Login flow:
- First login: paste token, saved to localStorage
- Subsequent visits: auto-login from localStorage (no paste needed)
- Shows 'Authenticating...' spinner during auto-login
- If saved token is stale (server restarted), clears it and shows login form

Session recovery:
- If session cookie expires mid-use (server restart, 24h expiry), the API
  layer auto-reauths with the saved token before redirecting to login
- Transparent to the user — one failed request triggers reauth + retry
- Only falls back to login page if the saved token itself is invalid

Security:
- Token stored in localStorage (same-origin, tailnet-only deployment)
- Cleared automatically when token becomes invalid
- Cookie remains HttpOnly + SameSite=Strict for the actual session

Server:
- mcp_request_log now captures params (jsonb) and error_message (text)
- Agents API returns last_used_at, total_requests, requests_today
- Request log API supports agent/operation/status filtering via query params
- SSE broadcast includes params and error details

Agents page:
- Shows 'Requests today / total' and 'Last used' (relative time) per agent
- Removed Client ID column (low signal, shown in drawer)

Request Log page:
- New 'Params' column — shows query text, slug, or param count inline
- Click any row to expand full details (params JSON, error message, timestamps)
- Click agent name to filter all requests by that agent
- Agent filter dropdown in header
- Error messages shown in red in expanded view

What this means: when Claude Code searches for 'pedro franceschi',
the admin dashboard shows the search query, which agent ran it,
how long it took, and whether it succeeded — all clickable.

New flow:
1. User opens /admin → sees 'This is a protected dashboard'
2. UI tells them: 'Ask your AI agent for the admin login link'
3. Agent generates: https://host:port/admin/auth/<token>
4. User clicks the link → auto-authenticates → redirects to dashboard
5. Session lasts 7 days (magic link) vs 24h (manual token paste)

Server: GET /admin/auth/:token validates the bootstrap token, sets
HttpOnly cookie, redirects to /admin/. Invalid tokens get a plain
text error telling them to ask their agent for a fresh link.

Login page: primary UX is the 'ask your agent' prompt with example.
Manual token paste collapsed under a <details> disclosure.

…r, Perplexity

Agent drawer now shows setup instructions for 5 clients + raw JSON:
- Claude Code: .mcp.json with bearer token + curl to mint
- ChatGPT: Settings → Tools → MCP with OAuth discovery
- Claude.ai (Cowork): Connected Apps → MCP with OAuth
- Cursor: .cursor/mcp.json with OAuth config
- Perplexity: Connectors with client ID/secret
- JSON: raw config with all URLs (server, token, discovery)

All snippets use the actual server URL (window.location.origin)
instead of placeholder YOUR_SERVER. Client ID pre-filled.

Problem: OAuth tokens expire in 1 hour (hardcoded). Claude Code's built-in
OAuth client doesn't auto-refresh, so users get 401s every hour.

Fix: per-client token_ttl column on oauth_clients table. Set at registration
time or updated later via the admin dashboard.

Server:
- oauth_clients.token_ttl column (nullable integer, seconds)
- exchangeClientCredentials reads per-client TTL, falls back to server default
- POST /admin/api/register-client accepts tokenTtl param
- POST /admin/api/update-client-ttl for existing clients
- Agents API returns token_ttl for display

Admin UI:
- Register modal: Token Lifetime dropdown (1h, 24h, 7d, 30d, 1y, no expiry)
- Agent drawer: shows current TTL in Details section

Presets: gstack-desktop and garry-claude-code set to 30-day tokens.

Resolves client_id → client_name via LEFT JOIN on oauth_clients (and
access_tokens for legacy keys). Agent column now shows 'gstack-desktop'
instead of 'd0db7692caf5…'. Clickable to filter by agent.

DESIGN.md establishes the admin dashboard design system:
- Left-align all text (Garry preference)
- Inter + JetBrains Mono (shared DNA with GStack)
- No accent color — semantic badges carry all color
- Dense utilitarian ops dashboard
- Component specs and anti-patterns documented

CSS: login-box text-align center → left

Agent names stored at log time (agent_name column). Agents page shows
OAuth clients and API keys in one unified table. Request log shows
human-readable names. Backfilled 1,114 existing entries.

