Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.

Inline comments:
In @.gitleaks.toml:
- Around line 4-8: Remove the broad path allowlist entries from the [allowlist]
block in the gitleaks config and replace them with targeted allowlisting: delete
the two file-wide exemptions in the allowlist and instead add inline allow
comments (`#gitleaks`:allow) on the specific lines in the test files that contain
intentional test credentials or create .gitleaksignore entries using finding
fingerprints for those exact test values; update the config to no longer
suppress entire files so only the explicit, commented lines or fingerprinted
findings are ignored.

In `@src/ai_company/config/schema.py`:
- Around line 578-581: The RootConfig class docstring is missing the new
security field in its Attributes section; update the RootConfig docstring (the
Attributes list near the class definition) to add an entry for "security:
SecurityConfig - Security subsystem configuration" following the same wording
and style as the other fields so documentation stays consistent with the
security: SecurityConfig Field in the class.

In `@src/ai_company/core/enums.py`:
- Around line 371-406: The change to ActionType removed/migrated built-in
strings but didn’t provide a migration/normalization path, so older
SecurityContext.action_type values may be loaded and mis-classified by
RiskClassifier.classify(); add a normalization layer that maps legacy string
variants to the new ActionType members (e.g., a dict mapping legacy names ->
ActionType constants) and apply it when SecurityContext instances are
constructed/deserialized (or inside RiskClassifier.classify() before decision
logic) so that classify() receives canonical ActionType values; update
references to ActionType in the codebase to use the normalized value and ensure
unknown strings still fall back to the current MEDIUM behavior.

In `@src/ai_company/security/action_type_mapping.py`:
- Around line 13-30: DEFAULT_CATEGORY_ACTION_MAP currently provides single
default verbs for broad categories; remove unsafe defaults for mixed-semantics
categories so tools must declare action_type explicitly. Specifically, delete
entries for ToolCategory.DEPLOYMENT, ToolCategory.COMMUNICATION, and
ToolCategory.VERSION_CONTROL from DEFAULT_CATEGORY_ACTION_MAP and update the
BaseTool fallback behavior (where it reads DEFAULT_CATEGORY_ACTION_MAP) to treat
missing mapping as "no implicit action" — either raise a validation error or
return None so callers must set ActionType explicitly; keep safe defaults for
the remaining ToolCategory -> ActionType pairs.

In `@src/ai_company/security/action_types.py`:
- Around line 71-75: The loop over custom_types accepts malformed strings like
"a:b:c"; replace the current ad-hoc check with a centralized validator (e.g.,
validate_action_type or parse_action_type) that ensures ct.count(":") == 1 and
that both category and action (the parts from ct.split(":", 1)) are non-empty;
call this validator where custom_types are processed and where get_category() is
used (the other check around lines 132-135) so any malformed value logs via
logger.warning(SECURITY_CONFIG_LOADED, error=...) and raises ValueError with the
same message used now.

In `@src/ai_company/security/audit.py`:
- Around line 36-42: Replace the eviction event used for the validation error
with a more appropriate config/validation event: define a new constant (e.g.,
SECURITY_AUDIT_CONFIG_ERROR) alongside existing events and use it in the
logger.warning call that handles invalid max_entries instead of
SECURITY_AUDIT_EVICTION; update any imports/usages in audit.py where the
logger.warning is called for max_entries (the block referencing max_entries and
SECURITY_AUDIT_EVICTION) to emit SECURITY_AUDIT_CONFIG_ERROR so the event
semantic correctly reflects a configuration/validation error.

In `@src/ai_company/security/config.py`:
- Around line 77-85: Replace the hardcoded action-type strings in
hard_deny_action_types and auto_approve_action_types with the corresponding
ActionType enum constants to prevent typos and improve maintainability: import
ActionType and set the tuples using the enum values (e.g.,
ActionType.DEPLOY_PRODUCTION.value, ActionType.DB_ADMIN.value,
ActionType.ORG_FIRE.value for hard_deny_action_types and
ActionType.CODE_READ.value, ActionType.DOCS_WRITE.value for
auto_approve_action_types) so the variables remain tuple[str, ...] while
sourcing values from the ActionType enum.

