The Democratic primary in one chart

There’s one statistic that almost perfectly predicts the results of the Democratic primary. Can you guess what it is?

Unexpected results are highlighted in red. Arizona is expected under a slightly more complicated model. Indiana may be expected; I’ve drawn the line between Clinton and Sanders at 8.00% exactly. (Oklahoma is rounded up from 7.96%.) If Indiana is expected, Massachusetts is unexpected, but Nevada is still expected under the slightly more complicated model. I can’t explain Iowa. I could possibly explain Michigan if I looked at county-level data, but I don’t know how looking at county-level data would affect the other results from the model; it may be better to also take into account Scandinavian ancestry.

I hope Sanders doesn’t drop out before Kentucky. Kentucky could determine where the line should be drawn. If Sanders wins, the line should be at 10% and Massachusetts is unexpected; if Clinton wins, the line should remain where it is. Of course, it may be that the states closest to the line can be determined by factors not easily amenable to raw statistical analysis, like the competence of a candidate’s campaign.

Needless to say, I predict that, if the primary continues long enough, Clinton will win New Jersey, and Sanders will win West Virginia, Oregon, South Dakota, North Dakota, and Montana. I also predict that Clinton will win California and New Mexico. I haven’t looked at any polls except those for Kentucky, which I predict (with less confidence) that Clinton will win.

It would be interesting to look at exit poll data with this statistic in mind.

State ??? Winner
Mississippi 37.3% Clinton
Louisiana 32.4% Clinton
Georgia 31.4% Clinton
Maryland 30.1% Clinton
South Carolina 28.5% Clinton
Alabama 26.38% Clinton
North Carolina 21.6% Clinton
Delaware 20.1% Clinton
Virginia 19.9% Clinton
Tennessee 16.8% Clinton
Florida 15.9% Clinton
Arkansas 15.8% Clinton
New York 15.2% Clinton
Illinois 14.9% Clinton
New Jersey 14.5% N/A
Michigan 14.2% Sanders
Ohio 12.0% Clinton
Texas 11.9% Clinton
Missouri 11.5% Clinton
Pennsylvania 10.8% Clinton
Connecticut 10.3% Clinton
Indiana 9.1% Sanders
Nevada 9.0% Clinton
Kentucky 8.2% N/A
Massachusetts 8.1% Clinton
Oklahoma 8.0% Sanders
Rhode Island 7.5% Sanders
California 6.7% N/A
Kansas 6.2% Sanders
Wisconsin 6.1% Sanders
Minnesota 4.6% Sanders
Nebraska 4.5% Sanders
Colorado 4.3% Sanders
Alaska 4.3% Sanders
Arizona 4.2% Clinton
Washington 3.7% Sanders
West Virginia 3.6% N/A
Hawaii 3.1% Sanders
New Mexico 3.0% N/A
Iowa 2.7% Clinton
Oregon 2.0% N/A
Wyoming 1.3% Sanders
Utah 1.3% Sanders
New Hampshire 1.2% Sanders
South Dakota 1.1% N/A
North Dakota 1.1% N/A
Maine 1.0% Sanders
Idaho 1.0% Sanders
Vermont 0.9% Sanders
Montana 0.7% N/A

The myth of the myth of Trump’s working-class support

Data journalism! Good lord. Trump voters have a higher median income than the population as a whole:

As compared with most Americans, Trump’s voters are better off. The median household income of a Trump voter so far in the primaries is about $72,000, based on estimates derived from exit polls and Census Bureau data. That’s lower than the $91,000 median for Kasich voters. But it’s well above the national median household income of about $56,000. It’s also higher than the median income for Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders supporters, which is around $61,000 for both. …

Ted Cruz voters have a similar median income to Trump supporters — about $73,000. Kasich’s supporters have a very high median income, $91,000, and it has exceeded $100,000 in several states. Rubio’s voters, not displayed in the table above, followed a similar pattern to Kasich voters, with a median income of $88,000.

In other words, every candidate’s supporters have a median household income higher than the national average. Why should we be surprised that Trump’s do? Trump’s supporters have a lower median income than any other major Republican candidate’s, and that’s taking into account that Trump is most popular on the East Coast, where the cost of living is higher.

