The uncertainties regarding the future of the UK following Brexit have worried commentators across the country and more widely in the EU, but nowhere as much as in Northern Ireland. Indeed, “of all the UK’s nations or regions, Northern Ireland faces the biggest political, security and economic problems as a consequence of the UK leaving the EU.”[1]

The following text will provide some context to the whole EU-UK-Ireland-Northern Ireland entanglement that has slowed down the most recent negotiations in Brussels and the different realities that exist for each actor. At the forefront of this analysis is the growing concern regarding the continuity and survival of the peace process in Northern Ireland, which would be threatened by a hard Brexit.

Contextualising Hard Brexit: The Current Political Situation in Northern Ireland

The first thing to mention when observing the effects of Brexit from a Northern Ireland perspective is that Northern Irish society is not ‘normal’.

A still fragile peace has been maintained and supported for the past twenty years by a number of actors including the European Union, whose role in the implementation of the peace process through generous funding and programmes is widely acknowledged throughout the island of Ireland. In other words, the EU has greatly contributed towards consolidating peace in Northern Ireland, and many fear that Ulster’s departure from the Union will lead to economic, political and security vulnerabilities – hence threatening the status quo that has kept violence at bay so far. It is not surprising, then, that Northern Ireland voted by a majority of 56% to remain in the EU.

Despite its many successes, the peace process seems to be implementing conflict management and containment rather than conflict transformation and reconciliation. In other words, Northern Ireland is better than it was, but not as good as it could be. The Agreement might have put an end to large-scale/widespread violence, and led to a power-sharing government; but today Northern Irish society remains deeply divided: political parties are overwhelmingly sectarian, and a vast majority of schools, some neighbourhoods and even certain sports are segregated.

Furthermore, not all paramilitary groups have given up their weapons, and the presence of loyalist and republican armed groups is another strong indicator of the fragility of the peace process. Paramilitary groups from both sides of the conflict occasionally resurface by threatening the security services or drug dealers, or by carrying out punishment shootings and murders.

In fact, the presence of the ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) in Northern Ireland is an sign that work is still to be done in terms of overcoming the violent past. Indeed, the Red Cross “tackles humanitarian problems in Northern Ireland arising from violence and the legacy of the conflict”. While the ICRC had stopped prison visits in the region after the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, an assessment of needs in 2010 led to the conclusion that “the humanitarian situation warranted a full-time presence in the region.”

Current Political Deadlock

In addition to this ‘not quite there yet’ context, the current political situation in Northern Ireland is slowly deteriorating.

For the past few years, the political landscape has been monopolised by the two most polarised parties in the region – the nationalist and republic Sinn Féin and the unionist and loyalist Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). Both parties represent the most extreme views of their respective communities, weighing more than their more moderate counterparts – the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) respectively. But following a dispute over costs of an energy scheme orchestrated by the DUP in January 2017, Sinn Féin decided to withdraw from government, hence triggering the collapse of the power-sharing government at Stormont. New elections simply consolidated the base of both Sinn Féin and the DUP, leading to yet another political deadlock which remains to be resolved to this day. This ‘political vacuum’ demonstrates that Northern Ireland has yet to achieve complete stability and peace between its two communities.

If no agreement is reached between the two main parties in the foreseeable future, there is a real risk of seeing the return of direct rule by the UK government – which would only further deteriorate relations between the two communities and rattle the fragile peace that has been able to flourish since power-sharing. This situation also means that Northern Ireland does not currently have a unified strong voice or position with which to deal with the consequences of Brexit.

Finally, to make matters even more complicated, the formation of the current UK government may also have consequences on Northern Irish politics. In the aftermath of the May 2017 elections in the UK, the Conservative Party found itself in a delicate situation in which it would either have to call a new round of elections or form a minority government with the support of none other than the DUP. Prime Minister Theresa May opted for this second option, thus relying on ten DUP MPs to keep her in power.

The problem with this political agreement is that the United Kingdom has since the Good Friday Agreement taken a relatively neutral stance along with the Republic of Ireland when dealing with Northern Ireland. It will be very hard to carry on this way while one party to the conflict is at Westminster. Trust will be hard to gain from the nationalist/Catholic community, leading to increased complexity if the British government is to mediate any future political dispute in Northern Ireland.

