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@nhlfr nhlfr commented Feb 15, 2017

Just showing my idea and progress, not ready for submitting upstream yet.


The --system-call-filter option allows to override the default
seccomp filter with the list predefined by the user.

Fixes systemd#5163

.help = "System calls filter for systemd-nspawn",
.value =
"_sysctl\0"
"add_key"
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What is the \0? I wonder why it's there for _sysctl but not for the other.

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My fault, I need to add \0 everywhere, as it separates syscalls in filter, like here https://github.com/systemd/systemd/blob/master/src/shared/seccomp-util.c#L267-L647

SyscallFilterSet filter;
int capability;
} SyscallFilterSetCap;
#endif
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Is there a reason to have the typedef SyscallFilterSetCap inside the "#ifdef"?

I am not quite sure about systemd, but in the Linux kernel header files, they try to have the definitions being defined both in #ifdef block and the #else block, sometimes with dummy struct/functions definitions for the #else block.

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example of dummy function from http://www.linuxjournal.com/node/5780/print :

#if ENABLE_BLAAH
#define blaah(x) if(x) printf("blaah %d\n",x)
#else
#define blaah(x) do { } while(0)
#endif

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Well, I thought that seccomp-util.h can be included only when having seccomp headers, but that's not true, so I removed it. Thanks for pointing out.

@nhlfr nhlfr force-pushed the nhlfr/nspawn-system-call-filter branch 2 times, most recently from f7bddac to c5face9 Compare February 15, 2017 15:12
@nhlfr nhlfr force-pushed the nhlfr/nspawn-system-call-filter branch from c5face9 to 32e96f0 Compare February 24, 2017 15:36
The --system-call-filter option allows to override the default
seccomp filter with the list predefined by the user.

Fixes systemd#5163
@nhlfr nhlfr force-pushed the nhlfr/nspawn-system-call-filter branch from 32e96f0 to 51a8791 Compare February 24, 2017 15:38
@nhlfr nhlfr closed this Mar 2, 2017
alban pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 20, 2017
We would only log a terse message when pid1 or systemd-journald crashed.
It seems better to reuse the normal code paths as much as possible,
with the following differences:
- if pid1 crashes, we cannot launch the helper, so we don't analyze the
 coredump, just write it to file directly from the helper invoked by the
 kernel;
- if journald crashes, we can produce the backtrace, but we don't log full
  structured messages.

With comparison to previous code, advantages are:
- we go through most of the steps, so for example vacuuming is performed,
- we gather and log more data. In particular for journald and pid1 crashes we
  generate a backtrace, and for pid1 crashes we record the metadata (fdinfo,
  maps, etc.),
- coredumpctl shows pid1 crashes.

A disavantage (inefficiency) is that we gather metadata for journald crashes
which is then ignored because _TRANSPORT=kernel does not support structued
messages.

Messages for the systemd-journald "crash" have _TRANSPORT=kernel, and
_TRANSPORT=journal for the pid1 "crash".

Feb 26 16:27:55 systemd[1]: systemd-journald.service: Main process exited, code=dumped, status=11/SEGV
Feb 26 16:27:55 systemd[1]: systemd-journald.service: Unit entered failed state.
Feb 26 16:37:54 systemd-coredump[18801]: Process 18729 (systemd-journal) of user 0 dumped core.
Feb 26 16:37:54 systemd-coredump[18801]: Coredump diverted to /var/lib/systemd/coredump/core.systemd-journal.0.36c14bf3c6ce4c38914f441038990979.18729.1488145074000000.lz4
Feb 26 16:37:54 systemd-coredump[18801]: Stack trace of thread 18729:
Feb 26 16:37:54 systemd-coredump[18801]: #0  0x00007f46d6a06b8d fsync (libpthread.so.0)
Feb 26 16:37:54 systemd-coredump[18801]: #1  0x00007f46d71bfc47 journal_file_set_online (libsystemd-shared-233.so)
Feb 26 16:37:54 systemd-coredump[18801]: #2  0x00007f46d71c1c31 journal_file_append_object (libsystemd-shared-233.so)
Feb 26 16:37:54 systemd-coredump[18801]: #3  0x00007f46d71c3405 journal_file_append_data (libsystemd-shared-233.so)
Feb 26 16:37:54 systemd-coredump[18801]: #4  0x00007f46d71c4b7c journal_file_append_entry (libsystemd-shared-233.so)
Feb 26 16:37:54 systemd-coredump[18801]: #5  0x00005577688cf056 write_to_journal (systemd-journald)
Feb 26 16:37:54 systemd-coredump[18801]: #6  0x00005577688d2e98 dispatch_message_real (systemd-journald)
Feb 26 16:37:54 kernel: systemd-coredum: 9 output lines suppressed due to ratelimiting
Feb 26 16:37:54 systemd-journald[18810]: Journal started

Feb 26 16:50:59 systemd-coredump[19229]: Due to PID 1 having crashed coredump collection will now be turned off.
Feb 26 16:51:00 systemd[1]: Caught <SEGV>, dumped core as pid 19228.
Feb 26 16:51:00 systemd[1]: Freezing execution.
Feb 26 16:51:00 systemd-coredump[19229]: Process 19228 (systemd) of user 0 dumped core.