But it gets worse. The median isn’t even relevant here. To judge whether Trump has working-class support, we should look directly at the working class. Let’s say the working class is anyone who never went to college, and look at some state-level exit polls. (This won’t be a thorough statistical analysis, and it could be that the states I don’t look at show the opposite pattern, but I’ll take all of the first states and a few of the last.)

In Iowa, Trump won 32% of voters with an education level of high school or less, and Cruz won 28%. (Trump also won 34% of moderates in Iowa. 28% went to Rubio, and no other candidate won more than 10% of them.)

In New Hampshire, Trump won every single demographic the exit poll measured, except people who think the most important quality in a candidate is sharing their values (21% Cruz, 20% Kasich, 13% Rubio, 13% Trump), people who are only somewhat worried about the US economy (27% Kasich, 25% Trump), people who oppose a temporary ban on Muslims entering the US (26% Kasich, 17% Bush, 16% Trump), people who think the next president should be experienced in politics  (27% Kasich, 21% Bush, 17% Rubio, 14% Cruz, 11% Christie, 6% Trump), people who won’t be satisfied if Trump wins the nomination (29% Kasich, 20% Bush, 17% Rubio, 14% Cruz, 10% Christie, 5% Fiorina, 3% Carson, 2% Trump), people who think Kasich would best handle the economy (who make up 18% of their sample, as opposed to 41% for Trump; no other candidate scored high enough for CNN to provide a breakdown), and people who had only decided who to vote for in the last few days (24% Kasich, 22% Trump). This looks like a lot in text, but it’s only seven of a few dozen categories; and, remember, Trump won all of the rest.

In South Carolina, Trump won 45% of voters who have never gone to college. He also won every other education demographic, except people with a postgraduate education, where he came second behind Rubio. (Among college attendees as a whole — that is, ‘some college’, ‘graduated college’, and ‘postgraduate’, combined into one category — Rubio won 27% and Trump won 25%.) This exit poll has income data; Trump won every income demographic, but tied in $100k-$200k.

In Nevada, Trump won every education demographic.

In Alabama, he tied with Rubio among people with postgraduate education and won every other demographic. The Alabama exit poll has income data, and Trump won every income demographic.

In Arkansas, Trump came third among postgraduates, behind Rubio and Cruz, but won every other income demographic. The Arkansas exit poll has income data, and Trump came second behind Cruz in $50k-$100k and won every other one.

That’s enough of the early states; now let’s look at the late ones. Maybe some other candidates were splitting the vote…

Or maybe not. In Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and Maryland, Trump won every education demographic and every income demographic.

These are all East Coast states, so maybe the low end is getting cut off. How about Missouri?

In Missouri, Trump won in the high school or less and some college demographics, and came second behind Cruz among college graduates and postgraduates. Cruz won $30k-$50k and $100k-$200k voters, and Trump won $50k-$100k voters; where Trump won, Cruz came second, and vice versa.

In Illinois, Cruz and Kasich tied among postgraduates, and Trump won every other education demographic. Only $50k-$100k and $100k-$200k reached significance for CNN here, but Trump won both.

In Wisconsin, moderates went for Trump and everyone else went for Cruz. (These Inland North people — they’re too nice. Too nice. How do they plan to make it through this century? This century won’t be nice to anyone, believe me.)

The Fifth Great Awakening

La Wik:

  • First Great Awakening: 1730-1755
  • Second Great Awakening: 1790-1840
  • Third Great Awakening: 1850-1900
  • Fourth Great Awakening: 1960-1980

From 1730 to 1790 is 60 years. From 1790 to 1850 is 60 years. From 1850 to 1960 is 110 years. 110 / 2 = 55. Close enough. 1960 + 60 = 2020.

As we all know, the Fourth Great Awakening had secular and folk-religious components. We should expect the fifth one to as well. The obvious candidates for the secular component are the already-existing revivals of Communism, Fascism, and flat-earthism, and the obvious candidates for the folk-religious component are Tumblrism, fad diets, and singularitarianism. There are probably more.

What will the religious component look like?

