hope all the FORK points can be resolved before the upgrade
by submitting a transaction with script FORKTRIGGER(); NEO.transfer(self, victim, amount) inside when v3.5.0, the attacker will get his money back when v3.6.0.
ALL the PRs listed above should not be blamed, since looking at these pull requests individually, there is no problem with their implementation. while in the context of upgrading from v3.5.0, more historical baggage is introduced. maintainers should create a new PR to handle all possible fork points to ensure mainnet state consistency.
I'm fine if the final decision is to ignore the fork risks and proceed to upgrade to v3.6.0. we will still try to monitor, warn and prevent possible forks as much as possible to keep the mainnet safe though I don't think we should let the mainnet take the risk.
hardfork PRs should learn from #2810
if (!IsHardforkEnabled(Hardfork.HF_Basilisk))
{
RuntimeNotifyV1(eventName, state);
return;
}
hope all the FORK points can be resolved before the upgrade
ContractManagement.GetContractByIdContractManagement.GetContractHashesNeoToken.UnclaimedGASNeoToken.GetAccountStateCryptoLib.Bls12381Deserializeby submitting a transaction with script
FORKTRIGGER(); NEO.transfer(self, victim, amount)inside when v3.5.0, the attacker will get his money back when v3.6.0.ALL the PRs listed above should not be blamed, since looking at these pull requests individually, there is no problem with their implementation. while in the context of upgrading from v3.5.0, more historical baggage is introduced. maintainers should create a new PR to handle all possible fork points to ensure mainnet state consistency.
I'm fine if the final decision is to ignore the fork risks and proceed to upgrade to v3.6.0. we will still try to monitor, warn and prevent possible forks as much as possible to keep the mainnet safe though I don't think we should let the mainnet take the risk.