist society, Marx was blunt:
“Modern bourgeois property relations are ‘maintained’ by state power; the bourgeoisie establishes state power to defend its property relations.”
In a class-ruled society, this kind of political power is the tool by which the ruling class carries out its domination—it is the ruling class’s lifeline. Once they hold political power, they can use it to suppress resistance by the ruled classes, protect the economic base on which they depend, and maintain their political domination over the exploited classes. Conversely, if the ruling class loses political power, all their economic and political privileges will evaporate, and their rule will be overturned. This is why they cling desperately to state power.
Clearly, in a class society, the ruling class will not willingly relinquish state power. When the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production reaches a point where revolutionary transformation is unavoidable, the ruling class will inevitably use its political power to protect the old relations of production that form the basis of its existence. Therefore, any oppressed class trying to break through the old relations of production to win emancipation must engage the old ruling class in the fiercest struggle, with the focal point being the state’s political power. As Engels put it:
“In every struggle of class against class, the immediate aim of the struggle is political power. The ruling class defends its supreme political power—that is, its secure majority in the legislature. The ruled class first fights for a share of political power and then for all of it, so it can change existing laws according to its own interests and needs.”
Only by seizing the state power that firmly safeguards the old relations of production from the ruling class—and by overthrowing the old class—can the oppressed class disintegrate the old relations of production thoroughly and achieve final emancipation. Marx pointed out:
“It is impossible to emancipate the oppressed class without injuring the class that oppresses it and without simultaneously dismantling the entire state structure built on such a dismal social foundation.”
The nature and aims of class struggle dictate that, for any class seeking to become the ruling force and establish a new society, the initial revolutionary action must be to overthrow the existing ruling class and seize political power. Marx and Engels noted,
“Every class struggling for mastery — even the proletariat, whose mastery presupposes the abolition of the old form of society and of mastery itself — must first conquer political power to represent its interests as the general interest. Initially, it is forced to do so.”
Once state power has been seized, the oppressed class realizes its rule over society as a whole by rising to become the ruling class. For example, in Western Europe,
“in countries where the bourgeoisie has already conquered political power, political domination has become the domination of the bourgeoisie over society as a whole, and not the domination of individual bourgeois over their own workers.”
Therefore, whether a revolution succeeds or fails is primarily determined by whether it seizes state power. As Lenin pointed out, the most fundamental question in any revolution is the question of state power. When state power passes from one class to another, that is the first and most basic sign of a revolution.
The question of state power becomes the fundamental question of revolution for two reasons.
First, the oppressed class can only rise to become the ruling class and exercise social rule by taking hold of state power.
Second, the question of state power directly affects the revolution itself. This is mainly because no revolution is carried out by a single oppressed class acting alone.
In reality, when an oppressed class representing new productive forces moves to overthrow the ruling class, it must portray its interests as those of all members of society. At the same time, it must unite all non-ruling classes to mount the most powerful revolutionary action and overthrow the old ruling class.
Marx and Engels pointed out:
“Particularly in relations that have existed hitherto, when one class always ruled and the conditions of an individual’s life always coincided with a class’s conditions, the practical task of each newly emerging class appeared to each of its members as a universal task. Each class could overthrow its predecessor only by liberating individuals of all classes from chains that had fettered them. Under these circumstances, the task of individual members of a class striving for domination must be described as a universal human task.”
Engels believed that an alliance of different classes was a prerequisite for every revolution. Revolutions that cannot proceed without class alliances will have a state power outcome that determines the nature, course, and outcome of the entire revolution. During the European revolutions of 1848–1849, the working class was the main revolutionary force. However, due to objective and subjective constraints, the European working class was not yet mature enough for a socialist revolution. Consequently, from the outset, the workers were confined to aiding the bourgeoisie in seizing power. This behavior not only meant that the revolution was not socialist, but also sealed the workers’ fate as victims of the revolution.
Half a century later, Lenin fully absorbed the lessons of that revolution. While leading the revolutionary struggle in Russia, he emphasized the importance of the question of state power. After the Russian bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1905, he explicitly stated that, unlike the historical European revolutions, a proletariat-led revolution must not establish a bourgeois regime. He said:
“The revolution is recognized by all. The task now is to define which classes must build the new superstructure and how they will build it.” If this is not defined, the slogan ‘revolution’ is empty and meaningless at the present time….”
Throughout the Russian Revolution, Lenin insisted that the proletariat hold revolutionary leadership. Based on this belief, he actively promoted the establishment of proletarian organs of state power. After June 1906, when workers’ deputies’ soviets were successively established in major Russian cities and industrial regions amid working-class struggles, Lenin immediately recognized their significance. He praised them and their activity highly. He also drew theoretical conclusions from their activity.
Lenin believed that the soviets were the embryo of a new revolutionary state power. He thought that, with an uprising’s victory, they would transform from organs of armed insurrection into a revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. He regarded the formation of these organizations as the beginning of seizing power and establishing a revolutionary democratic dictatorship of workers and peasants. He regarded them as the first shoots of a new type of state organ. In later revolutions, the Russian proletariat achieved final victory and founded a socialist state based on the dictatorship of the proletariat by relying on these very same soviets.
Treating the question of state power as the fundamental question of every revolution is a basic idea in Marxist revolutionary theory. This idea’s core value is that the transfer and final destination of state power determine not only whether a revolution succeeds or fails, but also its overall nature, process, and outcome. For this reason, while guiding the Russian Revolution, Lenin repeatedly warned that one cannot evade the question of state power or act as if it does not matter in class struggle and political revolution.
“Marxism recognizes a fully developed, ‘nation-wide’ class struggle only if it embraces not merely politics, but also the most significant aspect of politics: the organization of state power.”
Lenin argued that a class that does not understand the importance of state power cannot participate consciously in a revolution, let alone lead one. The history of the October Revolution shows that the Bolsheviks’ final victory was achieved precisely because they held fast to this fundamental question of revolution.
III. The Proletarian Revolution
The proletarian revolution must first seize state power.
The proletariat’s historical mission determines the nature, tasks, and goals of the proletarian revolution. In the Afterword to the second German edition of Capital, Marx succinctly described this mission: to overthrow the capitalist mode of production and ultimately abolish all classes. This is the greatest historical mission in human history. Accordingly, the proletarian revolution will be the broadest, deepest, and most thoroughgoing revolution in history.
“To accomplish this social revolution, the proletariat must seize power because it will put them in a position of authority, enabling them to remove every obstacle on the road to their great aim.”
Like all previous class revolutions in history, the proletarian revolution must first seize political power. Engels said:
“At the same time, we have always held the view that to attain the aims of the future social revolution and other, far more important aims, the working class must first take possession of the organized political power of the state. With its help, they must crush the resistance of the capitalist class and reorganize society on a new basis.”
In terms of its historical mission, however, the proletarian revolution’s seizure of power is of special importance, unlike any other class revolution. All previous social revolutions, except for the transition from primitive communal ownership to slavery, have merely replaced one form of private ownership with another. In contrast, the proletarian revolution aims to eliminate private ownership altogether and establish a society based on public ownership of the means of production. Nevertheless, socialist relations of production cannot arise within capitalist society. Only by seizing power and using force can the proletariat expropriate the bourgeoisie’s means of production and establish a socialist economic system.
Furthermore, since the proletarian revolution aims to abolish all systems of exploitation, classes, and distinctions, it faces more formidable and self-assured enemies than any other revolution in history. Only by seizing power and relying on force can the proletariat suppress the resistance of the exploiters through revolutionary violence and consolidate the new social system. For the proletariat, seizing state power from the bourgeoisie is the primary sign of victory in the proletarian revolution.
The proletariat must first seize state power. However, their historical mission is such that
“the working class cannot simply take hold of the ready-made state machinery and use it for its own purposes.”
Marx developed this idea through a thorough analysis of the Paris Commune’s experience. There are two aspects to this idea: the old state machine must be transformed, and a new kind of democratic proletarian state must be built. This is the unavoidable road by which the proletariat achieves complete emancipation. During the Paris Commune’s revolutionary practice, the destruction of the old state machine and the establishment of a new one occurred almost simultaneously.
Marx’s idea had already taken an initial shape in his summary of the European revolutions of 1848–1849. At that time, Marx believed that the bourgeois state machine should be smashed with revolutionary violence to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat. His clear statement of this idea was based on a scientific analysis of the experiences and lessons of those revolutions.
First, by analyzing the class character of France’s February Republic and the lessons of the Paris workers’ June uprising defeat, Marx revealed that, no matter its form, the bourgeois state suppresses the proletariat. One cannot indulge the illusion that the bourgeois state can serve the proletariat. Marx concluded that the defeat of the June uprising proved:
“The bourgeois republic means the unlimited despotism of one class over the others.”
Within the framework of such a republic, the slightest improvement in the proletariat’s position is a fantasy, let alone relying on it to achieve emancipation. Therefore, Marx believed that the demands the proletariat had originally tried to force the February Republic to meet should be replaced by a bold revolutionary battle cry: “Overthrow the bourgeoisie! A Dictatorship of the working class!”
Second, after analyzing the historical evolution of the French bourgeois state, Marx argued that bourgeois revolutions replace one system of exploitation with another. They do not need to destroy the old state apparatus; they only need to take control of it and adapt it to suit their rule. For the proletariat to win emancipation, it must concentrate all its forces against this power. In his 1871 letter to Ludwig Kugelmann, Marx made this point explicit:
“In the final chapter of The Eighteenth Brumaire, I state that the next phase of the French Revolution must dismantle the bureaucratic-military apparatus rather than merely transferring it from one group to another. This is the precondition for any genuine people’s revolution on the continent.”
The conclusion that the proletariat must destroy the old state apparatus through revolutionary violence reveals the fundamental difference between proletarian and bourgeois revolutions. It is one of the fundamental Marxist principles regarding the state and revolution. By 1871, when Marx summarized the Paris Commune’s revolutionary experience, he developed this conclusion into the statement that:
“The proletariat cannot simply take hold of the existing state apparatus and use this ready-made tool to achieve its own goals.”
This statement is consistent with the earlier conclusion that, after winning the proletarian revolution, the proletariat cannot simply seize and operate the existing state apparatus to achieve its aims. However, unlike the earlier formulation, it does not stress that the old state machine must be smashed by violent means without exception; rather, it emphasizes the principle that the old state machine cannot be used as is. In Marx’s view, his emphasis on violently smashing the old state machine was mainly directed at the substantial bureaucratic and military apparatus of the European bourgeoisie, led by France.
As seen in his 1871 letter to Ludwig Kugelmann, Marx confined the conclusion about violently smashing the old state machine to continental Europe and did not treat it as the only method. In countries like Britain, where the capitalist economy and bourgeois democratic institutions were relatively developed and the military-bureaucratic apparatus was relatively weak,
If you read the final chapter of my The Eighteenth of Brumaire, you will see that I believe the next attempt at the French Revolution should no longer transfer the bureaucratic military apparatus from the hands of some to others, as before, but should smash it—this is precisely the precondition for any genuine people’s revolution on the continent.
The idea that the proletariat must destroy the existing state apparatus through revolutionary violence highlights the fundamental distinction between proletarian and bourgeois revolutions. It is one of the fundamental Marxist principles regarding the state and revolution. By 1871, when Marx summarized the Paris Commune’s revolutionary experience, this conclusion had evolved into the statement:
“The proletariat cannot simply take hold of the existing state apparatus and use this ready-made instrument to achieve its own ends.”
This statement is consistent with the earlier conclusion that, after winning the proletarian revolution, the proletariat cannot simply seize and operate the existing state apparatus to achieve its aims. However, unlike the earlier conclusion, this formulation does not emphasize that the old state machine must be destroyed by violent means. Rather, it emphasizes the principle that the old state machine cannot be used straightforwardly.
As the above analysis shows, the idea that the proletariat must destroy the old state apparatus and establish their revolutionary dictatorship is Marx and Engels’s conclusion from the experience of proletarian revolutionary struggles. Guided by this principle, the Russian October Revolution achieved a final victory. Under the leadership of Lenin and the Bolshevik Party, the Russian proletariat smashed the old state machine of Tsarist Russia’s warlord and bureaucratic systems. They established a Soviet state of proletarian dictatorship. Thus, the state transformed from an instrument by which a few exploiters oppressed the majority into an instrument by which the majority ruled the few.
Similarly, the Chinese Revolution also won under the guidance of this principle. Mao Zedong led China’s revolutionary struggle based on Marxist revolutionary theory and focused the objective of the struggle on overthrowing the counterrevolutionary dictatorship of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie. The Chinese Revolution’s victory was achieved by thoroughly smashing the old state machine—the military, bureaucracy, and secret police—that enforced the counterrevolutionary dictatorship and establishing proletarian political power.
Section Three: Political Revolution Develops into Social Revolution
Political revolution is the prerequisite for social revolution
The laws governing socio-historical development show that when the development of productive forces cannot advance without changing existing relations of production, a sharp contradiction is triggered that will inevitably lead to a large-scale revolution. This contradiction is resolved through the revolution. Human history advances through the repeated resolution of this contradiction. The essence of every revolution in history is changing the relations of production. However, every set of relations of production has its own political superstructure, which is determined and adapted by those relations. Once formed, the political superstructure actively protects and consolidates those relations of production.
Therefore, when the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production reaches the point at which changing the old relations of production through revolutionary means is the only alternative, the first target the revolution inevitably encounters is the old political superstructure that protects the old relations of production. In other words, a social revolution that changes the relations of production and establishes new ones must begin with a political revolution that fundamentally changes the political superstructure. This is precisely why Marx believed that political revolution is the prerequisite for social revolution.
However, in terms of political revolutions, they are the inevitable outcome of social revolutions. A social revolution, whose main objective is to transform old relations of production and establish new ones, is a large-scale event that occurs over an extended period. When productive forces reach a certain stage of development and conflict with the existing relations of production within which they operate, an era of social revolution begins. The political revolution that occurs during this time is the result of the growing sharpness of that contradiction. Therefore, every political revolution in history is the result of a particular social revolution’s emergence and development.
Thus, the bourgeois social revolution began within feudal society itself, which objectively required a corresponding bourgeois political revolution because the growth of bourgeois economic power demanded political domination. Likewise, the material conditions for the proletariat’s social revolution are formed within capitalist society. These material conditions—
“industrial progress, which the bourgeoisie produces involuntarily and cannot resist”—
make the transformation of the mode of production and the abolition of its capitalist character absolutely necessary. They also drive the conflict between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie to the point where the proletariat cannot emancipate itself without seizing political power through revolution. This kind of political revolution corresponds to the new social revolution triggered by the development of large-scale industry in capitalist society.
A political revolution is the premise and precondition of a social revolution. In other words, a social revolution must have a political revolution pave the way for it. Without a political revolution first, achieving the final victory of a social revolution is extremely difficult. The core task of a political revolution is seizing state power and establishing a new political regime. As a product of class antagonism, political revolution is a central theme of social-historical development in class societies.
“Only when there are no classes or class antagonisms will social evolution cease to be political revolution.”
In a class-based society, class struggles are primarily fought for economic interests, but the immediate target is political power because it is a means of advancing economic interests. Victorious classes will do everything possible to protect their economic interests and privileges using the power in their hands. Marx said:
“Modern bourgeois property relations are ‘maintained’ by state power; the bourgeoisie establishes state power to defend its property relations.”
This essential relationship between economics and politics means that a social revolution aimed at changing economic relations can hardly be carried out thoroughly without first carrying out a political revolution to transform state power. It also means that a class seeking emancipation and a new society can hardly achieve a comprehensive transformation without first making a political revolution.
“To transform the world, you need political power.”
The proletarians themselves must become power, and first of all, revolutionary power.” Only by seizing power can the proletariat carry out a thorough social revolution.
Lenin stated it plainly:
“To effect this social revolution, the proletariat must win political power, which will make it master of the situation and enable it to remove all obstacles along the road to its great goal. In this sense, the dictatorship of the proletariat is an essential political condition of the social revolution.”
“There is still a great deal of ignorance and lack of consciousness in the peasant movement. Any illusion about this is extremely dangerous. The peasant’s ignorance first shows itself in not understanding the political direction of the movement—that is, in not understanding that without fundamental democratic reforms to the entire political system of the country, it is impossible to reliably expand land ownership.”
“We must plainly and definitely tell the peasants that if they want to carry out the agrarian revolution, they must also carry out the political revolution. Otherwise, there will be no lasting agrarian revolution, and perhaps none at all. Without a complete democratic revolution and the election of government officials by the people, there will be either peasant disturbances or Constitutional Democratic Party (Cadet) agrarian reforms.”
Lenin’s position aligned with Marx and Engels’s fundamental understanding of the relationship between political and social revolutions. This line of thinking paved the way for the ultimate victory of the October Revolution.
A political revolution is a prerequisite for a social revolution. A social revolution must clear a path for itself through a political revolution. Both the proletarian and bourgeois revolutions unfold according to this logic. This is fully confirmed by the social revolution that occurred in British history and was of great significance to the development of human history.
Between January and March of 1844, Engels wrote three articles analyzing social conditions in Britain, essentially one per month. In these articles, Engels argued that the eighteenth century was the century of revolution. On the European continent, the old world was destroyed in that revolutionary century. Yet, Britain remained outwardly calm, and neither the state nor the church underwent any change. However, beneath that calm exterior, Britain was undergoing a transformation of greater significance than any other country—a social revolution.
Although Britain’s social revolution at that time was the result of the union of the various branches of knowledge with practice—which had already taken on a scientific form in the eighteenth century—and France’s political revolution was the result of the union of the sciences with philosophy, one must not conclude that Britain’s social revolution lacked political revolutionary preconditions. On the contrary, Engels maintained that this social revolution, which became a mass movement in the eighteenth century, was fundamentally the outcome of the bourgeois political revolution carried out by Britain’s bourgeoisie in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Engels said:
“The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries created all the preconditions for the social revolution. They abolished medieval institutions, established a Protestant way of thinking in terms of society, politics, and religion, founded colonies and a navy for Britain, and placed the rising—already fairly strong—bourgeoisie alongside the aristocracy.”
Even though the political revolution carried out by the British bourgeoisie in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was incomplete, the bourgeoisie achieved their goal of seizing political power and reshaping the old political superstructure. This secured the bourgeoisie’s position of power and enabled their development, while also providing the conditions for Britain’s social revolution. Britain’s revolutionary process demonstrates that no revolution in the world has ever realized a social revolution without first carrying out a political revolution.
The entire history of the bourgeoisie’s struggle against feudal society unfolded in this way. Engels provided a detailed description of it in The Principles of Communism:
“Wherever large-scale industry has supplanted manufacture, the Industrial Revolution has maximized the wealth and power of the bourgeoisie, making it the dominant class in the country. Wherever this has happened, the bourgeoisie has seized political power and displaced the former ruling classes—the aristocracy, the guild masters, and the absolute monarchs who represented them. The bourgeoisie abolished primogeniture and laws prohibiting the sale of landed estates. It also abolished the nobility’s privileges, destroying the power of the privileged, landed aristocracy. It abolished all guilds and the privileges of craftsmen, shattering the guild masters’ arrogance. In their place, it introduced free competition. Under this system, anyone has the right to enter any field, and the only thing that can prevent them from doing so is a lack of necessary capital. Thus, free competition amounts to an open declaration that, because members of society possess unequal amounts of capital, they are unequal. Capital becomes the decisive power, and capitalists—the bourgeoisie—become the first class in society.
Capitalist relations of production had already begun to take shape within feudal society. Once the bourgeoisie seized state power and shattered the old social relations, those embryonic capitalist relations immediately burst forth. In seeking comprehensive domination over society, the bourgeoisie staged sweeping and dramatic scenes of social revolution. For this reason, Lenin held that:
“One of the fundamental differences between a bourgeois revolution and a socialist revolution is that, for a bourgeois revolution arising out of feudalism, the new economic organizations are gradually created within the old order, changing all aspects of feudal society gradually. The bourgeois revolution faced only one task: to sweep away, cast aside, and destroy all the fetters of the preceding social order. Any bourgeois revolution that has fulfilled this task has fulfilled all that it was called upon to do; it has strengthened the development of capitalism.”
In short, once the bourgeois revolution has seized power, it can carry out a social revolution based on perfecting and developing the existing relations of production.
The ultimate goal of the proletarian revolution is to completely overthrow the capitalist mode of production and, ultimately, abolish classes altogether. Therefore, the proletariat must not only carry out a political revolution, but also a social revolution. However, this revolutionary process differs from that of the bourgeoisie. As early as The Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels set out a clear design for the revolutionary process, proceeding from the proletariat’s historical mission:
“The first step in the revolution by the working class is to raise the proletariat to the position of ruling class, to win the battle of democracy. The proletariat will use its political supremacy to gradually take all capital from the bourgeoisie, centralizing all instruments of production in the hands of the state—that is, the proletariat organized as the ruling class—and increasing the total productive forces as rapidly as possible. Of course, in the beginning, this cannot be achieved except by making despotic inroads on the rights of property and the conditions of bourgeois production. These measures appear insufficient and untenable economically, but they outstrip themselves in the course of the movement and necessitate further inroads on the old social order. They are unavoidable as a means of entirely revolutionizing the mode of production.”
This revolutionary process demonstrates that seizing state power is the first step of the proletarian revolution—but only the beginning of the revolution as a whole. Unlike the bourgeois revolution, reaching this point does not mean that everything necessary has been accomplished. The relations of production that the proletariat aims to establish do not exist in embryonic form before the seizure of power. Rather, they begin to be established only after power is taken.
However, establishing socialist relations of production cannot be achieved simply by relying on state power in the hands of the proletariat. It requires a material foundation formed within capitalist society. The weaker the foundation, the harder it is to establish these relations. Thus, Lenin argued:
“The more backward the country that, due to historical circumstances, is the one to start the socialist revolution, the more difficult it is for that country to transition from capitalist to socialist relations. New, incredibly difficult organizational tasks are added to the tasks of destruction.”
Without the establishment of socialist relations of production, there can be no talk of a socialist revolution. However, without the positive, progressive forces generated by a socialist revolution, the political power that has already been won cannot be consolidated or developed further. As soon as the October Revolution in Russia triumphed, Lenin pointed out that the Bolshevik Party and the Soviet state must actively establish
“an extremely intricate and delicate system of new organizational relationships extending to the planned production and distribution of goods for tens of millions of people.”
“In order to defeat capitalism, it is first necessary to overthrow the exploiters and establish the power of the exploited. This means accomplishing the task of overthrowing the exploiters through revolutionary forces. Second, it is necessary to accomplish the constructive task of establishing new economic relations and setting an example of how this should be done. These two aspects of accomplishing a socialist revolution are indissolubly connected and distinguish our revolution from all previous ones, which never went beyond the destructive aspect.”
China’s socialist revolution also began on the basis of relatively underdeveloped productive forces. After seizing state power, the Chinese Communist Party spent a considerable period of time transforming the old forms of ownership and establishing new relations of production in order to carry out the socialist revolution. Only after the socialist transformation of capitalist industry and commerce was basically completed in 1957 did Mao Zedong say,
“Our fundamental task has changed from freeing the productive forces to protecting and developing them under the new relations of production.”
In summary, the ultimate aim of a bourgeois or proletarian revolution is social revolution. Therefore, only social revolution is revolution in the full sense of the term. However, the process by which these two classes transition from political to social revolution differs. After a political revolution, the bourgeoisie can proceed with a social revolution based on relations of production that have begun to take shape and are free.
By contrast, after carrying out a political revolution, the proletariat must use the state power it has seized to destroy the old relations of production while establishing new ones, thereby carrying out a broad and profound social revolution. The weaker the material foundation and the more backward the economy of the country in which the proletariat finds itself, the greater the difficulty in carrying out a social revolution.
Section 4: A revolution requires both subjective and objective conditions
I. A revolutionary situation is created by the sum of objective conditions
Revolution is a necessity in social historical movements. Its fundamental cause lies in the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production. However, when it comes to concrete revolutionary action, every revolution occurs under specific historical conditions. In other words, a particular revolution arises when certain conditions are present. These conditions include the objective and subjective conditions for revolution. Without both of these basic conditions, revolution will be impossible. AsMarx [Translator’s Note: and Engels] noted in The German Ideology:
“Whether the periodically recurring revolutionary upheavals are strong enough to overthrow the basis of everything that exists depends… If the material elements of a complete revolution are not present—namely, on the one hand, the existing productive forces and, on the other hand, the formation of a revolutionary mass that revolts not only against the existing conditions of society but also against the existing ‘production of life’ itself and the ‘total activity’ on which it was based—then, as the history of communism proves, it is absolutely immaterial whether the idea of this revolution has been expressed a hundred times already.”
From this passage, we can see that the development of the productive forces is the core of the objective conditions for revolution, while the formation of the revolutionary class forces is the core of the subjective conditions.
The development of the productive forces is the most important factor in creating the objective conditions for a revolution. Productive forces are the most revolutionary force; once they reach a certain level, they inevitably come into conflict with the existing relations of production. As this contradiction intensifies, an economic crisis first emerges, followed by a political crisis. When these crises drive society to a point where drastic political action is unavoidable, a revolutionary situation emerges.
The outbreak of the European revolutions of 1848, for example, was closely tied to the general crisis in British industry and commerce at the time. As Marx wrote,
“Since the beginning of the eighteenth century, there has been no serious revolution in Europe that has not been preceded by a commercial and financial crisis. The revolution of 1789 was preceded by such a crisis, as was the revolution of 1848.”
France’s defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 plunged the decaying Bonapartist government into a comprehensive crisis that set off the Paris Commune Revolution. As demonstrated by every revolution,
“crisis is one of the most powerful levers of political upheaval.”
A thorough political and economic crisis can create a revolutionary situation because, in a class-based society, such a crisis leads to an all-out confrontation between the ruling and ruled classes. Once that all-encompassing class confrontation emerges, revolution becomes inevitable. Mao Zedong explained it as follows:
“In human history, class antagonism exists, which is a particular manifestation of the struggle of contradictions.”
The contradiction between the exploiting and exploited classes—whether in slave, feudal, or capitalist societies—takes the form of the long-term coexistence of two mutually contradictory classes within the same society. They struggle against each other, but only when the contradiction between the two classes develops to a certain stage does it assume the form of open antagonism and develop into revolution.” This “certain stage” is, in reality, the stage of comprehensive class confrontation brought about by an all-around political and economic crisis.
The intensifying conflict between the productive forces and the relations of production results in an all-encompassing economic and political crisis. Together with the resulting comprehensive class confrontation, these factors produce a revolutionary situation. The emergence of this situation indicates that the objective conditions for a revolution have matured. Lenin held that a revolutionary situation has three main features:
The ruling class cannot continue ruling in the same way. A crisis “at the top,” or a political crisis within the ruling class, creates an opening through which the anger and dissatisfaction of the oppressed classes can emerge. However, merely having the lower classes unwilling to live in the old way is not usually enough for a revolution; for a revolution to occur, it is also necessary for the upper classes to be unable to live in the old way.
The poverty and suffering of the oppressed classes become exacerbated beyond the usual level.
As a result of the above, the activity of the masses rises sharply. In “peaceful” times, they endure exploitation in silence. However, in turbulent times, theerall crisis situation and “the upper classes” themselves compel them to take independent, historically significant action.
Lenin argued that a revolutionary situation must have these features for revolution to be possible:
“Without a revolutionary situation, there can be no revolution.”
According to Marxism, once the world market has formed and expanded to the point that every country’s production and consumption are global in nature, revolution can no longer be considered the result of a single country’s internal development. Thus, the emergence of a revolutionary situation in any country is shaped by international objective conditions. These conditions include the fundamental structure of international political and economic relations and the political and economic circumstances of countries closely connected to the country in question. As Marx and Engels pointed out:
“All historical conflicts have their origin in the contradiction between the productive forces and the form of intercourse. Moreover, for a conflict to occur in a particular country, it is not necessary for this contradiction to have developed to its utmost extreme in that country itself. Competition brought about by extensive intercourse with more industrialized countries is sufficient to produce similar contradictions in less industrialized countries. For example, the latent proletariat in Germany was brought into view by the competition of English industry.”
In fact, developed countries can influence less developed ones, and under certain conditions, problems arising in less developed countries can trigger crises and revolutions in developed countries. In Revolution in China and Europe, Marx analyzed the impact of the Taiping movement in China on Britain and Europe. He argued that the Taiping movement would present Britain with several problems.
First, China’s tea exports would decline and tea prices would rise. Consequently, Britain would have to spend more gold and silver to purchase this major consumer good.
Second, Britain’s cotton and woolen textiles would face a sharp contraction in the Chinese market.
Meanwhile, Western Europe was facing rising prices for meat, grain, and all other agricultural products due to poor harvests. These adverse factors, piling up on top of each other, would push British industry and commerce—already well advanced through most of a normal business cycle—toward crisis.
“One may boldly predict that the Chinese Revolution will ignite the spark that sets off the explosion of the mines within the modern industrial system, triggering the eruption of a long-brewing general crisis. Once that crisis spreads abroad, a political revolution will follow on the European continent.”
These two examples demonstrate that once economies become interconnected, the maturation of the objective conditions for revolution in a given country depends not only on its own economy and politics, but also on economic and political factors in the world at large and in other countries.
II. Revolution requires powerful mass revolutionary action
According to Marxism, revolution requires a revolutionary situation created by objective conditions as well as the subjective conditions necessary to seize that situation for revolution, namely powerful mass revolutionary action. Without such action, a revolutionary situation will not automatically transform into revolutionary action that overthrows the old society. In such circumstances, society will continue to decay, sometimes for as long as a decade or more. Therefore, whether a revolution can truly erupt depends on people’s actions and their strength. World history has repeatedly shown that the appearance of a revolutionary situation does not necessarily mean that a thunderous revolutionary drama will immediately follow. A revolutionary situation only indicates that the objective conditions for revolution have ripened and that revolution is possible. Beyond that, it cannot determine anything else. Lenin illustrated this point with concrete examples. He said:
“Such a situation existed in Russia in 1905 and in all revolutionary periods in the West. It also existed in Germany in the 1960s and in Russia from 1859 to 1861 and from 1879 to 1880, though no revolution occurred in those cases. Why was that? It is not every revolutionary situation that gives rise to a revolution. A revolution arises only out of a situation in which the aforementioned objective changes are accompanied by a subjective change: the ability of the revolutionary class to take mass action strong enough to overthrow the old government. A government never falls, even in a period of crisis, unless it is toppled.”
A revolution truly getting underway requires powerful, widespread revolutionary action. Such a situation depends on two factors: the awakening and consciousness of the masses themselves and the efforts of revolutionaries—i.e., the advanced elements or leaders of the revolution—to unite and win over all revolutionary forces. These two factors are closely linked.
Raising mass consciousness hinges on the masses’ understanding of the revolutionary situation and their identification with revolutionary action. Social being determines consciousness. In other words, improvements in the masses’ understanding and acceptance of the revolution depend first and foremost on the impact an actual social crisis has on them. The deeper the impact, the more readily revolutionary enthusiasm and consciousness are formed. The real condition of social crisis is the decisive factor. As Lenin put it:
“Millions of people cannot be ordered to make a revolution. They will rise up in revolution only when reduced to utter destitution—when they can no longer live—and when the pressure and resolve of millions upon millions can smash all the old obstacles and create a new life.”
Next, raising mass revolutionary consciousness depends on the education and agitation carried out by the revolutionary vanguard. Engels argued that, like the French Revolution, Germany’s bourgeois revolution benefited from a philosophical revolution that preceded it. France’s great thinkers enlightened people’s minds for the coming revolution, allowing history to stage the most thoroughgoing revolution. Similarly, the proletarian revolution requires the working class to enlighten the masses. Lenin stated explicitly:
“The great task of the working class is to enlighten all the democratic masses with revolutionary consciousness, educate them in struggle, and lead them in a fierce onslaught.”
The awakening of the masses and their revolutionary consciousness are key factors in determining whether a revolution can proceed and achieve final victory. Lenin listed this factor as the first element that makes revolution a reality. He said:
“For a revolution to take place, it is essential that a majority of workers—or at least a majority of class-conscious, thinking, and politically active workers—fully realize that revolution is necessary and be prepared to die for it.”
Lenin believed that if this condition is not present, one must not act rashly, but rather be patient and work actively. He said:
“In a small-peasant country, as long as the overwhelming majority of the population has not realized the necessity of a socialist revolution, the proletarian party cannot aim to ‘introduce’ socialism.”
Forming a powerful, mass revolutionary movement requires revolutionary consciousness among the masses and efforts by advanced revolutionaries to unite and organize all positive societal forces. This unity and organization begins with unity and organization within the revolutionary class itself. Next, it involves mobilizing and winning over every positive force in society.
When Lenin led the Russian Revolution, he explicitly made this point:
“If the proletariat throughout Russia can unite closely and rouse every genuinely revolutionary social stratum among the people—those willing to fight and unwilling to compromise—and prepare well for battle, then victory will surely belong to the proletariat.”
