Four minimal patches for Clawdi's multi-tenant dashboard integration:

1. web_server.py: HERMES_SESSION_TOKEN env override — reverse-proxied
   deployments set a stable token so the SPA can authenticate across
   restarts (mirrors upstream PR NousResearch#9800 pattern).

2. web_server.py: load_hermes_dotenv() at module init — uvicorn launches
   web_server.py directly, bypassing hermes_cli/main.py where the dotenv
   loader normally runs. Without this, the HERMES_SESSION_TOKEN written
   to ~/.hermes/.env is never loaded into os.environ.

3. web_server.py: expose plain `value` field for non-password env vars
   in GET /api/env — lets the dashboard round-trip comma-separated
   allow-lists (TELEGRAM_ALLOWED_USERS, FEISHU_ALLOWED_USERS, etc.)
   without forcing users to retype them.

4. config.py: register FEISHU_ALLOWED_USERS in OPTIONAL_ENV_VARS — the
   Feishu gateway adapter reads this from os.getenv() but it was missing
   from the registration list, so GET /api/env never surfaced it.

Upstream's dashboard auth middleware (NousResearch#9800) gates all /api/* routes
except a public allowlist. The chat fetch was a raw fetch() that
didn't include the bearer token, so every dashboard chat request
returned 401 Unauthorized.

Other dashboard pages go through fetchJSON() which reads
window.__HERMES_SESSION_TOKEN__ and auto-injects the Authorization
header; the chat fetch needs SSE (res.body streaming) so can't reuse
fetchJSON — instead it reads the token directly and sets the header.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

…ousResearch#9800)

Addresses responsible disclosure from FuzzMind Security Lab (CVE pending).

The web dashboard API server had 36 endpoints, of which only 5 checked
the session token. The token itself was served from an unauthenticated
GET /api/auth/session-token endpoint, rendering the protection circular.
When bound to 0.0.0.0 (--host flag), all API keys, config, and cron
management were accessible to any machine on the network.

Changes:
- Add auth middleware requiring session token on ALL /api/ routes except
  a small public whitelist (status, config/defaults, config/schema,
  model/info)
- Remove GET /api/auth/session-token endpoint entirely; inject the token
  into index.html via a <script> tag at serve time instead
- Replace all inline token comparisons (!=) with hmac.compare_digest()
  to prevent timing side-channel attacks
- Block non-localhost binding by default; require --insecure flag to
  override (with warning log)
- Update frontend fetchJSON() to send Authorization header on all
  requests using the injected window.__HERMES_SESSION_TOKEN__

Credit: Callum (@0xca1x) and @migraine-sudo at FuzzMind Security Lab

…ousResearch#9800)

Addresses responsible disclosure from FuzzMind Security Lab (CVE pending).

The web dashboard API server had 36 endpoints, of which only 5 checked
the session token. The token itself was served from an unauthenticated
GET /api/auth/session-token endpoint, rendering the protection circular.
When bound to 0.0.0.0 (--host flag), all API keys, config, and cron
management were accessible to any machine on the network.

Changes:
- Add auth middleware requiring session token on ALL /api/ routes except
  a small public whitelist (status, config/defaults, config/schema,
  model/info)
- Remove GET /api/auth/session-token endpoint entirely; inject the token
  into index.html via a <script> tag at serve time instead
- Replace all inline token comparisons (!=) with hmac.compare_digest()
  to prevent timing side-channel attacks
- Block non-localhost binding by default; require --insecure flag to
  override (with warning log)
- Update frontend fetchJSON() to send Authorization header on all
  requests using the injected window.__HERMES_SESSION_TOKEN__

Credit: Callum (@0xca1x) and @migraine-sudo at FuzzMind Security Lab

Four minimal patches for Clawdi's multi-tenant dashboard integration:

1. web_server.py: HERMES_SESSION_TOKEN env override — reverse-proxied
   deployments set a stable token so the SPA can authenticate across
   restarts (mirrors upstream PR NousResearch#9800 pattern).

