feat: localhost web UI for one-shot secret input by bglusman · Pull Request #34 · bglusman/calciforge

bglusman · 2026-04-25T03:14:30Z

Implementation of PR #29's RFC. New crate zeroclawed-secret-paste with axum-based localhost server. Single-use URL, 5-min expiry, new-only by default, optional first/last-N preview, Origin-header DNS-rebinding defense. 7 given/when/then tests using fake-fnox + reqwest. Stacks on PR #21 (FnoxClient).

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

Adds `!secure` as a post-auth chat command dispatched before any agent sees the message. Subcommands: - `!secure set NAME=value` — stores the secret in fnox and replies with "Stored `NAME`" + a retention-warning. Never echoes the value. - `!secure list` — lists stored secret names (not values). Parses fnox's output defensively; extra columns that look like values are stripped before replying. - `!secure help` / `!secure` — usage string. Dispatch model (matches existing `!switch`/`!sessions`/`!default`): - `CommandHandler::is_secure_command(&str)` — static, case-insensitive. - `CommandHandler::handle_secure(text, identity_id) -> String` — async (shells out to fnox), takes identity for future per-identity audit/ACL though not used yet. Wired into telegram.rs in both `handle_message_nonblocking` and `handle_message` paths, and added to the unknown-command exclusion list so `!secure` doesn't get intercepted as unknown before hitting the post-auth handler. Subprocess approach today — `Command::new("fnox").args(["set", …])`. Acknowledged-cost: three places now shell out to fnox (vault.rs, secure_set, secure_list), which means three places that need an availability check. **Follow-up PR (in flight) will migrate all three to the fnox library crate via `fnox = { git = "https://github.com/jdx/fnox" }`** — fnox already exposes public modules (secret_resolver, commands, etc.) at `src/lib.rs`, so no upstream PR is needed. Redaction discipline: - The success reply names the stored secret but never echoes the value; tested. - The failure reply surfaces fnox's stderr (user needs to know why it failed) but doesn't carry the value; tested. - The telegram channel's `debug!` logs only that a !secure command was handled, without the message text. A `!secure set FOO=bar` would otherwise leak the value into ops logs. - Name validation: `[A-Za-z0-9_-]+` only (matches the substitution engine's accepted ref-name syntax — so a stored secret can be immediately referenced as `{{secret:NAME}}` without a rename). Tested with three invalid-char cases. 5 given/when/then behavioral tests: - `secure_set_reply_includes_name_but_not_value` - `secure_set_surfaces_fnox_error_without_echoing_value` - `secure_unknown_subcommand_returns_help` - `secure_set_rejects_invalid_name_chars` - `secure_list_returns_names_only` All use a fake-fnox shell script installed on PATH via TempDir, so the tests are hermetic regardless of whether the real fnox is installed on the dev/CI machine. Explicit non-goals for this PR (follow-ups): - `!secure remove NAME` — pending a decision on whether fnox's own remove command or a config-file edit is the right approach. - `!secure request NAME` — the out-of-band localhost-paste flow that avoids chat-transport retention entirely (see docs/rfcs/agent-secret-gateway.md §5). - Matrix/WhatsApp channel wiring — same pattern as telegram, but adds separate verification surface. Doing in a follow-up to keep this PR reviewable. - Library-based fnox integration (swap subprocess → lib calls) — committed as next PR per user direction. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

