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libbpf: BTF writer APIs#115

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kernel-patches-bot wants to merge 1 commit intobpf-nextfrom
series/203713=>bpf-next
Closed

libbpf: BTF writer APIs#115
kernel-patches-bot wants to merge 1 commit intobpf-nextfrom
series/203713=>bpf-next

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Pull request for series with
subject: libbpf: BTF writer APIs
version: 2
url: https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/netdev/list/?series=204286

@kernel-patches-bot
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Master branch: ba5f4cf
series: https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/netdev/list/?series=204286
version: 2

Pull request is NOT updated. Failed to apply https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/netdev/list/?series=204286, error message:
Cmd('git') failed due to: exit code(128)
cmdline: git am -3
stderr: 'fatal: previous rebase directory .git/rebase-apply still exists but mbox given.'

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kernel-patches-bot commented Sep 28, 2020

Master branch: ba5f4cf
series: https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/netdev/list/?series=204286
version: 2

Pull request is NOT updated. Failed to apply https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/netdev/list/?series=204286
error message:

Cmd('git') failed due to: exit code(128)
  cmdline: git am -3
  stdout: 'Applying: libbpf: refactor internals of BTF type index
Applying: libbpf: generalize common logic for managing dynamically-sized arrays
Using index info to reconstruct a base tree...
M	tools/lib/bpf/btf.c
Falling back to patching base and 3-way merge...
Auto-merging tools/lib/bpf/btf.c
CONFLICT (content): Merge conflict in tools/lib/bpf/btf.c
Patch failed at 0002 libbpf: generalize common logic for managing dynamically-sized arrays
When you have resolved this problem, run "git am --continue".
If you prefer to skip this patch, run "git am --skip" instead.
To restore the original branch and stop patching, run "git am --abort".'
  stderr: 'error: Failed to merge in the changes.
hint: Use 'git am --show-current-patch' to see the failed patch'

conflict:

diff --cc tools/lib/bpf/btf.c
index 7c9957893ef2,f5255e2bd222..000000000000
--- a/tools/lib/bpf/btf.c
+++ b/tools/lib/bpf/btf.c
@@@ -27,18 -27,37 +27,22 @@@
  static struct btf_type btf_void;
  
  struct btf {
 -	void *raw_data;
 -	__u32 raw_size;
 -
 -	/*
 -	 * When BTF is loaded from ELF or raw memory it is stored
 -	 * in contiguous memory block, pointed to by raw_data pointer, and
 -	 * hdr, types_data, and strs_data point inside that memory region to
 -	 * respective parts of BTF representation:
 -	 *
 -	 * +--------------------------------+
 -	 * |  Header  |  Types  |  Strings  |
 -	 * +--------------------------------+
 -	 * ^          ^         ^
 -	 * |          |         |
 -	 * hdr        |         |
 -	 * types_data-+         |
 -	 * strs_data------------+
 -	 */
 -	struct btf_header *hdr;
 -	void *types_data;
 -	void *strs_data;
 -
 -	/* type ID to `struct btf_type *` lookup index */
 +	union {
 +		struct btf_header *hdr;
 +		void *data;
 +	};
  	__u32 *type_offs;
++<<<<<<< HEAD
 +	__u32 type_offs_cap;
 +	const char *strings;
 +	void *nohdr_data;
 +	void *types_data;
++=======
+ 	size_t type_offs_cap;
++>>>>>>> libbpf: generalize common logic for managing dynamically-sized arrays
  	__u32 nr_types;
 -
 -	/* BTF object FD, if loaded into kernel */
 +	__u32 data_size;
  	int fd;
 -
 -	/* Pointer size (in bytes) for a target architecture of this BTF */
  	int ptr_sz;
  };
  
@@@ -186,15 -230,19 +219,27 @@@ static int btf_type_size(const struct b
  static int btf_parse_type_sec(struct btf *btf)
  {
  	struct btf_header *hdr = btf->hdr;
 -	void *next_type = btf->types_data;
 +	void *next_type = btf->nohdr_data + hdr->type_off;
  	void *end_type = next_type + hdr->type_len;
+ 	int err, type_size;
  
++<<<<<<< HEAD
 +	btf->types_data = next_type;
 +
 +	while (next_type < end_type) {
 +		int type_size;
 +		int err;
++=======
+ 	/* VOID (type_id == 0) is specially handled by btf__get_type_by_id(),
+ 	 * so ensure we can never properly use its offset from index by
+ 	 * setting it to a large value
+ 	 */
+ 	err = btf_add_type_idx_entry(btf, UINT_MAX);
+ 	if (err)
+ 		return err;
++>>>>>>> libbpf: generalize common logic for managing dynamically-sized arrays
  
+ 	while (next_type < end_type) {
  		err = btf_add_type_idx_entry(btf, next_type - btf->types_data);
  		if (err)
  			return err;

@kernel-patches-bot
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kernel-patches-bot commented Sep 28, 2020

Master branch: 1fd17c8
series: https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/netdev/list/?series=204286
version: 2

Pull request is NOT updated. Failed to apply https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/netdev/list/?series=204286
error message:

  cmdline: git am -3
  stdout: 'Applying: libbpf: refactor internals of BTF type index
Applying: libbpf: generalize common logic for managing dynamically-sized arrays
Using index info to reconstruct a base tree...
M	tools/lib/bpf/btf.c
Falling back to patching base and 3-way merge...
Auto-merging tools/lib/bpf/btf.c
CONFLICT (content): Merge conflict in tools/lib/bpf/btf.c
Patch failed at 0002 libbpf: generalize common logic for managing dynamically-sized arrays
When you have resolved this problem, run "git am --continue".
If you prefer to skip this patch, run "git am --skip" instead.
To restore the original branch and stop patching, run "git am --abort".'
  stderr: 'error: Failed to merge in the changes.
hint: Use 'git am --show-current-patch' to see the failed patch'```