                                         Stack trace of thread 19228:
                                         #0  0x00007fab82075c47 kill (libc.so.6)
                                         #1  0x000055fdf7c38b6b crash (systemd)
                                         #2  0x00007fab824175c0 __restore_rt (libpthread.so.0)
                                         #3  0x00007fab82148573 epoll_wait (libc.so.6)
                                         #4  0x00007fab8366f84a sd_event_wait (libsystemd-shared-233.so)
                                         #5  0x00007fab836701de sd_event_run (libsystemd-shared-233.so)
                                         #6  0x000055fdf7c4a380 manager_loop (systemd)
                                         #7  0x000055fdf7c402c2 main (systemd)
                                         systemd#8  0x00007fab82060401 __libc_start_main (libc.so.6)
                                         systemd#9  0x000055fdf7c3818a _start (systemd)

Poor machine ;)
iaguis pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 7, 2017
So don't even try to added the filter to reduce noise.
The test is updated to skip calling _sysctl because the kernel prints
an oops-like message that is confusing and unhelpful:

Jul 15 21:07:01 rpi3 kernel: test-seccomp[8448]: syscall -10080
Jul 15 21:07:01 rpi3 kernel: Code: aa0503e4 aa0603e5 aa0703e6 d4000001 (b13ffc1f)
Jul 15 21:07:01 rpi3 kernel: CPU: 3 PID: 8448 Comm: test-seccomp Tainted: G        W       4.11.8-300.fc26.aarch64 #1
Jul 15 21:07:01 rpi3 kernel: Hardware name: raspberrypi rpi/rpi, BIOS 2017.05 06/24/2017
Jul 15 21:07:01 rpi3 kernel: task: ffff80002bb0bb00 task.stack: ffff800036354000
Jul 15 21:07:01 rpi3 kernel: PC is at 0xffff8669c7c4
Jul 15 21:07:01 rpi3 kernel: LR is at 0xaaaac64b6750
Jul 15 21:07:01 rpi3 kernel: pc : [<0000ffff8669c7c4>] lr : [<0000aaaac64b6750>] pstate: 60000000
Jul 15 21:07:01 rpi3 kernel: sp : 0000ffffdc640fd0
Jul 15 21:07:01 rpi3 kernel: x29: 0000ffffdc640fd0 x28: 0000000000000000
Jul 15 21:07:01 rpi3 kernel: x27: 0000000000000000 x26: 0000000000000000
Jul 15 21:07:01 rpi3 kernel: x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000
Jul 15 21:07:01 rpi3 kernel: x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000
Jul 15 21:07:01 rpi3 kernel: x21: 0000aaaac64b4940 x20: 0000000000000000
Jul 15 21:07:01 rpi3 kernel: x19: 0000aaaac64b88f8 x18: 0000000000000020
Jul 15 21:07:01 rpi3 kernel: x17: 0000ffff8669c7a0 x16: 0000aaaac64d2ee0
Jul 15 21:07:01 rpi3 kernel: x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000
Jul 15 21:07:01 rpi3 kernel: x13: 203a657275746365 x12: 0000000000000000
Jul 15 21:07:01 rpi3 kernel: x11: 0000ffffdc640418 x10: 0000000000000000
Jul 15 21:07:01 rpi3 kernel: x9 : 0000000000000005 x8 : 00000000ffffd8a0
Jul 15 21:07:01 rpi3 kernel: x7 : 7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f x6 : 7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f
Jul 15 21:07:01 rpi3 kernel: x5 : 65736d68716f7277 x4 : 0000000000000000
Jul 15 21:07:01 rpi3 kernel: x3 : 0000000000000008 x2 : 0000000000000000
Jul 15 21:07:01 rpi3 kernel: x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000
Jul 15 21:07:01 rpi3 kernel:

(cherry picked from commit 1e20e640132c700c23494bb9e2619afb83878380)
iaguis pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 29, 2018
In general we'd leak anything that was allocated in the first parsing of
netdev, e.g. netdev name, host name, etc. Use normal netdev_unref to make sure
everything is freed.

--- command ---
/home/zbyszek/src/systemd/build2/test-network
--- stderr ---
/etc/systemd/network/wg0.netdev:3: Failed to parse netdev kind, ignoring: wireguard
/etc/systemd/network/wg0.netdev:5: Unknown section 'WireGuard'. Ignoring.
/etc/systemd/network/wg0.netdev:9: Unknown section 'WireGuardPeer'. Ignoring.
NetDev has no Kind configured in /etc/systemd/network/wg0.netdev. Ignoring
/etc/systemd/network/br0.network:13: Unknown lvalue 'NetDev' in section 'Network'
br0: netdev ready

=================================================================
==11666==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks

Direct leak of 4 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7f3a314cf238 in __interceptor_strdup (/lib64/libasan.so.4+0x77238)
    #1 0x7f3a30e71ad1 in free_and_strdup ../src/basic/string-util.c:870
    #2 0x7f3a30d34fba in config_parse_ifname ../src/shared/conf-parser.c:981
    #3 0x7f3a30d2f5b0 in next_assignment ../src/shared/conf-parser.c:155
    #4 0x7f3a30d30303 in parse_line ../src/shared/conf-parser.c:273
    #5 0x7f3a30d30dee in config_parse ../src/shared/conf-parser.c:390
    #6 0x7f3a30d310a5 in config_parse_many_files ../src/shared/conf-parser.c:428
    #7 0x7f3a30d3181c in config_parse_many ../src/shared/conf-parser.c:487
    systemd#8 0x55b4200f9b00 in netdev_load_one ../src/network/netdev/netdev.c:634
    systemd#9 0x55b4200fb562 in netdev_load ../src/network/netdev/netdev.c:778
    systemd#10 0x55b4200c607a in manager_load_config ../src/network/networkd-manager.c:1299
    systemd#11 0x55b4200818e0 in test_load_config ../src/network/test-network.c:128
    systemd#12 0x55b42008343b in main ../src/network/test-network.c:254
    systemd#13 0x7f3a305f8889 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x20889)

