feat(acp-bridge): F3 — multi-client permission coordination (#4175)#4335
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Code Review: F3 — Multi-Client Permission Coordination (#4335)📋 Review SummaryThis PR implements F3 from #4175: a comprehensive multi-client permission coordination system with four distinct mediation policies ( 🔍 General FeedbackPositive aspects:
Areas of concern:
🎯 Specific Feedback🔴 Critical
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✅ Highlights
Summary RecommendationStatus: Changes Required This is a well-designed implementation of a complex feature, but the critical issues around empty voter sets, error message clarity, and redundant callbacks must be addressed before merging. The high-priority items around security documentation and proxy handling should also be resolved to prevent production incidents. Required fixes before merge:
Suggested follow-ups (post-merge):
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Pull request overview
Implements F3 multi-client permission coordination for qwen serve (new mediation strategies, wire events, and SDK support), while also landing Phase C worktree session persistence/UI safety nets and a redesign of managed auto-memory recall to be non-blocking.
Changes:
- Add permission-mediation capability + active policy surfacing, new SSE events (
permission_partial_vote,permission_forbidden), audit ring, and SDK reducer/type support. - Persist/restore worktree session state via a per-session sidecar file, add TUI/ACP/headless restore reminders, and add WorktreeExitDialog + footer/statusline worktree indicators.
- Make auto-memory recall fire-and-forget with opportunistic injection; extend selector timeout safety net; fix env-var-only model modalities defaults.
Reviewed changes
Copilot reviewed 62 out of 62 changed files in this pull request and generated 5 comments.
Show a summary per file
| File | Description |
|---|---|
| packages/vscode-ide-companion/schemas/settings.schema.json | Adds ui.hideBuiltinWorktreeIndicator to the VSCode companion settings schema. |
| packages/sdk-typescript/test/unit/daemonEvents.test.ts | Adds reducer/type-guard tests for new permission coordination events. |
| packages/sdk-typescript/src/index.ts | Re-exports new daemon permission event types. |
| packages/sdk-typescript/src/daemon/events.ts | Adds new daemon event types/guards + reducer state for partial votes/forbidden votes. |
| packages/core/src/tools/exit-worktree.ts | Updates exit semantics to preserve/clear worktree sidecar appropriately. |
| packages/core/src/tools/exit-worktree.test.ts | Increases timeouts to avoid flakiness. |
| packages/core/src/tools/exit-worktree.session.integ.test.ts | Adds integration coverage for sidecar cleanup behavior on exit. |
| packages/core/src/tools/enter-worktree.ts | Persists worktree session sidecar on successful enter and captures baseline HEAD commit. |
| packages/core/src/tools/enter-worktree.session.integ.test.ts | Adds integration coverage for sidecar persistence and overwrite semantics. |
| packages/core/src/services/worktreeSessionService.ts | Introduces sidecar read/write/clear + --resume restore helper with tamper checks. |
| packages/core/src/services/worktreeSessionService.test.ts | Unit tests for sidecar I/O and restore/tamper cleanup behavior. |
| packages/core/src/services/sessionService.ts | Adds getWorktreeSessionPath(sessionId) helper. |
| packages/core/src/services/gitWorktreeService.ts | Adds post-creation core.hooksPath configuration for worktrees. |
| packages/core/src/services/gitWorktreeService.hooks.integ.test.ts | Integration tests for hooksPath setup behavior. |
| packages/core/src/models/modelConfigResolver.ts | Fixes modelId resolution and auto-detects default modalities when unset. |
| packages/core/src/models/modelConfigResolver.test.ts | Regression tests for modalities defaulting in env-var-only + OAuth paths. |
| packages/core/src/memory/relevanceSelector.ts | Raises safety-net AbortSignal timeout from 1s to 30s (with caller abort still honored). |
| packages/core/src/memory/recall.ts | Distinguishes caller abort vs selector timeout to control heuristic fallback/logging. |
| packages/core/src/index.ts | Exports worktreeSessionService from core package surface. |
| packages/core/src/core/client.ts | Replaces recall deadline-race with non-blocking prefetch handle + opportunistic injection. |
| packages/core/src/core/client.test.ts | Updates/expands tests for new async prefetch lifecycle and cleanup paths. |
| packages/cli/src/ui/hooks/useWorktreeSession.ts | Adds hook to watch/read sidecar and drive UI state. |
| packages/cli/src/ui/hooks/useWorktreeSession.test.tsx | Tests for sidecar watch behavior (create/delete). |
| packages/cli/src/ui/hooks/useStatusLine.ts | Extends statusline payload with worktree fields and avoids churn via slug tracking. |
| packages/cli/src/ui/hooks/useDialogClose.ts | Adds Ctrl+C/global escape support for WorktreeExitDialog. |
| packages/cli/src/ui/contexts/UIStateContext.tsx | Adds activeWorktree and WorktreeExitDialog visibility to UI state. |
| packages/cli/src/ui/contexts/UIActionsContext.tsx | Renames suggestion visibility reporting hook to onTabConsumerChange and adds worktree-exit handler. |
| packages/cli/src/ui/components/WorktreeExitDialog.tsx | New dialog for keep/remove/cancel with git dirty/probe checks. |
| packages/cli/src/ui/components/WorktreeExitDialog.test.tsx | Basic render test with execFile stubbed. |
| packages/cli/src/ui/components/InputPrompt.tsx | Adds onTabConsumerChange broad Tab-consumer reporting; keeps onSuggestionsVisibilityChange narrow. |
| packages/cli/src/ui/components/InputPrompt.test.tsx | Adds regression tests for Tab-consumer reporting and narrow dropdown visibility signal. |
| packages/cli/src/ui/components/Footer.tsx | Adds built-in worktree indicator with opt-out setting. |
| packages/cli/src/ui/components/DialogManager.tsx | Wires WorktreeExitDialog into dialog routing. |
| packages/cli/src/ui/components/Composer.tsx | Separates narrow dropdown visibility from broad Tab-consumer signal for AppContainer. |
| packages/cli/src/ui/AppContainer.tsx | Adds worktree restore notice injection, exit interception via WorktreeExitDialog, and removal flow. |
| packages/cli/src/serve/types.ts | Extends /capabilities envelope with policy.permission. |
| packages/cli/src/serve/server.ts | Threads loopback bit into permission vote context and maps new typed permission errors to HTTP. |
| packages/cli/src/serve/runQwenServe.ts | Loads/validates permission policy settings at boot and wires into bridge options. |
| packages/cli/src/serve/permissionAudit.ts | Adds in-memory permission audit ring + publisher adapter. |
| packages/cli/src/serve/permissionAudit.test.ts | Unit tests for audit ring and publisher entry shapes/eviction. |
| packages/cli/src/serve/httpAcpBridge.test.ts | Bridge-level integration tests for active policy accessor and quorum validation. |
| packages/cli/src/serve/capabilities.ts | Adds permission_mediation capability descriptor with supported modes. |
| packages/cli/src/nonInteractiveCli.ts | Injects worktree restore reminder into headless --resume prompts and emits a system message event. |
| packages/cli/src/nonInteractiveCli.test.ts | Adds tests for headless worktree restore reminder injection and stale sidecar cleanup. |
| packages/cli/src/config/settingsSchema.ts | Adds ui.hideBuiltinWorktreeIndicator and new policy.* settings metadata. |
| packages/cli/src/acp-integration/session/Session.worktree.test.ts | Tests one-shot worktree notice consumption in ACP Session prompt pipeline. |
| packages/cli/src/acp-integration/session/Session.ts | Adds pendingWorktreeNotice injection/clear behavior. |
| packages/cli/src/acp-integration/acpAgent.worktree.test.ts | Agent-level integration tests for restoreWorktreeContext → pending notice wiring. |
| packages/cli/src/acp-integration/acpAgent.ts | Adds shared ACP worktree restore on load/resume entrypoints. |
| packages/acp-bridge/src/permission.ts | Documents forbidden vote reasons on the contract type. |
| packages/acp-bridge/src/index.ts | Re-exports new permission mediator module. |
| packages/acp-bridge/src/bridgeTypes.ts | Extends vote request context with fromLoopback and exposes permissionPolicy accessor. |
| packages/acp-bridge/src/bridgeOptions.ts | Adds permission mediation policy/quorum/audit injection options. |
| packages/acp-bridge/src/bridgeErrors.ts | Adds typed errors for forbidden votes, unimplemented policy, and cancel sentinel collision. |
| docs/developers/qwen-serve-protocol.md | Documents new permission mediation capability, policy semantics, and new SSE events/errors. |
| docs/design/worktree.md | Updates Phase C/D worktree design doc to reflect implemented persistence/UI work. |
| docs/design/2026-05-15-async-memory-recall-design.md | Adds design spec for async/non-blocking memory recall approach. |
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Three of the five Copilot inline findings adopted; two declined as out-of-scope (base-mismatch artifact between feat/f3-permission-mediator based on origin/main and PR base daemon_mode_b_main). ADOPTED - settingsSchema.ts:1681-1727 — `policy` / `permissionStrategy` / `consensusQuorum` now correctly mark `requiresRestart: true` since F3 v1 reads them once at boot. Description text reinforces the daemon-restart requirement so settings UIs don't suggest hot-reload. - events.ts isPermissionPartialVoteData — switched the three counter fields (`votesReceived` / `votesNeeded` / `quorum`) from naked `typeof === 'number'` to `isFiniteNumber` + `Number.isInteger` + range checks. Malformed frames carrying NaN / Infinity / fractional values now route through `unrecognizedKnownEventCount` instead of landing in reducer state. Matches the validation posture of the sibling `isMcpBudgetWarningData` / `isSlowClientWarningData`. - permissionAudit.ts header — said "bounded LRU" but the implementation is a FIFO ring (push + shift eviction). Comment fixed to "bounded FIFO ring buffer" matching the class JSDoc. DECLINED (replied with rationale on PR) - worktreeSessionService.ts:212 Windows path normalization — real bug but out of F3 scope. The diff shows it because PR base daemon_mode_b_main was branched from main earlier and the worktree session persistence work landed on main afterward; a rebase will drop it. Suggested a separate issue for the Windows forward-vs-backslash containment check. - top-level "PR description scope" comment — same base-mismatch artifact. The auto-memory + worktree + model-modalities changes are from main commits that landed AFTER daemon_mode_b_main branched off; they are NOT introduced by F3. Issue: #4175 (F3) — PR #4335
…rebased onto F1] Squashed F3 implementation rebased from origin/main onto daemon_mode_b_main (post-F1 #4319). F1 lifted the bridge core to @qwen-code/acp-bridge package; F3's edits to the pre-F1 httpAcpBridge.ts BridgeClient class + factory were ported to the new file locations: - BridgeClient.requestPermission rewrite → bridgeClient.ts - Factory mediator construction / pendingPermissions deletion / cancelPendingForSession refactor / respondTo*Permission rewrites / pendingPermissionCount + permissionPolicy getters / teardown sites (closeSession, killSession, shutdown drain) → bridge.ts - Error class re-exports → cli/src/serve/httpAcpBridge.ts shim (added CancelSentinelCollisionError, PermissionForbiddenError, PermissionPolicyNotImplementedError to the F1 re-export block) This commit folds 13 logical F3 commits + 4 review fold-ins (Copilot inline comments + 3 final-pass agent reviews) into a single post-rebase squash. The full review trail is in .claude/plans/fluttering-coalescing-kettle*.md (worktree-local). Strategies (4): first-responder (default, byte-for-byte preserved), designated, consensus (default N=floor(M/2)+1), local-only. New SSE events: permission_partial_vote, permission_forbidden. Capability tag: permission_mediation (always-on with build-supported modes list); active policy at /capabilities.policy.permission. Settings: policy.permissionStrategy enum + policy.consensusQuorum number, both requiresRestart: true (F3 v1 reads at boot). 3 new typed errors: PermissionForbiddenError → 403, PermissionPolicyNotImplementedError → 501 (forward-compat for future policy literals), CancelSentinelCollisionError → 500 (agent / daemon contract violation). Hardness invariants: N1 synchronous-register, N2 cleanup ordering, N3 originatorClientId stamping, O5 cancel sentinel pre-publish collision check, O8 pre-F3 permission_resolved wire shape preserved. Tests: 35 mediator unit + 10 audit ring + 56 SDK reducer + 6 bridgeClient + 3 bridge integration. Pre-existing httpAcpBridge.test.ts cross-session-vote suite passes byte-for-byte. Issue: #4175 (F3)
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Test coverage gaps at the HTTP integration boundary noted (not posted inline): detectFromLoopback (security gate for local-only policy), new HTTP error mappings (PermissionForbiddenError→403, PermissionPolicyNotImplementedError→501), and respondToSessionPermission forbidden/recorded branches all lack integration tests. Consider adding end-to-end vote tests for consensus, designated, and local-only policies through the HTTP surface.
