On Eurovision

Hunter Hunt-Hendrix, the philosophy student turned transcendental black metal frontman, justifies the existence of his band, Liturgy, as follows: since we live between two incomprehensibly immense catastrophes, the WESTERN APOCALYPSE of the 20th century (especially the two world wars) and the approaching COSMIC APOCALYPSE of ecological catastrophe, total war, etc., and since it is too late for human intervention to save us from the COSMIC APOCALYPSE, any action to avert it must, in order to succeed, tap into a source of power beyond what is humanly possible. Following Meillassoux’s argument that Hume’s question concerning the rational justification of belief in causal necessity reveals that “we could a priori … conceive a chaotic modification of natural laws” and therefore that we could posit their contingency, “adhere to the intellection of a radical Chaos which Hume has masterfully, if implicitly, reveal to us”, reject transcendent laws of all kinds, and think the “contingent, but eternally possible, effect of a Chaos unsubordinated to any law”, which is God, Hunt-Hendrix holds that, due to the univocal continuity of the ideal and the real, the birth of a God or a “redeemer-messiah” could, in principle, be brought about by human art; and he explicitly cites as inspiration the Mysterium, Alexander Scriabin’s concept of a week-long work of music and art, held in the foothills of the Himalayas, with bells hanging from the clouds in the sky, participation from the audience and from the surrounding birds and insects, etc., which would bring about the ecstatic dissolution of the universe and its transmutation into a higher plane of being. Unfortunately, the Mysterium was never completed: Scriabin died at the age of 44, of two different types of blood poisoning at the same time.

The missing piece of Hunt-Hendrix’s formulation of this messianic musical mission, although, as will be revealed later, it is debatable whether this was a miscalculation or an intentional elision, is the numerological aspect of this apocalyptic history. It is, as he says, a theoretical and an ethical choice to posit univocality, to work out a thought or a logic that encompasses the All; but one must notice, for example, the structure of the Christian God, or the minimal number of sides a two-dimensional polygon may have, or Hunt-Hendrix’s intertwined (interthrined) trike of art, music, and philosophy. The cover art of Liturgy’s latest album, The Ark Work, consists of two intertwined triangles, each missing a side—the same side, in fact; and the significance of this will soon be explained—; are we to take this as a sign that Hunt-Hendrix is aware of his omission?

Many recent mythological systems, including Hunt-Hendrix’s mythology of the Ark Work, revolve around an apocalyptic event that separated the incomprehensible traditions of the now-forgotten time that it ended from the ‘(pre)history as we know it’ that it created. Christianity contains the myth of Satan’s rebellion against God, the resulting birth of demons, and Satan’s temptation of Eve; Edenism contains the myth of the prehuman Melons engineering a humanoid biological weapon to bring about the apocalyptic destruction of the Neanderthal race, sometimes identified with Atlantis and Antarctica; the Nation of Islam contains the myth of the mad scientist Yakub, who grafted a race of devils to dominate the earth; and the recent legend of the Hyperwar revolves around the cataclysmic domination of a Eurasia-spanning civilization of telepaths by the Hwan Empire’s mass deployment of ‘nerve-stapling’, which cut prehumans off from the transcendent realm and from their innate psychic abilities. Certain similarities can be immediately noticed between all of these myths: the FIRST APOCALYPSE, the missing side of the Ark Work’s triangle(s), consisted of the deliberate injection of seemingly essential difference into the world, resulting in fracture, fragmentation, and f/Fall.

Some, albeit fewer, mythological systems also contain a close to the period of history as we know it, a positive apocalypse similar to that of Hunt-Hendrix and Scriabin. The most obvious example is the Christian eschaton, but more interesting in the context of Eurovision are Hegel’s Weltgeist, the singular spirit of the universe that will come to fully know itself at the end the dialectical process of history (which is composed of three repeating components), Hunt-Hendrix’s myth of the return of the creator-redeemer 01010n upon the reassembly of her shattered offspring, and perhaps the reversal of nerve-stapling and the rebirth of the Ancient Finnish Empire. To this list we may add the Marxist myth that human society had as its initial condition primitive communism, began developing inexorably through the stages of economic life once history began (which beginning is often identified with the advent of agriculture; cf. the Yazidi identification of the Forbidden Fruit with wheat), and will inevitably end with communism. In all of these mythological systems,

It would be a mistake, albeit a tempting one, to characterize this primordial, world-shattering conflict as a war between Good and Evil; it is best considered as a war between, as per Sandifer, Deceleration and Acceleration, or (in some tellings) the beginning of a war that continues to this day, with the forces of Acceleration checked at every turn but never fully defeated. Satan, of course, was the first accelerationist, being (via the Fall of Man) literally responsible for the existence of History itself, hence the Mormon characterization of the Fall as a necessary and even positive step in the eternal ascent of mankind (and in mainstream Christianity, consider that it is only because of Satan that God can be merciful and that His son can be a redeemer); Yakub responded to widespread political discontent in Mecca by weaponizing the most advanced technology available to him to create the race that went on to create modernity and the conditions of modern-day accelerationism; and the Hyperwar not only broke up the massive psychic connectivity of the prehuman world but fragmented the two world-spanning empires of the time into innumerable city-states, in accord with the secessionist agenda of many accelerationists today.

