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Europe

“With the Shield, or On It?”: Aspides and the EU Aspirations for Sea Control

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By Giacomo Leccese 

On 23 February 2026, the Council of the EU decided to extend the mandate of the EU naval operation EUNAVFOR Aspides, launched in March 2024 to safeguard the sea lines of communication (SLOC) in the Red Sea and protect European commercial vessels from Houthi attacks. Aspides has marked the most demanding naval engagement of the Union to date, moving beyond the low-intensity context that has traditionally characterized EU maritime operations. The choice to operate separately from the U.S.-led Prosperity Guardian coalition also signaled a deliberate effort to assert European strategic autonomy, with distinct assets, rules of engagement, and political objectives. The renewal of the operation, after two years of sustained deployment, therefore provides a valuable opportunity to assess the performance of the mission and to measure it against the stated ambition of the EU to act as a “global maritime security provider.” Regardless of how the situation in the Red Sea and the Houthi threat will evolve in the near future, an analysis of the mission provides the opportunity to examine some general gaps in the organization and efficiency of EU naval operations, as well as some limitations in the combat capabilities of NATO navies to address high-intensity threats at sea and counter potential sea denial actions in strategic chokepoints around the globe.

The name of the mission, Aspides, comes from the Greek word for “shield” (ἀσπίς). In ancient Spartan tradition, a warrior would return from battle either carrying his shield or borne upon it. After two years at sea, will the EU return with its shield in hand, or be carried back upon it? The evidence suggests the latter. Despite some operational and tactical achievements, the mission has struggled to meet its objectives, constrained by limited naval capabilities and a mandate that remained narrow and largely reactive to Houthi actions.

Measuring Success against the Mission Mandate

To evaluate the effectiveness of Aspides, it is necessary to measure its outcomes against its mandate. The mission’s objectives were to restore and safeguard freedom of navigation, escort and protect vessels, and enhance maritime situational awareness in the Red Sea. From this perspective, Aspides achieved notable operational and tactical results, yet did not fully accomplish its stated goals, especially those related to the restoration of freedom of navigation and the protection of ships.  During the operation, shipping agencies continued to avoid the Suez route, as concerns persisted regarding the safety of merchant vessels. Despite an additional 3,000 nautical miles and approximately ten days of sailing on the Asia-Western Europe route, the shipping industry continued to choose the Cape of Good Hope route, circumnavigating Africa. Even with a modest increase in traffic following the halt in Houthi attacks, the number of ships transiting the Red Sea remained well below the pre-crisis average of 72–75 per day recorded before the onset of Houthi sea denial operations in November 2023. To resume normal traffic in the Red Sea, shipping needs to have “safe enough” conditions, which means more protection. Aspides did not achieve this threshold.

Figure 1: Traffic trends in the Red Sea Route between November 2023 and November 2025. (Source: Hellenic Shipping News)

Concerning the protection of vessels, Aspides provided support to over 1,200 ships, demonstrating the ability of the European warships employed to intercept the various air threats posed by the Houthis.  Despite this, the inability of the mission to meet the commercial timelines of the shipping industry prompted some vessels to risk transiting the Red Sea without waiting for escort availability. This led several European vessels to be targeted by Houthi attacks, in some cases suffering severe damage or loss.  In this sense, also the objective of escorting and protecting vessels cannot be considered fully achieved, as the escort model failed to meet acceptable standards for responding to the needs of the shipping industry.

Insufficient Assets, Insufficient Protection

A key factor explaining the inability of Aspides to guarantee the required level of protection concerns the scarcity of naval assets at its disposal. Throughout its deployment, the mission maintained an average presence of only three warships, far below the estimated operational need of at least ten naval units supported by air assets. Such a limited presence inevitably constrained the mission’s capacity to ensure regular and comprehensive coverage along a maritime corridor extending for more than 1,200 nautical miles. Under these conditions, Aspides was able to organize only a maximum of four escorted transits each day (typically two northbound and two southbound) in spite of a minimum of eight to ten daily convoy movements indicated by shipping companies to be necessary to restore pre-crisis traffic levels. The mission is based on an escort-on-demand model, in which close protection is provided to vessels upon request and naval units are assigned when available. In this model, the limited number of available warships inevitably creates long waiting times and queues for maritime traders before receiving an escort.  In a commercial context where voyage decisions are made weekly, such delays have led many companies to reroute their merchant ships to the Cape Route or to attempt the dangerous passage through the Red Sea without protection. This explains both the failure to resume normal trade flows towards Suez and the attacks suffered by some unprotected European vessels, such as the Greek-operated Eternity C and Magic Seas, as well as the Dutch freighter Minervagracht.

The limited number of available naval assets reveals some significant gaps in European naval power. After the end of the Cold War and during periods of severe fiscal austerity, European navies underwent a significant downsizing. The decline in defense spending and the allocation of resources to the detriment of navies, given the importance of counterinsurgency operations in the early 2000s, reduced the number of naval units.