While Marxism emphasizes proletarian unity, it also places great importance on building the worker-peasant alliance and constructing a united front. Summing up the experience of the 1848 revolutions, Marx advanced the brilliant idea of establishing a worker-peasant alliance. He pointed out that, before the revolution mobilized and drew the peasantry close to the proletariat, the proletariat could not overthrow the capitalist system. The proletariat’s “solo” would inevitably turn into the “lonely cry of a wild goose.” Lenin developed this idea into a rigorous theoretical system in the October Revolution.
Marxism also places great importance on establishing and developing a revolutionary united front. In The Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels outline the principle that one can—and must—form alliances with all possible allies to oppose a common enemy, depending on the circumstances. In “Left-Wing” Communism: An Infantile Disorder, Lenin further developed this idea, arguing that the proletariat must make every possible effort and seize every opportunity to win over a large number of allies. The Chinese Communist Party, led by Comrade Mao Zedong, took it a step further, considering the development of the people’s democratic united front one of the three “magic weapons” for victory in the Chinese revolution.
III. Revolution requires a political party and theory
Revolution is a political action to overthrow the ruling class. Whether that action succeeds depends largely on a conscious class and conscious masses and the powerful revolutionary force formed on that basis. According to Marxism, in a proletarian revolution, the proletariat must have its own political party and revolutionary theory in order to constitute itself as a class and unite the broad laboring masses for revolutionary action.
For a proletarian revolution, building a party has four main purposes:
First, it enables the proletariat to act as a class. Marx pointed out:
“In its struggle against the collective power of the propertied classes, the working class cannot act as a class except by forming an independent political party opposed to all the old parties formed by the propertied classes.”
This is because once the working class has its own party, it will have a core around which it can unite. Under the party’s guidance, the working class can recognize and understand its position, mission, and goals. Marxism holds that a genuine proletarian party is a conscious class party—a party that understands the conditions, course, and general results of the proletarian movement and consistently represents its overall interests throughout that movement.
Second, the party unites the forces of the proletarian revolution to the greatest extent possible. A proletarian party is an organization of advanced elements. Its advanced and revolutionary character enables it to understand the revolutionary situation, process, and goals better than the broad laboring masses during a revolution. At the same time, the proletarian party represents the interests of the proletariat and the laboring masses during the revolution. These factors determine that, in the revolutionary process, the proletarian party can unite all revolutionary forces to the greatest possible extent.
Third, given the specific features of the situation, the party proposes revolutionary strategies and tasks. During a revolutionary period, life is like a torrent; objective conditions change swiftly and dramatically. Under these circumstances, formulating or revising revolutionary strategies and tasks in a timely manner becomes the key to victory. Only the party can do this, as it is the core of the class and the leader of the entire revolution. In practice, the proletarian party is the most resolute force that consistently drives the movement forward. In theory, it understands the conditions, course, goals, and tasks of the proletarian revolution.
Fourth, the party transforms revolution into organized political action. Lenin held that a victorious social revolution requires two conditions: a high level of development of the productive forces and a mature proletariat ready for the struggle. The latter chiefly includes a well-trained proletariat, strict political organization, and a clear understanding of its tasks and how to accomplish them. Only a prepared and mature proletariat can undertake the strongest and most effective revolutionary action—organized political action. The foremost sign of such maturity is the existence of a powerful party.
As the above analysis shows, the proletarian party is essential to transforming a revolutionary situation into a powerful revolutionary force. Not only does a proletarian party help bring together forces converging on the same goal, but it also ensures that this force can actively drive the revolution forward in line with the distinctive features of the revolutionary situation at different stages. This reduces setbacks and failures along the way.
The most powerful tool a proletarian party has for uniting and leading revolutionary forces is revolutionary theory. Lenin pointed out:
“Without revolutionary theory, there can be no great liberation movement in the world —the liberation movement of the oppressed class, the most revolutionary class in history.”
V. I. Lenin, The Voice of an Honest French Socialist, Published: Kommunist No. 1–2, 1915. Signed: N. Lenin. Published according to the text in the journal Kommunist.
Theory’s primary significance for revolution is that, once grasped by the masses, it becomes a material force.
Marx put it this way long ago:
“The weapon of criticism certainly cannot replace criticism by weapons; material force must be overthrown by material force. But theory, too, becomes a material force as soon as it has gripped the masses.”
In a November 1884 letter to Karl Kautsky, Engels analyzed the situation, noting that an important reason the German workers’ movement developed with unstoppable momentum and carried out a more thorough revolution than Britain and France was because it was guided by Marx’s theory.
“Marx had already summed up the results of Britain and France’s entire practical and theoretical history of development in theory, revealing the essence and ultimate historical fate of capitalist production. This gave the German proletariat a program that its predecessors, the British and French, never had. On the one hand, a deeper social revolution. On the other hand, greater clarity of mind and vision. This is the secret to the irresistible development of the German workers’ movement.”
The second layer of meaning that the theory has for revolution is that a scientific theory of revolution is an important tool for a proletarian party to lead the revolution to victory.
First, a scientific revolutionary theory forms the basis of a proletarian party. According to Engels, one major advantage of the proletarian party is its new scientific worldview. This new worldview is Marxism. Examining Russia’s and the Chinese Communist Party’s revolutionary practices reveals that final victory in revolution is closely related to the scientific theory followed by the proletarian party that leads it.
As the Chinese revolution was nearing victory, Mao Zedong pointed out:
“If there is to be a revolution, there must be a revolutionary party. Without a revolutionary party—without a party built on Marxist-Leninist revolutionary theory and in the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary style—it is impossible to lead the working class and the broad masses of the people to defeat imperialism and its running dogs.”
A scientific and advanced revolutionary theory is also an ideological weapon that unites and educates the broad masses of working people. Marxism holds that arming the revolutionary class intellectually is the key to achieving final victory. Lenin pointed out:
“Once the advanced representatives of the working class have mastered the ideas of scientific socialism and the concept of the historical role of the Russian worker, and these ideas have become widespread and stable organizations have been formed among the workers to transform their sporadic economic struggles into conscious class struggles, then the Russian worker will rise at the head of all democratic elements and overthrow absolutism. Together with the proletariat of all countries, the Russian proletariat will advance along the straight road of open political struggle to the victorious communist revolution.”
For this reason, Lenin strongly advocated spreading the doctrine of scientific socialism among workers. He believed that, to a large extent, class consciousness in revolution depends on scientific theory, education, and enlightenment. Therefore, the chief responsibility of the proletariat’s vanguard is to instill socialist consciousness in the revolutionary class and the masses to effectively mobilize and organize them into a powerful revolutionary force.
For a proletarian party serving as the leading revolutionary force, theory forms the basis for establishing the party’s revolutionary policies and strategies and improves its ability to analyze and evaluate the revolutionary situation.
The importance of theory for revolution determines the demand that theory be scientific and correct. Proletarian revolutionary practice has proven that any theoretical mistake will exact a heavy toll on the revolution. Therefore, determining and developing the specific theory that will guide the revolution based on revolutionary realities is key to a proletarian party’s success in leading the revolution to victory.
Section Five: The Dialectical Unity of Violent and Peaceful Methods
I. Violence is the midwife of a new society
The fundamental issue in a revolution is state power. Throughout social and historical development, the transfer of state power from one class to another is not automatic; rather, it is a coercive process. Revolution is the most powerful lever that drives this process. Marx once said:
“In many countries, institutions change gradually as new requirements arise and the old break down. However, establishing a new state constitution requires a real revolution.”
In a class-based society, the ruling class carries out political domination through the state as a machine of violence. When contradictions between the productive forces and relations of production and between the economic base and superstructure plunge political domination into an all-around crisis, no ruling class has ever voluntarily surrendered power due to a crisis of rule. On the contrary, they intensify their efforts, using their power and the state’s violent apparatus to shore up a tottering regime and impose harsher political domination.
Every revolution in history has occurred under such circumstances. The character of the ruling class’s political domination and the brutal, violent repression it displays in the final stage of its rule determine that a revolution whose central task is to seize state power and establish a new state system will have the following three characteristics.
Revolution is not custom-made. Rather, it is the result of an eruption of popular discontent. In other words, a revolution occurs only when tens of millions of people feel that they cannot continue living as they are.
Revolution is the most authoritative force on Earth. Specifically, it means one part of the population uses extremely authoritative means, such as rifles, bayonets, and cannons, to force another part to accept its will.
Revolution is a political action in which one kind of violence opposes another.
In summary, a revolution aimed at overthrowing the old political domination and seizing state power is a violent, explosive action, and violence is the basic method of revolution. Therefore, Marxism holds that force is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one. It is the instrument by which a social movement clears a path for itself and shatters ossified, dying political forms.
However, Marxism also holds that within the scope of social revolution, the task of the revolution is not only to seize state power, but also to use it to carry out the process by which a new mode of production replaces the old one. After examining how capitalism developed, Marx argued that replacing old and new modes of production requires the driving force of “the concentrated and organized force of society.” In this sense, Marx treats force as an economic power. Chapter Six [“Political Power Is the Power of Class Domination”] has already provided a dedicated analysis of this point.
As the midwife of a new society’s birth, violence is undoubtedly key to revolutionary victory. Engels said,
“Without violence and firm, implacable ruthlessness, nothing is ever accomplished in history.”
Revolutions are no different. If Charles I had not been sent to the scaffold and if the people of Paris had not forcibly stormed the Bastille, the history of the bourgeois revolutions in England and France might have turned out differently. Regardless of the nature of the class making the revolution and how passionate they may be, as long as they want to seize state power and become the ruling class, they cannot avoid using revolutionary violence. Marx brilliantly put this idea in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte:
“But unheroic though bourgeois society is, it nevertheless needed heroism, sacrifice, terror, civil war, and national wars to bring it into being.”
The highest form of violent revolution is armed struggle. As Lenin pointed out, in any class society—whether based on slavery, serfdom, or today’s system of wage labor—the oppressing class always possesses arms. Therefore:
“An oppressed class that does not strive to learn to use and acquire arms deserves only to be treated as slaves.”
Whether an armed uprising or armed struggle succeeds depends largely on whether the oppressed class has an army of its own. Summing up the experience of the Paris Commune, Marx explicitly stated that building a proletarian army was the foremost condition for establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat. An organized, armed revolutionary force is the strongest, most direct form of power in a revolution. Only with such a powerful offensive power can the old regime be dismantled completely and a new regime established. After a long and winding course of development, the Chinese revolution led by the Chinese Communist Party arrived at the conclusion that out of the barrels of guns comes political power.
Marxism has consistently maintained that the proletariat can only seize political power through violent revolution. This idea is based on a general understanding of the laws of revolution and, more importantly, on an understanding of the capitalist state and the reactionary nature of the bourgeoisie. As early as 1844, Engels plainly stated in The Condition of the Working Class in England:
“When you see the propertied class in such a state of frenzy, when you see them so dazzled by their immediate interests that they cannot perceive even the most obvious signs of the times, you must abandon any hope of peacefully solving England’s social problems. The only possible way out is a violent revolution, and there can be no doubt that this revolution will not keep people waiting long.”
Friedrich Engels, Condition of the Working Class in England, 1845, The Mining Proletariat
In The Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels openly affirm that the proletariat must use force to overthrow the bourgeoisie and establish its own political rule. The European revolutions of 1848 further solidified Marx and Engels’ understanding of violent revolution, clarifying a fundamental revolutionary principle: the proletariat must destroy the existing state apparatus by force to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat. Their analysis of the Paris Commune of 1871 further developed this idea, emphasizing the importance of establishing a revolutionary armed force to replace counterrevolutionary armed forces. This body of ideas about violent revolution was fully realized in the Russian October Revolution and the Chinese Revolution led by the Chinese Communist Party. It guided both revolutions to victory. Once again, the facts confirmed Marx’s famous dictum that force is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one.
2. Using peaceful methods in a revolutionary spirit
Although Marxism holds that violent revolution is the general rule, it has never ruled out the possibility of achieving power through peaceful means. The social and political development of different countries is extremely complex. Differences in national conditions produce diverse historical trajectories—some follow the general pattern while others take special paths. Therefore, even while emphasizing violent means, Marxism does not abandon or deny the possibility of peaceful means.
As early as 1847, Marx and Engels were considering the question of peaceful seizure of power. In The Principles of Communism, when Engels was asked whether private property could be abolished by peaceful means, he responded:
“One may hope so; the Communists themselves would be the last to oppose such a course.” The Communists know very well that not all conspiracies are useful; some are even harmful. They know that revolutions are not made at will and that they are always the necessary consequence of conditions independent of the will and leadership of particular parties and classes. However, we see that in almost all civilized countries, the development of the proletariat has been violently suppressed. In this way, the opponents of the Communists are doing everything they can to provoke a revolution. If all this ultimately drives the oppressed proletariat to revolt, we Communists will defend the proletariat’s cause with actions as we do with words.”
Later, in the 1880s and 1890s, Engels repeatedly returned to this issue. Marx, too, once believed that the working class in Britain and the United States in the 1870s “may attain their goal by peaceful means.” In 1872, in a speech at a mass meeting in Amsterdam, Marx said:
“We do not claim that the means necessary for achieving this goal will be the same everywhere. We know that we must take into account the institutions, customs, and traditions of the various countries. We acknowledge that there are countries, such as the United States and Great Britain—and perhaps Holland, if I knew its institutions better—where workers can achieve their goals peacefully. But even so, we must recognize that in most continental countries, revolution will require force. One day, it will be necessary to use force to establish labor’s rule.”
In summary, Marxism’s understanding of peaceful forms of revolution, including the discussions of Marx and Engels as well as the later views of Lenin and Mao Zedong, mainly includes the following aspects:
From the standpoint of the revolutionary class, the peaceful acquisition of political power is a revolution’s best-case aspiration. Since it avoids violence and bloodshed, Marxists should consider this approach whenever possible. On this point, Engels was explicit:
“If the social revolution and the realization of communism are the necessary result of our existing relations, then we must first take steps that will enable us to avoid violence and bloodshed when we carry out the transformation of social relations. There is only one means to that end: the peaceful realization of communism, or at least the peaceful preparation of communism.”
Engels is essentially saying that if the conditions are ripe for a peaceful revolution and it can proceed smoothly, Marxists would first consider peaceful methods and only resort to violence as a last resort. However, Marxism has consistently held that the chances of a revolution unfolding peacefully in real social development are extremely small.
Second, the revolutionary class should choose the method that is more likely to achieve the revolution’s goals, whether by peaceful or violent means. In a July 3, 1871 conversation with a reporter from The World, Marx said that the aim of revolution is to achieve the economic emancipation of the working class by seizing political power and using that power to carry out social tasks. As for the means of reaching that goal, different countries can choose their own methods. He gave an example:
“In England, the working class has the opportunity to demonstrate its political strength. Wherever peaceful propaganda can achieve this end more quickly and reliably, insurrection would be unwise.” In France, the endless succession of persecution laws and the life-or-death antagonism between the classes seem to make social war and a violent outcome inevitable. However, the manner in which that outcome is reached should be left to the working class of that country to decide.”
Here, Marx affirms the autonomy of revolutionary movements to choose their methods and the diversity of possible revolutionary paths. Peaceful methods are one expression of that diversity.
Third, a revolution can only take a peaceful form under certain conditions. These conditions have two aspects. The first is objective.
Marx and Engels believed that a revolution in Britain could proceed peacefully because they thought Britain had three objective conditions that other European countries did not have:
First, capitalist economic development and bourgeois democracy were relatively advanced.
Second, at that time, Britain’s military-bureaucratic machine, operating under the principles of liberal capitalism, was comparatively weak, unlike the military-bureaucratic machines of continental states.
Third, after more than a century of rule, Britain’s constitution and legal system had instilled a law-abiding political character in the British that other peoples did not have because, as Marx and Engels wrote, “in England, any change has to proceed through legal procedures, through forms consistent with the constitution.” [Articles for The New Moral World by Frederick Engels, Progress of Social Reform On the Continent]
Second, there are subjective conditions, mainly of two kinds:
The first condition: there must be a strong and effective political party.
Second condition: arms must be in the hands of the people, and there must be no external force suppressing them.
Since a peaceful revolution depends on certain conditions, the absence of these conditions necessitates a violent revolution. When analyzing the German Revolution, Engels concluded that the German government’s supreme power meant that any attempt to overthrow it would have to be violent. However, society is constantly changing and developing. Therefore, the objective and subjective conditions that determine revolutionary methods will also change as society evolves. In other words, even in countries where a peaceful revolution might be possible, that possibility could disappear as the state and society evolve.
Lenin believed that the possibility of a peaceful revolution in Britain no longer existed in the age of imperialism.
Fourth, peaceful methods should be employed with a revolutionary spirit. Peaceful and violent revolutions differ in method but not in goal: to seize political power. Due to the nature of class rule, Marxism holds that, even if the revolution ultimately proceeds by peaceful means, the entire revolutionary process must maintain a revolutionary spirit. In other words, peaceful methods must be employed with a revolutionary spirit. This requires that the proletariat not disarm or abandon revolutionary means lightly in the process of peacefully taking power. Only in this way can the final goal of a peaceful revolution be secured. As Marx once pointed out:
“We must announce to the governments: We know you are the armed power directed against the proletariat. We will move against you peacefully where possible and with arms if necessary.”
The International Workingmen’s Association, 1871, Political action and the working class, Speech by Marx the London Conference of the International, September, 1871
Therefore, during a revolution, one must be prepared in two ways: seek peaceful development when possible and adopt violent revolution when necessary. Throughout the history of the world proletarian revolution, bloody lessons have taught people that easily surrendering arms will ultimately lead to the proletariat’s defeat.
Fifth, just as a peaceful revolution cannot dispense with armed force, a violent revolution cannot dispense with legal struggle. In other words, even in countries where it is impossible to peacefully take power, a revolution cannot forgo all legal and peaceful methods of struggle, such as universal suffrage and parliamentary struggle. Engels said:
“If we give up the struggle against our enemies in the political field, we give up one of the most powerful means of action, especially the means of organization and propaganda. Universal suffrage provides us with an excellent means of action.”
In his Letter to the Workers of Europe and America, Lenin also pointed out that, as long as the struggle remains within the framework of the bourgeois system, socialists—fighters who strive to free working people from exploitation—should make use of bourgeois parliaments as rostrums and bases for propaganda, agitation, and organizing work. However, Marxism has repeatedly warned the proletariat not to confine the revolution to these arenas alone. Nor should the proletariat become intoxicated by its successes there, forgetting the nature of bourgeois rule, the ultimate aim of the proletarian revolution, and the necessity of violent revolution. History remembers these warnings.
Section Six: The Unity of Permanent Revolution and Stages of Revolutionary Development
I. A Dialectical View of Permanent Revolution and Stages of Revolutionary Development
The unity of permanent revolution and stages of revolutionary development is an important Marxist theory of proletarian revolution. Although Marx and Engels popularized the term “permanent revolution” while summarizing the European revolutions of 1848, the underlying ideas had already emerged prior to that year.
Prior to 1848, many European countries had already experienced worker movements in various forms. However, these societies still faced the task of overthrowing the feudal system and carrying out a bourgeois revolution. France had a bourgeois monarchy at the time, while Germany had an even more backward feudal autocracy. The realities of social development required Marx and Engels to theorize how the proletariat should make revolution in such countries. This question was not solved among the utopian socialists before Marx. For instance, the German utopian communist Wilhelm Weitling advocated for a direct transition from feudalism to communism. They opposed the proletariat supporting or taking part in a bourgeois-democratic revolution, instead fantasizing about the immediate realization of communism.
Marx and Engels approached this problem using historical materialism. They believed that social development has its own inherent laws. The primary objective of a proletarian revolution is to seize political power and establish the dictatorship of the proletariat. However, in order to achieve its goals, the proletariat must first overthrow feudal autocracy. Therefore, they opposed the utopian schemes of people like Wilhelm Weitling, who tried to leap into communism in a single bound. Instead, they argued that the proletariat must proceed in stages. Before fighting directly for a communist society, the proletariat must first abolish feudal autocracy and establish a bourgeois-democratic system.
“The workers know very well that the bourgeoisie will make wider concessions than an absolute monarchy will. In the interests of commerce and industry, the bourgeoisie must, against its will, create the conditions for the unity of the workers. The unity of the workers is the first requisite for their victory.” The workers know that abolishing bourgeois property relations is impossible while preserving feudal property relations. They know that the bourgeoisie’s revolutionary movement against feudal estates and absolute monarchy can only hasten the progress of their own revolutionary movement. Their struggle against the bourgeoisie begins only on the day the bourgeoisie is victorious. They can and should participate in the bourgeois revolution because it is a prerequisite for the workers’ revolution. However, the workers must not regard the bourgeois revolution as their ultimate goal.”
During the same period, Engels clearly stated:
In these two passages, Marx and Engels express four points.
“Above all, the proletarian revolution will establish a democratic constitution, thereby directly or indirectly establishing the political rule of the proletariat.”
In countries where feudal forces dominate and bourgeois democracy has not been established, the proletarian revolution should unfold in two stages: first, a bourgeois-democratic revolution; then, a socialist revolution.
A staged revolution does not slow the revolutionary process. On the contrary, it accelerates it because the first stage paves the way for the second.
The bourgeois-democratic revolution is a prerequisite for the proletariat’s socialist revolution. Therefore, the proletariat should participate in and drive the bourgeois-democratic revolution forward.
The ultimate objective of the proletariat is the dictatorship of the proletariat. Therefore, after the bourgeois-democratic revolution has won, the revolution must not halt, but continue until the final objective is realized.
Marx and Engels made the unified relationship between permanent revolution and the stages of revolutionary development clear within these four points.
On this fundamental understanding alone, Marx and Engels enthusiastically affirmed the proletariat’s participation in the bourgeois revolution and their efforts to establish a republican system for the bourgeoisie when they summed up the European revolutions of 1848. Engels pointed out:
“If the Revolution of 1848 was not a socialist revolution, it paved the way for one.”
However, Marx and Engels also keenly felt, based on their experience with the 1848 European revolutions, that the proletariat must resolutely transform the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist revolution and carry it through to the end when conditions are ripe to achieve final victory. In their Address of the Central Committee to the Communist League, they wrote that the proletariat’s
“battle cry must be: The Revolution in Permanence.”
They regarded this as an inescapable requirement of the proletariat’s historic mission. They wrote that petty-bourgeois democrats hope only to end the revolution quickly once their demands are met. In contrast, they wrote that their interests and tasks consist of making the revolution permanent until all possessing classes are forced out of their dominant position, the proletariat conquers state power, and the proletariat association progresses sufficiently in all dominant countries that competition among them ceases and the decisive forces of production are concentrated in their hands.
This conception, which united “permanent revolution” with a view of the stages of the revolution’s development, later became the direct theoretical foundation for the Bolshevik Party, led by Lenin, in formulating Russia’s revolutionary strategy and for the Chinese Communist Party, led by Mao Zedong, in determining China’s revolutionary path.
In 1905, when a bourgeois-democratic revolution broke out in Russia, Lenin developed the proletariat’s tactics within that revolution based on this conception. He held that the proletariat must actively participate in and lead the bourgeois-democratic revolution. He explained:
“Marxism teaches the proletariat not to remain aloof from the bourgeois revolution, not to be indifferent to it, and not to allow the bourgeoisie to assume leadership of the revolution. Rather, the proletariat must take an active role in the revolution, fight resolutely for consistent proletarian democracy, and see the revolution through to the end.” A complete victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution would mark the beginning of the socialist revolution. “The more complete, determined, and thorough the bourgeois revolution is, the more assured the proletariat’s struggle against the bourgeoisie for socialism will be.”
During this period, Lenin subjected two erroneous theories to relentless critique: the “Great Wall” theory and the “Permanent Revolution” theory. The “Great Wall” theory held that the proletariat must live under a bourgeois dictatorship for fifty to a hundred years before conditions would exist for a socialist revolution. By contrast, the “permanent revolution” theory was Trotsky’s ultra-left distortion of Marx and Engels. It blurred the boundary between democratic and socialist revolutions, attempting to skip the democratic stage and proceed directly to a socialist revolution.
In criticizing these errors, Lenin pointed out that the two revolutions are connected yet distinct. They cannot be separated by a “Great Wall,” nor can one stage be substituted for another. The proletariat’s participation in the ongoing bourgeois-democratic revolution is a necessary step in the fight for a socialist revolution and the proletariat’s dictatorship. Therefore, the proletariat cannot skip the bourgeois-democratic stage. It must strive to broaden the scope of the bourgeois-democratic revolution and carry it through to the end. Then, when the time is right, the democratic revolution can transform immediately into a socialist revolution. For this reason, Lenin said:
“We stand for uninterrupted revolution. We shall not stop halfway.”
Drawing on the ideas of Marx and Engels and taking China’s social conditions into account, Mao Zedong divided the Chinese revolution into two stages. The first stage was a bourgeois-democratic revolution, or the New Democratic Revolution, which would transform into a socialist revolution once conditions were ripe. Mao believed that:
“The democratic revolution is the necessary preparation for the socialist revolution, and the socialist revolution is the inevitable trend of the democratic revolution.” The ultimate goal of all communists is to establish a socialist and communist society. Only by recognizing the distinction between the democratic and socialist revolutions, and at the same time recognizing their interconnection, can we correctly lead the Chinese revolution.”
“To complete China’s bourgeois-democratic revolution (the new democratic revolution) and carry it forward to the stage of the socialist revolution when all the necessary conditions are present is the entire glorious and great revolutionary task of the Chinese Communist Party. Every Communist Party member should fight for it and must never give up halfway.”
In practice, the Chinese Revolution embodied the Marxist idea of uninterrupted revolution carried forward through distinct stages. In achieving final victory, the Chinese Revolution also proclaimed the triumph of this concept.
II. Seizing Leadership of the Revolution
According to Marxism, the bourgeois-democratic revolution and the socialist revolution are two links in a single chain. This vivid metaphor indicates both the close connection and the essential difference between the two kinds of revolution. The proletariat can only achieve final victory, seize state power, and realize the dictatorship of the proletariat by moving without interruption from the bourgeois-democratic revolution to the socialist revolution. The key to carrying out this uninterrupted revolution—and realizing the dictatorship of the proletariat—is whether the proletariat can take the lead in the bourgeois-democratic revolution.
Marxism argues that proletarian leadership is significant for an uninterrupted revolution in several ways.
First, it guarantees victory in the bourgeois-democratic revolution. The February Revolution in France showed that, faced with the growing strength of the workers, the bourgeois republican faction hesitated and wavered over establishing a republic. In the end, it was the proletariat’s struggle that won the republic. Thus, Marx said that
“the Paris proletariat regarded the republic as its own offspring.”
These two revolutions, which occurred in different periods and countries, show that proletarian leadership and participation play a decisive role in the bourgeois-democratic revolution. The bourgeois-democratic revolution directly affects the subsequent proletarian socialist revolution; the more thorough, complete, and determined the bourgeois revolution is, the more secure the proletariat’s struggle to win socialism and oppose the bourgeoisie will be.
Second, ensure that the democratic revolution transitions into a socialist revolution. In leading a bourgeois-democratic revolution, the proletariat must take every measure to mobilize revolutionary forces, above all organizing and arousing the peasantry, in order to secure victory. As Lenin said,
“Only if the proletariat can lead the majority of the peasants can the bourgeois-democratic revolution be victorious.” [Translator’s Note: Here the original Russian has ‘large section of the peasants’ rather than the majority (here translated from the Chinese version of the quote)]
Thus, as the proletariat leads the bourgeois-democratic revolution to victory, it gathers a conscious revolutionary force prepared for a socialist revolution. Since the proletariat leads the revolution, it controls the revolutionary process. Once the objective conditions for revolution are in place, the proletariat will use the revolutionary forces at its disposal to push the revolution forward into a socialist revolution at the right moment—carrying the revolution through to the end.
Third, leadership is the foundation of future political rule. The proletariat is the most prominent force in the bourgeois-democratic revolution and the leader of the revolution as a whole. In the course of the revolution, it can rally all exploited masses in the city and countryside and have them accept its leadership. Thus, among the revolutionary masses, leadership becomes an embryonic form of future state power.
The foregoing analysis and the historical course of the Chinese and Russian revolutions show that leadership is the key factor determining the success or failure of a revolution. Marxism places great importance on the proletariat’s leadership in a bourgeois revolution. During the Russian Revolution, Lenin asserted that
“Social-Democracy must strive with all its might for hegemony over the democratic masses and for developing revolutionary energy among them.”
Mao Zedong summarized the experience and lessons of the revolutionary years from 1924 to 1927 in the Chinese Revolution. He said:
“From 1924 to 1927, we saw how the revolution advanced when the bourgeoisie followed the political leadership of the proletariat and how it suffered defeat when the proletariat, with the Communist Party in charge, became the tail of the bourgeoisie in political terms.”
He concluded that although the Chinese proletariat had certain unavoidable weaknesses, such as smaller numbers, a younger age, and a lower level of education,
“they nevertheless became the most fundamental driving force of the Chinese revolution. Without the leadership of the proletariat, the Chinese revolution is bound to fail.”
According to Marxism, a necessary condition for the proletariat to lead the bourgeois-democratic revolution is for the proletarian party to maintain its independence. Lenin pointed out:
“The proletariat can play the leading role in this revolution only if it is united as a single, independent political force under the banner of the Social Democratic Labour Party, which directs its struggle both ideologically and practically.”
Therefore, Lenin warned that, while supporting the revolutionary peasantry in the bourgeois-democratic revolution, the proletariat should never forget its own class independence or its special class tasks. The party is the leading core of the entire class and revolution. The proletarian party’s independence ensures the independence of the proletariat’s principles and policies throughout the revolutionary process. More importantly, it ensures the revolution’s firmness and thoroughness. Thus, the proletariat can remain conscious of its interests and tasks and continuously strengthen the revolutionary forces in the struggle to realize them.
Section Seven: Reform is a byproduct of revolution
I. Reform is a byproduct of class struggle
According to Marxism, any genuine revolutionary upheaval in history brings about abrupt social change and a leap in development because it proclaims the end of one system and the beginning of another. This is a qualitative transformation in historical development. However, although such a change occurs “in an instant,” it requires the long-term accumulation and preparation of revolutionary conditions—that is, a process of quantitative accumulation.
Stalin referred to this process as evolutionary. He wrote,
“Evolution prepares for revolution and lays the groundwork for it, while revolution completes and promotes the further development of evolution.”
The process of quantitative accumulation required for a revolution—that is, preparing the objective and subjective conditions—should be am active one. However, this does not mean that revolutionaries should launch a revolution prematurely. According to Marx, under such circumstances, any revolutionary victory is only temporary and merely an auxiliary factor in revolutions carried out by other classes. For example, in the early period of a proletarian revolution, it cannot be a genuine revolution of that class. Rather, this “active process” is chiefly expressed in actively and consciously creating the objective and subjective conditions for revolution.
During this process, the revolutionary class can expand its forces through agitation, propaganda, and organization to secure more favorable revolutionary conditions. It can also compel the ruling class to make certain concessions through partial struggles, thereby placing itself in a more advantageous position. This is reform. Reform emerges as the revolutionary class prepares for revolution. In this sense, Marxism holds that reform is a byproduct of revolution.
Experience has shown that gains won through reform can become instruments of revolution under certain conditions. For this reason, Marxism does not deny the value and significance of reform struggles. On the contrary, Marxism includes reform struggles within the scope of revolutionary struggle, treating them as byproducts of revolution.
Lenin pointed out:
“It would be absolutely wrong to believe that the immediate struggle for a socialist revolution means we can or should abandon the fight for reforms. On the contrary, we should support every real economic and political improvement in the position of the masses.”
According to Marxism, to use reforms rationally and effectively in the service of revolution, one must first understand the nature of reform in a class-based society. What is reform? According to Marxism, reform means
“not destroying the foundations of the ruling class’s political power, but having the ruling class make certain concessions while preserving the conditions of its rule.”
Therefore, in a class society, reform has a dual character. For the revolutionary class, reform compels the ruling class to make necessary concessions while raising the revolutionary class to a relatively more favorable position. This creates better conditions for realizing the revolutionary class’s interests and tasks.
For the ruling class, reform also serves its interests because the bourgeoisie and the government fear legal action by the workers’ party more than illegal action and fear electoral success more than rebellion.
The concessions made through reform can also block, weaken, or extinguish revolutionary struggle; disperse the revolutionary class’s energies; and blur its understanding.
The dual nature of reform means that the revolutionary proletariat “uses reforms to develop revolutionary class struggle” (as Engels said, “We collect our debts in installments“), but must never “make its own” the slogans of incomplete bourgeois reformism.
Marxism is based on a profound understanding of the dual nature of reform. It resolutely opposes reformism that directly confines the aims and activity of the working class to the limits of reform. Lenin argued that the difference between Marxism and reformism on the question of reform versus revolution is not that the former opposes reforms while the latter supports them. Rather, the crux is that Marxism treats reforms only as a byproduct of revolution and stresses that reforms must be linked with revolution. By contrast, reformism treats reform as the ultimate goal and advocates replacing revolution with reform. As Lenin wrote,
“So long as the rule of capital exists, even if individual reforms are carried out, the workers will still remain wage slaves.”
Therefore, reformism that confines the working class’s aims and activities to the realm of reform is, in reality, a bourgeois deception of the workers. Marxism is superior to reformism because it uses the struggle to win reforms as a means to build strength and achieve the goal of revolution. Accordingly, for Marxism, reforms have their particular meaning and value as a byproduct of revolution.
