Last week, the Taipei District Court issued a ruling former Taipei Mayor, TPP Chair, and Presidential Candidate Ko Wen-je 柯文哲 guilty of corruption in the Core Pacific City real estate development case, sentencing him to 17 years in prison.
This verdict will have massive reverberations throughout the political system, though it’s unclear right now exactly what those will be. Maybe I’ll find time to speculate about that in another post.
For now, let’s try to figure out what just happened. If you are like me, corruption cases are very difficult because they are, by their very nature, convoluted and misleading.
I found a Facebook by political commentator Wen Lang-tung 溫朗東explaining the court’s decision in relatively simple language to be very helpful.
I translated this post into English using Perplexity. I asked the program not to make any additions or changes, so the writing is very choppy. I will post the translation first and then the original Chinese version at the end. Hopefully this will help readers understand the corruption case and why Ko was found guilty.
Please note that this was a District Court ruling. It will be appealed to higher courts, and the sentences are usually reduced somewhat when they are appealed. I have no idea what the timeline is for this process.
If you really want to geek out, you can read the Judicial Yuan’s 35 page press release.
Here is Wen’s post:
Core Pacific City Case Verdict Press Release: Plain Language Version
[1. First, Understand Floor Area Ratio]
The size of your plot of land determines how much floor space the government allows you to build. This upper limit is called the floor area ratio.
For example, on a 100 ping plot with a 560% floor area ratio, the total floor area across all floors can be up to 560 ping. You could build 10 stories of 56 ping each, or 20 stories of 28 ping each, but the total caps at 560 ping.
Why the limit? More building means more people, leading to worse traffic congestion, poorer air quality, and insufficient parking. The cost of your extra building affects everyone around you. So the government regulates it.
The Core Pacific City plot’s limit is 560%.
[2. What Core Pacific City Wanted]
Core Pacific City Co felt 560% wasn’t enough and wanted more.
They argued: We previously had a higher figure (120,284 square meters of floor area), which should remain valid forever.
But in 2018, the government reviewed the urban plan and removed that old figure. Core Pacific City challenged it in court. Their administrative appeal was rejected. Then their administrative lawsuit in July 2020 was also ruled against by the court. The court said the old figure was a one-time guarantee, and claims of permanent validity didn’t hold up.
All legitimate paths were blocked.
[3. How Shen Ching-ching Took the Back Door]
With the front door closed, Shen Ching-ching (chairman of Weijing Group) found a back door: floor area bonus.
The concept of floor area bonus is that if your project benefits the city (e.g., disaster prevention, smart buildings), the government can grant extra floor area.
But here’s the key: Taipei City already has a full set of regulations (Land Use Zoning Control Autonomous Ordinance), specifying which cases qualify for bonuses, how to calculate them, and the caps. This was passed by the city council and has legal force.
Core Pacific City didn’t follow this path.
Instead, they used Article 24 of the Urban Planning Act, allowing landowners to propose their own “detailed plan amendment,” where they designed their own bonus items.
The problem: Article 24 only allows landowners to propose detailed plans; it says nothing about granting bonuses. Core Pacific City invented three bonus items (resilient city contribution, smart city contribution, livable city contribution) and calculated they could get an extra 20% floor area.
[4. Reasons the Court Found It Illegal]
The court gave five reasons.
First, no legal basis. Floor area bonuses involve major public interest (citizens bear the consequences of your extra building), so under the constitutional principle of legal reservation, they require a law or legally authorized order. You can’t invent bonus items for yourself.
Second, violates superior regulations. Land Administration Act Article 25 caps third-category commercial zone floor area at 560%. The Ministry of the Interior’s “Urban Planning Detailed Plan Review Principles” Point 8 prohibits exceeding superior regulations. Core Pacific City’s bonuses broke both caps.
Third, illegally applies urban renewal rules. The bonus items borrowed from urban renewal bonus methods, but Core Pacific City didn’t qualify for urban renewal. Using inapplicable laws is illegal.
Fourth, violates equality principle. This plan only applied to Core Pacific City’s plot. If approved, other landowners could say, “I want to use Article 24 to set my own bonuses too.” Rules can’t make special exceptions for specific people.
Fifth, experts and rank-and-file officials blocked it. In October 2020, the expert consultation meeting saw committee members say “legality concerns” and “lacks public benefit.” The Urban Development Department’s stance was always “favoring private interests,” with billions in cost disparity. These opinions were in the attached documents, visible to approvers.
The court emphasized: The issue isn’t “20% bonus is too much” (discretionary appropriateness), but “you can’t grant it at all” (legality). Defendants claimed the court should respect the Urban Planning Committee’s professional discretion, but the court replied: Without legal authorization, you haven’t even reached the “discretion” stage.