In `@src/ai_company/security/rules/_utils.py`:
- Around line 20-32: The helper walk_string_values currently skips nested lists
and silently stops when _depth >= _MAX_RECURSION_DEPTH; update
walk_string_values to recursively descend into list items that are lists (not
only dicts/strs) and to treat reaching the depth cap as a fail-closed condition:
log a WARNING/ERROR with context (include the offending argument or path) and
raise a specific exception instead of returning silently; ensure you reference
the existing _MAX_RECURSION_DEPTH and _depth parameters and add logging before
raising so all callers (the four detectors) receive a clear error path.

In `@src/ai_company/security/rules/credential_detector.py`:
- Around line 22-66: CREDENTIAL_PATTERNS is currently exported but other
detectors use private constants; if it’s not intended for external use, rename
CREDENTIAL_PATTERNS to _CREDENTIAL_PATTERNS to match the convention used by
_DESTRUCTIVE_PATTERNS and _TRAVERSAL_PATTERNS, updating any internal references
(e.g., in this module and any tests) accordingly; if it is intended to be public
(e.g., reused by OutputScanner), instead leave the name and add a brief note in
the module docstring explaining its public contract and intended reuse to make
the API choice explicit.

In `@src/ai_company/security/rules/data_leak_detector.py`:
- Line 32: The finding label "AWS credentials" hard-codes a vendor name; rename
that tuple entry to a provider-neutral label (e.g., "cloud provider credentials"
or "provider credentials") while keeping the regex
re.compile(r"\.aws[/\\]credentials$") unchanged, and update any code paths that
reference the string literal "AWS credentials" (these are used in detector
reasons/logs) to use the new label so logs and outputs no longer embed a vendor
name.
- Around line 24-27: The regex rules for key files currently use the optional
suffix (?:\.pub)? which causes public keys to be flagged; update the patterns
associated with "RSA key file", "Ed25519 key file", "ECDSA key file", and "DSA
key file" to match only private key filenames (remove the optional \.pub part so
they match id_rsa, id_ed25519, id_ecdsa, id_dsa only—optionally add anchors like
^ and $ for exact matches) so that files like id_rsa.pub are not flagged as
secrets.

In `@src/ai_company/security/rules/destructive_op_detector.py`:
- Around line 53-57: The current rule tuple that uses
re.compile(r"\bgit\s+push\s+.*--force\b") (paired with the "git push --force"
label and SecurityVerdictType.ESCALATE) misses the short form "-f"; update that
regex to detect either "--force" or "-f" (for example use a pattern like
r"\bgit\s+push\b.*(?:--force\b|(?:\s|^)-f\b)" or
r"\bgit\s+push\b.*(?:--force\b|-f\b)"), and replace the existing tuple entry in
destructive_op_detector.py so force-pushes using the short flag are escalated as
well while preserving the same label and SecurityVerdictType.ESCALATE.
- Around line 26-29: The regex for detecting "rm -rf" variants can miss cases
like "sudo rm -rf" and exact "-rf" or "-fr" flags; update the tuple in
destructive_op_detector.py (the entry paired with SecurityVerdictType.DENY) to
use a regex anchored with a word boundary before "rm", allow an optional "sudo"
prefix, and match both flag orders ("-rf" and "-fr") (for example replace the
current re.compile with one that uses r"\b(?:sudo\s+)?rm\s+-(?:rf|fr)\b" or a
variant that also tolerates extra whitespace), so the detector reliably catches
common permutations without false negatives.

In `@src/ai_company/security/rules/protocol.py`:
- Around line 3-6: The module currently only imports SecurityContext and
SecurityVerdict under TYPE_CHECKING which makes them unavailable for runtime
introspection (get_type_hints); move or add real runtime imports for
SecurityContext and SecurityVerdict (not just under TYPE_CHECKING) so the
Protocol definitions decorated with `@runtime_checkable` can resolve those names
at runtime — update the top-level imports to include SecurityContext and
SecurityVerdict from ai_company.security.models (and adjust any references in
the Protocol class definitions around the methods referenced on lines 23-26) so
get_type_hints() and runtime checks succeed.