Despite this, European fleets have expanded their theater of operations beyond the usual seas surrounding the continent, as demonstrated by recent engagements in the Indo-Pacific. This deprives the European mission in the Red Sea of useful assets and places further strain on already limited available budgets. Furthermore, European fleets have been reshaped to focus on low-intensity operations, from crisis management to the fight against illegal trafficking, search and rescue, counter-piracy, and disaster relief. In this context, European navies lost 32% of their main surface combatants (frigates and destroyers) between 1999 and 2018, and Europe’s combat power at sea is considered to be half of what it was during the height of the Cold War. This decline is particularly impactful in the case of Aspides. Unlike other recent European naval operations, such as EUNAVFOR Atalanta, countering the Houthis requires high-end capabilities, with warships capable of providing air defense against threats such as anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), in addition to unmanned surface vessels (USVs).

After years of downscaling, European navies retain only a limited number of frigates and destroyers designed for air defense. These warships are comparatively lightly armed and lack the necessary number of Battle Force Missiles (BFM) and corresponding vertical launch system (VLS) cells to conduct and sustain high-end naval operations effectively. In this context, not only are there only a few usable ships for Aspides, but these vessels also have a limited operational tempo. Indeed, in a high-intensity environment like the one presented by the Houthis, the limited number of VLS cells compared to US and Asian warships forces European units to return to a nearby base to reload their interceptor missile magazines more frequently. Added to this already limited capacity are several problems with onboard systems malfunctions, which some experts believe are due to the cost-saving construction that characterizes European warships. Several naval units destined for Aspides, such as the German frigate Hessen and the Belgian frigate Louis Marie, experienced problems with their onboard missile systems, which affected their availability for protection missions.

Mandate Limitations and the Cost Asymmetry of Protection

These limitations highlight that Aspides, and European navies more broadly, are materially unable to guarantee the level of protection required to restore normal trade flows in the Red Sea in the event of prolonged and intense Houthi sea denial operations. Beyond the difficulty of covering such a vast area and meeting a high demand for protection with limited assets, European forces face the challenge of countering a persistent missile and drone threat. The major issue is not the difficulty of intercepting them, but rather the cost of doing so. As Cranny-Evans and Kaushal note, and as already demonstrated during the Tanker War of the 1980s, “securing shipping requires a disproportionately resource-intensive effort on the part of the defender relative to the attacker when the latter has the advantage of proximity.”

In addition to the aforementioned need for replenishing VLS cells rotating to a friendly reloading facility, European naval units deployed must expend disproportionately expensive interceptors to engage relatively cheap targets. For example, in the initial stage of the operation, French frigates launched dozens of Aster interceptor missiles, costing €1-1.5 million each, against drones costing just a few thousand dollars. This economic imbalance is compounded by the strain such operations place on limited interceptor missile production capacity and stockpiles.

European navies have resorted to various tactical measures to reduce this asymmetric disadvantage, but these do not allow for completely solving the problem. One of the most used alternatives was the use of guns on deck or helicopters to shoot down enemy drones. However, as explained by Italian Navy officers, even though this solution allows for a drastic reduction in costs and does not deplete interceptor missiles stockpiles, it has two drawbacks: first, guns have a shorter range than missiles, so the drone is neutralized much closer to the ship, reducing reaction time and increasing risks; second, when used near merchant vessels for their protection, stray projectiles risk hitting them.

Another solution employed against UAVs has been the use of non-kinetic measures, such as jamming to disrupt the link with the operator and GNSS. An example of this was the use of the Centauros anti-drone system by the Greek Navy. Even in this case, however, these countermeasures were not completely resolutive. Like guns on deck and on helicopters, electronic warfare (EW) remains much less effective against other types of airborne threats, such as anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs). In this sense, the primary defense remained tied to the use of expensive Aster interceptor missiles, as demonstrated by the engagements of the French Navy.

In this context of persistent asymmetric disadvantage, the only sustainable solution would have been to deter Houthi attacks or to limit their operational capabilities. However, Aspides’ exclusively defensive mandate has constituted a significant limitation in this sense. In Operations Poseidon Archer and Rough Rider (2024–2025), the United States and the United Kingdom conducted repeated airstrikes on Houthi missile sites and storage facilities in an effort to degrade their offensive capacity.

The effectiveness of these operations remains contested. Some analysts argue that their impact was limited, given the Houthis’ ability to relocate or conceal assets underground. Others, such as Knights, emphasize that the operational tempo between successive attacks in the Red Sea increased considerably after the strikes, suggesting a temporary reduction in capability.

Whatever their true effect, such operations were never a viable option for the European Union, being fundamentally incompatible with Aspides’ mandate and political objectives. Indeed, the decision to establish Aspides and not join the US-led Prosperity Guardian coalition stemmed from the preference of several EU members to avoid participation in kinetic actions in Yemen, both to prevent further escalation in the region and to avoid straining relations with Iran. Yet Aspides’ exclusively defensive and therefore reactive posture has left the mission particularly exposed to prolonged sea denial campaigns, without degrading enemy capabilities, a situation that is neither sustainable nor productive in the long term.

Addressing the Limits of Aspides: Rationalization, Coordination, and Prevention

Countering air and surface threats in coastal waters and confined basins has clearly proven a particularly difficult challenge, not only for the EU. Other operations in the Red Sea, such as Prosperity Guardian, have also failed to ensure the resumption of normal maritime traffic and have encountered similar difficulties in sustaining prolonged high-end militia threats. Both the U.S. and Royal Navy have faced the combined effects of depleted interceptor stockpiles and the cost asymmetry of defending against cheap threats, along with constraints in the number of ships available to meet operational requirements. The EU, however, unlike these two actors, in choosing to maintain an exclusively defensive approach, could have placed greater emphasis on the sustainability and effectiveness of Aspides by adopting the measures that are discussed henceforth.