In short: No law says Core Pacific City could get what it wanted.
[5. How Ko Wen-je Committed the Crime of Intent to profit]
Intent to profit requires: public official + knowingly violating the law + giving private parties undue benefits.
Ko Wen-je, as mayor, had final say on administrative matters.
He knew Core Pacific City’s appeal was rejected. He knew the administrative court ruled against them. He saw the experts’ doubts in attached documents. The Urban Development Department’s position was “favoring private interests.”
With all this information laid out, on October 27, 2020, he still approved the document, sending Core Pacific City’s detailed plan draft to public exhibition.
Core Pacific City thereby gained a bonus equivalent to 18,463.2 square meters of floor area. Dingyue Co (the developer) was deemed to have obtained illegal benefits of over NT$12.1 billion.
[6. How Ko Wen-je Committed The crime of accepting bribes]
Look at the timeline.
February 20, 2020: Shen Ching-ching met Ko Wen-je at city hall. They talked alone for about an hour; Shen’s assistant Chu Ya-hu waited outside without joining. Shen left with a satisfied smile.
February 21, 2020: The next day, the Urban Development Department received Core Pacific City’s settlement proposal.
March 10, 2020: Ying Hsiao-wei proposed for Core Pacific City at a city council seminar.
March 17, 2020: Core Pacific City formally submitted its petition.
March 24-26, 2020: Shen Ching-ching instructed seven Weijing Group employees to each withdraw cash from the group and donate NT$300,000 each (the legal personal cap) as political donations, totaling NT$2.1 million wired to the Taiwan People’s Party political donation account controlled by Ko.
After wiring, Chu Ya-hu messaged Li Wen-tsung (Ko’s aide): “Little Shen stingily donated NT$2.1 million (seven people, NT$300,000 each per rules).” Li replied: “Elders and friends contribute drops in the bucket; the mayor and we are grateful.”
Then Ko used mayoral power to refer Core Pacific City’s petition to the Urban Planning Committee. Per rules, cases in litigation should just notify petitioners to follow original procedures; he didn’t need to—and shouldn’t have—sent it to the committee. But he did.
How did the court deem it bribery, not political donations? Four factors.
Who gave the money: Shen Ching-ching, seeking Ko’s help.
How: He didn’t appear himself; had seven employees each donate NT$300,000. A lump NT$2.1 million is obvious; split into seven small amounts is less noticeable.
Timing: Met February 20; money arrived end of March. Core Pacific City was intensively pressing the city during this.
What happened after: Knowingly pushed a legally untenable request using mayoral power.
The court saw it together: This NT$2.1 million was Shen’s price for Ko to push the bonus case. Calling it “political donations” was just packaging.
Bribery and intent to profit are two sides of the same act (imaginary concurrence); the heavier crime applies. Bribery is heavier, so 13 years here.
[7. Why the NT$15 Million Didn’t Convict]
Ko’s computer had an Excel file with one entry: “2022/11/1 Little Shen 1500 Shen Ching-ching.” The court confirmed “Little Shen” is Shen (he always messaged Ko as “Little Shen” or “Weijing Little Shen”). Other entries cross-checked as real.
But law says: Defendant’s admission can’t be the sole conviction evidence; needs independent corroboration. This Excel is Ko’s own creation—it’s an admission.
NT$2.1 million has corroboration: transfer records, Chu’s message, Li’s reply, subsequent actions.
NT$15 million has only the Excel row; no independent money trail or evidence proving delivery.
Ko messaged Huang Shan-shan “Weijing Little Shen already gave, don’t ask him again,” but the court said it could refer to the NT$2.1 million, can’t rule that out.
Conclusion: Evidence insufficient for conviction threshold. Doesn’t mean NT$15 million didn’t happen.
This shows the verdict’s quality: The court doesn’t convict on everything it sees. Over the threshold convicts; under doesn’t.
[8. Ying Hsiao-wei’s NT$52.5 Million Bribery]
Ying Hsiao-wei is a Taipei city councilor, reelected since 2010. As councilor, she pressured the city hall for Core Pacific City: frequent meetings with officials, demanding documents, proposing at council seminars. Goal: Speed up city actions favoring Core Pacific City’s bonus.
How did Shen pay her? A circuitous route.
2017-2019: From Weijing Group’s China Engineering Co, wired “donations” to “Huaxia Association” accounts controlled by Ying, totaling NT$6 million over three years.
November 2021: 17 days after city hall approved Core Pacific City’s bonus, Shen issued six checks from Weijing Group companies to Huaxia Association and four others, totaling NT$45 million. All five associations actually controlled by Ying.
