chore(deps): update module github.com/sigstore/timestamp-authority/v2 to v2.0.6 [security]#2280
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… to v2.0.6 [security] (#2280) This PR contains the following updates: | Package | Type | Update | Change | OpenSSF | |---|---|---|---|---| | [github.com/sigstore/timestamp-authority/v2](https://redirect.github.com/sigstore/timestamp-authority) | indirect | patch | `v2.0.5` → `v2.0.6` | [](https://securityscorecards.dev/viewer/?uri=github.com/sigstore/timestamp-authority) | --- > [!WARNING] > Some dependencies could not be looked up. Check the [Dependency Dashboard](../issues/331) for more information. ### GitHub Vulnerability Alerts #### [CVE-2026-39984](https://redirect.github.com/sigstore/timestamp-authority/security/advisories/GHSA-xm5m-wgh2-rrg3) ### Authorization bypass via certificate bag manipulation in sigstore/timestamp-authority verifier An authorization bypass vulnerability exists in sigstore/timestamp-authority verifier (timestamp-authority/v2/pkg/verification): `VerifyTimestampResponse` function correctly verifies the certificate chain but when the TSA specific constraints are verified in `VerifyLeafCert`, the first non-CA certificate from the PKCS#7 certificate bag is used instead of the leaf certificate from the certificate chain. An attacker can exploit this by prepending a forged certificate to the certificate bag while the message is signed with an authorized key. The library validates the signature using the one certificate but performs authorization checks on the another, allowing an attacker to bypass some authorization controls. This vulnerability does **not** apply to timestamp-authority service, only to users of `timestamp-authority/v2/pkg/verification` package. This vulnerability does **not** apply to sigstore-go even though it is a user of `timestamp-authority/v2/pkg/verification`: Providing `TSACertificate` option to `VerifyTimestampResponse` fully mitigates the issue. ### Patches The issue will be fixed in timestamp-authority 2.0.6 ### Workarounds Users of `VerifyTimestampResponse` can use the `TSACertificate` option to specify the exact certificate they expect to be used: this fully mitigates the issue. ### References This issue was found after reading CVE-2026-33753 / GHSA-3xxc-pwj6-jgrj (originally reported by @​Jaynornj and @​Pr00fOf3xpl0it) --- ### Release Notes <details> <summary>sigstore/timestamp-authority (github.com/sigstore/timestamp-authority/v2)</summary> ### [`v2.0.6`](https://redirect.github.com/sigstore/timestamp-authority/releases/tag/v2.0.6) [Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/sigstore/timestamp-authority/compare/v2.0.5...v2.0.6) #### What's Changed - Ensure correct certificate is used for TSA auth checks (GHSA-xm5m-wgh2-rrg3) by [@​jku](https://redirect.github.com/jku) in [#​1333](https://redirect.github.com/sigstore/timestamp-authority/pull/1333) **Full Changelog**: <sigstore/timestamp-authority@v2.0.5...v2.0.6> </details> --- ### Configuration 📅 **Schedule**: (UTC) - Branch creation - "" - Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined) 🚦 **Automerge**: Enabled. ♻ **Rebasing**: Whenever PR is behind base branch, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox. 🔕 **Ignore**: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again. --- - [ ] <!-- rebase-check -->If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box --- This PR has been generated by [Renovate Bot](https://redirect.github.com/renovatebot/renovate). <!--renovate-debug:eyJjcmVhdGVkSW5WZXIiOiI0My4xMTMuMCIsInVwZGF0ZWRJblZlciI6IjQzLjExMy4wIiwidGFyZ2V0QnJhbmNoIjoibWFpbiIsImxhYmVscyI6W119--> Co-authored-by: ocmbot[bot] <125909804+ocmbot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> b7809b8
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… to v2.0.6 [security] (open-component-model#2280) This PR contains the following updates: | Package | Type | Update | Change | OpenSSF | |---|---|---|---|---| | [github.com/sigstore/timestamp-authority/v2](https://redirect.github.com/sigstore/timestamp-authority) | indirect | patch | `v2.0.5` → `v2.0.6` | [](https://securityscorecards.dev/viewer/?uri=github.com/sigstore/timestamp-authority) | --- > [!WARNING] > Some dependencies could not be looked up. Check the [Dependency Dashboard](..open-component-model/issues/331) for more information. ### GitHub Vulnerability Alerts #### [CVE-2026-39984](https://redirect.github.com/sigstore/timestamp-authority/security/advisories/GHSA-xm5m-wgh2-rrg3) ### Authorization