Lenin said:
“Suppose someone thinks that, in order to wage a direct struggle for socialist revolution, it seems we can—or should—give up the struggle for reforms. That view is entirely mistaken. ”
In a sense, reform is a form of compromise and accommodation. When Marxism acknowledges reforms, it also acknowledges the importance of compromise and accommodation in the revolutionary process. However, like reform itself, this compromise and accommodation is merely a byproduct of revolution, a detour tactic adopted when revolutionary conditions are not yet fully mature. Engels once firmly opposed the Blanquist Communists’ declaration of “no compromises,” considering it laughable—empty talk—because changing circumstances often force parties to compromise in their struggles. In September 1917, Lenin wrote a special article titled On Compromises to clarify the Bolshevik Party’s attitude toward compromise. The article notes:
“The task of a truly revolutionary party is not to declare that it is impossible to renounce all compromises but rather to remain true to its principles, its class, its revolutionary purpose, and its task of paving the way for revolution and educating the masses for victory in the revolution through all compromises (when they are unavoidable).”
Clearly, the compromise Lenin is referring to is a principled compromise that prioritizes revolution. Lenin believed that such compromise was not only unavoidable, but also highly necessary under certain conditions. He gave an example:
“Participation in the Third and Fourth Dumas was a compromise, a temporary renunciation of revolutionary demands. But this was entirely compelled by necessity because the balance of power at the time made launching a mass revolutionary struggle impossible for a certain period. For long-term preparation, we also had to know how to work inside this ‘pigsty.’”
According to Marxism, the more complex and difficult the revolutionary struggle becomes, the more necessary it is to carefully judge the situation and combine principledness and flexibility. Only by passing through necessary detours and accommodations can revolutionary forces be gathered and preserved under such circumstances, and only then can the most favorable breakthrough point be found. Thus, though reforms and compromises are merely by-products of revolution, they are nonetheless necessary and beneficial for the revolution’s ultimate success. While recognizing the necessity and practical significance of reforms and compromises, Marxism is primarily concerned with using these means rationally to achieve revolutionary ends. The most central Marxist principle is this: reform must be subordinate to revolution.
II. The struggle for reforms must be subordinate to the struggle for revolution
Reform must be subordinate to revolution. This is the core Marxist principle that governs the relationship between the two. Specifically, this principle is expressed in three ways:
First, the central task of a revolutionary class is revolutionary struggle, not the struggle for reforms. Marxism holds that a revolutionary class should not reject or abandon reforms. However, in fighting for reforms, the revolutionary class must not forget its own interests and tasks, nor the revolution itself. All reforms can only be pursued as by-products of revolution.
In other words, a revolutionary class should not pursue reforms for their own sake; they should fight for reforms for the sake of the revolution. In essence, such reforms are one component of the effort for revolution.
Lenin wrote:
“We must intensify revolutionary agitation among the masses, disseminate our uncompromising slogans more widely and clearly, and then, in the best case, hasten the revolution’s early victory. In the worst case, we will win incomplete concessions, such as a Duma ministry or universal but indirect suffrage, and transform these concessions into instruments of the revolution. Reforms are a byproduct of the class struggle of the revolutionary proletariat. To make obtaining this by-product ‘our own’ business would mean lapsing into liberal-bourgeois reformism.”
Second, the struggle for reforms should ultimately culminate in a revolutionary struggle. This has two meanings:
(1) The struggle for reforms must be subordinate to revolutionary struggle and serve it. For a revolutionary class to seize state power, achieve emancipation, and establish a new society, revolution is necessary. Only revolution can transfer state power from one class to another. Reform and revolution differ in essence. A revolutionary class
“cannot expect the replacement of one social system by another to be achieved through reforms or concessions by the ruling class, allowing one system to quietly pass into another.”
Therefore, the revolutionary class cannot substitute the reform struggle for revolutionary struggle. On the contrary, the revolutionary class must incorporate the struggle for reforms within the scope of revolutionary struggle. At the beginning of the Russian Revolution, Lenin made this explicit: in the past and in the present, revolutionary Social Democrats included the struggle for reforms within their activities. However, they subordinated even partial struggles for reforms to the overall revolutionary struggle for freedom and socialism.
(2) On the premise that revolution is the supreme guiding value and to ensure final victory, the proletariat must skillfully use the struggle for reforms to create conditions for revolutionary victory. Marxism regards this as a revolutionary tactic. This tactic retains value and significance not only before the proletariat wins victory, but also after. Lenin held that Marx recognized the former significance, but not the latter. Lenin pointed out:
“Before the proletariat achieves victory, reforms are a byproduct of the revolutionary class struggle. After the revolution, if the victorious country clearly lacks the strength to carry out a transition through revolutionary methods, then reforms also become a necessary and reasonable means of obtaining breathing room.”
Third, the struggle for reforms should be supported by a mass movement and combined with revolutionary methods. In essence, reforms are concessions that the ruling class makes while retaining state power. For these concessions to have real, practical meaning and ultimately become instruments of revolutionary struggle, they cannot be gifts from the ruling class or the outcome of a bargain. Rather, they must be the product of revolutionary struggle.
Lenin said:
“We are fighting not to suffer defeat, but to become victors—at least to achieve partial success. Even if we suffer defeat, we shall in any case achieve partial success. That is, we shall get reforms.”
Reforms that can serve as tools of revolution must arise from such a struggle.
On the other hand, if the results of reforms are to be consolidated and become a foundation for revolution rather than vanish instantly, the struggle for reforms must be supported by mass struggle. In other words, from the beginning, the struggle for reforms must be based on a broad mass foundation and closely integrated with the mass movement. Reforms pursued in this way will help the revolutionary class not only secure favorable conditions for revolution, but also expand the revolutionary ranks and strengthen revolutionary forces.
Hence, Lenin said:
“Any reform that is not supported by revolutionary methods of mass struggle cannot be stable, genuine, or serious. We have always pointed out that if the Social Democrats do not combine the struggle for reforms with revolutionary methods of the workers’ movement, they may become a sect divorced from the masses—an extremely serious threat to the success of a genuinely revolutionary socialist movement.”
According to Marxism, the basic relationship between reform and revolution is that reforms are a by-product of revolution. This relationship forms the basis of proletarian revolutionary strategy and is the most fundamental aspect of it. Due to the long-term formation of a revolutionary situation and revolutionary forces, as well as the complexity and tortuousness of the revolutionary struggle, the revolutionary class cannot refuse necessary reforms even after revolutionary victory.
Lenin held that reforms are an auxiliary instrument of the class struggle. This auxiliary instrument, of course, must be subordinated to revolution, the highest form of political action. Properly coordinating the relationship between reform and revolution is essential for ensuring the revolution’s smooth development and achieving final victory.
According to Marxism, the basic relationship between reform and revolution is that reforms are a by-product of revolution. This relationship forms the basis of proletarian revolutionary strategy and is the most fundamental aspect of it. Due to the long-term formation of a revolutionary situation and revolutionary forces, as well as the complexity and tortuousness of the revolutionary struggle, the revolutionary class cannot refuse necessary reforms even after revolutionary victory.
Lenin held that reforms are an auxiliary instrument of the class struggle. This auxiliary instrument, of course, must be subordinated to revolution, the highest form of political action. Properly coordinating the relationship between reform and revolution is essential for ensuring the revolution’s smooth development and achieving final victory.
Reform is the struggle waged by a revolutionary class within an existing regime to achieve its own goals. Marxism acknowledges the significance of reform and legal struggle within the framework of the old regime, including parliamentary struggle, anti-government protests and demonstrations, strikes, and electoral struggles. However, Marxism has always held that these struggles are merely supplementary to revolutionary struggle. Therefore, it has never believed that socialism can be realized through them alone.
Marxism resolutely opposes the reformist view that one can smoothly and “peacefully grow into” socialism by using these legal struggles because such an illusion endangers the entire proletarian revolution. The social position and historical mission of the proletariat determine that it can only liberate itself and achieve the great goal of liberating all humanity through revolution.
As a retired US State Department guy who spend his first four years doing consular work (non-immigrant visas, immigrant visas, visiting Americans in jail (one time even a suspected mob torpedo!) then later working on Chinese affairs at State for 15 years (it’s kind of addicting) and then got fascinated with the ChatGPT Large Language Model so I put this question to ChatGPT5.2. The response copied below is in both Chinese and English along with a list in Chinese of relevant PRC laws and regulations. The response is also available online at https://chatgpt.com/share/698c701b-f7e0-8008-b88d-bffc0168a4bf
I’ve mostly used ChatGPT for my translation hobby now in my retirement sunset years. See for example 2025 Revision: Chinese Language Study and Translation Tools Very cool tools if you keep their limitations in mind. For the best results in Chinese – English translation I translate text in chunks of two to three paragraphs. The results are impressive. I tinker a bit, often changing passive constructions to active voice more often used in English and break up the lonnng paragraphs encountered in many Chinese language texts. It save me a lot of time and so I have been translating more and longer texts on my translation blog.
I have found ChatGPT to be excellent at searching and good at generating narratives, though not as impressive in that regard. Just make sure you check its sources. Often, you will find a “Sources” button. I often ask it to include references in its searches just to get a longer list. Its narratives are considerably more reliable than the average social media post, but you should always check references for anything serious, such as something you are writing or sharing with friends. Of course, it is not intelligent, despite its use of “I,” etc. That’s marketing, and it’s misleading.
You can ask it any question and it will respond in any language. I understand that the quality of the text is best in languages that it has a considerable amount of text on. However, I once asked it to respond in Hawaiian just for fun, and it did! If something is wrong with a household appliance, I can describe the problem in plain English, and it often provides the answer.
Learning how to craft prompts for a particular topic involves some trial and error. You can always run a query a few times to refine it. ChatGPT is also a good source for learning how to use it. Just ask!
ChatGPT has many uses that I have only begun to explore. For example, it can correct mistakes in a Chinese letter and give you conversation practice.
Different so-called AIs have different strengths and weaknesses. ChatGPT is great for translation if you translate in chunks of two or three paragraphs at a time. I wrote a note about using ChatGPT for Chinese translation. I use DeepL, a dedicated translation LLM AI. It’s better than ChatGPT if you want to translate a long stretch of text. The DeepL plug-in for the Chrome browser on my PC translates webpages on the fly, so I can browse the web in Russian with minimal lag.
I have ChatGPT 5.2, which costs $20 per month. There is a Plus version, but the Pro version is more expensive. The main difference between the two is that the Pro version is intended for heavy industrial use. From what I’ve read, a home user probably wouldn’t notice any difference.
One of the things that makes ChatGPT considerably better for searching than Google is its ability to understand human-language queries.
ChatGPT has improved significantly and overcome some of its shortcomings in just the past two years. Still, always ask for examples and check them for important information. Often, you can see a Sources button at the end of a response. Asking for sources is always a good idea.
Most important is that any former PRC citizen who become a US citizen should always enter the PRC with a US passport and PRC visa. Otherwise if you do have a problem the PRC may not recognize your foreign citizenship and the US will not have consular access to you as a US citizen to check on your welfare and see that your case is being handed justly (although you would have to hire your own lawyer.) Before going to China check the US State Department’s website travel.state.gov to see if there is any advice posted there. Longer response in Chinese has more details.
Below is an AI-generated responses (ChatGPT5.2/Thinking), not advice from a lawyer (only PRC citizens are permitted to practice Chinese law) so take it for general background information and not as legal advice.
For Example: A ChatGPT5.2 Response
The question: If a PRC citizen emigrates to the USA, becomes a US citizen and then visits China on a US passport with PRC visa in the passport does that mean that the PRC recognizes that the PRC citizenship has been extinguished? Provide Chinese language references to relevant PRC laws and reports on actual practice..
Not necessarily.
Getting a PRC visa in a U.S. passport is strong evidence that the PRC consular system is treating you as a “foreigner for entry purposes”, but it is not a formal, individualized “recognition decision” that your former PRC nationality has been extinguished in every administrative context.
What matters legally (in PRC law) is whether you met the conditions for automatic loss of PRC nationality, and then—separately—whether PRC agencies have updated your records (户口、身份证、出入境系统等).
1) What PRC nationality law says (Chinese-language primary law)
The PRC Nationality Law is explicit:
PRC does not recognize dual nationality: 《中华人民共和国国籍法》第三条：“中华人民共和国不承认中国公民具有双重国籍。”
Automatic loss upon foreign naturalization (key rule): 《中华人民共和国国籍法》第九条：“定居外国的中国公民，自愿加入或取得外国国籍的，即自动丧失中国国籍。”
So if a PRC citizen (a) “定居外国” and (b) “自愿加入或取得外国国籍” (e.g., naturalized as a U.S. citizen), PRC nationality is lost automatically by operation of law (自动丧失).
2) Why a PRC visa in a U.S. passport is not the same thing as a “formal recognition” of loss
Under the Exit-Entry Administration Law, “外国人入境” is processed on the basis of 护照 + 签证:
This shows the legal structure: a visa is an entry document for foreigners. If you are admitted using a U.S. passport + PRC visa, the border/consular workflow is treating you as a foreign national for that travel event.
But that does not necessarily mean every PRC database has been updated to reflect your nationality loss, nor does it guarantee that you will never be treated as “still Chinese” in edge cases (for example, if you still have active PRC identity documents/户口 records, or if an official applies local compliance rules conservatively).
3) What actual practice looks like (Chinese-language official practice references)
A) Consular/visa practice: “former PRC nationals” applying on a foreign passport
PRC embassies/consulates and the official MFA consular portal commonly require extra documentation for people who “曾有中国国籍，后加入外国国籍者,” e.g. naturalization proof + last PRC passport:
If you tell me what you mean by “recognizes” (for example: 边检入境身份、国内买房/继承/银行开户身份、还是是否还能用中国身份证办事), I can map the same legal framework to that specific “recognition” scenario and point you to the most relevant PRC-side rules/practice documents.
Longer Response via ChatGPT5.2/Thinking
Does entering China on a U.S. passport with a Chinese visa mean that China has “acknowledged the automatic loss of Chinese nationality and will treat the person as a foreign national in all respects”?
Executive Summary
From the standpoint of written law, if a former Chinese citizen has “settled abroad” and has “voluntarily joined or acquired foreign nationality,” then under Article 9 of the Nationality Law of the People’s Republic of China, that person’s Chinese nationality is “automatically lost.” At the same time, Article 3 of the Nationality Law expressly provides that China “does not recognize dual nationality for Chinese citizens.” This means that, in principle, whether Chinese nationality is lost depends on whether the statutory requirements of Article 9 are satisfied, not on whether the person’s household registration (hukou) or PRC resident ID card has been canceled.
In actual governance and administrative practice, however, “automatic loss” in the sense of the Nationality Law is not the same thing as “all administrative systems (household registration, identity documents, financial real-name registration, real estate registration, etc.) have updated their information and will consistently treat the person as a foreigner.” The Ministry of Public Security’s rules and norms on household registration and resident ID-card administration clearly require that a person who has acquired foreign nationality and thereby automatically lost Chinese nationality must deregister their hukou and surrender their resident ID card. In real-world processing, applicants are typically required to present materials such as a “valid foreign passport and a Chinese visa.” Therefore, “holding a U.S. passport with a Chinese visa affixed” is better understood as a strong signal that the entry-exit and consular visa systems are handling the person as a foreign national—but it does not automatically guarantee that every domestic agency, in every matter, will “unconditionally accept” this and treat the person as a foreigner across the board.
In publicly available typical practice materials, there are situations in which “the port of entry/visa system treats the person as a foreigner, but within China the person still retains a PRC household registration or can still use PRC identification documents, thereby creating compliance risks.” For example, one Shenzhen case described in media reports indicates that after acquiring foreign nationality, the individual still kept (and even transferred into) a Shenzhen hukou, and for a long period entered and exited China using a foreign passport plus a Chinese visa. Later, after the visa expired, the person remained in China and worked without obtaining the required permissions, and was found to have engaged in illegal stay and illegal employment and was given administrative penalties. The report emphasized the view that “failure to cancel household registration does not affect the recognition of the person’s foreign nationality status.” Materials of this kind suggest that what truly determines “whether one will be stably treated as a foreigner across agencies” is not only the combination of travel documents used for entry, but also cancellation of hukou and resident ID, synchronization of related accounts and registration information, and avoiding continued use of PRC citizen documents in domestic administrative and commercial activities.
mermaidCopyflowchart TD
A[原中国公民] --> B[在美国入籍/取得外国国籍]
B --> C{是否符合国籍法第9条要件:\n定居外国 + 自愿加入或取得外国国籍}
C -->|是| D[法律效果:\n自动丧失中国国籍]
C -->|争议/信息不足| E[可能出现“国籍认定/冲突”问题\n需进一步核验材料]
D --> F[领事签证路径:\n用外国护照申请中国签证\n(常要求原中国护照/入籍证明等)]
F --> G[口岸入境:\n外国人入境规则=护照+签证\n可能采集指纹等生物识别信息]
G --> H{是否希望在国内稳定按“外国人”办理各项事务?}
H -->|是| I[行政同步步骤:\n注销户口 + 交回居民身份证\n并更新各系统信息]
H -->|否/暂不| J[风险区:\n户籍/身份证残留可能导致\n不同部门不同对待或触发调查]
I --> K[后续办理:\n银行/通信/房产/居留工作等\n尽量统一使用外国人证件链]
J --> L[可能后果:\n被要求补办注销手续\n或在居留/就业等监管中承担责任]
Summary of Chapter Thirteen of The Logic of Politics: Principles of Marxist Political Science
Political development is an ongoing task for every society and is shaped by overall social development. Politics changes with society. In Marxist historical-materialist terms, society is a “living organism” whose economic base conditions the political superstructure and ideology. The way property is held and how production is organized sets the broad parameters for how politics can evolve. Within this framework, political development follows certain objective regularities all the while taking distinct forms in different eras and in different societies.
The Logic of Politics: Principles of Marxist Political Science by Wang Huning and others.
Following the logic of the economic relations of production/political superstructure presented earlier in “The Logic of Politics,” key “engines” and “centers” of political development are identified, albeit contingent. Although economically driven change is the ultimate cause, politics has relative autonomy and can accelerate or obstruct economic development. In that sense, political development should serve economic development in the long run. State power presides over political development. Real political development involves more than surface changes in political forms; it encompasses the building, reform, and effectiveness of the state power apparatus, especially as a vehicle for resolving major political conflicts. In class societies, class struggle is a major driver. When old political forms require revolutionary transformation, organized struggle becomes indispensable because entrenched ruling classes do not voluntarily relinquish their privileged positions.
“The Logic of Politics” moves ahead in this chapter by explaining how ideas, culture, and consciousness emerge from material life, which has implications for the development of the political system over time. Objective laws exist that govern economic motion, much like Newtonian laws govern physical motion. Politics is not merely wishful thinking; what can be achieved depends on a range of economic, social, and cultural factors. Political development occurs through conscious political activity, but its rules are objective and not dependent on individual will. Contingency affects timing and pathways, but necessity dominates the long-term direction. As discussed in previous chapters, specific national conditions, despite sharing the same “basic” economic foundation, can yield many political trajectories due to differences in history, culture, and other concrete conditions. There is no single, fixed model that shows the way forward. Rather, one must be designed for each specific national situation, though it can benefit from knowledge of shared laws and overall trends.
The Logic of Politics: Principles of Marxist Political Science translated in full with citations to sources and context to sources added:
Sources of quoted text are usually not provided in the Chinese text. Source citations have been found and added to the translated English text.
The Chinese text of Chapter Thirteen follows the English translation.
Chapter Thirteen: Social Development Promotes Political Development
Political development is the essential task confronting every country and society at each and every stage of historical development. Political development, as a key component of the overall development of society, is driven by and shaped by the overall development of society. Political development has its own internal laws. In different countries or historical periods, these laws manifest themselves in different ways, resulting in political development worldwide displaying both deep commonalities and considerable diversity, possessing both a universal and particular characters, both necessity according to universals and particularities according to contingent local circumstances. Based on historical materialism, the Marxist view of political development explains comprehensively and systematically the internal laws and forms of political development. Marxism seeks to realize the highest ideals of political development: the complete emancipation of humanity, or communism finding the way within these understandings within the necessary trends of overall human development
Section One: Political Development Proceeds According to Its Internal Laws
I. Economic Development Determines Political Development
Engels believed that Hegel’s greatest achievement was his portrayal of the entire natural, historical and spiritual world as a process — that is, as something in constant motion, change, transformation and development — and his attempt to uncover the internal connections within that motion and development. Hegel’s work greatly inspired Marx, laying the foundation for the creation of historical materialism. However, Marx’s historical materialism went a step further than Hegel’s theory. While viewing history as a process of human development, Marx successfully revealed and presented the laws governing that process. Within the Marxist theoretical system, the development of human society is of paramount importance. Marx put it very clearly:
“In the social production of their life, men enter into definite, necessary relations, independent of their will; namely, relations of production appropriate to a definite stage in the development of their material productive forces.’ The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society — the real foundation on which a legal and political superstructure arises, and which corresponds to certain forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political, and intellectual life.”
The relationship between these three elements shows that the development of the political superstructure is constrained and determined by the mode of production of material life, i.e. economic development. Although Marx’s political theory includes the term ‘political development’, he did not treat it as an independent field of study. Nevertheless, by exploring the laws governing the development of society as a living organism, Marx revealed the development of politics — an important component of that organism — and the laws that govern it in a comprehensive and scientific way.
Both social and political structures emerge from people’s processes of production and their everyday lives. According to Marxism, the first premise of all human history is undoubtedly the existence of living individuals. In order to exist, people need to work — they must engage in production. The conditions of individual existence depend on the material conditions under which they produce. In other words, the way people live and interact with one another is determined by the material conditions of production.
Based on this idea, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels carefully examined three forms of property in pre-capitalist societies in The German Ideology: tribal property; property in the ancient communal system and the state; and feudal or estate-based property. They found that social and political structures differ under different forms that property is held and also change alongside changes in relation to how property is held in society. Marx and Engels therefore concluded that:
From this, we can see that the following is true: individuals who engage in production activities in a specific manner enter into particular social and political relationships. In every case, empirical observation must reveal the connection between social structure, political structure, and production on the basis of experience, and this connection should not be given any mystical or speculative colouring. Social structure and the state constantly arise from the life process of specific individuals.’
Marx and Engels paid close attention to ownership (property relations) because ownership encompasses all relations of production. The interaction between relations of production and productive forces is the basis of human society.
Marxism has always viewed society as a living organism in development. This organism comprises three major systems: the economic base, the political superstructure and ideology. Society takes shape and develops through the organic integration and movement of these three systems. Marx explained the internal connections among these systems very clearly.
‘In the social production of their lives, people enter into definite, necessary relations that are independent of their will — relations of production that correspond to a specific stage in the development of their productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society — the real foundation on which a legal and political superstructure arises, with corresponding forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the process of social, political and intellectual life as a whole.’
These internal connections demonstrate that the development of the political superstructure is constrained and determined by the mode of production of material life, i.e. economic development. In Marx’s political theory, political development is discussed, but it is not treated as an independent field of study. Nevertheless, when Marx investigated the laws governing the development of society as a living organism, he revealed the development of politics — an important component of that organism — and its movement laws in a comprehensive and scientific manner.
Social and political structures arise from people’s processes of production and their everyday lives. According to the Marxist view, the foundation of all human history is the existence of living individuals. In order to survive, people must engage in production. The conditions of individuals’ existence depend on the material conditions under which they produce. Therefore, the way of life and mode of association that people have is determined by the material conditions of production in society. In The German Ideology, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels examined three forms of property in pre-capitalist societies that were brought about by the division of labor: tribal property; the property of ancient communities and states; and feudal or estate property. They concluded that social and political structures are founded about the forms that the ownership of property in society take and evolve as these forms of ownership at the very foundation of society change.
Marx and Engels therefore concluded:
“From this, it is clear that definite individuals who are productively active in a certain way enter into certain social and political relations. Empirical observation must empirically reveal the connection of the social and political structures to production in each instance, without mystification or speculation. The social structure and the state continually evolve out of the life process of definite individuals.”
Marx and Engels paid close attention to forms of property because property encompasses the entirety of the relations of production. The interaction between these relations and the productive forces is the foundation of historical human development. According to Marxism, productive forces are the most active and revolutionary factor in production. They are also the decisive factor in the development of production and are constantly evolving. Marx pointed out:
“The method of production and the means of production are constantly changing and being revolutionized. The division of labor leads to further division; the adoption of machinery leads to wider adoption; and large-scale production leads to even larger production.”
The development of productive forces determines relations of production. The productive forces must have corresponding relations of production suited to them. Therefore, when productive forces surpass the capacity of existing relations of production, they demand a change and the establishment of new relations. These newly established relations of production provide fresh possibilities for the productive forces to develop on an even larger scale. Through their interaction with the relations of production, the productive forces propel the movement and development of human history.
Human beings are the sum total of all social relations, and the material production carried out by people is social production. Thus, the relations of production formed during this process are social relations. In a class-based society, these social relations necessarily manifest as class relations, thereby determining the social and political structures. As the productive forces develop and require changes in the relations of production, the entire social and political structures must also change. Since productive forces are constantly developing, political development, like social development, is an inevitable trend. In this developmental process, changes in property forms that reflect a given stage of productive force development directly and decisively influence political development. More specifically, the proposition that economic development determines political development has three dimensions of meaning.
First, the ultimate cause of political change and development is changes in economic conditions. As Friedrich Engels points out in the preface to The Communist Manifesto:
“In every historical epoch, the prevailing mode of economic production and exchange—and the social structure that necessarily arises from it—forms the foundation on which the political and intellectual history of that epoch is built. Only from that foundation can that history be explained….”
This shows that, when analyzing political change and development, we cannot treat politics as an isolated entity and search only within politics for the cause or driving force of political change. Politics is the concentrated expression of economics. The various conflicts and shifts in political life reflect conflicts and shifts in the economic realm. Karl Marx demonstrated this with ample evidence when he analyzed the class struggles in France from 1848 to 1850. According to Marx, the fundamental cause of the political conflicts and factional struggles of that time was the opposing interests of the various social classes and groups, which were brought about by economic development. Therefore, when Engels summarized Marx’s historical materialism, he explicitly stated:
“The ultimate causes of all social changes and political revolutions are not to be sought in people’s minds or in their growing insight into eternal truth and justice. Rather, they are to be sought in changes in the modes of production and exchange. They are not to be sought in the philosophy of the epoch, but rather in its economics.”
Second, economic development promotes political development. The initial driving force of economic development is the growth of productive forces. Overall, productive forces are a constantly advancing power. As they advance, they inevitably create new demands on the relations of production. These demands often become the impetus for new political developments. As Marx wrote,
“When the material conditions of social existence develop to the point where it becomes urgently necessary to transform its official political form, the entire appearance of the old regime changes.” Thus, Marx held that “with the change of the economic foundation, the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed.”
A strong foundation of economic development tends to lead to faster and larger-scale political development transformation. Conversely, rapid political development is impossible under conditions of slow economic development. When analyzing Russia’s social and political development from 1904 to 1910, Vladimir Lenin divided the period into two three-year spans with different development speeds based on the socioeconomic foundation of the time.
“From a theoretical standpoint, the first three years were marked by rapid changes to the fundamental aspects of Russia’s state system. The socio-economic basis for these changes in the ‘superstructure’ was the various activities of different social classes (within and outside the Dumas, publishing, forming associations, holding meetings, etc.), which took an overt form. The strength, scope, and scale of these activities were unprecedented in history. In contrast, the last three years were marked by slow evolution and nearly complete stagnation. There were no particularly noticeable changes in the state system. Most of the ‘arenas’ in which the various classes previously carried out diverse activities—openly and in many directions—have either disappeared completely or almost completely.”
Third, political development presupposes economic development. No type of political development occurs spontaneously. It requires certain social and economic conditions to trigger and propel it. Without a corresponding economic foundation, artificial political development is often fragile or impossible when economic development has not yet created a need for a new political form. As Marx and Engels pointed out:
“As long as productive forces have not developed to the point where competition becomes superfluous and continue to produce competition in one form or another, the oppressed class may have the ‘will’ to abolish competition and the state and law, but what they desire remains impossible.”
However, since political development is relatively independent, it can outpace social and economic development. If the corresponding economic foundation does not catch up in time to provide solid support when political development is “advanced” (ahead of its base), that advanced political development may fall into crisis because of its weak foundation. When commemorating the fourth anniversary of the October Revolution, Lenin identified the greatest challenge facing the new-born Soviet regime.
“Lastly is our most important and most difficult task: economic construction. This is the task we have come least close to accomplishing. It involves laying the economic foundations for the new socialist edifice on the site of the demolished feudal edifice and the semi-demolished capitalist edifice.”
Similarly, as the founding of New China approached, Mao Zedong recognized the importance of this issue. In “On Coalition Government,” he wrote:
“A New-Democratic state cannot be consolidated unless it has a solid economic foundation; unless it has agriculture that is considerably more progressive than it is today; unless it has large-scale industry that occupies an overwhelmingly dominant proportion of the national economy; and unless it has corresponding transport, trade, finance, and other enterprises as its foundation.”
II. Political Development and Economic Development
Fundamentally, political development is driven by economic progress. However, because the state system is the institutional embodiment of politics, it separates itself from society from the moment it emerges and becomes a force above society. Thus, while politics are determined by the socioeconomic base, politics also possess relative autonomy. This relative autonomy means that political development has its own relatively independent trajectory and process, which cannot perfectly correspond to economic development. History shows that
“the political structure of society is by no means altered in a corresponding fashion immediately following such a violent transformation in the conditions of its economic life.”
This relative autonomy allows politics to influence economic development. If political development were entirely determined by economic development, political development would lose its independence, and there would be no opportunity for a “reaction.” The relative autonomy of political development means that it is not purely passive, but often active and creative.
An accurate understanding of the demands that economic development places on the political system allows for proactive political reform, which can cause political development to precede economic development and provide better political conditions for it.
Ultimately, the purpose of political development is to support economic development. For this to occur, the direction of political development must align with the direction of economic development. Otherwise, such “development” damages the economy, leading to an economic crisis. When analyzing the influence of political power on economic development, Engels pointed out:
“After political power has made itself independent of society and transformed itself from servant to master, it can work in two different directions. Either it works in the sense and direction of natural economic development, in which case no conflict arises and economic development accelerates, or it works against economic development. In this case, with few exceptions, political power regularly succumbs to the pressure of economic development.”
Therefore, genuine political development creates a virtuous cycle with economic development. In this cycle, politics and the economy mutually promote and advance.
Throughout history, genuine political development has repeatedly created new opportunities for economic growth. It helps establish and solidify a new economic situation while striving to eliminate obsolete economic and political factors that hinder development. Britain’s bourgeois revolution was incomplete, and the constitutional monarchy it established was heavily compromised. However, because the revolution’s overall tendency conformed to the laws of social development, and because the constitutional monarchy was a significant political achievement compared to the earlier absolute monarchy, it created major possibilities for Britain’s capitalist development and laid the groundwork for the Industrial Revolution.
Marx praised this achievement highly. He wrote,
“It was precisely with the establishment of the constitutional monarchy that the great development and transformation of bourgeois society began in England… Under the constitutional monarchy, manufacturing developed on an unprecedented scale. This later gave way to large-scale industry, the steam engine, and the great factory.”
Many classes in the population disappeared and were replaced by new classes with new conditions of existence and demands. A new, more powerful bourgeoisie was born. While the old bourgeoisie fought the French Revolution, the new bourgeoisie seized the world market. This class became so mighty that even before the Reform Bill transferred political power directly into its hands, it compelled its opponents to pass laws that were almost solely advantageous to it and satisfied its demands. It won direct representation in Parliament and used that power to eliminate the last remnants of the residual strength preserved by landed property.”
Therefore, genuine political development creates a virtuous cycle of economic growth. In this cycle, politics and economics reinforce each other, advancing together.
Throughout history, genuine political development has paved the way for economic growth by fostering new patterns of expansion and eliminating obsolete economic and political factors that hinder progress. In England’s historical development, the bourgeois revolution—though incomplete—and the highly compromised constitutional monarchy it established nonetheless represented an overall tendency consistent with the laws of social development. Compared with earlier monarchical absolutism, the constitutional monarchy established during the revolution was a significant political development. Consequently, the establishment of a constitutional monarchy created significant opportunities for the development of capitalism in England, paving the way for the Industrial Revolution. Karl Marx praised the contributions of the English constitutional monarchy. He said:
“With the establishment of the constitutional monarchy, the great development and transformation of bourgeois society in England began. Under constitutional monarchy, manufacturing developed on an unprecedented scale for the first time, later giving way to large-scale industry, the steam engine, and the factory.”
Many social classes disappeared and were replaced by new ones with different conditions and demands. While the old bourgeoisie fought the French Revolution, a new, more powerful bourgeoisie was born, conquering the world market. This class became so powerful that, even before the Reform Bill transferred political power directly into its hands, it could force its opponents to enact laws that were almost exclusively in its interest. The new bourgeoisie obtained direct representation in Parliament and used that power to eliminate the last remnants of strength preserved by landed property.