2022: Additional NT$1.5 million via transfers and political donations.
Total: NT$52.5 million.
How prove association money was Ying’s? Tracked money flows to the minute and location.
Case 1: Chung-hua Martial Arts Association withdrew NT$2 million cash December 21, 2021 (“activity expenses”). But its 2021 financials show total expenses NT$380,000, year-end balance NT$4.61 million. The NT$2 million unrelated to activities. Actually deposited in three tranches (NT$600,000 x2, NT$800,000) to Ying’s bank loan account for repayment.
Case 2: June 15, 2022, aide Chen Chia-min withdrew NT$3.53 million cash at 10:15 a.m. from City Development Promotion Association account (Taipei Fubon Bank, Songjiang Road 200). 38 minutes later at 10:54 a.m., deposited NT$3.5 million cash to Ying’s Yuanta Bank loan account (Songjiang Road 192). Same road, walking distance under a minute. Association’s 2022 expenses only NT$14,920; the NT$3.53 million unrelated.
Case 3: August 8, 2022, Chen withdrew NT$2 million cash at 11:17 a.m. from Huaxia Hope Care Association (First Bank Daan Branch, Xinyi Road Sec. 4 No. 382). 32 minutes later at 11:49 a.m., deposited NT$2 million to Ying’s Citibank credit card account (Xinyi Road Sec. 4 No. 460). Slip says “prepay credit card fees, cardholder friend repayment.”
Timing, amounts match; distances tiny; no matching association expenses. Court: Associations were waystations; money’s true end was Ying’s loans and credit cards.
As for quid pro quo: Ying actively pressured during Core Pacific City vs. city litigation; continued after administrative court loss. November 1, 2021 city approval; November 18 checks for NT$45 million. “Long-sought demands realized, funds received immediately after—timing tightly matches.”
[9. Ying Hsiao-wei’s Money Laundering]
Ying used “withdraw cash, then deposit” to deliberately break electronic trails. Direct transfer from association to personal account leaves bank records, easily traced. Cash out/in severs the link: association shows “cash withdrawal,” personal shows “cash deposit,” no direct electronic tie.
This intentional flow-breaking earned a separate 3-year money laundering sentence plus NT$10 million fine.
Also, Ying fled before prosecutors searched, going to Taoyuan Airport then Taichung Airport to exit. Court factored this into sentencing: “Intent to obstruct justice, wasting judicial resources.”
[10. Shen Ching-ching’s Bribery and Intent to profit]
Shen Ching-ching initiated it all. He wanted more floor area, paid to unblock Ko and Ying.
He committed bribery (NT$2.1 million to Ko, NT$52.5 million to Ying) and intent to profit (with officials, illegally granting Core Pacific City the bonus). Court punished the heavier intent to profit: 10 years plus NT$20 million fine.
How prove he “knowingly” violated law? He knew appeal rejected, lawsuit lost, no urban renewal eligibility. Legit paths blocked, so he sought back doors. If truly legal, why spend over NT$50 million bribing? Just pursue legit channels. Spending that much proves he knew legit paths wouldn’t win.
Illegal benefits: Dingyue Co deemed to forfeit over NT$12.1 billion. Invest tens of millions for hundreds of billions back—that’s why he bribed.
[11. Ko Wen-je’s Embezzlement of Political Donations]
This is separate from Core Pacific City; Ko’s other crime.
Key question: Whose money are political donations?
Ko claimed: Donated to me is mine.
Court disagreed. Political donations have statutory use limits: special accounts, MOICA declarations, only for political activities. Candidate is more “manager” than full owner.
Simple reason: If political donations were candidate’s private property, transparency and no-profit rules would be meaningless. People donate for politics, not pocket money.
Direct embezzlement of NT$6 million cash: In 2022 as mayor, Ko took three NT$2 million cash donations specified for TPP. Neither deposited nor declared. NT$6 million vanished outside special accounts.
Drained NT$61.34 million via Muka Co: Ko-controlled “Muka Co” siphoned political donations under various names.
Portrait rights trick: Ko signed “portrait rights license” with Muka; Muka contracted campaign HQ for “license fees.” Transferred NT$15 million from donation account to Muka, then NT$4.5 million to Ko’s personal account (NT$2.44 million to family securities). Using own face for campaign, then charging own campaign “portrait fees”—court saw no real commercial nature.
Fundraising items: Ko’s Facebook, IG, TPP site called it “fundraising,” “donations,” “presidential campaign funds,” priced multiples of cost. Court deemed political donations. NT$41.33 million all to Muka, not special account.