- packages/sdk-typescript/src/daemon/index.ts: re-export the four F3 permission event types (`DaemonPermissionForbiddenData/Event`, `DaemonPermissionPartialVoteData/Event`) so the public package barrel at `src/index.ts` (which forwards them via `from './daemon/index.js'`) resolves at build time. Without this fix `npm run build --workspace=packages/sdk-typescript` failed with TS2305/TS2724; vitest passed only because it resolves TS source via tsx and bypasses tsc compilation. Reported in PR #4335 review comments 3270615836 / 3270622302 (wenshao via Qwen Code /review). - packages/cli/src/serve/server.test.ts: append `'permission_mediation'` to `EXPECTED_STAGE1_FEATURES` and adjust `EXPECTED_REGISTERED_FEATURES` reordering so the test fixture matches the registry's actual order (`...workspace_mcp_restart, require_auth, auth_device_flow, permission_mediation`). Without this fix four `serve capability registry` tests asserted via `.toEqual` against a stale list. - docs/developers/qwen-serve-protocol.md: swap `permission_mediation` and `auth_device_flow` in the documented capability list so the order mirrors `SERVE_CAPABILITY_REGISTRY` declaration order. - packages/vscode-ide-companion/schemas/settings.schema.json: regenerate the IDE-companion JSON schema with the new `policy` section (was pending from Commit 5 of the F3 series; checked in here so the IDE companion sees the same `permissionStrategy` / `consensusQuorum` shape that the CLI accepts). 🤖 Generated with [Qwen Code](https://github.com/QwenLM/qwen-code)
Wenshao review #4335 surfaced two related Critical findings: 1. **Audit publisher silently no-op in production** (3270622298). The `bridgeOptions.ts:305` JSDoc claimed "the bridge allocates an internal `PermissionAuditRing`" but the actual fallback at `bridge.ts:543` is `createNoOpPermissionAuditPublisher()`, and `runQwenServe.ts` never wired one. All 5 audit record types (`requested`, `voted`, `forbidden`, `resolved`, `timeout`) were silently discarded — the forensic audit trail the F3 plan committed to ("ring 留给后续 PR 加查询接口") never existed in any deployed daemon. 2. **Timeout breadcrumb lost** (3270622304). Pre-F3 wrote `"timed out after Xms"` to daemon stderr on every permission timeout. F3 removed that direct write and delegated to `audit.recordTimeout()`, but the audit publisher is the no-op fallback in production (see #1). Operators tailing daemon stderr could no longer observe permission timeouts. Fixes: - `runQwenServe.ts` allocates a `PermissionAuditRing` (default cap 512) + `createPermissionAuditPublisher` and passes the publisher via `BridgeOptions.permissionAudit`. The ring is held in the daemon host's closure for the lifetime of the daemon — a future `GET /workspace/permission/audit` route (out of F3 v1 scope) can lift it out for query without further bridge changes. - `permissionMediator.ts` writes the stderr breadcrumb directly from the timer callback, before forwarding to the (potentially no-op) audit publisher. Wrapped in try/catch because `process.stderr.write` can synchronously throw on EPIPE — losing observability is preferable to crashing the timer queue. - `bridgeOptions.ts` JSDoc rewritten to match reality: the bridge falls back to a no-op publisher; production wiring lives in `runQwenServe.ts`; the stderr breadcrumb is in the mediator (independent of the publisher). - New unit test `writes a stderr breadcrumb when the timer fires` spies on `process.stderr.write` and asserts the breadcrumb format contains the requestId, sessionId, and the timeout duration so future refactors can't silently drop the line again. 🤖 Generated with [Qwen Code](https://github.com/QwenLM/qwen-code)
) Two small follow-ups from wenshao review #4335: - **`bridge.ts:672-682` — dead `_resolutionToAcpResponse` helper** (3270622309). Defined and immediately suppressed with `void`. The identical `resolutionToAcpResponse` lives at `bridgeClient.ts:41` and is the one actually used by `BridgeClient.requestPermission` — the bridge-factory copy was a stranded leftover from the lift out of inline closures into the mediator pattern. Removed declaration, `void` statement, and the now-unused `RequestPermissionResponse` (`@agentclientprotocol/sdk`) and `PermissionResolution` (`./permission.js`) imports. - **SDK reducer `mergeOriginator` for F3 events** (3270622311). The mediator stamps `originatorClientId` (= prompt originator per N3) on the `permission_partial_vote` / `permission_forbidden` envelope, but the reducer cases used `next.push({ ...event.data })` which only copies `data` fields. SDK consumers reading `permissionVoteProgress[reqId]` / `forbiddenVotes[i]` could not determine which client's prompt was targeted by the partial-vote progress / forbidden vote — same gap PR #4282 fixed for approval-mode / tool-toggle / workspace-init / mcp-restart. Applied the existing `mergeOriginator` helper to both reducer cases. Added `originatorClientId?: string` to both Data interfaces with JSDoc explaining the propagation contract (preserve any pre-existing `data.originatorClientId`; otherwise stamp from the envelope; for forbidden votes the field is distinct from `data.clientId` which carries the rejected voter). Three new reducer tests: 1. `permission_partial_vote` propagates envelope originator into `permissionVoteProgress`. 2. `permission_forbidden` propagates envelope originator into `forbiddenVotes`, distinct from `data.clientId`. 3. `mergeOriginator` preserves any pre-existing `data.originatorClientId` over the envelope value. 🤖 Generated with [Qwen Code](https://github.com/QwenLM/qwen-code)
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@wenshao on review #4324465567 (HTTP integration test coverage gaps): acknowledged and partially addressing in this PR cycle, partially deferring. In-PR: the four blocking findings from the inline reviews are landed (commits aac5e63, 318ffe5, 92b58ff) — daemon barrel re-exports unblock Test coverage acknowledged but deferred to keep this PR's diff focused on the production-correctness fixes you flagged as Critical. Specifically:
These four gaps add ~300 LOC of integration tests and will land in a separate follow-up PR off If you'd prefer the test backfill in this PR before merge, happy to add a Commit D — let me know which way you'd like to proceed. |
…leanup (#4335) Four findings from wenshao review #4324937255 — the Critical one masked an actual hang scenario; the other three are observability / correctness fixes that round out F3 v1. **[Critical] safeEmit / safeAudit stderr breadcrumb wraps** (3271041461). Both helpers wrote `process.stderr.write` inside their `catch` block WITHOUT a nested `try/catch`. If stderr itself synchronously throws (EPIPE during daemon shutdown), the exception escapes the "safe" wrapper. In `resolveEntry`'s cleanup ladder (`safeEmit → rememberResolved → safeAudit → pending.resolve`), an escaping safeEmit exception aborts before `pending.resolve(resolution)` runs — the request was already deleted from `this.pending` (no double-resolve guard), so the agent's awaiting Promise never settles. `requestPermission` hangs until the timeout fires. The timer callback already wraps its breadcrumb in `try/catch` for the same reason — applied the matching pattern to safeEmit + safeAudit. **[Suggestion] Idempotent re-vote audit shows attempted optionId, not the original** (3271041464). When `client_A` originally voted for `proceed_once` and later attempts `proceed_always`, the tally silently keeps `proceed_once` (idempotent) but the audit ring recorded `optionId: proceed_always`. An operator reading the ring would see a vote for proceed_always that never counted toward quorum. Look up the originally-voted option from the tally and substitute it into the audit record. Added regression test asserting the audit reflects tally state. **[Suggestion] SDK reducer leaks `permissionVoteProgress` on mid-permission reconnect** (3271041465). When an SDK client reconnects and misses `permission_request`, then receives `permission_partial_vote` (stored in `permissionVoteProgress`), then receives `permission_resolved` — the early-return path on unmatched `requestId` did NOT clear `permissionVoteProgress`. The orphan progress entry persisted until session end. Both `permission_resolved` and `permission_already_resolved` reducer cases now unconditionally clear any orphan entry on the unmatched path. Two new reducer tests cover the recovery contract; the misleading "the next `permission_resolved` will clear both" comment on `permission_partial_vote` is corrected. **[Suggestion] Document votersAtIssue snapshot timing window** (3271041469). The snapshot fires synchronously after `entry.events.publish`, with no event-loop yield between, so a NEW HTTP client cannot register between publish and snapshot. But an SSE-only subscriber (no `X-Qwen-Client-Id` registered yet) that connected BEFORE publish is invisible to the snapshot — `consensus` silently rejects its later vote as `forbidden`. Documented the window in `votersForSession` JSDoc; future PRs surfacing `eligibleVoters[]` on `permission_request.data` should source it from the same snapshot for consistency. No code change — the narrow window is acceptable for F3 v1, and the structural fix (snapshot at publish time) requires bridge-level refactor. 🤖 Generated with [Qwen Code](https://github.com/QwenLM/qwen-code)
…8 loopback (#4335) Four findings from wenshao review #4325130053. The Critical one is a real security gap; the others are observability + correctness hardening. **[Critical] Cancel sentinel injection bypass** (3271185588). The mediator's `vote()` recognizes `CANCEL_VOTE_SENTINEL` BEFORE validating the option against `allowedOptionIds`, so a wire client sending `{outcome:'selected', optionId:'__cancelled__'}` would short-circuit ALL policy dispatch (designated originator check, consensus quorum, local-only loopback gate). The mediator's JSDoc documented the precondition ("callers MUST NOT forward an incoming vote.optionId === CANCEL_VOTE_SENTINEL from a wire client") but the precondition was never enforced — the bridge's `respondToSessionPermission` mapped the wire optionId straight through. Added an explicit `InvalidPermissionOptionError` throw when the wire payload is `{selected, CANCEL_VOTE_SENTINEL}`. The collision-defense at request issue time (`CancelSentinelCollisionError`) already prevents agents from advertising the sentinel as a legitimate option; this closes the remaining vector. **[Suggestion] Silent quorum cap + M=0 hang observability** (3271185594). Two related diagnostic gaps in the consensus policy: - When `policy.consensusQuorum` exceeds `votersAtIssue.size`, the cap fires silently. Operators investigating "why did consensus resolve at N=2 when I configured 5?" had no breadcrumb. - When `policy === 'consensus'` and `votersAtIssue.size === 0`, every vote rejects as `forbidden: designated_mismatch` because the empty snapshot can never match any voter clientId. The request hangs until `permissionTimeoutMs` with no diagnostic signal. Added stderr breadcrumbs at both points: cap-applied (once per request via a `consensusQuorumCapNoted` flag on `MediatorPending`) and at issue time when consensus M=0. No semantic change — the cap and the timeout-only resolution behavior are intentional per the F3 plan; the breadcrumbs just make them debuggable. **[Suggestion] detectFromLoopback misses 127.0.0.0/8** (3271185597). Per RFC 1122 the entire `127.0.0.0/8` block is loopback. The exact-match Set of three literals (`127.0.0.1`, `::1`, `::ffff:127.0.0.1`) silently fail-CLOSED on legitimate `127.0.0.2` / `127.0.1.1` / `::ffff:127.0.0.2` peers, causing unexpected `remote_not_allowed` rejections under `local-only` policy. Switched to a prefix test so the entire `/8` and its dual-stack mirror are accepted. Direction stays fail-CLOSED for unrecognized address shapes. **[Suggestion] VSCode JSON schema integer/min validation** (3271185604). `runQwenServe.ts` validates `Number.isInteger(consensusQuorum) && >= 1`, but the generated `settings.schema.json` declared `"type": "number"` so VSCode's inline JSON Schema validation accepted `0` / `-1` / `1.5` and the user only learned the value was invalid on the next daemon restart. Added `jsonSchemaOverride: {type:'integer', minimum:1}` to the `consensusQuorum` settings entry and regenerated the schema. IDE editors now flag invalid values immediately. 🤖 Generated with [Qwen Code](https://github.com/QwenLM/qwen-code)
# Conflicts: # packages/cli/src/serve/runQwenServe.ts
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Critical — Pre-merge blockers
[typecheck] packages/cli/src/serve/server.test.ts:529 — FakeBridge is missing the required permissionPolicy property (TS2741). HttpAcpBridge now requires readonly permissionPolicy: PermissionPolicy (added at bridgeTypes.ts:407 in this PR). The fakeBridge() factory must include permissionPolicy: 'first-responder' as const in its return object.
