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## Why [PR #1705](#1705) moved `apply_patch` execution under the configured sandbox and called out the need for integration coverage. We already covered textual `../` escapes, but did not have coverage for link aliases that live inside a writable workspace while pointing at, or aliasing, files visible outside it. This PR locks in the current sandbox boundary without changing production write semantics. Symlink escapes into a read-only outside root should fail and leave the outside file unchanged. Existing hard links are characterized separately: if a user-created hard link already exists inside the writable root, sandboxed writes preserve normal hard-link semantics rather than replacing the link and silently breaking that relationship. ## What Changed - Added `apply_patch_cli_does_not_write_through_symlink_escape_outside_workspace` to verify `apply_patch` cannot update a symlink that targets a file outside the writable workspace. - Added `apply_patch_cli_preserves_existing_hard_link_outside_workspace` to verify `apply_patch` intentionally writes through an existing hard link and does not unlink or replace it. - Added `file_system_sandboxed_write_preserves_existing_hard_link` to verify sandboxed `fs/writeFile` preserves an existing hard link and writes the shared inode. ## Testing - `cargo test -p codex-exec-server file_system_sandboxed_write` - `cargo test -p codex-core apply_patch_cli_does_not_write_through_symlink_escape_outside_workspace` - `cargo test -p codex-core apply_patch_cli_preserves_existing_hard_link_outside_workspace` - `just fix -p codex-exec-server -p codex-core` - `just fix -p codex-core` --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/21819). * #21845 * __->__ #21819
agogo233
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May 15, 2026
## Why [PR openai#1705](openai#1705) moved `apply_patch` execution under the configured sandbox and called out the need for integration coverage. We already covered textual `../` escapes, but did not have coverage for link aliases that live inside a writable workspace while pointing at, or aliasing, files visible outside it. This PR locks in the current sandbox boundary without changing production write semantics. Symlink escapes into a read-only outside root should fail and leave the outside file unchanged. Existing hard links are characterized separately: if a user-created hard link already exists inside the writable root, sandboxed writes preserve normal hard-link semantics rather than replacing the link and silently breaking that relationship. ## What Changed - Added `apply_patch_cli_does_not_write_through_symlink_escape_outside_workspace` to verify `apply_patch` cannot update a symlink that targets a file outside the writable workspace. - Added `apply_patch_cli_preserves_existing_hard_link_outside_workspace` to verify `apply_patch` intentionally writes through an existing hard link and does not unlink or replace it. - Added `file_system_sandboxed_write_preserves_existing_hard_link` to verify sandboxed `fs/writeFile` preserves an existing hard link and writes the shared inode. ## Testing - `cargo test -p codex-exec-server file_system_sandboxed_write` - `cargo test -p codex-core apply_patch_cli_does_not_write_through_symlink_escape_outside_workspace` - `cargo test -p codex-core apply_patch_cli_preserves_existing_hard_link_outside_workspace` - `just fix -p codex-exec-server -p codex-core` - `just fix -p codex-core` --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/21819). * openai#21845 * __->__ openai#21819
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dkropachev
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Jun 9, 2026
## Why [PR openai#1705](openai#1705) moved `apply_patch` execution under the configured sandbox and called out the need for integration coverage. We already covered textual `../` escapes, but did not have coverage for link aliases that live inside a writable workspace while pointing at, or aliasing, files visible outside it. This PR locks in the current sandbox boundary without changing production write semantics. Symlink escapes into a read-only outside root should fail and leave the outside file unchanged. Existing hard links are characterized separately: if a user-created hard link already exists inside the writable root, sandboxed writes preserve normal hard-link semantics rather than replacing the link and silently breaking that relationship. ## What Changed - Added `apply_patch_cli_does_not_write_through_symlink_escape_outside_workspace` to verify `apply_patch` cannot update a symlink that targets a file outside the writable workspace. - Added `apply_patch_cli_preserves_existing_hard_link_outside_workspace` to verify `apply_patch` intentionally writes through an existing hard link and does not unlink or replace it. - Added `file_system_sandboxed_write_preserves_existing_hard_link` to verify sandboxed `fs/writeFile` preserves an existing hard link and writes the shared inode. ## Testing - `cargo test -p codex-exec-server file_system_sandboxed_write` - `cargo test -p codex-core apply_patch_cli_does_not_write_through_symlink_escape_outside_workspace` - `cargo test -p codex-core apply_patch_cli_preserves_existing_hard_link_outside_workspace` - `just fix -p codex-exec-server -p codex-core` - `just fix -p codex-core` --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/21819). * openai#21845 * __->__ openai#21819
AIALRA-0
