QUESTION: What crimes are easier to commit when there is no end-to-end encryption of messenger systems; and what opportunities are lost?

I was asked this question, and it’s a good one, speaking clearly to “what is the value proposition of robust end-to-end encryption that is worthy of the name?”

I have written on an abstract level on this topic before, but my questioner is looking for a concrete checklist so I am hastily thrashing out some thoughts before bedtime, and will come back / update this later, with suggestions from Twitter and Facebook (if any).

Some thoughts and simple bullet points follow; I welcome comments and suggestions either below, or on the related Twitter thread.

What is End-to-End Security?

The value of end-to-end encryption is that only entities which can, are, and are visible as part of a group, have access to data shared with the group that is contemporaneous with their membership.

Therefore the baseline for any crimes which are enabled by lack of robust end-to-end security, are crimes which break this model; there certainly are more, but these are the low-hanging fruit.

In all instances we will use PLATFORM — rather than Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, Google, E-mail, Parler, Yahoo, AOL, etc, — as our hypothetical messaging platform, because it’s less emotionally charged to speak generically. In all scenarios, imagine what would happen / how much worse the situation would be, if the hypothetical PLATFORM was not end-to-end encrypted.

Data-Access Hacks

  1. Cloud Storage Leak: the PLATFORM development team decide to “move to the cloud” but they mess up their storage access controls, so that all user message databases are available to the whole internet.
  2. Cloud Hack and Exfiltrate: cloud service provider infiltration occurs, and cleartext chats and compromising pictures are exfiltrated from PLATFORM, leading to individual blackmails and suicides.
  3. Platform Infra Hack & Leak: someone somehow breaks into PLATFORM infrastructure and steals the conversations of several thousand people and corporate-ransoms those and all the other data for bitcoin.
  4. Platform API Scrape & Leak: there’s an authentication hole in the PLATFORM API and the conversations and locations of several thousand people are posted onto Bittorrent.
  5. Platform Auth Scrape & Leak: somebody guesses your (and others’) PLATFORM password and exfiltrates all the nude shots that you sent to your boyfriend; extortion or corporate ransom follows.
  6. Network Scrape & Leak: cleartext network traffic is surveilled, tampered, repeated, redirected, etc.
  7. Client Scrape & Leak: hypothetical: PLATFORM introduces ephemeral photo-messaging but doesn’t encrypt the image data “at rest”; scraper apps are written to recover & exfiltrate boob-flashes, dick-pics and other major teen embarrassment.

Data-Value Hacks

  1. Insanely unwisely, PLATFORM hosted voice recordings of children to support IoT toys, which subsequently get leaked
  2. Insanely unwisely, PLATFORM would host the British Prime Minister and their cabinet colleagues for both text-messaging and video-conferencing during lockdown
  3. It turns out that some companies want you to send them Passport and Drivers-License images over PLATFORM; and some countries also permit you to apply for visas via this mechanism, too
  4. It turns out that some companies want you to send them Credit Card details via PLATFORM.
  5. Basically: anything where you want to send valuable private data from A to B, is at risk from C, D, or E dropping in and stealing the data.
  6. Are you aware of the prevalence of mortgage deposit fraud and have you considered how much of that risk is due to use of unauthenticated e-mail for communication?

Opportunity-Cost Hacks

OMG SMS

Comments

2 responses to “QUESTION: What crimes are easier to commit when there is no end-to-end encryption of messenger systems; and what opportunities are lost?”

  1. […] making an attempt to ban finish to finish encryption (seek advice from Alec Muffet for extra nuanced discussions on E2E encryption), no-one ever appears to have gotten PGP working, and what does cryptography has to do with […]

  2. […] is. You have governments trying to ban end to end encryption (refer to Alec Muffet for more nuanced discussions on E2E encryption), no-one ever seems to have got PGP working, and what does cryptography has to do with privacy or […]

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