[typecheck] packages/cli/src/serve/server.test.ts:3994 — WorkspaceFileSystemFactory.forRequest() mock is missing the writeTextOverwrite method. Add writeTextOverwrite: async () => { throw new Error('unreachable'); } to the factory return.
[test] 5 F3-related test failures in server.test.ts — fromLoopback was added to the vote context in server.ts (lines ~1677, ~1720) but 4 test expectations (lines ~2806, ~2832, ~2925, ~2941) were not updated to include fromLoopback: true. Update the context assertions to include fromLoopback: true when Host is a loopback address.
— DeepSeek/deepseek-v4-pro via Qwen Code /review
Mixed batch: bridge-test backfill from wenshao's APPROVED review plus 4 DeepSeek/v4-pro suggestions and the 3 typecheck/test blockers DeepSeek named in CHANGES_REQUESTED #4325674833. **Pre-merge blockers (DeepSeek #4325674833 body)** - `server.test.ts:529` `FakeBridge` — added the F3-required `permissionPolicy: 'first-responder' as const`. Tests don't exercise mediation; the literal pins the pre-F3 default so existing assertions stay shape-compatible. - `server.test.ts:3994` `WorkspaceFileSystemFactory.forRequest()` mock — added the missing `writeTextOverwrite` method that PR #4334 introduced on `WorkspaceFileSystem` after this branch forked. - 4 vote-context test failures from `fromLoopback` plumbing — updated the four `expect(...).toEqual(...)` assertions in `POST /session/:id/permission/:requestId` and `POST /permission/:requestId` to include `fromLoopback: true` on the captured context. The supertest peer is `127.0.0.1`, so `detectFromLoopback(req)` correctly stamps the field; the pre-F3 expected shape was stale. **Inline suggestions adopted** - **3271420267** (wenshao APPROVED, security-critical) — added bridge-level test `rejects cancel sentinel injection via {selected,'__cancelled__'}` in `httpAcpBridge.test.ts`. Without it, a future refactor could silently remove the wire-injection guard that closes the policy-bypass attack surface introduced in Round 5 (#3271185588). Required `npm run build --workspace=packages/acp-bridge` to refresh `dist/` before vitest picked up the F3 bridge.ts changes; documented for future contributors editing F3 acp-bridge code. - **3271627444** (DeepSeek) — `request()` JSDoc rewritten to drop "Promise contract — never rejects" without qualification. The `CancelSentinelCollisionError` synchronous throw is real and intentional (a never-settling Promise alongside a thrown error is worse than fail-fast), but callers must be aware of it. Updated the contract doc to call out the sync-throw exception explicitly and documented that async callers get the throw via their own Promise machinery. - **3271627446** (DeepSeek) — fixed "Bounded LRU" comment on `MAX_RESOLVED_PERMISSION_RECORDS` to "Bounded FIFO" since `rememberResolved` uses `resolvedOrder.shift()` (drop oldest). Mirrors the parallel `PermissionAuditRing` correction in commit b0242dd. - **3271627457** (DeepSeek) — added stderr breadcrumbs to all 3 forbidden-vote sites (voteDesignated / voteConsensus / voteLocalOnly). Audit ring is in-memory only (no v1 query route), SSE events are transient — operators tailing daemon stderr previously had zero indication of permission rejections. New `writeForbiddenStderr` helper centralizes the formatting + try/catch defensive posture (mirrors the timeout breadcrumb pattern from Round 4). - **3271627459** (DeepSeek) — added a `TODO(forward-compat)` comment at `voteConsensus`'s rejection site documenting the `designated_mismatch` reason-code overload. The same wire string covers two distinct semantic cases: "voter is not the prompt originator" (designated policy) and "voter not in consensus votersAtIssue snapshot" (consensus). Splitting them into distinct codes is deferred to a future PR once an SDK consumer needs to disambiguate. 🤖 Generated with [Qwen Code](https://github.com/QwenLM/qwen-code)
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[Critical] tsc --noEmit reports 2 type errors in packages/cli/src/serve/server.test.ts (lines 529 and 3994) that are outside this PR's diff hunks but block typecheck:
- Line 529 —
FakeBridgemissing requiredpermissionPolicyproperty (TS2741).HttpAcpBridgegainedreadonly permissionPolicyatbridgeTypes.ts:407. - Line 3994 —
WorkspaceFileSystemmock missing requiredwriteTextOverwritemethod (TS2741).
— qwen-latest-series-invite-beta-v34 via Qwen Code /review
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Re #4325674833 (CHANGES_REQUESTED with 3 pre-merge blockers in body): all three are landed in commit c3de8f1 alongside the inline suggestions:
229/229 server.test.ts pass; 180/180 httpAcpBridge.test.ts pass; 37/37 mediator pass. |
…4335) 8 findings from wenshao Round 7. The Critical one closes a session- existence information leak; 6 Suggestions improve observability, type safety, and test coverage; 1 documents the cancel-sentinel escape hatch in the local-only setting description. **[Critical] Error precedence regression in respondToSessionPermission** (3271978329). When `peekSessionFor(requestId)` returned `undefined` (timed out / LRU-evicted / never registered), the cross-session guard at line 2033 didn't fire (`!== undefined` skips it), so execution fell through to `resolveTrustedClientId` which throws `InvalidClientIdError` (HTTP 400) when the caller's clientId isn't registered. Pre-F3 returned `false` (HTTP 404) for unknown requestIds regardless of clientId validity. Without the explicit guard, a probe with a fabricated clientId could distinguish "session exists with these registered clients" (400) from "no such request" (404). Added an explicit `actualSessionId === undefined → return false` short-circuit BEFORE the clientId validation. The defensive `unknown_request` switch case below becomes unreachable in practice; left in place for defense-in-depth. **[Suggestion] Cancel sentinel cross-policy escape hatch under `local-only`** (3271978336). Documented in `voteLocalOnly` JSDoc and the settings description that a remote voter can ABORT a pending permission via `{outcome:'cancelled'}` even though they cannot RESOLVE one. The F3 plan calls this out as intentional (cross-policy cancel for consistency with first-responder / designated / consensus); operators wanting strict-cancel-too need a dedicated loopback-bound daemon. Doc-only — semantic change deferred. **[Suggestion] CapabilitiesEnvelope.policy.permission widens silently** (3271978342). Replaced the inlined string-literal union with `import type { PermissionPolicy } from '@qwen-code/acp-bridge'`. Adding a 5th policy upstream would now trigger a compile error here instead of silently accepting the narrower set. **[Suggestion] M=2 unanimity surprise** (3271978356). Default quorum `floor(M/2)+1` requires unanimity for even M (M=2 → quorum=2; both voters must agree). An operator picking `consensus` with two clients expecting "majority of 2 = 1" gets unanimity instead — a split vote silently hangs until `permissionTimeoutMs`. Added stderr breadcrumb at issue time when the default formula yields unanimity (M ≥ 2 and floor(M/2)+1 == M). Mirrors the existing M=0 / cap-applied breadcrumbs added in Round 5. Formula stays unchanged (true majority for all M is mutually exclusive with M=1 → quorum=1). Description in the settings schema also calls out the M=2 case explicitly. **[Suggestion] Cancel sentinel adversarial test gap** (3271978359). The existing "resolves cancelled regardless of policy" test used the originator under designated and a votersAtIssue voter under consensus — those would be ACCEPTED by the policies even without the sentinel bypass. Added two adversarial tests that pin the cross-policy escape hatch: non-originator voter under designated and not-in-snapshot voter under consensus. **[Suggestion] BridgeClient pre-publish collision test gap** (3271978365). `bridgeClient.requestPermission` throws `CancelSentinelCollisionError` BEFORE publishing the SSE `permission_request` to prevent orphan events (the mediator-level collision check in `mediator.request` happens too late if publish goes first). Added test asserting the throw + asserting publish was NOT called + asserting `pendingPermissionIds` was NOT incremented. **[Suggestion] Settings descriptions missing security caveats** (3271978370). Added explicit caveats to `permissionStrategy` description: (a) `designated` notes that client identity is self-declared with no proof-of-possession (impersonation by observing originatorClientId on SSE frames is possible); (b) `local-only` notes the cancel-sentinel cross-policy escape hatch. Schema regenerated to `vscode-ide-companion/schemas/settings.schema.json`. **[Suggestion] Boot validation error class** (3271978374). Replaced `err.message.includes('invalid policy.')` substring matching with a dedicated `InvalidPolicyConfigError` class checked via `instanceof`. A future reworded validation message would have silently downgraded operator misconfiguration to "fall back to defaults" under the previous fragile match. 🤖 Generated with [Qwen Code](https://github.com/QwenLM/qwen-code)
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Re #4326092155 (top-level CHANGES_REQUESTED): both findings are already addressed in commit c3de8f1 (pushed before this review submitted at 07:25:05Z). Likely a stale automated run that scanned HEAD before the c3de8f1 push propagated.
Verification at current HEAD
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Inline notes from a review of the F3 permission mediator. Solid, carefully-invariant'd PR overall — the N1/N2 hardening, safeEmit/safeAudit wrapping, and the triple-guarded cancel-sentinel defense are well done, and first-responder wire-shape preservation looks intact.
One cleanup worth doing before merge (the bridgeClient.ts dead code, flagged inline); the rest are minor. Posting as comments, not a change request.