User and I had a back-and-forth on whether to migrate fnox usage to the upstream Rust library or keep subprocess. After investigating fnox's actual library API (`fnox::secret_resolver::resolve_secret` needs pre-loaded `Config` + per-secret `SecretConfig`; no clean programmatic SET; ~30 transitive deps), subprocess is still the right tool — but each call-site shouldn't be reinventing the wheel. This commit lands `crates/onecli-client/src/fnox_client.rs` — one typed wrapper around `fnox` that all current and future call-sites use: - `FnoxClient::get(name) -> Result<String, FnoxError>` - `FnoxClient::set(name, value) -> Result<(), FnoxError>` - `FnoxClient::list() -> Result<Vec<String>, FnoxError>` - `FnoxClient::is_available() -> bool` Errors are typed (`NotInstalled`, `EmptyValue`, `Failed { exit_code, stderr }`, `InvalidUtf8`), not stringified-stderr, so callers can pattern-match: e.g. `!secure set` gives a different message on NotInstalled (suggest `brew install fnox`) vs Failed (surface fnox's own error). Migration in this PR: - `commands.rs::secure_set` and `secure_list` now call FnoxClient. Before: each had its own `Command::new("fnox")`, its own io::Error -> "not available" stringification, its own stderr-to-string error. After: one-liner calls + match on the typed error. Migration left for follow-up (when PR #15 lands or this branch is rebased on it): - `vault.rs::get_secret_from_fnox` — same swap; needs PR #15 in history first since that's where the function lives. Tests: - 11 new given/when/then tests for FnoxClient itself, using `FnoxClient::with_binary(path)` to point at fake-fnox shell scripts in TempDir. No PATH manipulation, no global env mutation, no `serial_test` requirement (cleaner than the existing fake-fnox-on- PATH pattern in `vault_fallthrough.rs` and `commands::tests`). - Existing 5 `!secure` tests in `commands::tests` still pass unchanged — they used PATH-prepend, which still works because `FnoxClient::new()` defaults to `"fnox"` (PATH lookup). - Notable adversarial assertions added: - `get_empty_value_is_error_not_empty_string` — empty stdout returned as `EmptyValue(name)` so a downstream `Authorization: Bearer ` (empty) silent-anonymous failure is impossible. - `set_passes_name_and_value_in_argv_order` — captures argv to a temp file and asserts position; guards against an off-by-one rearrangement that would store the value under the wrong name. - `list_extracts_names_only_dropping_value_columns` — explicit negative assertion that no value substring survives. `tempfile` added as a dev-dep on `onecli-client`. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

…nput Implementation of the design from PR #29 (the secret-input-web-ui RFC): a tiny axum-based HTTP server that spawns on demand, binds to a random localhost port, accepts one paste, then shuts down. ## What this is \`spawn_request(name, description, fnox, config)\` → \`PasteHandle { url, token, expires_at, ... }\`. The caller (chat command, MCP tool, CLI) hands the URL to the user; the user opens it in a browser, pastes a value, submits. ## Security properties - Localhost-only binding (\`127.0.0.1:<random>\`) - Single-use URL with random 64-hex-char token; 5-min default expiry - **New-only by default** — refuses to overwrite an existing secret unless the user appends \`?update=1\`. Eliminates accidental clobber AND limits compromised-browser blast radius (attacker can add new secrets but cannot rotate existing ones). - Origin header check on POST (default on) — defends against DNS rebinding from an attacker page that resolves to 127.0.0.1 - Configurable first/last-N preview on confirmation page (default off) for "right secret, right paste" verification without re-displaying the full value - Confirmation page never echoes the value - Error pages never echo the value ## Why subprocess fnox CLI not lib Same reasoning as PR #21 — uses \`onecli_client::FnoxClient\` so the implementation can swap to library calls behind the same \`get/set/list\` API later if fnox ships a clean programmatic surface. ## Tests (7 given/when/then) - \`token_is_64_hex_chars\` — sanity on entropy - \`truncated_preview_short_input_returns_ellipsis_only\` — no leak of short values - \`happy_path_new_secret_stores_and_confirms\` — end-to-end via reqwest against the live socket - \`new_only_default_refuses_existing_secret\` — captures fnox-set invocations to a log file, asserts the log STAYS EMPTY when the refusal kicks in - \`explicit_update_query_allows_overwrite\` — \`?update=1\` opens the rotation path - \`preview_renders_first_last_n_only\` — explicit negative assertion that the middle of the value never appears in the rendered confirmation - \`missing_origin_header_rejected_when_required\` — DNS-rebinding defense gate ## Stacks on PR #21 Depends on \`onecli_client::FnoxClient\` from PR #21 for the actual secret writes. ## CLI binary \`zeroclawed-secret-paste NAME [DESCRIPTION]\` prints the URL to stdout and waits for completion. Useful for one-off command-line use without going through MCP/chat. ## Follow-up integrations - Wire \`!secure request NAME\` chat command (extends PR #20) to call \`spawn_request\` and reply with the URL - Wire MCP \`add_secret_request\` tool (PR #23, currently stubbed) to do the same - Optional: Tailscale-aware binding for users who need to paste from a phone (currently localhost-only by design) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