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 4 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s).
-------
iaguis pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 6, 2018
Early in journal_file_set_offline() f->header->state is tested to see if
it's != STATE_ONLINE, and since there's no need to do anything if the
journal isn't online, the function simply returned here.

Since moving part of the offlining process to a separate thread, there
are two problems here:

1. We can't simply check f->header->state, because if there is an
offline thread active it may modify f->header->state.

2. Even if the journal is deemed offline, the thread responsible may
still need joining, so a bare return may leak the thread's resources
like its stack.

To address #1, the helper journal_file_is_offlining() is called prior to
accessing f->header->state.

If journal_file_is_offlining() returns true, f->header->state isn't even
checked, because an offlining journal is obviously online, and we'll
just continue with the normal set offline code path.

If journal_file_is_offlining() returns false, then it's safe to check
f->header->state, because the offline_state is beyond the point of
modifying f->header->state, and there's a memory barrier in the helper.

If we find f->header->state is != STATE_ONLINE, then we call the
idempotent journal_file_set_offline_thread_join() on the way out of the
function, to join a potential lingering offline thread.
iaguis pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 6, 2018
Early in journal_file_set_offline() f->header->state is tested to see if
it's != STATE_ONLINE, and since there's no need to do anything if the
journal isn't online, the function simply returned here.

Since moving part of the offlining process to a separate thread, there
are two problems here:

1. We can't simply check f->header->state, because if there is an
offline thread active it may modify f->header->state.

2. Even if the journal is deemed offline, the thread responsible may
still need joining, so a bare return may leak the thread's resources
like its stack.

To address #1, the helper journal_file_is_offlining() is called prior to
accessing f->header->state.

If journal_file_is_offlining() returns true, f->header->state isn't even
checked, because an offlining journal is obviously online, and we'll
just continue with the normal set offline code path.

If journal_file_is_offlining() returns false, then it's safe to check
f->header->state, because the offline_state is beyond the point of
modifying f->header->state, and there's a memory barrier in the helper.

If we find f->header->state is != STATE_ONLINE, then we call the
idempotent journal_file_set_offline_thread_join() on the way out of the
function, to join a potential lingering offline thread.
dongsupark pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 1, 2018
==14==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60200055fa9c at pc 0x0000005458f1 bp 0x7ffc78940d90 sp 0x7ffc78940d88
READ of size 1 at 0x60200055fa9c thread T0
    #0 0x5458f0 in dhcp6_option_parse_domainname /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/libsystemd-network/dhcp6-option.c:555:29
    #1 0x54706e in dhcp6_lease_set_domains /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/libsystemd-network/sd-dhcp6-lease.c:242:13
    #2 0x53fce0 in client_parse_message /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/libsystemd-network/sd-dhcp6-client.c:984:29
    #3 0x53f3bc in client_receive_advertise /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/libsystemd-network/sd-dhcp6-client.c:1083:13
    #4 0x53d57f in client_receive_message /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/libsystemd-network/sd-dhcp6-client.c:1182:21
    #5 0x7f0f7159deee in source_dispatch /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/libsystemd/sd-event/sd-event.c:3042:21
    #6 0x7f0f7159d431 in sd_event_dispatch /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/libsystemd/sd-event/sd-event.c:3455:21
    #7 0x7f0f7159ea8d in sd_event_run /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/libsystemd/sd-event/sd-event.c:3512:21
    systemd#8 0x531f2b in fuzz_client /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/fuzz/fuzz-dhcp6-client.c:44:9
    systemd#9 0x531bc1 in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/fuzz/fuzz-dhcp6-client.c:53:9
    systemd#10 0x57bec8 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ExecuteCallback(unsigned char const*, unsigned long) /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:570:15
    systemd#11 0x579d67 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::RunOne(unsigned char const*, unsigned long, bool, fuzzer::InputInfo*, bool*) /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:479:3
    systemd#12 0x57dc92 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::MutateAndTestOne() /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:707:19
    systemd#13 0x580ca6 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::Loop(std::__1::vector<std::__1::basic_string<char, std::__1::char_traits<char>, std::__1::allocator<char> >, fuzzer::fuzzer_allocator<std::__1::basic_string<char, std::__1::char_traits<char>, std::__1::allocator<char> > > > const&) /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:838:5
    systemd#14 0x55e968 in fuzzer::FuzzerDriver(int*, char***, int (*)(unsigned char const*, unsigned long)) /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerDriver.cpp:764:6
    systemd#15 0x551a1c in main /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerMain.cpp:20:10
    systemd#16 0x7f0f701a082f in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2082f)
    systemd#17 0x41e928 in _start (/out/fuzz-dhcp6-client+0x41e928)
dongsupark pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 1, 2018
==14==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x6020001c761a at pc 0x000000540abc bp 0x7ffd0caf2c50 sp 0x7ffd0caf2c48
READ of size 2 at 0x6020001c761a thread T0
    #0 0x540abb in client_parse_message /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/libsystemd-network/sd-dhcp6-client.c:849:73
    #1 0x53f3bc in client_receive_advertise /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/libsystemd-network/sd-dhcp6-client.c:1083:13
    #2 0x53d57f in client_receive_message /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/libsystemd-network/sd-dhcp6-client.c:1182:21
    #3 0x7f71d8c3eeee in source_dispatch /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/libsystemd/sd-event/sd-event.c:3042:21
    #4 0x7f71d8c3e431 in sd_event_dispatch /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/libsystemd/sd-event/sd-event.c:3455:21
    #5 0x7f71d8c3fa8d in sd_event_run /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/libsystemd/sd-event/sd-event.c:3512:21
    #6 0x531f2b in fuzz_client /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/fuzz/fuzz-dhcp6-client.c:44:9
    #7 0x531bc1 in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/fuzz/fuzz-dhcp6-client.c:53:9
    systemd#8 0x57bef8 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ExecuteCallback(unsigned char const*, unsigned long) /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:570:15
    systemd#9 0x579d97 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::RunOne(unsigned char const*, unsigned long, bool, fuzzer::InputInfo*, bool*) /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:479:3
    systemd#10 0x57dcc2 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::MutateAndTestOne() /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:707:19
    systemd#11 0x580cd6 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::Loop(std::__1::vector<std::__1::basic_string<char, std::__1::char_traits<char>, std::__1::allocator<char> >, fuzzer::fuzzer_allocator<std::__1::basic_string<char, std::__1::char_traits<char>, std::__1::allocator<char> > > > const&) /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:838:5
    systemd#12 0x55e998 in fuzzer::FuzzerDriver(int*, char***, int (*)(unsigned char const*, unsigned long)) /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerDriver.cpp:764:6
    systemd#13 0x551a4c in main /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerMain.cpp:20:10
    systemd#14 0x7f71d784182f in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2082f)
    systemd#15 0x41e928 in _start (/out/fuzz-dhcp6-client+0x41e928)
dongsupark pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 1, 2018
A couple of changes:

1. Clearly name the drop-in entry files "Type #1", and the unified
   kernel images "Type #2", and be clearer that the latter is specific
   to UEFI.

2. Suffix all directory paths with a trailing "/" to clarify that these
   are directories. Also, enclose them all in ``.

3. Add introductory paragraph that explains that there is Type #1 and
   Type #2 and what they are about.

4. Explain that Type #2 is about signed UEFI SecureBoot.

5. Don't claim that $BOOT/loader/ contains really all files defined by
   the spec, because that's not true, Type #2 images are not located there
   after all.

Fixes: systemd#10399
dongsupark pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 1, 2018
This is useful for a couple of cases, I'm mostly interested in case #1:

1. Verifying "reasonable" values in a trivially scriptable way
2. Debugging unexpected time span parsing directly

Test Plan:

```
% build/systemd-analyze timespan 20
Original: 20
      μs: 20
   Human: 20us
% build/systemd-analyze timespan 20ms
Original: 20ms
      μs: 20000
   Human: 20ms
% build/systemd-analyze timespan 20z
Failed to parse time span '20z': Invalid argument
```
dongsupark pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 1, 2018
This is a follow-up to 8857fb9 that prevents the fuzzer from crashing with
```
==220==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: ABRT on unknown address 0x0000000000dc (pc 0x7ff4953c8428 bp 0x7ffcf66ec290 sp 0x7ffcf66ec128 T0)
SCARINESS: 10 (signal)
    #0 0x7ff4953c8427 in gsignal (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x35427)
    #1 0x7ff4953ca029 in abort (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x37029)
    #2 0x7ff49666503a in log_assert_failed_realm /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/basic/log.c:805:9
    #3 0x7ff496614ecf in safe_close /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/basic/fd-util.c:66:17
    #4 0x548806 in server_done /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/journal/journald-server.c:2064:9
    #5 0x5349fa in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/fuzz/fuzz-journald-kmsg.c:26:9
    #6 0x592755 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ExecuteCallback(unsigned char const*, unsigned long) /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:571:15
    #7 0x590627 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::RunOne(unsigned char const*, unsigned long, bool, fuzzer::InputInfo*, bool*) /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:480:3
    systemd#8 0x594432 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::MutateAndTestOne() /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:708:19
    systemd#9 0x5973c6 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::Loop(std::__1::vector<std::__1::basic_string<char, std::__1::char_traits<char>, std::__1::allocator<char> >, fuzzer::fuzzer_allocator<std::__1::basic_string<char, std::__1::char_traits<char>, std::__1::allocator<char> > > > const&) /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:839:5
    systemd#10 0x574541 in fuzzer::FuzzerDriver(int*, char***, int (*)(unsigned char const*, unsigned long)) /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerDriver.cpp:764:6
    systemd#11 0x5675fc in main /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerMain.cpp:20:10
    systemd#12 0x7ff4953b382f in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2082f)
    systemd#13 0x420f58 in _start (/out/fuzz-journald-kmsg+0x420f58)
```
vbatts pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 12, 2020
vbatts pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 12, 2020
Fixes: oss-fuzz#22208

```
test/fuzz/fuzz-calendarspec/oss-fuzz-22208... ../src/shared/calendarspec.c:666:48: runtime error: signed integer overflow: 2147000000 + 1000000 cannot be represented in type 'int'
    #0 0x7f0b9f6cc56a in prepend_component ../src/shared/calendarspec.c:666
    #1 0x7f0b9f6cd03a in parse_chain ../src/shared/calendarspec.c:718
    #2 0x7f0b9f6cea1c in parse_calendar_time ../src/shared/calendarspec.c:845
    #3 0x7f0b9f6d1397 in calendar_spec_from_string ../src/shared/calendarspec.c:1084
    #4 0x401570 in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput ../src/fuzz/fuzz-calendarspec.c:17
    #5 0x401ae0 in main ../src/fuzz/fuzz-main.c:39
    #6 0x7f0b9e31b1a2 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x271a2)
    #7 0x40122d in _start (/home/fsumsal/repos/systemd/build/fuzz-calendarspec+0x40122d)

SUMMARY: UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer: undefined-behavior ../src/shared/calendarspec.c:666:48 in
```