How hard Brexit Will Affect Northern Ireland & Identified Threats to Peace Process

With this very specific context in mind, it is now time to take a closer look at how a hard Brexit will affect Northern Ireland and its particularities, and ultimately how leaving the EU might endanger the peace process.

Main Issue: The Border

One of the most sensitive issues for many inhabitants of Northern Ireland, but also of Ireland, is the possible reinstatement of a hard border between the two territories. Symbolically, a return to a hard border may be viewed as a leap backwards in terms of the achievements made since the peace process.

According to some commentators, such a border “would undermine […] a peace process built on cross-Border institutions and minimising the Border. Re-imposing a hard border would wreck the strategy, with only the paramilitaries benefiting.” The return of a hard border is therefore seen as adding a security threat to an already fragile region. Indeed, “the reappearance of border controls will be an enticing target for dissident republicans, either for harassment or violent assault.”[2]  There is a real risk that those groups that remain supportive of violence against the British state will gain popularity in the border regions which have particularly suffered from a hard border in the past.

There is undeniably a danger of the return of a certain form of violence if such a border was to materialise following the UK’s exit from the EU. This has led some politicians to warn the UK government that not ensuring that the border remains as it is – physically invisible – would be “reckless and dangerous.”

Requests for a Referendum on a United Ireland

Another cause for concern is that Brexit might trigger questions around the future of Northern Ireland that were agreed to be discussed only once the region had regained total peace and stability. Indeed, a referendum around the future – either to remain part of the UK or to unify with the Republic – is part of the Good Friday Agreement and was included in the Northern Ireland Act 1998. Northern Ireland, unlike the rest of the UK, has a fairly straight-forward option to avoid the negative consequences of Brexit – vote to unify with the Republic of Ireland and thus remain within the EU.

But while the referendum was only ever mentioned by nationalist/republican parties in the past, the Republic of Ireland has recently expressed interest in the idea of a unified Ireland – an unprecedented move towards nationalism since the peace process.

For the first time in decades, Irish politicians have publicly expressed their opinions about the future of Northern Ireland, such as Simon Coveney, the deputy head of the Irish government, who said that “I would like to see a united Ireland in my lifetime – if possible, in my political lifetime.” This is understandable from the Republic’s perspective – it would be much easier to have no border at all, as a return to customs and other types of tariffs on the island would have dire economic consequences for the whole island.

Unsurprisingly, the unionist community and the DUP in particular have been very critical of Ireland’s stance in the Brexit negotiations and have accused the Irish government of using Brexit in order to unify the island. For many loyalists, this would be a direct threat to their very survival as a British and Protestant cultural tradition within an overwhelmingly Irish Catholic country.

Such fear is likely to provoke very strong and even violent reactions from certain factions, therefore disrupting the peace process. Indeed, “the enduring threat of violence by loyalist paramilitaries is an implicit, if seldom acknowledged brake […]. The emotional appeal of loyalism, and the long history of violence within that tradition, will not be easily overwhelmed by arguments about trade and prosperity in a united Ireland.”[3] A group or community will do anything to ensure its survival if it feels that its very existence is at stake. In the case of a united Ireland, the threat of a return to violence within the loyalist population and paramilitary groups remains highly likely.

Therefore, while a referendum about the future of Northern Ireland is entirely legal; its consequences could be extremely dangerous for peace and stability in the island. In the current context of political instability, and many issues linked to the past conflict not yet resolved, such a vote could trigger an explosive response on the part of the loyalist/unionist population.

The Ongoing EU-UK Negotiations:  A Brief Analysis of the Main Actors

Now that the dangers inherent to a hard Brexit have been underlined in the very specific context of a ‘post-war-but-still-in-conflict’ Northern Ireland, this last section will describe the main actors of the failed and then successful EU-UK agreement of the last few days (December 2017). By doing so, it is hoped that the last few weeks of negotiations in Brussels, but also the complexities linked to Northern Ireland and its peace process, will become more comprehensible for anyone who has been baffled by these recent frictions.

UK Government: Vague and Ambiguous on Northern Ireland

While the UK government certainly has a lot to deal with regarding the implementation of Brexit and its consequences, it appears that it has not really acknowledged enough the importance of taking seriously the Northern Ireland question in future negotiations. As a signatory to the Good Friday Agreement, the UK has pledged to work towards and protect peace and stability in Ulster.