The positive impact of political development on economic development demonstrates that political revolution is a prerequisite for economic revolution at every stage of social development. Political revolution is the most intense form of political development. A successful political revolution overthrows the old superstructure, stimulating the productive forces bound by the old relations of production. This allows the productive forces to develop on a broader stage, which is provided by new political forms.
In September 1917, facing a society in total chaos due to war and famine, Vladimir Lenin wrote The Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat It. In the article, Lenin explained that the real solution was to tightly link the resolution of socioeconomic problems with a political revolution, using the French Revolution as an example. Lenin argued that the heroic patriotism of the French people in fighting the Austro-Prussian coalition and their “military miracles” during 1792–1793 could not be separated from the material and historical-economic conditions of the time. Furthermore, he said that the formation of these conditions was inseparable from the conditions for French economic and social development created by the 1789 Revolution.
Lenin pointed out that the French Revolution
“destroyed the obsolete feudal system by genuinely revolutionary means. It enabled the whole nation to transition to a higher mode of production and to free peasant ownership of land. It carried out this transition with revolutionary democratic speed, decisiveness, perseverance, and selfless devotion. These are the material and economic conditions that ‘saved’ France at ‘miraculous’ speed, transforming and renewing its economic foundation.”
Lenin believed the crucial lesson to be learned from France was:
“If Russia is to become a country capable of defense and produce ‘miracles’ of heroism, it must sweep away the old by ‘Jacobin’ methods, renew itself economically, and remake itself.”
For this reason, Lenin advocated using revolutionary means to implement state-monopoly capitalism and proceed along the socialist road by taking concrete steps toward realizing socialism. He maintained that if this could be achieved, Russia could raise the entire country to a high level of economic organization through its revolution and democratic system. This line of thinking is consistent with the idea in The Communist Manifesto that the proletariat should take political revolution as the vanguard of economic revolution. The Manifesto states:
“The first step in the revolution by the working class is to raise the proletariat to the position of ruling class, to win the battle of democracy. The proletariat will use its political supremacy to gradually take all capital from the bourgeoisie and centralize all instruments of production in the hands of the state—that is, the proletariat organized as the ruling class—and increase the total productive forces as rapidly as possible.”
Although political development should serve economic development, this does not mean that political development must always precede economic development. In fact, that is impossible. Ultimately, political development is determined and propelled by economic development. While political development that runs ahead can provide new possibilities and space for economic development, no matter how far ahead it goes, its “lead” is always limited and will inevitably be overtaken by economic development.
“Monarchical absolutism arose after the feudal estates collapsed. It actively participated in undermining those estates, but now it tries to preserve even the shell of feudal particularism. If monarchical absolutism once protected trade and industry, thereby encouraging the rise of the bourgeoisie, and regarded trade and industry as necessary conditions for national strength and its own prestige, then now it has everywhere become an obstacle to the development of trade and industry—which are becoming an increasingly formidable weapon in the hands of a powerful bourgeoisie.”
Political development overtaken by economic development, or political development lagging behind economic development, may hinder economic development. However, if political development actively develops alongside economic development while remaining aligned with it and does not stagnate, then a relative lag in “timing” does not necessarily impede economic development.
Friedrich Engels observed that economic development proceeds more quickly when state power acts in the same direction. Therefore, we can conclude that political development should serve economic development. This does not mean that political development must always precede economic development. Rather, political development should be an uninterrupted process moving in the same direction as economic development.
In other words, politics should develop alongside economic development. Since political development is an essential part of any society’s development, the problem of political development is not, as some Western political scientists believe, something that only developing countries need to solve. In reality, both developing and developed countries face political development challenges. While the content of political development may differ between developed and developing countries, that does not mean the challenges confronting developed countries are necessarily lighter. In fact, that is not the case.
III. The core of political development is state power
The most important and fundamental political issue is state power. Vladimir Lenin said,
“The most essential aspect of politics is the apparatus of state power.”
Genuine political development is more than just changes and evolution in various forms of political expression. Rather, it is the growth and development of state power itself. The development of state power is at the core of political development. Political development has unfolded, unfolds, and will continue to unfold on the foundation of state power. Marxism fully recognizes this, treating it as the fundamental issue of revolution.
Marxism regards state power as the core of political development for two main reasons.
First, state power is the central issue in politics. In the development of class societies, whether dominated by exploitative classes or by the people, political issues are resolved through state power. Friedrich Engels, analyzing political struggle in capitalist society, pointed out:
“In every struggle of class against class, the immediate aim fought for is political power. The ruling class defends its political supremacy—that is, its secure majority in the legislature. The ruled class first fights for a share of political power and then for all of it in order to change existing laws according to their own interests and requirements.”
Lenin held that, in this sense, state power is the chief and fundamental question that concerns politics as a whole.
Second, state power plays a decisive role in social and economic life. So, what is state power? Engels said:
“Society creates an organ to protect its shared interests from internal and external threats. This organ is state power.” Thus, while the essence of state power is an instrument of class rule, its functions exert a significant influence across all spheres of social life.
Specifically, state power encompasses two aspects: state authority and the entities through which it is exercised. These organs include representative, administrative, judicial, procuratorial, military, and police organs, among others. The class that holds state authority realizes its class will and political domination through these organs.
In actual social life, the state plays a commanding role. Karl Marx said,
“Before us, there are two powers: the power of property, or the power of the owners, and political power, or state power. State power also rules over property.”
In other words:
“Property does not hold political power; political power toys with property through arbitrary taxation, confiscation, privilege, bureaucracy, and interference with industry and commerce.”
This commanding role establishes state authority as an important force for promoting social progress and organizing a new society.
The position and role of state power in social, political, and economic life establish state power as the core of political development. Accordingly, political development should firmly center on state power. During the most intense period of political revolution, the question of power becomes fundamental to the revolution.
“Every class that strives to achieve domination—if its domination, like that of the proletariat, is destined to abolish the entire old form of society and all domination—must first seize political power so that it can represent its own interests as universal interests. This is something it is compelled to do at the outset.”
Therefore, when Engels spoke of the proletarian revolution, he said:
“We have always held that to achieve the aims of the future social revolution—and far more important aims—the working class must first take possession of the organized political power of the state. With its aid, the working class must crush the resistance of the capitalist class and reorganize society on new lines.”
In his concrete proletarian revolutionary practice, Lenin clearly stated that the question of power was fundamental to the revolution. He believed that power determines the course of the revolution, as well as all issues of domestic and foreign policy.
Once a class seizes political power and becomes the ruling class, its primary objective is to establish and perfect state authority in order to consolidate its rule and promote social development. This becomes the foundation for overall political development. In the 20th century, the British bourgeoisie carried out two major transfers of power to meet the requirements of economic and social development and realize its own interests.
The first occurred with the Parliament Act of 1911, which shifted power from the House of Lords to the House of Commons. The second occurred after World War II, when administrative intervention in society expanded, shifting the center of power from the House of Commons to the Cabinet.
Similarly, the United States has amended its Constitution repeatedly over the course of its development in response to changing circumstances, ensuring the adaptability of its political system and enhancing its democratic character. The civil service systems established in Britain and the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries also strengthened state authority and promoted political development.
After establishing the Fifth Republic, President de Gaulle promoted French political development by making bold reforms to its governing institutions.
In established socialist countries, strengthening and improving state authority is key to promoting political development. Russia’s October Revolution established the world’s first proletarian dictatorship. Following the revolution’s success, the Russian working class and the Communist Party were tasked with strengthening the fledgling regime and advancing socialist political development. This was also the issue that Lenin addressed most in his “political testament.” He believed that transforming the old state apparatus inherited from the previous era was the first of two epoch-making tasks Russia faced at that time. When discussing how to establish the Central Control Commission, Lenin outlined the objectives that the transformation and strengthening of state institutions should accomplish.
First, it must be exemplary, second, it must win everybody’s absolute confidence, third, it must prove to all that we have justified the work of such a highly placed institution as the Central Control Commission.
To that end, he proposed the following six measures:
Streamlining staffing to raise efficiency,
Reorganizing institutional personnel by bringing outstanding individuals into the organs to thoroughly change the remnants of the old apparatus,
Changing work procedures to make them more scientific,
Organizing the compilation of high-quality textbooks on administrative management and study and research,
Selecting state personnel through strict examinations, and
Resolutely opposing bureaucratism in work.
Not only did Lenin’s theories and measures promote efforts to strengthen and improve Soviet authority at the time, they also provided theoretical guidance for the political development of other socialist countries.
Today, the two major tasks confronting Chinese society in building socialism are achieving economic modernization and political democratization. Political democratization is the central theme of China’s future political development. Comrade Deng Xiaoping believed that reforming and improving the party and state leadership systems was key to China’s political democratization. In his 1980 essay, “Reform of the System of Party and State Leadership,” he wrote:
“Some of our current systems and institutions in the Party and state are plagued by problems that seriously impede the full realization of the superiority of socialism. Unless they are conscientiously reformed, we can hardly expect to meet the urgent needs of modernization, and we are liable to become seriously alienated from the masses.”
He believed that the main problems that needed to be eliminated were bureaucratism, overconcentration of power, patriarchal practices, life tenure in leadership positions, and various privileges. Experience has shown that reforming the party and state leadership systems improves institutional arrangements, clarifies the relationship between the party and government, and rationalizes their respective roles. These reforms have also greatly promoted the development of China’s democratic politics, ushering in a new era of political development.
IV. Class Struggle Drives Political Development
According to historical materialism, the production and reproduction of human life are the ultimate driving forces behind social history. This “production” can be divided into two types: the production of the means of subsistence, and the propagation of the human species, or life. Therefore, Engels maintained that
“the social order under which the people of a particular historical epoch and country live is conditioned by both kinds of production: the stage of development of labor and the stage of development of the family.”
In early human societies, when the level of productive forces was low, social development was mainly governed by the production of life, or the stage of development of the family. However, once private property emerged and gave rise to social classes, the conflicts between them shattered the old kinship-based society and replaced it with a new state-based society. At this point, the family system was no longer what constrained the development of history and social institutions. Rather, it was social production based on specific ownership relations, and the class relations and class struggles resulting from that production. In this sense, Marx and Engels held that “the history of all hitherto existing societies is the history of class struggles.”
Class struggle is a driving force of social and historical development, as well as an important power that shapes a given social system. Accordingly, political development, which constitutes the main content of social-historical development, also develops alongside the development of class struggle. Class struggle is a major driving force of political development. Lenin said:
“We have always taught, and continue to teach, that the class struggle—the struggle of the exploited against the exploiters—is the basis of political transformations and ultimately determines their fate.”
Similarly, Marx does not deserve the credit for viewing class struggle as the driving force of political development. Engels observed that earlier thinkers sought the ultimate causes of historical change in evolving ideas. They believed that the most important historical changes—those that were decisive for everything—were political. But what was the motive force behind political change? They never asked.
“It was only in the new school of French historians, and partly in the English school as well, that the conviction arose that the driving force of European history—at least since the Middle Ages—was the struggle of the rising bourgeoisie for social and political domination against the feudal nobility.”
This shows that some British and French historians had already considered class struggle to be the driving force of political change. However, Marx proved that all previous history was the history of class struggles. In all the multifarious and complicated political struggles, he argued, the central issue was always the social and political rule of social classes—the old classes striving to maintain dominance and the rising classes striving to win it.
In societies marked by class antagonism,
“every class movement is necessarily, and has always been, a political movement.”
The various struggles within the political sphere are, in reality, merely illusory expressions of class struggle. As Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels wrote,
“All struggles within the state—the struggle between democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy; the struggle for the franchise; and so on—are merely illusory forms in which the real struggles between different classes are fought out.”
Therefore, it is easy to conclude that in any society based on class divisions, political development proceeds through class struggle and is the outcome of class struggle.
Therefore, in such a society, the level and scale of class struggle directly determine the pace and extent of political development. Marx and Engels believed that the outcomes of the bourgeois revolutions in Britain and France illustrate this point well. In the 1688 “Glorious Revolution,” Britain transitioned from monarchical absolutism to constitutional monarchy. The incomplete nature of that political revolution was determined by the bourgeoisie’s tendency to compromise with feudal forces during the struggle. The French Revolution, by contrast, was entirely different from the British Revolution. Marx believed that the French Revolution advanced a full century beyond its prototype, the English Revolution, in both time and substance. The driving reason for this was that the scale and intensity of the class struggle in France far exceeded that in Britain. Engels observed:
“France is the country where historical class struggles were fought to a decisive conclusion more than anywhere else. Therefore, the political forms in which these struggles were fought and their results were expressed were sharply defined. A center of feudalism in the Middle Ages and a model country of a unified, estate-based monarchy since the Renaissance, France shattered feudalism in the Great Revolution, establishing the unalloyed rule of the bourgeoisie in a form unmatched elsewhere in Europe.”
In a class-divided society, political development—whether reforming and promoting the existing political order or effecting a revolutionary transformation of politics and institutions—must be driven by a specific type and extent of class struggle. This is determined by the nature of the ruling class in class-antagonistic societies. Historically, the political rule of any ruling class has primarily consisted of safeguarding its interests. Thus, when the realization of its class interests is constrained or thrown into crisis, the ruling class naturally seeks to reform existing political forms and thereby promote political development. However, once its position is consolidated and its interests are secure, the ruling class often becomes reactionary, portraying the prevailing principles and methods of political life as eternal.
This bourgeois characteristic was particularly apparent during the French class struggles of 1848–1850. During the February Revolution of 1848, the French bourgeoisie overthrew the financial aristocracy’s despotic rule and established a republic based on universal suffrage. However, once they achieved political power, they immediately swung toward reaction.
“As soon as the bourgeois republicans in power felt secure, their first act was to disarm the workers.”
They forgot every promise made to the proletariat during the revolution because those pledges threatened the new republic. The actions of the French bourgeoisie in this regard fully bear out Marx’s remark:
“History furnishes no example of kings voluntarily limiting their own privileges and making concessions to popular demands without powerful external pressure. Likewise, it furnishes no example of kings keeping faith when they could violate their oaths and promises with impunity.”
This demonstrates that political development under the rule of the exploitative classes necessitates the impetus of class struggle in its various forms.
The establishment of universal suffrage is an important milestone in the democratic development of capitalist states. However, its formation is the result of prolonged class struggle. This class struggle encompasses not only conflict between ruling and ruled classes but also conflict between the ruling class and other social classes.
When political development reaches a point at which the old political forms must be transformed through revolution, class struggle becomes an indispensable means of that transformation. Throughout history, every reactionary class has refused to leave the stage voluntarily. Before its last breath, it often puts up a final fight. As Marx put it:
“An outlived social force, even though the foundations of its existence have long since rotted away, nevertheless still nominally controls all the symbols of power. It continues to drag on in a lingering half-life. At the same time, before it has even been formally pronounced dead and its will read, the heirs are already quarreling over the inheritance. History has confirmed this truth: it is precisely such a social force that makes a final effort before expiring—shifting from defense to offense, provoking struggle rather than avoiding it, and seeking to draw extreme conclusions from dubious premises that have long been condemned by history.”
In the face of this situation, the only option for the new social and political force is to organize and fight back. The level and scale of this struggle will ultimately determine the course of political development.
Section Two: Political development exhibits both unity and diversity.
I. Developmental Patterns and Trends Are Unified
This unity is mainly expressed in the laws that govern political development and its overall historical trend. In other words, regardless of the historical period or country, political development unfolds according to its fundamental laws. In essence, development proceeds in the direction set by the laws governing human societal development.
The unity of political development stems from the inherent, law-governed nature of social development. Engels believed that
“the development of history, like the development of nature, has its own inner laws”
and that historical materialism’s ultimate task is to discover the general laws of motion that carve their own path in the history of human society. These general laws of motion are laws of contradictory movement between productive forces and relations of production, as well as between the economic base and the superstructure. These laws determine the evolution of social formations. The law-governed nature of social development shapes the course of political development. Political development is an integral part of social development and must adhere to its fundamental principles. This means that political development always proceeds and unfolds in accordance with these laws, wherever and whenever it occurs. Engels said that the ultimate reasons for all social changes and political revolutions should be sought in changes in the mode of production and exchange.
However, political development belongs to the realm of the superstructure and is relatively independent. While the main participants in development act with a certain degree of consciousness and deliberation, political development is not arbitrary. It cannot be carried out according to the will of an individual or society.
According to Marx, no matter how much people want to break free from the constraints imposed by society’s inner laws, they must ultimately return to what those laws require. A person is always a social person—the sum total of all social relations. Marx clearly expressed this idea in the preface to Capital:
“My standpoint is that the development of the economic formation of society is a process of natural history. No matter how much an individual may imagine himself above various relations, in social terms, he is always the product of those relations.”
However, Marx did not deny the value and significance of conscious human activity in social development.
The universality of the laws governing political development means that, although political development unfolds at different times and in different places, taking varied forms, it is nevertheless governed by the internal laws of development itself. For example, when Friedrich Engels compared the conditions of workers in Britain and the United States, he noted that the
“The external environment of American workers is very different from that of British workers, but the same economic laws are at work in both countries. Therefore, although the results are not identical in every respect, they are still of the same nature. For this reason, we can also see the same struggle to shorten the workday and to legislate limits on working hours, particularly for factory workers, women, and children, in the United States.”
Another aspect of this universality is the overall direction of political development. The law-governed nature of sociohistorical development determines its inherent tendencies. Marxism treats society as a living organism in motion. It holds that
social relations of production—the social relations through which people carry out production—change and transform as material means of production and productive forces change and develop. The totality of these relations constitutes a society’s social relations; it constitutes the society itself as a society at a particular stage of historical development with its own distinctive characteristics.
Clearly, history takes shape and develops through the interaction between human beings and nature. This relationship conditions the relationships among human beings in society. As people’s ability to control nature increases and productive forces evolve, social relations inevitably change.
Accordingly, Marx held that
“They will not perish until they have fully realized their potential; and new, higher production relations will not appear until the material conditions for them have matured in the womb of the old society.”
Based on this idea, Marx divided the evolution of socioeconomic formations into four categories: the Asiatic, ancient, feudal, and modern bourgeois modes of production. According to Marx, the replacement of a lower socioeconomic formation by a higher one is a historical necessity. Changes in the socioeconomic formation determine changes in the political and cultural formations of society as a whole. As productive forces develop, the social economy necessarily advances toward higher forms. Therefore, in the course of its development, the overall tendency of any society’s political form is toward forms that correspond to higher economic forms.
Marx considered capitalist production relations to be the final antagonistic stage in the social production process. Yet, within capitalist society, developing productive forces create the material conditions for resolving that antagonism. From the standpoint of human history as a whole, it is necessary for capitalist society to be replaced by a higher form of society. That higher form is communism. Communism would end this antagonistic form:
“the class antagonism that stems from individuals’ social conditions of life.”
By placing all means of production under social ownership, communism would eliminate classes and promote the dissolution of the state, establishing an association of free individuals. Realizing communism is the highest ideal of Marxist political development. Marxism holds that the political development of all societies ultimately tends toward this ideal, as determined by the laws of human societal development.
Politics tends to develop in a unified direction. This unity is evident not only across the entire span of human history, but also within each specific historical era. In other words, countries living in the same historical period tend to exhibit similar political developments. This is because the economic laws that determine political development for states in the same era are the same. As Engels wrote,
“In every historical epoch, the prevailing mode of economic production and exchange, and the social organization necessarily following from it, form the basis on which is built, and from which alone can be explained, the political and intellectual history of that epoch….”
Throughout history, political developments form an overall trend. This trend is determined by the era’s fundamental economic movement. For instance, the English bourgeois revolution sparked a series of revolutions across Europe, culminating in the French Revolution. This established the general trend of modern bourgeois revolutions. Similarly, the world proletarian revolution, which began with the October Socialist Revolution and reached a turning point with the victory of the Chinese Revolution, established the general trend of modern proletarian revolutions. As countries become increasingly interconnected and societies become more internationalized, the overall current and trend of political development, as determined by each era’s economic movement, will exert a stronger influence, drawing more countries into this relatively unified direction of development.
II. Political Development Models Are Diverse
The unity of development laws and tendencies is an essential feature of political development. However, Marxism does not deny the diversity of specific methods and approaches to political development, or political development models. In fact, while Marxism emphasizes unity in political development, it also recognizes the importance of specific development models. As Lenin said,
“Variety does not destroy unity on major, fundamental, and essential questions; it guarantees unity.” Therefore, speaking of unity “does not demand the elimination of diversity”; rather, diversity guarantees the realization of unity.
The diversity of political development first appears as diversity over time. That is, in different historical periods, the models of political development differ. This is because the laws of economic life on which political development rests differ from period to period. Lenin stated explicitly:
“What Marx combated was precisely the idea that the laws of economic life are the same for the past and the present.” On the contrary, every historical period has its own laws. Economic life is a phenomenon similar to evolutionary history in other fields of biology.”
Even without considering social and political development in different socioeconomic formations, we can simply observe the course of capitalist development. Political development during the period of free capitalism differs greatly from political development during the period of monopoly capitalism. As the state transitions from the “rear” to the “front stage” of the economic sphere, significant changes occur in capitalist political development. As Lenin pointed out:
“From an economic standpoint, imperialism is the highest stage of capitalism. Production has reached such vast proportions that monopolies have superseded free competition. The political superstructure of this new economy, of monopoly capitalism—imperialism is monopoly capitalism—is the change from democracy to political reaction. Democracy corresponds to free competition.”
‘Finance capital strives for domination, not freedom.’”
The differences in politics between these two periods of capitalism are determined by the dominant economic laws of each period. The earlier period was characterized by free competition, while the latter was characterized by monopoly capital. Therefore, the models of political development during these periods are different.
Additionally, the diversity of political development varies across space. In other words, because social, historical, and cultural conditions differ from country to country, the specific paths and methods of political development differ as well. Britain, France, and the United States, for example, all ultimately arrived at capitalist societies, but the routes their bourgeoisies took in revolution and the means they adopted were not identical. The forms of political power established after revolutionary victory were also not identical; each represented a different model. Even during the imperialist period, each country’s political development proceeded according to its own internal logic. Lenin said:
“Trusts and banks, which are equally necessary everywhere under developed capitalism and modern imperialism, take various concrete forms in different countries. As for the political forms of the advanced imperialist countries—America, Britain, France, Germany, and so on—although they are basically similar, their forms are even less alike.”
Finally, the diversity of political development is reflected in the variety of development processes. Political development is a complex undertaking and involves all-round development. However, such comprehensive development usually unfolds through a process. Initially, development is partial and often begins with one aspect of the political sphere. Because social, historical, and cultural factors differ from country to country, the initial domain of political development varies. Some countries begin with political culture, some with institutional change, and some with social transformation. These different starting points give rise to different development processes. In France, for example, the bourgeoisie began with ideology; the Enlightenment paved the way for France’s political struggle. Thus, Engels argued that eighteenth-century France was an example of a philosophical revolution preceding a political revolution. Britain’s revolution, by contrast, began with class conflicts triggered by economic upheaval and the emergence of new classes.
Due to the diversity of political development models, although human society will ultimately move toward communism, the methods and paths chosen by different countries will inevitably differ. Lenin said:
“On the road by which mankind moves from today’s imperialism to tomorrow’s socialist revolution, this diversity is likewise revealed. All nations will arrive at socialism—this is inevitable—but not in exactly the same way. Each nation will have its own distinctive features in one or another form of democracy, one or another type of dictatorship of the proletariat, and the tempo of the socialist transformation of social life. There is nothing more meager in theory or more ridiculous in practice than painting the future in a single light-gray color ‘for the sake of historical materialism’—for at best, this would be no more than the wretched painting of the town of Suzdal.”
Since different countries have transitioned from capitalism to socialism in different ways, the methods by which they develop socialism will also differ. The factors that determine how each country reaches socialism will not be completely eliminated once socialism has been established. These factors include local characteristics, economic structures, lifestyles, historical traditions, customs, habits, the level of political consciousness among the population, and revolutionary experience. These differences will naturally be reflected in socialist revolutions and constructions, thereby determining their diversity.
Theory and practice both suggest that the more diverse development is, the more likely it is to achieve its goals. Fundamentally, this diversity is not pursued for novelty’s sake. Rather, it is grounded in a country’s realities and needs and serves as the basis for its development path. It is also based on objective reality and seeking truth from facts. Lenin strongly approved of this kind of diversity. He said:
“The richer this diversity is—not for novelty’s sake, of course—the more reliably and quickly we will achieve democratic centralism and a socialist economy.”
At its root, the diversity of real development requires that, when promoting socialist construction and development, people closely integrate the basic theories of Marxism with their own country’s concrete conditions and follow a path suited to their national circumstances. Only then can the expected goals of socialist construction be reached in each country. Therefore, Lenin said:
“The task of communists is to apply the basic principles of communism to the specific features of class and party relations, as well as the specific features of objective development toward communism. These features differ from country to country, so we must study, seek out, and discern them.”
Deng Xiaoping proposed that China follow a path of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” precisely because he understood the importance of diverse social and political developments across countries. Deng said:
“Our modernization program must proceed from China’s actual conditions. Whether in revolution or construction, we should pay attention to learning from and drawing on foreign experience. However, blindly copying foreign models has never led to success. We have learned many lessons in this regard. We must integrate the universal truth of Marxism with China’s concrete realities, forge our own path, and build socialism with Chinese characteristics. This is the basic conclusion we have reached after reflecting on our long history.”
Deng Xiaoping believed that China’s political system reforms and democratization should be based on China’s national conditions. In 1986, he envisioned a political system reform with three main goals: first, maintaining the vitality of the Party and the state; second, overcoming bureaucratism and increasing efficiency; and third, encouraging the initiative of grassroots units, workers, peasants, and intellectuals. He advocated for the ongoing exploration of China’s political system reform and democratic political development.
Third Section: Political Development Is Both Universal and Particular
I. Political development is a universal phenomenon
When evaluating Marx and Engels’s view of social history, Lenin argued that
they regarded society as a living organism in a state of constant development based on the dialectical method.
This analysis aligns with the thoughts of Marx and Engels themselves. Engels expressed the same idea when analyzing the difference between historical materialism and the mechanical materialism of the eighteenth century. He said:
“Modern materialism regards history as the process of human development, and its task is to discover the laws of motion of this process.”
Thus, it is evident that development is a fundamental attribute of social existence in Marxism.
Political life is an integral part of social life. Historical facts demonstrate that social development is the foundation of political development, and that any form of politics develops alongside social development. Just as development is a fundamental attribute of social existence, it is also a fundamental attribute of political existence. In this sense, political development is a universal phenomenon. In any society that still requires politics, the question of how to develop further always arises. Development permeates a society’s entire political history.
The Marxist conception of political development differs greatly from that of modern Western political scientists. In the modern West, the concept of “political development” emerged in response to challenges developing countries face, such as establishing political systems, strengthening political stability, and developing democratic politics. Western scholars therefore believe that developing countries are primarily responsible for political development and that an ideal model should be based on Western political systems.
Clearly, Western scholars view political development as a narrow and limited form of development. This is reflected in two ways. First, they consider Western political systems to be the ideal. They believe that once developing countries reach this goal, their politics will become stable, democratic, and modern. Second, they consider this type of development to be a significant issue only for developing countries. They claim that developed countries do not face this problem. These two points alone reveal the flaws in the modern Western conception of political development.
First, it is Western-centric, elevating Western political systems to a universal standard.
Second, this conception ignores the unique national and historical characteristics of political development, as well as the diversity of development paths.
Third, this conception denies the universal nature of political development — an essential attribute of political existence — and deliberately excludes Western social and political life from the category of development.
These errors are in complete opposition to the fundamental principles of the Marxist conception of political development.
According to Marxist theories of political development, political development is a universal phenomenon and problem that every society’s politics must confront. Due to historical, social, and cultural factors, developing countries typically face more significant and pressing challenges in this regard. However, political development is not solely an issue for developing countries; it is also a problem for developed countries. The history of developed countries demonstrates this. At the same time, Marxist theories of political development maintain that the fundamental principles of political development are universal and shared by all countries. In this sense, the inner laws and fundamental tendencies of development have universal significance.
Nevertheless, Marxism does not conclude that the political development model of any one country or region must have universal meaning and value, serving as a template for all others. On the contrary, the Marxist view of development fully affirms the value and significance of diverse political development models. Facts support the validity of this Marxist perspective on political development. The developmental histories of developing countries demonstrate that the political systems and principles promoted by Western scholars and politicians have not become firmly established. The much-touted “democracy experiments” have either failed or survived only in name; quite a few developing countries remain in persistent turmoil and disorder.
The universality of political development means that Western countries will inevitably face political development problems, too. Socialist countries are no exception; China’s reform experience shows that political development is necessary for them as well. Advanced Western countries’ political systems have already reached a relatively complete and mature stage after several centuries of evolution and development. They meet the four standards that Samuel Huntington proposed based on Western political systems:
Adaptability,
Complexity,
Autonomy, and
Coherence.
However, this does not mean that the system can respond to all changes without changing itself. Earlier analyses of differences in political development across earlier and later capitalist periods show that capitalist political systems develop alongside changes in capitalist economic life. In his book Late Capitalism, Belgian scholar Ernest Mandel [Translator’s note: available online. ] attempts to analyze Western countries using Marxism, arguing that during the period of “late capitalism,” the state inherently tends to bring more sectors of production and reproduction under state-financed conditions. In other words, the more capitalism develops, the more the state’s political structure develops as well. In this sense, Western countries, no less than developing countries, face political development as well.
The universality of political development is determined by the fundamental nature of politics itself. As long as humanity needs politics, political development will be universal and enduring. In other words, regardless of whether a society is consciously aware of it, it cannot ultimately avoid the challenge of political development. Positive political development helps political systems become more complete and mature, enabling society to make greater progress. However, the universality and enduring nature of political development does not mean that every country faces political development problems at all times.
Political development is shaped by the interaction of many factors and forces in social life, with economic and material conditions serving as the decisive force. When existing political forms can accommodate economic development, political development appears relatively balanced or slow because political tasks are not heavy or urgent. Conversely, when real social development falls into a severe crisis and cannot provide the necessary conditions for political development, politics enters a state of non-development. These situations are exceptional and temporary, whether in the former or latter case. The necessary requirements of social development itself will drive them back from the static to the dynamic so that political development re-enters the general current of universal development.
II. The Process of Political Development Does Not Rule Out Particularity
In his summary of the Russian Revolution, Lenin pointed out:
“The general laws of world history do not in the least exclude, but rather presuppose, that individual stages of development may display peculiarities in the form or sequence of that development.”
Lenin expressed two fundamental ideas here. First, although historical development is constrained by general laws of motion, it also exhibits unity and universality. Yet, at certain stages, it exhibits specificity and diversity. Second, the specificity and diversity that appear in development do not negate the general laws of motion. Rather, they create the conditions for the realization of those laws. Lenin classified developmental particularity into two categories.
The first is particularity in the form of development, which was analyzed in the previous discussion of “the diversity of political development models.”
The other is particularity in the sequence of development. Generally, the particularity of political development sequences stems from the particularity of social development sequences because the specific process and trajectory of political development are determined by social development.
Based on an understanding of the historical development of human society, Marxism posits that humanity will progress through several social formations in sequence: primitive, slave, feudal, capitalist, and communist societies. Socialist society is the initial stage of communist society. Marxism maintains that these five social formations are typical and each has a corresponding political superstructure that will change and develop as the formations succeed one another. However, these social formations are not fixed templates. Their typical character and sequential succession does not preclude the particularity and diversity of concrete development paths. The “particularity of the sequence of development” that Lenin spoke of mainly concerns these social formations and their replacement. In the historical development of human society, the particularity of the sequence is chiefly manifested in two respects.
First, the practical logic of actual development does not align with theoretical logic. Historical development is not usually carried out according to a common will or theoretical design. It is affected by a variety of real-world factors, and its ultimate direction is driven by the force resulting from the combined action of those factors within specific economic relations. Thus, particular countries often do not unfold according to theoretical logic due to various special factors tied to their own circumstances (even though theoretical logic has proven its validity across the overall sweep of historical development). Instead, they unfold according to a practical logic determined by those factors and do not align with the broader trend of world development.
For instance, China’s social-historical development progressed from primitive society to slave society and then to feudal society. However, it did not develop into a typical capitalist society. In fact, due to various historical circumstances, it became a semi-colonial, semi-feudal society. This type of society is a unique blend of feudalism and colonialism that emerged when world history entered the imperialist era. Therefore, fundamentally, it did not break away from the common route of world development. It was the result of the common route’s necessary tendency interacting with the country’s special circumstances. This unique path of development hindered China’s traditional feudal political superstructure from evolving into a more advanced political system.
Second, a kind of “leap” can occur in the historical development of social formations. In other words, some peoples or societies may be able to skip one or several stages of development by relying on certain special conditions and enter directly into a higher stage. Such leaps are often preceded by a leap in political development. First, state power is seized, and then a new society is organized and built in accordance with new social ideals and requirements.