conflict:
```diff --cc tools/lib/bpf/btf.c
index 7c9957893ef2,f5255e2bd222..000000000000
--- a/tools/lib/bpf/btf.c
+++ b/tools/lib/bpf/btf.c
@@@ -27,18 -27,37 +27,22 @@@
  static struct btf_type btf_void;
  
  struct btf {
 -	void *raw_data;
 -	__u32 raw_size;
 -
 -	/*
 -	 * When BTF is loaded from ELF or raw memory it is stored
 -	 * in contiguous memory block, pointed to by raw_data pointer, and
 -	 * hdr, types_data, and strs_data point inside that memory region to
 -	 * respective parts of BTF representation:
 -	 *
 -	 * +--------------------------------+
 -	 * |  Header  |  Types  |  Strings  |
 -	 * +--------------------------------+
 -	 * ^          ^         ^
 -	 * |          |         |
 -	 * hdr        |         |
 -	 * types_data-+         |
 -	 * strs_data------------+
 -	 */
 -	struct btf_header *hdr;
 -	void *types_data;
 -	void *strs_data;
 -
 -	/* type ID to `struct btf_type *` lookup index */
 +	union {
 +		struct btf_header *hdr;
 +		void *data;
 +	};
  	__u32 *type_offs;
++<<<<<<< HEAD
 +	__u32 type_offs_cap;
 +	const char *strings;
 +	void *nohdr_data;
 +	void *types_data;
++=======
+ 	size_t type_offs_cap;
++>>>>>>> libbpf: generalize common logic for managing dynamically-sized arrays
  	__u32 nr_types;
 -
 -	/* BTF object FD, if loaded into kernel */
 +	__u32 data_size;
  	int fd;
 -
 -	/* Pointer size (in bytes) for a target architecture of this BTF */
  	int ptr_sz;
  };
  
@@@ -186,15 -230,19 +219,27 @@@ static int btf_type_size(const struct b
  static int btf_parse_type_sec(struct btf *btf)
  {
  	struct btf_header *hdr = btf->hdr;
 -	void *next_type = btf->types_data;
 +	void *next_type = btf->nohdr_data + hdr->type_off;
  	void *end_type = next_type + hdr->type_len;
+ 	int err, type_size;
  
++<<<<<<< HEAD
 +	btf->types_data = next_type;
 +
 +	while (next_type < end_type) {
 +		int type_size;
 +		int err;
++=======
+ 	/* VOID (type_id == 0) is specially handled by btf__get_type_by_id(),
+ 	 * so ensure we can never properly use its offset from index by
+ 	 * setting it to a large value
+ 	 */
+ 	err = btf_add_type_idx_entry(btf, UINT_MAX);
+ 	if (err)
+ 		return err;
++>>>>>>> libbpf: generalize common logic for managing dynamically-sized arrays
  
+ 	while (next_type < end_type) {
  		err = btf_add_type_idx_entry(btf, next_type - btf->types_data);
  		if (err)
  			return err;```

@kernel-patches-bot
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Master branch: 1fd17c8
series: https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/netdev/list/?series=204286
version: 2

Pull request is NOT updated. Failed to apply https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/netdev/list/?series=204286
error message:

Cmd('git') failed due to: exit code(128)
  cmdline: git am -3
  stdout: 'Applying: libbpf: refactor internals of BTF type index
Applying: libbpf: generalize common logic for managing dynamically-sized arrays
Using index info to reconstruct a base tree...
M	tools/lib/bpf/btf.c
Falling back to patching base and 3-way merge...
Auto-merging tools/lib/bpf/btf.c
CONFLICT (content): Merge conflict in tools/lib/bpf/btf.c
Patch failed at 0002 libbpf: generalize common logic for managing dynamically-sized arrays
When you have resolved this problem, run "git am --continue".
If you prefer to skip this patch, run "git am --skip" instead.
To restore the original branch and stop patching, run "git am --abort".'
  stderr: 'error: Failed to merge in the changes.
hint: Use 'git am --show-current-patch' to see the failed patch'

conflict:

diff --cc tools/lib/bpf/btf.c
index 7c9957893ef2,f5255e2bd222..000000000000
--- a/tools/lib/bpf/btf.c
+++ b/tools/lib/bpf/btf.c
@@@ -27,18 -27,37 +27,22 @@@
  static struct btf_type btf_void;
  
  struct btf {
 -	void *raw_data;
 -	__u32 raw_size;
 -
 -	/*
 -	 * When BTF is loaded from ELF or raw memory it is stored
 -	 * in contiguous memory block, pointed to by raw_data pointer, and
 -	 * hdr, types_data, and strs_data point inside that memory region to
 -	 * respective parts of BTF representation:
 -	 *
 -	 * +--------------------------------+
 -	 * |  Header  |  Types  |  Strings  |
 -	 * +--------------------------------+
 -	 * ^          ^         ^
 -	 * |          |         |
 -	 * hdr        |         |
 -	 * types_data-+         |
 -	 * strs_data------------+
 -	 */
 -	struct btf_header *hdr;
 -	void *types_data;
 -	void *strs_data;
 -
 -	/* type ID to `struct btf_type *` lookup index */
 +	union {
 +		struct btf_header *hdr;
 +		void *data;
 +	};
  	__u32 *type_offs;
++<<<<<<< HEAD
 +	__u32 type_offs_cap;
 +	const char *strings;
 +	void *nohdr_data;
 +	void *types_data;
++=======
+ 	size_t type_offs_cap;
++>>>>>>> libbpf: generalize common logic for managing dynamically-sized arrays
  	__u32 nr_types;
 -
 -	/* BTF object FD, if loaded into kernel */
 +	__u32 data_size;
  	int fd;
 -
 -	/* Pointer size (in bytes) for a target architecture of this BTF */
  	int ptr_sz;
  };
  
@@@ -186,15 -230,19 +219,27 @@@ static int btf_type_size(const struct b
  static int btf_parse_type_sec(struct btf *btf)
  {
  	struct btf_header *hdr = btf->hdr;
 -	void *next_type = btf->types_data;
 +	void *next_type = btf->nohdr_data + hdr->type_off;
  	void *end_type = next_type + hdr->type_len;
+ 	int err, type_size;
  
++<<<<<<< HEAD
 +	btf->types_data = next_type;
 +
 +	while (next_type < end_type) {
 +		int type_size;
 +		int err;
++=======
+ 	/* VOID (type_id == 0) is specially handled by btf__get_type_by_id(),
+ 	 * so ensure we can never properly use its offset from index by
+ 	 * setting it to a large value
+ 	 */
+ 	err = btf_add_type_idx_entry(btf, UINT_MAX);
+ 	if (err)
+ 		return err;
++>>>>>>> libbpf: generalize common logic for managing dynamically-sized arrays
  
+ 	while (next_type < end_type) {
  		err = btf_add_type_idx_entry(btf, next_type - btf->types_data);
  		if (err)
  			return err;

@kernel-patches-bot
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At least one diff in series https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/netdev/list/?series=204286 irrelevant now. Closing PR.

kernel-patches-daemon-bpf bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 14, 2023
Commit c14f7cc ("PCI: Assign PCI domain IDs by ida_alloc()")
introduced a use-after-free bug in the bus removal cleanup. The issue was
found with kfence:

  [   19.293351] BUG: KFENCE: use-after-free read in pci_bus_release_domain_nr+0x10/0x70

  [   19.302817] Use-after-free read at 0x000000007f3b80eb (in kfence-#115):
  [   19.309677]  pci_bus_release_domain_nr+0x10/0x70
  [   19.309691]  dw_pcie_host_deinit+0x28/0x78
  [   19.309702]  tegra_pcie_deinit_controller+0x1c/0x38 [pcie_tegra194]
  [   19.309734]  tegra_pcie_dw_probe+0x648/0xb28 [pcie_tegra194]
  [   19.309752]  platform_probe+0x90/0xd8
  ...

  [   19.311457] kfence-#115: 0x00000000063a155a-0x00000000ba698da8, size=1072, cache=kmalloc-2k

  [   19.311469] allocated by task 96 on cpu 10 at 19.279323s:
  [   19.311562]  __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x260/0x278
  [   19.311571]  kmalloc_trace+0x24/0x30
  [   19.311580]  pci_alloc_bus+0x24/0xa0
  [   19.311590]  pci_register_host_bridge+0x48/0x4b8
  [   19.311601]  pci_scan_root_bus_bridge+0xc0/0xe8
  [   19.311613]  pci_host_probe+0x18/0xc0
  [   19.311623]  dw_pcie_host_init+0x2c0/0x568
  [   19.311630]  tegra_pcie_dw_probe+0x610/0xb28 [pcie_tegra194]
  [   19.311647]  platform_probe+0x90/0xd8
  ...

  [   19.311782] freed by task 96 on cpu 10 at 19.285833s:
  [   19.311799]  release_pcibus_dev+0x30/0x40
  [   19.311808]  device_release+0x30/0x90
  [   19.311814]  kobject_put+0xa8/0x120
  [   19.311832]  device_unregister+0x20/0x30
  [   19.311839]  pci_remove_bus+0x78/0x88
  [   19.311850]  pci_remove_root_bus+0x5c/0x98
  [   19.311860]  dw_pcie_host_deinit+0x28/0x78
  [   19.311866]  tegra_pcie_deinit_controller+0x1c/0x38 [pcie_tegra194]
  [   19.311883]  tegra_pcie_dw_probe+0x648/0xb28 [pcie_tegra194]
  [   19.311900]  platform_probe+0x90/0xd8
  ...

  [   19.313579] CPU: 10 PID: 96 Comm: kworker/u24:2 Not tainted 6.2.0 #4
  [   19.320171] Hardware name:  /, BIOS 1.0-d7fb19b 08/10/2022
  [   19.325852] Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func

The stack trace is a bit misleading as dw_pcie_host_deinit() doesn't
directly call pci_bus_release_domain_nr(). The issue turns out to be in
pci_remove_root_bus() which first calls pci_remove_bus() which frees the
struct pci_bus when its struct device is released. Then
pci_bus_release_domain_nr() is called and accesses the freed struct
pci_bus. Reordering these fixes the issue.

Fixes: c14f7cc ("PCI: Assign PCI domain IDs by ida_alloc()")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230329123835.2724518-1-robh@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b529cb69-0602-9eed-fc02-2f068707a006@nvidia.com
Reported-by: Jon Hunter <jonathanh@nvidia.com>
Tested-by: Jon Hunter <jonathanh@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org	# v6.2+
Cc: Pali Rohár <pali@kernel.org>
kernel-patches-daemon-bpf bot pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 18, 2023
Enable CPU v4 instruction tests for arm64. Below are the test results from
BPF test_progs selftests:

  # ./test_progs -t ldsx_insn,verifier_sdiv,verifier_movsx,verifier_ldsx,verifier_gotol,verifier_bswap
  #115/1   ldsx_insn/map_val and probed_memory:OK
  #115/2   ldsx_insn/ctx_member_sign_ext:OK
  #115/3   ldsx_insn/ctx_member_narrow_sign_ext:OK
  #115     ldsx_insn:OK
  #302/1   verifier_bswap/BSWAP, 16:OK
  #302/2   verifier_bswap/BSWAP, 16 @unpriv:OK
  #302/3   verifier_bswap/BSWAP, 32:OK
  #302/4   verifier_bswap/BSWAP, 32 @unpriv:OK
  #302/5   verifier_bswap/BSWAP, 64:OK
  #302/6   verifier_bswap/BSWAP, 64 @unpriv:OK
  #302     verifier_bswap:OK
  #316/1   verifier_gotol/gotol, small_imm:OK
  #316/2   verifier_gotol/gotol, small_imm @unpriv:OK
  #316     verifier_gotol:OK
  #324/1   verifier_ldsx/LDSX, S8:OK
  #324/2   verifier_ldsx/LDSX, S8 @unpriv:OK
  #324/3   verifier_ldsx/LDSX, S16:OK
  #324/4   verifier_ldsx/LDSX, S16 @unpriv:OK
  #324/5   verifier_ldsx/LDSX, S32:OK
  #324/6   verifier_ldsx/LDSX, S32 @unpriv:OK
  #324/7   verifier_ldsx/LDSX, S8 range checking, privileged:OK
  #324/8   verifier_ldsx/LDSX, S16 range checking:OK
  #324/9   verifier_ldsx/LDSX, S16 range checking @unpriv:OK
  #324/10  verifier_ldsx/LDSX, S32 range checking:OK
  #324/11  verifier_ldsx/LDSX, S32 range checking @unpriv:OK
  #324     verifier_ldsx:OK
  #335/1   verifier_movsx/MOV32SX, S8:OK
  #335/2   verifier_movsx/MOV32SX, S8 @unpriv:OK
  #335/3   verifier_movsx/MOV32SX, S16:OK
  #335/4   verifier_movsx/MOV32SX, S16 @unpriv:OK
  #335/5   verifier_movsx/MOV64SX, S8:OK
  #335/6   verifier_movsx/MOV64SX, S8 @unpriv:OK
  #335/7   verifier_movsx/MOV64SX, S16:OK
  #335/8   verifier_movsx/MOV64SX, S16 @unpriv:OK
  #335/9   verifier_movsx/MOV64SX, S32:OK
  #335/10  verifier_movsx/MOV64SX, S32 @unpriv:OK
  #335/11  verifier_movsx/MOV32SX, S8, range_check:OK
  #335/12  verifier_movsx/MOV32SX, S8, range_check @unpriv:OK
  #335/13  verifier_movsx/MOV32SX, S16, range_check:OK
  #335/14  verifier_movsx/MOV32SX, S16, range_check @unpriv:OK
  #335/15  verifier_movsx/MOV32SX, S16, range_check 2:OK
  #335/16  verifier_movsx/MOV32SX, S16, range_check 2 @unpriv:OK
  #335/17  verifier_movsx/MOV64SX, S8, range_check:OK
  #335/18  verifier_movsx/MOV64SX, S8, range_check @unpriv:OK
  #335/19  verifier_movsx/MOV64SX, S16, range_check:OK
  #335/20  verifier_movsx/MOV64SX, S16, range_check @unpriv:OK
  #335/21  verifier_movsx/MOV64SX, S32, range_check:OK
  #335/22  verifier_movsx/MOV64SX, S32, range_check @unpriv:OK
  #335/23  verifier_movsx/MOV64SX, S16, R10 Sign Extension:OK
  #335/24  verifier_movsx/MOV64SX, S16, R10 Sign Extension @unpriv:OK
  #335     verifier_movsx:OK
  #347/1   verifier_sdiv/SDIV32, non-zero imm divisor, check 1:OK
  #347/2   verifier_sdiv/SDIV32, non-zero imm divisor, check 1 @unpriv:OK
  #347/3   verifier_sdiv/SDIV32, non-zero imm divisor, check 2:OK
  #347/4   verifier_sdiv/SDIV32, non-zero imm divisor, check 2 @unpriv:OK
  #347/5   verifier_sdiv/SDIV32, non-zero imm divisor, check 3:OK
  #347/6   verifier_sdiv/SDIV32, non-zero imm divisor, check 3 @unpriv:OK
  #347/7   verifier_sdiv/SDIV32, non-zero imm divisor, check 4:OK
  #347/8   verifier_sdiv/SDIV32, non-zero imm divisor, check 4 @unpriv:OK
  #347/9   verifier_sdiv/SDIV32, non-zero imm divisor, check 5:OK
  #347/10  verifier_sdiv/SDIV32, non-zero imm divisor, check 5 @unpriv:OK
  #347/11  verifier_sdiv/SDIV32, non-zero imm divisor, check 6:OK
  #347/12  verifier_sdiv/SDIV32, non-zero imm divisor, check 6 @unpriv:OK
  #347/13  verifier_sdiv/SDIV32, non-zero imm divisor, check 7:OK
  #347/14  verifier_sdiv/SDIV32, non-zero imm divisor, check 7 @unpriv:OK
  #347/15  verifier_sdiv/SDIV32, non-zero imm divisor, check 8:OK
  #347/16  verifier_sdiv/SDIV32, non-zero imm divisor, check 8 @unpriv:OK
  #347/17  verifier_sdiv/SDIV32, non-zero reg divisor, check 1:OK
  #347/18  verifier_sdiv/SDIV32, non-zero reg divisor, check 1 @unpriv:OK
  #347/19  verifier_sdiv/SDIV32, non-zero reg divisor, check 2:OK
  #347/20  verifier_sdiv/SDIV32, non-zero reg divisor, check 2 @unpriv:OK
  #347/21  verifier_sdiv/SDIV32, non-zero reg divisor, check 3:OK
  #347/22  verifier_sdiv/SDIV32, non-zero reg divisor, check 3 @unpriv:OK
  #347/23  verifier_sdiv/SDIV32, non-zero reg divisor, check 4:OK
  #347/24  verifier_sdiv/SDIV32, non-zero reg divisor, check 4 @unpriv:OK
  #347/25  verifier_sdiv/SDIV32, non-zero reg divisor, check 5:OK
  #347/26  verifier_sdiv/SDIV32, non-zero reg divisor, check 5 @unpriv:OK
  #347/27  verifier_sdiv/SDIV32, non-zero reg divisor, check 6:OK
  #347/28  verifier_sdiv/SDIV32, non-zero reg divisor, check 6 @unpriv:OK
  #347/29  verifier_sdiv/SDIV32, non-zero reg divisor, check 7:OK
  #347/30  verifier_sdiv/SDIV32, non-zero reg divisor, check 7 @unpriv:OK
  #347/31  verifier_sdiv/SDIV32, non-zero reg divisor, check 8:OK
  #347/32  verifier_sdiv/SDIV32, non-zero reg divisor, check 8 @unpriv:OK
  #347/33  verifier_sdiv/SDIV64, non-zero imm divisor, check 1:OK
  #347/34  verifier_sdiv/SDIV64, non-zero imm divisor, check 1 @unpriv:OK
  #347/35  verifier_sdiv/SDIV64, non-zero imm divisor, check 2:OK
  #347/36  verifier_sdiv/SDIV64, non-zero imm divisor, check 2 @unpriv:OK
  #347/37  verifier_sdiv/SDIV64, non-zero imm divisor, check 3:OK
  #347/38  verifier_sdiv/SDIV64, non-zero imm divisor, check 3 @unpriv:OK
  #347/39  verifier_sdiv/SDIV64, non-zero imm divisor, check 4:OK
  #347/40  verifier_sdiv/SDIV64, non-zero imm divisor, check 4 @unpriv:OK
  #347/41  verifier_sdiv/SDIV64, non-zero imm divisor, check 5:OK
  #347/42  verifier_sdiv/SDIV64, non-zero imm divisor, check 5 @unpriv:OK
  #347/43  verifier_sdiv/SDIV64, non-zero imm divisor, check 6:OK
  #347/44  verifier_sdiv/SDIV64, non-zero imm divisor, check 6 @unpriv:OK
  #347/45  verifier_sdiv/SDIV64, non-zero reg divisor, check 1:OK
  #347/46  verifier_sdiv/SDIV64, non-zero reg divisor, check 1 @unpriv:OK
  #347/47  verifier_sdiv/SDIV64, non-zero reg divisor, check 2:OK
  #347/48  verifier_sdiv/SDIV64, non-zero reg divisor, check 2 @unpriv:OK
  #347/49  verifier_sdiv/SDIV64, non-zero reg divisor, check 3:OK
  #347/50  verifier_sdiv/SDIV64, non-zero reg divisor, check 3 @unpriv:OK
  #347/51  verifier_sdiv/SDIV64, non-zero reg divisor, check 4:OK
  #347/52  verifier_sdiv/SDIV64, non-zero reg divisor, check 4 @unpriv:OK
  #347/53  verifier_sdiv/SDIV64, non-zero reg divisor, check 5:OK
  #347/54  verifier_sdiv/SDIV64, non-zero reg divisor, check 5 @unpriv:OK
  #347/55  verifier_sdiv/SDIV64, non-zero reg divisor, check 6:OK
  #347/56  verifier_sdiv/SDIV64, non-zero reg divisor, check 6 @unpriv:OK
  #347/57  verifier_sdiv/SMOD32, non-zero imm divisor, check 1:OK
  #347/58  verifier_sdiv/SMOD32, non-zero imm divisor, check 1 @unpriv:OK
  #347/59  verifier_sdiv/SMOD32, non-zero imm divisor, check 2:OK
  #347/60  verifier_sdiv/SMOD32, non-zero imm divisor, check 2 @unpriv:OK
  #347/61  verifier_sdiv/SMOD32, non-zero imm divisor, check 3:OK
  #347/62  verifier_sdiv/SMOD32, non-zero imm divisor, check 3 @unpriv:OK
  #347/63  verifier_sdiv/SMOD32, non-zero imm divisor, check 4:OK
  #347/64  verifier_sdiv/SMOD32, non-zero imm divisor, check 4 @unpriv:OK
  #347/65  verifier_sdiv/SMOD32, non-zero imm divisor, check 5:OK
  #347/66  verifier_sdiv/SMOD32, non-zero imm divisor, check 5 @unpriv:OK
  #347/67  verifier_sdiv/SMOD32, non-zero imm divisor, check 6:OK
  #347/68  verifier_sdiv/SMOD32, non-zero imm divisor, check 6 @unpriv:OK
  #347/69  verifier_sdiv/SMOD32, non-zero reg divisor, check 1:OK
  #347/70  verifier_sdiv/SMOD32, non-zero reg divisor, check 1 @unpriv:OK
  #347/71  verifier_sdiv/SMOD32, non-zero reg divisor, check 2:OK
  #347/72  verifier_sdiv/SMOD32, non-zero reg divisor, check 2 @unpriv:OK
  #347/73  verifier_sdiv/SMOD32, non-zero reg divisor, check 3:OK
  #347/74  verifier_sdiv/SMOD32, non-zero reg divisor, check 3 @unpriv:OK
  #347/75  verifier_sdiv/SMOD32, non-zero reg divisor, check 4:OK
  #347/76  verifier_sdiv/SMOD32, non-zero reg divisor, check 4 @unpriv:OK
  #347/77  verifier_sdiv/SMOD32, non-zero reg divisor, check 5:OK
  #347/78  verifier_sdiv/SMOD32, non-zero reg divisor, check 5 @unpriv:OK
  #347/79  verifier_sdiv/SMOD32, non-zero reg divisor, check 6:OK
  #347/80  verifier_sdiv/SMOD32, non-zero reg divisor, check 6 @unpriv:OK
  #347/81  verifier_sdiv/SMOD64, non-zero imm divisor, check 1:OK
  #347/82  verifier_sdiv/SMOD64, non-zero imm divisor, check 1 @unpriv:OK
  #347/83  verifier_sdiv/SMOD64, non-zero imm divisor, check 2:OK
  #347/84  verifier_sdiv/SMOD64, non-zero imm divisor, check 2 @unpriv:OK
  #347/85  verifier_sdiv/SMOD64, non-zero imm divisor, check 3:OK
  #347/86  verifier_sdiv/SMOD64, non-zero imm divisor, check 3 @unpriv:OK
  #347/87  verifier_sdiv/SMOD64, non-zero imm divisor, check 4:OK
  #347/88  verifier_sdiv/SMOD64, non-zero imm divisor, check 4 @unpriv:OK
  #347/89  verifier_sdiv/SMOD64, non-zero imm divisor, check 5:OK
  #347/90  verifier_sdiv/SMOD64, non-zero imm divisor, check 5 @unpriv:OK
  #347/91  verifier_sdiv/SMOD64, non-zero imm divisor, check 6:OK
  #347/92  verifier_sdiv/SMOD64, non-zero imm divisor, check 6 @unpriv:OK
  #347/93  verifier_sdiv/SMOD64, non-zero imm divisor, check 7:OK
  #347/94  verifier_sdiv/SMOD64, non-zero imm divisor, check 7 @unpriv:OK
  #347/95  verifier_sdiv/SMOD64, non-zero imm divisor, check 8:OK
  #347/96  verifier_sdiv/SMOD64, non-zero imm divisor, check 8 @unpriv:OK
  #347/97  verifier_sdiv/SMOD64, non-zero reg divisor, check 1:OK
  #347/98  verifier_sdiv/SMOD64, non-zero reg divisor, check 1 @unpriv:OK
  #347/99  verifier_sdiv/SMOD64, non-zero reg divisor, check 2:OK