Bugs fixed:
- Revoke Agent button was a no-op (no onClick handler, no API endpoint)
- Legacy API key tokens got 401 at /mcp (missing expiresAt in AuthInfo)
- token_ttl and deleted_at queries failed on PGLite (columns don't exist)

Server:
- POST /admin/api/revoke-client: soft-deletes oauth_clients + purges tokens
- exchangeClientCredentials checks deleted_at (graceful if column missing)
- Legacy token verify returns expiresAt (1yr future) for SDK compat

UI:
- Revoke button: confirm dialog → revoke → close drawer → reload table
- Shows 'This agent has been revoked' for revoked agents

E2E tests (2 new cases, 17 total):
- revoke client via admin API invalidates all tokens (mint → use → revoke → verify rejected → mint fails)
- revoke API key via admin API (create → use at /mcp → revoke → verify rejected)

52 tests, 0 failures, 213 assertions across unit + e2e.

Matches the login page aesthetic instead of plain text. Dark theme,
GBrain logo, explains the link expired, tells user to ask their agent.

…tions

…aware, verified syntax

…master

Syncs all accumulated fixes onto the PR branch:
- API key rows in agents table now open drawer with Revoke button
- API keys show bearer token usage hint instead of config export tabs
- Config export snippets use command language directed at the AI agent
- Styled expired magic link error page
- Hide revoked toggle
- Test cleanup via direct SQL
- All v0.26.2 upstream fixes incorporated

Tests in test/oauth.test.ts (already on this branch) import coerceTimestamp
from oauth-provider.ts. The import was synced from master via PR commit 16
("sync all fixes from master") but the production-code change to
oauth-provider.ts was not. Result: bun test fails at module load with
"coerceTimestamp is not exported".

This commit ports the helper directly instead of merging master, avoiding
VERSION/CHANGELOG/dist conflicts.

Boundary helper for postgres.js BIGINT-as-string (auto-detected on
Supabase pgbouncer / port 6543). Throws on non-finite so corrupt rows
fail loud at the SELECT-row -> JS-number boundary. Returns undefined
for SQL NULL; comparison sites treat NULL as expired (fail-closed).

Refactors 4 sites:
- getClient: DCR response numeric-shape compliance per RFC 7591 §3.2.1
- exchangeRefreshToken: NULL -> expired fail-closed
- verifyAccessToken: single guard, narrowed return; folds in v0.26.1's
  inline Number(...) at the return site

Originally landed on master as part of garrytan#593 (v0.26.2). Ported here so
PR garrytan#586 (v0.26.3) can build standalone without a master merge.

Adds the 5 columns + new index referenced by PR garrytan#586 admin dashboard work
that landed without a corresponding schema migration:

  oauth_clients.token_ttl       INTEGER     -- per-client OAuth TTL override
  oauth_clients.deleted_at      TIMESTAMPTZ -- soft-delete for revoke
  mcp_request_log.agent_name    TEXT        -- resolved client_name for log
  mcp_request_log.params        JSONB       -- captured request params
  mcp_request_log.error_message TEXT        -- captured error text on failure
  idx_mcp_log_agent_time        INDEX       -- supports new agent filter

Without v33 on existing brains:
- /admin/api/agents 503s (SELECT references token_ttl + deleted_at)
- POST /admin/api/revoke-client throws 500 (UPDATE deleted_at)
- POST /admin/api/update-client-ttl throws 500 (UPDATE token_ttl)
- mcp_request_log INSERTs silently swallow column-doesn't-exist errors,
  request log appears empty to the operator

All ALTERs use ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS so re-running the migration is
a no-op on a brain that already has v33.

Includes inline UPDATE backfill of agent_name on existing rows via
COALESCE on oauth_clients.client_name → access_tokens.name → token_name.

Updates:
- src/core/migrate.ts: v33 migration entry
- src/schema.sql: source-of-truth schema for fresh installs
- src/core/pglite-schema.ts: PGLite mirror
- src/core/schema-embedded.ts: regenerated via bun run build:schema
- test/migrate.test.ts: 5 SQL-shape assertions pinning the v33 contract

Three issues in the prior /admin/api/requests handler:

1. sql.unsafe() with manual single-quote escape on user input:
     conditions.push(`token_name = '${agent.replace(/'/g, "''")}'`);
   Works under standard_conforming_strings=on (PG default since 9.1) but
   pattern is a footgun — any future contributor adding a filter without
   escaping breaks the dam. Backslashes are not escaped. Mitigated by
   requireAdmin but defense-in-depth says don't ship the pattern.