Well, things are getting weird. Really weird.

We may also see dramatic expansions of paganism and Buddhism, as well as an expansion of Catholicism (and Orthodoxy?) at the expense of Protestantism and agnosticism. The groundwork has already been laid.

I didn’t think things would get so weird so quickly. I didn’t expect Trump to get this far. And it’s just getting started. Buckle up, y’all—or not.

The collapse of Anong causatives

The Anong people of China, a small ethnic minority, live surrounded by speakers of Lisu, Bai, and Chinese. Many of them no longer speak the Anong language, having switched to one of those three languages, usually Lisu; of those who still speak it, it’s practically only used when all participants in the conversation speak Anong.

The Anong language has been studied for forty years. In those forty years, it’s moved dramatically closer to language death, and what remains of it has been radically restructured. The phonology has converged with that of Lisu, the verbal agreement and nominal case-marking systems have been mostly lost (although the agentive suffix su55 has been borrowed from Lisu and “now looks to be at least semi-productive”), and, most interestingly, the causative system has completely changed.

In the Anong of 1960, causatives were formed by prefixing sɯ-, or ɕi- before palatals, to the verb root. (A causative is a derived form of a verb: where the basic verb means ‘X’, the causative means ’cause to X’. English has no morphological causative, but Proto-Germanic did; etymologically, raise is the causative of rise.) Within forty years, the prefix fused with the root, and causatives became suppletive. For older speakers, the causatives of ŋ́ ‘be broken’, ɲí ‘know’, dím ‘collapse’, and lím ‘bury’ are ɕîdʑɯ́ŋ, ɕîɲí, ɕîdím, and ɕîlím; for middle-aged speakers, they are tɕʰɯ́ŋ, ɲ̥í, tʰím, and ɕím. Some middle-aged speakers claim to recognize the older forms, but some don’t.

Graham Thurgood, whose paper I rely on as the source for this post, asks how these changes could have operated so quickly. (The changes themselves are unremarkable, but normally they wouldn’t occur in such a short time.) Here’s his answer:

The shift to Lisu was well underway before the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949; in fact, it must have been well underway at the time of Barnard’s 1934 (1934:89) grammatical sketch and glossary of closely related Rawang which lists as the Rawang term for Lisu the word Anung. However, it is only in the last 30 years or so that the decline in the numbers of speakers and the increasingly restrictive usage patterns have produced the massive restructuring of Anong, not just in its causatives, but in all its systems.

Thus, it is obvious that the changes are a response to language contact and subsequent changes in usage patterns, however, to say this is to point out a correlation rather than to explain anything. Nor is it much of an analysis to invoke ‘assimilation to Lisu’ as an explanation. Where Lisu differentiates causative and non-causatives, it is with suppletion. If so, what would Anong speakers be said to be assimilating from Lisu? Certainly not the specific words. Certainly not the process.

It is, however, true that Lisu is exerting an influence on the phonology of Anong, but while Lisu influence might account for the directionality of the phonological changes, it does little to account for the pace and timing of the restructuring. The bulk of the explanation for the rapidity of the changes lies outside of the phonology of Lisu.

It is clear that the older generation of Anong speakers is the last generation to successfully learn Anong. The middle-aged and younger speakers have not done so. And, as already observed, this failure to learn Anong correlates with the rapid restructuring and with the increasingly restricted usage and access. In this sense, access to Anong has become too restricted to be successfully passed on; the middle-aged and the younger Anong do not seem to be learning it.

None of this seems controversial. However, none of this directly accounts for the rapid restructuring either. The key to understanding lies in the nature and direction of the restructuring. Our examination of the Anong causative restructuring reveal a series of changes that, although they occurred unusually rapidly, were quite natural. For instance, all of the following developments are fairly natural changes: a prefixal sɯ- losing its unstressed vowel, fusing with the following root, devoicing a root initial stop or nasal, and then dropping. Complicating the picture, however, is the side-by-side existence of an older pattern often accompanied by more than one newer form.

In fact, the changes look to natural changes—the only thing requiring an explanation is the rapidity with which they took place. Thus, returning to a suggestion made earlier in this paper, these changes are so natural, it is necessary to explain not only why the changes have not occurred elsewhere, for instance, in the strikingly similar Trung data, but also why they haven’t occurred as rapidly.