One may now ask: if, as per Hunt-Hendrix, it is a (desirable) theoretical and ethical choice to think univocally, how is it not ‘evil’ to introduce this essential difference into the world? The answer is simple, and contained in Hunt-Hendrix’s mythology itself, which (as previously mentioned) reflects the memory of the FIRST APOCALYPSE: the Wrath of God, the “shy virgin” 01010n, wanted to give someone her unbearably powerful light, so she gave birth to S/he/im, a “proto-gendered subject-object”, who couldn’t bear it and immediately shattered. 01010n retreated, but left behind a flicker of light, the Genesis Caul, born of the act, which in turn bore Kel Valhaal and Reign Array. These two entities have the task, led by the Genesis Caul, of creating prisms to reflect 01010n’s light, that someday S/he/im may be able to bear it, and that someday 01010n may return and redeem the world. Compare Nick Land’s ‘neoreactionary’ formulation of accelerationism: capitalistic, secessionistic fragmentation, the maximization of geopolitical difference, is desirable precisely because it will lead to the elimination of difference, by empowering the forces destined to give birth to a superintelligent machinic singleton, an artificial messiah whose presence retroactively redeems the world that created it. This singularitarian accelerationism frequently overlaps with transhumanism, producing a historiopolitical system supporting the intensification of human psychological, cultural, and morphological difference and the creation of a machinic God, a unitary redeemer-messiah, to end history, unite the world, and avert the COSMIC APOCALYPSE. Note that, because in Land’s formulation of accelerationism the intensification of difference will bring about its elimination, efforts to reduce difference are in this system necessarily decelerationist.

Certain aspects of the reputation of those associated with Land’s ‘neoreactionary’ formulation of accelerationism must be understood before the events of this year’s Eurovision may be rendered comprehensible, but the mythological and prehistorical background must be explained first. Consider the myth of the FIRST APOCALYPSE contained within Christianity: after Satan, the first accelerationist, led an army of (fallen) angels to secede from the Kingdom of God and injected difference into the world, he began the process of history via the Temptation of Eve. In the Garden of Eden, Adam had eternal life, as did Eve, who was fashioned from Adam’s rib; it was only after and due to the Fall that man became mortal. The Christian mythology may not seem relevant here, since it seems to posit two prehistoric apocalypses—the myth of Satan and the myth of the Flood—but these are rightly considered as two components of the same FIRST APOCALYPSE. (The third side of the triangle, which must exist for aforementioned numerological reasons, is revealed by the separation of the myth of Satan and the myth of the Fall. Thus does univocality reveal itself: as the Christian God is triune, so is the Christian FIRST APOCALYPSE.) This is for three(!) reasons: first, they are all contained in Genesis—Satan appears as the serpent in the Genesis narrative of the Fall (a uniquely Christian addition, perhaps arising out of numerological necessity)—; second, it was the evil of mankind (i.e. Satan) that motivated God to flood the Earth; and third, the Flood is contained temporally within a trend of the Genesis narrative: lifespans decrease over time. Methuselah, who lived and died before the Flood, lived for 969 years; the patriarch Abraham, however, died “a good old age, an old man, and full of years” (KJV)—and this “good old age” was only 175! This trend stretches backwards, of course, to the prelapsarian time, since Adam and Eve were immortal. The significance of this should be readily apparent, given the established significance of difference to the structure of history: a reduction in (or acceleration of) human lifespan beginning with immortality (combined with the end of the era where humans could be born from other humans’ ribs) may be reinterpreted as an increase in the importance of heterosexuality, i.e. the sexual love of essential difference. We may assume, on the grounds of their immortality, their prelapsarian method of reproduction, and the clear conceptual parallels with the recurring mythological pattern wherein history is bracketed by the beginning and end of essential difference, that Adam and Eve were gay; and that, given Satan’s association with difference and historical Christianity’s generally negative attitude toward sex, heterosexuality is of the devil; and furthermore, given the importance of difference to the many myths of the FIRST APOCALYPSE, which we may assume, following the usual methods of mythological scholarship, reflect a real event, we are led naturally and necessarily to the conclusion that the FIRST APOCALYPSE was the introduction of mortality/heterosexuality, that messianic apocalypticism of the sort that Hunt-Hendrix advocates is precisely the Gay Agenda, and that there is perhaps a vast and ancient conspiracy of incredibly gay accelerationists—perhaps including the Sacred Band of Thebes, a little-known army of homosexuals which was eventually defeated by Philip II of Macedon, father of noted decelerationist Alexander the Great. As it happens, “conspiracy of incredibly gay accelerationists” is precisely the reputation of the group most closely associated with Landian accelerationism; but one must expect that an ancient conspiracy would have more than one tentacle—which brings us to Eurovision.

