Archive for the ‘infrastructure’ Category

Recent developments in the LY

June 10, 2024

Dear Legislative Yuan, I’d like to ask you for a small favor. You already helped me a lot by having them brawl a few days before my book about legislative brawls was supposed to come out. I really appreciate your thoughtfulness. However, I need to trouble you one more time. You see, Oxford University Press changed the estimated release date of my book from May 24 to July 10. Could you see it in your heart to schedule another dramatic melee sometime around early or mid-July? I see that the first legislative session is scheduled to end on July 16 and the KMT is promising to pass a lot of controversial legislation by that date, so it shouldn’t be that hard to stage another brouhaha. I’d really be grateful. Thanks, Nathan.

(removes tongue from cheek)

I shouldn’t be surprised that the KMT is trying to leverage its position in the legislature to the fullest extent possible and is decidedly NOT seeking to find common ground with the DPP. After all, I just published a book chapter about the fight over vaccines in which the KMT energetically opposed the DPP at every opportunity it could find. Some of their objections were reasonable, others … not so much. It’s not the opposition’s job to make the government’s life easier. A vigorous opposition is part of democracy, and it doesn’t necessarily lead to bad policies. Taiwan didn’t achieve one of the highest vaccination rates in the world because the parties put aside their differences to pursue a critical national interest. Rather, this was achieved in the context of a fully competitive, adversarial, cutthroat democratic structure. But if everybody couldn’t get along and cooperate in year two of a global pandemic, why should we expect to see that now?

I’m not really surprised that the KMT is taking what one of my friends called a scorched-earth approach towards the DPP in an effort to ensure that Lai’s presidency is seen as a failure. As soon as the election results came in, I fully expected them to pass the investigation power, so they could use that as a cudgel to harass the government over the next four years. I didn’t expect that there would be popular protests so soon against the KMT’s strong-arm tactics in the legislature, but I’m not surprised at all that the KMT has chosen to dismiss those protests as creations of the DPP and politically unimportant.

However, I am surprised by a few things. First, the breadth of the KMT’s agenda is a bit shocking. They seem to think their very narrow plurality of seats legislature (on fewer votes than the DPP won and clear loss in the presidential election) gives them a mandate to do undo the everything from previous eight years. They have floated bills addressing party assets, pension reform, and the anti-infiltration act. They’ve also proposed diverting a lot more money from the central government to local governments, the majority of which they conveniently control. And of course, there is the massive East Coast infrastructure proposal. Taken together, these bills would render central government almost penniless and put the KMT completely in charge of spending.

Oh, and when the protesters started circulating lists of legislators who had barely won, insinuating that these might be good targets for a recall effort, the KMT proposed changing the election and recall law to make recalls harder. I’ve written a bit about recalls, and I actually think their proposal is mostly reasonable. The current law makes it too easy to recall an elected official, and requiring the recall to get more votes than the politician got in the general election is a good first step.  But it’s not a good look to propose this immediately after you ram through a controversial piece of legislation and it seems like a backlash might be brewing. (Let’s also remember that one of the strongest voices demanding this very low recall threshold eight years ago was none other than current TPP caucus leader Huang Kuo-chang.)

I don’t remember hearing most of these proposed in KMT campaign rallies.

One thing they have talked about every now and then for several years (almost exclusively in events on the East Coast) was an East Coast infrastructure package. I do remember hearing them talk about extending freeway number six through the mountains to the East Coast and building an Expressway up and down the East Coast. I don’t remember the third (and most expensive) part of the current proposed package: the high speed rail line on the East Coast (alternatively billed as a high speed rail line circling the entire island).

Let’s think about these three projects. The Expressway is a legitimate option. People have been debating whether or not to build this for quite a few years, and there are reasonable arguments on both sides. It might be difficult to extend freeway #5 all the way to Taitung, but an Expressway from Hualien to Taitung through the eastern Rift Valley is a feasible and defensible plan.

The second project, extending freeway number six, which currently runs through the northern part of Nantou County (in central Taiwan) to Puli, through the central mountain range all the way to Hualien on the East Coast is not nearly as reasonable. If you’ve ever been on one of the cross-island highways, you’ll be aware that there are no easy routes through the central mountain range. There is certainly nothing straight or flat enough to easily put a high speed freeway through those 50 kilometers. This project would require lots of long, deep tunnels and high bridges. I suppose Taiwan probably could build this, and we might even be able to make it sturdy enough to withstand most earthquakes and/or typhoon-induced landslides. But we’d have to ignore the enormous environmental impact of a huge road right through the heart of the deep mountains. Also, is there really that much demand for travel between Taichung and Hualien? I don’t hear much clamoring from the Taichung side.

And then there’s the East Coast high speed rail proposal. Putting aside the enormous costs of building this line through several mountains in Taiwan’s most earthquake-prone zone, let’s think briefly about the high speed rail line on the West Coast. Over 90% of the population lives on the West Coast, but ridership was lower than expected and the project almost went bankrupt about a decade ago. The government had to inject a lot of cash and restructure ownership to save it. Is there any way that a HSR line on the East Coast where only about a million people live makes financial sense?

I’ve seen estimates for the price tag of these three projects at anywhere from 1.5 to 2.5 trillion NT dollars, with most people saying 2 trillion. For perspective, Taiwan’s current GDP is about 24 trillion. President Tsai’s huge infrastructure plan totaled about 800 billion, but that covered hundreds of projects all over the country, not just three mega-projects all on the East Coast.

This brings me to KMT floor leader Fu Kun-chi 傅崐萁, who seems to be orchestrating the KMT’s ambitious LY agenda. We’re not hearing a lot about the domestic agenda from other KMT heavyweights like party chair Chu, Speaker Han, former president Ma, or recent presidential candidate Hou. Fu is front and center defining party priorities. Fu has publicly stated that he wants to pass a lot of these bills, including the infrastructure package, by the end of this legislative session on July 16.

Let me remind you that Fu’s district is Hualien. That is, he has effectively demanded that the KMT commit itself to spending the entire national budget for transportation and development (and probably more) on his local district. How in the world has this not caused an immediate revolt within the party? Don’t other KMT legislators have roads, bridges, or MRT lines that they want to build or upgrade? Fu’s proposed spending package is so massive that it will crowd out other spending priorities, perhaps including some of the social welfare programs that are quite dear to many KMT constituencies. Would you rather have a little-used highway through the mountains or a fully funded national healthcare program? How can the KMT legislators explain this choice to their constituents?

I can’t shake the notion that there is something different about Fu’s leadership. I can’t think of another KMT figure who has tried to bend the party to his will in such an audacious way who was not a mainlander. Well, I can think of one, but we’ll get to him in a minute.