Both the socialist societies established by the Russian October Revolution and China’s socialist revolution display this “leap” character to some extent when viewed in terms of each country’s historical trajectory. This kind of forward leap was achieved by first seizing power and establishing a new political system. When Lenin criticized the mistaken view that
“Russia’s productive forces have not yet developed to a level sufficient to realize socialism,”
he argued that establishing socialist state power would resolve the issue. He said:
“Since building socialism requires a certain level of culture, why can’t we first use revolutionary means to obtain the preconditions for reaching that level? Then, based on workers’ and peasants’ power and the Soviet system, we can catch up with other countries.”
In the face of increasingly favorable conditions for a socialist revolution and its implementation, Lenin rejected the rigid model that required Russia to follow the path of Western European capitalist and bourgeois-democratic development.
According to Marxism, the patterns and sequences that emerge during political development are not merely the result of human design or intention. Rather, these patterns arise from two sets of factors: the differences in the objective conditions on which political development depends, and the development’s own complexity.
First, political development itself is an extremely complex system. While ultimately constrained by the laws governing economic motion, political development is brought about by economic motion and many other factors. Engels repeatedly stressed that the historical process unfolds through the interaction of all these factors. Although economic motion is the most important factor, it is not the only factor. Political development is also influenced by social, historical, cultural, psychological, and other factors involving leaders and the masses, as well as natural factors. Political development must adapt to and balance within the broader environment formed by these factors. In different historical periods and under different sociohistorical conditions, the combined force formed by these factors and the direction of that force differ. This can cause political development to display special characteristics during a given process or stage.
Second, the political development of different countries relies on different objective conditions, which is an important reason why political development takes on special characteristics in some countries. Marx pointed out:
“The same economic basis—the same from the standpoint of its main conditions—can, owing to innumerable different empirical circumstances, natural environments, racial relations, external historical influences, and so on, show infinite variations and gradations in appearance, which can be ascertained only by analyzing the empirically given circumstances.”
These variations occur when the same economic basis operates under each country’s unique historical, social, and cultural circumstances. During the same historical period and on the same economic basis, these variations directly determine that the political development of different countries will exhibit distinct characteristics. Of course, these special forms of political development do not cause development itself to deviate from the general trajectory of world political development during that period.
In summary, political development is a universal task that all countries must confront, and it unfolds according to the general laws of historical development. However, differences in social, historical, and cultural factors mean that political development often proceeds through particular forms and processes in different countries. These particular forms and processes fully display each country’s national character and historical continuity. Thus, while Marxism holds that political development is an important component of social development and is constrained by a unified set of laws that unfold along the necessary tendency of historical development, it does not assume that political development follows a fixed model or course in all countries. Rather, Marxism emphasizes that each country’s political development should be based on its historical and real conditions. Because the concrete processes of political development in different countries influence and constrain one another, Marxism holds that the direction and mainstream of political development in each historical period are revealed amid the diversity and differences of political development across countries.
Section Four: Political Development: Necessity and Contingency
I. In development, necessity is dominant
Political development has its own internal laws and unfolds within the confines of those laws. However, every society’s political development is brought about through the interaction of multiple factors, including social, historical, cultural, psychological, and natural factors, among others. Therefore, any instance of political development embodies the dialectical unity between necessity and contingency.
The necessity of political development refers to its unshakable, law-governed tendency. This tendency makes political development an unavoidable process under certain conditions. Conversely, the contingency of political development refers to wavering or deviations within the necessary process—an indeterminate tendency in which development could occur in various ways. Marxism holds that each political development contains both necessity and contingency, which coexist in a dialectically unified relationship. In political development, necessity occupies the leading and governing position, and contingency supplements and expresses necessity. Therefore, necessity plays a decisive role in political development.
The inevitability of political development is the outward expression of the internal laws that govern it. From a Marxist perspective, all social movements are natural-historical processes that obey specific laws. These laws are objective and do not change with human will. Thus, when these laws act upon social movements and determine social development, the inevitable movement and development are their external forms of expression. This means that, despite the presence of many accidental factors, the laws will still make themselves evident through the inevitability of development. As Engels put it:
“The more a social activity or series of social processes becomes too powerful for conscious control, grows beyond people’s control, and appears to be a matter of pure chance, the more surely the laws peculiar to it assert themselves as if by natural necessity.”
Throughout human history, as societies become more developed politically and socially, laws take effect and people’s actions become less important. Under these conditions, the resulting development becomes even more historically inevitable.
Politics is the concentrated expression of economics. Political development is determined by economic development and advances alongside it. This is the fundamental principle of political development. Thus, the inevitability of political development is ultimately the inevitability of economic development. In other words, political development must move in the same direction as economic development. Engels said:
“The further the field moves away from economics and approaches pure abstract thought, the more chance will dominate its development and the more crooked its curve will appear. However, if you draw the average axis of the curve, you will find that the longer the period considered and the wider the field examined, the more parallel this axis will be to the axis of economic development.”
Marx-Engels Correspondence 1894, Engels to Borgius, London, January 25, 1894
While it is difficult to draw a central axis in the trajectory of ideological development, it is relatively easy to do so in the tortuous course of political development. Once that axis is identified, the basic principle of political development becomes apparent: inevitability occupies the dominant, governing position and guides the entire process.
Political development depends on economic development. This means that political development will be incomplete or temporary until it obtains the corresponding material foundation in economic development. In other words, sufficient material forces are needed to propel inevitability to its fullest potential. Marx said:
“As long as the material conditions necessary for the abolition of the bourgeois mode of production have not been created in the course of history, the proletariat’s victory over the bourgeoisie will only be temporary and in service to the bourgeois revolution itself, as in 1794.”
Accordingly, the inevitability of political development is not the same as actuality. To transform the dominant inevitability into a concrete, real movement requires the driving force of economic motion and the necessary material foundation formed by it.
In political development, the dominant necessity is mainly manifested in three forms:
(1) The necessity of development itself. In social life, development is an essential attribute of politics. There is no such thing as politics that never develop. This means that development is inevitable for politics, while non-development is only temporary. Marx said:
“When the material conditions of a society’s existence develop to the point where they urgently require a change in it s official political forms, the entire political physiognomy of the old regime changes.”
(2) The necessity of the operation of laws. At any time and under any conditions, political development is inevitably governed by its own internal laws. No matter how large the human factor may be, every stage of development is fundamentally the result of these internal laws at work. As Engels said,
“In the realm of social history, those who act are conscious people who act after deliberation or out of passion and pursue some purpose. Nothing happens without conscious intention or an intended aim.”
However, this “cannot in the least alter the fact that the course of history is governed by inner general laws.”
(3) The necessity of development direction. Throughout history, the ultimate direction of political development has never been set by human design. Rather, it has been determined by the laws that govern social movement development. Therefore, this direction is necessary from the beginning of political development. As Mao Zedong said,
“This is a law of history, an inevitable and irresistible trend; no force can reverse it.”
On the other hand, when viewed across the entire course of human history, political development has always progressed in steps under the guidance of necessary historical trends. According to Marxism, the necessary direction of social and political development in all countries is socialism and communism.
Political development does not exist in isolation from the process of its realization. Once political development accumulates sufficient strength and a qualitative leap becomes possible, its necessity expresses itself through a series of contingencies, carving out a path in the process. According to Marxism, contingency supplements and expresses necessity, and there is no necessity divorced from contingency.
Mao Zedong said:
“What makes a thing so is necessity, and the form in which this necessity manifests itself is contingency. Every form in which necessity manifests itself is contingency, and necessity manifests itself through contingency. Therefore, ‘Without this particular cause, the Wuchang Uprising would certainly not have occurred on October 10,’ is correct. However, the necessity of the 1911 Revolution (the major cause) was bound to erupt through another contingency (the minor cause) and be carried through to completion through countless contingencies (the minor causes)—perhaps becoming the Hanyang Uprising on October 11 or an uprising in another place, on another day, in another month. ‘If it does not break out at the most appropriate moment, it will not necessarily become a prairie fire’ is correct, but it was also bound to break out at another most appropriate moment and become a prairie fire.”
Mao’s analysis of the relationship between necessity and contingency in the 1911 Revolution shows that no matter the nature, content, or form of political development, there is no development that appears as pure necessity without passing through contingency.
II. Contingency’s Dual Role in Development
Political development has both a necessary and a contingent aspect. Contingency is indispensable to political development as a supplement to necessity and as the form in which necessity appears. Although it is not the decisive factor, contingency can still exert a significant influence on political development. Marx said:
“On the other hand, if ‘accidents’ played no part whatsoever, world history would have a very mystical character.”
According to Marx, contingency has a twofold effect on socio-political development. First, it can speed things up. Second, it can slow them down. As he put it:
“The acceleration and retardation of developments depend greatly on such ‘accidents,’ including the ‘accident’ of the character of the individuals who first lead the movement.”
Contingent circumstances in political development are limitless and may affect development at any moment.
Judging from the theoretical logic of political development and historical facts, contingent factors tend to have a relatively greater impact on political development when it is still in the stage of quantitative accumulation—when it has not yet formed a powerful momentum or realized its necessity due to a lack of corresponding material conditions. This is evident in Engels’s analysis of Germany’s social and political situation in 1892. Engels said that, in Germany,
“capitalist society has not yet taken control of the state in form; it has had to let the hereditary monarch, the bureaucrats, and the Junker landlord class rule, contenting itself with the fact that its own interests are ultimately decisive.”
He added that
“Germany today is wavering between two tendencies. On the one hand, all official and propertied social strata are forming an alliance against the proletariat. Ultimately, this tendency will lead to the formation of a ‘reactionary gang,’ which will gain the upper hand under conditions of peaceful development. On the other hand, there is a tendency to repeatedly put old, unresolved conflicts back on the agenda out of cowardice. These conflicts are between a monarchy that preserves remnants of absolutism, the landed aristocracy, and a bureaucracy that imagines itself above all parties, and an industrial bourgeoisie whose material interests are harmed daily by these moribund factors.”
Engels concluded that the tendency that gains the upper hand at a given moment depends on personal, local, and other such circumstances. Situations in which such factors determine the overall course of development are temporary. Ultimately, they will be overcome by the necessity inherent in development itself. As the factors of necessity increase, the significance of contingency naturally declines.
Contingency plays a twofold role in political development. First, it can accelerate events. This accelerating effect can be crucial for political development at a given stage. However, when viewed across the entire course of development, it is auxiliary, not decisive. In other words, no matter how many contingent factors appear, they cannot produce a decisive acceleration of political development unless the necessary objective and subjective conditions are in place.
Consider France, for example. Without the English Revolution of the seventeenth century serving as a rehearsal, the American Revolution ushering in a new era in which the bourgeoisie triumphed in the eighteenth century, the efforts of Enlightenment thinkers broadening French minds, the vanguard of a philosophical revolution, and the growth and strengthening of the French bourgeoisie alongside the comprehensive crisis of feudal rule, certain contingent economic factors, such as grain shortages, would not have become the main driving force behind the people of Paris storming the Bastille. Likewise, the fall of the Bastille would not have immediately unleashed the most thorough and profound bourgeois revolution in French history. Nor would the “miracle” have occurred whereby the French people overcame all feudal obligations in a single day, just three weeks after taking the Bastille.
Throughout world history, many social and political revolutions have likewise been propelled by such contingent factors. When analyzing the class struggles in France from 1848 to 1850, Marx noted that two significant economic events accelerated the outbreak of European revolutions.
“The potato blight and crop failures of 1845 and 1846 increased the general unrest among the people. The famine of 1847 sparked bloody conflicts in France and the rest of Europe. The second significant economic event that hastened the outbreak of revolution was a general commercial and industrial crisis in England. The aftereffects of this crisis on the continent had not yet run their course when the February Revolution broke out.” ”
However, Marxism reminds us not to treat these contingent factors as the sole cause of the movement or revolution. Rather, they merely accelerate it, like a fuse on a cannon already packed with powder and aimed at its target. Nevertheless, since these factors clear the path for the ultimate realization of necessity, they can play a pivotal role in the movement and its development.
According to Marx, contingent factors that can accelerate or slow socio-political development include “accidents,” such as the characteristics of individuals who are at the forefront of a movement from the beginning. Experience shows that individuals can play a decisive role in accelerating political development. Engels believed that Marx’s presence had precisely this kind of significance for social history. When discussing how necessity often clears a path through contingencies, Engels used Marx’s discovery of the materialist conception of history as an example. Engels wrote,
“While Marx discovered the materialist conception of history, Thierry, Mignet, Guizot, and all the English historians up to 1850 are proof that it was striven for. The discovery of the same conception by Morgan proves that the time was ripe for it and that it indeed had to be discovered.”
Marx-Engels Correspondence 1894, Engels to Borgius, London, January 25, 1894
In other words: In one sense, Marx’s discovery of historical materialism was a historical accident because, by that point in history, others would have made the discovery if Marx had not. The discovery was necessary, but who made it was contingent. Yet the fact that Marx was the one to discover historical materialism had a profound impact on proletarian revolution worldwide and on the development of world history itself. When Marx died, Engels offered this appraisal of him:
“Whatever we are, we are through him, and whatever the movement of today is, it is through his theoretical and practical work. Without him, we would still be stuck in the mire of confusion.”
Marx’s case clearly shows that a person’s place in history and society is not predetermined. However, their presence can greatly advance socio-political development.
Of course, individuals who appear in history can also hinder development. In nineteenth-century France, for example, Bonaparte—the most insignificant figure in the world—pushed France back into an era of wearing Napoleon’s uniform after staging a parody of the Eighteenth Brumaire that was ridiculous beyond belief. From that point forward, French history entered an extremely farcical stage.
Contingent factors play a dual role in development; they can promote or impede progress. During social and political development, the emergence of a chance circumstance can impede progress, influence the direction of development, or alter it entirely. In the former case, development slows down or stops. In the latter case, development takes a more circuitous route, delaying the time needed to achieve its goals.
Many factors emerge during political development that are difficult to predict. However, advancing political development hinges on knowing how to grasp, assess, and respond to the effects produced by these factors.
First, one should probe the necessity reflected by all kinds of contingencies, whether positive or negative, and thus accurately judge the timing, conditions, and problems facing political development. This ensures that political development does not miss emerging opportunities and that problems arising in political development are promptly resolved at their first appearance, thus ensuring the smooth progress of political development.
Second, one should leverage the propelling effect of contingent factors to accelerate the realization of political development’s internal necessity. At the same time, one should work to eliminate the effects of negative contingent factors, adopting corresponding remedial measures to advance political development as much as possible.
Section Five: Political Development as a Conscious Political Activity
I. The laws of political development are objective
Political development is an essential part of overall social development. Any form of political development emerges through people’s active participation and collaborative efforts. When promoting political development, people have conscious intentions and anticipated goals. They hope that political development will unfold according to their plans so they can achieve their desired outcomes. Thus, it may seem that social and political development is entirely the result of people’s subjective will and efforts, and not lawful or necessary. However, this is not the case. Marxism holds that political development unfolds with people’s participation and is influenced by their consciousness and goal-seeking. Nevertheless, it follows objective laws independent of human will.
Examining the histories of countries around the world reveals that the political development of any country at any given time reflects the interests of particular social classes, political groups, and individuals. For instance, the establishment and development of American federalism are connected to the federalism promoted by the Federalists, led by figures such as Madison and Hamilton. The French Revolution’s radical transformation and relentless struggle to establish a bourgeois democratic republic are linked to Enlightenment thinkers, particularly the radical ideas of Rousseau. Nevertheless, political development is not solely determined by those who participate in or guide it.
Those who participate in or guide political development do so first as social beings, not as subjects of consciousness. As such, people participate in and influence political development under the influence of the laws of social development. Therefore, they merely function as one element in the developmental process. No matter how much they may fantasize, they cannot become “legislators” who stand outside the process and determine political development. This is just as Marx said.
“The development of the economic formation of society is a process of natural history. In the social sense, a person is the product of these relations, however much he may subjectively raise himself above them.”
Therefore, when Engels evaluated eighteenth-century thinkers, he acknowledged their greatness and tremendous influence. However, he also noted that “they could not transcend the limitations imposed by their era.” This was not only true of eighteenth-century thinkers, but also of thinkers before and after them.
Human participation and guidance can significantly impact the process of political development. However, its impact is insufficient to alter the underlying laws and overall trajectory of political development. According to Marxism, political development, like social development, has an inherent trend that emerges from fundamental forces and is not subject to individual will. Engels made this point particularly well when he spoke about how the history people create does not bend to their will.
The eventual outcome always emerges from the clash of many individual wills, and each of those wills, in turn, is made what it is by many particular conditions of life. In this way there are countless forces crossing and interweaving, countless “parallelograms of forces,” and from all this a single overall result is produced—the historical event. This result can itself be viewed as the product of a power that, taken as a whole, works unconsciously and without intending to do so. For any one person’s desire is checked by another’s, and in the end what comes about is something no one had wished for. Thus past history always proceeds in the manner of a natural process, and in substance it is governed by the same laws of motion.
But although the will of each individual—each of whom wants what his constitution and the external circumstances (ultimately economic ones, whether personal or generally social) lead him to want—does not achieve its own aim, and although these wills merge into a general average, into an overall resultant force, it does not follow in the slightest that they amount to zero. On the contrary, each will contributes to the resultant, and is therefore included within it.
Human beings differ from animals in that they consciously create their own history. In that sense, the process of human social development is a process of conscious human activity. This activity does not discard or alter the objective laws of social development. Rather, it is expressed through people’s understanding and application of these laws. The history of social development shows that these laws are objective yet not unknowable or beyond human control. Historical materialism affirms the objective nature of these laws to provide a solid and reliable foundation for people’s conscious actions and to establish a scientific basis for maximizing human initiative and agency in social development.
Similarly, socio-political development is a process of conscious activity. This is determined not only by the fact that human beings create history but also by the intrinsic relationship between human beings and political life. Over two thousand years ago, the renowned ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle proposed the significant idea that “man is by nature a political animal,” arguing that anyone who does not participate in the political life of the city-state is either a beast or a god. Marx affirmed and further developed Aristotle’s proposition.
“Man is, in the most literal sense, a political animal—not merely a gregarious animal, but an animal that can become an individual only in the midst of society.”
Karl Marx, Introduction, Late August – Mid-September 1857
Clearly, for Marx, man is a political animal not only in terms of human essence, but also in terms of human social existence. Therefore, in the course of social-historical development, the relationship between human beings and socio-political life is extremely close. Human development is directly connected to the development of socio-political life. This means that, although political development has its own internal, objective laws that are independent of human will, people’s conscious activity propels its actual movement.
Examining the history of human social development reveals that people’s conscious activity in political development manifests in three primary forms:
(1) Participating in political development. A human being is the sum of all social relations—not only a social being, but also a political being. Therefore, whether people want it or not, most people participate in political life or are affected by it. In their interaction with political life, people inevitably bring their wishes, demands, and goals into that life, hoping to realize them through political activity. The continual aggregation, exchange, and impact of these wishes, demands, and goals pushes political development forward, sometimes intentionally and sometimes unintentionally. In class societies, as participation takes the form of class participation, the principal aim is to obtain political power. The struggles various classes wage for political power determine how political power is allocated and, in turn, the changes in political forms that follow from that allocation.
(2) Studying political rule. Marxism holds that ever since society split into classes and the state arose on that basis, the ruling class has explored—both in practice and in theory—how to realize political domination effectively. In the West, Aristotle’s theory of constitutions; Augustine’s and Aquinas’s theological political doctrines; Bodin’s theory of sovereignty; Machiavelli’s doctrine of princely power; the natural-law theories, social-contract doctrines, and theories of the separation of powers of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Montesquieu, and others; and modern liberal political theory represented by J. S. Mill not only summarized the political development of Western societies in various periods, but also provided theoretical foundations for political development in new periods.
In China, the Confucian theory of “cultivate the self, regulate the family, govern the state, and bring peace to all under heaven” supplied important guiding principles for the political development of China’s more than two thousand years of feudal society.
(3) Transforming political forms. Marx repeatedly pointed out:
“With the change of the economic foundation, the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed.”
Transformation is inevitable, but whether it proceeds faster or slower, it still requires the impetus of people’s conscious activity. In class societies, this mainly appears as the conscious drive of the class seeking to win rule. In his conversation with the British writer H. G. Wells, Stalin repeatedly emphasized:
“The process by which one social system is replaced by another is not regarded by Communists as a simply spontaneous and peaceful process, but as a complicated, long, and violent process.”
In that process, the new class must wage a ruthless struggle against the old class to seize political power and remake or destroy the old political forms, thereby driving political development forward.
According to Marxism, people’s active and effective conscious activity in political development is grounded in a deep understanding and comprehensive grasp of the internal laws of political development. Conscious activity based on these laws has two meanings:
(1) It enables the forces that propel political development to operate as much as possible in the desired direction. Engels said:
“Active social forces work exactly like natural forces: blindly, forcibly, destructively, so long as we do not understand, and reckon with, them. But, when once we understand them, when once we grasp their action, their direction, their effects, it depends only upon ourselves to subject them more and more to our own will, and, by means of them, to reach our own ends.”
(2) It allows political development to proceed smoothly and helps avoid unnecessary detours. Once people understand the laws of motion, they can participate in and promote political development in a way that is consistent with those laws. This ensures that positive forces with beneficial effects occupy the dominant position in the “resultant force” driving political development. Under these conditions, political development can progress rapidly. Marx noted in Capital:
“A society can no more leap over the natural phases of its development than it can remove them by decree. But it can shorten and lessen the birth-pangs.”
Political development is an extremely complex systems project. To promote political development, people must understand and grasp its laws from multiple angles. This involves exploring the laws’ specific content, modes of operation, and movement trends at different levels and from different perspectives. The main things people must grasp in advancing political development include:
(1) The social foundations of political development, especially its economic foundation. Political development is determined and driven by economic development. The level and prospects of economic development directly determine the preconditions and potential of political development. The economic foundation involves two main aspects: first, material and technological capabilities, and second, the economic system. The former indirectly affects political development, while the latter directly affects it. Advances in material and technological capabilities change patterns of economic life and the economic system, triggering changes in the political system. Additionally, material and technological capabilities determine the overall scale and scope of political development because their strength directly affects society’s capacity to absorb and sustain political development.
(2) Interest relationships among classes, strata, and groups in political development. Political development belongs to the superstructure, and its fundamental driving force is economic movement. However, as political development unfolds, it becomes directly connected to conflicts, struggles, bargaining, and transactions among social classes, strata, and groups representing different economic interests in the political arena. Thus, Marxism holds that economic interests determine political and legal institutions. The resulting force formed through the conflict, offsetting, convergence, and supplementation of different classes’, strata’, and groups’ interests in the political sphere directly determines the direction, process, and methods of political development. Therefore, clearly recognizing and grasping the interest relationships among classes, strata, and groups within political development also helps one recognize the main forces and trends of political development. This allows one to determine the strategies and measures that should be adopted to further political development.
(3) The historical and cultural background of political development. According to Marxism, all social development unfolds based on certain historical premises and the social conditions specified by those premises. Political development is no exception. Therefore, when choosing the path and goals of political development, one must take into account the historical background, cultural atmosphere, social psychology, and national temperament that shape it. If one ignores these historical and cultural factors and relies entirely on subjective desires and imagination to determine the path and goals of political development, no matter how much effort is expended, the final outcome will be worthless and end in painful circumstances. The eighteenth-century Enlightenment thinker Montesquieu offered a comprehensive analysis and discussion of this point. The three aforementioned aspects operate together to determine political development. Therefore, to grasp the specific laws of political development, one must make concrete analyses of the various factors and their potential effects and also grasp the overall relationships among these three factors and how they shape political development.
III. Political development must correspond to social development
Marxism holds that political development has relative independence and does not necessarily proceed in step with the development of the social-economic foundation: it may run ahead of economic development, or it may lag behind it. For the overall development of society as a whole, the spatial and formal distance between political development and socio-economic development is not the essence of the problem. The essence lies in whether the overall direction of political development is consistent with the direction of social development, and whether a healthy, mutually reinforcing cycle of interaction can form between political development and socio-economic development. This is the question of whether political development should correspond to social development.
Political development is a process in which people consciously participate, guide, and propel changes in political life. Therefore, the compatibility of political and social development largely depends on how human initiative is applied to political development.
The relationship between political and social development is reflected in two main respects.
(1) Political development should actively and proactively advance alongside social development and, above all, correspond to socioeconomic development, the core of social development. The main objective of this development is to ensure that political power continually
“works in the sense and direction of natural economic development.”
In this way, no conflict arises between the two, and economic development accelerates. Thus, political development can form a healthy, mutually reinforcing relationship with economic development, promoting social progress and development. For various reasons, the political superstructure often lags behind the development of the economic base. This necessitates actively pushing political development forward so that it can adapt to changes in socioeconomic life.
(2) Socioeconomic development can create opportunities for political development and establish the conditions under which certain trends emerge. Under these conditions, due to people’s conscious and creative activity, political development can outpace socio-economic development in some respects. However, when people push a trend-forming political development too hard, it may swing to the other extreme, charging blindly toward an ideal while forgetting the foundation and real possibilities provided by actual social and economic development. History shows that this kind of excessively “ahead-of-its-time” political development can cause political and economic development to diverge, eliminating the possibility of healthy interaction between the two. In such circumstances, political development fails to open new spaces and possibilities for socioeconomic development. Instead, it can throw economic development into disorder and lead it onto a mistaken path. Thus, when promoting political development, conscious initiative and creativity must not be based on subjective fantasies or impulsive passion. Rather, it must be based on the fundamental laws of motion and developmental tendencies of both the economy and politics. Only then can political and economic development form a mutually reinforcing relationship.
The above analysis shows that political development must adapt to social development. This means political development should be active and proactive, as well as controlled. In other words, rational and effective political development requires that the character and direction of development be consistent with the overall trend of social development and that there be a rational process and appropriate scale. The rationality of the process and scale depends on the economic conditions of real social life and on people’s understanding of those conditions when promoting political development.
The Chinese Communist Party’s goal was to establish and develop socialism in China. In 1939, when Mao Zedong considered how to achieve this goal, he did not treat it as an abstract concept or as something for which an abstract plan could be devised. Instead, he closely linked the realization of this goal with China’s specific national conditions. This formed a rational process for achieving the goal and defined the level each stage needed to reach. Mao emphasized that the objectives, tasks, motivating factors, and process of the Chinese revolution were all rooted in China’s social nature, or its specific national conditions. Based on his deep analysis of these conditions, Mao believed that the Chinese revolution should proceed in two stages. First, a bourgeois-democratic revolution would transform China’s colonial, semi-colonial, and semi-feudal social status. After this revolution’s victory, a socialist revolution would immediately follow. Mao said:
“To complete the bourgeois-democratic revolution in China (the new-democratic revolution) and, when all the necessary conditions are present, be prepared to transform it into the stage of socialist revolution—this is the entire glorious and great revolutionary task of the Chinese Communist Party.” He emphasized that these two revolutions are connected yet distinct: “The democratic revolution is the necessary preparation for the socialist revolution, and the socialist revolution is the inevitable trend of the democratic revolution. The ultimate goal of communists is to strive for the realization of a socialist and communist society. Only by recognizing the difference between the democratic and socialist revolutions, and at the same time recognizing their connection, can one correctly lead the Chinese revolution.”
Modern Chinese history has demonstrated the accuracy of Mao’s analysis and judgment of the revolutionary process based on China’s national conditions. China’s revolutionary experience shows that achieving the ultimate goal of political development requires a rational process. The stages and the level of development that each stage should reach must be determined entirely on the basis of a society’s specific national conditions.
The adaptation of political development to social development is comprehensive. It must adapt to a society’s changing socioeconomic life and history, cultural traditions, national spirit, and social psychology. These factors form the background of social development. Just as a society’s economic development determines the nature, tasks, driving forces, and process of political development, these background factors shape the concrete methods, pathways, and value principles by which political development is chosen and defined.
According to the Marxist view, people do not make their own history however they please; rather, they make it under conditions pre-established by historical factors.
Engels said:
“We make our own history, but in the first place, under very specific conditions and circumstances. Among these, the economic conditions are ultimately decisive. However, the political conditions and traditions in people’s minds also play a role, albeit not the most significant one.”
Marx-Engels Correspondence 1890, Engels to J. Bloch In Königsberg, London, September 21, 1890
Regarding political development, Engels’s point is that any political development unfolds within specific premises and conditions. These premises and conditions include economic, historical, and cultural factors. In this sense, the political development of any society cannot abandon its historical and cultural background entirely. Rather, it should be compatible with that background. The purpose of compatibility is to develop better. Since these historical and cultural factors develop alongside society, this kind of compatibility must be creative. History has shown that political development that disregards historicity and national particularity will ultimately fall into crisis and collapse because such development cannot be fully accepted or aligned with a society’s prevailing spirit.
Author: Tang Zhihua Release Date: December 27, 2013
Tang Zhihua is Vice Dean of the School of Politics and Public Administration at Guangxi Normal University, Professor, Doctoral Supervisor, Visiting Scholar at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London. Research Focus: Theory and Practice of Adapting Marxism to the Chinese Context.
The Short Course on the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (hereinafter referred to as the “Short Course”) was published in September 1938 and subsequently introduced to China from the Soviet Union. The study, promotion, and research of the Short Course underwent two periods of heightened focus: one during the Yan’an Rectification Movement and the early years of the People’s Republic and another from the early to late 1950s. The latter period was driven by the desire to learn from the Soviet experience in socialist construction. Influenced by the Stalinist model, these periods emphasized the theoretical study and promotional dissemination of the Short Course with limited academic research. Following China’s reforms in the 1980s and the subsequent changes to traditional socialist models, critical reflection began on the theoretical synthesis of the Stalinist model, including the Short Course.
From the late 1980s to the early 1990s and continuing through 2005, research on the Concise History entered a fifteen-year period of relative inactivity in China, influenced by the dramatic changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
In July 2004, the Russian Ministry of Education republished A Short Course on the History of the CPSU(B) and distributed it as a reference textbook for history courses at Russian universities. This event reignited academic interest in A Short Course in China. From late 2005 to early 2006, publications such as the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Journal, Red Flag Manuscripts, Century Tide, Chinese Spirit, and the World Socialist Tracking Report featured articles introducing the work. 2005 successively featured articles introducing the work. This sparked a new wave of research on the Concise History. Over the past three decades, since the early 1980s, Chinese scholars have primarily focused their studies of the Concise History on the following areas:
I. Research on the Origins of Compiling the Short Course and Its Translation and Publication in China
1. Why was the Short Course Written
Traditional views hold that it was a product of Stalin’s efforts to establish his theoretical authority. However, some scholars argue that analyzing and summarizing the origins of its compilation cannot be simplified by focusing on any single aspect. Rather, it must be examined from the perspective of the various “needs” of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), such as leader criticism, historical tradition, experiential education, unifying theory, interpreting practice, and establishing authority. A Short Course on the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) resulted from the interplay of multiple factors—nation and state, history and reality, theory and practice, party and leader—rather than a single purpose or demand. This complexity of genesis has led to diverse interpretations of the content, style, and function of A Short Course on the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks).
Some scholars, when analyzing the historical context and motivations behind the writing of “On Dialectical and Historical Materialism,” have suggested that the reason for compiling the “Short Course” was to: First, to clarify that dialectical and historical materialism constitute the theoretical foundation of proletarian revolution and the proletarian party. This served to honor the final wishes of Marx, Engels, and Lenin and synthesize the historical experience of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the socialist revolution and construction in the Soviet Union from a philosophical perspective. On the other hand, the compilation was also intended to adapt to the Party’s shift in political line, consolidate and perfect the Stalinist model of socialism, resolve academic issues, and establish Stalin’s personal theoretical authority.[2]
2. Regarding the Translation and Publication of “A Short Course” in China
Some scholars have proposed the “three-version theory.” Zhang Jingru and Tang Manzhen noted that the seventh chapter and conclusion of the book were translated into Chinese and published in the Yan’an-based weekly journal Liberation just two months after its publication in November 1938. Soon after, three Chinese translations began circulating.
The Chongqing translation, divided into two volumes, circulated widely in the hinterland provinces.
The Shanghai translation circulated primarily in Shanghai and areas where the New Fourth Army operated.
The Moscow Foreign Workers’ Publishing House translation, Considered the highest quality of the three, circulated primarily in the North China anti-Japanese base areas and the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, though it was also frequently seen in the interior provinces and throughout Central China.
Numerous reprints circulated in certain North China anti-Japanese bases. By March 1941, rough estimates indicate that 100,000 copies of The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had been distributed in China.[3]
Some scholars have proposed that there were four editions of the Concise Tutorial during the New Democratic period. Zhu Baoqiang observed that, when the Concise Tutorial was introduced from the Soviet Union to China in early 1939, four influential Chinese translations of it emerged domestically that same year.
The first was a translation of the Soviet Foreign Languages Press edition of the Tutorial. This version circulated widely in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, various anti-Japanese bases in northern China, and the rear areas throughout central China.
Second, three distinct Chinese editions emerged during the War of Resistance Against Japan and the Liberation War: the Chongqing China Publishing House edition, the Yan’an Liberation Press edition, and the Shanghai Qiming Press edition.