  #347/100 verifier_sdiv/SMOD64, non-zero reg divisor, check 2 @unpriv:OK
  #347/101 verifier_sdiv/SMOD64, non-zero reg divisor, check 3:OK
  #347/102 verifier_sdiv/SMOD64, non-zero reg divisor, check 3 @unpriv:OK
  #347/103 verifier_sdiv/SMOD64, non-zero reg divisor, check 4:OK
  #347/104 verifier_sdiv/SMOD64, non-zero reg divisor, check 4 @unpriv:OK
  #347/105 verifier_sdiv/SMOD64, non-zero reg divisor, check 5:OK
  #347/106 verifier_sdiv/SMOD64, non-zero reg divisor, check 5 @unpriv:OK
  #347/107 verifier_sdiv/SMOD64, non-zero reg divisor, check 6:OK
  #347/108 verifier_sdiv/SMOD64, non-zero reg divisor, check 6 @unpriv:OK
  #347/109 verifier_sdiv/SMOD64, non-zero reg divisor, check 7:OK
  #347/110 verifier_sdiv/SMOD64, non-zero reg divisor, check 7 @unpriv:OK
  #347/111 verifier_sdiv/SMOD64, non-zero reg divisor, check 8:OK
  #347/112 verifier_sdiv/SMOD64, non-zero reg divisor, check 8 @unpriv:OK
  #347/113 verifier_sdiv/SDIV32, zero divisor:OK
  #347/114 verifier_sdiv/SDIV32, zero divisor @unpriv:OK
  #347/115 verifier_sdiv/SDIV64, zero divisor:OK
  #347/116 verifier_sdiv/SDIV64, zero divisor @unpriv:OK
  #347/117 verifier_sdiv/SMOD32, zero divisor:OK
  #347/118 verifier_sdiv/SMOD32, zero divisor @unpriv:OK
  #347/119 verifier_sdiv/SMOD64, zero divisor:OK
  #347/120 verifier_sdiv/SMOD64, zero divisor @unpriv:OK
  #347     verifier_sdiv:OK
  Summary: 6/166 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED

Signed-off-by: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Tested-by: Florent Revest <revest@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Acked-by: Florent Revest <revest@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230815154158.717901-8-xukuohai@huaweicloud.com
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request Dec 4, 2025
The push_nsh() action structure looks like this:

 OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH(OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH(OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE,...))

The outermost OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH attribute is OK'ed by the
nla_for_each_nested() inside __ovs_nla_copy_actions().  The innermost
OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE/MD1/MD2 are OK'ed by the nla_for_each_nested()
inside nsh_key_put_from_nlattr().  But nothing checks if the attribute
in the middle is OK.  We don't even check that this attribute is the
OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH.  We just do a double unwrap with a pair of nla_data()
calls - first time directly while calling validate_push_nsh() and the
second time as part of the nla_for_each_nested() macro, which isn't
safe, potentially causing invalid memory access if the size of this
attribute is incorrect.  The failure may not be noticed during
validation due to larger netlink buffer, but cause trouble later during
action execution where the buffer is allocated exactly to the size:

 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
 Read of size 184 at addr ffff88816459a634 by task a.out/22624

 CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 22624 6.18.0-rc7+ kernel-patches#115 PREEMPT(voluntary)
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x70
  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x390
  kasan_report+0xdd/0x110
  kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1b0
  __asan_memcpy+0x20/0x60
  nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
  push_nsh+0x82/0x120 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1405/0x2840 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xd5/0x3b0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0x949/0xdb0 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1d6/0x2b0
  genl_family_rcv_msg+0x336/0x580
  genl_rcv_msg+0x9f/0x130
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x11f/0x370
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x73e/0xaa0
  netlink_sendmsg+0x744/0xbf0
  __sys_sendto+0x3d6/0x450
  do_syscall_64+0x79/0x2c0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
  </TASK>

Let's add some checks that the attribute is properly sized and it's
the only one attribute inside the action.  Technically, there is no
real reason for OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH to be there, as we know that we're
pushing an NSH header already, it just creates extra nesting, but
that's how uAPI works today.  So, keeping as it is.

Fixes: b2d0f5d ("openvswitch: enable NSH support")
Reported-by: Junvy Yang <zhuque@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets <i.maximets@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron echaudro@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request Dec 4, 2025
The push_nsh() action structure looks like this:

 OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH(OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH(OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE,...))

The outermost OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH attribute is OK'ed by the
nla_for_each_nested() inside __ovs_nla_copy_actions().  The innermost
OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE/MD1/MD2 are OK'ed by the nla_for_each_nested()
inside nsh_key_put_from_nlattr().  But nothing checks if the attribute
in the middle is OK.  We don't even check that this attribute is the
OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH.  We just do a double unwrap with a pair of nla_data()
calls - first time directly while calling validate_push_nsh() and the
second time as part of the nla_for_each_nested() macro, which isn't
safe, potentially causing invalid memory access if the size of this
attribute is incorrect.  The failure may not be noticed during
validation due to larger netlink buffer, but cause trouble later during
action execution where the buffer is allocated exactly to the size:

 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
 Read of size 184 at addr ffff88816459a634 by task a.out/22624

 CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 22624 6.18.0-rc7+ kernel-patches#115 PREEMPT(voluntary)
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x70
  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x390
  kasan_report+0xdd/0x110
  kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1b0
  __asan_memcpy+0x20/0x60
  nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
  push_nsh+0x82/0x120 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1405/0x2840 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xd5/0x3b0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0x949/0xdb0 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1d6/0x2b0
  genl_family_rcv_msg+0x336/0x580
  genl_rcv_msg+0x9f/0x130
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x11f/0x370
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x73e/0xaa0
  netlink_sendmsg+0x744/0xbf0
  __sys_sendto+0x3d6/0x450
  do_syscall_64+0x79/0x2c0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
  </TASK>

Let's add some checks that the attribute is properly sized and it's
the only one attribute inside the action.  Technically, there is no
real reason for OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH to be there, as we know that we're
pushing an NSH header already, it just creates extra nesting, but
that's how uAPI works today.  So, keeping as it is.

Fixes: b2d0f5d ("openvswitch: enable NSH support")
Reported-by: Junvy Yang <zhuque@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets <i.maximets@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron echaudro@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request Dec 4, 2025
The push_nsh() action structure looks like this:

 OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH(OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH(OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE,...))

The outermost OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH attribute is OK'ed by the
nla_for_each_nested() inside __ovs_nla_copy_actions().  The innermost
OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE/MD1/MD2 are OK'ed by the nla_for_each_nested()
inside nsh_key_put_from_nlattr().  But nothing checks if the attribute
in the middle is OK.  We don't even check that this attribute is the
OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH.  We just do a double unwrap with a pair of nla_data()
calls - first time directly while calling validate_push_nsh() and the
second time as part of the nla_for_each_nested() macro, which isn't
safe, potentially causing invalid memory access if the size of this
attribute is incorrect.  The failure may not be noticed during
validation due to larger netlink buffer, but cause trouble later during
action execution where the buffer is allocated exactly to the size:

 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
 Read of size 184 at addr ffff88816459a634 by task a.out/22624

 CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 22624 6.18.0-rc7+ kernel-patches#115 PREEMPT(voluntary)
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x70
  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x390
  kasan_report+0xdd/0x110
  kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1b0
  __asan_memcpy+0x20/0x60
  nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
  push_nsh+0x82/0x120 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1405/0x2840 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xd5/0x3b0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0x949/0xdb0 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1d6/0x2b0
  genl_family_rcv_msg+0x336/0x580
  genl_rcv_msg+0x9f/0x130
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x11f/0x370
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x73e/0xaa0
  netlink_sendmsg+0x744/0xbf0
  __sys_sendto+0x3d6/0x450
  do_syscall_64+0x79/0x2c0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
  </TASK>

Let's add some checks that the attribute is properly sized and it's
the only one attribute inside the action.  Technically, there is no
real reason for OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH to be there, as we know that we're
pushing an NSH header already, it just creates extra nesting, but
that's how uAPI works today.  So, keeping as it is.

Fixes: b2d0f5d ("openvswitch: enable NSH support")
Reported-by: Junvy Yang <zhuque@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets <i.maximets@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron echaudro@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Aaron Conole <aconole@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request Dec 4, 2025
The push_nsh() action structure looks like this:

 OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH(OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH(OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE,...))

The outermost OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH attribute is OK'ed by the
nla_for_each_nested() inside __ovs_nla_copy_actions().  The innermost
OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE/MD1/MD2 are OK'ed by the nla_for_each_nested()
inside nsh_key_put_from_nlattr().  But nothing checks if the attribute
in the middle is OK.  We don't even check that this attribute is the
OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH.  We just do a double unwrap with a pair of nla_data()
calls - first time directly while calling validate_push_nsh() and the
second time as part of the nla_for_each_nested() macro, which isn't
safe, potentially causing invalid memory access if the size of this
attribute is incorrect.  The failure may not be noticed during
validation due to larger netlink buffer, but cause trouble later during
action execution where the buffer is allocated exactly to the size:

 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
 Read of size 184 at addr ffff88816459a634 by task a.out/22624

 CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 22624 6.18.0-rc7+ kernel-patches#115 PREEMPT(voluntary)
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x70
  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x390
  kasan_report+0xdd/0x110
  kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1b0
  __asan_memcpy+0x20/0x60
  nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
  push_nsh+0x82/0x120 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1405/0x2840 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xd5/0x3b0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0x949/0xdb0 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1d6/0x2b0
  genl_family_rcv_msg+0x336/0x580
  genl_rcv_msg+0x9f/0x130
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x11f/0x370
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x73e/0xaa0
  netlink_sendmsg+0x744/0xbf0
  __sys_sendto+0x3d6/0x450
  do_syscall_64+0x79/0x2c0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
  </TASK>

Let's add some checks that the attribute is properly sized and it's
the only one attribute inside the action.  Technically, there is no
real reason for OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH to be there, as we know that we're
pushing an NSH header already, it just creates extra nesting, but
that's how uAPI works today.  So, keeping as it is.

Fixes: b2d0f5d ("openvswitch: enable NSH support")
Reported-by: Junvy Yang <zhuque@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets <i.maximets@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron echaudro@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Aaron Conole <aconole@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request Dec 5, 2025
The push_nsh() action structure looks like this:

 OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH(OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH(OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE,...))

The outermost OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH attribute is OK'ed by the
nla_for_each_nested() inside __ovs_nla_copy_actions().  The innermost
OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE/MD1/MD2 are OK'ed by the nla_for_each_nested()
inside nsh_key_put_from_nlattr().  But nothing checks if the attribute
in the middle is OK.  We don't even check that this attribute is the
OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH.  We just do a double unwrap with a pair of nla_data()
calls - first time directly while calling validate_push_nsh() and the
second time as part of the nla_for_each_nested() macro, which isn't
safe, potentially causing invalid memory access if the size of this
attribute is incorrect.  The failure may not be noticed during
validation due to larger netlink buffer, but cause trouble later during
action execution where the buffer is allocated exactly to the size:

 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
 Read of size 184 at addr ffff88816459a634 by task a.out/22624

 CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 22624 6.18.0-rc7+ kernel-patches#115 PREEMPT(voluntary)
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x70
  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x390
  kasan_report+0xdd/0x110
  kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1b0
  __asan_memcpy+0x20/0x60
  nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
  push_nsh+0x82/0x120 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1405/0x2840 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xd5/0x3b0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0x949/0xdb0 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1d6/0x2b0
  genl_family_rcv_msg+0x336/0x580
  genl_rcv_msg+0x9f/0x130
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x11f/0x370
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x73e/0xaa0
  netlink_sendmsg+0x744/0xbf0
  __sys_sendto+0x3d6/0x450
  do_syscall_64+0x79/0x2c0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
  </TASK>

Let's add some checks that the attribute is properly sized and it's
the only one attribute inside the action.  Technically, there is no
real reason for OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH to be there, as we know that we're
pushing an NSH header already, it just creates extra nesting, but
that's how uAPI works today.  So, keeping as it is.

Fixes: b2d0f5d ("openvswitch: enable NSH support")
Reported-by: Junvy Yang <zhuque@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets <i.maximets@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron echaudro@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Aaron Conole <aconole@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request Dec 5, 2025
The push_nsh() action structure looks like this:

 OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH(OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH(OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE,...))

The outermost OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH attribute is OK'ed by the
nla_for_each_nested() inside __ovs_nla_copy_actions().  The innermost
OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE/MD1/MD2 are OK'ed by the nla_for_each_nested()
inside nsh_key_put_from_nlattr().  But nothing checks if the attribute
in the middle is OK.  We don't even check that this attribute is the
OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH.  We just do a double unwrap with a pair of nla_data()
calls - first time directly while calling validate_push_nsh() and the
second time as part of the nla_for_each_nested() macro, which isn't
safe, potentially causing invalid memory access if the size of this
attribute is incorrect.  The failure may not be noticed during
validation due to larger netlink buffer, but cause trouble later during
action execution where the buffer is allocated exactly to the size:

 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
 Read of size 184 at addr ffff88816459a634 by task a.out/22624

 CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 22624 6.18.0-rc7+ kernel-patches#115 PREEMPT(voluntary)
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x70
  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x390
  kasan_report+0xdd/0x110
  kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1b0
  __asan_memcpy+0x20/0x60
  nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
  push_nsh+0x82/0x120 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1405/0x2840 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xd5/0x3b0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0x949/0xdb0 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1d6/0x2b0