Eurovision, for those who don’t know, is an annual song contest in which any European country can participate. It was created after the WESTERN APOCALYPSE to promote European unity  (i.e. decelerationism), but has evolved into a significant institution within gay culture. The Eurovision stage is often used to promote political causes—for example, this year, Russia placed third with a song about a possessive lover and Ukraine won with a horror ballad about Stalin’s deportation of the Tatars from Crimea, last year Georgia entered a goth track good enough that everyone politely ignored that it was supposed to be about feminism or something (admittedly, it helped that it was sung by a model with a superhuman fashion sense), and two years ago Austria won with a bearded-lady drag act—and it is universally used to remind the world of the bizarre fact that the only two European countries that have any taste at all are Georgia and Montenegro. (Finland used to, but now it doesn’t.) Since Eurovision is often political, we should expect to see the conflict between decelerationism and accelerationism play out within it, and indeed we do: its inclusion of Australia for two years in a row shows the decelerationist tendencies of its administration, and whichever conspiracy made so many entrants have that godawful Tumblr haircut is, given Tumblr’s politics, surely decelerationist as well. So, to find the opposing, accelerationist conspiracy, we ought to look for the entrant with the best hair.

This exercise is vastly more interesting than it may seem. The entrant with the best  (and most Hunt-Hendrix-like) hair is, objectively and indisputably, Alexander Ivanov of Belarus—who, rumor has it, wanted to perform his entry, “Help You Fly” (an accelerationist song title if ever there was one) naked and accompanied by two live wolves. (Gay furry stuff is in fact not uncommon in Eurovision: see Cyprus 2016 and Azerbaijan 2015.) Naturally, they didn’t let him—and, given the importance of aerial travel (remember the bells hanging from the clouds in the sky) and animal participation to the Mysterium of another East Slav named Alexander, the only possible conclusion is that Ivanov’s performance was to be the realization of the Mysterium, and the messianic project of the Gay Accelerationist Illuminati was almost brought to fruition, but was thwarted in the eleventh hour by the vast decelerationist conspiracy.

Does the mystery model generalize?

I recently found a simple statistic that distinguishes with near-perfect accuracy between states that voted for Clinton and states that voted for Sanders. It would be interesting to see whether it generalizes to the Republican primary, or to the 2012 general, though I doubt it will.

State ??? 2016 Dem primary 2016 GOP Primary 2012 General
Mississippi 37.3% Clinton Trump Romney
Louisiana 32.4% Clinton Trump Romney
Georgia 31.4% Clinton Trump Romney
Maryland 30.1% Clinton Trump Obama
South Carolina 28.5% Clinton Trump Romney
Alabama 26.4% Clinton Trump Romney
North Carolina 21.6% Clinton Trump Romney
Delaware 20.1% Clinton Trump Obama
Virginia 19.9% Clinton Trump Obama
Tennessee 16.8% Clinton Trump Romney
Florida 15.9% Clinton Trump Romney
Arkansas 15.8% Clinton Trump Romney
New York 15.2% Clinton Trump Obama
Illinois 14.9% Clinton Trump Obama
New Jersey 14.5% N/A N/A Obama
Michigan 14.2% Sanders Trump Obama
Ohio 12.0% Clinton Kasich Obama
Texas 11.9% Clinton Cruz Romney
Missouri 11.5% Clinton Trump Romney
Pennsylvania 10.8% Clinton Trump Obama
Connecticut 10.3% Clinton Trump Obama
Indiana 9.1% Sanders Trump Romney
Nevada 9.0% Clinton Trump Obama
Kentucky 8.2% N/A Trump Romney
Massachusetts 8.1% Clinton Trump Obama
Oklahoma 8.0% Sanders Cruz Romney
Rhode Island 7.5% Sanders Trump Obama
California 6.7% N/A N/A Obama
Kansas 6.2% Sanders Cruz Romney
Wisconsin 6.1% Sanders Cruz Obama
Minnesota 4.6% Sanders Rubio Obama
Nebraska 4.5% Sanders N/A Romney
Colorado 4.3% Sanders Cruz Obama
Alaska 4.3% Sanders Cruz Romney
Arizona 4.2% Clinton Trump Romney
Washington 3.7% Sanders N/A Obama
West Virginia 3.6% Sanders N/A Romney
Hawaii 3.1% Sanders Trump Obama
New Mexico 3.0% N/A N/A Obama
Iowa 2.7% Clinton Cruz Obama
Oregon 2.0% N/A  N/A Obama
Wyoming 1.3% Sanders Cruz Romney
Utah 1.3% Sanders Cruz Romney
New Hampshire 1.2% Sanders Trump Obama
South Dakota 1.1% N/A N/A Romney
North Dakota 1.1% N/A N/A Romney
Maine 1.0% Sanders Cruz Obama
Idaho 1.0% Sanders Cruz Romney
Vermont 0.9% Sanders Trump Obama
Montana 0.7% N/A N/A Romney