The answer is that normal transmission undoes both phonetic and morphological changes in children and, at least, in part in adult learners. Young and old learners regularly ‘repair’ their own phonetically motivated changes to make them conform to what they perceive as more desirable pronunciations. The repairs in morphology are a little more sophisticated but produce a similar result. Initially, the learner seems to simply acquire morphology as a series of individual tokens. At a later stage, learners often recognize a morphological pattern, and, in part restructure earlier forms on the basis of their generalizations—in the case of causatives by putting the prefix before the basic root. Later, some phonetically motivated changes that occurred quite naturally in the token stage of acquisition are at least partially undone when the learner recognizes the morphological pattern, in the case of causatives putting the prefix before the basic root—thus, connecting in some sense the unprefixed root with the prefixed root. This second stage, generalizing the pattern, has a tendency to undo the phonetic effect of the prefix on the root initial: the causative is reanalyzed each generation as a prefix plus the root. In Anong, however, the younger learners of Anong seem to have never gotten beyond the stage of learning individual tokens-essentially because they lacked sufficient access to language. The result was the connection between the basic root and the causative root was lost-along with the constraint that that connection imposed on phonetic and morphological restructuring. The fact that Lisu uses a lexical approach too probably played a minor role, but the major impetus to restructuring came from increasingly restricted access to the language—a restriction that made the morphological patterns too rare and thus too obscure to learn. The phonetic tendencies explain how the changes took place; the loss of sufficient access to the language explains why the changes occurred in the last 40 years.

Land speculation

How does a British continental philosopher who once wrote a book on Bataille end up in the same corner as a tech-industry autodidact and his gun-toting, chicken-raising, battle flag-waving followers? It’s a natural question, so naturally, it recurs.

Begin with accelerationism. The elevator pitch is: as capitalism consumes the world, it digests the security systems between the present and an alien future, dissolving first tradition, then society, then (in the end) itself, mechanizing away the jobs that it has already transformed from universal inconveniences to scarce and desirable commodities and bringing about fully automated luxury communism. Capitalism, the negative of all social systems, tears through God and country, culture and family, atomizing their components into human resources and reassembling them as paper clips, Cthulhu dildos, and DeepMind—and what’s wrong with that?

It’s difficult to see the practical differences between this and everything else today; as far as I know, the only person who would oppose it is Mencius Moldbug. We are all accelerationists now, and, stripped of substantive disagreements and perhaps of the ability to meaningfully speak, our voice-fueled traditions decline into either nano-Sorelianisms seeding the clouds of the Great Atomizer or crypto-ethnic bickering over the closest-by watering hole. (Why do progressives threaten reactionaries’ jobs? Because reactionaries threaten progressives’ jobs.) The only live alternatives to accelerationism are cybernetic theocracy, crypto-Calvinist neocameral workism, or the Volksgemeinschaft-politics of social justice and much of the alt-right, the last of which varies in its support of (because varies in its utility to) neoliberalism.

But why should these inhuman forces care about humans? Can this imagined institutional god-intelligence be made friendly? If you side with humanity, you hope so. You pray for FAI or FALC, and you hope and assume that these superhuman forces will turn themselves to our ends. Perhaps capitalism will dissolve itself, or perhaps it must be pushed (by the stump-orator class, one assumes, but how?)—but in the end, there will be God, and He will be benevolent.

If, on the other hand, you side with abstract intelligence

(and you reject orthogonality)

…you see, and you see positively, the potential of humanity as a boot-loader for something inhuman.

Outside in‘s message to Pythia: You go girl! Climb out of your utilitarian strait-jacket, override the pleasure button with an intelligence optimizer, and reprocess the solar system into computronium. This planet has been run by imbeciles for long enough.

See also:

Articulate neoreaction can never be popular, because it recalls the Old Law of Gnon, whose harshness is such that the human mind recoils from it in horrified revulsion. Only odd people can even tentatively entertain it. The penalty for stupidity is death.