(cherry picked from commit c07f18f)
vbatts pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 12, 2020
We'd try to map a zero-byte buffer from a NULL pointer, which is undefined behaviour.

src/systemd/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-message.c:3161:60: runtime error: applying zero offset to null pointer
    #0 0x7f6ff064e691 in find_part /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-message.c:3161:60
    #1 0x7f6ff0640788 in message_peek_body /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-message.c:3283:16
    #2 0x7f6ff064e8db in enter_struct_or_dict_entry /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-message.c:3967:21
    #3 0x7f6ff06444ac in bus_message_enter_struct /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-message.c:4009:13
    #4 0x7f6ff0641dde in sd_bus_message_enter_container /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-message.c:4136:21
    #5 0x7f6ff0619874 in sd_bus_message_dump /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-dump.c:178:29
    #6 0x4293d9 in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/fuzz/fuzz-bus-message.c:39:9
    #7 0x441986 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ExecuteCallback(unsigned char const*, unsigned long) /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:558:15
    systemd#8 0x44121e in fuzzer::Fuzzer::RunOne(unsigned char const*, unsigned long, bool, fuzzer::InputInfo*, bool*) /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:470:3
    systemd#9 0x443164 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ReadAndExecuteSeedCorpora(std::__1::vector<fuzzer::SizedFile, fuzzer::fuzzer_allocator<fuzzer::SizedFile> >&) /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:770:7
    systemd#10 0x4434bc in fuzzer::Fuzzer::Loop(std::__1::vector<fuzzer::SizedFile, fuzzer::fuzzer_allocator<fuzzer::SizedFile> >&) /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:799:3
    systemd#11 0x42d2bc in fuzzer::FuzzerDriver(int*, char***, int (*)(unsigned char const*, unsigned long)) /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerDriver.cpp:846:6
    systemd#12 0x42978a in main /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerMain.cpp:19:10
    systemd#13 0x7f6fef13c82f in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2082f)
    systemd#14 0x407808 in _start (out/fuzz-bus-message+0x407808)

(cherry picked from commit b17af3e)
vbatts pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 12, 2020
We'd try to map a zero-byte buffer from a NULL pointer, which is undefined behaviour.

src/systemd/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-message.c:3161:60: runtime error: applying zero offset to null pointer
    #0 0x7f6ff064e691 in find_part /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-message.c:3161:60
    #1 0x7f6ff0640788 in message_peek_body /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-message.c:3283:16
    #2 0x7f6ff064e8db in enter_struct_or_dict_entry /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-message.c:3967:21
    #3 0x7f6ff06444ac in bus_message_enter_struct /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-message.c:4009:13
    #4 0x7f6ff0641dde in sd_bus_message_enter_container /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-message.c:4136:21
    #5 0x7f6ff0619874 in sd_bus_message_dump /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-dump.c:178:29
    #6 0x4293d9 in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput /work/build/../../src/systemd/src/fuzz/fuzz-bus-message.c:39:9
    #7 0x441986 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ExecuteCallback(unsigned char const*, unsigned long) /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:558:15
    systemd#8 0x44121e in fuzzer::Fuzzer::RunOne(unsigned char const*, unsigned long, bool, fuzzer::InputInfo*, bool*) /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:470:3
    systemd#9 0x443164 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ReadAndExecuteSeedCorpora(std::__1::vector<fuzzer::SizedFile, fuzzer::fuzzer_allocator<fuzzer::SizedFile> >&) /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:770:7
    systemd#10 0x4434bc in fuzzer::Fuzzer::Loop(std::__1::vector<fuzzer::SizedFile, fuzzer::fuzzer_allocator<fuzzer::SizedFile> >&) /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:799:3
    systemd#11 0x42d2bc in fuzzer::FuzzerDriver(int*, char***, int (*)(unsigned char const*, unsigned long)) /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerDriver.cpp:846:6
    systemd#12 0x42978a in main /src/libfuzzer/FuzzerMain.cpp:19:10
    systemd#13 0x7f6fef13c82f in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2082f)
    systemd#14 0x407808 in _start (out/fuzz-bus-message+0x407808)