We don’t talk about provincial origins 省籍as much these days. It’s no longer a driving force in most people’s everyday lives. For younger people, the idea is almost meaningless. You can even omit this variable from most voting models without losing any significant explanatory power. It has almost become a topic that we don’t talk about in polite society. But there is one realm in which provincial origins still matter quite a bit: elite KMT politics. Mainlanders are disproportionately represented at the top of the KMT pyramid. But even more importantly, they dominate the KMT’s ideas. The leaders and thinkers who shape what the contemporary KMT stands for and will do are overwhelmingly mainlanders. It was quite important inside the KMT that “native Taiwanese” Hou Yu-ih’s running mate was mainlander Jaw Shao-kang in order to balance the ticket.

I think this is a result of a historical legacy, one of those long tails of the authoritarian era. When the KMT relocated to Taiwan after 1949, it had to figure out how to govern an unfamiliar and potentially hostile population. Its solution was a mixture of repression and patronage, and this turned out to be quite successful for the regime. Some local elites were repressed, but most were offered a nice deal: Stay inside the party structures, run the local governments under the KMT banner, and we will let you govern locally as you please. You will enjoy social prestige, and we will turn a blind eye if you make a little money here and there. Stay in your lane, leave the high politics to us, and everyone will do well. In some places, the existing social elites were happy to accept this deal and become local faction leaders. In other places, the KMT created new elites using the same framework. It’s important to remember that while these local elites were enjoying the carrot, the stick always loomed in the background. Everyone understood the local office holders were not just living on their official salary; they were almost universally taking advantage of their position to line their pockets (or their friends’ pockets). Sometimes this was done using the grey areas of the law, and sometimes it was outright soliciting bribes. Regardless, it wasn’t very difficult for the KMT regime to deal with an uppity local official by finding them guilty of corruption since they were, in fact, almost always guilty of some degree of corruption.

Think about what this does to the psychology of both sides. During the authoritarian era, the KMT mainlander elite needed the local factions to win votes and maintain its popular legitimacy. But they could always look down on the local politicians as corrupt collaborators with no real core values. Of course, there was plenty of corruption among the mainlander elite as well, but it wasn’t quite so overtly embedded into the social contract. This allowed the mainlander group to see themselves as natural leaders guided by lofty ideals who were rightfully responsible for deciding the direction of the country. Taiwanese faction leaders also learned this lesson. It was not their place to ask about national politics. They were wise to keep their heads down and go along to get along.

This was the model of the KMT’s authoritarian era, but I think vestiges of it have it have persisted to this day. The most jarring example came in the clash between Ma Ting-jeou and Wang Jin-pyng in September 2013. When laying the foundations to pass the services trade agreement with China, potentially fundamentally altering Taiwan’s future, Ma decided he needed to first purge Speaker Wang to ensure smooth passage in the legislature. Without much actual evidence, Ma and his allies made a big show accusing Wang of massive, systemic corruption and tried to evict him from the party. The charges seemed quite flimsy to most of society, but they seemed to be quite persuasive among the die-hard KMT true believers. Wang came up through a local faction and was renowned as a masterful dealmaker in the legislature. (Deals always seem corrupt to true believers who don’t want to sacrifice anything, no matter how small.) Wang never trumpeted or pushed his own agenda; rather, he facilitated other people’s goals. He was the epitome of an amoral local KMT politician. Of course they thought he was corrupt!

I said above that there was one glaring exception. Lee Teng-hui was a native Taiwanese KMT politician who had a clear vision and bent the party to his will to pursue it. LTH did not lack efficacy. However, even in his case you can see some of these traditional attitudes and behaviors. Before he was president, he famously kept his ideas to himself. In his first few years as president, he went along with traditional KMT positions such as the national unification guidelines, the famous 1993 meeting in Singapore with the PRC delegates, and talked about establishing a new Chinese culture 建立新中原. It wasn’t until he had fully consolidated his power and won a popular mandate in the 1996 elections that he started openly talking about things like special state to state relations. And how did the mainlander lead attack him? They accused him of relying on systematic corruption. His power base was in the local factions and in big business, so this was an easy accusation. (Note that when Ma Ying-jeou was supported by local factions and big businesses, they didn’t call him corrupt.)

OK, that’s a lot of verbiage, and we should probably get back to Fu Kun-chi. He seems like a departure from traditional KMT norms. He is THE traditional local politician. He’s nicknamed the King of Hualien, and he has a few corruption scandals under his belt. He is precisely this type of person who would have kept their head down in the past. But he seems to feel empowered free to act in the same way that, I don’t know, someone like Jaw Shao-kang might. Fu recently led a delegation of KMT legislators to China, apparently unconcerned with any blowback from society or the governing party. And now he’s pushing bills to increase the power of the legislature, roll back some of the DPP’s policies, and financially hamstring the government by directing massive funds to his own district. It’s quite an audacious agenda.

Maybe the KMT is turning a page and shedding some of its authoritarian heritage. Maybe it matters that Fu is Hakka, not Hoklo. Maybe I’m completely off base. It just seems strange to me that Fu Kun-chi, of all people, is suddenly the public face of the KMT.

Somehow I hijacked this post about current events in the legislature with a long digression about provincial origins. Oops. Let’s get back to the legislature.

The KMT and TPP were united under Fu’s lead in the fight over investigation power. However, his grip over the legislature isn’t absolute. No one is coming out directly against Fu, but there are some cracks emerging. Lai Shih-pao, who most people thought would become the KMT floor leader, recently suggested that there is not an internal KMT consensus about the three East Coast infrastructure bills and more discussion within the party is needed. TPP floor leader Huang Kuo-chang suggested that his party is willing to support good infrastructure projects, but then he threw in a couple of caveats. First, the TPP is against using special budgets as a matter of principle. This could be a major stumbling block, since that would mean the infrastructure projects must be funded through the regular budget, which is written by the Executive Yuan. (You can also imagine they are laying the groundwork for how they might oppose a major weapons purchase.) Second, the project must be fiscally responsible, which could mean anything the TPP wants it to. However, a major part of Ko Wen-je’s appeal was that he didn’t increase Taipei City’s debt burden when he was mayor, so it would be a major departure from his brand if the TPP supported the budget-busting East Coast infrastructure plan. And then a few days ago, the KMT central standing committee decided to put the infrastructure plan on hold for a while. Fu responded by saying that the number six highway extension and the East Coast high speed rail project were actually policies advocated by speaker Han, not him. It’s true that I have heard Han advocate the number six freeway project several times, but it was usually on a stage standing next to Fu. I think what we’re seeing is the KMT pulling back from such an obviously indefensible financial sinkhole. But the rest of the agenda is still on the table.

I’ve been writing this blog entry for several days, the new events keep forcing me to go back and rewrite sections of it. So I think I’d better stop here and just post this before something else happens.