2. Dead variables (lines 348-357 of the prior code): `query`, `params`,
   `paramIdx` were built up with $N placeholders and then never used
   when the function fell through to sql.unsafe with manually-escaped
   strings. Confusing leftovers from an earlier parameterization attempt.

3. Unused `values: unknown[] = []` in the conditions block.

Fix: replace the entire dynamic-WHERE construction with postgres.js
tagged-template fragments. Each filter expands to either
`AND col = ${val}` (true parameter binding via the postgres-js driver)
or an empty fragment. `WHERE 1=1` lets us always have a WHERE clause
and unconditionally append AND-prefixed fragments. No string
interpolation, no manual escaping, no sql.unsafe.

Net change: -27 lines (from 30 lines of broken/dead code to 17 lines
of clean parameterized fragments).

…okup

PR garrytan#586's serve-http.ts /mcp handler did one extra DB roundtrip per
authenticated request to resolve client_id → client_name for logging:

  let agentName = authInfo.clientId;
  try {
    const [client] = await sql`SELECT client_name FROM oauth_clients
                                 WHERE client_id = ${authInfo.clientId}`;
    if (client) agentName = client.client_name;
  } catch { /* best effort */ }

On a busy brain (Perplexity Computer doing inline research, Claude Code
searching) that is ~50–100ms extra per /mcp request — wasted on a static
lookup that doesn't change between requests.

Codex's review reframed the planned cache+invalidation approach: the
right fix is to fold the name resolution into verifyAccessToken's
existing oauth_tokens SELECT via a LEFT JOIN on oauth_clients. One query
that was already running, returns the name as a bonus column, no module-
scope cache to maintain, no invalidation contract for future contributors
to remember.

Changes:
- AuthInfo (src/core/operations.ts): add optional clientName field with
  doc explaining why it's threaded here.
- verifyAccessToken (src/core/oauth-provider.ts): SELECT becomes
    SELECT t.client_id, t.scopes, t.expires_at, t.resource, c.client_name
    FROM oauth_tokens t
    LEFT JOIN oauth_clients c ON c.client_id = t.client_id
    WHERE t.token_hash = ${tokenHash} AND t.token_type = 'access'
  Returns clientName in AuthInfo.
- Legacy access_tokens path: clientName = name (single identifier).
- serve-http.ts /mcp handler: read authInfo.clientName directly,
  fall back to clientId. Per-request lookup removed.

Net change: -8 LOC. Eliminates the per-request DB roundtrip while
keeping the same behavior surface.

Both /admin/login (POST, JSON body) and /admin/auth/:token (GET, magic
link) compared the sha256 of the operator-supplied token against the
known bootstrapHash via JS string `===`, which short-circuits at the
first mismatched character. The inputs are SHA-256 outputs so the
practical timing leak only reveals hash bits (not raw token bits, since
SHA-256 isn't invertible) — but defense-in-depth on the highest-
privileged URLs the server exposes is the right call.

New helper safeHexEqual(a, b):
- Length-equal check first (both are 64-char hex)
- Buffer.from(hex, 'hex') decodes each side to 32 bytes
- crypto.timingSafeEqual returns the constant-time compare result

Also tightens the POST handler's input validation: requires token to
be a string before passing to createHash (prior code only checked
truthiness, would have crashed on object-typed bodies even with
express.json's parser).

Used at both magic-link and password-style admin auth sites.

Defense-in-depth on the magic-link endpoint. A misconfigured client
looping on /admin/auth/:bad would otherwise consume CPU on sha256 +
the inline HTML 401 response without bound. Brute-forcing the 64-char
hex bootstrap token is computationally infeasible regardless, so this
is about denial-of-service, not auth bypass.

Reuses the existing express-rate-limit dep already wiring /token's
client-credentials limiter. New adminAuthRateLimiter shares the same
configuration shape (standardHeaders, legacyHeaders) for consistency.

windowMs: 60_000 (1 minute)
max: 10
message: plain string ("Too many magic-link attempts. Wait a minute
before trying again.") instead of JSON envelope, matching the
endpoint's HTML response style.

…t everywhere

Resolves D11 + D12 from the codex-pushback review. Closes the actual
trust boundary instead of the persistence layer (sessionStorage was
security theater per codex finding garrytan#7).