The limited number of available air defense vessels is an issue difficult to overcome in the short term. European navies have begun a modernization process, commissioning new warships to restore some lost capabilities, but it will take years for these vessels to enter into operation, as many are expected around 2030. However, one of the main problems highlighted by Aspides was the inability to optimize the limited assets available. Of the 21 nations participating in the mission, only a few have contributed combat vessels (Italy, France, Greece, Belgium, and the Netherlands), and only Italy, France, and Greece have deployed assets continuously since the start of the operation. Like previous EU-led operations such as Atalanta, as well as ad hoc coalitions among European states such as Operation Agenor in the Strait of Hormuz, Aspides confirms the recurring pattern of an unbalanced commitment, especially towards the countries with the greatest interests at stake. It is no coincidence that the ports most affected by the Red Sea crisis were precisely those of Greece, Italy, and France, the main contributors to the mission.

Even the overlap between different operations with European participants in the same waters contributes to straining already limited European naval capacities. For example, several EU members, such as Denmark, Finland, Greece, and the Netherlands, participate in the Prosperity Guardian coalition, providing public, logistical or active military support. This forces some European warships to rotate and reduce their participation in Aspides to contribute to other missions. The decision to launch Aspides and not expand the existing EUNAVFOR Atalanta operating in nearby waters further contributed to a dispersion of resources.

Given the difficulty of materially and economically sustaining a prolonged threat from the coast, the EU also missed several opportunities that would have allowed it to reduce the Houthis’ offensive capabilities, even without kinetic operations on Yemeni soil. Despite the ability to produce much of their arsenal locally, the Houthis remained heavily dependent on Iranian supplies for most of the weapons used in their attacks in the Red Sea. In particular, it appears highly likely that the militia imported components or ready-made weapons in the case of short- and medium-range anti-ship ballistic missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles, and Waid drones, the most sophisticated long-range UAVs used in maritime attacks. These weapons require components and know-how not available to the militia for local production. The Houthis were therefore dependent on Iranian supplies by sea or by land on the Yemen-Omani border. As Knights evidenced, this reliance, which constitutes one of the main weaknesses of the militia, was not exploited by the naval forces engaged in the Red Sea.

The EU could have reduced the offensive capabilities of the Houthis by blocking Iranian weapons and components, both by intervening directly to intercept shipping by sea, but above all by supporting the Yemeni coast guard and border forces with capacity-building initiatives and economic and material backing. In this sense, the EU has provided partial support to the coast guard, but local experts considered the level of aid “far below what is required.” Yemeni forces have demonstrated on several occasions their ability to intercept Iranian supplies if properly equipped and assisted. For its part, the EU has shown on other occasions, such as the fight against piracy in Somalia, how it is particularly adept at capacity-building initiatives and supporting local forces. Consistently backing the Yemeni Guard Coast would have allowed the EU to degrade the capabilities of the Houthis without risking regional escalation and worsening relations with Iran. It would have also allowed the EU to enhance its reputation as a maritime security actor, working cooperatively with regional actors.

Figure 2: Houthi Weapons Supply Chains. Source: Orion Policy Institute. https://orionpolicy.org/the-houthi-drone-supply-chain/

Conclusion

Beyond the specific case of the Houthis and the Red Sea, the analysis points to broader lessons. It underscores the need to improve the efficiency of EU naval operations, particularly in high-intensity contexts, while also highlighting implications for NATO as it prepares to confront the practical challenges of sustaining protracted operations in littoral waters against a well-armed, land-based opponent.

In the short and medium term, to address its limited high-end naval capabilities, the EU is called upon to better rationalize resources and improve burden-sharing. On the rationalization side, the overlapping of numerous missions involving multiple European navies in the same area of ​​operations should be avoided because it reduces the already very limited number of warships available for each mission. From the burden-sharing perspective, once again, the particular interests of member states have constituted the main lever of contribution, leaving the level of commitment of some countries with useful naval capabilities very low, such as Germany, or inexistent, such as Spain. Increasing the level of engagement of these members is essential to increasing the number of large surface combatants available.

Even the exclusively reactive posture of Aspides has proven unsustainable given the asymmetric disadvantage of Western navies in the face of Houthi threats. In such cases, against adversaries heavily dependent on external arms supplies, the EU should combine its preference for de-escalation with its expertise in low-end capabilities, attempting to support local actors in degrading the enemy’s offensive arsenal.

Finally, the logistical and economic challenges posed by the Red Sea engagement provide an incentive to invest in specific capabilities in anticipation of possible future similar conflicts in littoral waters involving NATO. First, the need for new measures to ensure the continued availability of interceptor missiles has emerged. In this regard, the first attempts to recharge VLS at sea by the French and US navies are noteworthy. Second, the need to reduce the asymmetric cost disadvantage in the face of low-cost threats, such as drones, has been evidenced clearly. Particular attention must be given to appropriate countermeasures, such as EW and directed-energy weapons, capable of reducing defense costs.

Aspides would probably return home “on the shield” at this time, but the mission, with its difficulties, provides an opportunity to improve the European naval power.

Giacomo Leccese is an External Researcher at the Center for International and Strategic Studies (CISS) at LUISS University of Rome. He also serves as a Subject Matter Expert for the course of Strategic Studies at the Department of Political Science of the same university. His main interests concern maritime security, both in its surface and submarine dimensions, European defense, and the security dynamics in the MENA region.