  genl_family_rcv_msg+0x336/0x580
  genl_rcv_msg+0x9f/0x130
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x11f/0x370
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x73e/0xaa0
  netlink_sendmsg+0x744/0xbf0
  __sys_sendto+0x3d6/0x450
  do_syscall_64+0x79/0x2c0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
  </TASK>

Let's add some checks that the attribute is properly sized and it's
the only one attribute inside the action.  Technically, there is no
real reason for OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH to be there, as we know that we're
pushing an NSH header already, it just creates extra nesting, but
that's how uAPI works today.  So, keeping as it is.

Fixes: b2d0f5d ("openvswitch: enable NSH support")
Reported-by: Junvy Yang <zhuque@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets <i.maximets@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron echaudro@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Aaron Conole <aconole@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request Dec 5, 2025
The push_nsh() action structure looks like this:

 OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH(OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH(OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE,...))

The outermost OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH attribute is OK'ed by the
nla_for_each_nested() inside __ovs_nla_copy_actions().  The innermost
OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE/MD1/MD2 are OK'ed by the nla_for_each_nested()
inside nsh_key_put_from_nlattr().  But nothing checks if the attribute
in the middle is OK.  We don't even check that this attribute is the
OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH.  We just do a double unwrap with a pair of nla_data()
calls - first time directly while calling validate_push_nsh() and the
second time as part of the nla_for_each_nested() macro, which isn't
safe, potentially causing invalid memory access if the size of this
attribute is incorrect.  The failure may not be noticed during
validation due to larger netlink buffer, but cause trouble later during
action execution where the buffer is allocated exactly to the size:

 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
 Read of size 184 at addr ffff88816459a634 by task a.out/22624

 CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 22624 6.18.0-rc7+ kernel-patches#115 PREEMPT(voluntary)
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x70
  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x390
  kasan_report+0xdd/0x110
  kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1b0
  __asan_memcpy+0x20/0x60
  nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
  push_nsh+0x82/0x120 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1405/0x2840 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xd5/0x3b0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0x949/0xdb0 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1d6/0x2b0
  genl_family_rcv_msg+0x336/0x580
  genl_rcv_msg+0x9f/0x130
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x11f/0x370
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x73e/0xaa0
  netlink_sendmsg+0x744/0xbf0
  __sys_sendto+0x3d6/0x450
  do_syscall_64+0x79/0x2c0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
  </TASK>

Let's add some checks that the attribute is properly sized and it's
the only one attribute inside the action.  Technically, there is no
real reason for OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH to be there, as we know that we're
pushing an NSH header already, it just creates extra nesting, but
that's how uAPI works today.  So, keeping as it is.

Fixes: b2d0f5d ("openvswitch: enable NSH support")
Reported-by: Junvy Yang <zhuque@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets <i.maximets@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron echaudro@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Aaron Conole <aconole@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request Dec 7, 2025
The push_nsh() action structure looks like this:

 OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH(OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH(OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE,...))

The outermost OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH attribute is OK'ed by the
nla_for_each_nested() inside __ovs_nla_copy_actions().  The innermost
OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE/MD1/MD2 are OK'ed by the nla_for_each_nested()
inside nsh_key_put_from_nlattr().  But nothing checks if the attribute
in the middle is OK.  We don't even check that this attribute is the
OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH.  We just do a double unwrap with a pair of nla_data()
calls - first time directly while calling validate_push_nsh() and the
second time as part of the nla_for_each_nested() macro, which isn't
safe, potentially causing invalid memory access if the size of this
attribute is incorrect.  The failure may not be noticed during
validation due to larger netlink buffer, but cause trouble later during
action execution where the buffer is allocated exactly to the size:

 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
 Read of size 184 at addr ffff88816459a634 by task a.out/22624

 CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 22624 6.18.0-rc7+ kernel-patches#115 PREEMPT(voluntary)
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x70
  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x390
  kasan_report+0xdd/0x110
  kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1b0
  __asan_memcpy+0x20/0x60
  nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
  push_nsh+0x82/0x120 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1405/0x2840 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xd5/0x3b0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0x949/0xdb0 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1d6/0x2b0
  genl_family_rcv_msg+0x336/0x580
  genl_rcv_msg+0x9f/0x130
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x11f/0x370
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x73e/0xaa0
  netlink_sendmsg+0x744/0xbf0
  __sys_sendto+0x3d6/0x450
  do_syscall_64+0x79/0x2c0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
  </TASK>

Let's add some checks that the attribute is properly sized and it's
the only one attribute inside the action.  Technically, there is no
real reason for OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH to be there, as we know that we're
pushing an NSH header already, it just creates extra nesting, but
that's how uAPI works today.  So, keeping as it is.

Fixes: b2d0f5d ("openvswitch: enable NSH support")
Reported-by: Junvy Yang <zhuque@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets <i.maximets@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron echaudro@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Aaron Conole <aconole@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request Dec 7, 2025
The push_nsh() action structure looks like this:

 OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH(OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH(OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE,...))

The outermost OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH attribute is OK'ed by the
nla_for_each_nested() inside __ovs_nla_copy_actions().  The innermost
OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE/MD1/MD2 are OK'ed by the nla_for_each_nested()
inside nsh_key_put_from_nlattr().  But nothing checks if the attribute
in the middle is OK.  We don't even check that this attribute is the
OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH.  We just do a double unwrap with a pair of nla_data()
calls - first time directly while calling validate_push_nsh() and the
second time as part of the nla_for_each_nested() macro, which isn't
safe, potentially causing invalid memory access if the size of this
attribute is incorrect.  The failure may not be noticed during
validation due to larger netlink buffer, but cause trouble later during
action execution where the buffer is allocated exactly to the size:

 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
 Read of size 184 at addr ffff88816459a634 by task a.out/22624

 CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 22624 6.18.0-rc7+ kernel-patches#115 PREEMPT(voluntary)
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x70
  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x390
  kasan_report+0xdd/0x110
  kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1b0
  __asan_memcpy+0x20/0x60
  nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
  push_nsh+0x82/0x120 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1405/0x2840 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xd5/0x3b0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0x949/0xdb0 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1d6/0x2b0
  genl_family_rcv_msg+0x336/0x580
  genl_rcv_msg+0x9f/0x130
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x11f/0x370
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x73e/0xaa0
  netlink_sendmsg+0x744/0xbf0
  __sys_sendto+0x3d6/0x450
  do_syscall_64+0x79/0x2c0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
  </TASK>

Let's add some checks that the attribute is properly sized and it's
the only one attribute inside the action.  Technically, there is no
real reason for OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH to be there, as we know that we're
pushing an NSH header already, it just creates extra nesting, but
that's how uAPI works today.  So, keeping as it is.

Fixes: b2d0f5d ("openvswitch: enable NSH support")
Reported-by: Junvy Yang <zhuque@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets <i.maximets@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron echaudro@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Aaron Conole <aconole@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request Dec 7, 2025
The push_nsh() action structure looks like this:

 OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH(OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH(OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE,...))

The outermost OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH attribute is OK'ed by the
nla_for_each_nested() inside __ovs_nla_copy_actions().  The innermost
OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE/MD1/MD2 are OK'ed by the nla_for_each_nested()
inside nsh_key_put_from_nlattr().  But nothing checks if the attribute
in the middle is OK.  We don't even check that this attribute is the
OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH.  We just do a double unwrap with a pair of nla_data()
calls - first time directly while calling validate_push_nsh() and the
second time as part of the nla_for_each_nested() macro, which isn't
safe, potentially causing invalid memory access if the size of this
attribute is incorrect.  The failure may not be noticed during
validation due to larger netlink buffer, but cause trouble later during
action execution where the buffer is allocated exactly to the size:

 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
 Read of size 184 at addr ffff88816459a634 by task a.out/22624

 CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 22624 6.18.0-rc7+ kernel-patches#115 PREEMPT(voluntary)
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x70
  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x390
  kasan_report+0xdd/0x110
  kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1b0
  __asan_memcpy+0x20/0x60
  nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
  push_nsh+0x82/0x120 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1405/0x2840 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xd5/0x3b0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0x949/0xdb0 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1d6/0x2b0
  genl_family_rcv_msg+0x336/0x580
  genl_rcv_msg+0x9f/0x130
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x11f/0x370
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x73e/0xaa0
  netlink_sendmsg+0x744/0xbf0
  __sys_sendto+0x3d6/0x450
  do_syscall_64+0x79/0x2c0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
  </TASK>

Let's add some checks that the attribute is properly sized and it's
the only one attribute inside the action.  Technically, there is no
real reason for OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH to be there, as we know that we're
pushing an NSH header already, it just creates extra nesting, but
that's how uAPI works today.  So, keeping as it is.

Fixes: b2d0f5d ("openvswitch: enable NSH support")
Reported-by: Junvy Yang <zhuque@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets <i.maximets@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron echaudro@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Aaron Conole <aconole@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request Dec 7, 2025
The push_nsh() action structure looks like this:

 OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH(OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH(OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE,...))

The outermost OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH attribute is OK'ed by the
nla_for_each_nested() inside __ovs_nla_copy_actions().  The innermost
OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE/MD1/MD2 are OK'ed by the nla_for_each_nested()
inside nsh_key_put_from_nlattr().  But nothing checks if the attribute
in the middle is OK.  We don't even check that this attribute is the
OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH.  We just do a double unwrap with a pair of nla_data()
calls - first time directly while calling validate_push_nsh() and the
second time as part of the nla_for_each_nested() macro, which isn't
safe, potentially causing invalid memory access if the size of this
attribute is incorrect.  The failure may not be noticed during
validation due to larger netlink buffer, but cause trouble later during
action execution where the buffer is allocated exactly to the size:

 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
 Read of size 184 at addr ffff88816459a634 by task a.out/22624

 CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 22624 6.18.0-rc7+ kernel-patches#115 PREEMPT(voluntary)
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x70
  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x390
  kasan_report+0xdd/0x110
  kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1b0
  __asan_memcpy+0x20/0x60
  nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
  push_nsh+0x82/0x120 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1405/0x2840 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xd5/0x3b0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0x949/0xdb0 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1d6/0x2b0
  genl_family_rcv_msg+0x336/0x580
  genl_rcv_msg+0x9f/0x130
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x11f/0x370
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x73e/0xaa0
  netlink_sendmsg+0x744/0xbf0
  __sys_sendto+0x3d6/0x450
  do_syscall_64+0x79/0x2c0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
  </TASK>

Let's add some checks that the attribute is properly sized and it's
the only one attribute inside the action.  Technically, there is no
real reason for OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH to be there, as we know that we're
pushing an NSH header already, it just creates extra nesting, but
that's how uAPI works today.  So, keeping as it is.

Fixes: b2d0f5d ("openvswitch: enable NSH support")
Reported-by: Junvy Yang <zhuque@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets <i.maximets@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron echaudro@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Aaron Conole <aconole@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request Dec 7, 2025
The push_nsh() action structure looks like this:

 OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH(OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH(OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE,...))

The outermost OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH attribute is OK'ed by the
nla_for_each_nested() inside __ovs_nla_copy_actions().  The innermost
OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE/MD1/MD2 are OK'ed by the nla_for_each_nested()
inside nsh_key_put_from_nlattr().  But nothing checks if the attribute
in the middle is OK.  We don't even check that this attribute is the
OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH.  We just do a double unwrap with a pair of nla_data()
calls - first time directly while calling validate_push_nsh() and the
second time as part of the nla_for_each_nested() macro, which isn't
safe, potentially causing invalid memory access if the size of this
attribute is incorrect.  The failure may not be noticed during
validation due to larger netlink buffer, but cause trouble later during
action execution where the buffer is allocated exactly to the size:

 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
 Read of size 184 at addr ffff88816459a634 by task a.out/22624

 CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 22624 6.18.0-rc7+ kernel-patches#115 PREEMPT(voluntary)
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x70
  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x390
  kasan_report+0xdd/0x110
  kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1b0
  __asan_memcpy+0x20/0x60
  nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
  push_nsh+0x82/0x120 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1405/0x2840 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xd5/0x3b0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0x949/0xdb0 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1d6/0x2b0
  genl_family_rcv_msg+0x336/0x580
  genl_rcv_msg+0x9f/0x130
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x11f/0x370
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x73e/0xaa0
  netlink_sendmsg+0x744/0xbf0
  __sys_sendto+0x3d6/0x450
  do_syscall_64+0x79/0x2c0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
  </TASK>

Let's add some checks that the attribute is properly sized and it's
the only one attribute inside the action.  Technically, there is no
real reason for OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH to be there, as we know that we're
pushing an NSH header already, it just creates extra nesting, but