bypass via certificate bag manipulation in sigstore/timestamp-authority verifier An authorization bypass vulnerability exists in sigstore/timestamp-authority verifier (timestamp-authority/v2/pkg/verification): `VerifyTimestampResponse` function correctly verifies the certificate chain but when the TSA specific constraints are verified in `VerifyLeafCert`, the first non-CA certificate from the PKCS#7 certificate bag is used instead of the leaf certificate from the certificate chain. An attacker can exploit this by prepending a forged certificate to the certificate bag while the message is signed with an authorized key. The library validates the signature using the one certificate but performs authorization checks on the another, allowing an attacker to bypass some authorization controls. This vulnerability does **not** apply to timestamp-authority service, only to users of `timestamp-authority/v2/pkg/verification` package. This vulnerability does **not** apply to sigstore-go even though it is a user of `timestamp-authority/v2/pkg/verification`: Providing `TSACertificate` option to `VerifyTimestampResponse` fully mitigates the issue. ### Patches The issue will be fixed in timestamp-authority 2.0.6 ### Workarounds Users of `VerifyTimestampResponse` can use the `TSACertificate` option to specify the exact certificate they expect to be used: this fully mitigates the issue. ### References This issue was found after reading CVE-2026-33753 / GHSA-3xxc-pwj6-jgrj (originally reported by @​Jaynornj and @​Pr00fOf3xpl0it) --- ### Release Notes <details> <summary>sigstore/timestamp-authority (github.com/sigstore/timestamp-authority/v2)</summary> ### [`v2.0.6`](https://redirect.github.com/sigstore/timestamp-authority/releases/tag/v2.0.6) [Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/sigstore/timestamp-authority/compare/v2.0.5...v2.0.6) #### What's Changed - Ensure correct certificate is used for TSA auth checks (GHSA-xm5m-wgh2-rrg3) by [@​jku](https://redirect.github.com/jku) in [#​1333](https://redirect.github.com/sigstore/timestamp-authority/pull/1333) **Full Changelog**: <sigstore/timestamp-authority@v2.0.5...v2.0.6> </details> --- ### Configuration 📅 **Schedule**: (UTC) - Branch creation - "" - Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined) 🚦 **Automerge**: Enabled. ♻ **Rebasing**: Whenever PR is behind base branch, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox. 🔕 **Ignore**: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again. --- - [ ] <!-- rebase-check -->If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box --- This PR has been generated by [Renovate Bot](https://redirect.github.com/renovatebot/renovate). <!--renovate-debug:eyJjcmVhdGVkSW5WZXIiOiI0My4xMTMuMCIsInVwZGF0ZWRJblZlciI6IjQzLjExMy4wIiwidGFyZ2V0QnJhbmNoIjoibWFpbiIsImxhYmVscyI6W119--> Co-authored-by: ocmbot[bot] <125909804+ocmbot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Signed-off-by: Gerald Morrison (SAP) <gerald.morrison@sap.com>
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… to v2.0.6 [security] (open-component-model#2280) This PR contains the following updates: | Package | Type | Update | Change | OpenSSF | |---|---|---|---|---| | [github.com/sigstore/timestamp-authority/v2](https://redirect.github.com/sigstore/timestamp-authority) | indirect | patch | `v2.0.5` → `v2.0.6` | [](https://securityscorecards.dev/viewer/?uri=github.com/sigstore/timestamp-authority) | --- > [!WARNING] > Some dependencies could not be looked up. Check the [Dependency Dashboard](..open-component-model/issues/331) for more information. ### GitHub Vulnerability Alerts #### [CVE-2026-39984](https://redirect.github.com/sigstore/timestamp-authority/security/advisories/GHSA-xm5m-wgh2-rrg3) ### Authorization bypass via certificate bag manipulation in sigstore/timestamp-authority verifier An authorization bypass vulnerability exists in sigstore/timestamp-authority verifier (timestamp-authority/v2/pkg/verification): `VerifyTimestampResponse` function correctly verifies the certificate chain but when the TSA specific constraints are verified in `VerifyLeafCert`, the first non-CA certificate from the PKCS#7 certificate bag is used instead of the leaf certificate from the certificate chain. An attacker can exploit this by prepending a forged certificate to the certificate bag while the message is signed with an authorized key. The library validates the signature using the one certificate