Featured image: EU Extends Red Sea Maritime Security Operation Through 2026, Expands Intelligence Sharing. Source: gCaptain. https://gcaptain.com/eu-extends-red-sea-maritime-security-operation-through-2026-expands-intelligence-sharing/

Future Tech

Asymmetry Rising: How Autonomous Systems Enforce Sea Denial

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By Rudraksh Pathak

Naval warfare is approaching a point where the traditional capital ship is no longer an unambiguous asset in contested waters. For decades, naval power was measured in tonnage and platforms: the size of destroyers, the number of vertical launch cells, the quietness of submarines. That framework still matters, but it is no longer sufficient. Increasingly, the most serious threat to a multi-billion-dollar surface combatant is not a peer navy’s capital ship, but a mass of inexpensive, expendable autonomous systems that strain the ship’s ability to defend itself.

This dynamic resembles a modern incarnation of the Jeune École theory of the late nineteenth century, which argued that small, inexpensive platforms armed with torpedoes could undermine battleship dominance. What technology has changed is not the idea itself, but its feasibility. Today, autonomous systems allow navies that cannot compete ship-for-ship to impose risk at sea at a fraction of the cost. Concepts resembling Project Seawarden illustrate how sea denial can be achieved not by matching an adversary’s fleet, but by making forward operations increasingly hazardous.

Doctrinal Shifts: The Indo-Pacific Reality

This shift from theory to doctrine is currently manifesting across the Indo-Pacific, where regional powers are actively prioritizing asymmetric denial over traditional fleet matching.

The USV Threat: Surface Denial

Recognizing that matching Chinese naval tonnage is financially and logistically prohibitive, Taiwan is rapidly shifting its procurement toward sea denial capabilities. Taipei is prioritizing the development and mass production of uncrewed surface vessels (USVs), such as the Endeavour Manta and Kuai Chi.1,2 These platforms are explicitly designed for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and one-way kamikaze missions. Capable of carrying explosive payloads, they present a highly expendable, low-cost threat specifically optimized to strike high-value surface combatants and enforce sea denial in the contested waters of the Taiwan Strait.

The UUV Threat: Subsurface Friction

Beneath the surface, the focus has shifted toward generating persistent friction without risking multi-billion-dollar crewed submarines. The Royal Australian Navy, in collaboration with industry partners, is rapidly producing the “Ghost Shark” Extra Large Autonomous Undersea Vehicle (XL-AUV).3 This program aims to deliver a stealthy, long-range autonomous capability to conduct persistent surveillance and strike missions, effectively laying down an affordable undersea deterrence layer. Concurrently, China views the undersea domain as central to great-power competition, actively integrating seabed sensors and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) into a vast anti-submarine warfare network designed to control maritime choke points and compel adversary vessels to withdraw.4

The Network: The Multi-Domain Fabric

Physical drones, however, cannot enforce denial in isolation; they require a battle space management network capable of coordinating them across domains to overwhelm adversary defenses. Acknowledging the need to counter the People’s Liberation Army’s advantage in mass, the U.S. Department of Defense launched the “Replicator” initiative.5 Driven heavily by the operational needs of the Indo-Pacific Command, Replicator aims to field thousands of attritable, autonomous systems across multiple domains within a two-year window. By networking these small, smart, and cheap systems, the strategic objective is to penetrate heavily contested anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) environments, creating a distributed autonomous fabric that paralyzes adversary logistics and operational tempo.

The Logistics of the Interceptor Trap

The central problem is not simply that autonomous drones are cheap. It is that defending against them is expensive, finite, and logistically fragile. Modern surface combatants rely on highly capable interceptors such as the SM-2 or Aster 30, each costing millions of dollars and occupying limited space in a ship’s vertical launch system. Against a small number of high-end threats, this exchange makes sense. Against large numbers of low-cost autonomous platforms, it does not.

This creates what can be described as the “Interceptor Trap.” Defenders are compelled to expend scarce, high-value interceptors against targets that may cost only tens of thousands of dollars. The imbalance is not merely financial. Missile magazines cannot be replenished at sea, and once depleted, a ship must withdraw to reload. By contrast, an adversary can scale production of simple autonomous systems far more rapidly and with fewer constraints. Systems modeled on the Seawarden concept exploit this friction. They do not need to penetrate defenses perfectly; they need only to force defenders to consume their most capable weapons on the least valuable targets.

Attacking the Logistics Chain

Much of the discussion around autonomous maritime systems focuses on dramatic scenarios involving aircraft carriers or major surface combatants. In practice, the more consequential vulnerability lies elsewhere. Fleet oilers, replenishment ships, and other logistics vessels are essential to sustained naval operations, yet they are slow, lightly defended, and highly visible.

Disrupting these ships does not require sinking them outright. Damage to propulsion, steering, or hull integrity can remove a logistics vessel from service for months. Without reliable replenishment, even the most capable carrier strike group becomes tethered to distant ports. Autonomous underwater or surface systems do not need to breach the layered defenses of a destroyer to shape a campaign; targeting the logistics tail can achieve the same effect more reliably. It is not a dramatic way to fight, but it is an effective one.