KP SHOW concert: NT$8,800 tickets, promoted as “fundraising.” NT$770,000 surplus to Muka.
Tsai Feng Co NT$3 million: Wanted to donate to TPP, told “wire to Muka.” Went to Muka, not TPP account. Li Wen-chuan issued four fake invoices (“design consulting”) to disguise as business.
Diverted NT$8.27 million from Chung Wang Foundation: Set up for “social welfare, aiding vulnerable.” But Ko nominally hired campaign staff as foundation employees, paying salaries from foundation for campaign work. Salaries 60% of 2023 expenses. Welfare foundation became private piggy bank. Court found breach of trust.
[12. Other Defendants]
Huang Ching-mao (former Urban Development Department director): 6 years 6 months. Knew experts’ doubts, court loss, no bonus basis; still approved, assigned Shao Hsiu-pei to project team. Intent to profit.
Peng Chen-sheng (former deputy mayor): 2 years, suspended. Bridged Ko and department. Confessed in investigation, no personal gain; reduced then further mitigated per Criminal Code Article 59, no jail.
Shao Hsiu-pei (former department section chief): 1 year 3 months, suspended. Assigned by Huang to project team, suggested Article 24 detailed plan—the illegal path. Confessed, provided key testimony; Witness Protection Act reduction.
Li Wen-tsung (Ko aide): Guilty 4 years 6 months on some counts, not guilty on others. Embezzlement and breach of trust guilty. Bribery not: Received Chu’s message, thanked, but no evidence he knew Ko-Shen bonus deal or joined bribery intent.
Li Wen-chuan (Muka accountant): 2 years 4 months. Handled donation-to-Muka transfers, fake invoices hiding NT$3 million donations.公益侵占 plus false accounting.
Tuan Mu Cheng (accountant): 1 year. Knew major donation account issues, still issued “no violations found” audit; entered fake expenses in declaration system. Business false document crime.
Wu Shun-min: Not guilty. Post-retirement paid Weijing advisor and unpaid Ying advisor. Attended meetings, pressed officials. But no public official status post-retirement; doesn’t meet graft requirements. Weijing pay was advisor salary. No evidence he knew Ying’s bribes. Court: Behavior “highly improper,” but below guilt threshold.
Chang Chih-cheng: Not guilty. Weijing employee, followed Shen’s orders on proxy donations. Didn’t join Ko meetings; no evidence he “knew” bribes (at most guessed), didn’t join bonus push. Acted on orders, no joint intent.
[13. How Sentencing Was Decided]
Ko as mayor held top power, should protect citizens. Bribery NT$2.1 million, illegal bonus benefits over NT$10 billion, embezzled donations/foundation funds tens of millions. Shredded notes during search suggest evidence destruction. Hsu Chih-yu rushed abroad pre-search. Denied all throughout; court: “No favorable post-crime attitude, severely wasted judicial resources.” Didn’t return proceeds.
Why Ying’s bribery heavier than Ko’s? NT$52.5 million far exceeds NT$2.1 million. Association flow breaks show “high legal hostility.” Fled pre-search. Denied throughout.
Why Peng and Shao suspended? Both confessed, no personal gain. Peng further mitigated per Article 59. Shao extra Witness Protection reduction. Their statements/testimony evidenced others’ crimes.
[14. Confiscation Amounts]
Ko: NT$12.6 million.
Ko and Li Wen-tsung joint: Over NT$8.27 million.
Ying: NT$52.5 million.
Dingyue Co (Core Pacific City developer): Over NT$12.1 billion.
Muka Co: Over NT$61.34 million.
Dingyue’s NT$12.1 billion is the illegal bonus gains—the case’s weight.
[15. Overall Logic of the Verdict]
The reasoning chain:
Step 1: Bonus itself illegal. No legal basis, violates superior regs, equality; experts/staff warned. Issue is no authorization, not discretion.
Step 2: Ko et al. “knowingly” illegal. Appeal loss, lawsuit loss, expert doubts, department opposition—all in attachments, they saw.
Step 3: Money exchanges confirmed. Shen to Ko NT$2.1 million, to Ying NT$52.5 million; records and traces.
Step 4: Quid pro quo between money and acts. Who, when, how given; what done after—all matches.
Step 5: Strictly separates convictable from not. NT$2.1 million fully corroborated, guilty. NT$15 million only admission, not. Wu no official status, not. Chang no joint intent, not. Li’s bribery no intent evidence, not.
Court drew evidence line: Over convicts, under doesn’t. Some fully guilty, some partial, some fully not. Each with reasons.
The case will be appealed.