Zhu Baoqiang also highlighted the differing characteristics of these editions. Some argue that the Moscow, China Publishing House, and Liberation Press editions of the Short Course were “official” translations organized by “authoritative” bodies. These versions embodied the partisan consciousness and value aspirations of the Communist Parties of the Soviet Union and China. They received substantial support from organized forces and vigorous promotion by party propaganda organs. Consequently, these three translations exerted significant influence both within and outside the Party, enjoying extensive distribution and dissemination.
In contrast, the Shanghai Qiming Press edition of the Chinese translation of the Short Course, translated by Wu Qingyou 吳清友—a renowned Republic of China-era scholar with expertise in Soviet political history—reflected the author’s scholarly research on the history of the Soviet Communist Party. This edition, devoid of official overtones, differed from the aforementioned three translations in aspects such as its title, structure, and language.
Zhu Baoqiang pointed out that, after the founding of the People’s Republic, four editions of the Concise Textbook were published domestically: the People’s Publishing House edition, the large-print edition, the Central Compilation and Translation Bureau edition, and the editions in ethnic minority languages. He discussed the translation, publication, and dissemination of these editions. The People’s Publishing House edition achieved the highest national circulation, the widest dissemination, and the greatest influence after the founding of the nation. In 1980, the Nationalities Publishing House released the first two minority language versions of the Short Course: the Kazakh and Tibetan editions. These editions hold significant importance.
II. Research on the Influence of the Concise Tutorial on the Disciplines of Chinese Communist Party History and Soviet History
Because the Concise Tutorial was designated a Party history textbook, it profoundly influenced the study of the Chinese Communist Party’s history. Since the 1980s, domestic scholars have primarily examined the Concise Tutorial from the perspective of party history as an academic discipline.
In October 1988, six organizations, including the National Central Party History Research Association, jointly convened a symposium titled “The Influence of the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on the Study of the History of the Communist Party of China.” At the symposium, scholars acknowledged that the Short Course played a significant role in advancing research and teaching on the history of the Communist Party of China. However, they also agreed that the Short Course had a greater negative impact on the study of the history of the Communist Party of China.
First and foremost, it profoundly influenced the writing of the history of the Chinese Communist Party. During the Cultural Revolution, a prominent example was the rewriting of the Party’s history as a chronicle of ten ideological struggles. Another example is its impact on the compilation of Party history textbooks for higher education institutions. The 1961 publication Lectures on the History of the Chinese Communist Party, compiled by the Beijing Higher Education Collaborative Group, was modeled after it. The entire book inappropriately exaggerates the role of individual leaders in history, emphasizing Mao Zedong’s activities. Therefore, to reform Party history education and elevate the level of research on the history of the Chinese Communist Party, it is essential to reject the Party history system modeled on the Short Course and instead compile high-quality works on the history of the Chinese Communist Party in accordance with the requirements of the discipline of history.[6]
Wang Yu believes that the most detrimental impact of the Short Course on our country was that, for a long time, we treated it as the ultimate model for connecting theory and practice. We adopted a dogmatic attitude toward it, mistakenly treating the experience of one country—the Soviet Union—or a particular historical period as a universal Marxist truth. Consequently, we mechanically replicated Soviet practices, particularly those related to socialist revolution and construction. [7]
Liao Gailong believes that evaluations of the Short Course, as well as its impact on the history of the Chinese Communist Party, should take an analytical approach. The book has been widely circulated and highly praised in China and around the world. It possesses merits in both form and content, offering elements that are appealing and beneficial. In terms of language and narrative, the book is remarkably concise and fluent with vivid storytelling. Most sections integrate historical analysis with commentary, making the content easy to understand and accept while leaving a profound impression. He acknowledges its positive influence on the study and teaching of the history of the Chinese Communist Party. For example, it integrates universal Marxist principles with specific Chinese revolutionary practices, establishing Mao Zedong Thought as the primary theoretical framework for researching and teaching CPC history. Following the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee, the CPC Central Committee continued to adhere to this fundamental ideological principle. However, it was also noted that the Short Course contained significant errors that distorted history and deified Lenin and Stalin. The theory of expanding class struggle had previously led to grave errors, such as excessive purges and the wrongful execution of numerous innocent cadres and masses in various Soviet areas across China. This theory also significantly influenced Mao Zedong’s later “leftist” errors in expanding class struggle within socialist society.
Zhang Jingru pointed out that, during the formative period of Chinese Communist Party history studies, research in this field had already begun to be influenced by this book. This influence manifested primarily as an excessive emphasis on theoretical and critical content, prioritizing political significance while treating historical facts as mere accompaniment. The Short Course exerted a multifaceted influence on CPC history teaching and research, but its most fundamental impact stemmed from its approach. It was written according to the requirements of a theoretical discipline rather than a historical one. This misidentified the nature of the discipline and its subject of study. This persistent confusion about the discipline’s nature and research focus was an internal factor that hindered the normal development of CPC historiography.⁹
Gong Yuzhi analyzed the influence of The Short Course History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on the approval process for Chinese Communist Party history textbooks. He proposed the question: “How are Party history textbooks approved?” In the past, there was a model, namely the 1938 Concise Course in the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks). This model demonstrated its immense authority by openly declaring on the cover that the book was ‘approved by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks).’ Moreover, it incorporated nearly the entirety of Stalin’s Collected Works.” The CPC’s party history textbook approval process was profoundly influenced by this model, though it was not an exact replica of the Soviet approach. Gong Yuzhi contends that CPC party history textbook approval underwent several distinct models:
The first was the Yan’an model. In this model, the Central Committee plenary session adopted the Resolution on Certain Historical Issues. However, unlike the Soviet approach, this model did not involve compiling and publishing a Party history textbook approved by the Central Committee.
The second model emerged in the early years of the People’s Republic and is exemplified by Hu Qiming’s Thirty Years of the Chinese Communist Party. In this model, the highest Party leader, Mao Zedong, reviewed and annotated the work. Then, it was published under the name of an authoritative Party theorist, Hu Qiming, in the People’s Daily. Finally, it was released as a widely distributed standalone publication.
The third model, exemplified by the 1991 publications History of the Communist Party of China (Volume I) and Seventy Years of the Communist Party of China, involved works approved by the Central Party History Leading Group and published under the names of the “Research Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China” and authoritative theorists.
Shortly after the 1988 symposium, “The Influence of the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on the Study of the History of the Communist Party of China,” Zhang Jingru and Tang Manzhen published a book, History of the Study of the History of the Communist Party of China, in which they further analyzed the impact of the Short Course on the study of the history of the Communist Party of China. They argued that the Tutorial’s positive influence was primarily manifested in the following ways:
Thematic Focus: This work elucidates Leninism’s contribution to the development of Marxism, clearly revealing the integration of Marxist fundamentals into conscious revolutionary activities in Russia.
Using historical evidence, the work demonstrates that mastering Marxist theory does not require rote memorization of formulas and conclusions. Rather, it requires learning to apply and develop these theories within the context of one’s own revolutionary practice.
This central theme holds significant inspirational value for overcoming dogmatism and rigid conservatism in the study of Party history, enriching theory with fresh, vibrant, domestic revolutionary experience and guiding people to focus on historical facts. The Short Course on the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union focuses its research on the evolution of the CPSU’s strategy and tactics alongside the development of Leninism. Its primary objective is to educate Party members and cadres in Marxism-Leninism. The book played a vital role in advancing the Party’s theoretical research and unifying its understanding. Party history research must adhere to the overarching principle of serving the formulation of the Party’s correct strategies, tactics, and ideological line.
Researchers must elevate the Party’s rich practical experience into theory and continuously produce scientific analyses and evaluations of the Party’s theoretical development from a historical perspective. Its negative impact was manifested primarily in the following ways: The Short Course lacked historical depth and tended to prioritize theory over history. Consequently, it was not persuasive and made it difficult for readers to accept. It also excessively emphasized the cruelty of intra-Party struggles and exaggerated the personal roles of Lenin and Stalin. This had an adverse effect on the study of the history of the Chinese Communist Party during its early formative period. [12]
Beyond examining the influence of the Short Course on the History on Chinese Communist Party history, many historians have focused on its impact on Soviet historiography. However, the vast majority of these discussions highlight its negative aspects. “The publication of the Short Course became a significant ideological source for substituting theory for history and for formulaic, simplistic approaches within Soviet historiography.” The Short Course established principles regarding attitudes toward history, or methodological perspectives, which became integrated into Soviet historical science and profoundly influenced the research of several generations of historians. The Textbook virtually determined the entire conceptual framework of subsequent historiography, dominating Soviet historical research from the 1940s to the 1960s and continuing to influence historical studies even after the 20th Congress of the CPSU. The Soviet Union elevated the Textbook to the status of the “only correct” model, which merely served to justify the victors. This confined both Marxism and historical science.” [14]
III. On the Concise Tutorial and Research into the Popularization of Marxism
1. Was the Concise Tutorial a Marxist-Leninist Work?
Soviet historian Maslov argued that the Short Course was a product of Stalinism that completely contradicted Marxism-Leninism. Maslov contended that the entire work was a cult of personality and an encyclopedia of Stalin’s personality cult. It arbitrarily distorted the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Therefore, it should be utterly rejected. Influenced by this perspective, some domestic scholars adopt a negative stance toward the Short Course, viewing it as the definitive marker of Stalin’s ideological model reaching its final consolidation. Prior to the 1950s, the Short Course served as the supreme compendium of Stalin’s ideological theories. It expounded on his socialist model and ideological framework, exerting a pernicious influence across all socialist nations of the era. It crystallized the entirety of the cult of personality surrounding Stalin. The textbook also solidified dogmatism, left-wing extremism, and utopianism.
While most scholars of Chinese Communist Party history agree that the Short Course with respect to Marxism-Leninism is not a rigorous historical work, they also acknowledge its significant role in disseminating Marxist-Leninist theory as a “classic” text promoting this ideology. “It disseminated fundamental Marxist-Leninist knowledge across two generations, a contribution that should not be dismissed.” For example, in the 1980s, Liao Gailong praised the Short Course for helping him study Lenin’s works. However, he also noted that the book contained a significant amount of erroneous, non-Marxist theoretical viewpoints that could not withstand historical scrutiny.
Scholars of Marxist philosophy have examined Section 2 of Chapter 4 of the Short Course, entitled “Dialectical and Historical Materialism.” They note that Stalin devoted over 20,000 words to three main sections: “Marxist Dialectics,” “Dialectical Materialism in Marxist Philosophy,” and “Historical Materialism.” Though not easy to understand, and although some sections contain serious theoretical errors, this work possesses both value and limitations as a product of its specific era. It is neither “a beacon guiding every principle toward a monumental treatise” nor entirely devoid of meaning. [18]
2. Why “A Brief Introduction” Was Popular in China
Some scholars have analyzed this from two perspectives: the Party’s theoretical need for Marxism-Leninism and the textual characteristics of the Short Course. Su Shuangbi noted that the Chinese Communist Party’s study and mastery of Marxism derived primarily from imported Russian Marxist works. While the Chinese revolution made many original contributions, such as the strategy of encircling cities from the countryside, which was conceived by the Chinese Communist Party, its theoretical framework could hardly escape Soviet influence completely. From the land revolution to the War of Resistance Against Japan, the Chinese Revolution evolved rapidly, compelling Communists to arm themselves urgently with Marxism-Leninism. However, two major challenges existed at that time.
First, wartime conditions made it impossible for people to read extensive Marxist literature systematically.
Second, the Liberated Areas suffered from a severe shortage of classic works, making it difficult to find suitable reading materials for cadres.
The publication of the Chinese translation of A Short Course provided cadres with an accessible textbook for studying Marxism. A Short Course was noted for its summarization skills and literary quality, offering a systematic and concise introduction to Lenin’s major works with clear perspectives. Accessible and easy to grasp, it became an essential textbook for Party cadres studying Marxism. [9]
Some scholars analyze the situation from the perspective of the practical necessity of combating dogmatism. Using the study of the Concise Tutorial as a case study, Huang Zhigao examined the Marxist study movement during the Yan’an period. He proposed that the need to combat dogmatism directly influenced the selection of content when the Chinese Communist Party studied the Short Course. The Short Course on the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) was a pivotal document in the Party’s Marxist education during the democratic revolution period. It met the Party’s need to strengthen Marxist theory and provided tools to correct dogmatic errors and improve Marxist academic practices. Huang further distilled Mao Zedong’s approach to Marxist study from his discourses on the Short Course. First, study must be thorough. Second, study must emphasize learning the methodology of thought. Third, study must focus on researching practical issues of the Chinese revolution.
Some scholars analyze this phenomenon from the perspective of the leader’s personal charisma and preferences. Zhu Baoqiang argues that the widespread and enduring dissemination of the Concise Tutorial within the CPC was inseparable from Mao Zedong’s consistent advocacy and promotion. Mao Zedong’s personal and consistent endorsement and promotion served as one of the driving forces propelling the dissemination and popularization of the Short Course within the CPC. His charisma and ideological preferences played an irreplaceable role in enabling the Short Course to exert its enduring political influence within the Party.[21]
Some scholars emphasize the need for analysis from multiple perspectives, such as social history, contemporary demands, and individual preferences. Lou Shenghua points out that the significant impact of the Short Course in China was inseparable from various factors, including the social and historical conditions of the time. The analysis examined the qualities of the primary audience, the state of Marxist-Leninist publications at the time, and the objective need for the Communist Party of China to address the revolutionary and developmental challenges of the era. It also considered the leaders’ endorsement and the Party’s and state’s extensive organizational promotion.[22]
3. The Popularization of the Short Course
Some scholars have examined the popularization of the Short Course in China from a communication studies perspective. For example, Lou Shenghua examined the historical dissemination and influence of the Short Course in China over the course of half a century. He compared its distinct impact on China in terms of content and form across different historical periods. Focusing on the relationship between Soviet and Chinese revolutionary and construction practices, Lou studied the significant influence of the Concise Manual in popularizing basic Marxist-Leninist knowledge, enhancing the Marxism-Leninism theoretical level of Party members and cadres, guiding intra-Party struggles, and advancing research on the history of the Chinese Communist Party. Shenghua offers an objective and comprehensive assessment of the work’s positive contributions and limitations. He analyzes the socio-historical conditions that enabled the Short Course‘s profound historical impact in modern China and extracts essential lessons for historical reflection and future reference.
Some scholars have also examined the popularization of A Short Course in the Soviet Union and its international reception from the perspective of the global communist movement. Wen Yi examined why the Concise History became essential reading for communist parties worldwide, noting that it ultimately became the Soviet Union’s sole textbook on Bolshevik party history and the only encyclopedia of Marxism-Leninism. This process was intertwined with the mythologizing and deification of Stalin’s personal prestige, achieved through the stringent measures adopted by Stalin and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) to ensure its realization.” Wen Yi also examined the relationship between the Comintern and the study of the Short Course, briefly mentioning its adoption by communist parties in Germany, the United States, and other countries.
4. The Role of A Short Course in Popularizing Marxism
Some scholars argue that the fatal flaws inherent in the Short Course made its negative impact on the popularization of Marxism predominant. This book is dogmatic and metaphysical. While it indoctrinates people with ready-made dogmas, it blocks the path to assimilating new knowledge and ideas. “The result is merely the cultivation of a large number of ideological propagandists while stifling the ability of all party cadres to think independently.” [26]
Overall, however, most scholars believe that the Short Course should be analyzed objectively, acknowledging its role in promoting the popularization and Sinicization of Marxism while also recognizing the errors it contains. For a long time, China required the Concise Textbook for study in Party schools, cadre training institutions, and higher education institutions. The book played a positive role in studying and understanding the experiences of the Soviet Revolution and construction, as well as learning and mastering the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism. The Short Course performed a positive historical function in the theoretical propaganda work and cadre education of the Chinese Communist Party by disseminating basic Marxist-Leninist knowledge across two generations—a contribution that should not be erased. However, the substantial number of erroneous theoretical viewpoints and false historical accounts within the book have not stood the test of time and have produced serious adverse effects, leading to numerous misconceptions in the Party’s theoretical propaganda work.
Additionally, scholars have examined the significant impact of Short Course on the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on the Chinese Communist Party’s propaganda efforts. Ouyang Junxi noted that the Concise Course on the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) profoundly influenced the Chinese Communist Party’s propaganda efforts. This influence manifested in three primary ways:
First, it heightened the CPC’s awareness of the importance of propaganda, advancing the development of cadre education.
Second, it rectified the Party’s previous practice of separating Marxism and Leninism from each other and from Party history education. Instead, it integrated Marxism and Leninism with Marxist-Leninist education and Party history education.
Third, it strengthened the integration of the Party’s propaganda work with the realities of the War of Resistance.
These efforts played a positive role in achieving ideological unity within the CPC during the War of Resistance.
In short, the Short Course is a work that has exerted profound historical influence on the international communist movement. Domestic scholars’ engagement with its study, promotion, and research has followed the ebb and flow of the international communist movement, progressing from fervent enthusiasm to waning interest and shifting from unqualified affirmation to rejection and finally to rational dialectical analysis. Research perspectives have expanded from a narrow focus on party history to include multiple disciplines, such as history, communication studies, political science, and textual studies. The current mixed historical evaluations of the Short Course demonstrate the need for further in-depth research.
References:
[1] Xu Chong and Meng Lingrong: History and Conflict: An Analysis of the Origins of Compiling the A Short Course on the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Journal of Russian Studies, No. 4, 2012.
[2] Xie Juan: “The Historical Context and Political Motives of ‘On Dialectical Materialism and Historical Materialism’,” Journal of Inner Mongolia Agricultural University (Social Sciences Edition), Issue 3, 2011.
[3] Zhang Jingru and Tang Manzhen: History of Communist Party Historiography, China Renmin University Press, 1990, p. 63.
[4] Zhu Baoqiang: “The Translation, Publication, and Dissemination of A Brief Introduction to the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) in China,” Party History Research and Teaching, Issue 4, 2012.
[5] Zhu Baoqiang: “The Translation, Publication, and Dissemination of A Brief Introduction to the Short Course on the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) in China,” Party History Research and Teaching, No. 4, 2012.
[6][7][8][9] The Impact of A Short Course in the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) on the Teaching and Research of the History of the Chinese Communist Party (Excerpts from Symposium Discussions), Chinese Communist Party History Research, No. 1, 1989.
[10] Gong Yuzi, *Party History Notes*, Zhejiang People’s Publishing House, 2002, p. 88.
[11] Zhang Jingru and Tang Manzhen: History of Communist Party Historiography, People’s University Press, 1990, p. 6.
[12] Zhang Jingru and Tang Manzhen, History of Communist Party Historiography, China Renmin University Press, 1990, p. 65.
[13] Qishan De: A Preliminary Study of Soviet-Era Historiography (PhD dissertation, Jilin University, 2010), p. 19.
[14] Liu Zhi: “The Short Course on the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) Turns Marxism into a Closed System,” originally published in Shulin, No. 2, 1988, and included in Century-Long Practice, Anhui University Press, 2005 edition.
[15] Maslov, “A Short Course of the History of the RCP(Bolshevik)—An Encyclopedia of Stalin’s Cult of Personality,” translated by Ma Guifan, *Research on the History of the Chinese Communist Party*, no. 2, 1989.
[16] Li Zongyu et al., *Research on the Stalin Model*, Central Compilation Press, 1999, pp. 331–332.
[17] The Impact of A Short Course in the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) on the Teaching and Research of the History of the Communist Party of China (Excerpts from Symposium Discussions), Research on the History of the Communist Party of China, No. 1, 1989.
[18] Huang Nan-sen et al., History of Marxist Philosophy, Vol. 5, Beijing Publishing House, 1996, p. 415.
[19] The Impact of A Short Course on the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) on the Teaching and Research of Chinese Communist Party History (Excerpts from Symposium Discussions), Chinese Communist Party History Research, No. 1, 1989.
[20] Huang Zhigao: “A Short Course on the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) and the Marxist Study Movement During the Yan’an Period,” Fujian Party History Monthly, No. 18, 2011.
[21] Zhu Baoqiang: Mao Zedong and the Dissemination of A Short Course on the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) Within the Chinese Communist Party, Chinese and Foreign Entrepreneurs, Issue 1, 2012.
[22] Lou Shenghua: On the Influence of A Short Course in the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) in China, Nanjing Social Sciences, No. 6, 1997.
[23] Lou Shenghua: On the Influence of A Short Course in the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) in China, Nanjing Social Sciences, No. 6, 1997.
[24] Wen Yi: Why Did A Short Course on the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Become the “Sole Textbook on Party History”? (Parts I and II), Study Times, December 4 and 18, 2006.
[25] Wen Yi: Why Has the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) Become Essential Reading for Communist Parties Worldwide? (Parts I and II), Study Times, January 1 and 15, 2007.
[26] Zhang Guangming: The Evolution of Socialism from West to East, Yunnan People’s Publishing House, 2004, p. 171.
[27] The Impact of A Short Course on the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) on the Teaching and Research of Chinese Communist Party History (Excerpts from Symposium Discussions), Chinese Communist Party History Research, No. 1, 1989.
[28] Ouyang Junxi: On the Dissemination of the Concise Tutorial on the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) in China During the War of Resistance Against Japan and Its Influence on the Propaganda Work of the Chinese Communist Party, Party History Research and Teaching, No. 2, 2008.
Tang Zhihua, Vice Dean of the School of Politics and Administration at Guangxi Normal University, Professor, Doctoral Supervisor, Visiting Scholar at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London, UK. Research Focus: Theory and Practice of Adapting Marxism to Chinese Context.
Amidst the ongoing purges of top officers of the PLA what should be the attitude of PLA officers and soldiers. They are continually exhorted to be loyal to the Party 政治合格。The PLA is the creature of the Chinese Communist Party and not a national military of China.
This January 12, 2026 PLA Daily 解放军报 editorial translated below gives a sense of the attitude that the PLA is expected to take.
It also reminds that the PLA has gone through purges before even before the start of military campaign and that the dream and constant preparations to take Taiwan remain regardless of purges.
(It does not mention that Qing Dynasty China abandoned Taiwan to Japan after losing the 1895 war with Japan. But that’s another story.)
Corruption, the disasters it brings, and repeated purges are perennial. Mention of a monument to 846 undercover agents in Taiwan who were killed after one person betrayed them. (The passage: “Beijing, the Wuming Heroes Memorial Plaza in the Western Hills: four white-marble statues of martyrs stand in silent stillness. On a granite wall are engraved the names of 846 heroes who fell on the covert front in Taiwan.” Taiwan has a partial list -see PRC Spies in the ROC/Taiwan Military)
The list continues with a Korean War PLA hero who years later fell as a corrupt official, and tales of legendary revolutionary generals who turned down gifts.
Corruption is generally the rationale for purges from PLA generals on down to pesky dissidents. That Chinese many Chinese Party and government officials are corrupt is a widely-held view in China so accusations of corruption is always a plausible explanation.
For the Party though, more alarming is the military officers might have their own political agenda. This, or the mistaken perception that they do on the part of (today with Xi) an aging Party leader, and that officer is done. Loyal advice based on military expertise that brings into question the leader’s hopes and plans could fall into that category.
For Chinese leaders the alternately hot and cold (whimsical?) policies towards ostensible allies and ostensible adversaries alike of the Trump regime (regime? Yes. Confucius taught me to rectify names.正名) in the United States may figure into their calculations. Or even offer a window either of opportunity or miscalculation. Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku in January 1941 warned that underestimating American will would be a dangerous miscalculation. Nobody listened, Yamamoto loyally led the attack anyways.
This PLA Daily editorial is long. The first half is boilerplate and bombastic. The second half is much more interesting. So you may want to skip downtown the second half.
The PLA purges that have reduced the Party’s Central Military Commission that sits atop the PLA down to just two members – – Party General Secretary Xi Jinping and a PLA political commisar.
Foreign commentary is divided on whether the purges makes an attack on Taiwan more or less likely.
Forging the Party-Led People’s Army Into an Even Stronger Force
—Written as the People’s Army continues to deepen political rectification and consolidation in the new era and on the new journey
Xie Xinping January 12, 2026, | Source: PLA Daily
“Assault and annihilate, break through and strike, raid at long range; seize strongpoints, cut lines, seal ports…”
On the eve of New Year’s Day, the Eastern Theater Command released a series of short videos of the “Justice Mission–2025” exercise. “Hammer of Justice” and “Arrow of Justice” sent shockwaves across the Taiwan Strait. As people competed to repost them, they also gave enthusiastic praise: the People’s Army has always been tough, and always worthy of trust!
Justice will prevail; the mission will be accomplished. This exercise displayed to the world the Chinese military’s hard-core capability to defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity.
“Enhance strategic capabilities to safeguard national sovereignty, security, and development interests.” Two months ago, the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th CPC Central Committee made new strategic deployments for “achieving the centenary goal of building the military on schedule, and advancing national defense and military modernization with high quality.”
It was also at this meeting that a report on the investigation by the Central Military Commission into serious disciplinary and legal violations by nine people, including He Weidong, Miao Hua, and He Hongjun, was reviewed and approved—confirming the earlier decision by the Politburo to expel these nine from the Party.
“Without fighting corruption with an iron fist, the consequences will be endless. ‘Beside a sunken ship a thousand sails pass; before a sick tree ten thousand trees spring to life.’” When speaking at the plenum about the struggle against corruption, Chairman Xi’s tone was resolute and forceful.
Armored columns in formation, giant warships on patrol, fighter aircraft soaring, thunder crossing the sea… the People’s Army prepares for war to deter war, brandishing its sword toward the Taiwan Strait, confirming a powerful judgment: the more thoroughly corruption is fought, the more solid the foundation for tackling hard problems; the stronger the army-building, the firmer its footing.
(I)
“A grand national ceremony, majestic and martial; victorious glory forever inscribed in history.”
On September 3, 2025, on Tiananmen Square in Beijing, a grand military parade was held to commemorate the 80th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War.
That day, in the Air Force formation, there was a soldier named Ji Jiakun. He is a descendant of the national hero of the War of Resistance, Ji Hongchang. As he marched proudly past Tiananmen Square, he carried in his chest pocket a photograph of Ji Hongchang.
That day, on the reviewing stand, there was a mother named Yao Jiushui. She is the mother of martyr Chen Xiangrong. Watching the imposing posture of the troops on parade, she felt as if her son were right before her.
“Clear love, only for China.” That day, across the vast land, seas, and skies of the motherland, officers and soldiers of the entire military guarded the nation’s peace and security with the same bearing and the same sincerity.
The review is not confined to a single day; the review is not confined to a single avenue!
“The Chinese People’s Liberation Army has always been a heroic force in which the Party and the people can place complete trust.” The People’s Army’s new appearance as it advances toward the centenary of its founding pays tribute to a glorious history, consoles the souls of countless martyrs, and fully demonstrates the new demeanor of political army-building in the new era, the new configuration of force structure, new progress in modernization, and new achievements in preparing for and fighting wars.
To build a strong military, one must first be strong politically; political strength is the most fundamental strength. Without revolutionary forging in the political sense, there can be no great transformation of the People’s Army in the new era.
In April 2025, the micro-documentary Tempered Into Steel: 100 Years of the Communist Party of China, whose online views had already surpassed one billion, was rebroadcast on CCTV’s National Defense and Military Channel.
“Stoke that furnace red-hot—only by striking while the iron is hot can you succeed!” The single character “temper” (炼) captures the political character of the Party and the People’s Army: “A great Marxist political party is not born great; it is forged in long social practice, and tempered in constant self-revolution.”
Gutian, Yan’an—two red furnaces of political rectification and consolidation for the People’s Army—stand along history’s great thoroughfare. Linking them is precisely round after round of tempering, hammer blow after hammer blow of forging.
Today, entering the old site of the Gutian Conference, the scorched marks of charcoal fires on the floor of the meeting hall are still clearly visible. In the conference memorial hall, a 1942 printed copy of the Gutian Conference Resolution rests quietly in a display case. During the Yan’an Rectification Movement, Comrade Mao Zedong personally wrote to the General Political Department of the Military Commission, requesting that several thousand more copies of the Gutian Conference Resolution be printed and distributed to officers at and above company-commander level, listing it as an important document for study.
From Gutian to Yan’an, it was precisely the continuous tempering of an unextinguished furnace fire that cast the Army’s soul and transformed it, so that no mountain or river could stop it—red flags swept through critical passes on the wind.
“When the great furnace melts away the old form, a new life is reshaped—breaking the cocoon to emerge.” Wherever the fire of tempering has burned, it always gives rise to a new round of “kiln transformation.” Entering the new era and new journey, Gutian and Yan’an have again become two striking landmarks in the People’s Army’s baptism by fire.
“We came here to trace our roots, to think deeply about where we set out from and why we set out.” In 2014, Chairman Xi personally decided to convene the All-Army Political Work Conference at Gutian. He pointed out “Ten Prominent Problems” existing in the troops—especially among leading cadres—saying matters had “reached the point where they must be solved,” and he moved decisively to rectify political discipline and political norms in the People’s Army, insisting on advancing political rectification with the spirit of a rectification campaign—turning the tide and stabilizing the situation.
“Ten years ago we went to Gutian to convene the All-Army Political Work Conference; today we come to Yan’an to convene the CMC Political Work Conference, once again to trace our roots.” In 2024, at the Central Military Commission Political Work Conference, Chairman Xi distilled and summarized the meaning and key points of the new-era guideline for political army-building in “Ten Clarifications,” scientifically analyzed the real challenges, risks, and tests facing political army-building, clearly put forward the new-era requirements of the “Six Ensures,” and stressed “pressing ahead with political army-building without the slightest pause.”
After being purified by fire, new life is born from fire. Time and again Chairman Xi has led the People’s Army back to its roots and fanned the “tempering fire,” eliminating accumulated abuses and setting things right with unprecedented resolve and strength. It is precisely under Chairman Xi’s strong leadership that this Party-led People’s Army has held fast to its roots and soul, accelerated its pace of development, and won the initiative in marching toward a world-class military.
Ten years—again from Gutian to Yan’an. As history looks back with tenderness, it also casts a stern gaze upon us—
Entering the second decade of the 21st century, the ship of the People’s Army has drawn closer and closer to the shore of its dreams, while also sailing into a stretch of deep waters where winds howl and waves run high.
The dream, so near—never before have we been so close to the center of the world stage; never before have we been so close to realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation; never before have we had such capability and confidence to achieve that goal.
The test, so formidable—amid the peaks and troughs of “changes unseen in a century,” the speed of changes in the situation and environment, the weight of tasks of reform, development, and stability, and the number of contradictions, risks, and challenges have never before posed such great tests for our Party in governing the country and commanding the military.
Midstream, the waves grow more urgent; halfway up the mountain, the road grows steeper.
What is historical initiative? What is historical consciousness?
To shoulder heavy responsibilities, we must dare to face problems head-on and have the courage to carry out self-revolution! To pursue victory, we must promptly remove the bad apples and wash away filth and mud, resolutely solving problems in the present—solving them before we march toward the battlefield!
(II)
The Taklamakan Desert is known as a “sea of death.”
Today, along the world’s longest green ecological barrier encircling the desert, 100,000 rose bushes bloom in the wind.
Over decades and generations, people carrying a green dream of “locking the desert’s edge” have created a stunning ecological miracle—an achievement of lasting merit for ages to come.
Desertification is regarded as nature’s cancer; corruption is regarded as society’s cancer.
Controlling deserts is a battle between humanity and nature; eradicating corruption is a confrontation between humanity and itself.
Corruption can be called a millennia-old disease of human society. As Marx said, “What is obsolete always tries to restore and consolidate itself in newly born forms.” Looking back on the rise of great powers, among the world’s major countries in the course of industrialization, corruption has often proven stubborn and long-lasting; looking across the rise and fall of national fortunes, some developing countries have sunk into long-term stagnation and turmoil, and corruption has also been a major cause.
The military is the pillar of the nation; if the military is corrupt, the foundations of the state are shaken.
In 1915, Zhou Enlai, then studying at Nankai Middle School in Tianjin, wrote an essay titled “On the Navy,” whose point targeted the corruption and slackness of the old armed forces.
“Dragging along, muddled and dreamlike, spending whole days in drink and pleasure, with not the slightest research into military affairs.” In the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, “the entire force was wiped out, its false show completely lost; land was ceded, armies were lost, the truth fully exposed. Hopes of strength became a bubble; prospects of peace again became a fantasy.” In the essay, Zhou Enlai cried out from the depths of his heart: “A man must first disgrace himself before others disgrace him; a country must first attack itself before others attack it.”
Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, Liu Bocheng, He Long, Ye Jianying… Many founding marshals and generals of the Republic had once served in the old armies. Looking back at the choices of their youth, every one of them felt acutely the “corruption of the old armies.”
How could such a military become the nation’s shield? How could it become the vanguard of national salvation?
The original aspiration with which our army was founded, and the mission it bears, are fundamentally incompatible with such “oldness” and such “corruption”—as irreconcilable as fire and water.
Why did many of the Republic’s founding commanders, over a lifetime, analyze themselves unsparingly, reform themselves without letting up an inch, demand “unfeelingly” of their families, and love the people with all their strength?
So that they would never, in thought, return to the “old world” the Party and this army set out to overthrow.
So that they would never, in action, walk toward the “opposite side” the Party and this army set out to bring down.