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Jun 10, 2026
## Why [PR openai#1705](openai#1705) moved `apply_patch` execution under the configured sandbox and called out the need for integration coverage. We already covered textual `../` escapes, but did not have coverage for link aliases that live inside a writable workspace while pointing at, or aliasing, files visible outside it. This PR locks in the current sandbox boundary without changing production write semantics. Symlink escapes into a read-only outside root should fail and leave the outside file unchanged. Existing hard links are characterized separately: if a user-created hard link already exists inside the writable root, sandboxed writes preserve normal hard-link semantics rather than replacing the link and silently breaking that relationship. ## What Changed - Added `apply_patch_cli_does_not_write_through_symlink_escape_outside_workspace` to verify `apply_patch` cannot update a symlink that targets a file outside the writable workspace. - Added `apply_patch_cli_preserves_existing_hard_link_outside_workspace` to verify `apply_patch` intentionally writes through an existing hard link and does not unlink or replace it. - Added `file_system_sandboxed_write_preserves_existing_hard_link` to verify sandboxed `fs/writeFile` preserves an existing hard link and writes the shared inode. ## Testing - `cargo test -p codex-exec-server file_system_sandboxed_write` - `cargo test -p codex-core apply_patch_cli_does_not_write_through_symlink_escape_outside_workspace` - `cargo test -p codex-core apply_patch_cli_preserves_existing_hard_link_outside_workspace` - `just fix -p codex-exec-server -p codex-core` - `just fix -p codex-core` --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/21819). * openai#21845 * __->__ openai#21819
AIALRA-0
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Jun 10, 2026
## Why [PR openai#1705](openai#1705) moved `apply_patch` execution under the configured sandbox and called out the need for integration coverage. We already covered textual `../` escapes, but did not have coverage for link aliases that live inside a writable workspace while pointing at, or aliasing, files visible outside it. This PR locks in the current sandbox boundary without changing production write semantics. Symlink escapes into a read-only outside root should fail and leave the outside file unchanged. Existing hard links are characterized separately: if a user-created hard link already exists inside the writable root, sandboxed writes preserve normal hard-link semantics rather than replacing the link and silently breaking that relationship. ## What Changed - Added `apply_patch_cli_does_not_write_through_symlink_escape_outside_workspace` to verify `apply_patch` cannot update a symlink that targets a file outside the writable workspace. - Added `apply_patch_cli_preserves_existing_hard_link_outside_workspace` to verify `apply_patch` intentionally writes through an existing hard link and does not unlink or replace it. - Added `file_system_sandboxed_write_preserves_existing_hard_link` to verify sandboxed `fs/writeFile` preserves an existing hard link and writes the shared inode. ## Testing - `cargo test -p codex-exec-server file_system_sandboxed_write` - `cargo test -p codex-core apply_patch_cli_does_not_write_through_symlink_escape_outside_workspace` - `cargo test -p codex-core apply_patch_cli_preserves_existing_hard_link_outside_workspace` - `just fix -p codex-exec-server -p codex-core` - `just fix -p codex-core` --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/21819). * openai#21845 * __->__ openai#21819
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Why
#21819 adds high-level coverage for sandboxed
apply_patchand sandboxedfs/writeFilebehavior around link aliases. This follow-up tests the lower-level macOS workspace-write sandbox directly so the boundary is explicit.The important distinction is that writing an existing hard link inside the writable workspace preserves normal filesystem semantics, but that is not an arbitrary-write primitive by itself: the sandbox rejects creating a new hard link to a file outside the workspace, and it rejects symlink write-through to an outside target.
What Changed
Added macOS-only
codex-execsandbox tests that verify workspace-write:Testing
cargo test -p codex-exec macos_workspace_writejust fix -p codex-execStack created with Sapling. Best reviewed with ReviewStack.