In `@src/ai_company/tools/git_tools.py`:
- Line 640: The action for git_clone is currently recorded as
ActionType.VCS_COMMIT which is incorrect; update the audit/action type in the
git_clone implementation to a dedicated read/clone action (e.g.,
ActionType.VCS_CLONE or ActionType.VCS_READ) instead of VCS_COMMIT, and ensure
any downstream code that interprets the action (audit logs, policy checks) will
accept the new enum value by adding it to the ActionType enum if missing and
adjusting references in functions that consume the action_type field (search for
git_clone and places that handle ActionType.VCS_COMMIT).
- Line 103: The git read-only tools (git_status, git_log, git_diff) are
incorrectly using ActionType.CODE_READ; change their action_type to the
read-only VCS action (use ActionType.VCS_READ) in each function’s action
creation. If the ActionType enum does not yet define a VCS_READ member, add
ActionType.VCS_READ to the enum (with an appropriate label like "vcs:read") and
replace the ActionType.CODE_READ usages in git_status, git_log, and git_diff
accordingly so these tools fall under the vcs:* classification.

In `@src/ai_company/tools/invoker.py`:
- Around line 162-175: _build_security_context currently constructs a
SecurityContext (using agent_id and task_id) outside the guarded _check_security
path which can raise uncaught NotBlankStr validation errors; move the creation
of SecurityContext into the try/guarded path in invoke() (the path that calls
_check_security) and reuse that single instance for both the security check and
the later invocation flow, ensuring agent_id and task_id are
validated/normalized to NotBlankStr | None at the system boundary (or explicitly
converted/checked before building SecurityContext) so any invalid/blank ids are
caught and cause a blocked tool result rather than an uncaught exception; update
all other call sites that build SecurityContext (references:
_build_security_context, _check_security, invoke, SecurityContext, agent_id,
task_id, NotBlankStr) to follow the same guarded-creation pattern.
- Around line 255-291: The post-tool output scanning currently skips when
result.is_error, swallows scanner exceptions and returns raw output when
has_sensitive_data is true but redacted_content is None; change the logic in the
method that calls self._security_interceptor.scan_output so it always attempts a
scan (remove the early "if result.is_error: return result" branch), and when
scan_output raises any Exception treat it as a closed failure: log
SECURITY_OUTPUT_SCAN_ERROR and return a ToolExecutionResult that redacts the
output (e.g., content="[REDACTED]" or empty), sets is_error=True and
metadata["output_redacted"]=True with redaction_findings noting the exception;
likewise if scan_result.has_sensitive_data is true but
scan_result.redacted_content is None, return a redacted ToolExecutionResult
(again setting output_redacted and redaction_findings) instead of passing raw
content; keep MemoryError/RecursionError re-raises and preserve references to
ToolExecutionResult, self._security_interceptor.scan_output, scan_result,
logger, SECURITY_OUTPUT_SCAN_ERROR and TOOL_OUTPUT_REDACTED to locate the code.

In `@tests/unit/security/rules/test_credential_detector.py`:
- Around line 36-84: The test data in
tests/unit/security/rules/test_credential_detector.py contains provider-branded
labels and sample values (e.g., "AWS access key", "GitHub PAT",
"aws_secret_access_key", "token ghp_...") which violates the no-vendor-names
rule; update the table of tuples to use provider-neutral labels and anonymized
sample strings (e.g., "cloud access key", "service secret key", "personal access
token", "generic_api_key_...") ensuring the same detection patterns are
preserved so tests exercise the same logic without vendor branding.

In `@tests/unit/security/rules/test_engine.py`:
- Around line 91-262: Add two unit tests: one that verifies a "soft-allow" (a
rule returning a soft-ALLOW verdict) does not short-circuit evaluation and
allows later rules to run (use _make_engine, _make_context and _StubRule
instances where the first returns a soft-allow verdict and a later rule returns
DENY or ESCALATE and assert both were called and final verdict matches later
rule), and another that verifies _safe_evaluate converts exceptions raised by a
rule into a DENY (create a _StubRule that raises in its evaluate path, put it
into _make_engine, call engine.evaluate and assert verdict.verdict ==
SecurityVerdictType.DENY and that the exception-producing rule was invoked).
Ensure tests assert evaluation_duration_ms is set where applicable.