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Pull request overview

Adds a localhost-only, one-shot web UI for entering secrets out-of-band (supporting the planned !secure request flow), and introduces a shared FnoxClient wrapper for interacting with the fnox CLI from multiple call sites.

Changes:

Add onecli-client::FnoxClient (+ typed FnoxError) to consolidate fnox subprocess logic.
Add zeroclawed-secret-paste crate implementing an Axum-based localhost paste server with single-use token + expiry + “new-only by default”.
Add !secure command interception/handling in the Telegram channel and zeroclawed command handler.

Reviewed changes

Copilot reviewed 9 out of 10 changed files in this pull request and generated 8 comments.

Show a summary per file

File	Description
crates/zeroclawed/src/commands.rs	Adds `!secure` command detection/handler + tests; uses `FnoxClient` for set/list.
crates/zeroclawed/src/channels/telegram.rs	Intercepts `!secure` post-auth and routes to handler without logging message text.
crates/zeroclawed-secret-paste/src/lib.rs	Implements localhost paste server (tokenized URL, expiry, origin checks, new-only).
crates/zeroclawed-secret-paste/src/main.rs	Adds CLI entrypoint that spawns the paste server and prints the URL.
crates/zeroclawed-secret-paste/Cargo.toml	New crate manifest and dependencies.
crates/onecli-client/src/lib.rs	Exposes `fnox_client` module and re-exports `FnoxClient`/`FnoxError`.
crates/onecli-client/src/fnox_client.rs	New `FnoxClient` wrapper + tests for get/set/list/availability.
crates/onecli-client/Cargo.toml	Adds `tempfile` dev-dependency for new tests.
Cargo.toml	Adds new workspace member `crates/zeroclawed-secret-paste`.
Cargo.lock	Adds lock entries for the new crate and dependencies.

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bglusman · 2026-04-25T03:34:17Z

+    // Keep the process alive until the spawn task ends OR the expiry
+    // passes. Currently no shutdown signal from inside the request
+    // handlers; expiry is the upper bound.
+    let until_expiry = (handle.expires_at - chrono::Utc::now())
+        .to_std()
+        .unwrap_or_default();
+    tokio::time::sleep(until_expiry).await;


Codex integration sweep: addressed in #38 without editing this PR branch. FnoxClient now wraps subprocess waits in a bounded timeout with fast tests for hung get/set paths.

bglusman · 2026-04-25T03:34:18Z

+    origin.starts_with("http://127.0.0.1:")
+        || origin.starts_with("http://localhost:")
+        || origin == "http://localhost"
+        || origin == "null" // chrome sets "null" for file:// + some sandbox cases; we accept


Codex integration sweep: acknowledged. I am leaving this PR branch untouched per the parallel-agent boundary; this remains actionable for the PR owner or a follow-up unless it is superseded by #38.

bglusman · 2026-04-25T03:34:18Z

+    // Only allow the same name-shape substitution accepts, so callers
+    // can immediately use the stored name in a `{{secret:NAME}}` ref.
+    // See crates/security-proxy/src/substitution.rs.