Persistent Friction and the Zone of Uncertainty

Autonomous systems impose costs even when they do not attack. The maritime environment is already cluttered with biological noise, commercial traffic, and complex acoustic conditions. Introducing large numbers of small, low-signature platforms into this environment compounds the problem. Distinguishing a hostile autonomous system from benign background noise becomes a continuous challenge rather than a discrete event.

For operators, this creates sustained cognitive strain. Commanders must assume that any contact could represent a threat, even if most do not. Ships maneuver more aggressively, burn more fuel, and devote greater attention to defensive postures. Over time, this persistent uncertainty degrades operational tempo and increases the likelihood of error. Autonomous systems designed for endurance and persistence are particularly effective at generating this friction, regardless of whether they ever fire a weapon.

Conclusion: The End of Maritime Sanctuary

High-value naval platforms carry significance far beyond their military utility. They are symbols of national prestige, and damage to them carries political consequences even when losses are limited. By contrast, unmanned systems carry little political risk. Losing an autonomous platform does not provoke domestic backlash or escalation pressure.

As competition intensifies in regions such as the Indian Ocean, the balance of advantage may increasingly Favor those who can impose denial rather than project dominance. The decisive question is shifting away from who fields the most impressive platforms, and toward who can most effectively deny the use of contested maritime spaces. In that environment, low-cost autonomous systems are not force multipliers; they are force limiters, capable of eroding the operational freedom of even the most advanced navies.

Rudraksh Pathak is an undergraduate engineering student and co-founder of Enlir Avant Systéme. His research focuses on maritime strategy, autonomous systems, and distributed unmanned architectures in naval warfare. His current work explores ontologies for defense systems, systems engineering for unmanned battle management systems, and digital twin frameworks for autonomous operational environments.

References

[1] “Taiwanese Drone Firm Pitches Unmanned Surface Vessels for Coastal Defense,” USNI News, December 2025.

[2] Sutton, H. I. “Taiwan’s Asymmetric Capabilities: Weaponised Uncrewed Surface Vessels,” Covert Shores, August 2024.

[3]”Anduril Wins Ghost Shark Contract,” Australian Defence Magazine, September 10, 2025.

[4]”Exploring the Role of UUVs in Maritime Surveillance and A2/AD Capabilities,” Center for a New American Security (CNAS), June 2024.

[5]”Implementing the Department of Defense Replicator Initiative to Accelerate All-Domain Attritable Autonomous Systems,” Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), U.S. Department of Defense, November 30, 2023.

Featured Image: Medium displacement unmanned surface vessel Sea Hunter sails in formation during Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2022., Aug. 3, 2022.  (U.S. Navy Photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class Kylie Jagiello.)

Announcements

CIMSEC’s 2024 Holiday Reading List

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By the CIMSEC Team

Happy holidays shipmates! The CIMSEC team has once again put our heads together for what is our fifth annual Holiday Reading List. Below you will find a selection of books we have read and enjoyed over the past year and some that we plan on enjoying in the future, and that we think you might enjoy, too. (Jared even snuck in some other nautical gift ideas.) And of course, we have noted when authors have appeared in CIMSEC or on the Sea Control Podcast. Whether you need to find a book for that special navalist in your life, or if you need something to read on the beach with your toes in the sand or curled up by the fire – we have got you covered. Enjoy, and happy holidays from the CIMSEC team to all our readers and listeners!

If you want even more recommendations, you can find our previous holiday reading list editions from 2020, 2021, 2022, and 2023 here!

Claude Berube
Senior Editor

Into the Deep: A Memoir from the Man Who Found the Titanic by Dr. Robert Ballard

Retired Navy Commander Ballard has earned the moniker of “hero” to many for his incredible career of curiosity and discovery which he recounts in this memoir. While his experiences with Titanic and others made him famous, his questions, hypotheses, and methods of how he found each of the ships are as important as his reinterpretation of history with ancient Mediterranean trade routes as well as reinforcing the ancient flood stories of Noah and Gilgamesh in the Black Sea. He continues to expand humanity’s understanding of the sea floor which anyone can watch on live feeds from his ship E/V Nautilus.

The Wide Wide Sea: Imperial Ambition, First Contact and the Fateful Final Voyage of Captain James Cook by Hampton Sides

Keeping with the theme of exploration, this new treatment of Cook’s life and final voyage dispels common myths and explains his final days.

Path to Power, Means of Ascent, and Master of the Senate by Robert Caro

I’ve only recently gotten around to the first three books on Lyndon Johnson in the proposed five book series in what may well be the best and most comprehensive biographical treatment of any president. The CIMSEC audience, especially officers, may wonder why these recommendations, but there are many historical lessons from the New Deal to the Great Society. Those eventually assigned to the Office of Legislative Affairs may also find it of interest. Of course, there’s also Caro’s treatment of LBJ’s time as a Navy officer during the Second World War. The Audible versions are excellent for those with limited time and a long commute.

Collin Fox
Senior Editor

Dreadnought: Britain, Germany, and the Coming of the Great War by Robert K. Massie

All the Factors of Victory: Admiral Joseph Mason Reeves and the Origins of Carrier Air Power by Thomas Wildenberg

Books like Massie’s and Wildenberg’s illustrate how revolutionary changes in naval technology catalyzed the world wars and transformed war at sea twice over in less than 30 years. A Ticonderoga-class cruiser with equally antique SM-2 Standard missiles remains tactically relevant today despite their 1970’s-era designs, but the thought of a ship designed in 1866 fighting in the Battle of Jutland in 1916 or a weapon from 1892 influencing the Battle of Midway in 1942 is laughable. That scale and pace of change will come again. The best way to create and prepare for it is cultivating a deeper historical understanding with engaging books like these.