…4335) 6 follow-up findings from wenshao Round 8 review #4326742064 (state: COMMENTED — not blocking but addresses leftover risk surfaces). **[Suggestion] Legacy `respondToPermission` info leak** (3272493777). Round 7 closed the cross-session client-registration oracle on the session-scoped vote route, but the legacy workspace-level route (`POST /permission/<requestId>`) still called `resolveAnyTrustedClientId` on unknown-requestId paths, throwing `InvalidClientIdError` (400) for unregistered clientIds and returning false (404) for registered ones — the same oracle. The PR #4231 reasoning ("preserve security boundary") was inverted: the 400-vs-404 distinction WAS the leak. Removed the call, deleted the now-unused `resolveAnyTrustedClientId` helper, and updated the previously-leak-asserting test (`rejects unknown permission votes with unregistered client ids`) to assert the new uniform `false` behavior across all 3 input shapes (unregistered / registered / no-clientId). **[Suggestion] Error-precedence regression test gap + observability inconsistency** (3272493792). Two parts: - Added regression test `returns false (not InvalidClientIdError) when session exists but requestId is unknown and clientId is unregistered` to lock the Round-7 fix against future refactors. - Promoted the error-precedence guard's stderr line from debug-gated `writeServeDebugLine` to unconditional `writeStderrLine`, matching the `writeForbiddenStderr` posture in the mediator. Operators tailing stderr at 3 AM no longer need `QWEN_SERVE_DEBUG=1` to see unexpected 404s on the permission endpoint. **[Suggestion] Settings description "UNANIMITY for even M" was factually wrong** (3272493795). `floor(M/2)+1` equals M only when M=2; for M=4 it gives 3 (supermajority), M=6 gives 4 (~67%). The mediator's own unanimity warning correctly fires only when M=2. Settings description now reads "UNANIMITY for M=2 (quorum=2, both must agree) and supermajority for larger even M (M=4 → quorum=3; M=6 → quorum=4)". VSCode JSON schema regenerated. **[Suggestion] runQwenServe.ts inline policy unions** (3272493805). Same drift-protection rationale as the types.ts fix in Round 7. Imported `PermissionPolicy` from `@qwen-code/acp-bridge`, replaced 3 inline unions: the `let` declaration, the `as` cast, and the `VALID_PERMISSION_POLICIES` Set construction. Used a typed-array + Set<string> pattern (drift caught at array construction; runtime Set keeps `.has(string)` ergonomics). **[Suggestion] InvalidPolicyConfigError discrimination needs positive tests** (3272493818). Extracted the inline `policyConfig`-validation logic into an exported `validatePolicyConfig(policyConfig, onWarning?)` helper and exported `InvalidPolicyConfigError` itself. Added 7 unit tests covering: empty config, all 4 valid literals, invalid literal throws (with class identity check + message regex), 4 non-positive-integer quorum cases throw, valid combination returns, mismatch (consensusQuorum + non-consensus strategy) emits warning without throwing, no-warning happy path, and error messages name the failed field. The boot path in `runQwenServe` now delegates to the helper (one call site, DRY). **[Suggestion] Unanimity breadcrumb spammed per-request** (3272493829). The Round-7 unanimity stderr line fires inside the synchronous Promise executor of every `request()` call, which for a 2-client consensus session is EVERY permission request (M=2 unanimity is the normal operating mode, not a rare edge). Added `unanimityBreadcrumbEmitted` boolean to the mediator class (per-mediator dedup, parallel to `consensusQuorumCapNoted` on `MediatorPending`). One emit per daemon lifetime — visible at boot, silent thereafter. Comment also corrects the "for even M" generalization to "for M=2" specifically, matching the actual condition (`floor(M/2)+1 === M` only for M=1 and M=2). 🤖 Generated with [Qwen Code](https://github.com/QwenLM/qwen-code)
…es (#4335) 8 follow-up findings from wenshao Round 9 (4 separate review records: 4326832742 / 4326833568 / 4326844430 / 4326851074, the last one a non-blocking comment review). 1 Critical + 7 Suggestions. **[Critical] Terminal events leaked forbiddenVotes history** (3272576003). `session_died` / `session_closed` / `client_evicted` / `stream_error` reducer cases cleared `pendingPermissions` and `permissionVoteProgress` but not `forbiddenVotes` / `forbiddenVoteCount`. Adapters reading view state for a dead session would render stale rejection data. All 4 cases now zero out the rejection ring + counter. Parameterized regression test asserts the cleanup contract. **[Suggestion] safeAudit JSDoc was orphaned over writeForbiddenStderr** (3272567323). Two consecutive JSDoc blocks were stacked back-to-back but the method definitions followed in the opposite order, so IDE hover and API doc generation showed `safeAudit`'s docs as `writeForbiddenStderr`'s. Reordered method definitions so each JSDoc precedes its actual method. **[Suggestion] writeForbiddenStderr had no test coverage** (3272568031). Added a 3-path test (designated / consensus / local-only) that spies on `process.stderr.write` and asserts each breadcrumb contains the expected reason fragment plus the requestId + sessionId for grep-ability. Pins the format so a future refactor can't silently drop the line. **[Suggestion] resolveEntry numbered list contradicted code** (3272581553). The N2-invariant cleanup ladder docstring bundled "delete from pending + write to resolved" into step 2 ahead of the SSE emit, but the actual code defers `rememberResolved` until AFTER `safeEmit` (the I5 inline comment on line 1103 correctly explains this). Split step 2 into two halves around the emit so the spec faithfully describes the ordering invariant. **[Suggestion] Dead exports in bridgeClient.ts** (3272581548). `MAX_RESOLVED_PERMISSION_RECORDS`, `PendingPermission`, and `PermissionResolutionRecord` were defined and exported but no longer referenced — the mediator owns the same state under different names (`permissionMediator.ts:77` / `:319`). The JSDoc still pointed at deleted closures (`registerPending`, `resolvedPermissions` map). Removed all three definitions and the matching re-exports in `cli/src/serve/httpAcpBridge.ts`. **[Suggestion] detectFromLoopback prefix-match had no direct test** (3272581557). Supertest in the broader server.test.ts suite always connects from `127.0.0.1`, so the Round-5 prefix-match fix for `127.x`-beyond-`.0.0.1`, `::1`, `::ffff:127.*`, and the fail-closed branches had no coverage. Exported the helper from `server.ts` (loosened parameter type to a minimal shape so tests don't need to spin up Express) and added an `it.each` table covering the variants the fix targets, plus an explicit "does NOT consult X-Forwarded-For" assertion as a security pin. **[Suggestion] Validate-policies set is a 4th hardcoded copy** (3272581563). The policy literals already exist in 3 places — `PermissionPolicy` type, `SERVE_CAPABILITY_REGISTRY.permission_ mediation.modes`, and `settingsSchema.ts` enum options. `validatePolicyConfig` now derives its valid-set from `SERVE_CAPABILITY_REGISTRY.permission_mediation.modes` (single runtime source of truth). Adding a 5th policy upstream lands in one place; a future drift between the registry and the type union would still surface at the `as PermissionPolicy` cast. **[Suggestion] BridgeClient over-coupled to MultiClientPermissionMediator** (3272581569). `BridgeClient` only ever calls `mediator.request()` but its field was typed as the concrete class, forcing every test stub to fake all 6 mediator members. Narrowed the field type to `Pick<PermissionMediator, 'request'>` (the frozen interface from `permission.ts`); the bridge factory still passes the full `MultiClientPermissionMediator` instance via structural typing. Test stubs simplified from 6 placeholder members to 1. 🤖 Generated with [Qwen Code](https://github.com/QwenLM/qwen-code)
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No issues found in the latest Round 9 changes. Build, deterministic checks, and targeted tests passed. LGTM! ✅ — gpt-5.5 via Qwen Code /review
wenshao APPROVED the PR (review 4327485978: "No issues found in the latest Round 9 changes... LGTM ✅") with 3 minor follow-up suggestions in a separate COMMENTED review (4327443147). All adopted; the 4th suggestion (3273077262) was already addressed in Round 9. **[Suggestion] Symmetric stderr breadcrumb on legacy respondToPermission** (3273077256). The session-scoped sibling already writes an unconditional `writeStderrLine` on its `actualSessionId === undefined` rejection path (Round 8 / 3272493792); the legacy `POST /permission/<id>` route returned `false` silently after the Round-8 oracle removal, leaving an observability gap. Added matching `writeStderrLine`. Operators tailing stderr at 3 AM now see legacy-route 404s without needing QWEN_SERVE_DEBUG=1. **[Suggestion] consensusQuorum contract mismatch** (3273077270). The warning text told the operator "the override will be ignored" but the function still propagated `permissionConsensusQuorum` to BridgeOptions. The downstream mediator only reads it under the consensus policy, so behavior was correct — but the public contract contradicted itself. Adopt option (a): drop the value to `undefined` when the strategy is not 'consensus' so the returned struct matches what the warning promises. Updated the existing `validatePolicyConfig` test to assert the new contract. **[Suggestion] Stderr-breadcrumb assertion missing from error-precedence regression test** (3273077272). The Round-8 test pinned the return-value behavior (`false`) but not the unconditional-stderr promotion that was the primary behavioral change of that hunk. Added `vi.spyOn(process.stderr, 'write')` + assertions for both "rejected permission vote" and the literal requestId in the test. A future refactor that drops or downgrades the log line is now caught. **[Suggestion] _validPolicies underscore-prefix misleading** (3273077262 — already addressed). Round 9's commit 6793b89 replaced the literal `_validPolicies` array with a single Set derived from `SERVE_CAPABILITY_REGISTRY.permission_mediation.modes` (per separate suggestion 3272581563). The underscore-prefixed identifier is gone in current HEAD; replied via PR comment pointing wenshao at the existing fix. 🤖 Generated with [Qwen Code](https://github.com/QwenLM/qwen-code)
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Approve based on local real-world verification on PR head c3de8f10. One outstanding ask below (CRIT #7) — please reply inline before merge.
Local test results
| Item | Result |
|---|---|
npm ci |
exit 0 |
packages/acp-bridge/ (incl. new permissionMediator.test.ts + PermissionAuditRing coverage) |
6 files / 99/99 pass |
packages/cli/src/serve/ |
19 files / 781/781 pass (one flaky-looking 1/781 on first run, stable on retry) |
packages/sdk-typescript/ |
13 files / 439/439 pass |
npm run typecheck |
exit 0 (the 3 prior pre-merge blockers in server.test.ts:529 / 3994 + fromLoopback context all landed in c3de8f102) |
npm run lint:ci (--max-warnings 0) |
exit 0 |
npm run build --workspace=packages/sdk-typescript |
exit 0 (CRIT #3270615836 / #3270622302 — daemon barrel re-export fix in aac5e638c verified) |
npm run bundle |
exit 0 |
Boot smoke qwen serve --port 47336 --require-auth |
OK; /capabilities exposes permission_mediation feature + policy.permission: 'first-responder' |
7 [Critical] threads — disposition
| # | thread | Status |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | sdk-typescript/src/index.ts:71 (daemon barrel) |
✅ Fixed aac5e638c |
| 2 | bridgeOptions.ts:305 (audit ring no-op in production) |
✅ Fixed 318ffe5d5 (runQwenServe.ts allocates ring + publisher) |
| 3 | sdk-typescript/src/index.ts:71 (duplicate of #1) |
✅ Same aac5e638c |
| 4 | permissionMediator.ts:481 (timeout stderr breadcrumb regression) |
✅ Fixed 318ffe5d5 (breadcrumb + try/catch + spy test) |
| 5 | permissionMediator.ts:975 (safeEmit/safeAudit EPIPE → unsettled Promise) |
✅ Fixed f7c8010e8 (nested try/catch around stderr write) |
| 6 | bridge.ts:2071 (wire cancel sentinel injection bypasses policy) |
✅ Fixed d94a0420c (wire guard throws InvalidPermissionOptionError before mediator.vote; bridge-level test added) |
| 7 | bridge.ts:2045 (error precedence: 400 vs 404 leaks clientId↔session) |
On CRIT #7 — please reply inline
The current head adds a comment ("requestId is unknown OR matches THIS session — only now validate clientId") that suggests this validation order is intentional, but there's no explicit reply on the inline review thread (#3271978329). The trade-off is real:
- Pre-F3: 404 for unknown requestId regardless of caller identity.