that's how uAPI works today.  So, keeping as it is.

Fixes: b2d0f5d ("openvswitch: enable NSH support")
Reported-by: Junvy Yang <zhuque@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets <i.maximets@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron echaudro@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Aaron Conole <aconole@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request Dec 8, 2025
The push_nsh() action structure looks like this:

 OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH(OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH(OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE,...))

The outermost OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH attribute is OK'ed by the
nla_for_each_nested() inside __ovs_nla_copy_actions().  The innermost
OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE/MD1/MD2 are OK'ed by the nla_for_each_nested()
inside nsh_key_put_from_nlattr().  But nothing checks if the attribute
in the middle is OK.  We don't even check that this attribute is the
OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH.  We just do a double unwrap with a pair of nla_data()
calls - first time directly while calling validate_push_nsh() and the
second time as part of the nla_for_each_nested() macro, which isn't
safe, potentially causing invalid memory access if the size of this
attribute is incorrect.  The failure may not be noticed during
validation due to larger netlink buffer, but cause trouble later during
action execution where the buffer is allocated exactly to the size:

 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
 Read of size 184 at addr ffff88816459a634 by task a.out/22624

 CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 22624 6.18.0-rc7+ kernel-patches#115 PREEMPT(voluntary)
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x70
  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x390
  kasan_report+0xdd/0x110
  kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1b0
  __asan_memcpy+0x20/0x60
  nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
  push_nsh+0x82/0x120 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1405/0x2840 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xd5/0x3b0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0x949/0xdb0 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1d6/0x2b0
  genl_family_rcv_msg+0x336/0x580
  genl_rcv_msg+0x9f/0x130
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x11f/0x370
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x73e/0xaa0
  netlink_sendmsg+0x744/0xbf0
  __sys_sendto+0x3d6/0x450
  do_syscall_64+0x79/0x2c0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
  </TASK>

Let's add some checks that the attribute is properly sized and it's
the only one attribute inside the action.  Technically, there is no
real reason for OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH to be there, as we know that we're
pushing an NSH header already, it just creates extra nesting, but
that's how uAPI works today.  So, keeping as it is.

Fixes: b2d0f5d ("openvswitch: enable NSH support")
Reported-by: Junvy Yang <zhuque@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets <i.maximets@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron echaudro@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Aaron Conole <aconole@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request Dec 8, 2025
The push_nsh() action structure looks like this:

 OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH(OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH(OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE,...))

The outermost OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH attribute is OK'ed by the
nla_for_each_nested() inside __ovs_nla_copy_actions().  The innermost
OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE/MD1/MD2 are OK'ed by the nla_for_each_nested()
inside nsh_key_put_from_nlattr().  But nothing checks if the attribute
in the middle is OK.  We don't even check that this attribute is the
OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH.  We just do a double unwrap with a pair of nla_data()
calls - first time directly while calling validate_push_nsh() and the
second time as part of the nla_for_each_nested() macro, which isn't
safe, potentially causing invalid memory access if the size of this
attribute is incorrect.  The failure may not be noticed during
validation due to larger netlink buffer, but cause trouble later during
action execution where the buffer is allocated exactly to the size:

 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
 Read of size 184 at addr ffff88816459a634 by task a.out/22624

 CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 22624 6.18.0-rc7+ kernel-patches#115 PREEMPT(voluntary)
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x70
  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x390
  kasan_report+0xdd/0x110
  kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1b0
  __asan_memcpy+0x20/0x60
  nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
  push_nsh+0x82/0x120 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1405/0x2840 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xd5/0x3b0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0x949/0xdb0 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1d6/0x2b0
  genl_family_rcv_msg+0x336/0x580
  genl_rcv_msg+0x9f/0x130
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x11f/0x370
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x73e/0xaa0
  netlink_sendmsg+0x744/0xbf0
  __sys_sendto+0x3d6/0x450
  do_syscall_64+0x79/0x2c0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
  </TASK>

Let's add some checks that the attribute is properly sized and it's
the only one attribute inside the action.  Technically, there is no
real reason for OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH to be there, as we know that we're
pushing an NSH header already, it just creates extra nesting, but
that's how uAPI works today.  So, keeping as it is.

Fixes: b2d0f5d ("openvswitch: enable NSH support")
Reported-by: Junvy Yang <zhuque@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets <i.maximets@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron echaudro@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Aaron Conole <aconole@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request Dec 8, 2025
The push_nsh() action structure looks like this:

 OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH(OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH(OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE,...))

The outermost OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH attribute is OK'ed by the
nla_for_each_nested() inside __ovs_nla_copy_actions().  The innermost
OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE/MD1/MD2 are OK'ed by the nla_for_each_nested()
inside nsh_key_put_from_nlattr().  But nothing checks if the attribute
in the middle is OK.  We don't even check that this attribute is the
OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH.  We just do a double unwrap with a pair of nla_data()
calls - first time directly while calling validate_push_nsh() and the
second time as part of the nla_for_each_nested() macro, which isn't
safe, potentially causing invalid memory access if the size of this
attribute is incorrect.  The failure may not be noticed during
validation due to larger netlink buffer, but cause trouble later during
action execution where the buffer is allocated exactly to the size:

 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
 Read of size 184 at addr ffff88816459a634 by task a.out/22624

 CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 22624 6.18.0-rc7+ kernel-patches#115 PREEMPT(voluntary)
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x70
  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x390
  kasan_report+0xdd/0x110
  kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1b0
  __asan_memcpy+0x20/0x60
  nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
  push_nsh+0x82/0x120 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1405/0x2840 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xd5/0x3b0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0x949/0xdb0 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1d6/0x2b0
  genl_family_rcv_msg+0x336/0x580
  genl_rcv_msg+0x9f/0x130
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x11f/0x370
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x73e/0xaa0
  netlink_sendmsg+0x744/0xbf0
  __sys_sendto+0x3d6/0x450
  do_syscall_64+0x79/0x2c0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
  </TASK>

Let's add some checks that the attribute is properly sized and it's
the only one attribute inside the action.  Technically, there is no
real reason for OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH to be there, as we know that we're
pushing an NSH header already, it just creates extra nesting, but
that's how uAPI works today.  So, keeping as it is.

Fixes: b2d0f5d ("openvswitch: enable NSH support")
Reported-by: Junvy Yang <zhuque@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets <i.maximets@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron echaudro@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Aaron Conole <aconole@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request Dec 8, 2025
The push_nsh() action structure looks like this:

 OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH(OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH(OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE,...))

The outermost OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH attribute is OK'ed by the
nla_for_each_nested() inside __ovs_nla_copy_actions().  The innermost
OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE/MD1/MD2 are OK'ed by the nla_for_each_nested()
inside nsh_key_put_from_nlattr().  But nothing checks if the attribute
in the middle is OK.  We don't even check that this attribute is the
OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH.  We just do a double unwrap with a pair of nla_data()
calls - first time directly while calling validate_push_nsh() and the
second time as part of the nla_for_each_nested() macro, which isn't
safe, potentially causing invalid memory access if the size of this
attribute is incorrect.  The failure may not be noticed during
validation due to larger netlink buffer, but cause trouble later during
action execution where the buffer is allocated exactly to the size:

 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
 Read of size 184 at addr ffff88816459a634 by task a.out/22624

 CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 22624 6.18.0-rc7+ kernel-patches#115 PREEMPT(voluntary)
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x70
  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x390
  kasan_report+0xdd/0x110
  kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1b0
  __asan_memcpy+0x20/0x60
  nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
  push_nsh+0x82/0x120 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1405/0x2840 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xd5/0x3b0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0x949/0xdb0 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1d6/0x2b0
  genl_family_rcv_msg+0x336/0x580
  genl_rcv_msg+0x9f/0x130
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x11f/0x370
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x73e/0xaa0
  netlink_sendmsg+0x744/0xbf0
  __sys_sendto+0x3d6/0x450
  do_syscall_64+0x79/0x2c0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
  </TASK>

Let's add some checks that the attribute is properly sized and it's
the only one attribute inside the action.  Technically, there is no
real reason for OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH to be there, as we know that we're
pushing an NSH header already, it just creates extra nesting, but
that's how uAPI works today.  So, keeping as it is.

Fixes: b2d0f5d ("openvswitch: enable NSH support")
Reported-by: Junvy Yang <zhuque@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets <i.maximets@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron echaudro@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Aaron Conole <aconole@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request Dec 8, 2025
The push_nsh() action structure looks like this:

 OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH(OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH(OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE,...))

The outermost OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH attribute is OK'ed by the
nla_for_each_nested() inside __ovs_nla_copy_actions().  The innermost
OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE/MD1/MD2 are OK'ed by the nla_for_each_nested()
inside nsh_key_put_from_nlattr().  But nothing checks if the attribute
in the middle is OK.  We don't even check that this attribute is the
OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH.  We just do a double unwrap with a pair of nla_data()
calls - first time directly while calling validate_push_nsh() and the
second time as part of the nla_for_each_nested() macro, which isn't
safe, potentially causing invalid memory access if the size of this
attribute is incorrect.  The failure may not be noticed during
validation due to larger netlink buffer, but cause trouble later during
action execution where the buffer is allocated exactly to the size:

 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
 Read of size 184 at addr ffff88816459a634 by task a.out/22624

 CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 22624 6.18.0-rc7+ kernel-patches#115 PREEMPT(voluntary)
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x70
  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x390
  kasan_report+0xdd/0x110
  kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1b0
  __asan_memcpy+0x20/0x60
  nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
  push_nsh+0x82/0x120 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1405/0x2840 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xd5/0x3b0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0x949/0xdb0 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1d6/0x2b0
  genl_family_rcv_msg+0x336/0x580
  genl_rcv_msg+0x9f/0x130
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x11f/0x370
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x73e/0xaa0
  netlink_sendmsg+0x744/0xbf0
  __sys_sendto+0x3d6/0x450
  do_syscall_64+0x79/0x2c0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
  </TASK>

Let's add some checks that the attribute is properly sized and it's
the only one attribute inside the action.  Technically, there is no
real reason for OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH to be there, as we know that we're
pushing an NSH header already, it just creates extra nesting, but
that's how uAPI works today.  So, keeping as it is.

Fixes: b2d0f5d ("openvswitch: enable NSH support")
Reported-by: Junvy Yang <zhuque@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets <i.maximets@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron echaudro@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Aaron Conole <aconole@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request Dec 8, 2025
The push_nsh() action structure looks like this:

 OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH(OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH(OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE,...))

The outermost OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH attribute is OK'ed by the
nla_for_each_nested() inside __ovs_nla_copy_actions().  The innermost
OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE/MD1/MD2 are OK'ed by the nla_for_each_nested()
inside nsh_key_put_from_nlattr().  But nothing checks if the attribute
in the middle is OK.  We don't even check that this attribute is the
OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH.  We just do a double unwrap with a pair of nla_data()
calls - first time directly while calling validate_push_nsh() and the
second time as part of the nla_for_each_nested() macro, which isn't
safe, potentially causing invalid memory access if the size of this
attribute is incorrect.  The failure may not be noticed during
validation due to larger netlink buffer, but cause trouble later during
action execution where the buffer is allocated exactly to the size:

 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
 Read of size 184 at addr ffff88816459a634 by task a.out/22624

 CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 22624 6.18.0-rc7+ kernel-patches#115 PREEMPT(voluntary)
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x70
  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x390
  kasan_report+0xdd/0x110
  kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1b0
  __asan_memcpy+0x20/0x60
  nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
  push_nsh+0x82/0x120 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1405/0x2840 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xd5/0x3b0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0x949/0xdb0 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1d6/0x2b0
  genl_family_rcv_msg+0x336/0x580
  genl_rcv_msg+0x9f/0x130
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x11f/0x370
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x73e/0xaa0
  netlink_sendmsg+0x744/0xbf0
  __sys_sendto+0x3d6/0x450
  do_syscall_64+0x79/0x2c0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
  </TASK>

Let's add some checks that the attribute is properly sized and it's
the only one attribute inside the action.  Technically, there is no
real reason for OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH to be there, as we know that we're
pushing an NSH header already, it just creates extra nesting, but
that's how uAPI works today.  So, keeping as it is.

Fixes: b2d0f5d ("openvswitch: enable NSH support")
Reported-by: Junvy Yang <zhuque@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets <i.maximets@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron echaudro@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Aaron Conole <aconole@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request Dec 8, 2025
The push_nsh() action structure looks like this:

 OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH(OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH(OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE,...))