京華城案判決新聞稿白話版：
【一、先搞懂容積率】
你家那塊地有多大，政府就規定你最多能蓋多少坪。這個上限叫容積率。
比如100坪的地，容積率560%，你全部樓層加起來最多蓋560坪。可以蓋10層每層56坪，也可以蓋20層每層28坪，但總共就是560坪封頂。
為什麼要有上限？因為蓋越多、住越多人，馬路更塞、空氣更差、停車位更不夠。你多蓋的部分，代價是周圍所有人一起扛。所以政府要管。
京華城那塊地，上限就是560%。
【二、京華城想要什麼】
京華城公司覺得560%不夠，想要更多。
他們說：以前我們有一個更高的數字（120,284平方公尺的樓地板面積），這個應該永遠有效。
但政府107年重新檢討都市計畫，把那個舊數字刪了。京華城不服，去打官司。先提訴願，被駁回。再打行政訴訟，109年7月也被法院判輸。法院說那個舊數字是一次性保障，永久有效的說法站不住。
正規的路，全部走不通了。
【三、沈慶京怎麼走後門】
正門堵死了，沈慶京（威京集團主席）找了一條後門：容積獎勵。
容積獎勵的概念是，如果你的建案對城市有貢獻（防災、智慧建築之類的），政府可以額外多給你一點容積。
但重點來了。台北市已經有一整套法規（土地使用分區管制自治條例），寫清楚了哪些情況可以拿容積獎勵、怎麼算、上限多少。這套法規是市議會通過的，有法律效力。
京華城偏偏沒走這條路。
他們走都市計畫法第24條，讓地主自己提一個「細部計畫修正案」，在裡面自己設計容積獎勵項目。
問題是，第24條只說地主可以自己提細部計畫，裡面根本沒有寫可以給容積獎勵。京華城等於自己發明了三個獎勵項目（韌性城市貢獻、智慧城市貢獻、宜居城市貢獻），自己算出來可以多拿20%容積。
【四、法院認定違法的理由】
法院給了五個理由。
第一，沒有法律依據。容積獎勵涉及重大公共利益（你多蓋的部分，全體市民承擔後果），依憲法的法律保留原則，必須有法律或法律授權的命令當依據。你不能自己發明獎勵項目給自己。
第二，違反上位法規。土管條例第25條寫死了第三種商業區容積率不超過560%。內政部的「都市計畫細部計畫審議原則」第8點也規定不得逾越上位法規。京華城的獎勵突破了這兩道上限。
第三，違法準用都更。那些獎勵項目套的是都市更新的獎勵辦法，但京華城根本不符合都更條件。拿不適用的法來用，就是違法。
第四，違反平等原則。這個計畫只對京華城一塊地有效。如果准了，以後別的地主也說「我也要用第24條自己訂容積獎勵」，怎麼辦？同樣的規則不能給特定人開特例。
第五，專家和基層公務員都擋過。109年10月專家諮詢會議，委員直接說「有適法性疑慮」、「缺乏公益性」。都發局基層的立場一直是：這樣做是「圖利私人」，成本差距數十億。這些意見都在簽呈附件裡，核章的人看得到。
法院特別強調：這裡的問題，不在於「20%獎勵太多了」這種裁量適當性，而在於「你根本不能給」這種合法性。被告辯稱法院應該尊重都委會的專業判斷餘地，法院的回答是：你連法律授權都沒有，根本還沒進入「裁量」這個階段。
講到底就一句話：京華城想要的東西，沒有任何法律說可以給。
【五、柯文哲怎麼構成圖利罪】
圖利罪的要件：公務員＋明知違背法令＋讓私人拿到不該拿的好處。
柯文哲是市長，行政事務有最終拍板權。
他知道京華城的主張被訴願駁回了。知道行政法院也判京華城輸了。看得到簽呈附件裡專家的質疑。都發局的立場一直是「圖利私人」。
在這些資訊全部攤在面前的情況下，他還是在109年10月27日的簽呈上核章決行，讓京華城的細部計畫草案進入公告公展程序。
京華城因此取得的容積獎勵換算成樓地板面積是18,463.2平方公尺。鼎越公司（開發公司）被法院認定的不法利益是121億餘元。
【六、柯文哲怎麼構成收賄罪】
這要把時間線排出來看。
109年2月20日，沈慶京去市政府見柯文哲。兩人單獨談了大約一小時，沈慶京的助手朱亞虎在外面等，沒參與。談完沈慶京面露滿意微笑離去。
109年2月21日，隔天，都發局就收到京華城提出的和解方案。
