Joseph Aronesty (2026)
Inspired by Thomas Paine’s Common Sense (1776)
Introduction
In January of 1776, a short pamphlet began circulating through the American colonies. It was written not for scholars or statesmen, but for ordinary citizens. Its purpose was simple and radical: to explain, in plain language, why submission to concentrated power was neither natural nor necessary.
The pamphlet was Common Sense, and its author, Thomas Paine, did not argue that King George III was uniquely wicked. Instead, he made a far more unsettling claim—that monarchy itself was a flawed system, and that placing excessive authority in any single individual inevitably corrupted both ruler and ruled.
Nearly two and a half centuries later, the outward forms of power have changed, but the underlying dynamics have not. Titles evolve. Justifications adapt. The language of authority modernizes. Yet the temptation toward autocratic rule—and the willingness of people to accept it—remains a constant of political life.
What follows is not a historical reenactment, nor an argument about personalities. It is a modern restatement of Paine’s central insight: that free societies do not lose their liberty all at once, but by failing to recognize familiar dangers in unfamiliar forms.
Paine wrote to awaken his contemporaries to patterns they were already living through. The purpose here is the same.
On the Nature of Concentrated Power
There is a persistent belief among free people that power, once granted, will restrain itself. Human history offers no support for this belief.
Power does not seek balance. It seeks continuance, expansion, and ultimately immunity from challenge. Democracy dies not because of a moral failing of individuals so much as a predictable feature of absolute authority once it is detached from regular accountability. The problem is not that one person becomes all-powerful, but that many people slowly grow accustomed to absolute power.
The defenders of concentrated power often argue that a strong executive is necessary to protect the nation. Yet history repeatedly shows the opposite: such power rarely protects a people from danger, but very often protects the autocrats from the people.
Personal rule—whether it wears a crown, a uniform, or the language of popular mandate—rests on a simple inversion of responsibility. Citizens are told that judgment is a burden best surrendered. Loyalty is redefined as obedience. Dissent is reframed as weakness, or worse, betrayal.
This is how liberty erodes without being formally abolished. No proclamation announces it. No constitution need be rewritten at first. The shift occurs in tone, in expectation, in what citizens come to tolerate in the name of order. A free people does not wake one morning to discover itself unfree; it arrives there by degrees, persuaded that exceptional power is both necessary and temporary.
At this stage, the question is no longer whether power has overreached, but whether the public has forgotten why limits existed in the first place.
Those who argue that “this time is different” must answer a hard question: different from what? From human nature? From history? From every prior instance in which concentrated power promised stability and delivered submission?
A government of laws depends on citizens who understand that strength lies not in domination, but in restraint. When restraint is abandoned—when power is admired for its force rather than its limits—the transition away from self-government has already begun, whether it is acknowledged or not.
On Why Free People Surrender Their Judgment
The loss of liberty rarely begins with force. It begins with a sense of relief.
Democratic self-government is demanding. It requires attention, disagreement, patience, and the humility to accept that no single voice—including one’s own—is sufficient. In uncertain times, this burden feels heavy. When a confident figure offers certainty in place of complexity, many experience not alarm, but comfort.
This is the first seduction of personal rule within a democracy. People do not abandon freedom because they despise it, but because they are persuaded that freedom has become impractical. They are told that debate is weakness, that disagreement is disorder, and that unity requires obedience. The promise is simple: trust me, and you may rest.
What is surrendered first is not rights, but personal judgment.
Fear plays a central role, but not always in obvious ways. It is not merely fear of enemies, foreign or domestic, but fear of instability, fear of social conflict, fear of economic uncertainty. A population anxious about its footing becomes willing to trade liberty for reassurance, even when said reassurance is largely performative and offers no real relief.
Those who resist this trade are often caricatured as dangerous, radical, unrealistic and disloyal the leader’s cause. In this way, caution and protest are recast as cowardice, and submission as strength.
The most effective autocrats do not demand admiration; they cultivate dependency. They position themselves as indispensable solutions to problems they continuously emphasize and rarely resolve. Each new crisis reinforces the narrative that only extraordinary authority can preserve order, and that ordinary checks are luxuries of a calmer time.
None of this requires the suspension of elections or the abandonment of constitutional language. The words remain. The habits change.
The final psychological shift occurs when people come to believe that resistance is futile—that the trajectory is inevitable, and that adapting is wiser than objecting. At that moment, power no longer needs to coerce. It is sustained by resignation.
And so, a free society depends not on perfect leaders, but on citizens who retain the nerve to think, to question, and to withstand the discomfort of disagreement. When that nerve is lost—when convenience replaces vigilance—no external enemy is required. The erosion is complete from within.
On How Institutions Are Emptied Without Being Overthrown
Free societies often imagine that tyranny arrives by spectacle—tanks in streets, constitutions burned, courts shuttered. In reality, institutions are more commonly hollowed than destroyed.
The outward forms remain. Elections are held. Legislatures convene. Courts issue opinions. Yet their authority is gradually diminished, not by decree, but by disregard. When power is personalized, institutions are tolerated only so long as they comply. When they resist, they are portrayed as illegitimate, corrupt, or obstructive.
Another method of hollowing out a democracy is selective obedience. Rules are praised when they benefit the powerful and dismissed when they restrain them. Enforcement becomes inconsistent. Precedent is ignored. Over time, citizens learn that law is not a standard, but a tool—applied unevenly and explained afterward.
Once this lesson is absorbed, trust in government collapses. Faith in institutions declines, while faith in the authoritarian rises. The public, weary of complexity, begins to see institutions as theater and the individual leader as the only “real” actor.
At this point, institutional failure is not an accident; it becomes evidence used to justify further consolidation of power. The damage itself becomes the argument.
On the Myth That This Is Inevitable
Perhaps the most paralyzing belief in any republic is the belief that decline is unavoidable.
When citizens are repeatedly told that norms are obsolete, that restraint is naïve, and that past standards cannot survive modern pressures, they may come to accept erosion as adaptation. What was once alarming becomes familiar. What was once resisted becomes expected.
Yet history shows that inevitability is often an illusion created by momentum and fatigue. Systems do not collapse because collapse is natural, but because enough people conclude that resistance is useless. The belief that “nothing can be done” becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Those who benefit from concentrated power rely on resignation. It discourages participation without provoking opposition. It replaces outrage with detachment, and engagement with cynicism. A disengaged citizenry is far easier to manage than an angry one.
The most dangerous phrase in a free society is not “this must be done,” but “this cannot be stopped.”
On the Duty of the Citizen in a Free Society
Thomas Paine understood that liberty is not sustained by declarations alone. It is sustained by citizens willing to accept the inconvenience of freedom.
Self-government demands more than periodic consent and voting, It requires continuous attention, the courage to dissent, and the refusal to confuse comfort with stability. It asks citizens to tolerate disagreement and to defend principles even when doing so is socially costly.
Liberty does not depend on optimism, but on memory—the memory that concentrated power has always justified itself as necessary, temporary, and benevolent. A government of the people is a historical exception, not the rule. It survives only so long as citizens remember that order imposed without consent is not democracy, but quiet submission.
A free people need not be perfect. But they must remain awake.
The moment citizens surrender their judgment in exchange for reassurances, they trade a difficult freedom for an easy dependence. History offers many names for this arrangement. None of them describe a democratic republic.
Relevant Prior Post
A Call for a Union of Governors to Protect Citizens from Federal Overreach
THE ENGLISH CODE 