In early spring 1942, the Yan River gradually thawed. In response to objections by some to launching the Rectification Movement, Mao Zedong’s attitude was firm: “Even if it’s smashed to pieces, even if Yan’an is lost, even if everyone yells and screams, we must carry out rectification—and carry it through to the end, thoroughly.”
On May 1, 1950, all of Hainan Island was liberated. That very day, the CPC Central Committee issued “Instructions on Launching a Rectification Movement Throughout the Entire Party and the Entire Military,” with the blade aimed straight at feelings of pride in achievement, commandism, and the errors of a small number who were corrupt and degenerate, politically decadent, and who broke laws and discipline.
Rectification in adversity, rectification in success; rectification in hardship, rectification in victory—our army’s pursuit of purity and honor never stops.
“Corruption is the greatest threat our Party faces; fighting corruption is the most thorough self-revolution.” “There must be no place in the military where corrupt elements can hide.” “There is no ‘imperial pardon,’ no ‘iron-capped princes.’” In the new era, Chairman Xi has led the military with unprecedented resolve and intensity in rectifying conduct and fighting corruption—upholding no forbidden zones, full coverage, and zero tolerance; emphasizing strong deterrence and high pressure with sustained shock; insisting that cases must be investigated and corruption must be punished.
Persist relentlessly, work for the long haul; without complete victory we will not withdraw. Like moving from “sand advances, people retreat” to “green advances, sand retreats,” governance of corruption has become a steadfast struggle to improve the political ecosystem.
Yet as the anti-corruption struggle reaches a new threshold, we must dispel certain mists before us—for example, blindly optimistic “quick victory theories,” passively pessimistic “hopelessness theories,” and indiscriminate “harm theories” that cannot tell right from wrong…
“Unafraid of floating clouds that block the view.” To cross this new threshold, we need even more the strategic composure and historical patience of “clouds may rage across the sky, yet we remain calm.”
“A new pine resents not being a thousand feet tall; vile bamboo must be cut down by the ten thousand stalks.” At this moment, we are no longer at the beginning stage of clearing a path through thorns; we have reached a steep pass midway up the mountain, when the climb is at its hardest. Looking back, we have already used thunderous fire to burn away rotten “corrupt timber,” bringing vitality back to vast forests; we have used the heavy plow of law-based governance to break up compacted “soil,” leaving no place for the roots of unwritten rules to hide.
But only after climbing high does one realize the wind has not ceased. The pass ahead has stronger winds, steeper slopes, and more perilous roads.
This “wind” is the “new-type” and “hidden” nature of corrupt phenomena—like termites hollowing out a dike in silence, with deeper harm; this “peril” is the “generational contagion” and “mutated fermentation” of pernicious influences and accumulated abuses, with fiercer toxicity; this “pass” is the “turning point” in deepened governance—integrating efforts so that officials do not dare to be corrupt, cannot be corrupt, and do not want to be corrupt, treating both symptoms and root causes through systemic measures, which is all the more difficult.
The anti-corruption struggle is always on the road. “If one only undertook struggle when there was a very smooth chance of success, then making world history would be far too easy.” “At every revolutionary stage, there will always be some dross that sinks down.”
Ice three feet thick does not form in a single day, nor is removing three feet of ice achieved in a single day. We must remain extraordinarily clear-eyed about the situation and extraordinarily resolute in attitude; we must never slacken, never soften our hand—“we should ride our remaining courage to pursue the beaten foe to the end; we must not seek a reputation as some modern-day Xiang Yu!”
(III)
October 25, 2025 marked the 75th anniversary of the Chinese People’s Volunteers’ departure to fight in the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea.
More than seventy years ago on the Huachuan Lake battlefield, 22-year-old company commander Zhao Zhili led his company to hold Hill 288.4, fighting tenaciously for four days and four nights.
During armistice talks, the U.S. side did not believe that a single company had held the high ground, and requested to meet Zhao Zhili, who commanded the fight. His photograph appeared in Western newspapers, and he was called “the victor of the battle for the Eastern Gibraltar.”
Yet no one could have imagined that more than thirty years later Zhao Zhili’s name would again appear in news reports—in a People’s Daily item reporting that he had become a prisoner for embezzlement.
From the heroic and glorious end to the corrupt and fallen end—Zhao Zhili held the high ground on the battlefield, so why did the “high ground” in his heart collapse?
Beijing, the Wuming Heroes Memorial Plaza in the Western Hills: four white-marble statues of martyrs stand in silent stillness. On a granite wall are engraved the names of 846 heroes who fell on the covert front in Taiwan.
They, because of one person’s corruption and degeneration, lie forever on the far side of the Strait.
Cai Xiaoqian, a Communist Party member who had taken part in the Long March—if he had not been greedy for a steak, he might not have exposed his whereabouts, been arrested, and ultimately defected, causing severe blows to the entire underground Party organization in Taiwan.
A Red Army soldier who had crossed ten thousand rivers and mountains lost his way on an island.
A Communist Party member who had eaten grass roots and tree bark fell over a “single steak”!
In the harsh environment of struggle against the enemy, Cai Xiaoqian often went to restaurants and bars in Taipei to eat, drink, and seek amusement.
That steak was only the last snowflake that triggered an avalanche!
One who is good at removing harm examines the root; one who is good at curing illness cuts off the source. When deeply analyzing a series of major corruption cases in our military in recent years, Chairman Xi emphasized: “These problems manifest in politics, ideology, organization, work style, discipline, and other aspects; at root, they lie in ideals and convictions, Party spirit cultivation, and official ethics and personal character.”
“Carry the revolution through to the end”—this is the inscription Comrade Zhu De wrote at age 89. Less than two months before he passed away, after seeing a new translation of The Communist Manifesto, despite advanced age and poor health he went especially to the Central Party School to exchange views with the translators about his study experience.
“Medal of the Republic” recipient Zhang Fuqing had a copy of A Reader of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s Series of Important Speeches on his desk, its pages already a bit curled. In the margins he wrote: “We must constantly remold our subjective world, strengthen Party spirit cultivation, cultivate character and moral tempering; be honest in做人, be steady in doing things, be clean in holding office, always remain loyal to the Party, personally clean, and brave to take responsibility.” That year the veteran was 93 and had been retired for over thirty years.
Zhang Lianyin, former deputy commander of the Hebei Provincial Military District, retired and returned to his hometown, leading a team to plant more than two million trees in order to prevent wind and control sand and change the look of his home area. When asked, “If not for fame or profit, then what is it for?” he answered, regarding his Party membership as a “lifelong post”: “If it were for fame and profit, I wouldn’t be a Communist Party member.”
This is what original aspiration looks like. It cannot be faked; and it will certainly be recognized by the masses’ “bright eyes,” and “tested” by time’s litmus paper. If it is dusted over or cast aside, it is like the first domino falling: it is not the loss of one city or one region, but a chain reaction of collapses.
The Party’s original aspiration is the People’s Army’s original aspiration. Forgetting the original aspiration means betrayal of the Party and the People’s Army. And corruption is shameless surrender in peacetime.
If you look closely at the rows of decorations on the chests of some senior military leaders who have been investigated, many had rich experience and repeated military merit—yet as they went along they lost their original aspiration and willingly sank.
The tiger of desire is always ready to swallow anyone who relaxes their self-remolding. Iron facts tell us: to hold fast to our original aspiration, we must uproot erroneous ideas and establish correct values.
To uproot means to do it thoroughly—pry open hard rock and earth, dig up deep-buried tangled roots.
To establish means to do it firmly—hold high the banner of ideals, set clear boundaries between right and wrong.
After the founding of New China, whenever someone came to visit, Senior General Xu Haidong would always ask: “Have you made political mistakes? Have you taken too much economically? Have you divorced your wife in your personal life?” Three questions from a general: first about ideology, second about integrity, third about conduct.
In a diary, Martyr Wang Jie also had “three questions”: “What is an ideal? Carrying the revolution through to the end is the ideal. What is the future? The revolutionary cause is the future. What is happiness? Serving the people is happiness.”
“August 1 Medal” recipient Wei Changjin, after being awarded the honorary title “Combat Hero” by the Central Military Commission, once published an essay posing a “question of life”: “In my future work and life, can I become the best version of myself, withstand every test, continue to hold fast to my ‘post,’ and be worthy of my old company and of this generation of soldiers?”
Ask others; ask yourself—ask what? Why join the Party, why become a soldier, why become a commander? In the end, it is to ask out one answer—
“No matter how far you go forward, you must not forget the road you have traveled; no matter how far you go, even into a glorious future, you must not forget the past you have traveled, and you must not forget why you set out.”
(IV)
On the eve of National Day 1955, the People’s Liberation Army conducted its first conferral of military ranks.
Many generals covered in wounds and with distinguished wartime achievements wrote letters to the Party Central Committee and Chairman Mao—
Luo Ronghuan: “I joined the revolution relatively late and my contribution is small; to confer on me the rank of marshal would be undeserved.”
Ye Jianying: “At most I should be placed at the rank of grand general; that is the verdict of history.”
Xu Guangda: “My contribution to the Chinese revolution, to speak truthfully, is insignificant. Not to mention compared with the grand generals; I feel ashamed—in comparison even with some long-serving generals, I feel inferior… I sincerely and prudently apply: confer on me the rank of general.”
Xu Liqing: “Compared with what the Party and people require, what I have done is insignificant… In terms of virtue, talent, seniority, and merit, being conferred the rank of lieutenant general already fills me with honor.”
…
Since the founding commanders of the Republic did not set their hearts on ranks, why then did they race across battlefields, bathe in blood, and never regret even after countless brushes with death? They regarded their own merit as small and low—so what did they regard as heavy and high?
Words unspoken are heard amid drums and thunder. The commanders answered with action—
In 1955, Li Jukui was not granted a rank because he was appointed the first Minister of the Petroleum Industry. In 1958, he returned to military work; when his rank was conferred later, he firmly insisted on “take the lower, not the higher.” On his 80th birthday he wrote in his notebook: “Even if you give me greater power, I will never use power for personal gain; even if you give me more money, I will never lose the spirit of hard struggle; even if you let me live another eighty years, I will never stop pressing forward.”
In 1955, before Sun Yi was conferred the rank of lieutenant general, he wrote to the organization: “I was born into poverty; when I was lost, it was the Party that guided me and allowed me to devote myself to the revolution. I did not join the revolution to seek office, still less for salary; when assessing my rank, take the lower, not the higher…”
In 1955, Chen Geng’s children asked what “general” he had been given. Naturally humorous, Chen Geng laughed: “No general at all—just chili sauce!” Then his expression turned serious: “Compared with those comrades who shared life and death with us but sacrificed for the nation, being able to carry life through to nationwide liberation is already great fortune; to boast of wartime merit after victory is a desecration of those nameless heroes and martyrs who died.”
What is the soul of a commander? Where is the soul of a commander? It is not the stars on the shoulder, but the backbone in the heart.
In recent years, as senior military leaders who lost their faith have fallen one after another, people have sighed with regret and burned with anger: they have desecrated heroic predecessors, stained the glory of generals, and failed the hopes of the people!
They are absolutely not what generals of the People’s Army should be! Since its founding, the People’s Army has never lost its true colors because of a tiny handful of bad apples.
“Today we talk on the basis of Party spirit.” “Obey the Party’s arrangements in all things.” “You will command the troops into Tibet.” “We will resolutely complete the mission.”
This was the dialogue in 1950 between Comrade Deng Xiaoping and Zhang Guohua, commander of the 18th Army, after the Party Central Committee decided to advance into Tibet ahead of schedule.
No more needed. “Party spirit” was the “common language” of the two revolutionary commanders.
How could Zhang Guohua not know the difficulties of marching into Tibet? At the oath-taking rally, he brought his three-year-old daughter Nannan onto the stage: “Not only will I go into Tibet; my wife will go into Tibet; even my daughter will not stay in the interior—she will march into Tibet with me.” Nannan ultimately died on the march to Tibet, becoming the youngest “martyr” of the 18th Army.
A thousand-pound burden on the shoulders, ten thousand troops behind—this is a generation of the Republic’s war commanders!
“War is not far from us,” was something the “Missile Commander” Yang Yegong often said.
To build the Republic’s “strategic iron fist,” Yang Yegong rushed about his post as if tightly wound by a spring: “Military struggle preparations are a race against time; we must cherish every second more precious than gold.”
On July 1, 2004, Yang Yegong’s condition rapidly deteriorated. His wife hoped he could personally explain his final affairs, but what he kept murmuring on his deathbed was: “One-two-one, forward…”
A year later, the “Touching China” organizing committee wrote in its award citation to Yang Yegong: “He measured his work with a ruler, and calculated his life by the second; without asking for appointment to lead a brigade, he had already given his all…”
The Party and the people will always need commanders of “blade across the horse, ready to charge,” and warriors “willing to spill hot blood.”
“Don’t reach out a hand; reach out and you will be caught. The Party and the people are watching; under the gaze of ten thousand eyes you cannot escape.” This is a famous line from Marshal Chen Yi’s 1954 poem “Seven-Character Ancient Verse: Don’t Reach Out a Hand.”
In the poem Chen Yi frankly admits ordinary human weaknesses and hard-to-resist temptations: “How could one not love rank and power—rank and power tower like mountains. How could one not love powder and rouge—drink the river of love dry and still thirst. How could one not love adulation—praise songs fill the ears, a joy like immortals.”
But in the following lines he answers how to resist these temptations: “First think: never forget the root—what comes from the people, do no evil. Second think: the Party nurtured me—without the Party, what could I accomplish? Third think: food, clothing, housing—without the people, how could I live? Fourth think: though I have merit, how could I be without faults—shouldn’t I feel ashamed?”
What is the bearing of a great general? In struggle against the enemy, courage that shakes heaven and earth; in restraining oneself, caution as if walking on thin ice. While serving as mayor of Shanghai, Chen Yi often received merchants and industrialists; when someone tried to give him antiques, calligraphy, or paintings, he always politely refused. He said: “We Communists are most strict about discipline. In this respect, having too much nerve won’t do—not even a little too much nerve.”
One who changes color at the sight of a hundred pieces of gold cannot command the three armies. From ancient times, the “positions” senior commanders must hold include not only positions on the battlefield, but also positions of integrity.
Once the position of integrity is lost, the harm is no less than losing armies and territory.
The Chinese nation has never lacked war commanders; the People’s Army has never lacked heroes. In the new era of strengthening the military and rejuvenating the armed forces, we will surely forge great-power commanders worthy of the rejuvenation mission—loyal to the Party’s and people’s cause, marching at the head of steel formations, and drawing the sword on the high ground of future battlefields.
(V)
Liaoning, Shandong, Fujian…
Each time a great-power warship is launched or commissioned, many netizens fondly recall that tear-inducing old photo: General Liu Huaqing standing on tiptoe to look around the U.S. aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk.
The “aircraft carrier dream” is linked to the dream of a strong military. Little known is that when the spring tide of reform and opening surged, the hard road of the People’s Navy’s modernization came not only from the longing of “standing on tiptoe to see ships,” but also began with a top-down overhaul.
That overhaul began at the top leadership organs. In those years, less than twenty days after taking office as commander of the navy, Liu Huaqing followed Deng Xiaoping’s instruction that “the navy must be put in order,” convening a chiefs’ office meeting on the theme of rectifying the navy headquarters and addressing lax work style, slack management, and loose discipline.
Only by clearing the muddied and uplifting the pure can one see far. Starting with rectifying work style and discipline, the navy carried out comprehensive reorganization and reform. One strategic plan after another emerged, outlining blueprints for major future tasks such as developing aircraft carriers.
“Do you see it? The sidelights of the Liaoning illuminate the Taiwan Strait; the wake of the Shandong cuts across the blue waves of the South China Sea; the Fujian’s electromagnetic catapults push ‘the stars’ even farther…”
Tackling hard problems; fulfilling the dream. Today, when we look back at China’s aircraft carriers going from none to some—“from 0 to 3”—we must not forget the repeated self-revolutions along the hard road, and the repeated rounds of formation alignment and consolidation.
In Dalian, Liaoning, Chairman Xi boarded the Liaoning, climbed the ladders, went down to the hangar deck, entered compartments and battle stations, and learned about officers’ and soldiers’ work and training, emphasizing adherence to higher standards and a leading position, continuously deepening work-style building, and striving to realize a fundamental improvement.
In Sanya, Hainan, Chairman Xi boarded the Fujian and came to the catapult integrated control station, personally pressing the launch button at a new battle post unprecedented in our military. The Fujian uses electromagnetic catapult technology, decided upon personally by Chairman Xi. As the People’s Navy battles the seas and skies and moves into the deep blue, it has gained greater potential energy and stronger kinetic energy.
In the new era, the accelerated period in which great-power equipment is densely commissioned is also a period of remolding through tempering-fire for the People’s Army’s rectification and consolidation.
The river of history surges forward. Today, achieving the centenary goal of building the military on schedule has entered a countdown. In time that flies by, to fight the hard battle, we must win this battle against corruption.
These two tough battles have already seized one dangerous pass after another, and both have entered the most grueling stretch.
“Follow the Way and proceed, but halfway you must redouble your efforts; understanding is not far off—do not shrink from labor to reach the summit.” Chairman Xi once quoted this couplet from Nanyue Hengshan. On the stormy and bitter journey, the nearer we draw to the goal, the steeper the climb may become, and the weather more changeable. In a hundred-mile journey, ninety miles are only halfway; the last ten miles are often the hardest, and the truest test of stamina.
Tackling hard problems requires marching while also tightening the ranks—
Back then, by the raging Jinsha River, the Red Army established strict crossing discipline: even corps commanders and division commanders had to board boats in order at the whistle. A few small boats carried thousands upon thousands across the great river in orderly fashion—urgent but not chaotic. Without such rank-tightening and such work style, snow mountains, grasslands, and great rivers might have been impossible to cross.
On the new journey, this heroic force that crossed the Jinsha and Dadu Rivers must never be blocked by muddy, polluted waters on the road of tackling hard problems. Senior leading cadres must even more take the lead in joining the ranks and undergoing rectification and consolidation—putting themselves into it, showing the courage to set aside “face” and expose shortcomings, reflecting deeply with an attitude of digging to the roots and stirring the soul, making serious corrections, and driving rectification so it hits the “point” and reaches the “root.”
Rectification and consolidation must go deeper the more we tackle hard problems—
Before the Crossing-the-Yangtze Campaign, units carried out months-long consolidation, strictly handling people and matters involving pride in achievement and violations of discipline. After that, the million-strong army crossed the Yangtze—both sweeping away the enemy like rotten wood and winning people’s hearts by strict discipline.
On the new journey, political rectification advances into depth; the hard battle of reaching the military centenary has reached a crucial stage. This means we are closer to victory, and it also means we must summon the courage of “the more perilous, the more we press forward” and the determination of “not leaving this war to future generations”—bearing heavy burdens knowingly, overcoming difficulties knowingly, seizing the day, and ensuring success.
Tackling hard problems carries the massive potential energy of rectification and consolidation; and isn’t rectification itself a hard battle of breaking the old and establishing the new, of replacing bones and washing marrow?
With the courage to turn the blade inward, the determination to use strong medicine to remove illness, and the tenacity of dripping water piercing stone, the Party Central Committee and Chairman Xi have rectified work style and discipline, building momentum like a high gorge storing water. The Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th CPC Central Committee wrote “continuing to deepen political rectification and consolidation” into the Recommendations of the CPC Central Committee on Formulating the Fifteenth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development. On the road of tackling hard problems, rectification can only intensify, charge again, and deepen.
Tackling hard problems is the heavy responsibility history has given us, and also the opportunity the era has given us—
More than ten years ago, a young officer born after 1990, Li Zhe, became a member of the Liaoning. Later he served on two other aircraft carriers as well: “On the Liaoning I was a ‘newbie’; on the Shandong I gradually grew into a little sapling. Now on the Fujian, I can shelter those who come after me from wind and rain.”
More than ten years ago, the after 1990-born student Liu Mengke was captivated by the roaring warplanes in the grand parade, planting a seed of a dream. Today, the boy who once looked up at the sky flies in the parade; the early-warning aircraft that once could only be seen in military magazines have been fielded in system form, becoming his close “comrades-in-arms”…
As clean wind sweeps away corrupt leaves, it also brings forth the sprouting of new buds and nurtures hope of metabolism and renewal.
During the War of Resistance, Deng Xiaoping said earnestly at a meeting: “If all our comrades removed bad practices, how much greater strength would our Party gain! Rectification is our Party-building plan for a century; every comrade must consciously take part.”
From a “century-long plan” to the “hard battle toward the centenary,” each generation has its mission.
Only when water drops are pure can rivers be clear. In continuously deepened political rectification and consolidation, none of us can evade or dodge; in the hard task of forging ahead amid rapids, none of us can fall behind; in the soul-cleansing purification, none of us can stand aside.
Recalling those years, the young Deng Zhongxia wrote a poem titled “Victory”: “What thorns cannot be cut? What jackals cannot be killed? What mountains cannot be pushed over? You need only struggle—boldly struggle; persist—persist forever. Victory will be yours!”
So many things are urgent, always; heaven and earth turn, time presses.
One mountain stretch, one water stretch; the Long March of ten thousand miles has not yet ceased.
Fly across, move swiftly; add power, go full speed—sprinting toward achieving the centenary goal of building the military on schedule, we firmly believe—
Victory over corruption is certain! A strong military will be achieved!
(Editors: Wang Xiaoxiao, Peng Xiaoling)
, – – –
Here’s a glossary of key political/military terms and set phrases from the article, with pinyin + concise English renderings and brief usage notes where helpful.
Core political–military terms
党领导的人民军队 (dǎng lǐngdǎo de rénmín jūnduì) — the Party-led People’s Army Stock formulation stressing CCP leadership over the PLA.
人民军队 (rénmín jūnduì) — the People’s Army / people’s armed forces Often shorthand for the PLA as a “people’s” force.
政治建军 (zhèngzhì jiànjūn) — building the military politically / political army-building Means prioritizing ideology, Party control, discipline, loyalty.
政治整训 (zhèngzhì zhěngxùn) — political rectification and consolidation (within the military) 整 = rectify/put in order; 训 = train/discipline. Often implies campaigns of discipline + ideological tightening.
持续深化政治整训 (chíxù shēnhuà zhèngzhì zhěngxùn) — continuously deepen political rectification and consolidation
整风精神 (zhěngfēng jīngshén) — the spirit of “rectification” (Rectification Campaign ethos) Alludes to Yan’an Rectification: criticism/self-criticism, ideological remolding, discipline.
政治纲纪 (zhèngzhì gāngjì) — political discipline and political rules/norms 纲纪 = framework of discipline, order, and rules.
正本清源 (zhèngběn qīngyuán) — correct the root, cleanse the source; set things right at the foundation Common anti-corruption/rectification phrase.
二十届四中全会 (Èrshí jiè Sìzhōng Quánhuì) — 4th Plenum of the 20th Central Committee
建军一百年奋斗目标 (jiànjūn yībǎinián fèndòu mùbiāo) — the centenary goal of building the military Refers to the PLA’s 100th anniversary (1927–2027) goal-setting.
国防和军队现代化 (guófáng hé jūnduì xiàndàihuà) — national defense and military modernization
如期实现 (rúqī shíxiàn) — achieve on schedule
十五五规划 (Shíwǔwǔ guīhuà) — the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030)
Cadre/self-discipline idioms & set lines
整到“点”上、训到“根”上 (zhěng dào “diǎn” shàng, xùn dào “gēn” shàng) — rectify to the key point, train to the root Rhythmic slogan for “target the essentials / root causes.”
揭短亮丑 (jiēduǎn liàngchǒu) — expose shortcomings and reveal ugliness Often used for “self-criticism.”
触动灵魂 (chùdòng línghún) — touch/stir the soul (deep ideological reflection)
知重负重、知难克难 (zhī zhòng fù zhòng, zhī nán kè nán) — knowing the weight, bearing it; knowing the difficulty, overcoming it
只争朝夕 (zhǐ zhēng zhāoxī) — seize the day; race against time
务期必成 (wù qī bì chéng) — ensure success; must succeed
不敢腐、不能腐、不想腐 (bù gǎn fǔ, bù néng fǔ, bù xiǎng fǔ) — do not dare to be corrupt, cannot be corrupt, do not want to be corrupt Triad frequently used in governance discourse.
Historical/political references (names/titles)
古田会议 (Gǔtián Huìyì) — the Gutian Conference
《古田会议决议》 (Gǔtián Huìyì Juéyì) — Resolution of the Gutian Conference
延安整风 (Yán’ān Zhěngfēng) — the Yan’an Rectification Movement
《共产党宣言》 (Gòngchǎndǎng Xuānyán) — The Communist Manifesto
抗美援朝 (Kàng Měi Yuán Cháo) — Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea (Korean War framing)
中国人民志愿军 (Zhōngguó Rénmín Zhìyuànjūn) — Chinese People’s Volunteers
Poetic/idiomatic quotations used as rhetoric (optional quick gloss)
沉舟侧畔千帆过，病树前头万木春 — beside a sunken boat a thousand sails pass; before a sick tree ten thousand trees bloom
不畏浮云遮望眼 — not afraid of floating clouds that block the view
乱云飞渡仍从容 — calm and composed even as chaotic clouds sweep past
新松恨不高千尺，恶竹应须斩万竿 — new pines regret not being a thousand feet tall; vile bamboo should be cut by the ten thousand stalks
宜将剩勇追穷寇，不可沽名学霸王 — use remaining courage to pursue the enemy to the end; don’t seek fame by imitating Xiang Yu
I just came across online a 1939 letter from Mao Zedong about the ancient philosopher Mozi written to Chen Boda, then working in the Chinese Communist Party Propaganda Department who had just written the article “Mozi’s Philosophical Thought’. Chen Boda later became the top propagandist and interpreter of Mao Zedong Thought during the first two decades of the PRC. You might say that Chinese philosophy got Chen Boda the job!
See also the second article below “Reading Mao’s Chronology (171): How Did Chen Boda Enter Mao Zedong’s Come to Mao’s Attention?”
If you have the energy, you might also want to read the 2010 article on the influence of Mohist thought on the young Mao Zedong by Li Zhenghua of the Nankai University School of Marxism.
Mozi was a fourth century BCE contemporary of Confucius who advocated universal love and pacifism. Several of his disciples, known as Mohists, were famous logicians.
Mao’s letter was published in a 2000-page 2003 compendium of Mao’s ideological and philosophical works intended to guide workers in the social sciences. You can download the book 第一编关于世界观和方法论 [A Thematic Compilation of Excerpts from Mao Zedong’s Writings, Volume One On World View and Methods] from the Marxists International Archive for your reading pleasure and inspiration. The editors discussed their objectives in compiling the book in a postscript:
第一编关于世界观和方法论 [A Thematic Compilation of Excerpts from Mao Zedong’s Writings, Volume One On World View and Methods]
For a long time, many readers—especially those engaged in theoretical work, propaganda/education and in the teaching and research of the social sciences—have hoped for the publication of a reference work that would select and excerpt Mao Zedong’s important statements on various subjects and, in a relatively comprehensive, systematic, and accurate way, reflect the scientific system and basic content of Mao Zedong Thought.
Since the 1990s, the second edition of Selected Works of Mao Zedong, the Collected Works of Mao Zedong, and other collections of Mao Zedong’s important writings have been published one after another, making the conditions for compiling such a book increasingly ripe. We began the editorial work in 1998 and, after five years, completed this large theoretical reference work, A Thematic Compilation of Excerpts from Mao Zedong’s Writings.
Postscript to 第一编关于世界观和方法论 [A Thematic Compilation of Excerpts from Mao Zedong’s Writings, Volume One On World View and Methods]
Letter to Chen Boda Regarding the Essay “Mozi’s Philosophical Thought”[1]
I have read “Mozi’s Philosophical Thought.” This is a major accomplishment on your part—you have found a Heraclitus[3] in China. I have a few individual comments; I have written them on a separate sheet for your reference. They are merely impressions based on the wording, without any foundation in research.
Salutations!
Mao Zedong Night of February 1
(1) The title It might be better changed to “A Great Figure of Ancient Dialectical Materialism—Mozi’s Philosophical Thought,” or “Mozi’s Materialist Philosophy.”
(2) The “substance” of things is not limited to attributes; it also includes their most fundamental quality. Quality and attributes are inseparable, but they are distinct. Certain attributes of a thing can be removed while the thing remains the same, because the quality that makes it that thing is still present. “Will and vital energy” (zhiqi): “will” seems to refer to the quality of a thing—the unchanging element (within the scope of a single thing); “vital energy” seems to refer to quantity and attributes—the changing element.
(3) “A gentleman cannot distinguish from his conduct what is benevolence and what is not benevolence.” The meaning of this sentence should be: when a gentleman goes about doing things, he only knows how to do unbenevolent things and does not know how to do benevolent things. Put this way it seems clearer.
(4) The section on causality It seems one could discuss it as the relationship between necessity and contingency. “Why a thing is so” is necessity; the form in which necessity manifests itself is contingency. Every form in which necessity manifests itself is contingency; necessity always expresses itself through contingency. Therefore, it is correct to say, “Without this part of the cause, there certainly would not have been the Wuchang Uprising of October 10.” But the necessity of the 1911 Revolution (the major cause) would inevitably have broken out through some other contingency (a minor cause), and would have been completed through countless contingencies (minor causes). It might have become the Hanyang Uprising of October 11, or an uprising somewhere on some other day of some other month. “If it does not break out at the most appropriate moment, it will not necessarily become a prairie fire”—this is correct; but it would also inevitably break out at another most appropriate moment and become a prairie fire.
(5) The question of the “Doctrine of the Mean” The Mohist statements “to desire to set rights aright, to dislike setting harms aright”[4], “two without partiality”[5], and “upright and not to be shaken”[6], and the Confucian statements “grasp the two ends and use the middle”[7], “choose the Mean, hold it in your heart and never lose it”[8], “stand in the middle without leaning,” and “unchanged even unto death”[9] all mean the same thing. They all affirm the stability of quality, and for the sake of this stability they wage struggle on two fronts, opposing excess and insufficiency. Here are a few points:
(1) This is waging struggle on two fronts, using the method of two-front struggle to define a relative quality. (2) Confucians and Mohists speak differently, but the meaning is the same; the Mohists do not develop anything special here. (3) “Upright” (zheng) is a concept of quality, the same as the Confucian “middle” (the middle means not being偏, not leaning to one side). “Weighting” (quan) is not a concept of quality; it is a method for specifying this quality and distinguishing it from other, different qualities—like the Confucian “grasp” (zhi) in “grasp the two ends and use the middle.” The “upright” in “desire to set rights aright” is “benefit,” making benefit distinct from harm. The “upright” in “dislike setting harms aright” is “harm,” making harm distinct from benefit and not mixing the two. “Weighting means two without partiality” should be understood as: specifying a definite quality of a thing so that it does not lean left or right (does not lean toward a different quality). But this sentence is not as clear and apt as “excess is as bad as insufficiency,” and there is no need to say it is a “development” of “excess is as bad as insufficiency.” (4) As for saying that “two without partiality” means that Mozi saw that a quality contains two different aspects, and that not inclining toward either aspect is what makes it “upright” and truly in accord with that quality—this is very inappropriate. It turns the Mohists into eclectic compromisers. A quality has two aspects, but within a process one aspect is primary and relatively stable. One must “lean” toward it; one must lean toward this aspect. What is called a definite quality, or “a” quality, refers to this aspect—this is quality. Otherwise quality is negated. Thus when the Mohists speak of “no partiality,” it means not leaning left or right toward a different quality; it does not mean not leaning toward one of the two aspects of a single quality (in fact that is not “partiality” at all; it is precisely “uprightness”). If the Mohists are dialectical materialists, they should be explained in this way.
(6) The problem of “half” and “endpoint” This passage in Mozi—especially Hu Shi’s interpretation—cannot prove the problem of qualitative transformation. It seems to be talking about the problem of the finite and the infinite.
Printed according to the Selected Letters of Mao Zedong, People’s Publishing House edition (1983).
Notes [1] The essay “Mozi’s Philosophical Thought” was written by Chen Boda and was published successively in 1939 and 1940 in issues nos. 82, 102, and 104 of Jiefang (Liberation). [2] Chen Boda was then working in the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. [3] Heraclitus (ca. 540–470 BCE), an ancient Greek materialist philosopher and founder of the Ephesian school. His philosophy contained rudimentary materialist and dialectical ideas; Lenin called him “one of the founders of dialectics.” [4] See Mozi, “Jing I” (Canons, Part I). The original reads: “欲正权利，且恶正权害.” [5] See Mozi, “Jingshuo I” (Explanations of the Canons, Part I). The original reads: “仗者，两而勿偏.” Sun Yirang’s Mozi Jiangu says “仗” should be read as “权.” [6] See Mozi, “Jing II” (Canons, Part II). The original reads: “正而不可担.” Sun Yirang’s Mozi Jiangu says “担” should be read as “摇.” [7] See Zhongyong (Doctrine of the Mean). Original: “子曰：‘舜其大知也与……执其两端，用其中于民，其斯以为舜乎。’” [8] See Zhongyong. Original: “子曰：‘回之为人也，择乎中庸，得一善，则拳拳服膺，而弗失之矣。’” [9] See Zhongyong. Original: “君子和而不流……国无道，至死不变，强哉矫。”
It was his expertise on philosophy and the Chinese classics that brought Chen Boda to Mao’s attention at Yan’an. Here is the story, machine translated by DeepL.