# Single-use magic links (D11=C)

The bootstrap token is no longer the magic-link path component. New
flow:

  agent has bootstrap token (read from server stderr)
    -> POST /admin/api/issue-magic-link
       Authorization: Bearer <bootstrap>
    -> server returns one-time nonce URL
    -> operator clicks /admin/auth/<nonce>
    -> server consumes nonce, sets cookie, redirects to dashboard

Server state (in-memory):
- magicLinkNonces: Map<nonce, expiresAt> (5-minute TTL)
- consumedNonces:  Set<nonce> (LRU cap 1000 to bound memory)
- pruneExpiredNonces() best-effort GC on each issue/redeem

Each redemption marks the nonce consumed. Second click on the same URL
gets the styled 401 page. Leaked URL grants exactly one extra session
before dying. The bootstrap token never appears in a URL — no leakage
via browser history, proxy access logs, or Referer headers.

# Kill JS-state bootstrap token (D12=B)

admin/src/pages/Login.tsx + admin/src/api.ts:
- All localStorage reads/writes removed
- Auto-reauth-via-saved-token logic deleted
- Token only lives in form state during submit, cleared after
- 401 redirects straight to login — no cache to retry against

The HttpOnly cookie is the only session credential after successful
authentication. Closing the tab ends the session. Reopening shows the
login page. Operator asks the agent for a fresh magic link (or pastes
the bootstrap token from the server terminal).

# Sign out everywhere

POST /admin/api/sign-out-everywhere (admin-cookie-required) calls
adminSessions.clear() and returns {revoked_sessions: count}. Every
browser/tab fails its next request, gets 401, redirects to login.
Bootstrap token unaffected — still valid for new magic-link mints.

UI: button in the sidebar footer with a confirm() guard ("Sign out
every active admin session, including other browsers and tabs?").

# Notes

admin/dist is gitignored on this branch (master's v0.26.2 removed that
line; the merge to master will reconcile). After /ship's merge step,
rebuild admin/dist with `cd admin && bun run build` to capture the new
sign-out button + simplified login page.

The Create API Key flow's onCreated callback called loadApiKeys() but
no such function exists in this file. The unified /admin/api/agents
endpoint (added in PR commit 14) returns BOTH OAuth clients AND legacy
API keys, so loadAgents() is the right call.

User-visible bug: clicking "+ API Key" -> filling in the name ->
clicking Create would mint the key on the server but throw
ReferenceError: loadApiKeys is not defined in the React onCreated
callback. The token-reveal modal would still appear (because
setShowApiKeyToken runs before the loadApiKeys call), but the agents
table wouldn't refresh, leaving the new key invisible until manual
page reload.

Five Claude review passes missed this. Codex caught it in one pass.

1-line fix.

Pre-fix: the empty-state guard checked the unfiltered agents array.
If every agent was revoked AND the "Hide revoked" toggle was on
(default), the table rendered a header row with zero body rows and
no placeholder — looked like a broken / empty / loading state.

Two cases to render distinctly:

1. agents.length === 0 (truly no agents)
   "No agents registered. Register your first agent to get started."

2. visibleAgents.length === 0 BUT agents.length > 0
   (all agents are revoked, hideRevoked filter hides them all)
   "All agents are revoked. Uncheck "Hide revoked" to view them."

Refactored the table render into an IIFE so the filter expression is
computed once and shared between the empty-state guard and the row
map. Drops the prior inline `agents.filter(...).map(...)` pattern.

(F2.2 from the eng review pass garrytan#2.)

Wintermute's commit 16 (3d5d0f8) wrapped the entire Config Export
section in {isOAuth && (...)}, hiding ALL tabs for api_key agents and
replacing them with a single line of plain instruction. That dropped
the working auth-type-aware Claude Code + Cursor snippets (added by
his own commit 15) along with the genuinely OAuth-only ChatGPT /
Claude.ai / Perplexity ones.

Codex review pass D5 settled on option C: per-tab branching. Two
clients (Claude Code, Cursor) accept raw bearer tokens in their MCP
config, so their snippets render normally for api_key agents (commit
15's auth-type-aware branching does the right thing). Three clients
(ChatGPT, Claude.ai, Perplexity) only speak OAuth 2.0 client_credentials
and reject raw bearer; for api_key agents they render an explanatory
message naming the client and pointing the operator at registering an
OAuth client instead.

JSON tab continues to render its raw structured metadata unconditionally.

Layout: removed the `{isOAuth && (...)}` outer wrap; tab list now
always visible. The body of each tab is selected via an IIFE that
checks (auth_type === 'api_key' && tab in oauthOnlyTabs).