Posted in budget, infrastructure, legislative politics, party politics | 7 Comments »

Today’s quake and 921

April 3, 2024

As you’re probably aware, there was a big earthquake in Taiwan today. Most of the news stories mention that it’s the biggest earthquake Taiwan has experienced in 25 years. At first glance, this one looks almost as big as that one. The September 21, 1999 earthquake was a 7.3 and this one is being reported by local media as 7.2. (The international media is reporting this one at 7.4, but I also remember the 921 earthquake was initially reported as a 7.6.) I was here on 921, and that was one of the most terrifying experiences of my life. (To answer the musical question, I will never forget the 21st night of September.) So I want to make a few comments about how that experience was different from this earthquake.

The 921 quake was much more destructive. There were two things that are not reflected in that 7.3 number. First, it lasted a long time. Earthquakes generally have some softer periods has some harder periods, but the really intense shaking only lasts 10 or 20 seconds. The intense part of the 921 earthquake lasted well over a minute. Second, most earthquakes shake side to side. The 921 quake shook up and down, which is a much more devastating movement. Initial reports are that four people have died in this earthquake. More than 2000 people died in the 921 quake. We are seeing pictures of the same few buildings that are precariously leaning over. In 1999, there were hundreds, maybe thousands of buildings that were structurally ruined and had to be torn down. Actually, many of them didn’t need to be torn down because the earthquake completely flattened them.

My personal experience was also very different. Both times I was sleeping, and the earthquake woke me up. In the 921 quake, I was on the third floor of a fairly old four-story building, the kind you see all over the place in Taiwan. I had a few 3-foot high bookshelves, and they slammed violently against the wall repeatedly. It was the only time I have ever been genuinely afraid that the building might collapse. I had post-traumatic stress every aftershock for the next few weeks. Out of instinct, I went across the street to the NCCU campus and my unofficial home at the Election Study Center. About 10 of us gathered there and spent the next few hours reassuring each other that we would be OK. At that time, the ESC was still in an old, dilapidated building, so we had to run outside into the rain every time there was an aftershock. The power had gone out completely but one person had a battery powered transistor radio (wow, that sounds ancient now!) and said that there had been a report of an explosion at the distillery in Puli (Nantou). I thought, holy cow, this earthquake was so big that they felt our earthquake 200 kilometers away! Later, I learned that we had felt their earthquake, not the other way around. It was a massive quake.

This morning there was some significant shaking, but none of my 6-foot bookcases banged against the walls. Nothing fell off our shelves, and we didn’t have any damage. My wife and I didn’t get out of bed, and when the shaking stopped, we went back to sleep. Our building has a frame of steel girders, not the old-fashioned rebar and cement, so my experience this time might be different because I was in a sturdier building. That said, I never felt anxious, much less afraid, this time.

After the 921 earthquake, the power went out all over Taiwan. One of the electric towers sending power from central Taiwan to the north slid off a mountain, and it took several weeks to repair it. All the available electricity was reserved for the highest priority sites, such as hospitals and military bases. In late September, it was still too hot to sleep without at least an electric fan until 2:00 or 3:00 AM, so everyone was groggy and grumpy for the next few weeks. This time, my electricity didn’t go out at all. Some people lost power, but I don’t think anybody lost power for very long.

This is a political blog, so you’re probably wondering what kind of political impact this earthquake will have. I confidently predict that it will have almost no impact at all. This earthquake took place three months after the presidential election. The 921 earthquake took place six months before a presidential election. There were a lot of people who thought that the earthquake would be the defining issue of that election. After all, it upended hundreds of thousands of people’s lives. In Nantou, county magistrate Peng Pai-hsien 彭百顯 turned his back on a career of opposition politics to endorse the KMT presidential candidate Lien Chan. Lien was still the premier at the time, and Nantou desperately needed relief. In Taipei, the city government could post a deputy mayor at the single collapsed building; Nantou didn’t have enough county government employees to post a civil servant of any rank at every collapsed building. Nantou was also among the poorest county governments. The legislature quickly passed an emergency relief act, and Peng needed to be sure Nantou would get its fair share. He may have also made a political calculation that the earthquake would be the turning point in Lien’s presidential campaign. Even though Lien’s polling numbers were miserable, usually under 10% (Soong routinely had 40% and Chen usually had around 20%), there were many people who just could not fathom the KMT losing the presidency. Surely, they could mobilize enough votes with their vaunted political machine. The earthquake provided an ideal opportunity for Premier Lien to hand out lots and lots of cash in the crucial battlegrounds of central Taiwan. It didn’t work out that way. Six months later, the earthquake had faded into the background as a political issue. If you look at the election returns, is hard to discern which areas were hit hardest by the earthquakes and which areas were relatively spared. Surveys also failed to identify the earthquake as an important factor. If that traumatic experience had almost no electoral impact, it’s hard to imagine that this one will matter very much with the next selection more than 2 ½ years away.

[Edit: As a reader points out, Lien was NOT premier at the time. He stepped down from that post in 1997. Vincent Siew (Hsiao Wan-chang 蕭萬長 was the premier. Lien was VP. Still, he could have used the opportunity to go to all kinds of places and represent the government handing out cash. He didn’t do that at all.]

Another difference is in the international media coverage. Because China has become such an inhospitable place for international media, there are now many correspondents based here in Taiwan. They were right on the scene and able to report this story quite thoroughly. In 1999, there were very few international reporters based here in Taiwan. If my memory is correct, CNN flew Mike Chinoy in from Hong Kong. He went from the airport straight to downtown Taipei, reported on the single building that had collapsed there, and turned around and went back to Hong Kong. CNN completely missed the main story, which was in central Taiwan. That’s what the international news environment was like a generation ago; this sloppy reporting wasn’t unusual. The quality of international news coverage is much, much better now.

A final consideration is that Taiwan is more prepared to deal with this kind of natural disaster now than it was 25 years ago. In the aftermath of that disaster, building codes were rewritten and more stringently enforced. One of the worst stories from that quake involved an elementary school that collapsed because some of the pillars were filled with empty salad oil tin cans instead of solid concrete. More prosaically, there were a lot of buildings that collapsed between the second and third floors. When you build with rebar, you are supposed to overlap the rods so that there is not a weak point. However, rebar is expensive so many builders ignored this requirement. The standard rebar piece is about two floors high, so there was a weak point between the second and third floor which the earthquake mercilessly exposed. A lot of the shoddy housing stock from the 1960s and 1970s has now been replaced with higher quality buildings.

Let’s end this piece by going back to electricity. Someone just sent me a very interesting article. About 300,000 households lost power this time compared to 6.5 million in 1999. Still, today’s earthquake did knock several generators and transformers offline, accounting for 3.2 million kilowatts, more than 10% of the total supply at the time. Why didn’t this overload the system and lead to a more widespread system failure? This article argues solar power came to the rescue. At 7:50 (just before the earthquake), solar power accounted for 2.9 million kilowatts (10.8% of the total supply). At 8:00 AM (2 minutes after the earthquake), that figure had risen to 3.3 million kilowatts (12.2%). At 8:10, solar power provided 3.7 million kilowatts (13.2%). At 8:40, it was 4.8 million kilowatts (13.2%). By 11:40 (when most of the damage had been repaired and the regular sources were coming back online), solar power provided 8.4 million kilowatts (25.8%). In short, the government’s drive to transition to green energy has had the added bonus of making the grid more resilient!