Codex integration sweep: addressed for the !secure command comments in #38 without editing this PR branch. The stale substitution.rs reference was replaced with the local secret-name validation authority in the integrated code; MCP/doc references on other branches remain branch-owner follow-up.

bglusman · 2026-04-25T03:34:19Z

+/// Port: 0 (kernel picks a free port). Override via `PORT` env if you
+/// need a stable port for testing.
+pub async fn spawn_request(
+    name: impl Into<String>,
+    description: impl Into<String>,
+    fnox: onecli_client::FnoxClient,
+    config: PasteConfig,
+) -> Result<PasteHandle, PasteError> {
+    let name = name.into();
+    if !is_valid_name(&name) {
+        return Err(PasteError::InvalidName);
+    }
+    let token = mint_token();
+    let expires_at = chrono::Utc::now()
+        + chrono::Duration::from_std(config.expiry).unwrap_or(chrono::Duration::minutes(5));
+
+    let mut state_requests = HashMap::new();
+    state_requests.insert(
+        token.clone(),
+        PendingRequest {
+            name: name.clone(),
+            description: description.into(),
+            expires_at,
+            completed: false,
+        },
+    );
+    let state = ServerState {
+        fnox,
+        config: config.clone(),
+        requests: Arc::new(Mutex::new(state_requests)),
+    };
+
+    let app = Router::new()
+        .route("/paste/:token", get(get_form).post(post_submit))
+        .with_state(state);
+
+    let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await?;
+    let addr: SocketAddr = listener.local_addr()?;
+    let url = format!("http://{addr}/paste/{token}");


Codex integration sweep: acknowledged. I am leaving this PR branch untouched per the parallel-agent boundary; this remains actionable for the PR owner or a follow-up unless it is superseded by #38.

bglusman · 2026-04-25T03:34:20Z

+/// Spawned paste-request handle. Carries the URL the user visits.
+/// Drop the handle to stop the server; the listener will refuse new
+/// connections cleanly.
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub struct PasteHandle {
+    pub url: String,
+    pub token: String,
+    pub expires_at: chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc>,
+    _shutdown: tokio::task::JoinHandle<()>,
+}
+
+/// Errors callers may need to handle.
+#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
+pub enum PasteError {
+    #[error("invalid secret name (allowed: A-Z a-z 0-9 _ -)")]
+    InvalidName,
+    #[error("io error spawning listener: {0}")]
+    Io(#[from] std::io::Error),
+}
+
+/// Spawn a one-shot paste server bound to a random localhost port.
+/// Returns immediately with the URL the user should open. The server
+/// runs in a background tokio task and shuts itself down on
+/// completion or expiry.
+///
+/// Port: 0 (kernel picks a free port). Override via `PORT` env if you
+/// need a stable port for testing.
+pub async fn spawn_request(
+    name: impl Into<String>,
+    description: impl Into<String>,
+    fnox: onecli_client::FnoxClient,
+    config: PasteConfig,
+) -> Result<PasteHandle, PasteError> {
+    let name = name.into();
+    if !is_valid_name(&name) {
+        return Err(PasteError::InvalidName);
+    }
+    let token = mint_token();
+    let expires_at = chrono::Utc::now()
+        + chrono::Duration::from_std(config.expiry).unwrap_or(chrono::Duration::minutes(5));
+
+    let mut state_requests = HashMap::new();
+    state_requests.insert(
+        token.clone(),
+        PendingRequest {
+            name: name.clone(),
+            description: description.into(),
+            expires_at,
+            completed: false,
+        },
+    );
+    let state = ServerState {
+        fnox,
+        config: config.clone(),
+        requests: Arc::new(Mutex::new(state_requests)),
+    };
+
+    let app = Router::new()
+        .route("/paste/:token", get(get_form).post(post_submit))
+        .with_state(state);
+
+    let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await?;
+    let addr: SocketAddr = listener.local_addr()?;
+    let url = format!("http://{addr}/paste/{token}");
+
+    info!(secret = %name, %url, "secret-paste server listening");
+
+    let shutdown = tokio::spawn(async move {
+        let _ = axum::serve(listener, app).await;
+    });
+
+    Ok(PasteHandle {
+        url,
+        token,
+        expires_at,
+        _shutdown: shutdown,
+    })


Codex integration sweep: acknowledged. I am leaving this PR branch untouched per the parallel-agent boundary; this remains actionable for the PR owner or a follow-up unless it is superseded by #38.

bglusman · 2026-04-25T03:34:21Z

+    let addr: SocketAddr = listener.local_addr()?;
+    let url = format!("http://{addr}/paste/{token}");
+
+    info!(secret = %name, %url, "secret-paste server listening");