109年3月10日，應曉薇在市議會座談會幫京華城提案。
109年3月17日，京華城正式提陳情函。
109年3月24日到26日，沈慶京指示威京集團7名員工，每人從集團領現金，再以個人名義各捐政治獻金30萬元（剛好是法定個人上限），共210萬元匯進柯文哲掌控的民眾黨政治獻金專戶。
朱亞虎匯完款後傳訊息給李文宗（柯文哲幕僚）：「小沈十分小氣的捐了210萬（七人、依規定每人30）」。李文宗回覆：「長輩友人涓涓襄助，市長和我們都心存感激」。
之後，柯文哲用市長權力裁示把京華城陳情案送都委會研議。依規定，訴訟進行中的案子通知陳情人走原程序就好，他完全不需要也不該另外提送都委會。但他做了。
法院怎麼認定是賄賂而非政治獻金？看四件事。
給錢的人是誰。沈慶京，正在求柯文哲幫忙。
給錢的方式。他自己不出面，叫7個員工各捐30萬。一次捐210萬太明顯，拆成7筆小額就不容易被注意。
給錢的時間。2月20日見面，3月底錢到。這段時間京華城正密集向市府提要求。
收錢後做了什麼。明知京華城的要求在法律上站不住腳，還用市長權力往前推。
法院把這些合在一起看：這210萬就是沈慶京為了讓柯文哲推容積案而付的代價。叫「政治獻金」只是包裝。
收賄罪和圖利罪是同一件事的兩面，法律上叫想像競合，從重的罪處罰。收賄罪比圖利罪重，所以這一塊判13年。
【七、1500萬為什麼判不成】
柯文哲電腦裡有一個Excel檔案，其中一筆紀錄寫著：「2022/11/1 小沈 1500 沈慶京」。法院確認「小沈」就是沈慶京（沈慶京跟柯文哲傳訊息一律自稱「小沈」或「威京小沈」）。檔案裡其他筆紀錄經交叉比對，都是真的。
但法律規定：被告的自白不能當唯一的定罪證據，必須有其他獨立證據佐證。這條Excel是柯文哲自己寫的，性質就是自白。
210萬有佐證。匯款紀錄、朱亞虎的訊息、李文宗的回覆、後續的行政作為。
1500萬除了那行Excel，沒有獨立的金流紀錄或其他證據能證明這筆錢確實交付了。
柯文哲傳訊息跟黃珊珊說「威京小沈已給過，不要再找他」，但法院說這句話也可能是指那210萬，沒辦法排除這個可能性。
結論是：目前證據不夠，達不到定罪門檻。不代表1500萬一定沒有。
這段反而是整份判決裡很重要的品質指標。法院不會看到什麼就全部往有罪判。過門檻的定罪，沒過的就是不定。
【八、應曉薇收賄5,250萬】
應曉薇是台北市議員，從99年連任至今。她用議員身分幫京華城施壓市政府：頻繁約見公務員、大量索取資料、在議會座談會提案。目的是讓市府加速推動對京華城有利的容積案。
沈慶京怎麼付錢給她？走了一條迂迴路線。
106到108年，從威京集團旗下的中華工程公司，以「捐款」名義匯到應曉薇控制的「華夏協會」帳戶，3年共600萬。
110年11月，在北市府核定京華城容積獎勵之後17天，沈慶京用威京集團的公司開了6張支票，抬頭是華夏協會等5個協會，共4,500萬。這5個協會都是應曉薇實際掌控的。
111年，再以匯款和政治獻金方式交付150萬。
合計5,250萬。
法院怎麼證明協會的錢就是應曉薇的錢？追蹤金流，精確到分鐘和地理位置。
案例一。中華技擊協會110年12月21日提領現金200萬，傳票寫「活動費用」。但法院拉出這個協會110年的財務報表，全年支出只有38萬，年底結餘461萬。那200萬根本和活動無關。事實上分三筆（60萬、60萬、80萬）存進了應曉薇的銀行貸款帳戶還貸款。
案例二。111年6月15日，應曉薇的助理陳佳敏在上午10點15分從城市發展促進會帳戶提領353萬現金（台北富邦銀行，松江路200號）。38分鐘後在10點54分，把350萬現金存進應曉薇的永豐銀行貸款帳戶還貸款（松江路192號）。同一條路上，走路不到一分鐘。城市發展促進會111年全年支出只有1萬4,920元，那353萬當然和會務無關。