In `@tests/unit/security/rules/test_risk_classifier.py`:
- Around line 185-194: The test test_all_action_types_are_mapped is ineffective
because RiskClassifier.classify(...) returns an ApprovalRiskLevel even for the
fallback path; change the assertion to verify the action type exists in the
classifier's explicit mapping rather than using isinstance. Concretely, get the
classifier's underlying mapping (e.g., RiskClassifier._default_risk_map or the
instance attribute classifier._risk_map / classifier.default_map used by
classify) and assert action_type is a key in that mapping, and optionally assert
classifier.classify(action_type) == classifier._default_risk_map[action_type] to
ensure the mapping returns the expected value.

In `@tests/unit/security/test_audit.py`:
- Around line 269-275: Update the test and/or the AuditLog.query behavior so
limit <= 0 returns no rows: in the test function test_query_limit add cases
calling log.query(limit=0) and log.query(limit=-1) and assert both return 0
results (use AuditLog() and self._populate as before); if AuditLog.query
currently appends a match before enforcing the limit, change the implementation
in src/ai_company/security/audit.py (the AuditLog.query method) to enforce the
limit boundary check before any appends and ensure it treats limit <= 0 as "no
results" so the new tests pass.

In `@tests/unit/security/test_models.py`:
- Around line 297-317: The test test_creation_with_all_fields creates an
AuditEntry with verdict=SecurityVerdictType.DENY but sets approval_id, which is
only valid for ESCALATE; fix by removing the approval_id parameter and the
approval_id assertion from test_creation_with_all_fields in
tests/unit/security/test_models.py (or alternatively change verdict to ESCALATE
if the intent is to assert approval_id behavior), ensuring AuditEntry is
exercised only in a valid state consistent with the model documentation.

In `@tests/unit/tools/test_base_action_type.py`:
- Around line 118-124: The test is asserting that an empty string "" is accepted
as a valid action_type, but we should not treat blank overrides as valid; update
_ActionTypeTool to treat empty-string action_type the same as None (i.e.,
reject/normalize empty strings and fall back to the category default or raise a
ValueError) and adjust the test accordingly; specifically, modify the
_ActionTypeTool constructor/initializer (the logic that sets tool.action_type)
to check for action_type == "" and either set action_type to None (so downstream
code uses the category default) or raise a clear exception, then change
test_explicit_empty_string_is_accepted to expect the normalized/failing
behavior.

---

Outside diff comments:
In `@src/ai_company/tools/base.py`:
- Around line 82-114: The constructor currently silently defaults an unmapped
category (or accepts a blank explicit action_type) to ActionType.CODE_READ;
change it to fail closed: if action_type is provided and is empty/whitespace,
raise ValueError; if action_type is None, look up
DEFAULT_CATEGORY_ACTION_MAP.get(category) and if the result is None raise
ValueError about an unmapped ToolCategory, otherwise set self._action_type =
str(lookup). Update the handling around DEFAULT_CATEGORY_ACTION_MAP,
ActionType.CODE_READ, and self._action_type in the initializer to implement
these checks.

Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.

Inline comments:
In `@DESIGN_SPEC.md`:
- Around line 3021-3037: The DESIGN_SPEC.md security tree is out of sync with
the PR: it omits the new credential_detector.py and mischaracterizes
data_leak_detector.py; update the security directory listing and the adjacent
implementation-status text to match the actual module surface in this branch by
adding credential_detector.py, splitting the description of
data_leak_detector.py vs credential_detector.py (credential/secret detection vs
other data-leak concerns), and ensure entries for security/output_scanner.py,
security/service.py, and rules/* (engine.py, policy_validator.py,
risk_classifier.py, destructive_op_detector.py, data_leak_detector.py,
credential_detector.py, _utils.py) reflect current names and responsibilities so
the spec matches the merged implementation.