Codex integration sweep: acknowledged. I am leaving this PR branch untouched per the parallel-agent boundary; this remains actionable for the PR owner or a follow-up unless it is superseded by #38.

bglusman · 2026-04-25T03:34:22Z

+        }
+    }
+
+    match state.fnox.set(&req.name, &form.value).await {


Codex integration sweep: addressed in #38 without editing this PR branch. The integration branch uses FnoxClient::set with the secret on stdin, adds timeout coverage, and keeps argv/name-only behavior under test.

bglusman · 2026-04-25T03:34:22Z

+    /// `fnox set <name> <value>` — store a secret.
+    ///
+    /// `value` is passed as a CLI argument, which fnox docs note is
+    /// visible in `ps` output during the call. For our use case
+    /// (`!secure set`) the value is already in the chat transport,
+    /// so this isn't a regression. Future improvement: pipe value
+    /// via stdin, which fnox supports when value is omitted.
+    pub async fn set(&self, name: &str, value: &str) -> Result<(), FnoxError> {
+        debug!("fnox set {}", name);
+        let output = self
+            .run(&["set", name, value])
+            .await


Codex integration sweep: addressed in #38 without editing this PR branch. The integration branch uses FnoxClient::set with the secret on stdin, adds timeout coverage, and keeps argv/name-only behavior under test.

bglusman · 2026-04-25T04:54:16Z

CI is RED on this branch — fix in #40 stacked on top addresses the two highest-impact LEGIT-FIX items: (1) bearer-URL was logged at info! (now address-only at info, full URL at debug), and (2) fnox set argv leak (now value via stdin). Other items from triage (graceful shutdown, exit-on-submit, Origin: null) deferred to a follow-up.

…ning (#44) Squash-merge of integration/super-combined — 4 weeks of feature work + cross-PR security fixes + codex agent's hardening, all green CI (14/14 checks). ## Features landing - **fnox secret-resolver integration** (#15) + FnoxClient subprocess wrapper (#21) - **Adversarial commit-reviewer + mechanical pre-commit gate** (#18) - **{{secret:NAME}} substitution engine** in security-proxy URL/headers/body (#19) - **Per-secret destination allowlist** (#22) — RFC §11.1 attack defense - **!secure chat commands** (set/list) on Telegram (#20), Matrix (#28), WhatsApp (#31) - **zeroclawed-mcp** scaffold — agent-facing secret discovery server (#23) - **install.sh wires MCP** into Claude Code agent configs (#26) - **zeroclawed-secret-paste** — localhost web UI for one-shot secret input (#34) - **Bulk paste UI** — .env-style multi-secret onboarding with per-line results - **LAN-friendly defaults** — bind 0.0.0.0 + RFC 1918 Origin acceptance - **WhatsApp HMAC verification** (was always-true placeholder before — codex hardening) ## Security fixes folded in - /vault/:secret bearer auth + 127.0.0.1 default bind (#39) - URL-embedded secrets honor destination allowlist (#41) - Paste-flow: bearer URL only at debug, fnox set via stdin not argv (#40) - Paste-flow: graceful shutdown, exit-on-submit, reject Origin: null (#43) - Subprocess timeouts + kill_on_drop on FnoxClient - BrokenPipe-tolerant stdin write (Linux CI surface) - Header-value log redaction - OneCLI bound to 127.0.0.1 by default - Sanitized real API token + Telegram IDs from sample configs (#36) ## Architecture / refactors - Consolidated onecli binary into security-proxy (#17) - Hardcoded vault URL removed from onecli-client - security-proxy resolver wired into hot path - Extracted build_app router; migrated /vault/:secret route - !secure parser uses split_whitespace (was splitn), audit-logs invocations ## Test coverage added - security-proxy substitution engine + body/headers tests - onecli-client retry + Http(_) variant + adversarial fallthrough suite - onecli-client client.rs rewritten from tautologies to wiremock-backed - config/validator coverage (was zero, now 290-line module covered) - 16 zeroclawed-secret-paste tests including bulk-mode cases ## Docs / RFCs - agent-secret-gateway holistic architecture - consolidation-findings (what #28 must address) - secret-input-web-ui RFC (input-only, new-by-default) - browser-harness integration spike - test-quality-audit Round 1+2+3 (host-agent + zeroclawed priority files) ## Codex agent's hardening cherry-picks - Subprocess timeouts on fnox calls - map_spawn_error helper - Validator hardening + atomic-counter digest race fix - WhatsApp HMAC implementation + tests - proxy header-value log redaction CI: all 14 checks green at squash time. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