Posted in infrastructure, Uncategorized | 8 Comments »

Musings on the old and new premiers

September 11, 2017

It seems I don’t get around to blogging very much these days. Hopefully I’ll pick up the pace as we move into the next election cycle. In the meantime, I have a few thoughts on the recent cabinet reshuffle.

 

Former Premier Lin Chuan’s 林全 resignation did not come as much of a surprise. After 16 months, it was time for a reset. His satisfaction ratings were not great, but it’s easy to overstate that point. We’ve had several stories in the international media gasping about President Tsai’s cratering satisfaction ratings in the high 20s or low 30s (“worse than Trump!!!!”), and Lin’s ratings were a notch below those levels. However, the Taiwanese electorate is historically much stingier with its approval for national politicians than the American electorate, and ratings in this range haven’t historically heralded disaster. I’ll have more to say on public opinion in a subsequent post. For right now, let’s just say that Lin’s ratings weren’t spectacular.

Taiwanese cabinet members come in two broad prototypes: elected politicians and technocrats. Lin is a classic technocrat, having served in various administrative and policy-focused positions since the mid-1990s. It is somewhat ironic that his biggest failings were technical rather than political. In recent weeks, the KMT has enthusiastically thrown the legislature into chaos protesting the Forward-Looking infrastructure package. They have made some substantive arguments against the package, such as claiming that spending on railways is wasteful, but their first and most effective argument was that the documentation was sloppy and incomplete. The cabinet’s original proposal for the massive eight year package came with a pitifully thin set of documents explaining exactly what the money would used for. In other words, the technocrats had not bothered to dot all the i’s and cross all the t’s. This is the kind of problem you might expect a career politician – with a focus on power and coalitions – to make, not a career technocrat who supposedly revels in the details of public policy. Lin ran into the same sort of problem in his biggest failing, the revision of the Labor Standards Law that has left almost no one satisfied. The broad and inflexible brush strokes of the new policy are the kind of thing you would not expect from a policy nerd with a detailed understanding of labor markets. They are exactly what you might expect from a politician catering to the whims of a specific interest group and ignoring all the others.

Meanwhile, Lin passed one of the most important political tests for any premier: he could almost always count on support from a majority in the legislature. The DPP LY caucus may not have been thrilled with the amendments to the Labor Standards Law, but they were willing not only to vote en masse for those amendments but even to physically push KMT legislators off the speaker’s podium so that they could vote for Lin’s bill. Likewise, in the fight over infrastructure, the DPP LY caucus allowed the KMT caucus to make noise and express their discontent, but at the end of the day, they passed the cabinet’s plan relatively unchanged. For the most part, the LY had Lin’s back. If you think that is trivial, try talking to former KMT Premier Jiang Yi-huah 江宜樺about whether a majority party in the LY always supports the premier’s agenda.

From a political perspective, Lin also handled marriage equality quite deftly. In the face of strident demands from pro-marriage equality forces to amend the Civil Code and deep trepidation from DPP legislators staring at polls showing substantial opposition to this among back in their districts, Lin simply sidestepped the issue. By interpreting the Grand Justices’ ruling as implying that the language in the Civil Code requiring marriage to include one man and one woman was unconstitutional, Lin decided that there was no need to amend the Civil Code. Gay marriages can be registered under the current law. In this way, Lin did not force DPP legislators into a no-win situation by forcing them to offend either their young voters or everyone over forty.

This is not to say that Lin has been a terrible technocrat and a genius politician. He has had plenty of political failings. For example, somehow the DPP managed to tackle the very thorny issue of pension reform, pass a bill that the KMT didn’t dare try to physically block in the legislature, and still leave the majority of people dissatisfied. What should have been a crowning triumph of Lin’s tenure is instead something that most people think should have been handled better. The technocratic efforts are, by nature, less visible, but it is reasonable to assume that he has quietly launched drives to remake government policy in a number of areas. Still, it is striking to me that his highest profile setbacks were mostly technical in nature.

 

Tainan mayor William Lai 賴清德 is the new premier, and there is a lot of speculation about his next move. Some people think he will run for New Taipei mayor next year, while others think he is planning to run for president in 2020. I don’t think either of these are likely.

The timetable for a mayoral run is very tight. The election will be in late November or early December next year, so he would have to start his campaign (and resign as premier) by May or June at the latest. However, he would have to announce his intention (or “reluctant capitulation” to the intense arm-twisting pressure from the rest of the DPP) to run a month or two before that. In other words, he would ony have a maximum of eight months in office as premier before starting the campaign. In April 2010, Eric Chu 朱立倫 announced he would be willing to run for New Taipei mayor after only eight months as deputy premier, so maybe the calendar isn’t too tight. However, I think premier and deputy premier are fundamentally different positions. The deputy premier isn’t the one in charge of the executive branch; Chu was not the one determining policy directions. When the deputy premier resigns, there is no need to formally reshuffle the cabinet. Mayor is arguably a step up from deputy premier, while it is almost certainly a step down from premier. It just doesn’t make sense for the premier, after only eight months, to claim that he has successfully accomplished everything he wants to do in his current job and is now ready to move on to a new and less important challenge. For the deputy premier, though, that makes perfect sense. Perhaps Frank Hsieh 謝長廷 is a better model for this proposed jump than Eric Chu. Hsieh was re-elected as Kaohsiung mayor in 2002, became premier in 2005, and then ran for Taipei mayor in 2006. However, Hsieh served as premier from February 2005 to January 2006, almost a full calendar year. Moreover, he took over as premier much earlier in the cycle (February rather than September) and he resigned well before the nominations for the next mayoral elections were decided. His calendar was much less compressed than Lai’s. Still, one year is not a particularly long time as premier, and Hsieh did not exactly resign in triumph. This lackluster record as premier probably contributed to his landslide defeat in the Taipei mayoral race. It is hard to see Lai arguing that he was a successful premier with only eight months in office. Running for mayor would probably require him to talk defensively rather than brag proudly about his tenure as premier.

Lai is even less likely to run for president in 2020 than to run for mayor in 2018. For one thing, as premier, he will now be tightly identified with Tsai. His triumphs are her triumphs, and her failings will rub off on him. More fundamentally, there simply is not much demand within the DPP right now for someone to split the party by running against their incumbent president. Tsai is still the leader of the party. Some of the shine may have come off her leadership, but she is still the unquestioned top dog and still on track to win a second term.