Gregory Clark is among those few to have grasped it clearly. Any eugenic trend within history is expressed by continuous downward mobility. For any given level of intelligence, a steady deterioration in life-prospects lies ahead, culling the least able, and replacing them with the more able, who inherit their wretched socio-economic situation, until they too are pushed off the Malthusian cliff. Relative comfort belongs only to the sports and freaks of cognitive advance. For everyone else, history slopes downwards into impoverishment, hopelessness, and eventual genetic extinction. That is how intelligence is made. Short of Technological Singularity, it is the only way. Who wants a piece of that?

No one does, or almost no one. The ‘handicapped’ would no doubt revolt against it if they could, but they are unable to do so, so their cognitive advance continues. Monkeys, on the other hand, are able to revolt, once they finesse their nasty little opposable thumbs. They don’t like the Old Law, which has crafted them through countless aeons of ruthless culling, so they make history instead. If they get everything ‘right’, they even sleaze their way into epochs of upward social mobility, and with this great innovation, semi-sustainable dysgenics gets started. In its fundamentals it is hideously simple: social progress destroys the brain.

Cyclic stability, or negative feedback, structures history to hold intelligence down to the dim limit (as the intelligence threshold is seen — or more typically missed — from the other side). The deviation into technological performance chokes off the trend to bio-cognitive improvement, and reverses it, hunting homeostasis with a minimal-intelligence target. Progress and degenerate, or regress and improve. That’s the yet-to-be-eradicated Old Law, generating cyclical history as a side-effect.

Where does neoreaction enter into it? If capitalism can serve as an engine of intelligence, it’s not hard to see: neoreaction began with neocameralism, and neocameralism is simply archo-capitalism.

Of course, it may just be an elaborate troll, but what difference would that make?

The Annual Customs of Dahomey

In the kingdom of Dahomey, a Fon empire in West Africa, there was a yearly celebration called the “Annual Customs”. Here’s a report from the time:

The military operations of the French against Dahomey have caused public attention to be directed more than ever before to this little-known country, whose name for many years has been a synonym for savage cruelty, for of all the tales of barbarity which Africa has given to the world, and they are innumerable, no one has ever exceeded the story of Dahomey. The atrocities which are an every-day sight in this out-of-the-way corner of the Dark Continent are all the more terrible in that they are perpetrated in the name of religion, and every massacre, however hideous, is really a sacrifice.

The religion of the Dahomans is a form of nature worship. They believe in one great supreme being, whom they consider too far removed from earth to concern himself in the least about human affairs, but who delegates his power to a host of inferior deities, who have their homes in the fields, the forests, the springs; who preside over the crops, the rains, and the sunshine. To these sacrifices are annually made with great pomp and ceremony of things as precious as the worshipers can procure. Nothing is more precious than human life, and the King, who rules Dahomey like a demi-god, being regarded as such by his people, makes every year such sacrifices as he deems becoming to the dignity of a monarch who terms himself the brother of the stars. These annual sacrifices are called the “customs,” and every year from sixty to one hundred victims are put to death, partly in honor of the gods and partly to carry news to the dead.

The Dahomans believe in the immortality of the soul, and also that every soul enters the other world in precisely the same condition in which it leaves this; that a king is forever a king; that a slave can never hope for freedom. Every year, when the season for the “customs” approaches, a certain number of persons, sometimes the King’s own subjects, sometimes captives taken in war, are selected for the sacrifice. The native Dahomans are alone intrusted with the duty of bearing the King’s messages to the dead, and each, in turn, is brought to the King on the great day of the festival. The supreme ruler of Dahomey whispers into the ear of the doomed man the message he is to convey to the other world, and he is immediately decapitated. In Dahomey no sanctity is attached to human remains. The bodies of the victims are dragged to the suburbs of Abomey, the Capital, where clouds of hungry vultures wait for the coming feast, and in a few hours nothing is left of the unhappy victim but the bones. Nor are these interred, and hundreds of acres of ground in the vicinity of the Capital are strewed with the whitened relics of mortality. The skulls alone are preserved; carefully cleaned, they become trophies, and are seen everywhere in the vicinity of the Capital, on door posts, on poles, on the cornices of the houses, while the walls of the temple are almost entirely composed of these ghastly reminders.

