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… security headers (#29) - Add per-instance HMAC-SHA256 signing key for VNC tunnel tokens (defense-in-depth against tunnel ID brute-force) - Verify HMAC signature before accepting /vnc-tunnel connections with constant-time comparison to prevent timing attacks - Add security headers to /vnc-viewer response: Referrer-Policy: no-referrer (prevents token leaking) X-Frame-Options: DENY (prevents clickjacking) Strict-Transport-Security (enforces HTTPS) Content-Security-Policy (restricts script sources to esm.sh) Cache-Control: no-store (prevents token caching) - Add <meta name="referrer" content="no-referrer"/> to viewer HTML Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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The CSP header added in #29 blocked the inline <script> and <style> tags in the VNC viewer HTML, causing a white screen. Generate a per-request cryptographic nonce and include it in both the CSP header (script-src/style-src) and the HTML tags (nonce="..."). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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zooqueen
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…) (#30) The CSP header added in #29 blocked the inline <script> and <style> tags in the VNC viewer HTML, causing a white screen. Generate a per-request cryptographic nonce and include it in both the CSP header (script-src/style-src) and the HTML tags (nonce="..."). Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
zooqueen
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… security headers (#29) (#29) - Add per-instance HMAC-SHA256 signing key for VNC tunnel tokens (defense-in-depth against tunnel ID brute-force) - Verify HMAC signature before accepting /vnc-tunnel connections with constant-time comparison to prevent timing attacks - Add security headers to /vnc-viewer response: Referrer-Policy: no-referrer (prevents token leaking) X-Frame-Options: DENY (prevents clickjacking) Strict-Transport-Security (enforces HTTPS) Content-Security-Policy (restricts script sources to esm.sh) Cache-Control: no-store (prevents token caching) - Add <meta name="referrer" content="no-referrer"/> to viewer HTML
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Summary
/vnc-tunnelendpoint verifies the signature with constant-time comparison before accepting connections. This adds defense-in-depth (UUID randomness + HMAC + 15s expiry + one-time use)./vnc-viewer: Referrer-Policy (prevents gateway token leaking via HTTP Referer), CSP (restricts scripts to esm.sh only, WebSocket to gateway host only), HSTS, X-Frame-Options: DENY, Cache-Control: no-store.Security Model
authorizeCanvasRequestwith timing-safe comparison + rate limitingTest plan
/vnc-viewer?token=...&nodeId=.../vnc-viewerresponse (verify with curl -I)🤖 Generated with Claude Code