Andrew Frame
Sea Control Associate Producer

The Pacific War Trilogy is a three-volume history of the Second World War in the Pacific, written by esteemed author and military historian Ian Toll. These are books measured by the quality of storytelling, attention to detail, and raw word count. Toll joins narrative historians like Nathaniel Philbrick, David McCulloch, and James Bradley in giving us the story as a story, making learning as easy as reading. You can listen to Jared interview Toll about his Pacific Trilogy and his book Six Frigates: The Epic History of the Founding of the U.S. Navy on Sea Control 229. 

Pacific Crucible: War at Sea in the Pacific, 1941–1942 is the first volume in the Pacific War trilogy. The book is a narrative history of the opening phase of the Pacific War, which took place in the eastern Pacific between the Allies and the Empire of Japan.

The Conquering Tide: War in the Pacific Islands, 1942–1944 is the second volume, narrating the middle phase in the central and southern Pacific.

Twilight of the Gods: War in the Western Pacific, 1944–1945 is the third and final volume taking place in the western Pacific as the conflict was brought to the Land of the Rising Sun.

Brian Kerg
Sea Control Co-Host

Chinese Amphibious Warfare: Prospects for a Cross-Strait Invasion, edited by Andrew S. Erickson, Conor M. Kennedy, Ryan D. Martinson.

This is the most current and comprehensive study of the operational considerations at play regarding a potential cross-strait attack by the People’s Republic of China against Taiwan. Without a successful amphibious assault, any Chinese invasion of Taiwan will fail – it is the critical piece of the military threat. Naval planners across the Indo-Pacific are laser focused on this exact contingency. This will be essential reading for anyone working on this scenario. Look for a Sea Control episode featuring Andrew Erickson coming soon.

Revolutionary Taiwan by Catherine Lila Chou and Mark Harrison

“Revolutionary Taiwan” is a top-notch exploration of Taiwan’s history across centuries. Too often, observers initiate the heart of cross-strait tensions starting at 1949, when the Kuo Ming Tang fled across the strait to Taiwan at the end of the Chinese Civil War. But the history of this island nation, and the root of today’s political tensions and cross-strait relations with China are far deeper and more complex than that, involving centuries-long struggles against colonization by those Taiwanese who lived on the island prior to the arrival of the Kuo Ming Tong, and their quest for democracy afterwards.

If your work is related to Taiwan or its security, and you want to ensure your analysis is sound regarding where Taiwan is and where it is going – this book is essential.

Walker Mills
Sea Control Co-Host and Senior Editor

The Wide Wide Sea: Imperial Ambition, First Contact and the Fateful Final Voyage of Captain James Cook by Hampton Sides

Sides is a masterful storyteller, and he does his best to chronicle Cook’s whole voyage, and not only the gory ending. He is able to capture subtle changes in Cook’s personality and leadership that likely impacted the voyage. Another testament to this book is that I am not the one to have it on my list. As someone who recently relocated to Hawaii, this book was one of the best I read this year. Jared interviewed Hampton Sides on Sea Control 527.

The Wager: A Tale of Shipwreck, Mutiny and Murder by David Grann

I’m late to the party on this one. The Wager was a #1 New York Times Bestseller last year, and if you haven’t read it yet, do yourself a favor and pick up a copy (or gift it to the special navalist in your life). Grann is at his best and the story is fascinating. It also pairs well with The Wide Wide Sea, and the movie Master and Commander: The Far Side of the World. In the new year I’m planning on keeping my Age of Sail kick going with The Billy Ruffian: The Bellerophon and the Downfall of Napoleon. You can listen to Jared interview Grann on Sea Control 440.

The Pacific’s New Navies: An Ocean, it’s Wars and the Making of US Sea Power by Thomas M. Jamison

Dr. Jamison is a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School and this book (release date 15 January 2025) is based on his PhD dissertation about exchanges in technology and tactics across the Pacific in the 19th Century. I had the pleasure of interviewing him about his thesis on Sea Control 379 and it was fascinating.

Fat Leonard: How One Man Bribed, Bilked and Seduced the U.S. Navy by Craig Whitlock

If you have served in the US Navy, you have heard of ‘Fat Leonard,’ scandal (court cases ongoing) that touched a generation of officers who served in the Pacific. I ordered Whitlock’s book as soon as it came out and I look forward to reading it.

Addison Pellerano
Sea Control Associate Producer

Red Crew: Fighting the War on Drugs with Reagan’s Coast Guard by Jim Howe 

A firsthand and action-packed account of the 1980s drug war from the executive officer of a Coast Guard surface-effects ship. It highlights the can-do attitude of the Coast Guard crews who manned the vessels and the missions they embarked on.

Naval Battle of Guadalcanal: Night Action, 13 November 1942 by James W. Grace

The book details a single engagement from the four days of the Battle of Guadalcanal. The author includes perspectives from both the US and Japanese sides and the planning that went into the battle.

Jared Samuelson
Sea Control Executive Producer ‘Emeritus’

I am submitting not a list of books, but rather items to engage the young maritime security enthusiast in your life. 