I’ve left out Nebraska and West Virginia from the GOP side, because those races had only one candidate.

The general election is clearly regional; our mystery statistic doesn’t appear to be relevant. The GOP primary is more interesting: the only states Trump lost above our 8.0% cutoff are Ohio (Kasich’s home state) and Texas (Cruz’s), but he won seven states below the cutoff: Rhode Island, Nebraska, Arizona, West Virginia, Hawaii, New Hampshire, and Vermont. Of these, Rhode Island, West Virginia, New Hampshire, and Vermont are East Coast states, and Trump has won every East Coast state except Maine; of the rest, Arizona is an exception for the Democrats as well, for obvious reasons that would be taken into account in a slightly more complex version of this model.

Another way to put this is: above our 8.0% cutoff, 10 Trump states voted for Obama in 2012 and 12 voted for Romney, but below it, every Trump state but Arizona went to Obama. (Below the cutoff, 6 non-Trump states went to Romney and 5 went to Obama.)

So: the mystery model appears to hold for the GOP primary, but there’s a regional effect on top of it.

What is Marxism?

When I pointed out that the Marxist tradition is still alive in American academia, the most common response I got was: “But the Marxist tradition isn’t Marxist!” For example:

Overall, I’d liken the place of Marx in academic sociology to that of a senior citizen who everybody publicly respects, but nobody really listens to. Even the remaining self-professed Marxists seem more interested in in things like ecology and identitarianism these days, even though (as I’ve fruitlessly tried pointing out to them) all that is at radical cross purposes with the Marxist enterprise in both its theoretical and political aspect alike.

Over a quarter of academic sociologists are self-professed Marxists, but if their self-profession is wrong

I’m not sure the quantitative surveys you quote do justice to the point Sandifer (may) have been making. The ‘old style’ Marxism where you do class analysis of a state, looking at what the interests of a class are, looking at how the material conditions of production affect ‘superstructures’ such as culture, ‘rights’, etc, is very rare in mainstream social science departments these days. I presume because such analysis might undermine some of the shibboleths of the ‘Cathedral’ – including ‘diversity’, ‘inclusion’, ‘white privilege’, ‘patriarchy’, etc. Those who call themselves Marxists in the academy have mostly long since abandoned material conceptions of history for Judith Butler inspired charlatanry.

This charlatanry is better known as the New Left—or, if you prefer (and there’s no reason not to, since the term was used even before ’68), Cultural Marxism—or, if you’re Tom Wolfe, Rococo Marxism. “You proles aren’t down with us? It’s… it’s not like we ever thought you were the revolutionary agent of history anyway.” Or maybe the CIA made it, or maybe the CIA made Tom Wolfe. Whatever. But something is going on, and it’s been going on since 1931.

Marxism today isn’t a school of thought at all; it’s an idiom, a set of shibboleths. Imagined Communities decisively refuted Marxism—but it was written in the Marxist idiom, so nobody minded. Tom Whyman laments the loss of a grand unifying national myth and glorifies directionless, irrational mass violence, but he does it in the Marxist idiom, so he’s not a fascist (read: Sorelian), which he is. In fact, some ex-Communists tell me that their former circles were OK with anything, so long as it came from someone who’s very highly educated. Someone who knows words. Someone who has the best words.

Benedict Anderson’s decisive refutation of Marxism is that, to paraphrase, it served as an idiom for the expression of nationalism, or a strategic position for nationalists to adopt. Certainly this is true of Ho Chi Minh and Deng Xiaoping, but this could be generalized: it serves as an idiom for whatever the people who used it wanted to do anyway. In Vietnam, this was nationalism; in the USA, as we can see from true believers like Fredrik deBoer, it’s Menckenism.

Phil Sandifer complains in Neoreaction a Basilisk that Mencius Moldbug never engaged with Marxism, and writes that “there’s a confrontation that’s obviously waiting to happen that Moldbug endlessly deferred”. But, aside from deBoer, how many serious Marxists are there today? Moldbug may not engage with “the philosophical principles of Karl Marx”, but he does engage with the most popular use of the Marxist idiom today: the caste war.