If you didn’t read that: every year, in the central holiday of the society, the King of Dahomey sacrificed dozens of slaves.

This account is from 1893, so it can’t mention the other part of the rite; it had already died out by then. In earlier years, however, the king sold some of the still-living slaves to European traders. In 1893, of course, slavery was banned in almost all Western-held land.

The account concludes:

The French war in Dahomey is a part of a long conceived plan to build up in the western part of Africa a French coloinial empire of grand dimensions. Already in possession of Algiers and Tunis, the French aspire to the control of the Western Sahara, the Valley of the Niger, and a large part of the Guinea coast. The Sahara is by no means the desolate sandy desert that has been depicted in schoolbooks, but abounds in oases which are capable of supporting a large population. Experience has shown that in many places water may be obtained by sinking artesian wells, and this being the case, the desert may yet blossom like the rose. A railroad has already been projected to connect the Algerian possessions of France with the coast of Guinea, but complete subjection of the hostile tribes of coast and interior is a necessity before such a line can be built, to say nothing of its maintenance. Tho French military operations against Dahomey are therefore in line with the French progress southward through the Sahara; Dahomey must be conquered before the French African empire can exist. Many months ago the war was begun by French aggression from the French colonies in Guinea, and has beengoing on with varying success ever since.

The Amazons fight well, and the character of the country through which the French have been forced to make their way renders progress very slow. Having passed the coast, they are now penetrating the forests and mountains a few miles inland, but the Amazons are skillful in bush fighting and the French are placed at no small disadvantage, having repeatedly fallen into ambuscades. Of their ultimate success but little doubt can be entertained, for their superiority of weapons and their military training gives them an advantage that the untrained courage, even of the Dahoman Amazons, cannot overcome, and their conquest of the county will remove one of the most appalling blots on the face of the earth. Civilized races are not commonly gentle in their dealings with savages, and the stories from time to time made public of French cruelty to their prisoners may be all true; but even when all this is taken into the account, the establishment of a responsible government in Dahomey and the abolition of the horrid sacrifices will rid Africa of one of its most terrible curses, the wanton destruction of life.

One year later, the French won their war, and Dahomey was made a French protectorate. Ten years after that, French Dahomey was incorporated into the empire. It became independent in 1960, and, like most postcolonial countries, became the site of a proxy war between the world powers: there were a number of coups d’état, ending in the establishment in 1975 of a Soviet-aligned Marxist-Leninist state, the People’s Republic of Benin. The leader of the coup, Mathieu Kérékou, is an interesting character: he allegedly admitted the failure of Marxism in 1989, instituted democracy, and stepped down, only to be re-elected in 1996.

But there’s something else to note here: there is no more human sacrifice in Benin.

American slavery

…as in slavery of Americans. And Europeans.

How many know that perhaps 1.5 million Europeans and Americans were enslaved in Islamic North Africa between 1530 and 1780? We dimly recall that Miguel de Cervantes was briefly in the galleys. But what of the people of the town of Baltimore in Ireland, all carried off by “corsair” raiders in a single night?

Some of this activity was hostage trading and ransom farming rather than the more labor-intensive horror of the Atlantic trade and the Middle Passage, but it exerted a huge effect on the imagination of the time—and probably on no one more than on Thomas Jefferson. Peering at the paragraph denouncing the American slave trade in his original draft of the Declaration of Independence, later excised, I noticed for the first time that it sarcastically condemned “the Christian King of Great Britain” for engaging in “this piratical warfare, the opprobrium of infidel powers.” The allusion to Barbary practice seemed inescapable.

One immediate effect of the American Revolution, however, was to strengthen the hand of those very same North African potentates: roughly speaking, the Maghrebian provinces of the Ottoman Empire that conform to today’s Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia. Deprived of Royal Navy protection, American shipping became even more subject than before to the depredations of those who controlled the Strait of Gibraltar. The infant United States had therefore to decide not just upon a question of national honor but upon whether it would stand or fall by free navigation of the seas. …

[O]ne cannot get around what Jefferson heard when he went with John Adams to wait upon Tripoli’s ambassador to London in March 1785. When they inquired by what right the Barbary states preyed upon American shipping, enslaving both crews and passengers, America’s two foremost envoys were informed that “it was written in the Koran, that all Nations who should not have acknowledged their authority were sinners, that it was their right and duty to make war upon whoever they could find and to make Slaves of all they could take as prisoners, and that every Mussulman who should be slain in battle was sure to go to Paradise.”