However, Northern Ireland was hardly mentioned at all during the Brexit campaign, and the UK government has too rarely underlined the importance of finding a solution that would not endanger the Northern Irish peace process. Northern Ireland will have to rely mostly – if not exclusively – on the UK government in terms of support for its various economic, social and peace-related needs. Yet it has become increasingly obvious that politicians tend to see Northern Ireland as an unwanted burden, rather than the subject of deep interest – “there is a very strange reluctance to give due attention to newsworthy Northern Ireland events in Britain.”

The current UK government finds itself in a complex situation, wanting to keep an open border between the two islands on one hand, but all the while wanting to have Northern Ireland leave the common market as the rest of the UK. There is a fear that by acknowledging that Northern Ireland should have a special status and remain within the single market, other regions or nations of the UK (Scotland or London for instance) may demand the same, hence leading to a soft Brexit and the UK remaining within the market. In other words, “hard Brexiteers always feared the Irish border might be a Trojan horse entering the citadel of their pure certitude.”

While the UK promises that there will be no hard border, it has also underlined that there will be no special status for Northern Ireland, thus “it leaves unclear how an open border will be achieved.” Furthermore, a recent revelation that members of the government believe this agreement is simply a ‘statement of intent’ – while it was assumed to be legally binding by the Irish government and the EU – does not tend to demonstrate the government’s full attention or commitment towards the peace process. It has thus been argued that “talks in Brussels are inching forward on ambiguities and vague promises.”

The Republic of Ireland’s Surge in Nationalism and Deteriorating Relations with the UK

Another actor in the EU-UK negotiations to have recently gained momentum is the Republic of Ireland, which will be deeply affected by the UK’s departure from the EU. To put it simply, “Brexit threatens Ireland’s core geopolitical and geo-economic interests.” As a result, the Irish Republic has been adamant that the UK take seriously the question of the border and trade-related issues that will have direct consequences on the internal and external functioning of the country.

The result of the UK government’s lack of concern or attention towards Ireland’s warnings has led to tense relations between the two states. Tension rose following the breakdown of the deal between the UK and EU on Monday 4^th December, as “the British government had made an agreement and was now going back on it. That this had happened was testament to the political uncertainty – chaos might be a better word – in London. That the Taoiseach told everyone about it showed everyone how much relations between Dublin and London had deteriorated.” Backed by the European Union, the Republic of Ireland has held its stance in a rare display of power towards the UK – “the Brexiteers pretended Ireland did not exist; now it has come back to haunt their grand schemes.”

Following Monday 4^th December’s turn of events, it was further mentioned that “as officials try to pick up the pieces with a deadline looming over their heads, British-Irish relations are as fraught as they have been in 30 years or more.” The uncertainty surrounding the UK’s real intentions mean that those worried about the negative effects of Brexit on Ireland and Northern Ireland cannot be promptly reassured.

EU: A Key Player in Preserving the Peace

As a major contributor towards peace and stability in Northern Ireland, it is no surprise that the EU has also underlined the importance of acknowledging Ulster’s fragile situation and the need to protect the peace process from Brexit.

The funding and support through various programmes have helped to rebuild ties between cross-border communities that had suffered from complete separation during the conflict. Its PEACE Programmes (III in 2007-2013 and IV in 2014-2020) have focused on promoting reconciliation through the promotion of shared spaces and improving cross-community relations at a local level. It has been estimated that the EU has spent around 1.5 billion euros on peace on the island of Ireland, which has also included paying for trauma counselling for over 5000 people in Northern Ireland.[4]

It is therefore clear that Northern Ireland has hugely benefited – and is still benefiting – from the EU’s financial and political support. Pulling the plug on this essential aspect of the peace process would be damaging for the region.

However, the EU might well decide to carry on its generous funding towards the peace process even once Northern Ireland is no longer within a member state – maintaining peace programmes in Northern Ireland does benefit and protect all EU citizens who reside on the island of Ireland (Irish citizens north and south of the border). As argued by one scholar, “Brussels has invested heavily, and long trumpeted, the peace process in Northern Ireland. The EU should strive to limit the negative impact of disagreements with London on that legacy. […] Continued support for Northern Ireland is in the EU’s interests – such programmes will assist European citizens and Ireland, which would suffer from any reversal of the peace process.”[5]

The EU has therefore been very supportive of the Republic of Ireland’s demands regarding the UK’s treatment of the border issue. Even before the Brexit vote, former Taoiseach Edna Kenny managed to secure an agreement with all members of the EU that would enable Northern Ireland’s automatic re-entry within the EU in the eventuality of a vote to leave the UK and unify with the Republic in a border poll.

