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Statecraft: The New Rules of Power in a Divided World, out now -
Jack Watling
13.1K posts
Jack Watling
@Jack_Watling
Joined May 2011
- On Bucha: after my last meeting in Ukraine I was walking to the car when a senior Ukrainian security official, flanked by two General Officers grabbed my arm and said "by the way; the Russians have moved a unit onto the Belarusian axis who will lead the killings." 1/4.
- Replying to @Jack_WatlingPeople calling for a specific response to Bucha are taking an atrocity out of its context. The response should be to ensure that Ukrainians can defeat the invasion through steady and systemic assistance. The volume and speed of kit delivered matters. 4/4
- Replying to @Jack_WatlingAnyone saying that Bucha is the result of brutalisation or rogue behaviour is wrong. This was the plan. It was pre-meditated. It is consistent with Russian methods in Chechnya. And if the Russian military had been more successful there would have been many more towns like it. 2/4
- Replying to @Jack_WatlingThis context - in which the Ukrainians knew that there were troops preparing to perpetrate acts like this, with the Kremlin describing Ukrainian identity as an accident of history - also explains why Ukrainian resistence has been so fierce. They see the stakes as existential. 3/4
- Seen a few takes recently arguing that Russian weapons don’t work well. Having spent time inside a number of Russian manufactured systems I thought I’d address why I think there is often a gap between Russian weapons on paper versus their performance in the field. 1/25
- There has been a lot of discussion around the effects of winter on operations. I thought I’d outline a couple of aspects of winter fighting that are both critical and often under appreciated. BLUF: Winter will likely favour the Ukrainian military. 1/17
- The @amnesty report demonstrates a weak understanding of the laws of armed conflict, no understanding of military operations, and indulges in insinuations without supplying supporting evidence. 1/4
- Replying to @Jack_WatlingIn conclusion, the problem with Russian weapons isn't usually that they don't work but rather that when they are linked up and operated by under trained crews they become decidely less than the sum of their parts. 25/25
- Replying to @Jack_WatlingSo, on the one hand quality control in Soviet manufacturing was poor. On the other hand the design team just accepted this and built in redundency to produce a very reliable and effective attack helicopter. Russian weapons involve lots of these kinds of workarounds. 5/25
- Replying to @Jack_WatlingWhat the Mi-24 crews had to explain to their US colleagues was that this was normal. It was why the helicopter has 8 bolts in its tail rotor of which 4 would often crack. All 8 bolts are replaced after a specified number of flying hours irrespective of their condition. 4/25
- I'd agree the UAF took the importance of NCO's to heart but Brig Gen Hilbert is I think mistaken that the Ukrainian military had built an effective NCO corps by the time the war started. Important not to draw false lessons. Some observations... 1/13Ukrainian troops took American military training "to heart," building an effective NCO corps and simulations for large-scale combat: U.S. general "The worst thing the Russians did was give us eight years to prepare," said Brig. Gen. Joseph E. Hilbert of 7th Army training command
- Replying to @Jack_WatlingThere are two primary problems with Russian weapons: integration and cognitive load. To begin with integration, a few years ago some Mi-24s allocated to ISAF were undergoing maintenance. It was found that some of the bolts holding the tail rotor in place had cracks in them. 2/25
- Replying to @Jack_WatlingNATO systems tend to have far fewer controls and what the controls do is contextual. The system supports the user so they can focus on judgement. The result is a system with a much higher initial training burden but a much higher effectiveness for a newly trained crew. 15/25
