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🔒 Aisle Security Analysis

We found 1 potential security issue(s) in this PR:

if (truncated) {
  const sortedKeySet = new Set(keys);
  hash.update("#object-tail:");
  for (const key in value) {
    if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(value, key) || sortedKeySet.has(key)) {
      continue;
    }
    hash.update(JSON.stringify(key));
    hash.update(":");
    updateJsonHash(hash, value[key]);
    hash.update(",");
  }
}

const MAX_TOTAL_NODES = 10_000;
const MAX_DEPTH = 50;

function updateJsonHashBounded(hash: Hash, value: JsonValue, state = { nodes: 0, depth: 0 }): void {
  if (state.nodes++ > MAX_TOTAL_NODES || state.depth > MAX_DEPTH) {
    hash.update("#truncated");
    return;
  }
  ​// ...same logic as updateJsonHash, but:
  ​// - only hash first N keys/items
  ​// - avoid tail full traversal; append '#object-tail-truncated' marker
  ​// - increment/decrement state.depth for recursion
}

Analyzed PR: #71758 at commit 791ab05

_{Last updated on: 2026-04-25T21:06:08Z}

Greptile Summary

This PR bounds the Object.keys enumeration surface in PermissionRequest fingerprinting by replacing full-key-list sorting with bounded traversal in readBoundedOwnKeys and insertion-order iteration in updateJsonHash, and moves the budget gate before fingerprint computation to skip CPU work on rate-limited requests.

• Budget move breaks dedup for concurrent duplicates: consumeNativeHookRelayPermissionBudget now runs before the pendingPermissionApprovals lookup, so N concurrent identical requests each consume a budget slot instead of sharing one. With a window of 12, 12 duplicate in-flight requests exhaust the budget, blocking new unique permissions from being prompted in the same minute.
• Content fingerprint is now insertion-order sensitive: updateJsonHash switched from sorted-key iteration to insertion-order traversal, so two logically identical toolInput objects with different key order produce different approval keys and won't deduplicate.

Confidence Score: 3/5

P1 behavioral regression in budget semantics could exhaust the rate-limit window under concurrent duplicate permission requests; safe fallback exists but dedup guarantee is broken.

One P1 finding (budget consumed before dedup check changes rate-limit semantics and drops pending-approval sharing for over-budget requests) pulls the score to 3. A P2 finding (order-dependent content fingerprint) adds further concern. The fallback to the provider approval path prevents a hard denial, but the correctness regression in the deduplication path is real.

src/agents/harness/native-hook-relay.ts — specifically the budget gate placement relative to the pending-approval map lookup (lines 438–454) and the updateJsonHash key iteration order (lines 559–569).

This is a comment left during a code review.
Path: src/agents/harness/native-hook-relay.ts
Line: 438-443

Comment:
**Budget consumed before dedup check exhausts window with concurrent identical requests**

Moving `consumeNativeHookRelayPermissionBudget` before the pending-approval lookup changes the budget semantics from "unique approval prompts launched" to "total relay permission calls processed." Under the old code, N concurrent requests for the same approval key each shared the one pending promise without consuming N budget slots. Now every concurrent duplicate consumes a slot, so 12 identical in-flight permission requests exhaust the full `MAX_PERMISSION_APPROVALS_PER_WINDOW` (12) budget — causing the 13th call for a genuinely new permission to return noop/defer in the same minute. Additionally, any request that arrives over-budget can no longer attach to an already-pending promise: it returns noop immediately rather than inheriting the in-flight decision.

How can I resolve this? If you propose a fix, please make it concise.

---

This is a comment left during a code review.
Path: src/agents/harness/native-hook-relay.ts
Line: 559-569

Comment:
**Content fingerprint is now key-insertion-order dependent**

Replacing `Object.keys(value).toSorted()` with `for (const key in value)` means two objects with identical key/value pairs but different insertion orders (e.g. `{a:1, b:2}` vs `{b:2, a:1}`) will produce different SHA-256 fingerprints. Since the content fingerprint is part of `approvalKey`, those two requests won't deduplicate and the user could see duplicate approval prompts for the same logical operation. In practice JavaScript engines preserve insertion order and JSON deserialization is deterministic, but any code path that constructs `toolInput` differently (e.g. via object spread in a different order) will silently break dedup.

How can I resolve this? If you propose a fix, please make it concise.

_{Reviews (1): Last reviewed commit: "fix: bound native hook permission finger..." | Re-trigger Greptile}