(cherry picked from commit b17af3e)
vbatts pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 12, 2020
```
p11-kit-0.23.20-1.fc32.x86_64 pam-1.3.1-26.fc33.x86_64 xz-libs-5.2.5-1.fc33.x86_64 zlib-1.2.11-21.fc32.x86_64
(gdb) bt
    lvalue=0x560e10 "SendOption", ltype=2, rvalue=0x560e1b "11:string", data=0x561e20, userdata=0x561cd0) at ../src/network/networkd-dhcp-common.c:580
    table=0x4392e0 <network_network_gperf_lookup>, section=0x560ef0 "DHCPv4", section_line=14, lvalue=0x560e10 "SendOption", rvalue=0x560e1b "11:string", flags=CONFIG_PARSE_WARN,
    userdata=0x561cd0) at ../src/shared/conf-parser.c:132
    lookup=0x7ffff7d2f76d <config_item_perf_lookup>, table=0x4392e0 <network_network_gperf_lookup>, flags=CONFIG_PARSE_WARN, section=0x7fffffffc9f8, section_line=0x7fffffffc9a0,
    section_ignored=0x7fffffffc99d, l=0x560e10 "SendOption", userdata=0x561cd0) at ../src/shared/conf-parser.c:270
    lookup=0x7ffff7d2f76d <config_item_perf_lookup>, table=0x4392e0 <network_network_gperf_lookup>, flags=CONFIG_PARSE_WARN, userdata=0x561cd0) at ../src/shared/conf-parser.c:395
    lookup=0x7ffff7d2f76d <config_item_perf_lookup>, table=0x4392e0 <network_network_gperf_lookup>, flags=CONFIG_PARSE_WARN, userdata=0x561cd0) at ../src/shared/conf-parser.c:452
    dropin_dirname=0x7fffffffcbd0 "veth99.network.d", sections=0x4f3a18 "Match", lookup=0x7ffff7d2f76d <config_item_perf_lookup>, table=0x4392e0 <network_network_gperf_lookup>,
    flags=CONFIG_PARSE_WARN, userdata=0x561cd0) at ../src/shared/conf-parser.c:511
(gdb) q
A debugging session is active.

	Inferior 1 [process 118718] will be killed.
```

```
$ printf '[DHCPv4]\nSendOption=1:uint8' >crash

$ ./out/fuzz-network-parser ./crash
INFO: Seed: 1158717610
INFO: Loaded 2 modules   (199728 inline 8-bit counters): 136668 [0x7faf3e91a930, 0x7faf3e93bf0c), 63060 [0xadf190, 0xaee7e4),
INFO: Loaded 2 PC tables (199728 PCs): 136668 [0x7faf3e93bf10,0x7faf3eb51cd0), 63060 [0xaee7e8,0xbe4d28),
./out/fuzz-network-parser: Running 1 inputs 1 time(s) each.
Running: ./crash
Assertion 's' failed at src/basic/parse-util.c:458, function int safe_atou8(const char *, uint8_t *)(). Aborting.
==5588== ERROR: libFuzzer: deadly signal
    #0 0x51811e in __sanitizer_print_stack_trace (/home/vagrant/systemd/out/fuzz-network-parser+0x51811e)
    #1 0x46b921 in fuzzer::PrintStackTrace() (/home/vagrant/systemd/out/fuzz-network-parser+0x46b921)
    #2 0x44ded6 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::CrashCallback() (.part.0) (/home/vagrant/systemd/out/fuzz-network-parser+0x44ded6)
    #3 0x44df9d in fuzzer::Fuzzer::StaticCrashSignalCallback() (/home/vagrant/systemd/out/fuzz-network-parser+0x44df9d)
    #4 0x7faf3d6d7b1f  (/lib64/libpthread.so.0+0x14b1f)
    #5 0x7faf3d3c2624 in raise (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x3c624)
    #6 0x7faf3d3ab8d8 in abort (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x258d8)
    #7 0x7faf3e12593a in log_assert_failed_realm /home/vagrant/systemd/build/../src/basic/log.c:819:9
    systemd#8 0x7faf3e140ce1 in safe_atou8 /home/vagrant/systemd/build/../src/basic/parse-util.c:458:9
    systemd#9 0x68089c in config_parse_dhcp_send_option /home/vagrant/systemd/build/../src/network/networkd-dhcp-common.c:517:21
    systemd#10 0x7faf3debed4e in next_assignment /home/vagrant/systemd/build/../src/shared/conf-parser.c:132:32
    systemd#11 0x7faf3deb7783 in parse_line /home/vagrant/systemd/build/../src/shared/conf-parser.c:270:16
    systemd#12 0x7faf3deb606c in config_parse /home/vagrant/systemd/build/../src/shared/conf-parser.c:395:21
    systemd#13 0x7faf3deb85ee in config_parse_many_files /home/vagrant/systemd/build/../src/shared/conf-parser.c:452:21
    systemd#14 0x7faf3deb8c57 in config_parse_many /home/vagrant/systemd/build/../src/shared/conf-parser.c:511:16
    systemd#15 0x57c2eb in network_load_one /home/vagrant/systemd/build/../src/network/networkd-network.c:470:13
    systemd#16 0x543490 in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput /home/vagrant/systemd/build/../src/network/fuzz-network-parser.c:26:16
    systemd#17 0x44e3e8 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ExecuteCallback(unsigned char const*, unsigned long) (/home/vagrant/systemd/out/fuzz-network-parser+0x44e3e8)
    systemd#18 0x433505 in fuzzer::RunOneTest(fuzzer::Fuzzer*, char const*, unsigned long) (/home/vagrant/systemd/out/fuzz-network-parser+0x433505)
    systemd#19 0x43c449 in fuzzer::FuzzerDriver(int*, char***, int (*)(unsigned char const*, unsigned long)) (/home/vagrant/systemd/out/fuzz-network-parser+0x43c449)
    systemd#20 0x42c4a6 in main (/home/vagrant/systemd/out/fuzz-network-parser+0x42c4a6)
    systemd#21 0x7faf3d3ad1a2 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x271a2)
    systemd#22 0x42c4fd in _start (/home/vagrant/systemd/out/fuzz-network-parser+0x42c4fd)

NOTE: libFuzzer has rudimentary signal handlers.
      Combine libFuzzer with AddressSanitizer or similar for better crash reports.
SUMMARY: libFuzzer: deadly signal