Lai’s goal should be for the DPP’s 2024 nomination. He is not necessarily in a great position for this. Premiers tend to have a relatively short shelf life. If he does very well, he might make it to the 2020 presidential election as premier. It is almost unthinkable that he might make it all the way to the 2024 election as premier. Perhaps his best scheme might be to persuade the current VP to yield that spot to him in order to guarantee his survival to 2024. However, it seems highly unlikely at this point that Chen Chien-jen 陳建仁 would want to step aside or that Tsai Ing-wen would ask him to. If we are still thinking of Lai as a presidential contender after his tenure as premier ends, he will have to find some other platform to keep him in the public eye for a year or three until the 2024 presidential campaign begins. However, that is a problem that we don’t have to worry about right now.

 

We are hearing a lot about how Lai is a leader of the New Tide 新潮流 faction, and some people are wondering if the New Tide faction is becoming dominant within the DPP. After all, it now controls the cabinet, many important local governments (Kaohsiung, Tainan, Taoyuan, Changhua, Pingtung), and it has a powerful presence in the LY. This is correct on the surface, but it is worth asking how cohesive the New Tide still is. From the 1980s through the Chen presidency, New Tide was famous for its internal discipline. There were three leaders (Lin Cho-shui 林濁水, Chiu I-jen 邱義仁, and Wu Nai-jen 吳乃仁) who ran the faction. They defined the ideals and policy priorities, built the organizational network, raised money, recruited and trained talent, made deals with other factions, and generally cultivated a tightly disciplined faction. Those three leaders have mostly faded from the scenes. Today’s New Tide is led by a disparate group of local leaders (the aforementioned mayors) and legislators (especially Tuan Yi-kang段宜康). There is no longer any central authority. Chen Chu 陳菊 may be a New Tide member, but she is primarily the mayor of Kaohsiung and her highest priority is on Kaohsiung’s problems. She isn’t going to take orders from William Lai or any other New Tide member. In fact, it is not an exaggeration to think that she has organized her own Kaohsiung-based faction including many people who are not necessarily New Tide figures and who answers to her rather than to any national New Tide leadership. The same goes for Cheng Wen-tsan 鄭文燦 in Taoyuan and every other mayor. In the legislature, the New Tide faction might help win nominations, but I don’t think it exercises quite as much control over its members as it once did. During the Chen-era, we started hearing about the North Tide 北流, Central Tide 中流, and South Tide 南流. These three had very different attitudes about whether to support the embattled President Chen. The North Tide led calls for him to resign, while the South Tide was much more supportive (reflecting difference in the larger population among northern and southern voters). The New Tide didn’t quite fracture, but its cohesion did suffer. I don’t think it has or will ever fully recover. So while it is not meaningless that Lai is a New Tide member, this doesn’t imply that New Tide is taking over everything. New Tide isn’t really a cohesive (unitary) actor with a distinctive set of policy preferences these days.

 

I’m not exactly buying into the hype about William Lai. I think there are a lot of parallels between Lai and Eric Chu. Both were relentlessly promoted by the media as the party’s great savior without having done very much to earn that mantle. Chu was a scholar and Lai was a doctor, both were singled out at a fairly young age and placed into a solidly blue/green district that they could win without much challenge. Both are physically attractive enough, neither is brimming with charisma, and neither has actually accomplished as much as you have the impression they have. Yet, somehow, we all have been led to believe that they are presidential material. In their first forays into cross-straits affairs, they even employed similar strategies by playing superficial word games. Chu tweaked the 1992 consensus, changing one character and advocating One China, both sides with the same interpretation 一中同表. Lai tried to coin a vacuous pro-China, love Taiwan 親中愛台. Both seemed to think that they could cleverly clear away all the obstacles to cross-straits relations by coming up with a better four-character slogan than anyone else. Neither seems to have bothered to think through the implications of these formulae the way Ma, Tsai, or Hsieh did.

In early 2015 when Chu took over as KMT party chair, I wrote that he was now stepping out of the easy aura of a local mayor, in which most every action is reported with a favorable tinge by an accommodating local reporter, and into the harsh light of national politics, where every action would be scrutinized and (fairly or unfairly) attacked if any partisan advantage could be gained. Likewise, Lai now steps into that harsh limelight. Rather than taking credit for the mango harvest or paving a road, he will more likely be blamed for not having a quick and painless solution to a variety of intractable problems such as the low birthrate, systemic youth unemployment, or companies willing to compromise food safety in order to cut costs. Lai just stepped into the big leagues, and the vague hero image that his boosters have so assiduously cultivated won’t survive if he doesn’t deliver the goods.

The parallel to Chu isn’t perfect. Lai has faced and overcome a few more electoral challenges than Chu. Chu won one term in the legislature; Lai won four terms. In particular, Lai survived the 2008 KMT tidal wave even though Ma beat Hsieh in his district. In addition, while Chu had both the Taoyuan and New Taipei mayoral nominations handed to him, Lai won an intense primary in 2010 to secure the mayoral nomination. However, if Lai has a few more substantial victories than Chu, he also has a couple of red flags. Lai has not been able to forge a compromise with affected residents over the rerouting of a rail line. He was also unable to manage a Dengue Fever outbreak.

But most disturbing was his response to the election of a KMT politician as speaker of the Tainan City council. Lai accused the speaker of buying votes and refused to attend city council meetings until the speaker was removed. The speaker probably had bought votes, but that is hardly justification for Lai’s behavior. The mayor does not have the power to assign guilt; that is job of the judiciary. Lai’s certitude in his right to assign guilt and ignore his legal duty to give reports and answer interpellations in the city council belies a stunning moral arrogance. The KMT sarcastically dubbed him Deity Lai 賴神, and, dishearteningly, he has not shied away from that moniker. It is very easy to imagine him refusing to see a flawed decision or even doubling down on it. If he is to have a successful tenure as premier, he will have to show a bit more humility that he has thus far.

 

Posted in budget, government posts, infrastructure, LBGT issues, local factions, party politics, pensions | 2 Comments »

evolution of the political map and money politics

November 25, 2014

In the last week before the election, all signs point to a good election night for the DPP. This should be their best local election since the 1997 landslide. Since that particular election is burned vividly into my memory, I thought I’d go back and look at a couple of things that have changed since then. In particular, I want to discuss (1) geography and how the political map has changed (2) the way that money politics is different today than a generation ago.

