fix(sms): validate X-Twilio-Signature on inbound webhooks#7121
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enjoykumawat wants to merge 1 commit into
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fix(sms): validate X-Twilio-Signature on inbound webhooks#7121enjoykumawat wants to merge 1 commit into
enjoykumawat wants to merge 1 commit into
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This vulnerability has been fixed in PR #7933 (merged). Thanks for the contribution, @enjoykumawat. |
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Summary
Fixes the unauthenticated RCE vulnerability reported in #7089.
The SMS webhook endpoint was accepting any HTTP POST without validating the
X-Twilio-Signatureheader, allowing an attacker to spoof any authorized phone number and drive the agent to execute arbitrary tools with full OS privileges.Changes:
_validate_twilio_signature()— implements Twilio's HMAC-SHA1 validation (URL + sorted POST params → HMAC-SHA1 with Auth Token → base64 →hmac.compare_digest)_handle_webhooknow rejects requests with missing or invalid signatures with HTTP 403Attack vector closed:
Test plan
X-Twilio-Signature→ rejected (403)Closes #7089