(13)The Federalist Papers
The Importance of the Union (1-14)
| FEDERALIST No. 1 | General Introduction Alexander Hamilton |
| FEDERALIST No. 2 | Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence John Jay |
| FEDERALIST No. 3 | Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence (con’t) John Jay |
| FEDERALIST No. 4 | Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence (con’t) John Jay |
| FEDERALIST No. 5 | Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence (con’t) John Jay |
| FEDERALIST No. 6 | Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States Alexander Hamilton |
| FEDERALIST No. 7 | Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States (con’t) Alexander Hamilton |
| FEDERALIST No. 8 | The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States Alexander Hamilton |
| FEDERALIST No. 9 | The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection Alexander Hamilton |
| FEDERALIST No. 10 | The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection (con’t) James Madison |
| FEDERALIST No. 11 | The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy Alexander Hamilton |
| FEDERALIST No. 12 | The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue Alexander Hamilton |
| FEDERALIST No. 13 | Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government Alexander Hamilton |
| FEDERALIST No. 14 | Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered James Madison |
Defects of the Articles of Confederation (15-22)
| FEDERALIST No. 15 | The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union Alexander Hamilton |
| FEDERALIST No. 16 | The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con’t) Alexander Hamilton |
| FEDERALIST No. 17 | The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con’t) Alexander Hamilton |
| FEDERALIST No. 18 | The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con’t) Alexander Hamilton and James Madison |
| FEDERALIST No. 19 | The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con’t) Alexander Hamilton and James Madison |
| FEDERALIST No. 20 | The Insufficiency fo the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (con’t) Alexander Hamilton and James Madison |
| FEDERALIST No. 21 | Other Defects of the Present Confederation Alexander Hamilton |
| FEDERALIST No. 22 | Other Defects of the Present Confederation (con’t) Alexander Hamilton |
Arguments for the Type of Government Contained in the Constitution (23-36)
| FEDERALIST No. 23 | The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union Alexander Hamilton |
| FEDERALIST No. 24 | The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered Alexander Hamilton |
| FEDERALIST No. 25 | The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered (con’t) Alexander Hamilton |
| FEDERALIST No. 26 | The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered Alexander Hamilton |
| FEDERALIST No. 27 | The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered (con’t) Alexander Hamilton |
| FEDERALIST No. 28 | The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered (con’t) Alexander Hamilton |
| FEDERALIST No. 29 | Concerning the Militia Alexander Hamilton |
| FEDERALIST No. 30 | Concerning the General Power of Taxation Alexander Hamilton |
| FEDERALIST No. 31 | Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con’t) Alexander Hamilton |
| FEDERALIST No. 32 | Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con’t) Alexander Hamilton |
| FEDERALIST No. 33 | Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con’t) Alexander Hamilton |
| FEDERALIST No. 34 | Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con’t) Alexander Hamilton |
| FEDERALIST No. 35 | Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con’t) Alexander Hamilton |
| FEDERALIST No. 36 | Concerning the General Power of Taxation (con’t) Alexander Hamilton |
The Republican Form of Government (37-51)
| FEDERALIST No. 37 | Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government James Madison |
| FEDERALIST No. 38 | The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed James Madison |
| FEDERALIST No. 39 | The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles James Madison |
| FEDERALIST No. 40 | The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained James Madison |
| FEDERALIST No. 41 | General View of the Powers Conferred by The Constitution James Madison |
| FEDERALIST No. 42 | The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered James Madison |
| FEDERALIST No. 43 | The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered (con’t) James Madison |
| FEDERALIST No. 44 | Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States James Madison |
| FEDERALIST No. 45 | The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered James Madison |
| FEDERALIST No. 46 | The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared James Madison |
| FEDERALIST No. 47 | The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts James Madison |
| FEDERALIST No. 48 | These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other James Madison |
| FEDERALIST No. 49 | Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention Alexander Hamilton or James Madison |
| FEDERALIST No. 50 | Periodical Appeals to the People Considered Alexander Hamilton or James Madison |
| FEDERALIST No. 51 | The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments Alexander Hamilton or James Madison |
The Legislative Branch (52-66)
| FEDERALIST No. 52 | The House of Representatives Alexander Hamilton or James Madison |
| FEDERALIST No. 53 | The House of Representatives (con’t) Alexander Hamilton or James Madison |
| FEDERALIST No. 54 | The Apportionment of Members Among the States Alexander Hamilton or James Madison |
| FEDERALIST No. 55 | The Total Number of the House of Representatives Alexander Hamilton or James Madison |
| FEDERALIST No. 56 | The Total Number of the House of Representatives (con’t) Alexander Hamilton or James Madison |
| FEDERALIST No. 57 | The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation Alexander Hamilton or James Madison |
| FEDERALIST No. 58 | Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands Considered James Madison |
| FEDERALIST No. 59 | Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members Alexander Hamilton |
| FEDERALIST No. 60 | Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members (con’t) Alexander Hamilton |
| FEDERALIST No. 61 | Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members (con’t) Alexander Hamilton |
| FEDERALIST No. 62 | The Senate Alexander Hamilton or James Madison |
| FEDERALIST No. 63 | The Senate (con’t) Alexander Hamilton or James Madison |
| FEDERALIST No. 64 | The Powers of the Senate John Jay |
| FEDERALIST No. 65 | The Powers of the Senate (con’t) Alexander Hamilton |
| FEDERALIST No. 66 | Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered Alexander Hamilton |
The Executive Branch (67-77)
| FEDERALIST No. 67 | The Executive Department Alexander Hamilton |
| FEDERALIST No. 68 | The Mode of Electing the President Alexander Hamilton |
| FEDERALIST No. 69 | The Real Character of the Executive Alexander Hamilton |
| FEDERALIST No. 70 | The Executive Department Further Considered Alexander Hamilton |
| FEDERALIST No. 70 | The Executive Department Further Considered Alexander Hamilton |
| FEDERALIST No. 71 | The Duration in Office of the Executive Alexander Hamilton |
| FEDERALIST No. 72 | The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered Alexander Hamilton |
| FEDERALIST No. 73 | The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power Alexander Hamilton |
| FEDERALIST No. 74 | The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning Power of the Executive Alexander Hamilton |
| FEDERALIST No. 75 | The Treaty-Making Power of the Executive Alexander Hamilton |
| FEDERALIST No. 76 | The Appointing Power of the Executive Alexander Hamilton |
| FEDERALIST No. 77 | The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered Alexander Hamilton |
The Judicial Branch (78-83)
| FEDERALIST No. 78 | The Judiciary Department Alexander Hamilton |
| FEDERALIST No. 79 | The Judiciary (con’t) Alexander Hamilton |
| FEDERALIST No. 80 | The Powers of the Judiciary Alexander Hamilton |
| FEDERALIST No. 81 | The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority Alexander Hamilton |
| FEDERALIST No. 82 | The Judiciary Continued Alexander Hamilton |
| FEDERALIST No. 83 | The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury Alexander Hamilton |
Conclusions and Miscellaneous Ideas
| FEDERALIST No. 84 | Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered Alexander Hamilton |
| FEDERALIST No. 85 | Concluding Remarks Alexander Hamilton |
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