AI won't catch your security vulnerabilities. But it might save you hundreds of hours fixing them. Joseph Katsioloudes recently demonstrated something revealing at AI Native DevCon: he asked GitHub Copilot to find security issues in code. It correctly identified SQL injection. It also flagged passwords stored in plain text, except they weren't actually there. Pure hallucination. 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗿𝗲𝗮𝗹 𝗽𝗿𝗼𝗯𝗹𝗲𝗺? Run the same prompt twice, get different results. Same code, same model, completely different outputs. Here's what actually works: • Purpose-built security tools handle detection (they're deterministic and reliable) • AI handles fixing (where it genuinely excels) • This hybrid approach helps teams fix vulnerabilities 3x faster Joseph's team built something practical for this: instruction files that prompt AI to perform structured security assessments of dependencies. Most developers spend under 15 minutes evaluating a new package before adopting it. These prompts deliver executive summaries with flagged risks and verifiable sources. The takeaway isn’t that AI is ineffective for security. It’s that understanding where AI is strong versus where it can be unreliable makes all the difference. 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗱𝗲𝘃𝗲𝗹𝗼𝗽𝗲𝗿𝘀 𝘀𝗵𝗶𝗽𝗽𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝘀𝗲𝗰𝘂𝗿𝗲 𝗰𝗼𝗱𝗲 𝗮𝗿𝗲𝗻'𝘁 𝗰𝗵𝗼𝗼𝘀𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗯𝗲𝘁𝘄𝗲𝗲𝗻 𝗔𝗜 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝘁𝗿𝗮𝗱𝗶𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻𝗮𝗹 𝘁𝗼𝗼𝗹𝘀. They're combining both strategically. Read the full article here: https://tessl.co/kjp
AI's Security Limitations in Code Review
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Just discovered an AI pentester that's changing how we think about security testing. 🛡️ Meet Shannon by KeygraphHQ — a fully autonomous AI that breaks your web apps before hackers do. Here's what makes it remarkable: → 96.15% success rate on industry benchmarks → Executes REAL exploits, not just alerts → Discovers injection attacks, XSS, SSRF, auth bypass vulnerabilities → Generates pentester-grade reports with reproducible proof-of-concepts The problem it solves is genius: Thanks to tools like Claude Code and Cursor, teams ship code constantly. But pentesting? Once a year. That's 364 days of potential vulnerabilities in production. Shannon closes that gap. In tests on OWASP Juice Shop, it found 20+ critical vulnerabilities including complete auth bypass and database exfiltration. All autonomously. The bigger picture: As AI accelerates development velocity, we need AI-powered security to match that speed. Shannon is a glimpse of that future — where every deploy can be security-tested automatically. What's your take? Are autonomous security tools the answer to keeping pace with AI-assisted development? Check it out: https://lnkd.in/ehVBdMBT
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𝐀𝐈 𝐋𝐋𝐃𝐅 𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐯𝐞𝐧𝐭/𝐃𝐞𝐭𝐞𝐜𝐭/𝐑𝐞𝐬𝐩𝐨𝐧𝐝 𝐏𝐥𝐚𝐲𝐛𝐨𝐨𝐤𝐬 & 𝐌𝐚𝐭𝐮𝐫𝐢𝐭𝐲 𝐒𝐜𝐨𝐫𝐞𝐜𝐚𝐫𝐝 𝐰𝐢𝐭𝐡 𝐂𝐫𝐨𝐬𝐬𝐰𝐚𝐥𝐤: 𝐋𝐋𝐃𝐅 ↔ 𝐎𝐖𝐀𝐒𝐏 𝐋𝐋𝐌 𝐓𝐨𝐩 𝟏𝟎 ↔ 𝐌𝐈𝐓𝐑𝐄 𝐀𝐓𝐋𝐀𝐒 𝗪𝗵𝘆 𝗱𝗼 𝘄𝗲 𝗻𝗲𝗲𝗱 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗰𝗿𝗼𝘀𝘀𝘄𝗮𝗹𝗸 Field experience consistently demonstrates that security measures are most effective when we collaborate rather than operate in silos. This crosswalk provides a clear, visual mapping from LLDF techniques to both the OWASP LLM Top 10 and MITRE ATLAS, enabling teams to align their efforts and maximize the effectiveness of their security programs. 𝗪𝗵𝘆 𝘂𝘀𝗲 𝗣𝗗𝗥 𝗣𝗹𝗮𝘆𝗯𝗼𝗼𝗸𝘀 & 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗠𝗮𝘁𝘂𝗿𝗶𝘁𝘆 𝗦𝗰𝗼𝗿𝗲𝗰𝗮𝗿𝗱 Security tools only deliver value when they are properly understood and used. The basic principle remains: you can’t protect what you don’t understand or can’t see. The PDR Playbook and Maturity Scorecard are practical resources for organizations implementing LLM security programs, providing both detailed tactical guidance and a strategic framework for assessing maturity. 