Add INT_MAX bounds check before EVP_CipherUpdate in PKCS8/PKCS12 encryption#3043
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Add INT_MAX bounds check before EVP_CipherUpdate in PKCS8/PKCS12 encryption#3043
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## main #3043 +/- ##
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- Coverage 78.38% 78.37% -0.01%
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Files 689 689
Lines 121129 121131 +2
Branches 16968 16970 +2
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justsmth
reviewed
Feb 25, 2026
justsmth
previously approved these changes
Feb 25, 2026
…yption EVP_CipherUpdate takes int for in_len, but add_encrypted_data and PKCS8_marshal_encrypted_private_key pass size_t values. Add a check that in_len + block_size fits in int to prevent silent truncation on 64-bit systems and size_t wraparound on 32-bit systems. This replaces the previous size_t-only overflow check with a unified check that covers both concerns.
justsmth
approved these changes
Mar 3, 2026
torben-hansen
approved these changes
Mar 4, 2026
WillChilds-Klein
pushed a commit
to WillChilds-Klein/aws-lc
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this pull request
Mar 11, 2026
…yption (aws#3043) ### Issues: N/A ### Description of changes: EVP_CipherUpdate takes int for in_len, but add_encrypted_data and PKCS8_marshal_encrypted_private_key pass size_t values. Add a check that in_len + block_size fits in int to prevent silent truncation on 64-bit systems and size_t wraparound on 32-bit systems. This replaces the previous size_t-only overflow check with a unified check that covers both concerns. ### Call-outs: There are a couple overlapping concerns here and we should make sure the logic is sound. - On a 64-bit system, `size_t` will be 64-bits wide and `int` will be 32-bits wide. This potentially results in a silent truncation due to `EVP_CipherUpdate`'s `int` input. - The Cipher's block-size (128-bits for AES) is added to the input length to determine the output buffer to allocate. This has the potential to overflow the `size_t` used to allocate that buffer (more of a concern for 32-bit systems). ### Testing: How is this change tested (unit tests, fuzz tests, etc.)? Are there any testing steps to be verified by the reviewer? CI By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license and the ISC license.
nebeid
pushed a commit
to nebeid/aws-lc
that referenced
this pull request
Mar 23, 2026
…yption (aws#3043) ### Issues: N/A ### Description of changes: EVP_CipherUpdate takes int for in_len, but add_encrypted_data and PKCS8_marshal_encrypted_private_key pass size_t values. Add a check that in_len + block_size fits in int to prevent silent truncation on 64-bit systems and size_t wraparound on 32-bit systems. This replaces the previous size_t-only overflow check with a unified check that covers both concerns. ### Call-outs: There are a couple overlapping concerns here and we should make sure the logic is sound. - On a 64-bit system, `size_t` will be 64-bits wide and `int` will be 32-bits wide. This potentially results in a silent truncation due to `EVP_CipherUpdate`'s `int` input. - The Cipher's block-size (128-bits for AES) is added to the input length to determine the output buffer to allocate. This has the potential to overflow the `size_t` used to allocate that buffer (more of a concern for 32-bit systems). ### Testing: How is this change tested (unit tests, fuzz tests, etc.)? Are there any testing steps to be verified by the reviewer? CI By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license and the ISC license.
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Issues:
N/A
Description of changes:
EVP_CipherUpdate takes int for in_len, but add_encrypted_data and
PKCS8_marshal_encrypted_private_key pass size_t values. Add a check
that in_len + block_size fits in int to prevent silent truncation on
64-bit systems and size_t wraparound on 32-bit systems. This replaces
the previous size_t-only overflow check with a unified check that
covers both concerns.
Call-outs:
There are a couple overlapping concerns here and we should make sure the logic is sound.
size_twill be 64-bits wide andintwill be 32-bits wide. This potentially results in a silent truncation due toEVP_CipherUpdate'sintinput.size_tused to allocate that buffer (more of a concern for 32-bit systems).Testing:
How is this change tested (unit tests, fuzz tests, etc.)? Are there any testing steps to be verified by the reviewer?
CI
By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license and the ISC license.