The outermost OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH attribute is OK'ed by the
nla_for_each_nested() inside __ovs_nla_copy_actions().  The innermost
OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE/MD1/MD2 are OK'ed by the nla_for_each_nested()
inside nsh_key_put_from_nlattr().  But nothing checks if the attribute
in the middle is OK.  We don't even check that this attribute is the
OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH.  We just do a double unwrap with a pair of nla_data()
calls - first time directly while calling validate_push_nsh() and the
second time as part of the nla_for_each_nested() macro, which isn't
safe, potentially causing invalid memory access if the size of this
attribute is incorrect.  The failure may not be noticed during
validation due to larger netlink buffer, but cause trouble later during
action execution where the buffer is allocated exactly to the size:

 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
 Read of size 184 at addr ffff88816459a634 by task a.out/22624

 CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 22624 6.18.0-rc7+ kernel-patches#115 PREEMPT(voluntary)
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x70
  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x390
  kasan_report+0xdd/0x110
  kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1b0
  __asan_memcpy+0x20/0x60
  nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
  push_nsh+0x82/0x120 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1405/0x2840 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xd5/0x3b0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0x949/0xdb0 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1d6/0x2b0
  genl_family_rcv_msg+0x336/0x580
  genl_rcv_msg+0x9f/0x130
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x11f/0x370
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x73e/0xaa0
  netlink_sendmsg+0x744/0xbf0
  __sys_sendto+0x3d6/0x450
  do_syscall_64+0x79/0x2c0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
  </TASK>

Let's add some checks that the attribute is properly sized and it's
the only one attribute inside the action.  Technically, there is no
real reason for OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH to be there, as we know that we're
pushing an NSH header already, it just creates extra nesting, but
that's how uAPI works today.  So, keeping as it is.

Fixes: b2d0f5d ("openvswitch: enable NSH support")
Reported-by: Junvy Yang <zhuque@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets <i.maximets@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron echaudro@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Aaron Conole <aconole@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request Dec 8, 2025
The push_nsh() action structure looks like this:

 OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH(OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH(OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE,...))

The outermost OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH attribute is OK'ed by the
nla_for_each_nested() inside __ovs_nla_copy_actions().  The innermost
OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE/MD1/MD2 are OK'ed by the nla_for_each_nested()
inside nsh_key_put_from_nlattr().  But nothing checks if the attribute
in the middle is OK.  We don't even check that this attribute is the
OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH.  We just do a double unwrap with a pair of nla_data()
calls - first time directly while calling validate_push_nsh() and the
second time as part of the nla_for_each_nested() macro, which isn't
safe, potentially causing invalid memory access if the size of this
attribute is incorrect.  The failure may not be noticed during
validation due to larger netlink buffer, but cause trouble later during
action execution where the buffer is allocated exactly to the size:

 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
 Read of size 184 at addr ffff88816459a634 by task a.out/22624

 CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 22624 6.18.0-rc7+ kernel-patches#115 PREEMPT(voluntary)
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x70
  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x390
  kasan_report+0xdd/0x110
  kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1b0
  __asan_memcpy+0x20/0x60
  nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
  push_nsh+0x82/0x120 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1405/0x2840 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xd5/0x3b0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0x949/0xdb0 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1d6/0x2b0
  genl_family_rcv_msg+0x336/0x580
  genl_rcv_msg+0x9f/0x130
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x11f/0x370
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x73e/0xaa0
  netlink_sendmsg+0x744/0xbf0
  __sys_sendto+0x3d6/0x450
  do_syscall_64+0x79/0x2c0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
  </TASK>

Let's add some checks that the attribute is properly sized and it's
the only one attribute inside the action.  Technically, there is no
real reason for OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH to be there, as we know that we're
pushing an NSH header already, it just creates extra nesting, but
that's how uAPI works today.  So, keeping as it is.

Fixes: b2d0f5d ("openvswitch: enable NSH support")
Reported-by: Junvy Yang <zhuque@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets <i.maximets@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron echaudro@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Aaron Conole <aconole@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request Dec 9, 2025
The push_nsh() action structure looks like this:

 OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH(OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH(OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE,...))

The outermost OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH attribute is OK'ed by the
nla_for_each_nested() inside __ovs_nla_copy_actions().  The innermost
OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE/MD1/MD2 are OK'ed by the nla_for_each_nested()
inside nsh_key_put_from_nlattr().  But nothing checks if the attribute
in the middle is OK.  We don't even check that this attribute is the
OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH.  We just do a double unwrap with a pair of nla_data()
calls - first time directly while calling validate_push_nsh() and the
second time as part of the nla_for_each_nested() macro, which isn't
safe, potentially causing invalid memory access if the size of this
attribute is incorrect.  The failure may not be noticed during
validation due to larger netlink buffer, but cause trouble later during
action execution where the buffer is allocated exactly to the size:

 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
 Read of size 184 at addr ffff88816459a634 by task a.out/22624

 CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 22624 6.18.0-rc7+ kernel-patches#115 PREEMPT(voluntary)
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x70
  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x390
  kasan_report+0xdd/0x110
  kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1b0
  __asan_memcpy+0x20/0x60
  nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
  push_nsh+0x82/0x120 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1405/0x2840 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xd5/0x3b0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0x949/0xdb0 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1d6/0x2b0
  genl_family_rcv_msg+0x336/0x580
  genl_rcv_msg+0x9f/0x130
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x11f/0x370
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x73e/0xaa0
  netlink_sendmsg+0x744/0xbf0
  __sys_sendto+0x3d6/0x450
  do_syscall_64+0x79/0x2c0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
  </TASK>

Let's add some checks that the attribute is properly sized and it's
the only one attribute inside the action.  Technically, there is no
real reason for OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH to be there, as we know that we're
pushing an NSH header already, it just creates extra nesting, but
that's how uAPI works today.  So, keeping as it is.

Fixes: b2d0f5d ("openvswitch: enable NSH support")
Reported-by: Junvy Yang <zhuque@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets <i.maximets@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron echaudro@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Aaron Conole <aconole@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request Dec 9, 2025
The push_nsh() action structure looks like this:

 OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH(OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH(OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE,...))

The outermost OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH attribute is OK'ed by the
nla_for_each_nested() inside __ovs_nla_copy_actions().  The innermost
OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE/MD1/MD2 are OK'ed by the nla_for_each_nested()
inside nsh_key_put_from_nlattr().  But nothing checks if the attribute
in the middle is OK.  We don't even check that this attribute is the
OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH.  We just do a double unwrap with a pair of nla_data()
calls - first time directly while calling validate_push_nsh() and the
second time as part of the nla_for_each_nested() macro, which isn't
safe, potentially causing invalid memory access if the size of this
attribute is incorrect.  The failure may not be noticed during
validation due to larger netlink buffer, but cause trouble later during
action execution where the buffer is allocated exactly to the size:

 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
 Read of size 184 at addr ffff88816459a634 by task a.out/22624

 CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 22624 6.18.0-rc7+ kernel-patches#115 PREEMPT(voluntary)
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x70
  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x390
  kasan_report+0xdd/0x110
  kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1b0
  __asan_memcpy+0x20/0x60
  nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
  push_nsh+0x82/0x120 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1405/0x2840 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xd5/0x3b0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0x949/0xdb0 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1d6/0x2b0
  genl_family_rcv_msg+0x336/0x580
  genl_rcv_msg+0x9f/0x130
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x11f/0x370
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x73e/0xaa0
  netlink_sendmsg+0x744/0xbf0
  __sys_sendto+0x3d6/0x450
  do_syscall_64+0x79/0x2c0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
  </TASK>

Let's add some checks that the attribute is properly sized and it's
the only one attribute inside the action.  Technically, there is no
real reason for OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH to be there, as we know that we're
pushing an NSH header already, it just creates extra nesting, but
that's how uAPI works today.  So, keeping as it is.

Fixes: b2d0f5d ("openvswitch: enable NSH support")
Reported-by: Junvy Yang <zhuque@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets <i.maximets@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron echaudro@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Aaron Conole <aconole@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request Dec 9, 2025
The push_nsh() action structure looks like this:

 OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH(OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH(OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE,...))

The outermost OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH attribute is OK'ed by the
nla_for_each_nested() inside __ovs_nla_copy_actions().  The innermost
OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE/MD1/MD2 are OK'ed by the nla_for_each_nested()
inside nsh_key_put_from_nlattr().  But nothing checks if the attribute
in the middle is OK.  We don't even check that this attribute is the
OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH.  We just do a double unwrap with a pair of nla_data()
calls - first time directly while calling validate_push_nsh() and the
second time as part of the nla_for_each_nested() macro, which isn't
safe, potentially causing invalid memory access if the size of this
attribute is incorrect.  The failure may not be noticed during
validation due to larger netlink buffer, but cause trouble later during
action execution where the buffer is allocated exactly to the size:

 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
 Read of size 184 at addr ffff88816459a634 by task a.out/22624

 CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 22624 6.18.0-rc7+ kernel-patches#115 PREEMPT(voluntary)
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x70
  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x390
  kasan_report+0xdd/0x110
  kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1b0
  __asan_memcpy+0x20/0x60
  nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
  push_nsh+0x82/0x120 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1405/0x2840 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xd5/0x3b0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0x949/0xdb0 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1d6/0x2b0
  genl_family_rcv_msg+0x336/0x580
  genl_rcv_msg+0x9f/0x130
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x11f/0x370
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x73e/0xaa0
  netlink_sendmsg+0x744/0xbf0
  __sys_sendto+0x3d6/0x450
  do_syscall_64+0x79/0x2c0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
  </TASK>

Let's add some checks that the attribute is properly sized and it's
the only one attribute inside the action.  Technically, there is no
real reason for OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH to be there, as we know that we're
pushing an NSH header already, it just creates extra nesting, but
that's how uAPI works today.  So, keeping as it is.

Fixes: b2d0f5d ("openvswitch: enable NSH support")
Reported-by: Junvy Yang <zhuque@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets <i.maximets@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron echaudro@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Aaron Conole <aconole@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request Dec 9, 2025
The push_nsh() action structure looks like this:

 OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH(OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH(OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE,...))

The outermost OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH attribute is OK'ed by the
nla_for_each_nested() inside __ovs_nla_copy_actions().  The innermost
OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE/MD1/MD2 are OK'ed by the nla_for_each_nested()
inside nsh_key_put_from_nlattr().  But nothing checks if the attribute
in the middle is OK.  We don't even check that this attribute is the
OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH.  We just do a double unwrap with a pair of nla_data()
calls - first time directly while calling validate_push_nsh() and the
second time as part of the nla_for_each_nested() macro, which isn't
safe, potentially causing invalid memory access if the size of this
attribute is incorrect.  The failure may not be noticed during
validation due to larger netlink buffer, but cause trouble later during
action execution where the buffer is allocated exactly to the size:

 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
 Read of size 184 at addr ffff88816459a634 by task a.out/22624

 CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 22624 6.18.0-rc7+ kernel-patches#115 PREEMPT(voluntary)
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x70
  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x390
  kasan_report+0xdd/0x110
  kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1b0
  __asan_memcpy+0x20/0x60
  nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
  push_nsh+0x82/0x120 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1405/0x2840 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xd5/0x3b0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0x949/0xdb0 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1d6/0x2b0
  genl_family_rcv_msg+0x336/0x580
  genl_rcv_msg+0x9f/0x130
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x11f/0x370
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x73e/0xaa0
  netlink_sendmsg+0x744/0xbf0
  __sys_sendto+0x3d6/0x450
  do_syscall_64+0x79/0x2c0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
  </TASK>

Let's add some checks that the attribute is properly sized and it's
the only one attribute inside the action.  Technically, there is no
real reason for OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH to be there, as we know that we're
pushing an NSH header already, it just creates extra nesting, but
that's how uAPI works today.  So, keeping as it is.

Fixes: b2d0f5d ("openvswitch: enable NSH support")
Reported-by: Junvy Yang <zhuque@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets <i.maximets@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron echaudro@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Aaron Conole <aconole@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request Dec 9, 2025
The push_nsh() action structure looks like this:

 OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH(OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH(OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE,...))

The outermost OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH attribute is OK'ed by the
nla_for_each_nested() inside __ovs_nla_copy_actions().  The innermost
OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE/MD1/MD2 are OK'ed by the nla_for_each_nested()
inside nsh_key_put_from_nlattr().  But nothing checks if the attribute
in the middle is OK.  We don't even check that this attribute is the
OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH.  We just do a double unwrap with a pair of nla_data()
calls - first time directly while calling validate_push_nsh() and the