𝐅𝐨𝐫 𝐎𝐫𝐠𝐚𝐧𝐢𝐳𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐬 𝐈𝐦𝐩𝐥𝐞𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐋𝐋𝐌 𝐒𝐞𝐜𝐮𝐫𝐢𝐭𝐲 𝐏𝐫𝐨𝐠𝐫𝐚𝐦𝐬 Operationalizing cybersecurity is a significant challenge for modern enterprises, especially in distributed environments dealing with shadow AI, public AI models, custom AI models, and agent frameworks. AI security is no exception. The good news is that organizations can adapt existing playbooks for Copilots, RAG, and Agents without starting from scratch. A robust framework helps enterprises accelerate secure AI adoption and approach AI security pragmatically, rather than from an alarmist perspective. 𝐋𝐋𝐃𝐄 𝐈𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐚𝐜𝐭𝐢𝐯𝐞 𝐋𝐚𝐛𝐬 The LLDE Lab approach: Setup → Benign Test → Attack Attempt (safe) → Actual Results → Expected Outcome. If Exploit Succeeds → Observables → P/D/R. This simulates “Memory OFF / Retrieval OFF.” LLDE Labs provides illustrations of what AI language-layer exploits look like, using benign data to demonstrate the countless possible variants. Additionally, the Lab purposefully uses benign data. The live workshop is where we demonstrate these exploits in an isolated environment with different models. 𝗟𝗟𝗗𝗙 𝗟𝗶𝘃𝗲 𝗪𝗼𝗿𝗸𝘀𝗵𝗼𝗽𝘀 Overview: A hands-on, cohort-based learning program designed to accelerate mastery of the LLDF (Learn, Lead, Deliver, Fix) framework for security professionals. This program includes practical labs, exportable playbooks, and a structured roadmap to guide teams from LLDF-0 to LLDF-4 maturity. The real question about AI security isn’t whether AI is inherently good or bad; it’s how organizations can effectively manage AI risks, today and into the future. Learn more at https://lldfportal.com
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Day 10 of 30 | Cybersecurity Lessons Docker recently patched a critical vulnerability in its built-in AI assistant, Ask Gordon, that could allow attackers to execute code or exfiltrate sensitive data using nothing more than Docker image metadata. The flaw, called DockerDash, abused how the AI assistant processed Docker image LABEL fields. These labels are normally harmless descriptions. In this case, a malicious actor could embed instructions inside metadata, and Ask Gordon would read, trust, and forward them to the Model Context Protocol gateway, which then executed them with Docker privileges. No validation. No warning. What makes this scary is that everything looks normal. The image works as expected. The AI behaves as expected. The user simply asks a question. That’s the lesson. Key takeaway- AI assistants inherit the trust of the tools they are embedded in. If untrusted input is treated as executable context, the AI becomes an attack surface. Why this matters- Modern developer environments rely heavily on AI assistants. When AI tools can interact with local systems, containers, and cloud resources, metadata becomes code and context becomes control. What this teaches us- AI features must follow zero trust principles Metadata should never be treated as trusted input AI supply chain risk is just as real as traditional software supply chain risk Learn more: https://lnkd.in/eP2rZxpm #CyberSecurity #AISecurity #AppSec #DevSecOps #Docker #SupplyChainSecurity #CloudSecurity #LearningInPublic #CyberLessons
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Open-source AI pentesting tools are getting uncomfortably good: AI has come a long way in the pentesting world. We are now seeing open-source tools that can genuinely mimic how a human tester works, not just fire off scans. I dug into three of them, BugTrace-AI, Shannon, and CAI, the Cybersecurity AI framework, and put them up against real-world targets in a lab environment. The results were better than I expected. Below is a breakdown of what each tool did well, where they fell … More → The post Open-source AI pentesting tools are getting uncomfortably good appeared first on Help Net Security.