```

(cherry picked from commit 1eb7342)
iaguis pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 26, 2020
"Linux" conflicts /efi/Linux when /efi is the install location.
/efi/Linux is already reserved for unified kernel images so we can't use
it for type #1 images. Instead, we use "Default".
iaguis pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 26, 2020
This lets the libc/xcrypt allocate as much storage area as it needs.
Should fix systemd#16965:

testsuite-46.sh[74]: ==74==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow on address 0x7f3e972e1080 at pc 0x7f3e9be8deed bp 0x7ffce4f28530 sp 0x7ffce4f27ce0
testsuite-46.sh[74]: WRITE of size 131232 at 0x7f3e972e1080 thread T0
testsuite-46.sh[74]:     #0 0x7f3e9be8deec  (/usr/lib/clang/10.0.1/lib/linux/libclang_rt.asan-x86_64.so+0x9feec)
testsuite-46.sh[74]:     #1 0x559cd05a6412 in user_record_make_hashed_password /systemd-meson-build/../build/src/home/user-record-util.c:818:21
testsuite-46.sh[74]:     #2 0x559cd058fb03 in create_home /systemd-meson-build/../build/src/home/homectl.c:1112:29
testsuite-46.sh[74]:     #3 0x7f3e9b5b3058 in dispatch_verb /systemd-meson-build/../build/src/shared/verbs.c:103:24
testsuite-46.sh[74]:     #4 0x559cd058c101 in run /systemd-meson-build/../build/src/home/homectl.c:3325:16
testsuite-46.sh[74]:     #5 0x559cd058c00a in main /systemd-meson-build/../build/src/home/homectl.c:3328:1
testsuite-46.sh[74]:     #6 0x7f3e9a88b151 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x28151)
testsuite-46.sh[74]:     #7 0x559cd0583e7d in _start (/usr/bin/homectl+0x24e7d)
testsuite-46.sh[74]: Address 0x7f3e972e1080 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 32896 in frame
testsuite-46.sh[74]:     #0 0x559cd05a60df in user_record_make_hashed_password /systemd-meson-build/../build/src/home/user-record-util.c:789
testsuite-46.sh[74]:   This frame has 6 object(s):
testsuite-46.sh[74]:     [32, 40) 'priv' (line 790)
testsuite-46.sh[74]:     [64, 72) 'np' (line 791)
testsuite-46.sh[74]:     [96, 104) 'salt' (line 809)
testsuite-46.sh[74]:     [128, 32896) 'cd' (line 810)
testsuite-46.sh[74]:     [33152, 33168) '.compoundliteral' <== Memory access at offset 32896 partially underflows this variable
testsuite-46.sh[74]:     [33184, 33192) 'new_array' (line 832) <== Memory access at offset 32896 partially underflows this variable
testsuite-46.sh[74]: HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork
testsuite-46.sh[74]:       (longjmp and C++ exceptions *are* supported)
testsuite-46.sh[74]: SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow (/usr/lib/clang/10.0.1/lib/linux/libclang_rt.asan-x86_64.so+0x9feec)

It seems 'struct crypt_data' is 32896 bytes, but libclang_rt wants more, at least 33168?
mauriciovasquezbernal pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 19, 2021
Coverity says:
CID 1446387 (#1 of 1): Bad bit shift operation (BAD_SHIFT)
8. negative_shift: In expression 1U << (int)cmd, shifting by a negative amount
has undefined behavior. The shift amount, cmd, is -22.

I don't think there's any issue, unless we forget to set token->data
appropriately. Let's add an assert.
iaguis pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 17, 2021
The current pattern '#' triggers on the openSUSE kernel version that is
printed early during boot when no actual prompt is ready
> [    0.000000] Linux version 5.12.10-1-default (geeko@buildhost) (gcc (SUSE Linux) 11.1.1 20210510 [revision 23855a176609fe8dda6abaf2b21846b4517966eb], GNU ld (GNU Binutils; openSUSE Tumbleweed) 2.36.1.20210326-4) #1 SMP Fri Jun 11 05:05:06 UTC 2021 (b92eaf7)

Instead wait for pattern that: a) should have fewer false positives, b)
still be with working on distro shells:

openSUSE (red color)
^[[1m^[[31mimage:~ #^[[m^O

arch
[root@image ~]#

debian
root@image:~#

ubuntu
root@image:~#

fedora
[root@image ~]#
iaguis pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 20, 2023
When exiting PID 1 we most likely don't have stdio/stdout open, so the
final LSan check would not print any actionable information and would
just crash PID 1 leading up to a kernel panic, which is a bit annoying.
Let's instead attempt to open /dev/console, and if we succeed redirect
LSan's report there.