“That was disgusting! Osama is a freedom fighter!”

i was on campus a couple of days after 9.11, and i had already recorded a spot for all things considered. they were looking for someone who would express any sort of anger, could not find one among their staff or usual contributors, i gather. i had been talking to my (now-deceased) brother jim, who was an unbelievable cynic, raconteur, and artist of the hyperbole. ‘i want to fly over the middle east and see nothing but piles of smoking rubble.’ i started there. you know, i too want vengeance. in fact this distinction between justice and vengeance is complete jive, just a way of pretending you don’t want revenge, or collectivizing responsibility, effectively offloading it from everyone entirely. i had three minutes, years of argument behind it. then i said: but even if it is legitimate to take vengeance, you are morally obliged to take your vengeance only precisely on the perpetrators. no burning rubble, my brother, without osama & co inside it. only them.

next day, robert merrill (a senior colleague), confronted me in the hall and said “that was disgusting!” the next words out his mouth were ‘osama is a freedom fighter!’ i felt a marked cooling toward me and rallying around him after that.

then for whatever political reason, they put my job to a national search. i did ‘six names of beauty’ as the talk, just or soon-to-published by routledge. anyway, it defines beauty’ as ‘the object of longing.’ then i put up my childhood crush emma peel. then i went on to buntings and roses and the universe as a whole. a lit prof, soheila ghaussy, hopped up and started saying my whole thing was just (paraphrasing) coming from the dick, and weren’t millennia of oppression enough? they hired someone else, who did not work out at all.

oh, and then there’s this, where i posted a miranda lambert song to my blog, which led to academics calling in the police and academics firing me. finally water-boarded to death!

what i have found over and over again is that teaching, research, and service are irrelevant in an academic career (research, for sure). the only real criterion of advancement is conformity. that’s why you have all these mediocrities at the very upper reaches: mere careerists. that’s why the senior level of the profession now is lilliputian compared to the last cohort.

(source)

Here is one of Robert Merrill’s syllabi.

Who doesn’t speak English at home?

20.7% of the population of the United States.

12.9% of the population speaks Spanish at home. In other words, over half of the people who don’t speak English at home speak Spanish at home. 3.7% of the population speaks another Indo-European language; the most common of these are French (0.43%) and German (0.36%).

How many people speak a European language other than Spanish at home? I’ll take ‘European languages’ to include French, Cajun, Italian, Portuguese, German, Luxembourgish, Yiddish, Pennsylvania German, Dutch, Frisian, all Scandinavian, Celtic, and Balto-Slavic languages, Greek, Romanian, Albanian, Finnish, Estonian, Hungarian, and Basque. This comes out to about seven million people, or 2.4%. French and German make up slightly more than two million of that figure, as do the Slavic languages.

0.62% speak an Indic language other than Urdu at home. The most common are Hindi, Gujarati, Bengali, and Punjabi.

0.99% speak Chinese at home, 0.55% Tagalog, 0.48% Vietnamese, and 0.38% Korean. For Asian languages as a whole, the figure is 3.3%.

Native American languages don’t make up a significant part of the statistic: only 0.12% of the population speak one at home, and 45.8% of them speak Navajo.

Almost as many people speak Arabic at home as French, and almost as many people speak an African language at home as Arabic.

8.6% of the population speak English less than “very well”.

Looking only at the part of the population that doesn’t speak English at home: 62.1% speak Spanish, 4.8% speak a Sinitic language (i.e. a “dialect of Chinese”), 2.7% speak Tagalog, 2.3% speak Vietnamese, and 2.1% speak French. These are the most common languages non-English languages spoken at home in the US; the only others with more than a million people are Korean and German. 17.8% speak an Indo-European language other than Spanish, and 11.8% speak a European language. 0.28% speak Navajo and 0.33% speak another Native American language.

Oddly, the Census Bureau considers “Paleo-siberian” (i.e. the Chukotko-Kamchatkan and Yukaghir languages, Ket, Nivkh, and Ainu) to be one language. 530 people speak it at home.

All you need to know about Sweden in one map

most-popular-duolingo

(source)

The USA comes out slightly better. English is only the second most popular language on Duolingo here. The only other first-world countries where the official language is the second most popular on Duolingo are Norway and Austria.

Duolingo writes:

Duolingo’s Swedish course turns out to be the most popular in Sweden itself: 27% of all users in Sweden are learning Swedish.

Why would that be the case? Immigration to Sweden has been skyrocketing in recent years: one in six Swedish residents in 2015 was born outside of Sweden. The fastest growing foreign-born groups are from Syria and Afghanistan, reflecting a recent increase in the refugee population. Duolingo recently released a Swedish course for Arabic speakers, which will hopefully help!