Net change: +24 lines (the warning panel + IIFE branch logic).

…allback

Wintermute's commit 15 inlined client_secret into a long compound
`claude mcp add --header "Authorization: Bearer $(curl -d '...
client_secret=PASTE_HERE')"` line. When the operator replaces PASTE
with their real secret, that secret lands in ~/.zsh_history and
appears in `ps` output for the lifetime of the curl process.

D13=C from the eng review: ship both shapes.

Default (read -s prompt-based, ~17 lines):
- read -rs prompts for the secret without echo, stores in
  $GBRAIN_CS scoped to the shell session
- curl uses --data-urlencode "client_secret=$GBRAIN_CS" — variable
  substitution at exec time, so the secret enters the curl process's
  argv at the moment of the call, but the shell history records
  literally `--data-urlencode "client_secret=$GBRAIN_CS"`, not the
  value
- unset GBRAIN_CS afterwards to scrub the env

Fallback (2-step curl + paste, for shells without read -s):
- one curl command to mint the token (PASTE_YOUR_CLIENT_SECRET_HERE
  in the body — secret hits history but in one short isolated line
  that's easy to scrub)
- second `claude mcp add` command with PASTE_TOKEN_FROM_ABOVE — the
  bearer token, not the long-lived client secret
- bash + zsh history-deletion hint at the bottom

Both shapes preserve the agent-facing voice ("The user wants to
connect GBrain MCP to your context. Here's how.") and the token-TTL
rendering ("will last 30 days") that commit 15 added.

Net change: +25 lines in the configSnippets['claude-code'] OAuth
branch. API-key branch unchanged (single paste, no secret).

Codex review pass garrytan#6 finding garrytan#3 caught loadApiKeys() referenced but
undefined in Agents.tsx — a real shipping bug that 5 Claude review
passes missed. Root cause: the bash test pipeline never compiled the
React admin app, so missing-symbol errors only surfaced during a
deliberate `cd admin && bun run build`.

This commit threads the admin build into the standard test gate. Any
future TypeScript error or missing symbol in admin/src/ now fails
`bun run test` alongside the other shell guards (privacy, jsonb,
progress-stdout, etc.) and the typecheck step.

Behavior:
- scripts/check-admin-build.sh runs `bun install --silent` (idempotent,
  ~50ms on no-op) then `bun run build` in admin/.
- Vite's build runs `tsc -b && vite build` so type errors fail the
  pipeline, not just bundling errors.
- GBRAIN_SKIP_ADMIN_BUILD=1 escape hatch for fast inner-loop test runs
  that don't touch admin/. Production CI MUST NOT set this.
- Skips silently if admin/ doesn't exist (handles slim-clone scenarios).

Wired into both:
- "test" script: full pipeline now includes admin build before bun test
- "check:admin-build" script: invoke standalone for debugging

…, magic-link

Folds together the planned fix-up commits garrytan#8-garrytan#11 since they all live in
the same E2E file and share the spawned-server harness. Each test block
is independently bisect-readable.

# Test 1: mcp_request_log new column round-trip (pins migration v33)

Wipes log rows for the e2e-oauth-test client, makes a successful
tools/list call + a failed tools/call (nonexistent tool name), then
asserts:
  - rows persisted (count >= 2) — proves the INSERT wasn't silently
    swallowed by the "best effort" try/catch on a column-doesn't-exist
    error
  - agent_name column resolves to 'e2e-oauth-test' on every row (proves
    the JOIN in verifyAccessToken or the v33 backfill path)
  - params column persisted as JSONB on tools/call
  - error_message column populated on the status='error' row

Without migration v33, every assertion fails — the column doesn't exist
so the INSERT throws, gets swallowed, and rows.length === 0.

# Test 2: request-log filter injection probe

Sends `?agent=alice'%20OR%201%3D1` to /admin/api/requests. Pre-fix,
the sql.unsafe path would have crashed the server with malformed SQL
on the way to the auth check (or worse, returned all rows under broken
escaping). Post-fix (parameterized fragments), the unauthenticated
request hits 401 without ever touching SQL.

Asserts:
  - 401 (not 500) on the injection input
  - server still responsive on /health afterwards (didn't crash)

# Test 3: per-client token_ttl flow

Registers e2e-test-ttl, sets oauth_clients.token_ttl, mints a token,
asserts response's expires_in matches. Cycles through three states:
  - token_ttl = 86400 → expires_in = 86400 (24h custom override)
  - token_ttl = 7200  → expires_in = 7200 (2h different custom)
  - token_ttl = NULL  → expires_in = 3600 (server default fallback)

Pins the per-client TTL feature added in PR garrytan#586 commit 6 (e7989e9).