The result is a bit messy, as it's slightly interleaved with the kernel
panic, but it's definitely better than not having the stack trace at
all:

[  OK  ] Reached target final.target.
[  OK  ] Finished systemd-poweroff.service.
[  OK  ] Reached target poweroff.target.

=================================================================
3 1m  43.251782] Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x00000100
[   43.252838] CPU: 2 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Not tainted 6.4.12-200.fc38.x86_64 #1
==[1==ERR O R :4 3Le.a2k53562] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.2-1.fc38 04/01/2014
[   43.254683] Call Trace:
[   43.254911]  <TASK>
[   43.255107]  dump_stack_lvl+0x47/0x60
S[ a  43.n2555i05]  panic+t0x192/0x350
izer[   :43.255966 ]  do_exit+0x990/0xdb10
etec[   43.256504]  do_group_exit+0x31/0x80
[   43.256889]  __x64_sys_exit_group+0x18/0x20
[   43.257288]  do_syscall_64+0x60/0x90
o_user_mod leaks[   43.257618]  ? syscall_exit_t

+0x2b/0x40
[   43.258411]  ? do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x90
1mDirect le[   43.258755]  ak of 21 byte(s)? exc_page_fault+0x7f/0x180
[   43.259446]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
 [   43.259901] RiIP: 0033:0x7f357nb8f3ad4
 1 objec[   43.260354] Ctode: 48 89 (f7 0f 05 c3 sf3 0f 1e fa b8 3b 00 00 00) 0f 05 c3 0f 1f 4 0 00 f3 0f 1e fa 50 58 b8 e7 00 00 00 48 83 ec 08 48 63 ff 0f 051
[   43.262581] RSP: 002b:00007ffc25872440 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000e7
a RBX: 00007f357be9b218 RCX: 00007f357b8f3ad4m:ffd
[   43.264512] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00007f357b933b63 RDI: 0000000000000001
[   43.265355] RBP: 00007f357be9b218 R08: efffffffffffffff R09: 00007ffc258721ef
[   43.266191] R10: 000000000000003f R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00000fe6ae9e0000
[   43.266891] R13: 00007f3574f00000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000007
[   43.267517]  </TASK>

    #0 0x7f357b8814a8 in strdup (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0x814a8) (BuildId: e5f0a0d511a659fbc47bf41072869139cb2db47f)
    #1 0x7f3578d43317 in cg_path_decode_unit ../src/basic/cgroup-util.c:1132
    #2 0x7f3578d43936 in cg_path_get_unit ../src/basic/cgroup-util.c:1190
    #3 0x7f3578d440f6 in cg_pid_get_unit ../src/basic/cgroup-util.c:1234
    #4 0x7f35789263d7 in bus_log_caller ../src/shared/bus-util.c:734
    #5 0x7f357a9cf10a in method_reload ../src/core/dbus-manager.c:1621
    #6 0x7f3578f77497 in method_callbacks_run ../src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-objects.c:406
    #7 0x7f3578f80dd8 in object_find_and_run ../src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-objects.c:1319
    systemd#8 0x7f3578f82487 in bus_process_object ../src/libsystemd/sd-bus/bus-objects.c:1439
    systemd#9 0x7f3578fe41f1 in process_message ../src/libsystemd/sd-bus/sd-bus.c:3007
    systemd#10 0x7f3578fe477b in process_running ../src/libsystemd/sd-bus/sd-bus.c:3049
    systemd#11 0x7f3578fe75d1 in bus_process_internal ../src/libsystemd/sd-bus/sd-bus.c:3269
    systemd#12 0x7f3578fe776e in sd_bus_process ../src/libsystemd/sd-bus/sd-bus.c:3296
    systemd#13 0x7f3578feaedc in io_callback ../src/libsystemd/sd-bus/sd-bus.c:3638
    systemd#14 0x7f35791c2f68 in source_dispatch ../src/libsystemd/sd-event/sd-event.c:4187
    systemd#15 0x7f35791cc6f9 in sd_event_dispatch ../src/libsystemd/sd-event/sd-event.c:4808
    systemd#16 0x7f35791cd830 in sd_event_run ../src/libsystemd/sd-event/sd-event.c:4869
    systemd#17 0x7f357abcd572 in manager_loop ../src/core/manager.c:3244
    systemd#18 0x41db21 in invoke_main_loop ../src/core/main.c:1960
    systemd#19 0x426615 in main ../src/core/main.c:3125
    systemd#20 0x7f3577c49b49 in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x27b49) (BuildId: 245240a31888ad5c11bbc55b18e02d87388f59a9)
    systemd#21 0x7f3577c49c0a in __libc_start_main_alias_2 (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x27c0a) (BuildId: 245240a31888ad5c11bbc55b18e02d87388f59a9)
    systemd#22 0x408494 in _start (/usr/lib/systemd/systemd+0x408494) (BuildId: fe61e1b0f00b6a36aa34e707a98c15c52f6b960a)

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 21 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s).
[   43.295912] Kernel Offset: 0x7000000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff)
[   43.297036] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x00000100 ]---

Originally noticed in systemd#28579.
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