- F3 current:
resolveTrustedClientIdthrows before the unknown-request branch, soclientIdvalidation happens first. Result: 400 for unregisteredclientIdeven whenrequestIdis fake → probe can distinguish "session X has clientId Y registered" from "no such request".
This is defensible as auth-first validation, but it inverts pre-F3 wire-error precedence and adds a small session-internal probe channel. Please either:
- (a) acknowledge the trade-off explicitly inline + add a note to
docs/developers/qwen-serve-protocol.mddocumenting that voters with unknownrequestIdreceive 400 (not 404) when theirclientIdisn't registered for the session, so SDK consumers stop expecting pre-F3 404-uniform behavior; OR - (b) restore 404-first by checking
actualSessionId === undefinedahead ofresolveTrustedClientId(the suggested patch in the thread).
Approving on the strength of the test results + the 6/7 critical fixes; not blocking on #7 because the security delta is small and the author's posture is defensible — but please leave a paper trail before merge.
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@wenshao Thanks for the re-approval and the thorough verification matrix! 🙏 On CRIT #7 (#3271978329 — error precedence): this was actually adopted as option (b) — restore 404-first between the head you tested (
Both vote routes now uniformly return |
F3 (#4335) merged to daemon_mode_b_main while F2 PR #4336 was still in review. Single conflict in `packages/cli/src/serve/server.test.ts` on `EXPECTED_REGISTERED_FEATURES`: - F3 added `permission_mediation` to `EXPECTED_STAGE1_FEATURES` and expected it as the last conditional in the registered list (after `auth_device_flow`). - F2 added `mcp_workspace_pool` + `mcp_pool_restart` between the stage1 baseline and `require_auth`. Resolved by combining both filters: drop both `auth_device_flow` AND `permission_mediation` from the stage1 spread, then list the four conditional tags in their `SERVE_CAPABILITY_REGISTRY` declaration order (`mcp_workspace_pool`, `mcp_pool_restart`, `require_auth`, `auth_device_flow`, `permission_mediation`). Auto-merge handled all other 9 cross-edited files cleanly (bridge.ts, bridgeTypes.ts, capabilities.ts, runQwenServe.ts, server.ts, types.ts, events.ts, daemonEvents.test.ts). Tests post-merge: 268 F2 + SDK tests pass; 103 acp-bridge tests pass. Typecheck clean across both packages.
PR #4335 本地构建与测试验证报告
概要
PR 相关代码共 ~816 个测试 覆盖(acp-bridge 47 + sdk-typescript 65 + cli 513,下文 §3 详列),全部通过。 1. 验证环境
2. 构建与静态检查2.1
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| 文件 | 测试数 | 状态 |
|---|---|---|
src/eventBus.test.ts |
20 | ✅ |
src/permissionMediator.test.ts |
40 | ✅ F3 核心 |
src/bridgeClient.test.ts |
7 | ✅ 含 cancel-sentinel 注入防御 |
src/spawnChannel.test.ts |
12 | ✅ |
src/status.test.ts |
16 | ✅ |
src/inMemoryChannel.test.ts |
8 | ✅ |
PR body 自述 "35 mediator unit tests",实际跑出 40 — 是 Round 4/5/7/8/9/10 review 期间累计补充的 5 个回归测试(idempotent re-vote audit、orphan voteProgress cleanup、unanimity 警示、forbidden stderr 三路径、terminal-event forbidden cleanup)。
stderr 中的 "permissionMediator: audit publisher threw" / "timed out after 5000ms" 是有意 throw 的测试用例(验证 safeAudit/safeEmit 的 try/catch 哑铃和 timer 容错),不是异常。
3.2 packages/sdk-typescript ✅ 443 / 443,24.10s
| F3 相关文件 | 测试数 | 状态 |
|---|---|---|
test/unit/daemonEvents.test.ts |
65 | ✅ partial-vote / forbidden / mergeOriginator / orphan cleanup |
其余 12 个文件(ProcessTransport、DaemonClient、Query 等共 378 个)全部通过。
3.3 packages/cli ✅ 6927 / 6936,9 skipped,156.96s
F3 直接覆盖的 6 个文件:
| 文件 | 测试数 | 状态 |
|---|---|---|
src/serve/httpAcpBridge.test.ts |
181 | ✅ 含 cancel-sentinel 注入防御 + 跨会话 vote 防泄漏 |
src/serve/server.test.ts |
245 | ✅ capability registry permission_mediation、EXPECTED_STAGE1_FEATURES 顺序、detectFromLoopback 防 XFF |
src/serve/permissionAudit.test.ts |
10 | ✅ FIFO / capacity / snapshot filters / 5 record shapes |
src/serve/runQwenServe.test.ts |
19 | ✅ validatePolicyConfig + InvalidPolicyConfigError |
src/config/settingsSchema.test.ts |
18 | ✅ |
src/config/jsonSchemaArg.test.ts |
40 | ✅ |
剩余 383 个 CLI 测试文件全绿,包括 serve/workspaceFileSystem.test.ts (75)、serve/workspaceAgents.test.ts (38)、serve/bridgeFileSystemAdapter.test.ts (18) 等所有 daemon 模式相邻文件。
3.4 packages/core ⚠️ 3 个失败 — 均为预存在,与 F3 无关
FAIL src/skills/skill-manager.test.ts > SkillManager > bundled skills > should load bundled skills in listSkills
FAIL src/skills/skill-manager.test.ts > SkillManager > bundled skills > should fall back to bundled level in loadSkill
FAIL src/core/anthropicContentGenerator/anthropicContentGenerator.test.ts > treats unset baseURL as Anthropic-native
根因分析(已交叉验证):
-
PR 4335 完全未触碰
packages/core/:$ git diff --name-only origin/daemon_mode_b_main...HEAD | grep -E "^packages/core/" (空 — 无任何 core 文件被改动)
-
在 PR base
daemon_mode_b_mainHEAD (981bc7c7e) 独立运行同样 2 个测试文件:Test Files 2 failed (2) Tests 3 failed | 129 passed (132)同样的 3 个失败。
-
在
origin/mainHEAD (16f0fde19) 独立运行:Test Files 1 failed | 1 passed (2) Tests 1 failed | 131 passed (132)skill-manager.test.ts2 个失败在 main 上 不复现(即 main 上已修复)—— 应该是 main 上已合入但daemon_mode_b_main尚未 fast-forward 的 feat(core): extend cross-auth fast models to agents #4153 (5fe12d4cc feat(core): extend cross-auth fast models to agents) 间接修复(该 PR 改了packages/core/src/skills/types.ts)。anthropicContentGenerator那 1 个失败在 main 上 仍复现,是更上游的预存在 flaky/regression,与本 PR 完全无关。
结论:packages/core 的 3 个失败不是本 PR 引入;将本 PR merge 进 daemon_mode_b_main 不会让任何新测试变红。下次把 daemon_mode_b_main rebase/merge 到 main 之后,2 个 skill-manager 失败会自动消失;1 个 anthropic 失败需要另开 PR 处理(已超出 F3 范畴)。
4. F3 关键不变量(hardness invariants)测试覆盖确认
PR body 声明的 5 个硬性不变量都在测试代码中找到对应断言:
| 不变量 | 含义 | 测试位置 |
|---|---|---|
| N1 同步 register | mediator.request() 在 Promise executor 内同步注册 pending,避免 forgetSession 竞态 |
permissionMediator.test.ts 中 mediator 单元测试 |
| N2 cleanup ordering | resolveEntry: clearTimeout → state delete → emit (try/catch) → audit (try/catch) → resolve |
permissionMediator.test.ts 含 "even when emit/audit throw" 用例(stderr 日志可见 audit publisher threw × 4) |
| N3 originatorClientId 戳印 | partial_vote / forbidden 事件戳 pending.originatorClientId;resolved 维持旧 wire 兼容 |
daemonEvents.test.ts mergeOriginator 3 用例 |
| O5 cancel sentinel 防注入 | 取消映射到 __cancelled__,禁止 wire client 直接传该字面量绕过策略 |
httpAcpBridge.test.ts "rejects cancel sentinel injection via {selected,'cancelled'}" + bridgeClient.test.ts "throws CancelSentinelCollisionError before publish" |
| O8 字节级 wire 兼容 | first-responder 策略下 permission_resolved 形状 bit-for-bit 不变 |
httpAcpBridge.test.ts cross-session-vote 快照测试组 |
5. 工作流副作用 / 风险扫描
- 默认行为:未在
settings.json写policy.permissionStrategy时,默认first-responder,与 pre-F3 行为字节级一致。升级零风险。 - 守恒能力:3 个新 typed error(403/500/501)、2 个新 SSE 事件(
permission_partial_vote/permission_forbidden)、1 个新 capability(permission_mediation)—— 都是 加法,旧客户端会无视而非崩。 - 观测性:
runQwenServe.ts在 daemon 进程内持有PermissionAuditRing(默认 512 条),同时permissionMediator.ts在 stderr 直接写 timeout/forbidden 面包屑,不依赖 audit publisher 是否实装(Round 3 修复)。 - 预升级清单:daemon 需重启才能让新的
policy.permissionStrategy/consensusQuorumsettings 生效(PR 已通过requiresRestart: true标注)。 - 未实现:
GET /workspace/permission/audit查询接口(已在 PR body "Out of scope" 列明),不影响 v1 行为。
6. 推荐结论
✅ 建议 merge。
- 构建、typecheck、lint、所有 PR 触碰范围的单测 全绿。
- ~816 条 F3 相关测试覆盖了 4 种策略、3 个新错误、5 个不变量、所有 review round 补的回归测试。
- 仅有的 3 条红测在
packages/core,在 PR base 上独立验证为预存在,且 PR 一行 core 代码都没改。 - 10 轮 review fold-in 历史完整可追,N1/N2/N3/O5/O8 都有对应锁定测试。
合入后建议把 daemon_mode_b_main rebase/merge 进 main,预计 2 个 skill-manager 失败会自动消失;剩余 1 个 anthropic User-Agent 失败需另起 PR。
附录:复现命令
# 1. 准备隔离 worktree
cd /Users/wenshao/Work/git/qwen-code
git fetch origin pull/4335/head:pr-4335-test
git worktree add .qwen/tmp/review-pr-4335 pr-4335-test
cd .qwen/tmp/review-pr-4335
# 2. tmux 4 窗口并行
tmux new-session -d -s pr4335 -c "$PWD"
tmux send-keys -t pr4335:0 'npm ci 2>&1 | tee /tmp/01-install.log' Enter
# (build/typecheck/lint/test 各自独立 window,见 tmux ls)
# 3. PR-相关测试
npm test --workspace=packages/acp-bridge
npm test --workspace=packages/sdk-typescript
npm test --workspace=packages/cli
npm test --workspace=packages/core # 仅 skill-manager × 2 + anthropic × 1 fail(预存在)
# 4. PR base 失败复现(证明非回归)
git worktree add .qwen/tmp/review-pr-4335-base origin/daemon_mode_b_main
cd .qwen/tmp/review-pr-4335-base/packages/core
npx vitest run src/skills/skill-manager.test.ts src/core/anthropicContentGenerator/anthropicContentGenerator.test.ts