 

In 1997, the DPP’s victory was almost unbelievable in geographic scope. Taipei and Kaohsiung Cities were not up for election, but all the other cities and counties were. The DPP won nearly every major race. In the south, the DPP held power in Kaoshiung County and Tainan County, they took back power in Pingtung, won a messy four-way race in Tainan City, and their ally, Chang Po-ya 張博雅(now the head of the Control Yuan) won a fifth consecutive term for the Hsu family dynasty in Chiayi City. In the north, the DPP easily retained power in Yilan County, won a tough three-way race in Hsinchu County, somehow held Taoyuan County (where Annette Lu 呂秀蓮 had won the office in a by-election a year earlier), won an outright majority in Hsinchu City, and narrowly edged out the KMT in the biggest prize, Taipei County. The DPP even won in Taichung City and County. They didn’t win in Nantou, but former DPP legislator Peng Pai-hsien 彭百顯 edged out both the DPP and KMT nominees to take that race. It could have been even worse for the KMT. They barely squeezed out victories in Changhua and Yunlin, the two biggest districts they held onto. In terms of numbers of cities and counties that each party won, it didn’t look so bad since the KMT won all the little districts. However, the DPP ended up governing about 80% of Taiwan’s population.

Today, that looks a little strange. The KMT’s last redoubt was in Changhua, Yunlin, and Chiayi County. Today, Yunlin and Chiayi usually can be counted on to vote for the DPP, and Changhua is far from a reliable area for either party. Today it would be nearly unthinkable for the DPP to sweep Taoyuan, Hsinchu County, and Hsinchu City. It seemed far less impossible then. The DPP had held the Hsinchu County government since 1989, and it had been very strong in several elections in Hsinchu City during the 1980s.

Many of us don’t realize (or can easily forget) just how much the political map has changed. In the 1990s, we didn’t talk so much about the blue north and green south. Rather, the DPP had strength in the north and south, but central Taiwan was often thought of as a “democratic desert.” Perhaps the best way to see the changes is to look at the DPP’s vote in national elections over the years.

  national north mid-north central mid-south south E/F
1994 39.4 41.7 33.8 36.3 43.8 40.6 26.3
2000 39.3 37.4 30.0 37.4 49.5 46.2 20.5
2004 50.1 45.9 42.5 50.5 59.6 57.0 29.1
2008 41.6 38.4 32.9 40.5 51.0 49.7 21.8
2012 45.6 42.2 37.4 44.9 57.0 53.6 25.1
(12-94) 6.2 0.5 3.6 8.6 13.2 13.0 -1.2

North: Taipei City and County, Keelung City, Yilan County

Mid-north: Taoyuan County, Hsinchu City and County, Miaoli County

Central: Taichung City and County, Changhua County, Nantou County

Mid-south: Yunlin County, Chiayi City and County, Tainan City and County

South: Kaohsiung City and County, Pingtung County, Penghu County

East/Fujian: Taitung, Hualien, Kinmen, Lienchiang (1994: Taitung, Hualien only)

 

Ignore the East/Fujian category; it is much smaller than the other five regions. It is also geographically incoherent.

In 1994, look at how close the other five regions were to each other. From the weakest to the strongest, the difference was only 10%. Moreover, the north was actually a better region for the DPP than the south. Today that is unthinkable. By 2012, the difference between the weakest and strongest regions had grown to 20%, and the south was about 8% better than the north.

Now look at the difference between 1994 and 2012 for each region. The north has barely changed (+0.5%), the mid-north has slightly increased, the center somewhat more, and the mid-south and south have both increased by a whopping 13%. The DPP’s gains over the past generation have come almost entirely in the southern half of the island.

This is what we mean when we talk about the south turning green and the north turning blue. In an absolute sense, the north hasn’t really gotten bluer. However, relative to the national average, the north and mid-north look far bluer than they did a generation ago. The southern half of the island is, of course, much greener. The central region, rather than being a “democratic desert” halfway between DPP bastions in the north and south, has become the bellwether area. As goes the center, so goes Taiwan.

 

You will notice that the mid-south has always been the DPP’s best area in national elections. However, it has not always been the DPP’s best area in local elections. In 1997, when the DPP won nearly everything else, it could not win Yunlin or Chiayi Counties. Somehow the KMT managed to maintain control of local politics in what objectively should have been the DPP’s best area. In the past 20 years, however, the KMT has completely lost this control. This gets me to my second big change in the past generation: money.

Money is emerging as a defining issue in current politics, but it runs on a very different logic today than a generation ago. Now we are increasingly aware of the power of large, multinational conglomerates that have extended their reach through every facet of Taiwan’s society. The old picture of an economy dominated by small and medium businesses (with a lot of family businesses) and a large middle class seems less and less accurate as a description of today’s Taiwan. Moreover, almost all businesses have established extensive ties with China. They either do their manufacturing in China, or they want to access China’s enormous domestic market. Because of these ties, economic inequality is increasingly bound together with identity politics.

A generation ago, businesses were just starting the move to China, and China itself was far poorer, less powerful, and had a much less aggressive foreign policy. The KMT, headed by Lee Teng-hui, was encouraging a Go-Slow policy for businesses toward China. The USA was still by far Taiwan’s most important market and trading partner.

Nevertheless, money in politics was one of the defining issues in the 1997 election. More specifically, the election was all about what voters called black and gold politics. Black referred to organized crime, and during the 1990s organized crime increasingly penetrated local politics. Following the spectacular police crackdowns on organized crime in the late CCK era, crime figures started to run for elected office as a way of gaining legal protection. If a crime boss was in the county assembly and could threaten to cut the local county police budget, the police learned quickly to back off. Minor crime figures ran for township councils, more important ones ran for county assemblies, and the biggest ones ran for the legislature. The ever-increasing presence of organized crime in elected offices led to more and more violence in local politics, larger and more ostentatious brothels and gambling parlors (you couldn’t miss the garish neon lights), and more petty and violent crime.

Local KMT factions had always used local government budgets to feed their electoral machines, and this continued in the 1990s. If you needed to build a road or a school, your friendly local contractor would inflate the budget, skimp on materials, and kick back 10% to the politicians. This could then be recycled back into politics. Candidates amassed huge war chests to buy votes at ever-increasing prices. Organized crime turned out to be very good at vote-buying. On the one hand, they had lots of tough young men who could either buy votes or scare off the vote buyers for rival candidates. On the other hand, they could remind voters who took the money that their ballot box had better have a lot of votes for the right candidate or else…

Anger against black and gold politics came to a climax in the summer of 1997 when actress Bai Bing-bing’s 白冰冰 daughter was kidnapped by a gang. The whole country watched on TV as the police incompetently tried to raid their hideout completely unaware that the gang was listening in on the police radio. When the gang killed Bai’s daughter, the nation was outraged. There was a massive protest in Taipei calling only for President Lee to apologize and Premier Lien to resign. A week before the election, the case flared up again when the last gang member stormed the South African embassy and held the Ambassador and his family hostage. Frank Hsieh 謝長廷 emerged the hero by going in to negotiate the gang member’s surrender and coming out with the Ambassador’s baby. When people went to vote the next weekend, black and gold issues were at the front of their considerations.