Unionism: DUPing for Survival?

Finally, the Democratic Unionist Party is another actor in the recent EU-UK negotiations whose role needs to be explained to better understand the current situation. This last section is therefore longer than the others, in order to provide enough context and information about the DUP’s move in Brussels which is inherently linked to the Northern Ireland conflict.

The Democratic Unionist Party was founded in 1971 by Ian Paisley, who led it until 2008. It has been described as mostly populist, anti- [Irish] nationalist and opposed to the involvement of the Republic of Ireland in Northern Ireland. In the past, members of the party had been “unwilling to share executive power with non-unionist parties.”[6]

During the years of violence in Northern Ireland, some representatives of the DUP have been known to use harsh and provocative language, bordering on sectarian and hateful – that enflamed further the conflict between the Catholic and Protestant communities. For instance, Councillor Charles Poots was cited as declaring in 1975 “if I was in control of this country it would not be in the same state as it is now. I would cut off all supplies including water and electricity to Catholic areas. And I would stop Catholics from getting social security. It is the only way to deal with enemies of the state and to stamp out the present troubles.”[7] Ian Paisley was also well known for his uncompromising speech, to say the least. Talking about Catholics at a loyalist rally in 1969, he claimed “they breed like rabbits and multiply like vermin.”

The DUP had always been against Irish nationalist parties entering any kind of government in Northern Ireland, especially Sinn Féin with its ties to the Irish Republic Army. Yet allegations have also been made of collusion between this unionist party and loyalist paramilitary groups responsible for numerous sectarian murders during the Troubles. It has been reported that “the terrorist group Ulster Resistance was founded by a collection of people who went on to be prominent DUP politicians.” As recently as the last elections in May 2017, several loyalist paramilitary groups publicly encouraged voters to elect DUP candidates, leading one commentator to argue that “the DUP’s past flirtations with loyalist paramilitary groups will continue to haunt the party’s public image […].”

What unionists fear the most is the disengagement of the United Kingdom in favour of an increased intervention of the Republic in Northern Ireland’s affairs – hence a real threat of a reunification of Ireland and transforming the unionist majority in Northern Ireland into a minority within an overwhelmingly Catholic country. This deep seated fear was most famously expressed by Ian Paisley, who clamoured on several occasion “No surrender. We will never bend the knee.” The use of this term demonstrates a feeling of alienation in a Northern Ireland where the presence and rights of the Catholic community are increasingly recognised. By proclaiming “No surrender”, Ian Paisley and the DUP were reminding the UK, the Republic of Ireland and the nationalist Catholic community that they still existed and would use whatever means to not disappear.

But the DUP ended up being at the heart of peace talks, eventually sharing power with nationalist Sinn Féin in a devolved Northern Irish Assembly in 2007. In his inaugural speech as First Minister in 2007, Ian Paisley’s language could not have been more different than in the 1960s and 1970s – “I believe that Northern Ireland has come to a time of peace, a time when hate will no longer rule. How good it will be to be part of a wonderful healing in our province.” The party has therefore come a long way in terms of its views on how to engage with the nationalist community; yet it is nevertheless still described as being “tied to an unswerving commitment to an ethnically defined conception of territorial sovereignty.”[8]

With this very brief history of the DUP and its strong attachment to Britain explained, last week’s negotiation breakdown becomes clearer. On Monday 4^th December 2017, the UK and EU were on the verge of signing off the first of a series of agreements leading to the UK’s effective exit from the Union when the deal was suddenly and abruptly called off, following a phone call between Theresa May and DUP leader Arlene Foster. One of the major aspects of this first deal was the Northern Ireland issue and the promise that the UK would under no circumstances re-establish a hard, physical border between the two parts of Ireland once it left the single market.

The reason for the DUP’s rejection of the agreement – while it was accepted by the Republic of Ireland (very keen to get this no hard border promise) – was that the UK conceded that Northern Ireland might be treated as a ‘special case’, keeping stronger links with the EU than the rest of the UK. The DUP has always called for Northern Ireland to be treated exactly the same way as all other parts of Britain, as it fears differential treatment means less British influence in Northern Ireland in favour of more Irish intervention. Arlene Foster had declared that “there will be no so-called ‘special status’ for Northern Ireland as demanded by Sinn Féin”, thus demonstrating yet again political divisions between the main parties in Northern Ireland.

