🔒 Remove vulnerable git_operations tool#31
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…wed arbitrary argument injection into `Command::new("git")`, which could lead to arbitrary command execution (e.g. via `--ext-cmd=`). Since `run_command` already exists and securely evaluates shell commands via the approval and permission mode system, the `git_operations` tool is redundant and unsecurable. This commit completely removes the `git_operations` tool from the codebase (tool schema, policy evaluation, and implementation).
Co-authored-by: google-labs-jules[bot] <161369871+google-labs-jules[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
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🎯 What: The vulnerability fixed was an argument injection in the
⚠️ Risk: A malicious agent could execute arbitrary shell commands by injecting arguments into the git command.
git_operationstool.🛡️ Solution: The fix removes the
git_operationstool entirely, as users can already use therun_commandtool which correctly adheres to the command execution policies.PR created automatically by Jules for task 15507483770031795507 started by @undivisible