Long thread about how I think the first 96 hours have gone, still very early/incomplete impressions. The initial Russian operation was premised on terrible assumptions about Ukraine’s ability & will to fight, and an unworkable concept of operations. Moscow badly miscalculated. 1/
Michael Kofman
7,664 posts
Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment. Defense analysis with a focus on the Russian and Ukrainian militaries.
- I think today we've seen a shift in Russian targeting towards critical civilian infrastructure, greater use of MLRS, and artillery in suburban areas. Unfortunately, my concern that this was going to get a lot more ugly and affect civilians is starting to materialize.
- Some very early impressions of the last two days. It's an operation with maximalist war aims, and Moscow's thinking on this war seems to have been colored by war optimism. It looked as though Russian forces were expecting a quicker UKR military collapse and easier gains. 1/
- Very long Sunday thread on the extent to which we overestimated the Russian military, a bit about the war, and on how we should think about Russian military power. 1/
- I’ve been traveling and not writing much these past two weeks. Some brief thoughts about the second phase of the war, Russia’s offensive to retake the Donbas, and implications. Thread. (map from Nathan below). 1/
- Thoughts on the current state of the war and where things might be heading. About 2 weeks ago I suggested that Russian forces have ~3 weeks before combat effectiveness becomes increasingly exhausted. I think that's generally been right, but we're not quite there yet. Thread. 1/
- Follow up thread on Russian force availability and long-term prospects. The Russian military has taken significant casualties. After redeploying, and pulling additional units from standing formations, it may be tapped out of available forces, for now. Thread 1/
- Hard to see how Moscow can achieve any political objectives in Ukraine. I always thought the war would be a terrible miscalculation. Don't see any way military means will get them there now. Here we see how wrong Russian assumptions were about Ukraine.Replying to @bopancMasses of ordinary Ukrainians are braving Russian invaders’ barrages to protest in occupied Kherson. A woman named Valentina Maganova says to the tune of gunfire: “We’re not afraid. Repost this across the world. Please, support us. Kherson is Ukraine!”
00:00 - The suspension of U.S. assistance for Ukraine is a very unfortunate and significant development, but it may not have immediate impact. Ukraine is far less dependent on the U.S. for day to day battlefield needs in 2025, than it was in earlier periods of the war. 1/
- I try not to make too many predictions. I think given all the problems in the Russian campaign, delusional assumptions, an unworkable concept of operations, little prepared for a sustained war like this, I give it ~3 more weeks before this is an exhausted force. 1/
- Russia’s annexation announcement stands in sharp contrast to the military reality on the ground, as Russian forces face envelopment at Lyman. There’s a good chance it will be followed by another defeat and the collapse of that pocket.
- Replying to @KofmanMichaelWhat I’ve seen so far suggests that Russian troops were unaware they would be ordered to invade, and appear reluctant to prosecute this war. They don't see Ukrainians as adversaries and the military didn’t prepare them for this campaign. Outside of Chechens, morale seems low. 5/
- Taking a cursory look at Russian losses two weeks into the war, it reads less as a general failure to modernize, and more as a failure to maintain and properly support the equipment. Abandonment rate exceedingly high.
- One aspect of this war is that Moscow has generally been trying to keep it hidden from the Russian public. They not only sought a quick & easy victory, but hoped to suppress news about the fighting, keeping images of mil operations across Ukraine out of the public eye.