but performs authorization checks on the another, allowing an attacker to bypass some authorization controls. This vulnerability does **not** apply to timestamp-authority service, only to users of `timestamp-authority/v2/pkg/verification` package. This vulnerability does **not** apply to sigstore-go even though it is a user of `timestamp-authority/v2/pkg/verification`: Providing `TSACertificate` option to `VerifyTimestampResponse` fully mitigates the issue. ### Patches The issue will be fixed in timestamp-authority 2.0.6 ### Workarounds Users of `VerifyTimestampResponse` can use the `TSACertificate` option to specify the exact certificate they expect to be used: this fully mitigates the issue. ### References This issue was found after reading CVE-2026-33753 / GHSA-3xxc-pwj6-jgrj (originally reported by @​Jaynornj and @​Pr00fOf3xpl0it) --- ### Release Notes <details> <summary>sigstore/timestamp-authority (github.com/sigstore/timestamp-authority/v2)</summary> ### [`v2.0.6`](https://redirect.github.com/sigstore/timestamp-authority/releases/tag/v2.0.6) [Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/sigstore/timestamp-authority/compare/v2.0.5...v2.0.6) #### What's Changed - Ensure correct certificate is used for TSA auth checks (GHSA-xm5m-wgh2-rrg3) by [@​jku](https://redirect.github.com/jku) in [#​1333](https://redirect.github.com/sigstore/timestamp-authority/pull/1333) **Full Changelog**: <sigstore/timestamp-authority@v2.0.5...v2.0.6> </details> --- ### Configuration 📅 **Schedule**: (UTC) - Branch creation - "" - Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined) 🚦 **Automerge**: Enabled. ♻ **Rebasing**: Whenever PR is behind base branch, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox. 🔕 **Ignore**: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again. --- - [ ] <!-- rebase-check -->If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box --- This PR has been generated by [Renovate Bot](https://redirect.github.com/renovatebot/renovate). <!--renovate-debug:eyJjcmVhdGVkSW5WZXIiOiI0My4xMTMuMCIsInVwZGF0ZWRJblZlciI6IjQzLjExMy4wIiwidGFyZ2V0QnJhbmNoIjoibWFpbiIsImxhYmVscyI6W119--> Co-authored-by: ocmbot[bot] <125909804+ocmbot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Signed-off-by: Gerald Morrison (SAP) <gerald.morrison@sap.com>
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This PR contains the following updates:
v2.0.5→v2.0.6Warning
Some dependencies could not be looked up. Check the Dependency Dashboard for more information.
GitHub Vulnerability Alerts
CVE-2026-39984
Authorization bypass via certificate bag manipulation in sigstore/timestamp-authority verifier
An authorization bypass vulnerability exists in sigstore/timestamp-authority verifier (timestamp-authority/v2/pkg/verification):
VerifyTimestampResponsefunction correctly verifies the certificate chain but when the TSA specific constraints are verified inVerifyLeafCert, the first non-CA certificate from the PKCS#7 certificate bag is used instead of the leaf certificate from the certificate chain. An attacker can exploit this by prepending a forged certificate to the certificate bag while the message is signed with an authorized key. The library validates the signature using the one certificate but performs authorization checks on the another, allowing an attacker to bypass some authorization controls.This vulnerability does not apply to timestamp-authority service, only to users of
timestamp-authority/v2/pkg/verificationpackage.This vulnerability does not apply to sigstore-go even though it is a user of
timestamp-authority/v2/pkg/verification: ProvidingTSACertificateoption toVerifyTimestampResponsefully mitigates the issue.Patches
The issue will be fixed in timestamp-authority 2.0.6
Workarounds
Users of
VerifyTimestampResponsecan use theTSACertificateoption to specify the exact certificate they expect to be used: this fully mitigates the issue.References
This issue was found after reading CVE-2026-33753 / GHSA-3xxc-pwj6-jgrj (originally reported by @Jaynornj and @Pr00fOf3xpl0it)
Release Notes
sigstore/timestamp-authority (github.com/sigstore/timestamp-authority/v2)
v2.0.6Compare Source
What's Changed
Full Changelog: sigstore/timestamp-authority@v2.0.5...v2.0.6
Configuration
📅 Schedule: (UTC)
🚦 Automerge: Enabled.
♻ Rebasing: Whenever PR is behind base branch, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.
🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.
This PR has been generated by Renovate Bot.