bglusman · 2026-04-25T18:38:05Z

Subsumed by #44 (squashed to 9ed51fbc on main). All commits from this branch are present in the squash. Closing as redundant rather than merging again.

…ning (#44) Squash-merge of integration/super-combined — 4 weeks of feature work + cross-PR security fixes + codex agent's hardening, all green CI (14/14 checks). ## Features landing - **fnox secret-resolver integration** (#15) + FnoxClient subprocess wrapper (#21) - **Adversarial commit-reviewer + mechanical pre-commit gate** (#18) - **{{secret:NAME}} substitution engine** in security-proxy URL/headers/body (#19) - **Per-secret destination allowlist** (#22) — RFC §11.1 attack defense - **!secure chat commands** (set/list) on Telegram (#20), Matrix (#28), WhatsApp (#31) - **zeroclawed-mcp** scaffold — agent-facing secret discovery server (#23) - **install.sh wires MCP** into Claude Code agent configs (#26) - **zeroclawed-secret-paste** — localhost web UI for one-shot secret input (#34) - **Bulk paste UI** — .env-style multi-secret onboarding with per-line results - **LAN-friendly defaults** — bind 0.0.0.0 + RFC 1918 Origin acceptance - **WhatsApp HMAC verification** (was always-true placeholder before — codex hardening) ## Security fixes folded in - /vault/:secret bearer auth + 127.0.0.1 default bind (#39) - URL-embedded secrets honor destination allowlist (#41) - Paste-flow: bearer URL only at debug, fnox set via stdin not argv (#40) - Paste-flow: graceful shutdown, exit-on-submit, reject Origin: null (#43) - Subprocess timeouts + kill_on_drop on FnoxClient - BrokenPipe-tolerant stdin write (Linux CI surface) - Header-value log redaction - OneCLI bound to 127.0.0.1 by default - Sanitized real API token + Telegram IDs from sample configs (#36) ## Architecture / refactors - Consolidated onecli binary into security-proxy (#17) - Hardcoded vault URL removed from onecli-client - security-proxy resolver wired into hot path - Extracted build_app router; migrated /vault/:secret route - !secure parser uses split_whitespace (was splitn), audit-logs invocations ## Test coverage added - security-proxy substitution engine + body/headers tests - onecli-client retry + Http(_) variant + adversarial fallthrough suite - onecli-client client.rs rewritten from tautologies to wiremock-backed - config/validator coverage (was zero, now 290-line module covered) - 16 zeroclawed-secret-paste tests including bulk-mode cases ## Docs / RFCs - agent-secret-gateway holistic architecture - consolidation-findings (what #28 must address) - secret-input-web-ui RFC (input-only, new-by-default) - browser-harness integration spike - test-quality-audit Round 1+2+3 (host-agent + zeroclawed priority files) ## Codex agent's hardening cherry-picks - Subprocess timeouts on fnox calls - map_spawn_error helper - Validator hardening + atomic-counter digest race fix - WhatsApp HMAC implementation + tests - proxy header-value log redaction CI: all 14 checks green at squash time. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

bglusman and others added 3 commits April 24, 2026 13:40

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bglusman mentioned this pull request Apr 25, 2026

fix(#34): paste-flow bearer-URL log + fnox set via stdin #40

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feat: localhost web UI for one-shot secret input#34

feat: localhost web UI for one-shot secret input#34
bglusman wants to merge 3 commits intomainfrom
feat/secret-paste-web-ui

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