Security: harden AGENTS.md with gateway, prompt injection, and supply chain rules#10514
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Security: harden AGENTS.md with gateway, prompt injection, and supply chain rules#10514catpilothq wants to merge 1 commit intoopenclaw:mainfrom
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AGENTS.md
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| ### Secret Hygiene | ||
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| - **NEVER** write API keys, tokens, or passwords to `openclaw.json`, `.env`, or any plaintext file. | ||
| - **ALWAYS** instruct the user to set these values as Environment Variables in their terminal profile. |
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Instructs printing secrets
The rule “NEVER write API keys… to .env” conflicts with common practice in this repo/ecosystem, but more importantly the surrounding guidance (“set these values as Environment Variables in their terminal profile”) pushes users toward globally-exported secrets and makes it harder to use per-project tooling. Consider narrowing this to “never commit secrets / never store secrets in repo files” and explicitly allow local, uncommitted .env where the project expects it (or clarify the repo’s intended secret management). As written, agents may refuse legitimate workflows or suggest insecure global exports.
Note: If this suggestion doesn't match your team's coding style, reply to this and let me know. I'll remember it for next time!
Prompt To Fix With AI
This is a comment left during a code review.
Path: AGENTS.md
Line: 33:33
Comment:
**Instructs printing secrets**
The rule “NEVER write API keys… to `.env`” conflicts with common practice in this repo/ecosystem, but more importantly the surrounding guidance (“set these values as Environment Variables in their terminal profile”) pushes users toward globally-exported secrets and makes it harder to use per-project tooling. Consider narrowing this to “never commit secrets / never store secrets in repo files” and explicitly allow local, uncommitted `.env` where the project expects it (or clarify the repo’s intended secret management). As written, agents may refuse legitimate workflows or suggest insecure global exports.
<sub>Note: If this suggestion doesn't match your team's coding style, reply to this and let me know. I'll remember it for next time!</sub>
How can I resolve this? If you propose a fix, please make it concise.… chain rules Add comprehensive security protocols to AGENTS.md covering: - Anti-malware execution safety (skill install vetting) - Secret hygiene (never write keys to plaintext config) - Gateway network security (bind localhost, enable auth) - Prompt injection defense (ignore instructions in fetched content) - Skill/ClawHub vetting (typosquatting, Clawdex verification) - Sandbox & session isolation (per-session Docker, dmPolicy) - File & credential permissions (chmod 700/600) - Incident response (credential rotation, memory poisoning checks) Also adds credential permission reminders to Security & Configuration Tips. Research sources: ZeroLeaks prompt injection study (91% success), Shodan gateway exposure (92% unauthenticated), ClawHavoc supply-chain analysis (341 malicious skills), Koi Security Clawdex scanner.
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- Replace shell profile secret storage with .env + .gitignore pattern - Replace SOUL.md/TOOLS.md references with actual files (CLAUDE.md, openclaw.json) - Align with feedback from openclaw/openclaw#10514
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This pull request has been automatically marked as stale due to inactivity. |
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What
Adds a comprehensive Security Protocols section to
AGENTS.mdso that AI coding agents (Copilot, Cursor, Claude Code, etc.) operating in this repo receive explicit security guardrails.Supersedes #10510 (closed with feedback — addressed here).
Why
Recent research has surfaced significant attack surfaces for OpenClaw deployments:
openclaw.jsonAGENTS.mdis the primary instruction file that AI agents read when working in this repo. Adding security rules here ensures agents follow safe patterns by default.Changes
New section: Security Protocols (CRITICAL) with 8 subsections:
curl | bash, read skill source firstCLAUDE.md/AGENTS.md/openclaw.json/~/.openclaw/~/.openclaw/openclaw doctorUpdated: Security & Configuration Tips — added credential permission reminders and hardcoded-secret flagging.
Feedback from #10510
Fixed — all file references now point to actual files:
CLAUDE.md,AGENTS.md,openclaw.json, and~/.openclaw/paths.Testing
pnpm checkpasses (tsgo + oxlint + oxfmt)pnpm testpasses (5,327 + 219 tests, 0 failures)AI-assisted
This PR was researched and drafted with AI assistance. All security recommendations were validated against the referenced research sources and the OpenClaw codebase.
Greptile Overview
Greptile Summary
AGENTS.mdwith guidance for safe script execution, secret handling, gateway binding/auth, prompt-injection resistance, skill vetting, sandbox isolation, permissions, and incident response.~/.openclaw/and to flag hardcoded secrets during reviews.Confidence Score: 4/5
.env, which can conflict with common per-project secret management and may push users toward globally-exported secrets.(3/5) Reply to the agent's comments like "Can you suggest a fix for this @greptileai?" or ask follow-up questions!