Today, even in local politics, money operates in different ways. On the one hand, if you try to play the traditional game of recycling money through local construction projects, it doesn’t work as well. On the one hand, prosecutors have much better tools for sniffing out corruption and more leeway to pursue those cases in court. On the other hand, the presence of organized crime has diminished considerably. There is much less (visible) prostitution and gambling. Vote buying doesn’t work as well as it used to. Perhaps most importantly, administrative reform in 2010 eliminated local township governments in Taipei, Taichung, Tainan, and Kaohsiung Counties, removing a vital source of cash in many of the most prosperous areas of Taiwan.

Of course, building stuff in the old ways is still attractive, but the future might be in the John Wu 吳志揚 Taoyuan model. As Michael Cole has repeatedly reminded us over the past few years, the Taoyuan government is pursuing an enormous development plan around the airport. However, rather than handing off contracts to lots of small time local cronies, Wu has invited big Chinese investors to come in and fund the project. It is hard to know exactly how the money is then recycled, but it doesn’t take much imagination to speculate that these Chinese investors repay the favor with political influence for Wu’s (or allies’) business dealings in China.

This may be simplifying things too much, but it seems to me that the old factional politics that used to be the basis of KMT local power in central and southern Taiwan have simply become much less lucrative. As the money slowed down to a trickle, faction politics were squeezed out by party politics. Since the DPP had always had quite a bit of sympathy bubbling under the surface in the south, once the factions weakened, it was nearly impossible for the KMT to maintain its partisan hold on those local governments. What was left of the factions switched sides and transferred their remaining support to the DPP. In the center where the two parties are much more evenly balanced, the factions have not yet made the same move en masse, but a few people have switched sides. In the north, the DPP had much less support and the factions have not been tempted to change sides. Now in Taoyuan, Wu may have figured out how to marry the traditional construction development state model with the new integration into the Chinese market. This new source of money might allow him and the KMT to maintain and reinforce their coalition of ideological supporters (of whom Taoyuan has always had many) and the watermelon faction who go wherever their economic interests point them.

 

Posted in 1994 mayor/governor, 1997 county executive, 2004 presidential, 2008 presidential, 2012 presidential, 2014 mayor, corruption, infrastructure, local factions, party politics | 4 Comments »

Kaohsiung MRT bleeds cash

September 15, 2010

I’ve been wondering if we would hear anything about the Kaohsiung MRT system during this election cycle, and here it is.

The Control Yuan is investigating the finances of the Kaohsiung MRT, and it has found that the KMRT is hemorrhaging money.  In the year that it has been open, the KMRT has lost NT 7b, and it is quickly running out of cash.

KMRT is officially a private business, but it is, of course, closely tied to the city government.  If the private business goes bankrupt, the city government will be left to bail out the mess.  So if the KMRT runs out of cash, fails to pay bondholders, or something else, the taxpayers can’t just ignore it as if it were a bank. [1]

The Control Yuan doesn’t seem to be accusing anyone of wrongdoing.  The basic problem is simply that not enough people are riding the KMRT so revenues are too low.  (The KMRT is a beautiful system, with gorgeous architecture, nice, shiny trains, and lots of elbow room.  But while having the whole train to yourself can be enjoyable, it makes for a financial disaster.)  I’m not sure whether the population density is too low, the lines were built on the wrong routes, people don’t habitually take mass transportation in Kaohsiung, or people simply haven’t adjusted their lives and transportation habits around the KMRT yet.  It might be something else, too.  However, the Kaohsiung MRT is clearly not part of the everyday lives of Kaohsiung residents the way the Taipei MRT is.

Anyway, one thing I have learned from Taipei politics is that the MRT has political consequences.   On the positive side, you get to spread around lots of contracts worth trainloads of money constructing the system.  On the negative side, once it is built, only negative political credit is possible.  If the system operates perfectly and makes a profit, no one gives you credit.  (Example: Does Mayor Hao get any credit because the Taipei MRT is rolling in profits?  Of course not! )  However, if anything goes wrong, the blame is swift and sharp.  The MRT is a tangible issue that voters can see and understand.  We might not understand the intricacies of health care reform, but everyone can understand a derailed train, a crowded and dirty station, a corruption scandal, or a construction delay.

So I expect to hear a lot more about the Kaohsiung MRT over the next two months.  I don’t think this will be sufficient to derail Chen Ju’s re-election bid, but it might eat into her margin significantly.

[1] That was intentional.

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The Hualian campaign and predictions

February 26, 2010

On the eve of the legislative yuan by-election, I thought I’d update the races and make some highly dubious predictions.

Three of the races are shaping up mostly as I discussed in my previous posts.  Chiayi County 2 is going to be a landslide DPP win.  Stunningly, the KMT seems to have publicly given up on the race in Hsinchu County.  KMT spokesmen are  publicly only hoping to protect two seats, and they always mean Taoyuan 3 and Hualian.

In Taoyuan, the race has degenerated into an ugly series of accusations that the other side is cheating, corrupt, an outsider, and so on.  The KMT has largely ignored the two independent candidates and focused its attacks on the DPP candidate, Huang Renzhu 黃仁杼.  Huang seemed like a much stronger candidate at the beginning of the campaign, but I think the KMT’s efforts to portray him as a small-minded, local, visionless, grassroots figure are taking some effect.

Something very interesting, however, is happening in Hualian.  The campaign has turned into a full-blown issue-oriented, not personality-oriented, campaign.  One issue is dominating discussion: transportation.  To understand this, we’re going to need some background.

Here’s a map of Hualian County from Wikipedia.  Hualian is in red.

Taiwan ROC political division map Hualien County.svg

At the end of 2009, 4.5% of the total population lived in the three counties along the east coast.  2.0% lived in Ilan County, just north of Hualian County; 1.0% lived in Taidong County, just south of Hualian County; and the other 1.5% lived in Hualian County.[1] Why do so few people live on the east coast?  A quick glance at a topographical map answers this question.

As you can see, it’s very hard to get from the Taipei area to Ilan County.  It’s even harder to get from Ilan County to Hualian County.  It’s not hard at all to get from Hualian to Taidong, since the East Coast Rift Valley is about 30km wide and runs from Hualian City at the northern mouth of the valley, to Taidong City, at the southern mouth.

Currently, there are three ways to get from Taipei to Hualian.  You can fly, take the train, or drive.  Driving is a real drag.  Ten years ago, there were two provincial highways going from Taipei to Ilan.  One was a winding mountain road; the other was a winding coastal road.  Both roads are heavily traveled two lane highways and are quite slow and dangerous.  The coastal route, which most heavy trucks used, had the added disadvantage of going to Jilong City, not directly to Taipei City.  Getting to Ilan is the easy part.  There is one road going from Ilan to Hualian.  This road is one of the most breathtaking roads in the world.  The mountains rise straight out of the ocean over 1000 feet high in many places.  (This is also true below the waves; the ocean floor is over 1000 feet below sea level.  From mountain peak to ocean floor is probably less than 100 feet horizontally in many places.)  For long stretches at a time, the road is carved out of the rock halfway up the side of the mountain.  Since you follow the shape of the mountainside, the road can be very twisty and prone to collapse.  In several sections, they have opted to build a short tunnel, but you can still see the old road going around the outside of the mountain.  Over the past three decades, the road has gotten progressively safer but less beautiful as they have built more and more of these bypass tunnels.  However, there is still plenty of scenic road left.  On a sunny summer day, the ocean waters are a deep blue and the mountains are dark brown, except where covered with lush green vegetation.  I’ve taken several memorable trips on this road, and it makes me happy every time.  Well, unless it’s not a sunny summer day.  When it is dark, when it rains, or both, this road is downright terrifying.  Even when it’s bright and sunny, this road is very slow.