But it’s not just Sweden. There are several other countries where immigrants are using Duolingo to learn the language of their new home.

In the United States, immigrants constitute 13.1% of the total population. But even more — over 20% of the population — speak a language other than English at home, and over 25 million people speak English less than “Very Well”. Perhaps not surprisingly, then, English is the second most popular language in the United States, attracting 21% of the country’s Duolingo users.

Another case is Norway, where Norwegian is the second most popular language (with 18% of all users). Similarly to Sweden, Norway has been recently accepting many migrants and refugees. According to the data from the beginning of the year, immigrants constitute 13.4% of the total population in Norway.

 

 

Vietnamese eggplant opium (or not)

In Hanoi, ‘coffee’ was initially borrowed from the French /kafe/ as trà phê /ʈaA2feA1/ (Martini 1958: 337–338).The first syllable is a phonetic stretcher, as the tone is different from that (A1) affected by default to borrowings from toneless languages, and the initial /ʈ/ does not match the /k/ in /kafe/. This syllable is semantically motivated: it is none other than the Sino-Vietnamese word for ‘tea’, /ʈaA2/ trà. Labelling coffee as a type of tea acclimatizes the new beverage, introducing it into a set that previously included trà tàu ‘Chinese tea (black tea)’, trà Huế  ‘Annamese tea (green tea)’, trà hoa ‘camellia tea’, trà rừng ‘three-seeded mercury (herbal) tea’, and so on. As for the second syllable, /feA1/ phê, it constitutes both a straightforward phonetic rendering of the syllable /fe/ and a semantically appropriate syllable, as coffee is apt to produce a sensation of elation not entirely unlike that produced by opium—another commodity associated with foreigners, which was actively promoted by colonial authorities (Le Failler 2001)—, whose psychotropic effects are evoked in Vietnamese through the expressive form phê phê. On the other hand, Vietnamese people with a command of French would pronounce the foreign word as /kaA1feA1/, with tone A1 (a level, non-low tone, used as the default for foreign syllables without a final stop). A hybrid of the two forms emerged: /kaA2feA1/ cà phê, correcting the initial to /k/ as in the donor language, but retaining the tone of /ʈaA2/ trà ‘tea’. This form became standard (see e.g. Nguyễn Như Ý 1999), to the puzzlement of the linguist Emeneau, who tentatively hypothesized that the A2 tone in /kaA2feA1/ must be due to an (implausible) assimilation to /kaA2/ ‘eggplant’ (Emeneau 1951: 4, 158).

(source)

The origins of “cultural Marxism”

The phrase, that is, not the thing it refers to. I was previously under the impression that the term was coined recently by the conservative press; as it turns out, neither of the two parts of that statement are true.

The earliest use indexed by Google Books appears in 1948, in the fourth volume of The Modern Quarterly, a British Communist paper:

The League itself unites the progressive writers of Germany and is the main organ of cultural Marxism—its editor is Bodo Uhse, and on its editorial committee are such men as Johannes Becher, Alfred Meusel and Klaus Gysi.

Klaus Gysi is the father of Gregor Gysi. “The League” is probably a reference to the Kulturbund zur demokratischen Erneuerung Deutschlands, whose name is sometimes translated as “Cultural League for the Democratic Renewal of Germany”. But this isn’t the usage we’re familiar with today.

The next example appears in 1961, in volume 57 of a journal that was founded in 1962, and Googling the relevant sentences turns up a JSTOR article from 1982, which does not appear to contain the phrase. But here are the sentences anyway.

Weiner goes to the philosophical root of the problem, bringing together cultural Marxism and political sociology. Collective action provides the conceptual and empirical connection between the two approaches.

A fellow with the improbable name of Richard R. Weiner wrote a book called “Cultural Marxism and political sociology” in 1981, so this is probably an error on Google’s part.

There is another mention in 1963, in “Theme and method in the allegorical novels of Rex Warner”:

Of course it is true that, as the clouds of World War II darkened, as Spain fell to totalitarianism, and as Moscow proved itself more and more ideologically alien to these Britons, hope for socialism, or “cultural Marxism,” died out among these …

But Google doesn’t give any more of a preview, and the context isn’t clear as to whether

It appears next (and, in its unambiguously familiar form, first) in 1964, in volume 246 of Punch:

Even Raymond Williams, who is often loosely bracketed with Hoggart as a “literary sociologist,” has a much firmer ideological foundation for his work, based as it is in the modified “cultural Marxism” of the New Left.

The modified “cultural Marxism” of the New Left! Raymond Williams was a New Left member—and, oddly, an active Welsh nationalist.

There’s a passing mention of “the humanistic, ‘cultural’ Marxism of the contemporary New Left” in London Magazine in 1966.