A new compromise was reached on Friday 8^th December, which was accepted by the DUP that was reassured on the absence of a ‘special status’ for the region. In fact, the UK has surprisingly agreed that “in the absence of agreed solutions, the United Kingdom will maintain full alignment with those rules of the Internal Market and the Customs Union which, now or in the future, support North-South cooperation, the all island economy and the protection of the 1998 Agreement (Article 50 of the agreement).” According to one commentator, “like the 1998 Good Friday Agreement and the 2006 St Andrews’s Agreement there is enough play in the wording to allow both sides in the North claim wins. That risks future rows.” But at least it keeps everyone happy for now.

Therefore, far from acting erratically, the DUP’s moves with regard to Brexit are relatively straightforward for a party that is afraid of being abandoned by the rest of the UK. They used their new found power in propping up the UK government to put forward their stance that Northern Ireland should in no circumstance be treated differently from the rest of the UK. In other words, “the whole point of the DUP is to safeguard Northern Ireland’s position within the UK”, and that it exactly why they acted the way they did last week in Brussels.

Conclusion

This text has therefore attempted to explain the tensions that have risen between different actors during the most recent round of Brexit negotiations in Brussels, in light of Northern Ireland’s particularities.

To conclude, then, tension and emotions rose around the possibility of the return of a hard border on the island of Ireland because the conflict in Northern Ireland is not entirely resolved. As the peace process is still ongoing, there remains a danger – however slight – of the return to a certain form of violence if the process is destabilised or weakened. A hard border is understood by many, including the EU and the Republic of Ireland, as potentially destabilising and weakening the Northern Irish peace process.

But by promising that a hard border will not return, the UK has put itself in a complex situation where it has to either treat Northern Ireland differently from the rest of Britain, or opt for a soft Brexit. As the British government has promised a hard Brexit, this would mean a special status for Northern Ireland. But this has been rejected by the DUP, fearing that being treated differently will draw Northern Ireland closer the Republic and even a unification of the island. The UK has ended up promising no hard border but also no special status for Northern Ireland; which means that the only option left is a soft Brexit – that until very recently did not seem to be an option at all.

The vagueness and ambiguities of the UK’s language in its agreements is fairly unreadable, and is not likely to reassure those who see a potential threat to peace in Northern Ireland. A mix of frustration, resentment and fear in communities on both sides of the Northern Irish divide is a dangerous combination; especially in a region that has not yet achieved a full transformation from conflict to peace. From a peace-process point of view, the best outcome of Brexit would be to disappoint the hard-line Brexiteers by securing an economic alignment between the UK and EU – hence a soft Brexit that goes against the government’s promises. This would likely cause political instability in the UK, but the possible collapse of the UK government is a far more preferable outcome to the collapse of the peace process in Northern Ireland.

 

[1] Burke, E. (2017). Ulster’s fight, Ulster’s rights? Brexit, Northern Ireland and the threat to British-Irish relations. Centre for European Reform, p. 2

[2] Burke, E. (2017). Ulster’s fight, Ulster’s rights? Brexit, Northern Ireland and the threat to British-Irish relations. Centre for European Reform, p. 5

[3] Burke, E. (2017). Ulster’s fight, Ulster’s rights? Brexit, Northern Ireland and the threat to British-Irish relations. Centre for European Reform, p. 5

[4] Burke, E. (2017). Ulster’s fight, Ulster’s rights? Brexit, Northern Ireland and the threat to British-Irish relations. Centre for European Reform, p. 6

[5] Burke, E. (2017). Ulster’s fight, Ulster’s rights? Brexit, Northern Ireland and the threat to British-Irish relations. Centre for European Reform, p. 10

[6] Darby, J. (1997). Scorpions in a Bottle: Conflicting Cultures in Northern Ireland. Minority Rights Publications. London: Minority Rights Group, p. 68

[7] O’Dowd, L., Rolston, B., and Tomlinson, M. (1980). Northern Ireland: Between civil rights and civil war. CSE Books, p. 168

[8] Shirlow, P. and Murtagh, B. (2006). Belfast: Segregation, Violence and the City. London; Ann Arbor, p. 46