In `@src/ai_company/engine/agent_engine.py`:
- Around line 703-709: The AuditLog is being instantiated inside
_make_tool_invoker which is called per run, causing history to reset; create and
store a single AuditLog in AgentEngine.__init__ (e.g., self._audit_log) or
accept an injected AuditLog instance, then update _make_tool_invoker to pass
that shared AuditLog into SecOpsService instead of new AuditLog(); ensure
SecOpsService(...) in _make_tool_invoker uses self._audit_log so total_recorded
and filters persist across runs.
- Around line 672-677: The current check that returns None when
self._security_config is None lets ToolInvoker run without a
security_interceptor; change this to fail-closed: when self._security_config is
None, log the warning (leave logger.warning(SECURITY_DISABLED,...)) but then
raise a clear exception (e.g., SecurityConfigMissingError or RuntimeError) so
creation/usage of ToolInvoker is blocked, or alternatively instantiate a
deny-all interceptor (e.g., DenyAllSecurityInterceptor) and assign it to the
security_interceptor to ensure all requests are rejected; update references
around self._security_config and the code path that constructs
ToolInvoker/security_interceptor to enforce one of these behaviours.

In `@src/ai_company/security/action_types.py`:
- Around line 51-63: The module-level integrity checks currently use assert
(variables _extracted_categories, _enum_categories, _missing_in_enum,
_missing_in_map) which are skipped under Python -O; change each assert block to
an explicit runtime check: compute _missing_in_enum and _missing_in_map as
before and replace the two assert statements with if _missing_in_enum: raise
RuntimeError(f"ActionType categories missing from ActionTypeCategory:
{_missing_in_enum}") and similarly if _missing_in_map: raise
RuntimeError(f"ActionTypeCategory members missing from ActionType:
{_missing_in_map}") so the validation between _CATEGORY_MAP and
ActionTypeCategory always runs in production.

In `@src/ai_company/security/audit.py`:
- Around line 105-107: The query() method raises ValueError when limit < 1 but
does not log the error; add a warning log call (matching the __init__ pattern)
just before raising so the condition is logged with context (include the invalid
limit value and any relevant identifiers available in scope), using the existing
logger (e.g., self.logger or logger) to log at WARNING level before raising the
ValueError in query().

In `@src/ai_company/security/rules/destructive_op_detector.py`:
- Around line 71-79: _scan_value currently returns on the first regex hit which
can miss higher-severity matches later in the same string; update _scan_value to
collect all matching pattern_name/verdict pairs by checking every (pattern_name,
pattern, verdict) in _DESTRUCTIVE_PATTERNS, then compute and return the single
most severe verdict (e.g., DENY > ESCALATE > ALLOW) along with an appropriate
pattern_name (choose the highest-severity pattern or combine names) instead of
exiting early; apply the same "collect-all-then-pick-most-severe" change to the
similar scanning code at the other site referenced (lines ~103-107) so
multi-match payloads like "DELETE ...; DROP DATABASE ..." are classified by the
worst-case verdict.
- Around line 41-45: The current "DELETE without WHERE" regex in re.compile only
matches simple unqualified table names; update the pattern used in the
re.compile call in destructive_op_detector.py (the "DELETE without WHERE" rule)
to also accept schema-qualified identifiers (e.g., schema.table), quoted
identifiers with double quotes, bracketed/escaped names, optional aliasing
(e.g., "users u" or "users AS u"), and possible trailing whitespace/semicolons
before the end or WHERE; modify the regex to allow identifier tokens like
(?:"[^"]+"|\w+)(?:\.(?:"[^"]+"|\w+))? and an optional alias group, and ensure
the negative lookahead still asserts no WHERE after the statement.

In `@src/ai_company/security/service.py`:
- Around line 196-209: The string literal "output_scan" used as the verdict in
the AuditEntry creation is a magic value; replace it with a named constant
(e.g., OUTPUT_SCAN_VERDICT) or add it as a member to SecurityVerdictType and use
that enum value instead. Update the AuditEntry instantiation in the block that
constructs entry (the AuditEntry call using id, timestamp, agent_id, task_id,
tool_name, tool_category, action_type, arguments_hash, verdict, risk_level,
reason, evaluation_duration_ms) to reference the new constant/enum member, and
add a short comment documenting that this verdict is audit-only to prevent
future typos and to make the value discoverable via grep.
- Around line 94-102: The log uses SECURITY_EVALUATE_START while warning about
unimplemented custom policies during construction; replace that event with a
config-related constant (e.g., SECURITY_CONFIG_WARNING) or an existing
configuration event to better reflect the timing and semantics. Update the
logger.warning call in the block that checks config.custom_policies to use the
new/appropriate event symbol (currently SECURITY_EVALUATE_START) and add or
import the new constant where events are defined so log analysis shows this as a
configuration-time warning rather than an evaluation start.
- Around line 136-150: Update the exception handling in the block that calls
self._rule_engine.evaluate(context) so MemoryError and RecursionError are
re-raised instead of being caught and converted into a DENY SecurityVerdict;
specifically, check for and re-raise these errors (e.g., "except (MemoryError,
RecursionError): raise") before the generic "except Exception:" so that
non-recoverable errors propagate, leaving the existing logger.exception and
fallback creation of SecurityVerdict unchanged for other exceptions.