Reading Mao’s Chronology (171): How Did Chen Boda Enter Mao Zedong’s Come to Mao’s Attention?
On January 17, 1939, Mao Zedong replied to He Gan-zhi, then professor at Shaanbei Public School and head of the Chinese Studies Department. The letter stated:
I was very pleased to read your letter. Among our comrades, those with both interest and determination to study Chinese history remain few. In Yan’an, Comrade Chen Boda is conducting research in this field, and you are considering writing a national history—this is excellent. I hope you will proceed earnestly with your work. As for myself, my aspirations have not yet been realized. I intended to collect materials on China’s war history but have yet to begin. My tools are insufficient; this year I can only focus on developing tools—that is, studying philosophy, economics, and Leninism, with philosophy as the primary focus. In the future, I plan to research modern history and hope for your guidance.
Your three approaches to researching national history seem correct to me, especially the second one. If your book can demonstrate the merits and demerits of the two paths—national resistance versus national capitulation—and thoroughly condemn the national capitulationists of the Northern and Southern Dynasties, Southern Song, late Ming, and late Qing periods while praising the national resisters, it would be beneficial for the current War of Resistance Against Japan. One point, however: adopt a disapproving stance toward aggressive policies of “preying on the weak and attacking the ignorant” or “seeking grandeur and glory” (which have existed in Chinese history), ensuring they are not conflated with active resistance policies. Offensive actions undertaken for the sake of resistance do not fall under the category of aggression, such as the endeavors of Ban Chao during the Eastern Han Dynasty.
Mao Zedong mentioned Chen Boda in his letter because Chen was researching China’s ancient history.
On February 1, Mao Zedong wrote to Chen Boda regarding his article “The Philosophical Thought of Mozi.” The letter stated: “I have read ‘The Philosophical Thought of Mozi.’ This is a great achievement on your part—you have discovered Heraclitus in China. I have a few specific comments, which I have written on a separate sheet for your reference.” Mao’s main points were:
The “essence and attributes of things are inseparable yet distinct. Certain attributes of an object may be removed without altering the object itself, as its essence—the reason it is what it is—remains intact.”
“The section on causality could be rephrased to say that simultaneity is the relationship between necessity and contingency. ‘The reason things are as they are’ is necessity, and the form in which this necessity manifests is contingency. All manifestations of necessity are contingency; they are expressed through contingency.”
Regarding the Doctrine of the Mean: “The Mohist principles of ‘desiring to correct power, abhorring the harm of power,’ ‘being two without bias,‘ and ‘being correct and unshakable’ share the same meaning as the Confucian tenets of ‘holding both extremes and applying the middle,’ ‘choosing the Doctrine of the Mean and adhering to it without deviation,‘ ‘standing firm and impartial,’ and ‘remaining unchanged unto death.’ All affirm the stability of essence and advocate waging a two-front struggle for this stability, opposing both excess and deficiency.”
The Former Literary Youth
Chen Boda (July 29, 1904 – September 20, 1989), originally named Chen Jianxiang with the courtesy name Zhongshun, was born in Hui’an County, Quanzhou City, Fujian Province.
At age 15, Chen Boda enrolled in the Xiamen Jimei Normal School (now the Jimei University Normal College), founded by the wealthy overseas Chinese businessman Tan Kah Kee. After two and a half years at Jimei Normal School, the 17-year-old Chen returned to his hometown in Hui’an to teach at an elementary school. A year later, he took a teaching position at Xiamen Elementary School.
In the spring of 1925, Chen returned to Xiamen. Deeply admiring the literary figure Guo Moruo, he began studying novel writing. That very spring, Chen Boda—still an unknown figure in literary circles—published his first novel, Cold Days, in the highly regarded Modern Review magazine. Remarkably, Cold Days appeared right next to an article by the renowned Redology scholar Yu Pingbo. Chen Boda was just 20 when he wrote this novel, though he never wrote another one afterward.
Joining the Party After the Great Revolution’s Defeat
Following the April 12 counterrevolutionary coup in 1927, Chen Boda traveled from Xiamen to Shanghai and applied to join the Communist Party of China. He then boarded a ship bound for Wuhan alongside Wang Ming, Li Lishan, Luo Yinnong, Wang Hebo, and others. Upon arriving in Wuhan, the Party assigned him to serve as section chief of the Publishing Section within the Central Committee’s Propaganda Department. Cai Hesen, who had recently returned from the Soviet Union, was then the head of the Central Committee’s Propaganda Department. Soon after, Chen received notice from the Party organization: he was to be sent to the Soviet Union for study. He enrolled at Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow and was assigned to Class 2 of the first-year cohort.
By late 1930, the 26-year-old Chen had returned to China. In the spring of 1931, he arrived in Shanghai to reconnect with the Party organization. There, he met his classmate from Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow, Wang Ming, as well as the university’s president, Mif.
After staying in Shanghai for two months, Chen was dispatched by Wang Ming to Tianjin to work in the Propaganda Department of the CPC Shunzhi (Hebei) Provincial Committee. His task was to oversee the publication and editing of a journal titled Northern Red Flag.
Arrested and Imprisoned; Participated in Organizing the December 9th Movement After Release
On April 8, 1931, Chen Bo-da arrived in Tianjin by ship from Shanghai. On that day, the Shunzhi Provincial Committee of the CPC suffered severe disruption by Kuomintang secret agents. Chen Boda, using the alias Wang Tong, was captured along with 14 others, including Chen Yuandao, the head of the Organization Department; Xu Lanzhi, the provincial committee secretary; and Liu Ningyi and Liu Yaxiong (female). Due to the betrayal of Xu Lanzhi, the provincial committee secretary, the agents cracked the entire case. On September 4, 1931, Chen Boda, Chen Yuandao, and others were escorted from Tianjin to Beiping. Chen Boda was sentenced to two and a half years in prison and incarcerated at the “Beiping Military Reflection Institute.” He was released in 1932. In early 1933, the Party organization dispatched him to Zhangjiakou to work with Ji Hongchang‘s troops.
On December 9, 1935, the December 9th Movement erupted in Beiping. The following day, Chen Boda was dispatched by the Northern Bureau of the CPC Central Committee to Beiping. There, alongside Li Baohua and Ke Qingshi, he led the citywide student strike and was tasked with drafting the propaganda outline for the Beiping student movement.
In the spring of 1936, Liu Shaoqi arrived in Tianjin as the Central Committee’s representative to serve as Secretary of the Northern Bureau. Liu reorganized the Northern Bureau, nominating Peng Zhen as Minister of Organization, Chen Boda as Minister of Propaganda, and Lin Feng as Secretary-General. From this point on, the 32-year-old Chen Boda gained a certain standing within the Party as Minister of Propaganda for the CPC Northern Bureau.
Arrival in Yan’an
When Chen Boda arrived in Yan’an, the Shaanbei Public School had just been established and required faculty. Having previously taught Chinese literature at China University in Beiping, the organization assigned him to teach at the Shaanbei Public School. He was later transferred to teach at the Central Party School.
On May 5, 1938, the Marx-Lenin School was established in Yan’an. This institution, tasked with training theoretical cadres for the CPC Central Committee, was headed by Zhang Wentian, who concurrently served as General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee. Zhang Wentian, who was well acquainted with Chen Boda, immediately transferred him to teach at the Marx-Lenin School.
At the Marxism-Leninism Institute, Chen Boda taught the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, as well as history and philosophy. During one meeting, Mao Zedong was present. Zhang Wentian publicly introduced Chen Boda to Mao, but at that time, Mao did not take notice of him. Later, Chen Boda was transferred to the Central Committee’s Propaganda Department and appointed as head of the Publishing Section.
Catching Mao Zedong’s Attention
By chance, Chen Boda caught Mao Zedong’s attention. It occurred during a theoretical symposium attended by Mao, where Sun Yat-sen’s ideology was discussed. A debate erupted over the class nature of Sun’s thought. One view held that Sun’s ideology belonged to the petty bourgeoisie, while another contended it represented the national bourgeoisie.
Both sides argued fiercely. Chen Boda employed the dialectical method of opposites to explain: ” I believe Sun Yat-sen’s ideology possesses dual characteristics: it encompasses both the dual nature of petty-bourgeois ideology and the dual nature of national bourgeois ideology…“
After Chen Boda finished speaking, Mao Zedong responded with evident satisfaction: ”Comrade Chen Boda’s remarks were excellent. They provided a very apt analysis of the class attributes of Sun Yat-sen’s ideology…” Following the meeting, Mao Zedong kept Chen Boda behind and inquired about his background.
That evening, Mao sent word to Chen Boda, instructing him to hurry to the Canteen of the Organ Cooperative for dinner. It turned out Mao was hosting an American journalist. Mao told Chen Boda, “I’ve invited you along today as well, to dine with our American guest.”
During casual conversation, Mao learned that Chen had taught a course on the Pre-Qin philosophers at China University in Beiping. Mao himself had a keen interest in ancient Chinese philosophy, creating a shared topic of discussion.
At Mao’s suggestion, Chen began delivering lectures on ancient Chinese philosophy in Yan’an. Mao attended nearly every session, and his presence drew many others to follow. Chen Bodda soon gained renown in Yan’an’s theoretical circles.
In the autumn of 1938, the “New Philosophy Society” was established in Yan’an. Chen Bodda became the group’s leader and authored its founding manifesto, “The Origin of the New Philosophy Society,” published in the September 1938 issue of the weekly journal Liberation.
In January 1939, Chen Bodda wrote the essay “The Philosophical Thought of Mozi” and requested Mao’s corrections. After reading it carefully, Mao personally replied to Chen with the aforementioned letter.
Chen’s expertise in the study of ancient Chinese philosophy aligned precisely with Mao’s current intellectual focus. Seeing Mao’s high regard for his work, Chen subsequently submitted two additional manuscripts: “The Philosophical Thought of Confucius” and “The Philosophical Thought of Laozi.” After reading them, Mao became quite enthusiastic and wrote a longer letter on February 20, 1939, addressed to Zhang Wentian for forwarding to Chen Boda. In this letter, Mao detailed seven points of opinion, expressing his views on Confucius’s philosophical thought in response to Chen Boda’s articles. The main points were:
1. “‘If names are not correct, language will not be in order; if language is not in order, then affairs will not be done…’ As a comprehensive philosophical program, this is idealism, and Boda’s identification is correct; but if taken as a part of philosophy—that is, as a theory of practice—it is correct, akin to the meaning of ‘without correct theory, there can be no correct practice.’” Confucius’s system is idealist; yet as a partial truth, it is correct. All idealism possesses partial truths, and Confucius is no exception.“ ”Moreover, idealist philosophy has one strength: it emphasizes subjective initiative. Confucius exemplified this, which is why he attracted attention and support. One key reason mechanical materialism cannot overcome idealism is its neglect of subjective initiative. We should acknowledge this strength of Confucius.”
II. Regarding the Doctrine of the Mean: “Bo Da’s interpretation is correct but incomplete. ‘To exceed is as bad as to fall short’ represents a method for the struggle between two opposing forces—a crucial ideological approach. All philosophy, all thought, and all daily life must engage in this struggle between two opposing forces to affirm the relatively stable essence of things and concepts.” “That which ‘ Excess’ represents the ‘leftist’ tendency, while ‘insufficiency’ represents the ‘rightist’ tendency.“ Confucius’s concept of the Mean embodies the idea of identifying and determining quality through quantitative analysis to oppose both ‘leftist’ and ‘rightist’ deviations. ”This concept is indeed, as Bo Da stated, one of Confucius’s great discoveries and achievements—a crucial philosophical category deserving thorough elaboration.”
III. Regarding Confucius’s moral theory, “it should be subjected to materialist observation and subjected to more criticism, so as to make a principled distinction from the Kuomintang’s moral view (the Kuomintang most likes to cite Confucius in this regard).” “The concept of ‘benevolence’ has been exploited by idealist, confused thinkers for thousands of years after Confucius, causing utter chaos and truly harming people greatly. I believe Confucius’s moral categories of this sort should be subjected to historical materialist criticism and placed in their proper context.“
Upon receiving the letter, Chen Boda immediately revised his article according to Mao Zedong’s suggestions and resubmitted it to Mao.
On February 22, Mao Zedong wrote another letter to Zhang Wentian for forwarding to Chen Boda: ”I have read Comrade Boda’s article; the revisions are all good. However, I have the following additional comments for Comrade Boda to consider… Whether they are appropriate or not, please deliberate with Comrade Chen.” In this letter, Mao Zedong added three more points.
Consequently, the relationship between Chen Boda and Mao Zedong grew increasingly close.
On March 4, 1939, Mao Zedong attended a meeting of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. After this meeting, Chen Boda was transferred to work under Mao Zedong.
Mao Zedong and Mohist Thought: Unconscious Influence in His Early Years
December 20, 2010, 8:13 a.m. Source: Beijing Daily
by Zheng Linhua of the School of Marxism of Nankai University
郑林华 (作者单位：南开大学马克思主义教育学院)
Mao Zedong and Mohist Thought
When examining the relationship between traditional Chinese culture and the Communist Party of China, many scholars focus primarily on Confucianism, paying less attention to Mohism. In fact, Chinese Communists placed great emphasis on Mohist thought.
Many scholars studying this relationship tend to focus on Confucianism while paying less attention to Mohism. However, as some scholars have pointed out, it was Mohist thought, not Confucianism or other schools, that served as the political doctrine of the peasant class within traditional Chinese culture. In revolutionary practice, Mao Zedong and many other Communist Party leaders and theorists placed great emphasis on Mohist thought.
Direct evidence of Mao Zedong’s study of the Mozi includes two letters in Selected Letters: one dated February 1, 1939, addressed to Chen Boda; and another dated February 22, 1939, addressed to Zhang Wentian. Additionally, annotations on the “Principles of Ethics” are compiled in “Mao Zedong’s Early Manuscripts.” During the Yan’an period, the Party conducted in-depth research on traditional Chinese culture. Mao Zedong, Zhang Wentian, Fan Wenlan, Ai Siqi, and others were engaged in this work. After writing “The Philosophical Thought of Mozi,” Chen Boda sought guidance from Mao Zedong. Mao Zedong shared his views on the similarities and differences between Mozi’s “two principles without partiality” and Confucian “Golden Mean” philosophy. Mao noted that Mozi was China’s Heraclitus and suggested that the title of Chen’s essay did not sufficiently convey the high regard for Mozi.
Mao recommended changing the title to The Philosophical Thought of Mozi, the Ancient Master of Dialectical Materialism or Mozi’s Materialist Philosophy, as they are more appropriate. Heraclitus, an ancient Greek philosopher, held primitive materialist and dialectical ideas. Lenin once called him “one of the founders of dialectics.” Understanding Heraclitus’s status in Western philosophical history further illuminates Mao Zedong’s high regard for Mozi. Mao’s description of Mozi as a “master of dialectical materialism” demonstrates his extensive study of Mohist thought.
Mao Zedong’s Unconscious Absorption of Mohist Thought During His Early Education
Mao Zedong was unconsciously influenced by Mohist thought from an early age. In a 1936 conversation with Edgar Snow, Mao recalled that, as a child, he “loved reading old Chinese novels, especially stories about rebellions,” mentioning works such as The Loyal Subject [《精忠传》], Water Margin, SuiTang, Romance of the Three Kingdoms, and Journey to the West. Years later, Mao still recounted to Snow with interest: “I often read these books in class, covering them with a serious-looking book when the teacher approached. Most classmates did the same. We could recite many stories almost by heart and discussed them repeatedly… I believe these books had a profound influence on me, as I read them at an age when I was most receptive.” This reveals that, although Mao treated Confucian studies as an academic obligation in his youth, his true passion lay in novels depicting peasant rebellions, such as Water Margin.
Within traditional Chinese culture, the political philosophy underpinning peasant uprisings was Mohism. Influenced by novels such as Water Margin, which reflected Mohist thought deeply, Mao unconsciously absorbed Mohist ideas from an early age. In fact, the young Mao sympathized with peasants, even those who rebelled due to famine. He regarded Peng the Blacksmith, a peasant leader who was executed by the authorities during the Gelaohui uprising, as a hero. Mao had already positioned himself in defense of the peasant class, which constituted the vast majority of China’s population, in terms of political stance. This aligned with Mohist thought, which places paramount importance on safeguarding the interests of the greatest number of people. Born into a peasant family, Mao maintained a frugal and simple lifestyle even after becoming a leader. The influence of the Mohist spirit is evident in his personal life.
Young Mao Zedong’s Conscious Practice of Mohist Thought
In their studies of Mao Zedong’s ideology as a young man, most scholars have noted the influence of Huxiang culture while overlooking the inherent Mohist elements. Some scholars point out that besides Confucian thought and its philosophy of mind and nature, the young Mao’s personality ideals had two other distinct intellectual sources: Mohism and the practical scholarship of the late Ming and early Qing dynasties.” Born into a peasant family, Mao’s pursuit of fundamental principles and the ideals of sages and benevolent men reflected traditional Confucian heroism and scholar-official ethos. When he explored concrete paths to establish his resolve, cultivate himself, and become a sage, the values of labor, diligence, and the pursuit of practical results naturally became his life convictions. These values were concepts and customs of the lower strata of society, and they shaped his personal ideals, bearing a strong Mohist character. It is also described as “incorporating Confucianism into Mohism” or “filling Confucianism with Mohism.”
Although Tan Sitong’s teachings significantly influenced the young Mao Zedong, Tan, like other Chinese Confucian philosophers, did not consider physical labor important. In this regard, Mao had more in common with Mohist philosophy and Yan Yuan’s teachings, which emphasized “strength,” “power,” and physical “labor.” Yan Yuan’s thought bore distinct Mohist characteristics, and Mohist ideas naturally influenced the young Mao through Yan’s school of thought. Mao’s belief that sages could save the world extended beyond Confucianism.
He also regarded Mozi as a sage-savior. In his annotations to Principles of Ethics, Mao wrote, “All life activities perfect the individual; all morality perfects the individual. Expressing sympathy for others and seeking their happiness is not for others’ sake, but for one’s own. Possessing this heart of loving others, one must fulfill it. Failure to do so constitutes a deficiency in a complete life and a failure to reach the true goal.” Both Shakyamuni and Mozi sought to achieve their personal true goals.”
His admiration for Zeng Guofan did not stem from Zeng’s status as a Neo-Confucian master but rather “because Zeng embodied both ‘sages’ (cultivation) and ‘heroes’ (achievements), aligning closely with Mao’s tastes and aspirations at the time.” Zeng integrated Confucianism, Mohism, Daoism, and Legalism into his philosophy, describing himself as “embodying the essence of Laozi and Zhuangzi, while applying the principles of Yu and Mozi.” His diligence and frugality in personal conduct and household management were guided by Mohist ideals.
He also believed that Mohist principles could extend beyond personal and domestic governance to “saving the people.” “Human nature universally craves ease and abhors labor. Whether noble or lowly, wise or foolish, all crave ease and dread toil. This has been true throughout the ages. For one’s own sake, one must master skills, temper one’s body, persevere through hardship, and cultivate vigilance—only then can wisdom grow and insight deepen.” For the sake of the world, one must feel hunger and distress as one’s own and regard the suffering of even one person as one’s own guilt.” Great Yu traveled by boat for four years, passing his own door without entering.
Mozi worked tirelessly to benefit the world, living in extreme frugality and exerting himself to the utmost to save the people. Mao Zedong persisted in cold-water bathing regardless of the season during his time at Hunan First Normal School. He undertook long-distance travel and rural investigations with comrades like Xiao Zisheng and Cai Hesen without carrying a penny. This spirit of “taking self-imposed hardship to the extreme” is precisely what Mohism consistently advocates. “Clearly, the young Mao Zedong deeply resonated with Mohism’s class origins, lifestyle, and behavioral principles.” The New People’s Society, which Mao organized, also closely aligned with the spirit of Mohism, as evidenced by its various regulations for members. Within the society, Mao advocated for physical labor and the work-study principle: “I now deeply desire to work. I increasingly find a life devoted solely to speaking and thinking to be an extremely painful existence. I believe I must have a period dedicated solely to physical labor.” This directly resonated with Mohism’s reverence for manual labor.
Mao Zedong’s emphasis on Mohist thought coincided with the ideological currents of the May Fourth Movement
His absorption of and reference to Mohist thought were consistent with the “labor-respecting ideology” and “sacredness of labor” trends that emerged during the May Fourth period. These trends reflected the academic world’s growing emphasis on Mohist doctrine. Around the time of the New Culture Movement, the pioneers of the new culture sought theoretical support from both imported Western ideas, such as democracy and science, and China’s traditional culture, in order to counter Confucianism, which was then seen as a pillar of feudal rule. These pioneers rediscovered and reexamined Mozi’s teachings, once a prominent school that rivaled Confucianism.
This led to a trend of “honoring Mozi while suppressing Confucianism.” Liang Qichao, Chen Duxiu, and Hu Shi all placed great emphasis on Mohist thought. In 1917, while teaching ancient Chinese philosophy at Peking University, Hu Shi wrote Outline of the History of Chinese Philosophy, which focused on the ideas of Confucius and Mozi. Published in 1919, it became widely popular.
After arriving in Beijing in August 1918, Mao Zedong began working at Peking University’s library through Yang Changji’s introduction. He remained there until his departure in March 1919. During this period, he audited several courses and interacted with numerous figures of the New Culture Movement. Some scholars have analyzed that Mao attended Hu Shi’s lectures on Mozi philosophy during his time at Peking University. He also joined two academic societies: the Philosophy Research Association, founded in January 1919, and another society. Founded by Yang Changji, Liang Shuming, Hu Shi, and others, the association’s mission was “to study Eastern and Western philosophies and open new horizons of knowledge.”
Mao witnessed the activities of prominent figures in the New Culture Movement and befriended several renowned scholars. Having read their work frequently during his time at Hunan First Normal School, he seized the opportunity to consult with them directly. He organized a discussion at Peking University with Cai Yuanpei and Hu Shi, bringing together over a dozen members of the New People’s Society in Beijing. “The format involved members posing questions for their responses, with discussions primarily focusing on academic and philosophical perspectives on life.”
Although more specific materials are lacking, we can reasonably infer from the content of Hu Shi’s lectures and the prevailing academic emphasis on Mohism at the time that Mao likely studied Mohist thought during his time at Peking University or was influenced by Hu Shi’s and others’ research on Mohism. It must be noted that the young Mao Zedong admired Liang Qichao and Hu Shi, who placed great importance on Mohism. Liang Qichao declared himself “an ardent admirer of Mozi,” stating that “in terms of personal character, Mozi truly stands as an unparalleled practitioner throughout history—unmatched not only in China, but also rare worldwide.” Hu Shi similarly remarked: “By my teens, I had already been profoundly influenced by Laozi and Mozi.” During the May Fourth New Culture Movement, an intellectual trend emerged that “exalted Mozi while suppressing Confucius,” leading Guo Moruo to observe that figures like Liang and Hu “sought to establish a Moist shop after tearing down the Confucian shop.” Given Mao’s admiration for Liang and Hu, it was only natural that he would be influenced by their studies of Mohism.
—Zheng Linhua
(Author’s affiliation: School of Marxism Education, Nankai University)
Chinese text of Mao Zedong’s letter to Chen Boda translated above:
Radio Free Asia report. RFA is still around. It was largely shutdown in 2025 in the midst of Musk’s DOGE vandalism. Now RFA is coming back to a limited extend in Mandarin Chinese, Korean, and Burmese. Details at ChatGPT5 search link.
Catholic and Protestant Clergy Face Restrictions on Overseas Travel in Multiple Regions
By Gu Yuan
January 30, 2026 04:54 EST
The Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association has issued regulations explicitly restricting the passports of Catholic clergy for international travel. (Photo provided by a volunteer)
Religious clergy across multiple regions in China have recently reported facing stricter limitations on their overseas activities. The Catholic system has implemented internal documents mandating centralized collection and approval management of passports for clergy traveling abroad or to other regions, with these measures currently being enforced at the local level.
On December 16, 2025, the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association and the Chinese Catholic Bishops’ Conference adopted the “Provisions on Standardizing the Management of Passports and Travel Documents for Catholic Clergy Going Abroad (Trial Implementation)” during the Seventh Session of the Tenth Standing Committee of the “One Association and One Conference.” The document specifies that Catholic clergy—including bishops, priests, deacons, and nuns—must have their passports, travel permits for Hong Kong and Macao Special Administrative Regions, and mainland residents’ travel permits for Taiwan uniformly collected by the corresponding administrative bodies, with tiered management implemented.
Red header official circular Party-controlled organizations Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association and the Chinese Catholic Bishops’ Conference. This document is translated below.
According to the regulations, the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association and the Chinese Catholic Bishops’ Conference are responsible for managing the documents of their standing leadership members and the leadership of the Chinese Catholic Theological Seminary. Local Catholic “Two Associations” are responsible for the leadership members of their local theological seminaries, while the documents of other clergy are managed uniformly by their respective dioceses. The document summarizes the relevant management principles as “unified standardization, tiered custody, and hierarchical responsibility.”
A Catholic priest surnamed Guo from Baoding, North China, told reporters on Wednesday (January 28) that while dioceses previously tracked clergy travel abroad, passports were typically kept by individuals. Now, with centralized storage, personal outbound travel requires a more comprehensive approval process. He stated: “Whether attending international religious conferences, pursuing studies at seminaries, or visiting overseas relatives, advance application is required, and travel can only proceed after approval.”
The document also outlines approval procedures for clergy traveling abroad or leaving the country. According to regulations, clergy must submit applications through passport custodians along with supporting documentation. Only after approval by competent authorities can they process passports, visas, or entry permits. For private overseas travel, written applications must be submitted 30 days in advance. Passports can only be collected after approval and completion of a written pledge.
Restrictions impact church exchanges
A Catholic clergyman surnamed Zhao in Shanghai told reporters that such management practices affect international exchanges. “Some training and retreat activities are held overseas. If approval isn’t granted, we can’t travel abroad for these exchanges,” he said. He also mentioned that foreign believers visiting China for recent events had to report to higher authorities beforehand.
The document also outlines disciplinary measures. Failure to surrender credentials as required, unauthorized changes to itineraries or duration of stay may result in warnings or suspension of credential processing for the individual and their affiliated organization. Refusal to surrender credentials or “fraudulently obtaining credentials” will be handled according to regulations from national religious affairs authorities and internal church rules.
Restrictions extend beyond Catholic clergy. Mr. Jin, a Christian from Huai’an, Jiangsu, told reporters his passport and Hong Kong-Macau travel permit were not renewed upon expiration. “They won’t give me a passport or a permit to visit Hong Kong,” he said. “I’ve communicated with the police many times, but to no avail.”
Mr. Cao, a pastor from a house church in Anyang, Henan, told reporters he saw a Catholic notice online stating clergy must apply 30 days in advance for overseas travel and surrender passports within seven days of returning. He believes such regulations are not unique to Catholicism but represent broader immigration control arrangements.
“These requirements aren’t new,” he said. “They’ve long been part of immigration control protocols, only now explicitly codified in official documents.”
Exit Management Extends to Three-Self Churches
Pastor Cao noted that Catholic priests, pastors, and other clergy have long been integrated into the institutional management system and were not newly designated as “public officials.” He explained that these individuals have long been considered part of the institutional framework, belonging to the public institution system. Like teachers, doctors, and other groups, they are subject to relevant management regulations, which are not targeted at specific individuals.
Regarding phrases like “trial implementation” and “approved through deliberation,” Pastor Cao believes these regulations are not independent decisions made by the church, but rather management requirements presented in the form of internal resolutions.
He also indicated that the situation applies to the Christian Three-Self Patriotic Movement. The relevant exit-entry management requirements are not exclusive to Catholicism but also cover the Christian Three-Self system, involving issues such as private overseas travel and exit-entry approvals.
Scholar Liu Shilun told reporters that this regulation is part of recent adjustments to the management approach within the religious system. He explained that clergy are gradually being incorporated into management frameworks similar to other social systems, with their overseas activities treated as matters requiring approval and record-keeping.
In recent years, Chinese authorities have established exit management mechanisms across multiple social sectors. Overseas religious figures entering China to engage in religious activities must obtain approval from relevant religious institutions; otherwise, their activities will be deemed illegal.
Editor: Li Nuo
Translation of the official circular:
China Catholic Patriotic Association Bishops’ Conference of the Catholic Church in China
Provisions on Standardizing the Custody and Management of Travel Documents Held by Catholic Clergy Going Abroad (Including to Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan) (Trial)
(Adopted upon deliberation at the 7th Standing Committee Meeting of the 10th Session of China’s Catholic “One Association and One Conference” on December 16, 2025)
Article 1 In order to strengthen the management of Catholic clergy and further standardize the custody of travel documents held for going abroad (including to Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan), these Provisions are formulated on the basis of the Measures for the Administration of Religious Clergy and relevant internal Church rules, in light of the realities of Catholic work.
Article 2 For purposes of these Provisions, “Catholic clergy” includes: bishops, priests, deacons, and nuns.
Article 3 The “documents” referred to in these Provisions include: passports; permits for travel to and from the Hong Kong (Macao) Special Administrative Region; and Mainland Residents’ Travel Permits for travel to the Taiwan region. “Passport” here refers to an ordinary passport.
Article 4 Custody of travel documents shall be implemented in accordance with the principles of “unified standards, tiered custody, and responsibility at every level.”
Article 5 Catholic “One Association and One Conference” shall be responsible for the custody and management of travel documents of clergy who are members of the resident leadership group and department heads. It shall also be responsible for the custody and management of travel documents of clergy who are members of the leadership group and department heads of the National Seminary/Philosophy-and-Theology Institute.
Article 6 The local Catholic “Two Associations” shall be responsible for the custody and management of travel documents of clergy who are members of the resident leadership group of the local organizations and members of the leadership group of the local seminary/philosophy-and-theology institute. Travel documents of other clergy shall be managed in a unified manner by the diocese.
Article 7 Where it is necessary to use a personal (private) passport to carry out an official (public) overseas assignment, the individual shall submit to the document-custody unit a written request to retrieve the personal passport, together with the approval document for the official overseas assignment. Only after approval by the competent authority may the individual apply for and handle the relevant travel documents and visas/endorsements.
For personal (private) travel abroad (including to Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan), the individual shall, at least 30 days in advance, submit a written application through their unit (diocese, school, or activity venue) to the document-custody unit, explaining the specific itinerary arrangements, reason for travel, length of stay, and roster of personnel and other information. Only after approval by the competent authority and completion of a written undertaking may the individual apply for and handle the relevant travel documents and visas/endorsements.
Article 8 Clergy shall strictly carry out activities in accordance with the approved itinerary and time limits, and shall not arbitrarily change the itinerary or overstay.
Article 9 Clergy of Catholic “One Association and One Conference” who travel abroad (including to Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan) shall, within 7 days after re-entering the country, return their travel documents and, as required, complete and submit the report/record forms and return forms, etc., to confirm that they have returned to China.
Local clergy shall, in accordance with local rules and work needs, return travel documents to the custody unit for safekeeping within 7 days after re-entry.
Article 10 If a document holder loses travel documents while outside China, they shall promptly report the loss to the Chinese embassy or consulate in the locality, the Office of the Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Hong Kong or Macao Special Administrative Region, and the document-custody unit.
Afterward, the document holder shall submit a written report to the document-custody unit describing the circumstances of the loss.
Article 11 If a person does not carry out the planned travel, the travel documents shall be retrieved by the document-custody unit within 5 working days from the date the cancellation of the overseas travel matter is confirmed.
Article 12 Where a person fails to return travel documents as required, or changes itinerary arrangements or the length of stay without approval, in violation of the undertaking, the individual may—depending on the seriousness of the circumstances—be admonished or have the processing of travel documents for the individual and their unit (organization, school, or activity venue) suspended.
Where a person refuses to return travel documents, or fabricates falsehoods to fraudulently obtain travel documents, they shall be dealt with in accordance with relevant provisions of the national religious affairs authorities and internal rules.
Article 13 Document-custody units shall properly keep registration records for the documents in their custody. No one may privately damage travel documents, nor may anyone privately delegate document-custody authority.
Article 14 These Provisions shall be interpreted by Catholic “One Association and One Conference.”
Article 15 These Provisions shall take effect on the date of publication.
Chinese text scanned from a photo of the circular:
中國的大學必須端正學術風氣 中評社香港9月3日電／“剪刀一剪，漿糊一粘，大名一簽，長長一篇。許多論文就是這樣被製造出來的。”談到高校教育現狀，一位大學教授向記者念了這樣一個廣為流傳的順口溜。事實上，有關中國大學存在的“怪現象”早就是教育界關注的話題，而近日華裔數學家丘成桐批評北大“引進海外人才造假”事件，則再度引發了社會各界對大學“浮躁風氣”的熱烈討論。《環球時報》駐外記者採訪到多名在國外著名大學任教的華人學者，他們也對這一問題發表了自己的看法。
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