…esearch#818)

Follow-up to d4fc986 — the telegram.py edit didn't make it into that
commit due to a linter race. This adds the missing import + send()
integration.

Closes lmsanch/toryx-private#818 (replaces the partial close from d4fc986)

…sResearch#818)

Follow-up to f0e63ec extending the redaction chokepoint beyond telegram
and email:

- tools/tts_tool.py::text_to_speech_tool: redact `text` right after the
  empty-string guard. Every TTS provider (edge/elevenlabs/openai/fish/
  minimax/mistral/gemini/neutts) receives already-redacted input, so voice
  output can't leak secrets even though text output is fine.

- gateway/platforms/discord.py::send: same pattern as telegram/email —
  redact `content` at the top of the method.

Remaining platform adapters (slack, feishu, wecom, dingtalk, mattermost,
signal, bluebubbles, homeassistant, matrix, qqbot, sms) follow the same
one-line pattern and can land in a follow-up PR.

Still refs lmsanch/toryx-private#818

…ation (#4)

* feat(security): secret-redaction preprocessor + telegram/email integration

Motivating incident: toryx-private#807 Issue 5 — Christopher leaked raw
Alpaca API keys into a Telegram approval prompt. This module closes that
class at the send-path chokepoint.

New `tools/secret_redactor.py`:
- Regex-based redaction for common provider keys (Anthropic, OpenAI, Groq,
  Fireworks, Toryx, GitHub PAT, Slack, AWS) + Alpaca labeled headers + PEM
  private keys + generic Bearer tokens
- Replacement marker: [REDACTED:<kind>] so readers can see what was stripped
- Idempotent, fast (precompiled patterns), safe on None/empty input

Integration:
- gateway/platforms/telegram.py send(): redact content at the top of the
  method, before format_message() and chunking
- gateway/platforms/email.py send(): redact content before
  loop.run_in_executor passes it to _send_email

All test vectors use synthetic A/B/1 fillers to avoid tripping push-protection
secret-scanning. No real keys in tests.

Not yet wired (follow-up PR): TTS text at tts_tool.py::_generate_fish_audio,
plus the other platform adapters (discord, slack, feishu, wecom, etc.).

Closes lmsanch/toryx-private#818

* feat(security): wire secret redactor into telegram adapter too (NousResearch#818)

Follow-up to d4fc986 — the telegram.py edit didn't make it into that
commit due to a linter race. This adds the missing import + send()
integration.

Closes lmsanch/toryx-private#818 (replaces the partial close from d4fc986)

* feat(security): wire secret redactor into TTS + discord adapters (NousResearch#818)

Follow-up to f0e63ec extending the redaction chokepoint beyond telegram
and email:

- tools/tts_tool.py::text_to_speech_tool: redact `text` right after the
  empty-string guard. Every TTS provider (edge/elevenlabs/openai/fish/
  minimax/mistral/gemini/neutts) receives already-redacted input, so voice
  output can't leak secrets even though text output is fine.

- gateway/platforms/discord.py::send: same pattern as telegram/email —
  redact `content` at the top of the method.

Remaining platform adapters (slack, feishu, wecom, dingtalk, mattermost,
signal, bluebubbles, homeassistant, matrix, qqbot, sms) follow the same
one-line pattern and can land in a follow-up PR.

Still refs lmsanch/toryx-private#818