second time as part of the nla_for_each_nested() macro, which isn't
safe, potentially causing invalid memory access if the size of this
attribute is incorrect.  The failure may not be noticed during
validation due to larger netlink buffer, but cause trouble later during
action execution where the buffer is allocated exactly to the size:

 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
 Read of size 184 at addr ffff88816459a634 by task a.out/22624

 CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 22624 6.18.0-rc7+ kernel-patches#115 PREEMPT(voluntary)
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x70
  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x390
  kasan_report+0xdd/0x110
  kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1b0
  __asan_memcpy+0x20/0x60
  nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
  push_nsh+0x82/0x120 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1405/0x2840 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xd5/0x3b0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0x949/0xdb0 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1d6/0x2b0
  genl_family_rcv_msg+0x336/0x580
  genl_rcv_msg+0x9f/0x130
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x11f/0x370
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x73e/0xaa0
  netlink_sendmsg+0x744/0xbf0
  __sys_sendto+0x3d6/0x450
  do_syscall_64+0x79/0x2c0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
  </TASK>

Let's add some checks that the attribute is properly sized and it's
the only one attribute inside the action.  Technically, there is no
real reason for OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH to be there, as we know that we're
pushing an NSH header already, it just creates extra nesting, but
that's how uAPI works today.  So, keeping as it is.

Fixes: b2d0f5d ("openvswitch: enable NSH support")
Reported-by: Junvy Yang <zhuque@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets <i.maximets@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron echaudro@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Aaron Conole <aconole@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request Dec 9, 2025
The push_nsh() action structure looks like this:

 OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH(OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH(OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE,...))

The outermost OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH attribute is OK'ed by the
nla_for_each_nested() inside __ovs_nla_copy_actions().  The innermost
OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE/MD1/MD2 are OK'ed by the nla_for_each_nested()
inside nsh_key_put_from_nlattr().  But nothing checks if the attribute
in the middle is OK.  We don't even check that this attribute is the
OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH.  We just do a double unwrap with a pair of nla_data()
calls - first time directly while calling validate_push_nsh() and the
second time as part of the nla_for_each_nested() macro, which isn't
safe, potentially causing invalid memory access if the size of this
attribute is incorrect.  The failure may not be noticed during
validation due to larger netlink buffer, but cause trouble later during
action execution where the buffer is allocated exactly to the size:

 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
 Read of size 184 at addr ffff88816459a634 by task a.out/22624

 CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 22624 6.18.0-rc7+ kernel-patches#115 PREEMPT(voluntary)
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x70
  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x390
  kasan_report+0xdd/0x110
  kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1b0
  __asan_memcpy+0x20/0x60
  nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
  push_nsh+0x82/0x120 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1405/0x2840 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xd5/0x3b0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0x949/0xdb0 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1d6/0x2b0
  genl_family_rcv_msg+0x336/0x580
  genl_rcv_msg+0x9f/0x130
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x11f/0x370
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x73e/0xaa0
  netlink_sendmsg+0x744/0xbf0
  __sys_sendto+0x3d6/0x450
  do_syscall_64+0x79/0x2c0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
  </TASK>

Let's add some checks that the attribute is properly sized and it's
the only one attribute inside the action.  Technically, there is no
real reason for OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH to be there, as we know that we're
pushing an NSH header already, it just creates extra nesting, but
that's how uAPI works today.  So, keeping as it is.

Fixes: b2d0f5d ("openvswitch: enable NSH support")
Reported-by: Junvy Yang <zhuque@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets <i.maximets@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron echaudro@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Aaron Conole <aconole@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request Dec 9, 2025
The push_nsh() action structure looks like this:

 OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH(OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH(OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE,...))

The outermost OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH attribute is OK'ed by the
nla_for_each_nested() inside __ovs_nla_copy_actions().  The innermost
OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE/MD1/MD2 are OK'ed by the nla_for_each_nested()
inside nsh_key_put_from_nlattr().  But nothing checks if the attribute
in the middle is OK.  We don't even check that this attribute is the
OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH.  We just do a double unwrap with a pair of nla_data()
calls - first time directly while calling validate_push_nsh() and the
second time as part of the nla_for_each_nested() macro, which isn't
safe, potentially causing invalid memory access if the size of this
attribute is incorrect.  The failure may not be noticed during
validation due to larger netlink buffer, but cause trouble later during
action execution where the buffer is allocated exactly to the size:

 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
 Read of size 184 at addr ffff88816459a634 by task a.out/22624

 CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 22624 6.18.0-rc7+ kernel-patches#115 PREEMPT(voluntary)
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x70
  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x390
  kasan_report+0xdd/0x110
  kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1b0
  __asan_memcpy+0x20/0x60
  nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
  push_nsh+0x82/0x120 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1405/0x2840 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xd5/0x3b0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0x949/0xdb0 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1d6/0x2b0
  genl_family_rcv_msg+0x336/0x580
  genl_rcv_msg+0x9f/0x130
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x11f/0x370
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x73e/0xaa0
  netlink_sendmsg+0x744/0xbf0
  __sys_sendto+0x3d6/0x450
  do_syscall_64+0x79/0x2c0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
  </TASK>

Let's add some checks that the attribute is properly sized and it's
the only one attribute inside the action.  Technically, there is no
real reason for OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH to be there, as we know that we're
pushing an NSH header already, it just creates extra nesting, but
that's how uAPI works today.  So, keeping as it is.

Fixes: b2d0f5d ("openvswitch: enable NSH support")
Reported-by: Junvy Yang <zhuque@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets <i.maximets@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron echaudro@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Aaron Conole <aconole@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request Dec 9, 2025
The push_nsh() action structure looks like this:

 OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH(OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH(OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE,...))

The outermost OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH attribute is OK'ed by the
nla_for_each_nested() inside __ovs_nla_copy_actions().  The innermost
OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE/MD1/MD2 are OK'ed by the nla_for_each_nested()
inside nsh_key_put_from_nlattr().  But nothing checks if the attribute
in the middle is OK.  We don't even check that this attribute is the
OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH.  We just do a double unwrap with a pair of nla_data()
calls - first time directly while calling validate_push_nsh() and the
second time as part of the nla_for_each_nested() macro, which isn't
safe, potentially causing invalid memory access if the size of this
attribute is incorrect.  The failure may not be noticed during
validation due to larger netlink buffer, but cause trouble later during
action execution where the buffer is allocated exactly to the size:

 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
 Read of size 184 at addr ffff88816459a634 by task a.out/22624

 CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 22624 6.18.0-rc7+ kernel-patches#115 PREEMPT(voluntary)
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x70
  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x390
  kasan_report+0xdd/0x110
  kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1b0
  __asan_memcpy+0x20/0x60
  nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
  push_nsh+0x82/0x120 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1405/0x2840 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xd5/0x3b0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0x949/0xdb0 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1d6/0x2b0
  genl_family_rcv_msg+0x336/0x580
  genl_rcv_msg+0x9f/0x130
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x11f/0x370
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x73e/0xaa0
  netlink_sendmsg+0x744/0xbf0
  __sys_sendto+0x3d6/0x450
  do_syscall_64+0x79/0x2c0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
  </TASK>

Let's add some checks that the attribute is properly sized and it's
the only one attribute inside the action.  Technically, there is no
real reason for OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH to be there, as we know that we're
pushing an NSH header already, it just creates extra nesting, but
that's how uAPI works today.  So, keeping as it is.

Fixes: b2d0f5d ("openvswitch: enable NSH support")
Reported-by: Junvy Yang <zhuque@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets <i.maximets@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron echaudro@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Aaron Conole <aconole@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request Dec 10, 2025
The push_nsh() action structure looks like this:

 OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH(OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH(OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE,...))

The outermost OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH attribute is OK'ed by the
nla_for_each_nested() inside __ovs_nla_copy_actions().  The innermost
OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE/MD1/MD2 are OK'ed by the nla_for_each_nested()
inside nsh_key_put_from_nlattr().  But nothing checks if the attribute
in the middle is OK.  We don't even check that this attribute is the
OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH.  We just do a double unwrap with a pair of nla_data()
calls - first time directly while calling validate_push_nsh() and the
second time as part of the nla_for_each_nested() macro, which isn't
safe, potentially causing invalid memory access if the size of this
attribute is incorrect.  The failure may not be noticed during
validation due to larger netlink buffer, but cause trouble later during
action execution where the buffer is allocated exactly to the size:

 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
 Read of size 184 at addr ffff88816459a634 by task a.out/22624

 CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 22624 6.18.0-rc7+ kernel-patches#115 PREEMPT(voluntary)
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x70
  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x390
  kasan_report+0xdd/0x110
  kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1b0
  __asan_memcpy+0x20/0x60
  nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
  push_nsh+0x82/0x120 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1405/0x2840 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xd5/0x3b0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0x949/0xdb0 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1d6/0x2b0
  genl_family_rcv_msg+0x336/0x580
  genl_rcv_msg+0x9f/0x130
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x11f/0x370
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x73e/0xaa0
  netlink_sendmsg+0x744/0xbf0
  __sys_sendto+0x3d6/0x450
  do_syscall_64+0x79/0x2c0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
  </TASK>

Let's add some checks that the attribute is properly sized and it's
the only one attribute inside the action.  Technically, there is no
real reason for OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH to be there, as we know that we're
pushing an NSH header already, it just creates extra nesting, but
that's how uAPI works today.  So, keeping as it is.

Fixes: b2d0f5d ("openvswitch: enable NSH support")
Reported-by: Junvy Yang <zhuque@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets <i.maximets@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron echaudro@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Aaron Conole <aconole@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request Dec 10, 2025
The push_nsh() action structure looks like this:

 OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH(OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH(OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE,...))

The outermost OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH attribute is OK'ed by the
nla_for_each_nested() inside __ovs_nla_copy_actions().  The innermost
OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE/MD1/MD2 are OK'ed by the nla_for_each_nested()
inside nsh_key_put_from_nlattr().  But nothing checks if the attribute
in the middle is OK.  We don't even check that this attribute is the
OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH.  We just do a double unwrap with a pair of nla_data()
calls - first time directly while calling validate_push_nsh() and the
second time as part of the nla_for_each_nested() macro, which isn't
safe, potentially causing invalid memory access if the size of this
attribute is incorrect.  The failure may not be noticed during
validation due to larger netlink buffer, but cause trouble later during
action execution where the buffer is allocated exactly to the size:

 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
 Read of size 184 at addr ffff88816459a634 by task a.out/22624

 CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 22624 6.18.0-rc7+ kernel-patches#115 PREEMPT(voluntary)
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x70
  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x390
  kasan_report+0xdd/0x110
  kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1b0
  __asan_memcpy+0x20/0x60
  nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
  push_nsh+0x82/0x120 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1405/0x2840 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xd5/0x3b0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0x949/0xdb0 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1d6/0x2b0
  genl_family_rcv_msg+0x336/0x580
  genl_rcv_msg+0x9f/0x130
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x11f/0x370
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x73e/0xaa0
  netlink_sendmsg+0x744/0xbf0
  __sys_sendto+0x3d6/0x450
  do_syscall_64+0x79/0x2c0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
  </TASK>

Let's add some checks that the attribute is properly sized and it's
the only one attribute inside the action.  Technically, there is no
real reason for OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH to be there, as we know that we're
pushing an NSH header already, it just creates extra nesting, but
that's how uAPI works today.  So, keeping as it is.

Fixes: b2d0f5d ("openvswitch: enable NSH support")
Reported-by: Junvy Yang <zhuque@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets <i.maximets@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron echaudro@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Aaron Conole <aconole@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request Dec 10, 2025
The push_nsh() action structure looks like this:

 OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH(OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH(OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE,...))

The outermost OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH attribute is OK'ed by the
nla_for_each_nested() inside __ovs_nla_copy_actions().  The innermost
OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE/MD1/MD2 are OK'ed by the nla_for_each_nested()
inside nsh_key_put_from_nlattr().  But nothing checks if the attribute
in the middle is OK.  We don't even check that this attribute is the
OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH.  We just do a double unwrap with a pair of nla_data()
calls - first time directly while calling validate_push_nsh() and the
second time as part of the nla_for_each_nested() macro, which isn't
safe, potentially causing invalid memory access if the size of this
attribute is incorrect.  The failure may not be noticed during
validation due to larger netlink buffer, but cause trouble later during
action execution where the buffer is allocated exactly to the size:

 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
 Read of size 184 at addr ffff88816459a634 by task a.out/22624

 CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 22624 6.18.0-rc7+ kernel-patches#115 PREEMPT(voluntary)
