fix(browser): block upload symlink escapes#21972
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Do the tests cover “non-regular file” cases (f.e. directories/FIFOs) across platforms, or is that intentionally out of scope for now? Happy to help add coverage if needed |
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Summary\n- add resolveExistingPathsWithinRoot() to validate upload paths via safe file-open under root\n- reject symlink and non-regular file escapes while preserving existing not-found behavior\n- update browser upload call sites to await the new validator\n- add dedicated tests for traversal and symlink-escape cases\n\n## Why\nThis lands the browser path-hardening piece from #21268 separately from app deep-link changes.
Greptile Summary
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resolveExistingPathsWithinRoot()to validate file upload paths via safe file-open operations, preventing symlink escapes and path traversal attacks while preserving existing behavior for non-existent files.openFileWithinRoot()fromfs-safe.tsConfidence Score: 5/5
openFileWithinRoot()fromfs-safe.ts. All call sites properly await the new async function, error handling follows project conventions, and comprehensive tests validate the security improvements. The backward-compatible handling of non-existent files preserves existing behavior.Last reviewed commit: 9520890