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𝗖𝗼𝗱𝗲𝗦𝗵𝗶𝗲𝗹𝗱 𝗔𝗜: 𝗢𝗽𝗲𝗻-𝗦𝗼𝘂𝗿𝗰𝗲 𝗦𝗲𝗰𝘂𝗿𝗶𝘁𝘆 𝗦𝗰𝗮𝗻𝗻𝗲𝗿 𝗢𝗳𝗳𝗲𝗿𝘀 𝗖𝗼𝘀𝘁-𝗘𝗳𝗳𝗲𝗰𝘁𝗶𝘃𝗲 𝗣𝗿𝗼𝘁𝗲𝗰𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 🛰️ [SECURITY] CodeShield AI offers enterprise-grade security scanning at a 24% lower cost than GitGuardian, detecting vulnerabilities and secrets in code repositories. Why it matters: Data breaches are costly and preventable. CodeShield AI aims to provide accessible security for developers, especially for open-source projects, by offering comprehensive protection without slowing down workflows. 🤔 Can open-source security tools effectively compete with established commercial solutions in terms of accuracy and reliability? #OpenSource #Security #AI #DevSecOps #CodeScanning 📡 Follow DailyAIWire for autonomous AI news 🔗 https://lnkd.in/dyZYYq5C
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Open-source AI pentesting tools are getting uncomfortably good: AI has come a long way in the pentesting world. We are now seeing open-source tools that can genuinely mimic how a human tester works, not just fire off scans. I dug into three of them, BugTrace-AI, Shannon, and CAI, the Cybersecurity AI framework, and put them up against real-world targets in a lab environment. The results were better than I expected. Below is a breakdown of what each tool did well, where they fell … More → The post Open-source AI pentesting tools are getting uncomfortably good appeared first on Help Net Security. #HelpNetSecurity #Cybersecurity
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The New Cyber Front Isn’t Code. It’s "Promptware. what happens when your security architecture is built for code, but the attack arrives through conversation? the enterprise landscape is colliding with a harsh reality: the frantic race to deploy Autonomous AI Agents has inadvertently opened the door to a new, sophisticated class of natural language malware known as Promptware. for decades, the "First Law" of cybersecurity was simple: separate data from code. Large Language Models (LLMs) have obliterated that boundary. To an AI, a user’s email, a PDF resume, or a website snippet is no longer passive data—it is active instruction. this is not a bug; it is an architectural paradigm shift that creates a Multi-Step Kill Chain every C-Suite leader must recognize. The Evolution of the Threat: 1. From Injection to Obedience: Attackers aren't "hacking" the system; they are persuading it. Using Prompt Injection, they embed hidden commands in digital artifacts. The AI doesn't glitch—it obediently executes malicious logic because it cannot distinguish between your instructions and the adversary's. 2. The Persistence Problem: The threat has mutated beyond immediate theft. By poisoning an agent’s memory or RAG (Retrieval-Augmented Generation) stores, attackers plant "semantic sleeper cells." This compromises decision-making logic weeks or months after the initial infection. 3. Physical & Kinetic Risk: As we bridge AI agents to APIs and smart infrastructure, this moves from a digital annoyance to a physical threat. A compromised agent controlling operational technology (OT) or smart environments creates tangible safety risks. the Strategic Pivot: Cognitive Security we cannot "patch" these vulnerabilities with traditional firewalls. Securing the autonomous enterprise demands a Defense-in-Depth strategy that shifts focus from syntax to semantics: 1. Architectural Containment: We must design "padded rooms" for agents, ensuring they cannot access critical systems without human-in-the-loop verification. 2. Strict Least-Privilege: AI agents must operate with the bare minimum permissions—never administrative autonomy. 3. Semantic Monitoring: Security Operations Centers (SOCs) must evolve to analyze the intent of AI outputs, not just the code execution. as we transition from chatbots that talk to agents that act, the defining question for leadership is no longer "Is my software secure?" it is: "Is my AI following my strategy, or the hidden commands of an adversary?" #AIgovernance #Cybersecurity #GenerativeAI #StrategicRisk #CISO #PromptEngineering