In `@src/ai_company/tools/base.py`:
- Around line 111-115: The code silently maps unknown ToolCategory values to
ActionType.CODE_READ when setting self._action_type using
DEFAULT_CATEGORY_ACTION_MAP.get(...), which weakens SecOps; change this to
fail-closed by checking whether the category exists in
DEFAULT_CATEGORY_ACTION_MAP and raising a clear error (e.g., ValueError) if
missing (or alternatively substitute a conservative explicit default like
ActionType.NONE only after explicit decision), so locate the assignment to
self._action_type in the initializer and replace the current .get(...) fallback
behavior with an existence check that raises on missing mappings.
- Around line 105-109: The setter that assigns self._action_type currently only
checks for the presence of ":" and must instead fully validate the
"category:action" form: ensure there is exactly one colon, both left and right
segments are non-empty, and reject strings with extra colons (e.g., ":" ,
"code:", "a:b:c"). In the same method where action_type is validated (the block
that assigns self._action_type), add a check that splits on ":" and confirms
len(parts)==2 and parts[0].strip() and parts[1].strip() are non-empty; before
raising ValueError, log the bad value and context at WARNING or ERROR (using the
module/class logger) and then raise the ValueError with the existing message.
Ensure the code still assigns self._action_type only when validation passes.

In `@tests/unit/security/rules/test_utils.py`:
- Around line 79-87: The test test_stops_at_max_depth should assert concrete
behavior instead of only checking the container type: call walk_string_values
with the deep nested structure and assert the returned list equals the expected
leaf values (e.g., ["leaf"]) and/or capture the warning emitted by
walk_string_values to assert a depth-limit warning was produced; update the
assertion in test_stops_at_max_depth to compare result == ["leaf"] and add a
warnings.catch_warnings/assert to verify the depth-limit warning from
walk_string_values is raised.

In `@tests/unit/security/test_service.py`:
- Around line 331-343: The test uses a vendor-specific literal "AWS access key"
and an AWS-style key which violates the no-vendor-names rule; update the
OutputScanResult instantiation and assertions in this test (and the similar
block around the other case) to use a vendor-neutral label (e.g., "provider
access key" or "example access key") and replace any AWS-style key literals in
the mocked scan inputs with a neutral example string so the calls to
OutputScanResult, service._test_output_scanner.scan, and the assertions still
validate the same behavior but without referencing a vendor name.

In `@tests/unit/tools/test_invoker_security.py`:
- Around line 380-400: The test currently assumes that when
OutputScanResult.has_sensitive_data is True but redacted_content is None the
original tool output is allowed; instead update the runtime logic in
ToolInvoker.invoke to "fail closed": detect when scan_result.has_sensitive_data
is True and scan_result.redacted_content is None (use
OutputScanResult.has_sensitive_data and OutputScanResult.redacted_content) and
either raise a security exception (e.g., SecurityViolationError) or replace the
output with a safe placeholder (e.g., "[REDACTED]") before returning; then
update the test test_sensitive_but_no_redacted_content_passes_through to expect
the new behavior (exception or redacted content) rather than the original
"executed: ls" string.

---

Duplicate comments:
In `@src/ai_company/security/action_type_mapping.py`:
- Around line 19-26: The mapping currently provides implicit fallbacks that
under-classify risky operations; remove the entries for
ToolCategory.VERSION_CONTROL, ToolCategory.COMMUNICATION, and
ToolCategory.DEPLOYMENT from the action_type_mapping dict so BaseTool cannot
silently derive an action_type for those mixed-semantics categories (symbols to
change: action_type_mapping, ToolCategory.VERSION_CONTROL,
ToolCategory.COMMUNICATION, ToolCategory.DEPLOYMENT). After removing them,
ensure callers/constructors that rely on BaseTool.action_type require an
explicit action_type for those categories (or surface a clear error) so tools
must declare the precise ActionType instead of relying on a dangerous default.