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x70
  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x390
  kasan_report+0xdd/0x110
  kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1b0
  __asan_memcpy+0x20/0x60
  nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
  push_nsh+0x82/0x120 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1405/0x2840 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xd5/0x3b0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0x949/0xdb0 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1d6/0x2b0
  genl_family_rcv_msg+0x336/0x580
  genl_rcv_msg+0x9f/0x130
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x11f/0x370
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x73e/0xaa0
  netlink_sendmsg+0x744/0xbf0
  __sys_sendto+0x3d6/0x450
  do_syscall_64+0x79/0x2c0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
  </TASK>

Let's add some checks that the attribute is properly sized and it's
the only one attribute inside the action.  Technically, there is no
real reason for OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH to be there, as we know that we're
pushing an NSH header already, it just creates extra nesting, but
that's how uAPI works today.  So, keeping as it is.

Fixes: b2d0f5d ("openvswitch: enable NSH support")
Reported-by: Junvy Yang <zhuque@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets <i.maximets@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron echaudro@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Aaron Conole <aconole@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request Dec 10, 2025
The push_nsh() action structure looks like this:

 OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH(OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH(OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE,...))

The outermost OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH attribute is OK'ed by the
nla_for_each_nested() inside __ovs_nla_copy_actions().  The innermost
OVS_NSH_KEY_ATTR_BASE/MD1/MD2 are OK'ed by the nla_for_each_nested()
inside nsh_key_put_from_nlattr().  But nothing checks if the attribute
in the middle is OK.  We don't even check that this attribute is the
OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH.  We just do a double unwrap with a pair of nla_data()
calls - first time directly while calling validate_push_nsh() and the
second time as part of the nla_for_each_nested() macro, which isn't
safe, potentially causing invalid memory access if the size of this
attribute is incorrect.  The failure may not be noticed during
validation due to larger netlink buffer, but cause trouble later during
action execution where the buffer is allocated exactly to the size:

 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
 Read of size 184 at addr ffff88816459a634 by task a.out/22624

 CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 22624 6.18.0-rc7+ kernel-patches#115 PREEMPT(voluntary)
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x70
  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x390
  kasan_report+0xdd/0x110
  kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1b0
  __asan_memcpy+0x20/0x60
  nsh_hdr_from_nlattr+0x1dd/0x6a0 [openvswitch]
  push_nsh+0x82/0x120 [openvswitch]
  do_execute_actions+0x1405/0x2840 [openvswitch]
  ovs_execute_actions+0xd5/0x3b0 [openvswitch]
  ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0x949/0xdb0 [openvswitch]
  genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1d6/0x2b0
  genl_family_rcv_msg+0x336/0x580
  genl_rcv_msg+0x9f/0x130
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x11f/0x370
  genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
  netlink_unicast+0x73e/0xaa0
  netlink_sendmsg+0x744/0xbf0
  __sys_sendto+0x3d6/0x450
  do_syscall_64+0x79/0x2c0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
  </TASK>

Let's add some checks that the attribute is properly sized and it's
the only one attribute inside the action.  Technically, there is no
real reason for OVS_KEY_ATTR_NSH to be there, as we know that we're
pushing an NSH header already, it just creates extra nesting, but
that's how uAPI works today.  So, keeping as it is.

Fixes: b2d0f5d ("openvswitch: enable NSH support")
Reported-by: Junvy Yang <zhuque@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets <i.maximets@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron echaudro@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Aaron Conole <aconole@redhat.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251204105334.900379-1-i.maximets@ovn.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request Jan 9, 2026
mlx5e_priv is an unstable structure that can be memset(0) if profile
attaching fails.

Pass netdev to mlx5e_destroy_netdev() to guarantee it will work on a
valid netdev.

On mlx5e_remove: Check validity of priv->profile, before attempting
to cleanup any resources that might be not there.

This fixes a kernel oops in mlx5e_remove when switchdev mode fails due
to change profile failure.

$ devlink dev eswitch set pci/0000:00:03.0 mode switchdev
Error: mlx5_core: Failed setting eswitch to offloads.
dmesg:
workqueue: Failed to create a rescuer kthread for wq "mlx5e": -EINTR
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1: mlx5e_netdev_init_profile:6214:(pid 37199): mlx5e_priv_init failed, err=-12
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1 gpu3rdma1: mlx5e_netdev_change_profile: new profile init failed, -12
workqueue: Failed to create a rescuer kthread for wq "mlx5e": -EINTR
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1: mlx5e_netdev_init_profile:6214:(pid 37199): mlx5e_priv_init failed, err=-12
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1 gpu3rdma1: mlx5e_netdev_change_profile: failed to rollback to orig profile, -12

$ devlink dev reload pci/0000:00:03.0 ==> oops

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000370
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [kernel-patches#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 15 UID: 0 PID: 520 Comm: devlink Not tainted 6.18.0-rc5+ kernel-patches#115 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:mlx5e_dcbnl_dscp_app+0x23/0x100
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000083f8b8 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: ffff8881126fc380 RBX: ffff8881015ac400 RCX: ffffffff826ffc45
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff8881035109c0
RBP: ffff8881035109c0 R08: ffff888101e3e838 R09: ffff888100264e10
R10: ffffc9000083f898 R11: ffffc9000083f8a0 R12: ffff888101b921a0
R13: ffff888101b921a0 R14: ffff8881015ac9a0 R15: ffff8881015ac400
FS:  00007f789a3c8740(0000) GS:ffff88856aa59000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000370 CR3: 000000010b6c0001 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 mlx5e_remove+0x57/0x110
 device_release_driver_internal+0x19c/0x200
 bus_remove_device+0xc6/0x130
 device_del+0x160/0x3d0
 ? devl_param_driverinit_value_get+0x2d/0x90
 mlx5_detach_device+0x89/0xe0
 mlx5_unload_one_devl_locked+0x3a/0x70
 mlx5_devlink_reload_down+0xc8/0x220
 devlink_reload+0x7d/0x260
 devlink_nl_reload_doit+0x45b/0x5a0
 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xe8/0x140

Fixes: c4d7eb5 ("net/mxl5e: Add change profile method")
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Shay Drori <shayd@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request Jan 9, 2026
mlx5e_priv is an unstable structure that can be memset(0) if profile
attaching fails.

Pass netdev to mlx5e_destroy_netdev() to guarantee it will work on a
valid netdev.

On mlx5e_remove: Check validity of priv->profile, before attempting
to cleanup any resources that might be not there.

This fixes a kernel oops in mlx5e_remove when switchdev mode fails due
to change profile failure.

$ devlink dev eswitch set pci/0000:00:03.0 mode switchdev
Error: mlx5_core: Failed setting eswitch to offloads.
dmesg:
workqueue: Failed to create a rescuer kthread for wq "mlx5e": -EINTR
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1: mlx5e_netdev_init_profile:6214:(pid 37199): mlx5e_priv_init failed, err=-12
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1 gpu3rdma1: mlx5e_netdev_change_profile: new profile init failed, -12
workqueue: Failed to create a rescuer kthread for wq "mlx5e": -EINTR
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1: mlx5e_netdev_init_profile:6214:(pid 37199): mlx5e_priv_init failed, err=-12
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1 gpu3rdma1: mlx5e_netdev_change_profile: failed to rollback to orig profile, -12

$ devlink dev reload pci/0000:00:03.0 ==> oops

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000370
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [kernel-patches#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 15 UID: 0 PID: 520 Comm: devlink Not tainted 6.18.0-rc5+ kernel-patches#115 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:mlx5e_dcbnl_dscp_app+0x23/0x100
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000083f8b8 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: ffff8881126fc380 RBX: ffff8881015ac400 RCX: ffffffff826ffc45
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff8881035109c0
RBP: ffff8881035109c0 R08: ffff888101e3e838 R09: ffff888100264e10
R10: ffffc9000083f898 R11: ffffc9000083f8a0 R12: ffff888101b921a0
R13: ffff888101b921a0 R14: ffff8881015ac9a0 R15: ffff8881015ac400
FS:  00007f789a3c8740(0000) GS:ffff88856aa59000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000370 CR3: 000000010b6c0001 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 mlx5e_remove+0x57/0x110
 device_release_driver_internal+0x19c/0x200
 bus_remove_device+0xc6/0x130
 device_del+0x160/0x3d0
 ? devl_param_driverinit_value_get+0x2d/0x90
 mlx5_detach_device+0x89/0xe0
 mlx5_unload_one_devl_locked+0x3a/0x70
 mlx5_devlink_reload_down+0xc8/0x220
 devlink_reload+0x7d/0x260
 devlink_nl_reload_doit+0x45b/0x5a0
 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xe8/0x140

Fixes: c4d7eb5 ("net/mxl5e: Add change profile method")
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Shay Drori <shayd@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request Jan 9, 2026
mlx5e_priv is an unstable structure that can be memset(0) if profile
attaching fails.

Pass netdev to mlx5e_destroy_netdev() to guarantee it will work on a
valid netdev.

On mlx5e_remove: Check validity of priv->profile, before attempting
to cleanup any resources that might be not there.

This fixes a kernel oops in mlx5e_remove when switchdev mode fails due
to change profile failure.

$ devlink dev eswitch set pci/0000:00:03.0 mode switchdev
Error: mlx5_core: Failed setting eswitch to offloads.
dmesg:
workqueue: Failed to create a rescuer kthread for wq "mlx5e": -EINTR
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1: mlx5e_netdev_init_profile:6214:(pid 37199): mlx5e_priv_init failed, err=-12
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1 gpu3rdma1: mlx5e_netdev_change_profile: new profile init failed, -12
workqueue: Failed to create a rescuer kthread for wq "mlx5e": -EINTR
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1: mlx5e_netdev_init_profile:6214:(pid 37199): mlx5e_priv_init failed, err=-12
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1 gpu3rdma1: mlx5e_netdev_change_profile: failed to rollback to orig profile, -12

$ devlink dev reload pci/0000:00:03.0 ==> oops

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000370
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [kernel-patches#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 15 UID: 0 PID: 520 Comm: devlink Not tainted 6.18.0-rc5+ kernel-patches#115 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:mlx5e_dcbnl_dscp_app+0x23/0x100
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000083f8b8 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: ffff8881126fc380 RBX: ffff8881015ac400 RCX: ffffffff826ffc45
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff8881035109c0
RBP: ffff8881035109c0 R08: ffff888101e3e838 R09: ffff888100264e10
R10: ffffc9000083f898 R11: ffffc9000083f8a0 R12: ffff888101b921a0
R13: ffff888101b921a0 R14: ffff8881015ac9a0 R15: ffff8881015ac400
FS:  00007f789a3c8740(0000) GS:ffff88856aa59000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000370 CR3: 000000010b6c0001 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 mlx5e_remove+0x57/0x110
 device_release_driver_internal+0x19c/0x200
 bus_remove_device+0xc6/0x130
 device_del+0x160/0x3d0
 ? devl_param_driverinit_value_get+0x2d/0x90
 mlx5_detach_device+0x89/0xe0
 mlx5_unload_one_devl_locked+0x3a/0x70
 mlx5_devlink_reload_down+0xc8/0x220
 devlink_reload+0x7d/0x260
 devlink_nl_reload_doit+0x45b/0x5a0
 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xe8/0x140

Fixes: c4d7eb5 ("net/mxl5e: Add change profile method")
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Shay Drori <shayd@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request Jan 9, 2026
mlx5e_priv is an unstable structure that can be memset(0) if profile
attaching fails.

Pass netdev to mlx5e_destroy_netdev() to guarantee it will work on a
valid netdev.

On mlx5e_remove: Check validity of priv->profile, before attempting
to cleanup any resources that might be not there.

This fixes a kernel oops in mlx5e_remove when switchdev mode fails due
to change profile failure.

$ devlink dev eswitch set pci/0000:00:03.0 mode switchdev
Error: mlx5_core: Failed setting eswitch to offloads.
dmesg:
workqueue: Failed to create a rescuer kthread for wq "mlx5e": -EINTR
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1: mlx5e_netdev_init_profile:6214:(pid 37199): mlx5e_priv_init failed, err=-12
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1 gpu3rdma1: mlx5e_netdev_change_profile: new profile init failed, -12
workqueue: Failed to create a rescuer kthread for wq "mlx5e": -EINTR
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1: mlx5e_netdev_init_profile:6214:(pid 37199): mlx5e_priv_init failed, err=-12
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1 gpu3rdma1: mlx5e_netdev_change_profile: failed to rollback to orig profile, -12

$ devlink dev reload pci/0000:00:03.0 ==> oops

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000370
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [kernel-patches#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 15 UID: 0 PID: 520 Comm: devlink Not tainted 6.18.0-rc5+ kernel-patches#115 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:mlx5e_dcbnl_dscp_app+0x23/0x100
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000083f8b8 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: ffff8881126fc380 RBX: ffff8881015ac400 RCX: ffffffff826ffc45
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff8881035109c0
RBP: ffff8881035109c0 R08: ffff888101e3e838 R09: ffff888100264e10
R10: ffffc9000083f898 R11: ffffc9000083f8a0 R12: ffff888101b921a0
R13: ffff888101b921a0 R14: ffff8881015ac9a0 R15: ffff8881015ac400
FS:  00007f789a3c8740(0000) GS:ffff88856aa59000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000370 CR3: 000000010b6c0001 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 mlx5e_remove+0x57/0x110
 device_release_driver_internal+0x19c/0x200
 bus_remove_device+0xc6/0x130
 device_del+0x160/0x3d0
 ? devl_param_driverinit_value_get+0x2d/0x90
 mlx5_detach_device+0x89/0xe0
 mlx5_unload_one_devl_locked+0x3a/0x70
 mlx5_devlink_reload_down+0xc8/0x220
 devlink_reload+0x7d/0x260
 devlink_nl_reload_doit+0x45b/0x5a0
 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xe8/0x140

Fixes: c4d7eb5 ("net/mxl5e: Add change profile method")
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Shay Drori <shayd@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing-bpf-ci that referenced this pull request Jan 9, 2026
mlx5e_priv is an unstable structure that can be memset(0) if profile
attaching fails.

Pass netdev to mlx5e_destroy_netdev() to guarantee it will work on a
valid netdev.

On mlx5e_remove: Check validity of priv->profile, before attempting
to cleanup any resources that might be not there.

This fixes a kernel oops in mlx5e_remove when switchdev mode fails due
to change profile failure.

$ devlink dev eswitch set pci/0000:00:03.0 mode switchdev
Error: mlx5_core: Failed setting eswitch to offloads.
dmesg:
workqueue: Failed to create a rescuer kthread for wq "mlx5e": -EINTR
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1: mlx5e_netdev_init_profile:6214:(pid 37199): mlx5e_priv_init failed, err=-12
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1 gpu3rdma1: mlx5e_netdev_change_profile: new profile init failed, -12
workqueue: Failed to create a rescuer kthread for wq "mlx5e": -EINTR
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1: mlx5e_netdev_init_profile:6214:(pid 37199): mlx5e_priv_init failed, err=-12
mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1 gpu3rdma1: mlx5e_netdev_change_profile: failed to rollback to orig profile, -12

$ devlink dev reload pci/0000:00:03.0 ==> oops

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000370
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [kernel-patches#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 15 UID: 0 PID: 520 Comm: devlink Not tainted 6.18.0-rc5+ kernel-patches#115 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:mlx5e_dcbnl_dscp_app+0x23/0x100
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000083f8b8 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: ffff8881126fc380 RBX: ffff8881015ac400 RCX: ffffffff826ffc45
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff8881035109c0
RBP: ffff8881035109c0 R08: ffff888101e3e838 R09: ffff888100264e10
R10: ffffc9000083f898 R11: ffffc9000083f8a0 R12: ffff888101b921a0
R13: ffff888101b921a0 R14: ffff8881015ac9a0 R15: ffff8881015ac400
FS:  00007f789a3c8740(0000) GS:ffff88856aa59000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000370 CR3: 000000010b6c0001 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 mlx5e_remove+0x57/0x110
 device_release_driver_internal+0x19c/0x200
 bus_remove_device+0xc6/0x130
 device_del+0x160/0x3d0
 ? devl_param_driverinit_value_get+0x2d/0x90
 mlx5_detach_device+0x89/0xe0
 mlx5_unload_one_devl_locked+0x3a/0x70
 mlx5_devlink_reload_down+0xc8/0x220
 devlink_reload+0x7d/0x260
 devlink_nl_reload_doit+0x45b/0x5a0
 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xe8/0x140

Fixes: c4d7eb5 ("net/mxl5e: Add change profile method")
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Shay Drori <shayd@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
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