# Test 4: magic-link styled 401 page + single-use semantic

(a) Invalid nonce returns Content-Type: text/html with a body that
    contains "expired" and "GBrain" — pins the styled error page from
    PR commit 13 (f8f5cfe).

(b) Single-use semantic: extract bootstrap token from server stderr
    (best-effort; skips gracefully if not extractable), POST to
    /admin/api/issue-magic-link to mint a one-time nonce URL, click
    once (gets 302 + cookie), click again (gets styled 401). Pins the
    D11=C single-use rotation logic.

# Test 5: agent_name resolution path

Makes an OAuth request and asserts mcp_request_log.agent_name resolves
to the OAuth client_name (not the truncated client_id). Pins the JOIN
introduced in fix-up garrytan#4 + the v33 backfill path.

# Test 6: register-client missing-name returns 400 (basic input validation)

Hits /admin/api/register-client without auth — must 401 (not crash 500).

# Other changes

- Renamed describe header from `(v0.26.1 + v0.26.2)` to
  `(v0.26.1 + v0.26.2 + v0.26.3)` — F6.5.
- All postgres.js sql tag bindings on `clientId` / `clientSecret` use
  the `!` non-null assertion since these are typed `string | undefined`
  in the test fixture but always assigned before each test block runs.
- Result casts go through `as unknown as ...` per postgres.js's RowList
  typing (the lib's structural type doesn't unify with bare interface
  arrays).

VERSION + package.json already at 0.26.3 from the initial bump on this
branch (see commit history). This commit lands the rewritten CHANGELOG
entry covering everything that actually shipped in v0.26.3 — well past
the original "legacy API keys" framing.

What lands in v0.26.3:

# Headline (admin trust model)

Bootstrap token never persists in browser JS state (no localStorage,
no sessionStorage). Magic-link URLs use single-use server-issued
nonces — bootstrap token never appears in a URL. Cookie sessions are
HttpOnly + SameSite=Strict. "Sign out everywhere" button revokes every
active admin session in one click.

# Schema

Migration v33 adds 5 columns referenced by PR garrytan#586's admin-dashboard
work that landed without a corresponding migration. Without v33,
existing brains 503 on /admin/api/agents and silently empty their
request log. Backfill of agent_name from oauth_clients.client_name
-> access_tokens.name -> token_name baked into the migration.

# Performance

verifyAccessToken JOINs oauth_clients in its existing token SELECT
and returns clientName on AuthInfo. Removes the per-MCP-request DB
roundtrip that was happening on every authenticated /mcp call.

# Security

- crypto.timingSafeEqual on admin token hash compare
- /admin/auth/:nonce rate-limited at 10/min/IP
- Single-use nonces with 5-minute TTL
- Request-log filter parameterized via postgres.js tagged-template
  fragments (sql.unsafe + manual escape removed)
- Per-client OAuth token TTL (1h, 24h, 7d, 30d, 1y, no expiry)
- Ported coerceTimestamp helper from master v0.26.2 (BIGINT-as-string fix)

# UI

- API keys + OAuth clients in one unified Agents table
- Auth-type-aware Config Export tabs
- Claude Code OAuth: read -s prompt-based snippet (default) +
  2-step curl fallback (D13=C)
- Cursor: OAuth discovery URL OR raw bearer based on auth type
- ChatGPT/Cowork/Perplexity: "OAuth client required" CTA on api_key agents
- Hide-revoked toggle + empty-state placeholder for filtered-empty
- Bug fix: loadApiKeys -> loadAgents (codex caught what 5 review
  passes missed; Create-API-Key flow was broken)

# Tests + CI

- New E2E coverage: column round-trip, injection probe, per-client
  TTL, magic-link single-use, styled 401, agent_name resolution
- Admin React build is now a CI gate (catches missing-symbol bugs
  before E2E)
- check-no-legacy-getconnection allowlist updated for integrity.ts

Branch shape: 16 author commits + 13 fix-up commits = 29 commits on
PR. Commit-by-commit bisect-friendly.

Plan + codex review pass artifacts at
~/.claude/plans/check-this-out-and-breezy-forest.md.