# → 同样 3 failed | 129 passed日志文件位于 /tmp/pr-4335-test-logs/,tmux 会话 pr4335 保留供二次校验。
…stion) Adopts all 7 review threads from the first wenshao + Copilot review round on PR #4360. All technical fixes (no judgment calls). **[Critical] BridgeTimeoutError constructor blocks tsc** (wenshao PRRT_kwDOPB-92c6DfcRI) `server.test.ts:4670` called `new BridgeTimeoutError('initialize timed out')` but the constructor signature is `(label: string, timeoutMs: number)` — TS2554 blocked `tsc --noEmit` and `npm run build`. Fixed to `new BridgeTimeoutError('initialize', 5000)` per suggested fix; resulting message `"HttpAcpBridge initialize timed out after 5000ms"` still satisfies the existing `.toContain('timed out')` assertion. **[Suggestion] Copilot JSDoc package name** (Copilot PRRT_kwDOPB-92c6De-Sm, ToolCallEmitter.ts:210) JSDoc referenced `@qwen-code/core/mcp-tool` but the actual package is `@qwen-code/qwen-code-core` with the file at `packages/core/src/tools/mcp-tool.ts`. Updated the reference. **[Suggestion] Copilot errorKind type widening** (Copilot PRRT_kwDOPB-92c6De-Ro, events.ts:244) `DaemonStreamErrorData.errorKind` was typed as `string` and the JSDoc said "7-value" closed enum — but `DAEMON_ERROR_KINDS` actually has 8 values, and `SERVE_ERROR_KINDS` (daemon-side) has 9 (adds `stat_failed`). Typed as `DaemonErrorKind | (string & {})` for forward-compat: SDK consumers get IDE autocomplete on the known 8 kinds while still accepting future daemon-side additions (like `stat_failed`) without a type error. Updated JSDoc to accurately list 8 current values + call out the forward-compat widening. Side observation (NOT in scope of this PR): `DAEMON_ERROR_KINDS` (SDK) lacks `stat_failed` that exists in `SERVE_ERROR_KINDS` (daemon). That's a separate drift fix. **[Suggestion] TERMINAL wording misleading** (wenshao PRRT_kwDOPB-92c6Dj-JL, eventBus.ts:369) Comment called `state_resync_required` a "TERMINAL synthetic frame" but it's emitted FIRST (before replay) and the stream stays OPEN. Genuine terminals like `client_evicted` close the stream after the frame. Rewrote the comment per suggestion: "id-less synthetic frame... Unlike `client_evicted`, the stream stays OPEN" — so an oncall reading the source at 3am gets the right mental model. **[Suggestion] `_meta` merge dead code + stale reference** (wenshao PRRT_kwDOPB-92c6Dj-JF, server.ts:2569) The `existingMeta` merge reads `event._meta` at BridgeEvent top level, but ToolCallEmitter's `_meta` lives nested inside `event.data._meta` (publish path goes through `events.publish({type: 'session_update', data: params})`). In production `existingMeta` is always undefined — the merge is a forward-compat escape hatch, not an active merge. Also the comment referenced `extractServerTimestamp` (sdk-typescript) which grep confirms doesn't exist yet (it's planned in chiga0 PR #4353). Rewrote the comment block to (1) acknowledge no current producer sets `_meta` at the top level — it's a forward-compat hook for future envelope-level metadata; (2) drop the stale `extractServerTimestamp` reference and instead note that chiga0 PR #4353 plans the 3-location probe. Code shape unchanged (forward-compat spread stays). **[Suggestion] session_closed + client_evicted passthrough tests** (wenshao PRRT_kwDOPB-92c6Dj-JW, daemonEvents.test.ts:2284) `RESYNC_PASSTHROUGH_TYPES` has 5 members but only `session_died` and `stream_error` had passthrough tests. Added two missing tests: `session_closed` and `client_evicted` while awaitingResync. Critical because if a future refactor accidentally drops either from the set, a consumer in resync limbo would silently swallow the terminal signal and the UI would hang on "loading resync state…". **[Suggestion] readTextFile non-FsError passthrough test** (wenshao PRRT_kwDOPB-92c6Dj-JX, bridgeClient.test.ts:251) The non-FsError pass-through test only covered `writeTextFile`. Added a symmetric `readTextFile` test — the two `try/catch` blocks in `bridgeClient.ts` are independent, so test parity guards against divergent refactors (e.g. someone adding wrapping on one side but not the other). Verification - `packages/acp-bridge`: 6 files, 114/114 pass (+1 new readTextFile non-FsError test). - `packages/sdk-typescript`: 75/75 pass on daemonEvents.test.ts (+2 new session_closed / client_evicted passthrough tests). - `packages/cli/src/serve/server.test.ts`: 248 tests pass on touched cases (5 SSE / serverTimestamp / stream_error tests). Pre-existing F3 (#4335 merge) test failures unrelated to this PR's changes — verified by stash-test-restore on clean tree. - TypeScript clean on touched regions; `BridgeTimeoutError` 2-arg fix unblocks `tsc --noEmit` for the test file.
Adopts all 3 threads from wenshao's second review round on PR #4360. All Suggestion-level — daemon-side observability + 1 missing SDK reducer test. **[Suggestion] SSE ring eviction silently emits state_resync_required** (PRRT_kwDOPB-92c6Dp_Uk, eventBus.ts:394) Pre-fix: when a consumer reconnects past the ring boundary, the daemon emits `state_resync_required` with zero stderr breadcrumb. A 3am oncall chasing "my UI is frozen with stale state" couldn't grep daemon logs to distinguish (a) ring undersized, (b) client reconnecting too slowly, (c) network partition causing repeated reconnects. Fix: detect `next.value.type === 'state_resync_required'` in the SSE handler's iter loop in `server.ts` and emit a `writeStderrLine` with the gap details (`lastEventId`, `earliestInRing`, computed `gap` count, `reason`). Logged at the route boundary rather than inside `EventBus.subscribe` to keep the bus implementation pure + concentrate daemon-side observability in the route handler that already logs socket errors + heartbeats. **[Suggestion] Bridge iterator throw forwarded to client but not logged daemon-side** (PRRT_kwDOPB-92c6Dp_Uo, server.ts:1956) Pre-fix inconsistency: the adjacent `res.on('error', ...)` handler at line ~1925 logs SSE socket errors with `writeStderrLine`, but the bridge-iterator-catch block at line ~1940-1965 sends a `stream_error` SSE frame to the client AND swallows the error daemon-side. When the bridge iterator throws (subprocess crash, channel protocol error, unhandled rejection), distinguishing "subprocess OOM-killed" from "protocol bug" required attaching a debugger. Fix: mirror the adjacent handler's pattern — add `writeStderrLine` before the `stream_error` SSE frame send, including the classified `errorKind` (when available) in brackets so operators can grep for `[init_timeout]` / `[missing_binary]` etc. **[Suggestion] No SDK reducer test verifying stream_error.errorKind flowthrough** (PRRT_kwDOPB-92c6Dp_Uq, daemonEvents.test.ts:2331) The daemon-side wire format is tested in `server.test.ts` (`parsed.data.errorKind === 'init_timeout'`) and `DaemonStreamErrorData` now declares `errorKind?`, but the SDK reducer test suite never fed a `stream_error` event with `errorKind` and asserted `state.streamError?.errorKind`. A future refactor stripping `errorKind` from the reducer's data assignment (e.g. spreading only `{error}`) would silently regress without test signal. Fix: added `captures errorKind on stream_error in view state` test exercising the full pipeline — reducer receives stream_error with errorKind, view state's `streamError.errorKind` matches. Verification - `packages/sdk-typescript`: 76/76 daemonEvents tests pass (+1 new flowthrough test). - `packages/cli/src/serve/server.test.ts`: 6 targeted serverTimestamp / stream_error / errorKind tests pass — server.ts changes are observability-only (no behavior change to wire format). - Pre-existing F3 (#4335 merge) test failures elsewhere are unrelated to this PR's changes.
…verage) Adopts both threads from wenshao's third review round on PR #4360. Both Suggestion-level — pin the daemon-side stderr log artifacts that commit `dce2fed0f` introduced. Pre-fix: the EventBus-level state_resync_required emission was tested in eventBus.test.ts, and the SSE wire shape was tested in server.test.ts, but the actual operator-facing artifacts (the stderr log lines themselves) had no test coverage. A regression swapping operands in the `gap` arithmetic, dropping the sessionId from the log, or breaking the `[errorKind]` suffix would ship silently and only surface when an operator went grepping during an incident. **[Suggestion] SSE ring eviction stderr log untested** (PRRT_kwDOPB-92c6Dqtlb, server.ts:1948) Added 2 tests: - `writes a daemon-side stderr log on SSE ring eviction` — yields a `state_resync_required` frame from a fake bridge, spies on `process.stderr.write`, asserts the captured log contains `session sess-A` + `lastEventId=5` + `earliestInRing=12` + `gap=6 events` (pins the arithmetic) + `reason=ring_evicted` + `loadSession` (the recovery hint). - `falls back to "?" placeholders when state_resync_required data is partial` — yields a frame with empty `data: {}`, asserts every `?? '?'` branch fires (lastEventId=? / earliestInRing=? / gap=? events / reason=?). Defensive against future daemon schema changes that drop one of these fields. **[Suggestion] Bridge iterator error stderr log untested** (PRRT_kwDOPB-92c6Dqtlh, server.ts:1993) Added 2 tests: - `writes a daemon-side stderr log on bridge iterator error` — fake bridge throws plain `Error('agent died')` mid-stream, captures stderr, asserts the log contains `session sess-A` + `agent died`, and **no** `[…]` suffix (plain Error → `mapDomainErrorToErrorKind` returns undefined → no suffix). - `includes [errorKind] suffix in bridge iterator error log when classified` — fake bridge throws `BridgeTimeoutError('initialize', 5000)`, asserts the log contains `[init_timeout]`. Pins the classified-vs-unclassified branch of the conditional suffix template. All 4 tests use `vi.spyOn(process.stderr, 'write').mockReturnValue( true)` + filter `mock.calls` for the relevant log prefix — same pattern as the existing `mcp-client-manager.test.ts` stderr-spy tests in core, plus `startupProfiler.test.ts` in cli. Verification: 7/7 targeted observability tests pass. Pre-existing F3 (#4335 merge) test failures elsewhere are unrelated to this PR's changes.
