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Paper 2026/482

Cryptanalysis of Two Alternating Moduli Weak PRFs

Kai Hu, Shandong University
Gregor Leander, Ruhr Bochum University
Håvard Raddum, Simula UiB
Arne Sandrib, University of Bergen
Aleksei Udovenko, University of Luxembourg
Abstract

In this work, we present new cryptanalytic attacks on recently proposed, theory-inspired constructions of weak pseudorandom functions (weak-PRFs). We demonstrate attacks on several such designs, showing that the initial security arguments require significant refinement. Methodologically, our approach relies on novel observations about the structure of cyclic matrices, applications of Wagner's generalized birthday technique, and conversion into polynomial systems over $\mathbb{F}_3$. These findings highlight the need for a more careful analysis of those weak-PRF candidates

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info
Published by the IACR in TOSC 2026
Keywords
CryptanalysisWeak PRFAlternating ModuliDarkMatter
Contact author(s)
kai hu @ sdu edu cn
gregor leander @ rub de
haavardr @ simula no
arne sandrib @ student uib no
aleksei @ affine group
History
2026-03-09: approved
2026-03-08: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2026/482
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2026/482,
      author = {Kai Hu and Gregor Leander and Håvard Raddum and Arne Sandrib and Aleksei Udovenko},
      title = {Cryptanalysis of Two Alternating Moduli Weak {PRFs}},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2026/482},
      year = {2026},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/482}
}
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