Tom Crestodina’s Working Boats. I recommended this last year, and I’ll include it any time I’m asked to provide input to a reading list. If you grew up enthralled by David Macauley’s Castle, you’ll understand why this is my first choice and, with apologies to Macauley, the illustrations are better. Ten types of working vessels are shown with illustrative cutaways and descriptions. You can find plenty of other options on Tom’s website, The Scow, and feel free to put on Sea Control 431 while you browse.

The shipping container tissue box will show any office visitor that you don’t have to be our good friend Sal Mercogliano to be serious about the importance of merchant shipping. Fair warning: every person who sees this is going to want to play with the remarkably realistic functional door. While I have a Maersk box myself, a better choice might be CMA CGM so you can start a conversation about the role western companies are playing in China’s naval expansion, as detailed in Sea Control 364. 

Most LEGO harbor sets have focused on the industrial space dedicated to the loading and offloading of cargo, but the new Seaside Harbor with Cargo Ship is more reminiscent of San Diego’s 10th Avenue Marine Terminal, where most imported bananas enter the United States from colorfully painted Dole company vessels.

Benjamin Van Horrick
Senior Editor

Odysseus & the Oar: Healing After War and Military Service by Adam Magers 

What can an ancient myth tell us about reintegrating veterans into modern society and service members preparing for the mental and moral demands of future conflict? In Odysseus and the Oar, Adam Magers couples the ancient tale with Jungian psychological interruption to offer veterans longing to return home – and mental health professionals looking to assist – a framework for their odyssey. Unlike most mental health professionals, for Magers, the work of reintegration was a personal struggle before becoming a professional pursuit. A decorated combat veteran who fought in the Battle of Sadr City, Magers floundered upon reentry to American society, mirroring Odysseus’ epic struggle to return home. Born out of Magers clinical work and close study of the myth, Odysseus and the Oar offers a compelling guide for the treatment and understanding of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), extracting insights from Odysseus’ epic journey home while preparing future combatants for the convoluted moral space they will enter should hostilities commence again.

Out of Mesopotamia by Salar Abdoh

What occurred during the fight against ISIS in Syria and Iraq? Against the backdrop of fluttering black flags and orange jumpsuits, Salar Abdoh’s novel Out of Mesopotamia uses the conflict to explore age-old themes. He offers an Iranian perspective informed by his time as a war correspondent, giving depth to his narrative while exploring nuances ignored by Western audiences. The novel is not just poignant and darkly funny, but it serves as a meditation on the most vexing aspects of the human experience, topics highlighted by conflict.

Marie Williams
Sea Control Co-Host and Associate Producer

The Contest for the Indian Ocean: And the Making of a New World Order by Darshana Baruah

Scholars have long studied the maritime statecraft of great powers. But in this book, Darshana Baruah studies the statecraft of middle and rising powers, including island states, in the Indian Ocean, and how each builds influence to secure its strategic interests. The result is fresh insight into maritime statecraft and its role in 21st century geopolitics, making this book a a must-read. 

American Defense Reform: Lessons from Failure and Success in Navy History by Rear Adm. Dave Oliver, USN (Ret.) and Anand Toprani

This book adds historical sensibility to the debate on Department of Defense modernization. By interrogating the Navy’s acquisition system from postwar to post-Cold War, Rear Adm. Dave Oliver and Anand Toprani show how process, personnel, and priorities got the Navy more capability for less money and offer clear lessons for when they did not. For Sea Control’s episode on American Defense Reform with Rear Adm. Dave Oliver and Anand Toprani, stay tuned in Winter 2025. For CIMSEC’s written interview with both authors, see here. 

Dmitry Filipoff
Director of Online Content

Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941 by David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie

This classic work on the rise of the Imperial Japanese Navy remains a deeply enlightening look at how a new naval power upset the traditional maritime balance and rose to great power status. It offers a detailed yet comprehensive treatment of the core elements of naval power, including the IJN’s force structure planning, naval strategy, warfighting concepts, and technological progression. The aggressive underdog mentality of the IJN and its steely determination to eclipse western navies offers lessons for grasping the shifts currently underway in Asia.

Delivering Destruction: American Firepower and Amphibious Assault from Tarawa to Iwo Jima by Chris K. Hemler

The WWII island-hopping campaign of the U.S. in the Pacific demanded new, combined arms forms of delivering firepower ashore. While U.S. forces fought their way onto heavily defended beaches and across harrowing island terrain, a remarkable combined system of air, surface, and land-based fire support flexibly bombarded the enemy. As U.S. forces assaulted successive island strongholds and gained valuable combat experience, they steadily sharpened their approach to triphibious fire support. Chris Hemler’s Delivery Destruction is an illuminating analysis of the warfighting development of a capability and doctrine that was fundamental to the U.S. way of war in the Pacific. Read CIMSEC’s interview with Hemler on the book here. 

One Hundred Days: The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander by Admiral Sandy Woodward and Patrick Robinson

The Falklands War offers an instructive experience for modern naval commanders. In his memoir, Admiral Sandy Woodward provides a deeply personal perspective of the conflict, including combat decision-making, the plans and strategies of the British naval battlegroup, and the mental trials of a task force commander at war. The early days of the Sea Control podcast featured a significant number of episodes with Falklands War veterans sharing their stories, which can be viewed here.

Featured Image: Art created with Midjourney AI.