Then in 1967, in Literature and Society by Walter Laqueur and George Lachmann Mosse, its first appearance without scare quotes:

Cultural Marxism was most pervasive during the 1930s in New York literary circles, particularly among the generation of critics which came of age during the early years of the depression. …

One lasting effect of cultural Marxism in the 1930s was the greater sociological content in the discussion of the problems of American intellectuals.

Use of the phrase continues after that, and increases sharply in the early ’90s. Here’s an example from 1981, taken from a book by Lydia Sargent:

In her essay, “Cultural Marxism: Nonsynchrony and Feminist Practice,” Emily Hicks argues that the marriage of Marxism and feminism leads to a narrow formulation of their respective oppressions and a narrow understanding of the dynamics of society. Hicks states that a cultural Marxism is needed to reach and incorporate broader groups of people into a socialist movement: people who do not all have the same politics or the same political needs. Nor the same socialist vision. A Marxism that cannot reach more people with its theory and practice will become irrelevant. With an analysis of current political and economic trends viewed through the concept of nonsynchrony, Hicks shows why it is that despite a huge dissatisfaction with capitalism among certain sectors of the population (gays, working women, blacks) there is not necessarily a huge outpouring of support for a radical alternative. Hicks discusses why some women will make radical demands for childcare, birth control, [and] equal pay but will also feel a tremendous antagonism towards the women’s movement claiming forcefully that they are not “women’s libbers”. Hicks argues strategically for the need to build broad non-exclusive organizations struggling for progressive change.

The essay was published a year earlier. Emily Hicks studied under Herbert Marcuse from 1978 to 1979.

And here’s an example from 1984:

I found “cultural Marxism” as pursued by Raymond Williams, Gramsci, Habermas, Lukacs, and others immensely suggestive, yet ultimately unsatisfactory.

So there you go.

Is Marxism marginalized in academia?

No.

Phil Sandifer sent me a copy of Neoreaction A Basilisk, because this is the internet and shouting a lot is a viable strategy. I don’t know, man. But it’s an opportunity to get this blog up to an average of one post per day.

Sandifer writes:

Indeed, there’s actually a significant leftist intellectual tradition that can fairly legitimately claim to be completely suppressed by the American media and education system, and that’s well-known for observing that revolutions and transitions between ideologies generally come down to people with material power protecting that power. …

Marxism, especially in its good old-fashioned “a spectre is haunting Europe” revolutionary sense (which is a much larger body of work than Soviet Communism, and indeed one that contains countless scathing critiques of Leninism and Stanlinism) is absolutely one of the positions most completely excluded from the Cathedral, its use in Anglophone politics restricted to a derisive term slung about in the way that “fascist” is applied to Donald Trump, only with less accuracy.

It’s certainly true that that’s the way “Marxist” is used in Anglophone politics—but is Marxism “completely suppressed” by the American media and education system? Given that the sitting president of the United States of America was a no-shit Marxist-Leninist in college, this is somewhat hard to believe.

According to the Open Syllabus Project, the Communist Manifesto is the third most-assigned text in college syllabi, with 3,189 citations—behind only Plato’s Republic, with 3,573 citations, and The Elements of Style, with 3,934.

I didn’t have to read the Communist Manifesto in college, but I did have to read it in high school. Right before Animal Farm, admittedly, but Orwell was a socialist, and we certainly weren’t reading Mises. When I went to college, one of the department heads was an outspoken pro-Cuba Communist, another was an ex-anarchist who had recently and reluctantly converted to Rawlsianism, and I was assigned to read Emma Goldman, Voltairine de Cleyre, various texts on applied Marxism which I can’t remember because I never showed up to that class (because the professor made it obvious that anyone who turned in the papers and pretended to agree with Marxism would get at least a B), something by Robert Paul Wolff which I also can’t remember, some critical legal studies, and a chunk of Capital. The only author I was ever assigned who could be classified as a rightist, aside from the Fascist Manifesto (by a professor who hated Hegel, because he hated Hegel), was Nozick, who hardly counts.

I also took a class on activism taught by a team of self-professed Trotskyists who worked for the Democratic Party, so.

Back to the Open Syllabus Project. Marxists are not commonly assigned, but Marx is squarely within the canon. The Communist Manifesto is the third most frequently assigned book in college syllabi. The Communist Manifesto is more frequently assigned in colleges than Aristotle’s Ethics (#6), Leviathan (#7), The Prince (#8), Hamlet (#10), The Odyssey (#11), Orientalism (#12—yes, really), Canterbury Tales (#16), On Liberty (#19), Foucault’s Power (#26) On the Origin of Species (#27), Augustine’s Confessions (#28), Walden (#31), and The Wealth of Nations (#35).

Marx shows up again in the top 200 with Capital (#44) and The German Ideology (#158). Paulo Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed comes in at #99, and Frantz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth at #115. Scrolling down a bit, Adorno’s Culture Industry ranks #207.