案例三。111年8月8日，陳佳敏在11點17分從華夏希望關懷協會帳戶提領200萬現金（第一銀行大安分行，信義路四段382號）。32分鐘後在11點49分，把200萬存進應曉薇的花旗銀行信用卡帳戶（信義路四段460號）。存款傳票寫「預繳信用卡費、持卡人朋友還款」。
時間間隔、金額吻合、距離極近、協會帳上沒有對應的支出。法院結論：這些協會只是過路站，錢的真正終點是應曉薇個人的貸款和信用卡帳戶。
至於對價關係，應曉薇在京華城與北市府訴訟進行中就積極幫忙施壓，行政法院判京華城敗訴後仍持續推動。110年11月1日北市府核定容積獎勵，11月18日沈慶京就開出4,500萬的支票。「長年訴求實現後，旋獲款項，時間點密接吻合。」
【九、應曉薇的洗錢罪】
應曉薇用「提現金，再存入」的方式，刻意切斷電子轉帳的紀錄。如果直接從協會帳戶匯款到個人帳戶，銀行系統有完整的轉帳紀錄，一查就查到。先提現金再存，帳面上就斷掉了。協會帳上只看到「提領現金」，個人帳上只看到「存入現金」，兩筆之間沒有直接的電子連結。
這種刻意製造金流斷點的行為，法院另外判洗錢罪3年、併科罰金1,000萬。
另外，應曉薇在檢察官搜索前就先跑了，輾轉到桃園機場，又轉台中機場準備出境。法院把這列入量刑考量：「意圖妨礙司法，徒增司法資源耗費。」
【十、沈慶京行賄與圖利】
沈慶京是整件事的發動者。他想要更多容積，花錢打通柯文哲和應曉薇。
他同時犯了行賄罪（給柯文哲210萬、給應曉薇5,250萬）和圖利罪（跟公務員共同讓京華城違法取得容積獎勵）。法院從比較重的圖利罪處罰，判10年、併科罰金2,000萬。
法院怎麼認定他「明知」違法？他知道訴願被駁回、知道行政訴訟敗訴、知道京華城不符合都更條件。正規途徑全部走不通，他才去找人走後門。如果真覺得自己合法，何必花5,000多萬行賄？走正規途徑到底就好了。花這麼多錢打通關節這件事本身，就說明他知道正規途徑贏不了。
不法利益有多大？鼎越公司被法院認定應沒收121億餘元。投入幾千萬換回上百億，這就是他願意行賄的原因。
【十一、柯文哲侵占政治獻金】
這部分跟京華城案是分開的，是柯文哲另外犯的罪。
先講一個關鍵問題：政治獻金是誰的錢？
柯文哲辯稱，捐給我的就是我的錢。
法院的看法不同。法院說政治獻金有法定用途限制，必須存入專戶、向監察院申報、只能用在政治活動相關支出。候選人的角色比較像「管理者」，而非完全的所有權人。
道理很簡單：如果政治獻金就是候選人私人財產，那政治獻金法要求公開透明、避免營利這些規定就全部沒意義了。人民捐錢是支持政治活動，而非送候選人一筆私房錢。
直接侵占600萬現金。柯文哲在111年還當市長時收了三筆現金捐款，每筆200萬，指定捐給民眾黨。收了之後既沒存入專戶也沒申報。600萬就這樣消失在專戶之外。
用木可公司掏空6,134萬。柯文哲透過他控制的「木可公司」，用各種名目把政治獻金搬走。
肖像權的把戲。柯文哲先跟木可公司簽「肖像權授權同意書」，木可公司再跟競選總部簽約收「授權金」。用這個名目從政治獻金專戶匯了1,500萬到木可公司。然後再從木可公司匯450萬到柯文哲個人帳戶，其中244萬轉進家人的證券帳戶。候選人用自己的臉做競選宣傳，然後向自己的競選專戶收「肖像使用費」，法院認為這完全不具備真實商業交易的性質。
募款小物。柯文哲的臉書、IG和民眾黨官網寫的都是「募款」、「捐款」、「選總統募款」，價格是成本好幾倍。法院認定這些收入性質是政治獻金。但4,133萬全進了木可公司帳戶，沒存入專戶。
KP SHOW演唱會。門票8,800元，宣傳寫「募款」。盈餘77萬同樣進了木可公司。
採風公司300萬。採風公司想捐錢給民眾黨，被告知「匯到木可公司就好」。300萬進了木可公司，沒進民眾黨專戶。李文娟還開了4張假發票，品名寫「設計顧問」，把捐款偽裝成商業交易。
挪用眾望基金會827萬。眾望基金會的設立目的是「從事社會公益、扶助弱勢」。但柯文哲把競選團隊的人形式上聘為基金會員工，薪水從基金會出，實際工作全部是處理競選活動。薪資支出占基金會112年度總支出的六成。公益基金會變成了私人金庫。法院認定背信罪。