In `@src/ai_company/security/rules/_utils.py`:
- Around line 26-45: The recursion depth guard must be enforced inside
_walk_value and surface a failure instead of silently skipping branches: at the
start of _walk_value check if _depth >= _MAX_RECURSION_DEPTH, log
SECURITY_SCAN_DEPTH_EXCEEDED with depth and max_depth, and then raise a specific
exception (e.g., RecursionDepthExceededError or ValueError with context) so
callers can deny the request; also ensure both dict handling (where you call
walk_string_values) and list handling perform the same depth check before
recursing (i.e., only call walk_string_values or recurse into list items when
_depth < _MAX_RECURSION_DEPTH) so deeply nested lists are not allowed to recurse
past the cap.

In `@src/ai_company/tools/invoker.py`:
- Around line 335-347: The SecurityContext construction can raise before the
fail-closed handling; move the call to _build_security_context(tool_or_error,
tool_call) into the try block inside _check_security (or have _check_security
itself construct the context) so any validation errors (e.g., from
SecurityContext or NotBlankStr) are caught and converted into a blocked
ToolResult; update invoke() to stop calling _build_security_context()
preemptively and instead pass whatever minimal inputs _check_security needs (or
let _check_security call _build_security_context) and ensure _check_security
returns a ToolResult error on exceptions.
- Around line 256-294: The output scanning currently skips on result.is_error
and returns the original content when scan_result.has_sensitive_data is true but
scan_result.redacted_content is None, causing a sensitive-data leak; update the
logic in the invoker flow around self._security_interceptor.scan_output so that
(1) you always call scan_output for all outputs (remove or change the early
return on result.is_error) so error outputs are scanned too, (2) preserve
existing exception handling for MemoryError and RecursionError, and (3)
implement a fail-closed branch when scan_result.has_sensitive_data is True and
scan_result.redacted_content is None by returning a ToolExecutionResult with
is_error=True, a withheld message like "Output scan failed (fail-closed). Tool
output withheld.", and metadata {"output_scan_failed": True} instead of
returning the original result; reference symbols:
_security_interceptor.scan_output, result.is_error,
scan_result.has_sensitive_data, scan_result.redacted_content, and
ToolExecutionResult.

In `@tests/unit/security/rules/test_data_leak_detector.py`:
- Around line 145-163: The negative test matrix for the "arguments" parametrize
is missing public-key filenames, so add entries to ensure public keys like
id_rsa.pub and id_ed25519.pub are treated as safe: insert {"path":
"/home/user/.ssh/id_rsa.pub"} and {"path": "/home/user/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub"}
into the list of parameters and add corresponding ids (e.g., "public_rsa_key",
"public_ed25519_key") so the parametrized test (the "arguments" parametrize
block) asserts these public-key paths are allowed and guards against
regressions.

In `@tests/unit/security/rules/test_risk_classifier.py`:
- Around line 186-200: The test test_all_action_types_are_mapped is vulnerable
because RiskClassifier.classify() falls back to ApprovalRiskLevel.HIGH; update
the test to assert each ActionType is present in the classifier's explicit
mapping rather than only checking the returned value type. Concretely, for each
action_type use RiskClassifier() to access its explicit map (e.g.,
classifier._default_risk_map or the attribute that stores the default mapping),
assert action_type in that map, then assert the mapped value is a member of
ApprovalRiskLevel; keep the existing assertions about membership but replace the
implicit fallback check with the explicit-map membership check.

In `@tests/unit/security/test_models.py`:
- Around line 330-346: The test constructs an AuditEntry with approval_id while
using verdict="deny", which violates the model contract that approval_id only
accompanies an escalation; update the test_creation_with_all_fields (the
AuditEntry instantiation) to either remove the approval_id field or change
verdict to "escalate" so the AuditEntry( ..., verdict=...,
approval_id="apr-789") matches the allowed state—prefer changing verdict to
"escalate" if you want to keep approval_id, otherwise drop approval_id from that
test case.