About 5 years ago, it became much easier to get to Ilan from Taipei.  The government built a beautiful new four-lane divided freeway.  It cost a lot of money because it has several long tunnels deep underneath the surface.  The longest tunnel is over 12km long.  It also cuts the time to get to Ilan by more than half (unless, as is frequently the case on holidays, it has a traffic jam), and is far safer than either of the old roads.  As you might guess, weekend tourism in Ilan is booming.  It’s still very hard to get to Hualian or Taidong, however.

Let’s return to the campaign.  The DPP has never done very well in Hualian, and it didn’t have a local candidate willing to take up the fight.  They nominated Bi-khim Hsiao 蕭美琴, who has likely spent more time in Ohio[2] than in Hualian.  I think a lot of what has happened is probably due to a short-term horizon.  Hsiao had to have figured that her political career in Hualian would last all of two months, after which she would return to Taipei.  She took the nomination as a service to her party, and determined to fight (and lose) the good fight.  Since she had no reasonable chance of winning and wanted to bolster, not sully, her national image, she had no reason to descend into ugly mudslinging.  Rather, she constructed a policy-oriented campaign centered around economic development and transportation.  She is calling for several things, most notably for the government to subsidize half the price of bus and train tickets to Hualian and for Hualian businesses to be exempt from the operating tax.  The latter is inspired by her shock and disbelief[3] upon coming to Hualian and finding that Hualian’s level of development is roughly the same as Penghu’s.[4] Penghu businesses have a special exemption from the operating tax, and Hsiao insists that the residents “behind the mountains” should get the same treatment.  All of this would be just more cheap talk, but the DPP has introduced an “East Coast Development Act” in the legislature and pushed it through to the second reading.  The DPP bill budgets NT50 billion (USD 1.6 billion) for east coast development.  The KMT has reacted with its own version of the bill, but it provides for far less funding.  I wonder how Hsiao ever managed to get the DPP to accept responsibility for her campaign promises.  It must have been part of her conditions for accepting the nomination in the first place.  “If I go, I’ll have to run on transportation issues, so you’ll have to support my bill in the legislature.”  Of course, since neither she nor the DPP expected her to win, they probably did not expect to really have to pass or take responsibility for the financial consequences of these promises.

One thing that Hsiao noticeably has not endorsed is the freeway plan.  There is a plan to extend the Taipei-Ilan freeway all the way down the east coast.  Public opinion in Hualian (and presumably Taidong) is solidly in favor of the freeway.  There are two major reasons that it hasn’t been built: cost and environmental impact.  I can’t judge the environmental issues, except to say that people around the rest of the island seem to be more worried about environmental impact than people in Hualian.  Financially, this is a classic case of concentrated benefits and diffused costs.  People in Hualian would benefit disproportionally from the road while paying only a small fraction of the costs.  One estimate for the cost of the section between Ilan and Hualian was NT 89 billion (USD 2.8 billion).  About 70% of that was earmarked for one especially long tunnel.[5]

The candidate stumping hard for the highway is independent Shi Shenglang 施勝郎. In fact, the KMT has accused Shi of only having one idea.  Perhaps, but it seems to be a potent one.  The Shi campaign is practically daring the KMT to match its appeal.  County executive Fu Kunqi 傅崑萁 has publicly said that he will switch his support to the KMT candidate as soon as President Ma signs a statement that he will start building the freeway this term.

The KMT has responded by attacking Shi almost as much or perhaps even more than Hsiao.  I think this is a big mistake.  In Taoyuan, the KMT has ignored the two minor candidates, and they seem to be fading into the background.  In Hualian, the KMT has ensured that people think of this race as having three distinct choices.  It is entirely possible that the KMT argument that a vote for Shi is really a vote for Hsiao may backfire by reminding voters that Shi is in the race.  The KMT would have been better off by focusing on Hsiao and turning this into a choice between KMT and DPP.

OK, how about some predictions?  First, a disclaimer.  I don’t have much confidence in my predictions.  Each election is an incredibly complex phenomenon that we only see a very small slice of.  This is true for people working 24 hours a day on the campaigns, and it is much more true for people like me who see the election from afar and in scattered little bits.  Moreover, I rely heavily on past events to predict future events.  One reason that the social sciences are much more difficult than the natural sciences is that people, unlike molecules, learn, adjust their behavior, and even strategically.  My “predictions” are really just glorified guesses, and I expect them to be wrong quite often.

Here are my best guesses:

Chiayi County 2: Chen Mingwen 陳明文 (DPP) 69; Lin Derui 林德瑞 (KMT) 31.

Hsinchu County: Peng Shaojin 彭紹瑾 (DPP) 54; Zheng Yongtang 鄭永堂 (KMT) 46.

Taoyuan County Third District: Chen Xuesheng 陳學聖 (KMT) 49; Huang Renzhu 黃仁杼 (DPP) 40; Wu Yudong 吳餘棟 (IND) 7, Lin Xiangmei 林香美 (IND) 4.

Hualian County:  Bi-khim Hsiao 蕭美琴 (DPP) 44; Wang Tingsheng 王廷生 (KMT) 42; Shi Shenglang 施勝郎 (IND) 14.

I’m stunned by my own predictions.  That would be DPP 3, KMT 1.  According to the political map, the KMT should win the latter three seats handily.  I can’t believe that I think the DPP will be close in all of them, much less win in two of them.  I must be off my rocker.

[1] For reference, 29.7% of the total population lived in Greater Taipei (Taipei City, Taipei County, and Jilong City on the northern tip of the island.

[2] Hsiao has a BA from Oberlin and an MA from Columbia.

[3] Somehow she has turned being an outsider into an advantage.  She could naively and innocently be shocked by conditions in Hualian, leading to (convenient) moral outrage at the state of affairs.  In other words, her appeal is “I had no idea it was this bad!  We have to do something about this!”

[4] Penghu is the chain of islands to the west of central Taiwan.

[5] The central government is investigating an alternate plan to upgrade the existing provincial highway by putting in a few tunnels in the most treacherous sections.  This plan would cost about half as much as building a new freeway.  It would also still leave east coast residents with a two-lane, unlimited access highway with large stretches of winding road.

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