2. web_server.py: load_hermes_dotenv() at module init — uvicorn launches
   web_server.py directly, bypassing hermes_cli/main.py where the dotenv
   loader normally runs. Without this, the HERMES_SESSION_TOKEN written
   to ~/.hermes/.env is never loaded into os.environ.

3. web_server.py: expose plain `value` field for non-password env vars
   in GET /api/env — lets the dashboard round-trip comma-separated
   allow-lists (TELEGRAM_ALLOWED_USERS, FEISHU_ALLOWED_USERS, etc.)
   without forcing users to retype them.

4. config.py: register FEISHU_ALLOWED_USERS in OPTIONAL_ENV_VARS — the
   Feishu gateway adapter reads this from os.getenv() but it was missing
   from the registration list, so GET /api/env never surfaced it.

…ousResearch#9800)

Addresses responsible disclosure from FuzzMind Security Lab (CVE pending).

The web dashboard API server had 36 endpoints, of which only 5 checked
the session token. The token itself was served from an unauthenticated
GET /api/auth/session-token endpoint, rendering the protection circular.
When bound to 0.0.0.0 (--host flag), all API keys, config, and cron
management were accessible to any machine on the network.

Changes:
- Add auth middleware requiring session token on ALL /api/ routes except
  a small public whitelist (status, config/defaults, config/schema,
  model/info)
- Remove GET /api/auth/session-token endpoint entirely; inject the token
  into index.html via a <script> tag at serve time instead
- Replace all inline token comparisons (!=) with hmac.compare_digest()
  to prevent timing side-channel attacks
- Block non-localhost binding by default; require --insecure flag to
  override (with warning log)
- Update frontend fetchJSON() to send Authorization header on all
  requests using the injected window.__HERMES_SESSION_TOKEN__

Credit: Callum (@0xca1x) and @migraine-sudo at FuzzMind Security Lab

…ousResearch#9800)

Addresses responsible disclosure from FuzzMind Security Lab (CVE pending).

The web dashboard API server had 36 endpoints, of which only 5 checked
the session token. The token itself was served from an unauthenticated
GET /api/auth/session-token endpoint, rendering the protection circular.
When bound to 0.0.0.0 (--host flag), all API keys, config, and cron
management were accessible to any machine on the network.

Changes:
- Add auth middleware requiring session token on ALL /api/ routes except
  a small public whitelist (status, config/defaults, config/schema,
  model/info)
- Remove GET /api/auth/session-token endpoint entirely; inject the token
  into index.html via a <script> tag at serve time instead
- Replace all inline token comparisons (!=) with hmac.compare_digest()
  to prevent timing side-channel attacks
- Block non-localhost binding by default; require --insecure flag to
  override (with warning log)
- Update frontend fetchJSON() to send Authorization header on all
  requests using the injected window.__HERMES_SESSION_TOKEN__

Credit: Callum (@0xca1x) and @migraine-sudo at FuzzMind Security Lab

…ousResearch#9800)

Addresses responsible disclosure from FuzzMind Security Lab (CVE pending).

The web dashboard API server had 36 endpoints, of which only 5 checked
the session token. The token itself was served from an unauthenticated
GET /api/auth/session-token endpoint, rendering the protection circular.
When bound to 0.0.0.0 (--host flag), all API keys, config, and cron
management were accessible to any machine on the network.

Changes:
- Add auth middleware requiring session token on ALL /api/ routes except
  a small public whitelist (status, config/defaults, config/schema,
  model/info)
- Remove GET /api/auth/session-token endpoint entirely; inject the token
  into index.html via a <script> tag at serve time instead
- Replace all inline token comparisons (!=) with hmac.compare_digest()
  to prevent timing side-channel attacks
- Block non-localhost binding by default; require --insecure flag to
  override (with warning log)
- Update frontend fetchJSON() to send Authorization header on all
  requests using the injected window.__HERMES_SESSION_TOKEN__

Credit: Callum (@0xca1x) and @migraine-sudo at FuzzMind Security Lab