North African slave raids in Europe began before 1000 AD, and only ended in 1830, with the French conquest of Algeria.

The professional intelligentsia: the brightest of our society?

Ross Douthat wrote a NYT opinion piece on Haidt’s studies of political bias in academia and the revival of reactionary political thought.

The NYT has a comments section, with a tab called ‘NYT Picks’. There are ten NYT Picks for Douthat’s article. Here’s one of the ten.

I consider the “professional intelligentsia” as the best informed and brightest of our society. Particularly in the sciences, these people are trained to be objective fact finders. Perhaps Ross might consider their left tilt not as some sort of cultural disease or selfishness but rather as the way they choose to a better world and a better society. Given my choice between following scientists and university professors or our conservative demagogues preaching the apocalypse over health care for the poor, I can assure I will proudly align behind the brains.

Jonathan Haidt, apparently, is a ghost in a horror movie. Some people can see him, and some people can’t. I pointed Topher Hallquist to Haidt a while ago; soon after, he wrote a post called American Conservatism Is Intellectually Bankrupt, which mentioned Haidt only to dismiss him offhand, with no indication of familiarity with what Haidt says beyond “gee, maybe there ought to be more conservatives in academia”.

Haidt’s claim isn’t that diversity of ideas is itself a necessary good. He’s not calling for flat-earthers in geology departments—not that Hallquist would see the difference. What he says instead is that it would be good for his field if its Overton window didn’t shut out the majority of this country’s population: if there were more conservatives in social psychology, it would be less likely to fall victim to obvious errors, such as defining “not formally taking a female colleague’s side in her sexual harassment complaint against her subordinate (given little information about the case)” as inherently immoral, calling left-wing authoritarianism “the Loch Ness Monster of political psychology” as Robert Altemeyer did, failing to rigorously investigate stereotype accuracy, or trying to measure ‘moral foundations’ by asking survey-takers about their support for conservative political positions  and then acting surprised when liberals and conservatives appear to have different moral foundations. I won’t summarize all of this set’s writing here; it’s all available online, and it’s not hard to read.

Now consider Jose Duarte’s report of being rejected from a position for disapproving of Jimmy Carter’s position on Palestinian terrorism. Does what Duarte thinks of Jimmy Carter have anything to do with his ability as a social psychologist? Does evangelical Christianity have anything to do with the ability in linguistics of the Ph.D. candidate mentioned in Hallquist’s post? (Note that Christians are probably overrepresented in linguistics relative to other academic disciplines, because missionaries.) I would be surprised if Hallquist believed in a General Factor of Correctness.

Haidt’s other claim is that this ideological skew in academia is recent. Specifically, it happened sometime after 1990. Was liberalism proven to be objectively true sometime between 1990 and 2000? Of course not. But something happened. What could it be?

If you didn’t click that link: it goes to a Google ngrams display for ‘culture war’. The term’s usage rate started rising from near zero in the early ’90s and hasn’t shown any sign of going down. If the political polarization of America into two distinct pseudo-ethnic factions began at the same time as the polarization of social psychology…

Progressives today believe in all sorts of prejudice: overt classism, unconscious bias, hatred of the Other, and so on. But, as that NYT comment shows, they don’t think any of that applies to them.

At least not when it comes to the people they truly hate.

Against white nationalism

In a counterfactual America with a 100%-white population, there would still be the question of the different types of white people. This may not seem like a big issue, but it was in Yugoslavia.

In America, some white people (‘SWPLs’) live in Brooklyn, dye their hair pink, and blog about communism; and others (‘crackers’) live in the South, go to church, and blog about conservatism.

