-
Blogs I Follow
-
Recent Posts
- A more fundamental problem with Yujin Nagasawa’s Problem of Evil for Atheists
- A parody of the fine-tuning argument.
- Commentary on Yujin Nagasawa’s Problem of Evil for Atheists
- Another response to Andrew Loke on the Kalam
- Graham Oppy vs Andrew Loke on the Kalam: my critique of Loke’s argument
- Some remarks on Cameron Bertuzzi’s Kalam
- Why isn’t Atheism the default position according to William Lane Craig?
- William Lane Craig’s moral argument and the speed of light
- Some remarks on Josh Rasmussen’s How Reason Can Lead to God
- Problems for Craig’s view on God and time
- The epistemology of modality and some metaphysical consequences
- A reductio for the EAAN
- The Good and the Great, random thoughts
- Edward Feser’s Aristotelian Proof for God
- Robin Collins, the FTA and the problem of evil
- Hume’s Lapse?
- William Lane Craig on Does the Vastness of the Universe Support Naturalism?
- Divine Conceptualism
- Platonism, a short introduction
- Why is There Anything?
- William Lane Craig says he does not know how they would respond to his three points against Atheistic Moral Platonism
- A New and Improved Argument for a Necessary Being
- The Fine-Tuning Argument
- Hypothetical reasons are just as queer as categorical reasons
- Robert Adams on Excellence
- A tension between Divine Command Theory and the Ontological Argument
- Fine-Tuning, Firing Squads, and Observation Selection Effects
- Multiverses and the Inverse Gambler’s fallacy
- Thoughts on Moral Twin Earth
- Concluding Thoughts on MTE dialectic between Copp and Horgan & Timmons
- Referring to Moral Properties: Moral Twin Earth, Again
- Copping out of Moral Twin Earth
- Milk, Honey, and the Good Life on Moral Twin Earth
- Moral Twin Earth
- Absence of Evidence, Evidence of Absence, and Fossils
- Scientific Anti-Realism and Unobservables
- Free Will or not regardless of determinism or indeterminism
- Remarks on the Passing of Time
- The Kalam, taxicab fallacy, and atemporal causation
- Inconceivable Minds
- The Multiverse is parsimonious and not ad hoc?
- Moral Responsibility and Free Will
- Genes do not encode information for phenotypic traits
- Laurie Paul on Temporal Experience
- Libertarian Free Will and punching babies
- Utilitarianism and the plentitude principle.
- Johnathan Schaffer – Is there a fundamental level?
- Saul Smilansky on Free Will
- Reductionism vs Antireductionism in Biology
- Are Fairy Rings an example of Specified Complexity?
- Vulnerability in Scientific Theories without Popperian falsification
- A 5-case thought experiment for giving to charity
- Elliott Sober’s Contrastive Empiricism
- Logical Empiricist issues with theoretical terms
- The prayer-answering God has been falsified
- The Plurality of Causal Pluralism
- The moral fixed points: new directions for moral nonnaturalism
- Are there laws in Biology?
- A proper design inference
- Peter Singer on the life you can save
- Specified Complexity
- Irreducible Complexity
- Henry Allison, Transcendental Realism, Empirical Realism, and Transcendental Idealism
- Derk Pereboom’s arguments against Compatiblism
- Metametaethics
- Humean and Kantian Constructivism
- Many faces of Compatibilism
- Akeel Bilgrami on Value properties
- Karl Popper’s deductivism
Archives
- April 2026 (2)
- June 2025 (1)
- December 2020 (2)
- September 2020 (1)
- August 2020 (1)
- December 2019 (1)
- October 2019 (1)
- August 2019 (1)
- April 2018 (3)
- January 2018 (1)
- February 2017 (1)
- January 2017 (1)
- August 2016 (1)
- April 2016 (2)
- March 2016 (2)
- November 2015 (1)
- September 2015 (1)
- March 2015 (1)
- February 2015 (1)
- January 2015 (1)
- December 2014 (1)
- November 2014 (8)
- October 2014 (2)
- September 2014 (1)
- August 2014 (2)
- June 2014 (3)
- May 2014 (5)
- April 2014 (9)
- March 2014 (11)
- February 2014 (1)
Categories
- Abstract Objects (2)
- Applied Ethics (2)
- David Hume (1)
- Epistemology (1)
- Free Will (6)
- Intelligent Design (5)
- Josh Rasmussen (1)
- Kant (1)
- Metaethics (11)
- Metaphysics (6)
- Normative Ethics (1)
- Philosophy of Biology (3)
- Philosophy of Mind (1)
- Philosophy of Physics (1)
- Philosophy of Religion (22)
- Philosophy of Science (6)
- Physics (1)
- Uncategorized (3)
Category Archives: Metaphysics
The epistemology of modality and some metaphysical consequences
I want to consider how we know what worlds are metaphysically possible. First, let’s state what a possible world is. I like to think of possible worlds in the way Kripke states it: “‘Possible worlds’ are total ‘ways the world … Continue reading →
Posted in Epistemology, Metaphysics
|
Tagged epistemology of modality, possible worlds
|
Leave a comment
Platonism, a short introduction
By platonism, I will mean the contemporary view on it in analytic philosophy, and not necessarily Plato’s view. Platonists believe that the existence abstract objects are needed to make sense of three phenomena: resemblance, subject-predicate discourse, and abstract reference. By … Continue reading →
Laurie Paul on Temporal Experience
A summary of Laurie Paul’s Temporal Experience: Antireductionists about time hold that our experience of the nowness and passage of events are best explained by events really having mind-independent nowness and mind-independent temporal passage. Reductionists reject mind-independent nowness and mind-independent … Continue reading →
Johnathan Schaffer – Is there a fundamental level?
This is a summary of Johnathan Schaffer’s “Is there a fundamental level?” Schaffer argues that there are no good a priori arguments or a posteriori evidence for fundamental particles. (I won’t go over his arguments here.) The replacement of quantum … Continue reading →
The Plurality of Causal Pluralism
There are competing candidates on what causation is, viz., regularity, counterfactual dependence, probabilistic dependence, process, etc. The literature on the metaphysics of causation typically operates under the presumption that there is a single, deep metaphysical fact about what causation is. … Continue reading →