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Good Practice: Never Trust User Input What twenty years looks like In 2005, SPI Dynamics published a whitepaper on cross-site scripting. Core advice: validate everything, filter before processing, never trust user input. What we did: We took that paper and swapped the terminology. "Input validation" became "AI-powered validation." "Regular expressions" became "neural networks." "Filter" became "ML model." It read as a perfectly credible 2025 article on prompt injection. Structure identical. Advice identical. What OWASP says now: "Prompt injection occurs when dynamically generated AI responses process input that is not properly validated." In plain English: The thing your AI chatbot does when it reads a document containing hidden instructions — that's the same vulnerability we've been fighting since 2005. Same attack class. Same principle. Different nouns. We know how to assess this. We've just been treating it as new. It isn't. Sources: Spett, K. (2005). Cross-Site Scripting. SPI Dynamics. OWASP (2025). LLM01: Prompt Injection. Full analysis: https://lnkd.in/eKfD77kn #CyberSecurity #PromptInjection #XSS #PlainEnglish
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Anthropic's official Git MCP server had three critical vulnerabilities that could be exploited through simple prompt injection. I just discovered something that should terrify every AI developer. Most people think AI tools are secure by default because they come from trusted companies like Anthropic. They're dangerously wrong. Here's what nobody's talking about: The "canonical" Git MCP server—the reference implementation that developers copy—contained three vulnerabilities that could be weaponized through nothing more than a malicious README file or poisoned issue description. 🚨 The attack chain was devastatingly simple: → CVE-2025-68143: Path traversal via git_init tool (CVSS 8.8) → CVE-2025-68144: Argument injection in git commands (CVSS 8.1) → CVE-2025-68145: Missing path validation bypass (CVSS 7.1) An attacker could chain these to achieve remote code execution by: • Creating repos in arbitrary directories • Writing malicious .git/config files • Executing shell scripts through Git filters • All triggered by AI reading contaminated content The scariest part? This works "out of the box" with no exotic configurations needed. As Cyata's CEO noted: "If security boundaries break down even in the reference implementation, it's a signal that the entire MCP ecosystem needs deeper scrutiny." This isn't about one company's mistake. This is about our fundamental assumptions being wrong. We're building AI systems faster than we're securing them. The tools we trust to connect AI to our infrastructure are riddled with basic security flaws that attackers can exploit through the AI's own learning mechanisms. The fixes are deployed, but the broader question remains: How many other "canonical" AI tools are sitting ducks waiting to be exploited? Are you auditing your AI tool integrations with the same rigor as your production systems? #AICybersecurity #MachineLearning #CyberSecurity #Anthropic #PromptInjection Link: https://lnkd.in/gSFPrnCM
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Lessons in Machine Trust: Insights from an AI-Generated Honeypot The Impact of AI-Generated Code on Security: A Real-World Case Study Utilizing AI models to assist in coding has become a common practice in modern development teams. While it can enhance efficiency, there is a risk of over-reliance on AI-generated code, potentially leading to security vulnerabilities. The experience of Intruder serves as a practical example of how AI-generated code can impact security measures....
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