An EconLog post links to a survey that finds that 11% of professors are ‘radicals’ and 3% are Marxists, but the survey went out to all professors, and one would not learn Marxism in a chemistry class. In the humanities, 5% are Marxists (but 19% are ‘radicals’); in the social sciences, 18% are; in liberal arts colleges, 12% are; and in sociology, 26% of professors are Marxists.

Also, the Harvard Crimson endorsed the Khmer Rouge, Walter Duranty won a Pulitzer for Stalinist apologia, and Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the 32nd President of the United States, personally requested that Warner Bros. make, under close collaboration with the federal government of the United States, a movie based on a former US ambassador to the USSR’s pro-Stalin memoirs, which movie was of course itself pro-Stalin.

The Democratic primary, part 2

Data on white % for Sanders is from CNN’s exit polls.

This is profoundly annoying — there’s exit poll data for only five states below the line, one of which is Sanders’s home state and one of which is an unexplained outlier. How is anyone supposed to run any statistical analysis with this garbage? CBS and NYT are no better.

Is there a way to estimate white % for Sanders in states without exit polling? I don’t know statistics.

A naïve computation of Pearson’s coefficient gives = -0.6653, p = 0.00021. Removing the outliers of Texas, Nevada, and Vermont gives = -0.6971, = 0.00022. Removing Vermont alone gives = -0.6643, p = 0.0003.

Perhaps there are regional effects beyond our mystery coefficient. Looking at states with substantial Southern Baptist populations alone (that is: Mississippi, Georgia, South Carolina, Alabama, North Carolina, Virginia, Tennessee, Florida, Arkansas, Texas, Missouri, and Oklahoma), = -0.5729, = 0.051. This is not significant at p < 0.05, but only barely. If we add Maryland, which was founded as a refuge for Catholics and is plurality Catholic today, to make this a measure of the whole South, we get = -0.562, = 0.046.

Before looking at the non-Southern states, remember that we’re missing most of the low end. Pearson’s coefficient is woefully unsuited to this. Southern states don’t have this problem: all but Louisiana have exit poll data, and all but Kentucky (and West Virginia, which would be included by the Southern Baptist metric, and Delaware, which wouldn’t be) have voted. It’s pointless to give Pearson’s coefficient here; I include it in the hope that it motivates someone who does statistics to do a better analysis, or at least find more exit poll data. Non-Southern states: = -0.5124, = 0.061. Non-Southern states minus Texas, Nevada, and Vermont, = -0.1683, = 0.62.

State ??? White % for Sanders Winner
Mississippi 37.3% 31% Clinton
Louisiana 32.4% ??? Clinton
Georgia 31.4% 41% Clinton
Maryland 30.1% 42% Clinton
South Carolina 28.5% 46% Clinton
Alabama 26.4% 38% Clinton
North Carolina 21.6% 52% Clinton
Delaware 20.1% ??? Clinton
Virginia 19.9% 42% Clinton
Tennessee 16.8% 42% Clinton
Florida 15.9% 43% Clinton
Arkansas 15.8% 35% Clinton
New York 15.2% 50% Clinton
Illinois 14.9% 57% Clinton
New Jersey 14.5% N/A N/A
Michigan 14.2% 56% Sanders
Ohio 12.0% 47% Clinton
Texas 11.9% 41% Clinton
Missouri 11.5% 54% Clinton
Pennsylvania 10.8% 47% Clinton
Connecticut 10.3% 50% Clinton
Indiana 9.1% 59% Sanders
Nevada 9.0% 49% Clinton
Kentucky 8.2% N/A N/A
Massachusetts 8.1% 50% Clinton
Oklahoma 8.0% 56% Sanders
Rhode Island 7.5% ??? Sanders
California 6.7% N/A N/A
Kansas 6.2% ??? Sanders
Wisconsin 6.1% 59% Sanders
Minnesota 4.6% ??? Sanders
Nebraska 4.5% ??? Sanders
Colorado 4.3% ??? Sanders
Alaska 4.3% ??? Sanders
Arizona 4.2% ??? Clinton
Washington 3.7% ??? Sanders
West Virginia 3.6% N/A N/A
Hawaii 3.1% ??? Sanders
New Mexico 3.0% N/A N/A
Iowa 2.7% 46% Clinton
Oregon 2.0% N/A N/A
Wyoming 1.3% ??? Sanders
Utah 1.3% ??? Sanders
New Hampshire 1.2% 61% Sanders
South Dakota 1.1% N/A N/A
North Dakota 1.1% N/A N/A
Maine 1.0% ??? Sanders
Idaho 1.0% ??? Sanders
Vermont 0.9% 86% Sanders
Montana 0.7% N/A N/A
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