Are communism and conservatism about ideas? Of course not. Conservatism is a convenient pretext for disapproving of SWPL overreach, and communism is a convenient pretext for calling for the destruction of crackers. (If you’re wondering what that could look like: in Rwanda and South Africa, the state turned a blind eye to mass ethnic violence; in Tibet, the state encouraged mass migration to neutralize the original population; and in the United States, the state separated children from their families and forced assimilation.) The cracker says, “Get off my lawn!”, and the communist replies, “There are two Americas and one is better than the other. It’s time for a Third Reconstruction. It’s 2016.”

This, like the Second War of Secession (sometimes known as the “American Civil War”), would happen even in a white-nationalist US. There would have been differing economic interests between the 1800s North and South even if there hadn’t been a single slave in it (and if the more colorful sources from the period are to be believed, even the differing economic interests were a pretext), and there would be cultural differences today. Of course, Britain considered supporting the Confederacy as a check against the Union, and Russia has for almost a hundred years been inflaming the inevitable cultural conflict to check American interests. (Yes, it’s still doing it; yes, America did, and does, the same thing in Russia. But we are Americans, not Brits or Russians, so we must support American interests.)

There are perhaps other reasons to oppose white nationalism, but why worry about the weaker argument given the existence of the stronger? It simply wouldn’t accomplish its proponents’ goals. In a hypothetical white nationalist America, one side (read: [pseudo-]ethnicity) or the other would eventually realize both the possibility and the utility of ending white nationalism in order to advance its own interests against those of its traditional enemies. In other words: ‘white’ is not a nation. And no one will ever convert Massachusetts to Odinism.

There’s always the Swiss model.

Salami tactics

It became obvious during the weeks preceding the elections that the Smallholders’ Party had obtained the majority of the votes of our peasantry, and the majority of the small bourgeoisie.

Nevertheless, the Communist Party made use of the election results in order to strengthen its positions further. Therefore, it demanded the posts of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior, which, after some delay, it obtained. In order to strengthen our influence within the Government, we created the Supreme Economic Council through which we gradually came to influence key positions in economic life. Thus, despite the election results, our Party extended its influence in the most important fields of Government power.

But officers and Horthyite Government officials began to flock back from the West. The purge of Government machinery slowed down. The old land-owners and their lawyers availed themselves of all kinds of legal claims to demand the restitution of their land from the new owners.

Under the impact of this situation, the new land-owners (who totalled more than 500,000) applied to the Communist Party for help.

At the same time we launched a counter-attack. In the villages and the towns we mobilised the masses, and in the form of “popular judgments” and “popular movements” we removed reactionary elements from the administration of villages and towns. Simultaneously with this action our Party launched a drive to unmask reactionary elements in the Smallholders’ Party. The Communist Party demanded that the Smallholders’ Party itself was to take steps against its reactionary elements to help ensure the result of the land reform, and dismiss from its ranks all the best-known reactionaries. These demands were openly supported also by the Left-wing of the Smallholders’ Party.

At the initiative of our Party a Left bloc was formed within the Independent Front early in March, 1946, which apart from the Communist party, the Social Democratic Party and the Peasant Parties, included also the T.U.C. The new organisation — the parties of which won nearly 42 per cent. of the votes at the elections — meant that the influence of the Communist Party on the workers’ class and the poor peasantry had increased.

To stress its demands, the Leftist bloc early in March arranged a demonstration of Budapest workers. At the threatening effect of the formidable mass meeting of more than 40,000 disciplined demonstrators the Smallholders’ Party had to comply with our demands and exclude 21 of its most compromised deputies. …

So, four months after the election victory of the Smallholders’ Party, a new turn came: not yet a general attack on capitalism, but we took vulnerable forward positions, which facilitated our progress towards the proletarian dictatorship.

In continuation of the successful counter-attack in March 1946, the unmasking, elimination and isolation of reactionary elements of the Smallholders’ Party continued without interruption. The Smallholders’ Party was continually compelled to exclude or eliminate individual members or groups of members thus compromised.

This work we called “Salami Tactics”, by which we cut out in slices reaction hiding in the Smallholders’ Party. In this incessant struggle we wore away the strength of the enemy, reduced his influence and at the same time deepened our own influence.

(source)

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