user avatar
Alessio Patalano
@alessionaval
Professor of War & Strategy in East Asia | FRHistS | @warstudies | @kcl_CGS | Postwar Japan as a Seapower. Naval affairs. Strategy. Indo-Pacific. One ping only.
London, England
Joined March 2013
Posts
  • Pinned
    user avatar
    The Strategic Significance of the Maritime Theatre in the Russia–Ukraine War - good morning X. Delighted and honoured this piece Dan Hallett and I penned is out with ⁦@RUSI_org⁩ flagship publication- a short thread about our argument:
  • user avatar
    Good morning Twitter. It appears one can comfortably assert that on 13 April 2022, a new piece of naval history was written in the context of this terrible affair that is the Russian invasion of Ukraine. A thread on the RFN cruiser Moskva (pennant No 121):
  • user avatar
    Replying to @alessionaval and @CIMSEC
    Tonight Russian commanders will feel less secure as they reflect upon the fact that the BS is no longer their lake. It’s a box with no way out. It’s where denial has exposed the limits of control. Things have got much harder. Signing off for now. Thank you for reading!
  • user avatar
    Replying to @alessionaval
    Perhaps the most iconic symbolism around the role of the Moskva is captured in the shelling of Snake Island, with the now image of the Ukrainian soldiers responding in kind to the ship hailing them to surrender: the ultimate David vs Goliath challenge. Grit and Determination.
  • user avatar
    Replying to @alessionaval and @CIMSEC
    2. Politically, explaining why Russia could loose its flagship in the theatre where it has sea control is going to be hard - or even hide it; 3. Symbolically, Moscow is on fire. This is Ukraine response to Snake Island. This is David exposing Goliath’s disorientation.
  • user avatar
    Replying to @alessionaval
    This raises important questions about familiar themes in this invasion so far: a. Russian conops; b. Russian confidence/underestimation of UKR; c. Russian preparation and readiness. This ship had no real business so close to shore; it clearly underestimated op risk;
  • user avatar
    Replying to @alessionaval
    The dynamics confirm an old truth: fire is absolutely deadly threat to a naval combatant and if your crew and systems are not in tip top shape, that’s where the difference between success and defeat stands in war at sea. @CovertShores here is very helpful: navalnews.com/naval-news/202…
  • user avatar
    Replying to @alessionaval
    Further, with the closure of the Bosporus to all warships, it also meant that this ship would be the main asset available to support Russian naval ops in the BS. Couple that with the current shift in op focus south, this is not just any ship. This is key asset. This is ‘Moscow’.
  • user avatar
    Replying to @alessionaval
    So, what happened, and why does it matter? We know from official sources that 2 Neptune missiles hit the ship and a major fire ensued. The ship was operating incredibly close to shore, which is remarkable given the limited point defence system it has.
  • user avatar
    Replying to @alessionaval and @CIMSEC
    More will be written on this, since this is one of the most severe naval losses since the Falklands War. I shall come back to this too in due time. For now, expect some more turbulence on the naval front. As weapons arrive, denial will be on the menu.
  • user avatar
    Replying to @alessionaval
    The extent to which the ship was in a less than ideal state is debatable, but a couple of things matter here: 1. this is the flagship of the BS Fleet of the RFN; 2. it’s primary mission was to secure sea control and exploit; 3. it saw action very early on in the invasion.
  • user avatar
    Replying to @alessionaval
    This is relevant because it raises a question about battle-readiness and overall op condition. A ship first commissioned in 1983, it was recommissioned in 2000, and was supposed to undergo refit and upgrade in 2016 - but it did not.
    My two cents on the "Moskva". While it was the flagship of the VMF's Black Sea fleet and it won awards it was in a pitiful state. Broader modernisation was cancelled in 2015 and what was done was mostly servicing and extension of power plant's life. vpk.name/news/132344_mo…
  • user avatar
    I have to say. For the lead negotiator to openly dismiss the value of the territory as a scene setter, and to go on and articulate straw man arguments after straw man arguments before ending on ‘they started it’ - is quite extraordinary. Just extraordinary.
    "These are very tiny islands in the middle of the Indian Ocean where no one actually goes.” “I don't think we should be too worried about losing" the Chagos Islands, says special envoy for negotiations between the UK and Mauritius Jonathan Powell. @CalumAM | @Chloetilley
    00:00
  • user avatar
    Replying to @alessionaval
    Let’ be clear though. This wasn’t just about symbolism. Snake Island occupies a key strategic position for any op vs Odessa to take place, and RFN did what one would expect them to do early on: secure it. As the map shows this is an important place to prevent ops vs Odessa.