fix(security): add Twilio webhook signature validation (SMS RCE fix)#7933
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The startup guard tests called connect() which bound a real aiohttp server on port 8080 — flaky in any environment where the port is in use. Mock AppRunner, TCPSite, and ClientSession instead.
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This was referenced Apr 11, 2026
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Summary
Adds HMAC-SHA1 signature validation for inbound Twilio webhooks in the SMS adapter. Without this, anyone who can reach the webhook port can inject forged SMS messages that the agent processes with full tool access — unauthenticated RCE.
Salvaged from PR #7904 by @entropidelic (Mariano Nicolini). Cherry-picked all 6 contributor commits with authorship preserved.
Fixes #7089
What changed
X-Twilio-SignatureHMAC-SHA1 validation, fail-closed startup guard (SMS_WEBHOOK_URLrequired), insecure dev opt-out (SMS_INSECURE_NO_SIGNATURE), configurable bind host (SMS_WEBHOOK_HOST), port variant handling (443/80 toggle),keep_blank_values=Truefix for parse_qsTest results
Closes duplicates
This also closes these duplicate PRs for the same vulnerability:
Credit to all contributors for identifying and reporting this issue.