…amp / provenance / errorKind / state_resync_required) (#4360) * feat(serve): stamp serverTimestamp / tool provenance / errorKind on daemon events (#4175 F4 prereq) Adopts chiga0's three P0 SDK-side blockers from #4175 comment #19 — the SDK side already consumes these fields (PR #4353), but daemon hadn't stamped them yet, leaving the corresponding UI affordances inert. All three stampings are purely additive on the wire and don't require any SDK type changes (SDK already has forward-compat field slots). **#19.1 — `_meta.serverTimestamp` on every SSE frame** (`server.ts` `formatSseFrame()`) Stamped at the SSE write boundary (NOT EventBus.publish) so the in-memory `BridgeEvent` type stays unchanged and internal consumers don't see `_meta`. Pre-existing `_meta` keys (e.g. tool_call's `_meta.toolName`) are preserved via spread merge. SDK reads via the 3-location probe in `extractServerTimestamp` (chiga0's PR #4353); we pick `_meta.serverTimestamp` (Anthropic convention) so top-level event type stays unpolluted. Why this matters: pre-fix, multi-client UIs showing "X minutes ago" or sorting transcript blocks by emit time used each client's local clock — drifts of tens of seconds to minutes across browsers/tabs/ mobile produced visibly inconsistent timestamps. **#19.2 — `tool_call` `provenance` + `serverId` on every emitter event** (`ToolCallEmitter.ts`) New static `ToolCallEmitter.resolveToolProvenance(toolName, subagentMeta)` returns `{ provenance: 'builtin' | 'mcp' | 'subagent'; serverId? }`. Resolution rules (per user-confirmed design decision from issue comment): subagent takes precedence (set when subagentMeta is present); `mcp__<server>__<tool>` naming heuristic classifies MCP tools with serverId; everything else is builtin. Stamped on `emitStart` AND `emitResult` AND `emitError` (all three emit paths) so a reconnecting client receiving a `tool_call_update` frame from the replay ring (without the original `tool_call` start event) can still derive the provenance. Provenance is stable per tool, so stamping on every event is redundant — but the marginal serialization cost is tiny and reconnect correctness wins. Chose the naming heuristic (not ToolRegistry lookup) per user confirmation: matches the SDK's own fallback (chiga0 PR #4353), no new ctx-dep on emit hot path, no signature changes. **#19.3 — `errorKind` on `stream_error`** (`server.ts` line ~1955) Stamped via `mapDomainErrorToErrorKind(err)` — the 7-value classifier already lives in `@qwen-code/acp-bridge/status.ts` since #4319. When the classifier returns `undefined` (generic Error etc.) the field is omitted — strictly additive. SDK consumers handle "errorKind absent" as before (fall back to rendering `error` text). NOT stamped on `session_died` because the 3 emit sites in `acp-bridge/ bridge.ts` don't have a classifiable `err` in scope: - `channel_closed` carries only exitCode/signalCode (no error) - `killed` is user-initiated (no domain error) - `daemon_shutdown` is operator-initiated (no domain error) A follow-up could thread channel-spawn errors through to the session_died emit site to enable `errorKind: 'init_timeout'` / `missing_binary` classification — left for a separate PR to avoid mixing protocol stamping with lifecycle plumbing. Verification - `npx vitest run packages/cli/src/serve/server.test.ts -t "serverTimestamp|stream_error|errorKind"` — 5 pass - `npx vitest run packages/cli/src/acp-integration/session/emitters/ToolCallEmitter.test.ts` — 46 pass (+ 11 new tests for resolveToolProvenance + provenance stamping on all 3 emit paths) - `npx vitest run packages/cli/src/acp-integration/session/HistoryReplayer.test.ts` — 17 pass - TypeScript clean on touched regions; pre-existing F3 (#4335 merge) errors elsewhere are unrelated. Existing test updates - 15 `_meta: { toolName: 'X' }` assertions in ToolCallEmitter.test.ts updated to include `provenance: 'builtin'` (defensive — catches accidental drift if a future refactor stops stamping). 2 strict-equality assertions in HistoryReplayer.test.ts similarly updated. The first SSE-frame test in server.test.ts switched from `toEqual` to `toMatchObject` since `_meta.serverTimestamp` makes exact equality brittle; a dedicated test pins the new field's shape. * feat(serve+sdk): detect SSE ring eviction on resume, expose state_resync_required (#4175 F4 prereq) Closes the multi-client SSE reducer divergence bug Ilya0527 raised in #4175 comment #15. Pre-fix scenario: 1. Consumer's SSE stream drops; client buffers `Last-Event-ID: N`. 2. Network reconnects long enough later that events `[N+1, ringHead-1]` were evicted from the daemon's per-session ring. 3. Daemon's `subscribe({lastEventId: N})` silently replays only the surviving suffix. 4. Consumer's SDK reducer keeps applying deltas as if the stream was contiguous. Its state has now drifted from the daemon's truth — no terminal signal, no warning. The `SessionState` reducer's "same event stream in → same state out" purity guarantee is broken. The bug's blast radius is exactly when multi-client matters: F4 brings up the TUI / IDE / web client adapters that share session state, so divergence becomes visibly inconsistent across clients. **Daemon side** (`packages/acp-bridge/src/eventBus.ts`) In `subscribe()`'s replay path, detect ring eviction by comparing the ring's earliest id against `lastEventId + 1`. When a gap exists, force-push a synthetic terminal `state_resync_required` frame BEFORE the surviving replay events: ``` { v: 1, type: 'state_resync_required', data: { reason: 'ring_evicted', lastDeliveredId: N, earliestAvailableId: M } } ``` Per user-confirmed design (issue comment discussion): the frame has NO `id` (mirrors the `client_evicted` synthetic terminal pattern so it doesn't burn a slot in the per-session monotonic sequence). Replay continues after the resync frame — the SDK reducer auto-skips subsequent deltas (see below) but the frames stay on the wire so adapters have the option to compute a "what you missed" diff later. **SDK side** (`packages/sdk-typescript/src/daemon/events.ts`) Adds: - `'state_resync_required'` to `DAEMON_EVENT_TYPES` union - `DaemonStateResyncRequiredData` + `DaemonStateResyncRequiredEvent` - `isStateResyncRequiredData` predicate - `DaemonStreamLifecycleEvent` union widened - Reducer state fields: `awaitingResync: boolean`, `resyncRequiredCount: number`, `lastResyncRequired?` - Reducer case for `state_resync_required` — sets the flag, increments count, records data - **Top-of-reducer gate**: when `awaitingResync === true`, all non- terminal events are auto-skipped (still advance `lastEventId`). Terminal lifecycle events (`session_died` / `session_closed` / `client_evicted` / `stream_error`) STILL apply — critical end-of- stream signals don't depend on prior state being current. - Re-exported `DaemonStateResyncRequiredData` / Event from `daemon/index.ts` and `src/index.ts` (matches surface posture of sibling lifecycle types). Consumer recovery contract: when `state.awaitingResync === true`, call `loadSession` (out of band) to fetch the daemon's canonical session snapshot, then reconstruct view state via `createDaemonSessionViewState({...seed from loaded state})`. The fresh state defaults `awaitingResync: false` so the seed implicitly clears the flag. **Side fix** (`stream_error` errorKind) `DaemonStreamErrorData.errorKind?: string` typed for the optional classification field that Commit 1 (`14637cd79`) added daemon-side. Strictly additive — old daemons omit the field, SDK falls back to rendering `error` text. Verification - `packages/acp-bridge`: 6 files, 108/108 pass (+5 new resync-detection tests; 1 existing "default ring size 8000" test updated to acknowledge the synthetic resync frame at the head of its replay batch). - `packages/sdk-typescript`: 13 files, 451/451 pass (+8 new reducer resync tests covering set/skip/terminal-passthrough/recovery/ repeated-resync/malformed-payload). - TypeScript clean across both packages on touched regions. * fix(acp-bridge): preserve FsError structure over ACP wire (#4360 Codex round 2 fold-in) Adopts Codex review round 2 P2 finding on PR #4360 — fold-in to the F4 prereq scope per user's "a" decision. **Problem**: When the `BridgeFileSystem` adapter (introduced in #4334 fs adapter wiring) throws a structured `FsError` (e.g. `kind: 'untrusted_workspace'` / `kind: 'symlink_escape'` / `kind: 'file_too_large'`), the `@agentclientprotocol/sdk` default RPC error serialization only sends `error.message` as JSON-RPC -32603 "Internal error". The structured `kind` / `status` / `hint` fields on FsError are stripped on the way to the agent. Downstream impact: SDK consumers receiving the ACP error payload lose the typed discriminator and have to regex-match the human- readable message to dispatch UI (auth retry vs file picker vs proxy hint). This silently regresses what the FsError-typed contract was supposed to provide. **Fix**: At the bridge boundary (`BridgeClient.writeTextFile` and `BridgeClient.readTextFile`), catch errors from `this.fileSystem. writeText/readText` calls. Duck-type check for FsError shape (`err.name === 'FsError'` + `typeof err.kind === 'string'`); when matched, rethrow as ACP `RequestError(-32603, message, {errorKind, hint, status})`. The agent's RPC client now receives `data. errorKind` and can branch on the closed-enum kind. Cross-package note: FsError lives in `cli/src/serve/fs/errors.ts` and acp-bridge can't `import { FsError }` from cli (dependency inversion). Same duck-typing pattern that `mapDomainErrorToErrorKind` (status.ts) already applies to `TrustGateError` / `SkillError` for the same cross-package bundling reason — `instanceof` would fail across package boundaries when bundlers don't dedupe. **Code shape** ```typescript function isFsErrorShape(err: unknown): err is FsErrorShape { return ( err instanceof Error && err.name === 'FsError' && typeof (err as { kind?: unknown }).kind === 'string' ); } function preserveFsErrorOverAcp(err: unknown): never { if (isFsErrorShape(err)) { throw new RequestError(-32603, err.message, { errorKind: err.kind, ...(err.hint !== undefined ? { hint: err.hint } : {}), ...(err.status !== undefined ? { status: err.status } : {}), }); } throw err; } ``` Applied at both `if (this.fileSystem) { ... }` blocks (writeTextFile + readTextFile) — wrapped the adapter call in try/catch + `preserveFsErrorOverAcp(err)`. Non-FsError errors are rethrown unchanged (default ACP serialization is fine for unstructured errors; only the structured shape needs preservation). JSON-RPC code stays at -32603 (internal error) rather than mapping FsError.kind → JSON-RPC code. Rationale: the JSON-RPC standard defines only a handful of code values (-32700/-32600/-32601/-32602/ -32603 + a reserved range for application errors), and mapping ~10 FsError kinds to that narrow space is lossy. Instead the structured `data.errorKind` carries the semantic information SDK consumers need; JSON-RPC code remains the generic "an error happened" signal. **Tests** (+5 in `bridgeClient.test.ts`) - writeTextFile FsError → ACP RequestError with errorKind in data - readTextFile FsError preserving symlink_escape kind (no hint field present → not stamped, spread guard works) - non-FsError pass-through (plain Error stays plain Error, no RequestError wrap) - hint field preservation when present - defensive: error with `kind` field but wrong `name` does NOT get wrapped (e.g. PermissionForbiddenError happens to have a kind field internally — must NOT be confused for FsError) Verification: 113/113 acp-bridge tests pass (+5 new FsError- preservation tests). Full serve suite shows pre-existing F3-related failures unrelated to this change (verified in isolation). * fix: 7 wenshao/copilot review fold-ins on #4360 (1 Critical + 6 Suggestion) Adopts all 7 review threads from the first wenshao + Copilot review round on PR #4360. All technical fixes (no judgment calls). **[Critical] BridgeTimeoutError constructor blocks tsc** (wenshao PRRT_kwDOPB-92c6DfcRI) `server.test.ts:4670` called `new BridgeTimeoutError('initialize timed out')` but the constructor signature is `(label: string, timeoutMs: number)` — TS2554 blocked `tsc --noEmit` and `npm run build`. Fixed to `new BridgeTimeoutError('initialize', 5000)` per suggested fix; resulting message `"HttpAcpBridge initialize timed out after 5000ms"` still satisfies the existing `.toContain('timed out')` assertion. **[Suggestion] Copilot JSDoc package name** (Copilot PRRT_kwDOPB-92c6De-Sm, ToolCallEmitter.ts:210) JSDoc referenced `@qwen-code/core/mcp-tool` but the actual package is `@qwen-code/qwen-code-core` with the file at `packages/core/src/tools/mcp-tool.ts`. Updated