【十二、其他被告】
黃景茂（都發局前局長），6年6個月。知道專家有質疑、知道行政法院判京華城敗訴、知道容積獎勵缺乏依據，仍然核章，還指派邵琇珮去參與專案小組。圖利罪。
彭振聲（前副市長），2年、緩刑。在柯文哲和都發局之間擔任橋樑角色。偵查中自白、個人沒拿好處，依法減刑再酌減，緩刑不用坐牢。
邵琇珮（都發局前科長），1年3個月、緩刑。受黃景茂指派參與專案小組，建議京華城用第24條提細部計畫，就是後來那條違法的路。偵查中自白，配合提供關鍵證詞，適用證人保護法減刑。
李文宗（柯文哲幕僚），有罪4年6個月，另有部分無罪。侵占政治獻金和背信有罪。但收賄部分判無罪。他收到朱亞虎的訊息、回了感謝的話，但沒有證據顯示他知道柯文哲跟沈慶京在容積案上的交易，無法證明他參與了收賄合意。
李文娟（木可公司會計），2年4個月。經手政治獻金專戶到木可公司的匯款，開假發票掩蓋300萬政治獻金。公益侵占罪加填製不實會計憑證罪。
端木正（會計師），1年。明知政治獻金帳目有大量疑點，仍出具「未發現違法」的查核報告，還自己在申報系統裡輸入虛構的支出交易。行使業務登載不實準文書罪。
吳順民，無罪。退休後同時擔任威京集團有給職顧問和應曉薇無給職顧問。參與了多次會議、頻繁關切進度、給基層公務員壓力。但他退休後已經沒有公務員身分，不符合貪污罪的身分要件。從威京領的是顧問薪資。也沒證據顯示他知道應曉薇收賄。法院說他的行為「固極有不當」，但達不到有罪門檻。
張志澄，無罪。威京集團員工，受沈慶京指示辦理找人頭捐款的事。但他沒參與拜會柯文哲的行程，沒證據顯示他「明知」那些捐款是賄賂（頂多是自己推測），也沒參與後續爭取容積的過程。照指示做事，沒有共同犯罪決意。
【十三、量刑怎麼決定的】
柯文哲是市長，掌最高行政權，理應維護市民權益。收賄210萬，違法容積的不法利益逾百億，侵占政治獻金和基金會公款數千萬。搜索時查扣撕碎便條紙，暗示湮滅證據的意圖。許芷瑜在搜索前兩天急著出國。自始至終否認全部犯行，法院認為「不足為犯後態度之有利考量，且嚴重耗費有限司法資源」。未繳回犯罪所得。
應曉薇為什麼收賄部分比柯文哲更重？收賄金額5,250萬遠高於柯文哲的210萬。用協會帳戶製造金流斷點「法敵對意識甚高」。搜索前企圖出境。全程否認犯行。
彭振聲和邵琇珮為什麼可以緩刑？兩人都偵查中自白、個人沒拿好處。彭振聲減刑後法院又用刑法第59條酌減。邵琇珮額外適用證人保護法再減。他們的自白和證詞反過來成為認定其他被告犯罪的證據。
【十四、沒收金額】
柯文哲：1,260萬元。
柯文哲、李文宗共同：827萬餘元。
應曉薇：5,250萬元。
鼎越公司（京華城的開發公司）：121億餘元。
木可公司：6,134萬餘元。
其中鼎越公司的121億是京華城違法取得容積獎勵所獲得的不法利益。這個數字就是整件事的重量。
【十五、這份判決的整體邏輯】
整條推理鏈是這樣串的。
第一步，確認容積獎勵本身違法。沒有法律依據、違反上位法規、違反平等原則、專家和基層公務員都有警告。問題在於根本沒有法律授權，而非裁量適當與否。
第二步，確認柯文哲等人「明知」違法。訴願駁回、行政訴訟敗訴、專家質疑、都發局反對，全在簽呈附件裡，他們看得到。
第三步，確認有金錢往來。沈慶京給柯文哲210萬、給應曉薇5,250萬，有具體的匯款紀錄和通道追蹤。
第四步，確認金錢和職務行為之間有對價關係。誰給的、什麼時候給的、怎麼給的、收了之後做了什麼，全部對得上。
第五步，嚴格區分能定和不能定的。210萬有充分佐證，定罪。1500萬只有自白沒有佐證，不定罪。吳順民沒有公務員身分，不定罪。張志澄沒有共同犯意，不定罪。李文宗的收賄部分沒有證據顯示他參與合意，不定罪。
法院畫了一條證據門檻的線，過線的定罪，沒過的就是不定。有人全身有罪，有人一部分有罪一部分無罪，有人全身無罪。每一個判斷都有具體理由。
本案得上訴。
Frozen Garlic 