the reference. **[Suggestion] Copilot errorKind type widening** (Copilot PRRT_kwDOPB-92c6De-Ro, events.ts:244) `DaemonStreamErrorData.errorKind` was typed as `string` and the JSDoc said "7-value" closed enum — but `DAEMON_ERROR_KINDS` actually has 8 values, and `SERVE_ERROR_KINDS` (daemon-side) has 9 (adds `stat_failed`). Typed as `DaemonErrorKind | (string & {})` for forward-compat: SDK consumers get IDE autocomplete on the known 8 kinds while still accepting future daemon-side additions (like `stat_failed`) without a type error. Updated JSDoc to accurately list 8 current values + call out the forward-compat widening. Side observation (NOT in scope of this PR): `DAEMON_ERROR_KINDS` (SDK) lacks `stat_failed` that exists in `SERVE_ERROR_KINDS` (daemon). That's a separate drift fix. **[Suggestion] TERMINAL wording misleading** (wenshao PRRT_kwDOPB-92c6Dj-JL, eventBus.ts:369) Comment called `state_resync_required` a "TERMINAL synthetic frame" but it's emitted FIRST (before replay) and the stream stays OPEN. Genuine terminals like `client_evicted` close the stream after the frame. Rewrote the comment per suggestion: "id-less synthetic frame... Unlike `client_evicted`, the stream stays OPEN" — so an oncall reading the source at 3am gets the right mental model. **[Suggestion] `_meta` merge dead code + stale reference** (wenshao PRRT_kwDOPB-92c6Dj-JF, server.ts:2569) The `existingMeta` merge reads `event._meta` at BridgeEvent top level, but ToolCallEmitter's `_meta` lives nested inside `event.data._meta` (publish path goes through `events.publish({type: 'session_update', data: params})`). In production `existingMeta` is always undefined — the merge is a forward-compat escape hatch, not an active merge. Also the comment referenced `extractServerTimestamp` (sdk-typescript) which grep confirms doesn't exist yet (it's planned in chiga0 PR #4353). Rewrote the comment block to (1) acknowledge no current producer sets `_meta` at the top level — it's a forward-compat hook for future envelope-level metadata; (2) drop the stale `extractServerTimestamp` reference and instead note that chiga0 PR #4353 plans the 3-location probe. Code shape unchanged (forward-compat spread stays). **[Suggestion] session_closed + client_evicted passthrough tests** (wenshao PRRT_kwDOPB-92c6Dj-JW, daemonEvents.test.ts:2284) `RESYNC_PASSTHROUGH_TYPES` has 5 members but only `session_died` and `stream_error` had passthrough tests. Added two missing tests: `session_closed` and `client_evicted` while awaitingResync. Critical because if a future refactor accidentally drops either from the set, a consumer in resync limbo would silently swallow the terminal signal and the UI would hang on "loading resync state…". **[Suggestion] readTextFile non-FsError passthrough test** (wenshao PRRT_kwDOPB-92c6Dj-JX, bridgeClient.test.ts:251) The non-FsError pass-through test only covered `writeTextFile`. Added a symmetric `readTextFile` test — the two `try/catch` blocks in `bridgeClient.ts` are independent, so test parity guards against divergent refactors (e.g. someone adding wrapping on one side but not the other). Verification - `packages/acp-bridge`: 6 files, 114/114 pass (+1 new readTextFile non-FsError test). - `packages/sdk-typescript`: 75/75 pass on daemonEvents.test.ts (+2 new session_closed / client_evicted passthrough tests). - `packages/cli/src/serve/server.test.ts`: 248 tests pass on touched cases (5 SSE / serverTimestamp / stream_error tests). Pre-existing F3 (#4335 merge) test failures unrelated to this PR's changes — verified by stash-test-restore on clean tree. - TypeScript clean on touched regions; `BridgeTimeoutError` 2-arg fix unblocks `tsc --noEmit` for the test file. * fix: 3 wenshao observability fold-ins on #4360 (all Suggestion) Adopts all 3 threads from wenshao's second review round on PR #4360. All Suggestion-level — daemon-side observability + 1 missing SDK reducer test. **[Suggestion] SSE ring eviction silently emits state_resync_required** (PRRT_kwDOPB-92c6Dp_Uk, eventBus.ts:394) Pre-fix: when a consumer reconnects past the ring boundary, the daemon emits `state_resync_required` with zero stderr breadcrumb. A 3am oncall chasing "my UI is frozen with stale state" couldn't grep daemon logs to distinguish (a) ring undersized, (b) client reconnecting too slowly, (c) network partition causing repeated reconnects. Fix: detect `next.value.type === 'state_resync_required'` in the SSE handler's iter loop in `server.ts` and emit a `writeStderrLine` with the gap details (`lastEventId`, `earliestInRing`, computed `gap` count, `reason`). Logged at the route boundary rather than inside `EventBus.subscribe` to keep the bus implementation pure + concentrate daemon-side observability in the route handler that already logs socket errors + heartbeats. **[Suggestion] Bridge iterator throw forwarded to client but not logged daemon-side** (PRRT_kwDOPB-92c6Dp_Uo, server.ts:1956) Pre-fix inconsistency: the adjacent `res.on('error', ...)` handler at line ~1925 logs SSE socket errors with `writeStderrLine`, but the bridge-iterator-catch block at line ~1940-1965 sends a `stream_error` SSE frame to the client AND swallows the error daemon-side. When the bridge iterator throws (subprocess crash, channel protocol error, unhandled rejection), distinguishing "subprocess OOM-killed" from "protocol bug" required attaching a debugger. Fix: mirror the adjacent handler's pattern — add `writeStderrLine` before the `stream_error` SSE frame send, including the classified `errorKind` (when available) in brackets so operators can grep for `[init_timeout]` / `[missing_binary]` etc. **[Suggestion] No SDK reducer test verifying stream_error.errorKind flowthrough** (PRRT_kwDOPB-92c6Dp_Uq, daemonEvents.test.ts:2331) The daemon-side wire format is tested in `server.test.ts` (`parsed.data.errorKind === 'init_timeout'`) and `DaemonStreamErrorData` now declares `errorKind?`, but the SDK reducer test suite never fed a `stream_error` event with `errorKind` and asserted `state.streamError?.errorKind`. A future refactor stripping `errorKind` from the reducer's data assignment (e.g. spreading only `{error}`) would silently regress without test signal. Fix: added `captures errorKind on stream_error in view state` test exercising the full pipeline — reducer receives stream_error with errorKind, view state's `streamError.errorKind` matches. Verification - `packages/sdk-typescript`: 76/76 daemonEvents tests pass (+1 new flowthrough test). - `packages/cli/src/serve/server.test.ts`: 6 targeted serverTimestamp / stream_error / errorKind tests pass — server.ts changes are observability-only (no behavior change to wire format). - Pre-existing F3 (#4335 merge) test failures elsewhere are unrelated to this PR's changes. * test(serve): 2 wenshao observability fold-ins on #4360 (stderr log coverage) Adopts both threads from wenshao's third review round on PR #4360. Both Suggestion-level — pin the daemon-side stderr log artifacts that commit `dce2fed0f` introduced. Pre-fix: the EventBus-level state_resync_required emission was tested in eventBus.test.ts, and the SSE wire shape was tested in server.test.ts, but the actual operator-facing artifacts (the stderr log lines themselves) had no test coverage. A regression swapping operands in the `gap` arithmetic, dropping the sessionId from the log, or breaking the `[errorKind]` suffix would ship silently and only surface when an operator went grepping during an incident. **[Suggestion] SSE ring eviction stderr log untested** (PRRT_kwDOPB-92c6Dqtlb, server.ts:1948) Added 2 tests: - `writes a daemon-side stderr log on SSE ring eviction` — yields a `state_resync_required` frame from a fake bridge, spies on `process.stderr.write`, asserts the captured log contains `session sess-A` + `lastEventId=5` + `earliestInRing=12` + `gap=6 events` (pins the arithmetic) + `reason=ring_evicted` + `loadSession` (the recovery hint). - `falls back to "?" placeholders when state_resync_required data is partial` — yields a frame with empty `data: {}`, asserts every `?? '?'` branch fires (lastEventId=? / earliestInRing=? / gap=? events / reason=?). Defensive against future daemon schema changes that drop one of these fields. **[Suggestion] Bridge iterator error stderr log untested** (PRRT_kwDOPB-92c6Dqtlh, server.ts:1993) Added 2 tests: - `writes a daemon-side stderr log on bridge iterator error` — fake bridge throws plain `Error('agent died')` mid-stream, captures stderr, asserts the log contains `session sess-A` + `agent died`, and **no** `[…]` suffix (plain Error → `mapDomainErrorToErrorKind` returns undefined → no suffix). - `includes [errorKind] suffix in bridge iterator error log when classified` — fake bridge throws `BridgeTimeoutError('initialize', 5000)`, asserts the log contains `[init_timeout]`. Pins the classified-vs-unclassified branch of the conditional suffix template. All 4 tests use `vi.spyOn(process.stderr, 'write').mockReturnValue( true)` + filter `mock.calls` for the relevant log prefix — same pattern as the existing `mcp-client-manager.test.ts` stderr-spy tests in core, plus `startupProfiler.test.ts` in cli. Verification: 7/7 targeted observability tests pass. Pre-existing F3 (#4335 merge) test failures elsewhere are unrelated to this PR's changes.
F3 — Multi-Client Permission Coordination (#4175)
Implements F3 from #4175: the
PermissionMediatorcontract frozen by PR 22a (#4295)plus 4 strategy implementations, audit ring, capability surface, SDK reducer support, and docs.
Strategies
first-responder404. Wire-shape byte-for-byte preserved.designated403 permission_forbidden / designated_mismatch. Anonymous prompts (noX-Qwen-Client-Id) fall back to first-responder.consensusN = floor(M/2) + 1; override viapolicy.consensusQuorum). First option to reach quorum wins. Intermediate votes fan outpermission_partial_voteSSE events.local-only403 permission_forbidden / remote_not_allowed. Decided by kernel-stampedreq.socket.remoteAddress— does NOT consultX-Forwarded-Foror any header.What's new
MultiClientPermissionMediator(mediator owns ALL pending + resolved permission state; bridge keeps onlyentry.pendingPermissionIdsas a fast cap-check index)PermissionAuditRing+createPermissionAuditPublisher(in-memory bounded ring, default 512 entries, NOT routed onto SSE)permission_partial_vote(consensus only),permission_forbidden(designated/consensus/local-only)PermissionForbiddenError(403),PermissionPolicyNotImplementedError(501, forward-compat),CancelSentinelCollisionError(500)policy.permissionStrategyenum,policy.consensusQuorumnumberpermission_mediation(always-on,modes: [...]);/capabilities.policy.permissionexposes the active policyDaemonPermissionPartialVoteEvent/DaemonPermissionForbiddenEventtypes, reducer extensions (permissionVoteProgress,forbiddenVotes), barrel re-exportsHardness invariants
mediator.request()registers pending entries synchronously inside the Promise executor (no await before register) so aforgetSessionracing with the bridge'spublish → register → awaitsequencing can never miss a new pending.resolveEntrycleanup is hardened — clearTimeout → state delete → emit (try/catch) → audit (try/catch) → Promise resolve (last). Tests verify the Promise settles even when emit/audit throw.permission_partial_vote,permission_forbidden) stamporiginatorClientId = pending.originatorClientId(prompt originator). Pre-existingpermission_resolved.originatorClientId === voter.clientIdinconsistency is deliberately preserved for wire-shape compatibility — frozen by regression test.{outcome:'cancelled'}) maps tooptionId: '__cancelled__'sentinel. Mediator resolves cancelled regardless of policy; collision against agent-declared option labels is detected at request issue time and throwsCancelSentinelCollisionError.first-responder(default).httpAcpBridge.test.tssnapshot tests continue to pass.Out of scope (follow-ups)
GET /workspace/permission/auditquery route on the audit ring (Commit 4 stages the ring; route follow-up).consensusvoter authentication.POST /workspace/policylive-reload (today: daemon restart).References
permission/index.ts(Deferred + map-delete-before-resolve), claude-codePermissionRequesthook (decisionReason discriminator).claude/plans/fluttering-coalescing-kettle.mdTesting
httpAcpBridge.test.tssnapshot suite stays green (first-responder bit-for-bit preserved)Migration
Default behavior unchanged: omitting
policy.permissionStrategyfrom settings keeps the daemon on first-responder. Operators opt in by writing one of the 4 strings underpolicy.permissionStrategyin workspacesettings.json. Daemon restart required to pick up changes.🤖 Generated with Qwen Code