Book Review

The CIMSEC Holiday Reading List 2022

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By the CIMSEC Sea Control Podcast Team

Happy holidays Shipmates! We’ve have put our heads together for our third annual Holiday Reading List. Below you’ll find a selection of books that we’ve read and enjoyed over the last year and some that we plan on enjoying in the future (and that we think you might enjoy, too). And of course, it should come as no surprise that we’ve interviewed more than a few of the authors we have recommended. Enjoy, and happy holidays from the CIMSEC team to all our readers and listeners!

Joshua Groover
Sea Control Associate Producer

Freaks of a Feather by Kacy Tellessen

The book that started it all, Freaks of a Feather led me down a rabbit hole of memoirs written by Marines. Tellessen, a Marine Corps machine gunner and the alleged only Marine to ever carry a .50-cal receiver the full 20 kilometers during the final hike at the School of Infantry, tells the story of his time in the Marine Corps. He was deployed twice to Iraq and saw significant combat during his first deployment. Tellessen’s relaxed tone and honesty make for an interesting read that grapples with the trials of combat, and its long-term impacts on the individual.

Guns Up! by Johnnie M. Clark

My favorite read this year, Guns Up! follows Johnnie Clark, a Marine Corps machine gunner in the famed 5th Marine Regiment, through the Tet Offensive in Vietnam. The book is a gripping testament to the courage, dedication, and grit displayed by Clark and his fellow Marines during the Tet Offensive – I could hardly put it down when I was reading it!

With The Old Breed by E.B. Sledge

A Marine Corps and American Classic, With The Old Breed puts you in the shoes of E.B. Sledge aka “Sledgehammer” through his time in the Pacific during the Second World War. Sledgehammer served as a mortarman in the 5th Marine regiment. He chronicles the heroism, bravery, and sacrifice shown by Marines fighting in the Pacific, and the horrors and ravaging effects of war through his experiences at Peleliu and Okinawa.

19 Stars by Edgar F. Puryear Jr.

If you are looking for a book on leadership in the military, look no further. 19 Stars documents the “military character and leadership” of generals George S. Patton, Jr., Dwight D. Eisenhower, Douglas MacArthur, and George C. Marshall. The book is informative and provides the reader with excellent templates on how to lead themselves.

To Be Read:

The Fifth Act: America’s End in Afghanistan by Elliot Ackerman

Very excited to read this book given how recent the US withdrawal from Afghanistan occurred. Ackerman is a retired Marine and former CIA paramilitary officer who spent considerable time deployed to Afghanistan. He also played a significant role in the evacuation of Afghan nationals who helped the Coalition in Afghanistan. In the book, Ackerman documents this and other events that occurred in the week leading up to the U.S. withdrawal. The first part of the book sucked me right in – can’t wait to read the rest! Ackerman talked to us for Sea Control 247 about his recent book War in 2034.

Anna McNeil
Sea Control Co-Host

Best Cutters of the Best Coast Guard by The Claw of Knowledge

This much-anticipated Kickstarter project is the author’s second book. Written to honor the crews of the Coast Guard’s most famous ships by connecting their efforts in a long blue line, this effort reflects on just how significant (and often overlooked) an impact each ship can have over the span of their operational service. Illustrated with the plucky sort of self-effacing humor that has endeared the author to Coasties everywhere, this book is nonetheless an extensively researched and smartly assembled account of relatable events given historical context. You won’t want to miss it, and we simply must have the author on the podcast once he or she is ready for a book tour!

Maritime Cybersecurity by Dr. Gary Kessler and Dr. Steven Shepard 

This 2022 refresh to the highly regarded original has been well0received by maritime security professionals everywhere. Chock full of case studies and practical content, this is an excellent reference written by experts in their craft. Check out CIMSEC Sea Control Episode 293 to hear from Dr. Kessler and Dr. Diane Zorri on cyber threats and chokepoints.

This is How They Tell Me the World Ends: The Cyberweapons Arms Race by Nicole Perlroth

Recommended to me by an academic well-versed in both engineering and legal disciplines, this New York Times Best-Seller is a journalist’s account of how a single conversation overheard by chance led her down a winding path of intrigue and strategic competition. This book promises to be an interesting read, and to give context to how we have arrived in an era of modern ‘bug bounty’ programs. 

The Phoenix Project by Gene Kim, Kevin Behr and George Spafford

This book is a fictional account an Information Technology employee at a big business. You might not think this is for you at first blush, but it was recommended to me when asked IT professionals for a case study on successful ‘steering the boat’ of an enterprise’s security architecture to head in a new direction. If you’d like a pragmatic solution which gives you hope for your own organization’s security architecture challenges, you might want to read this book. Not to be confused with The Phoenix Program.

Red Famine by Anne Applebaum 

Recommended to me by a geopolitical analyst as “the best book for understanding Russia’s history of punishing Ukraine, and why Ukraine is fighting so hard to push them back.” An Economist best book of the year.

Walker Mills
Sea Control Co-Host
CIMSEC Senior Editor

Asia’s Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific by Robert Kaplan

After starting with Kaplan’s book Monsoon about the Indian Ocean before a trip to Sri Lanka, I have become a huge fan of Kaplan’s style and read several more of his books. Kaplan’s blend of travel writing and geopolitical analysis make his work easy reading but leave the reader with lasting impressions of foreign lands. Asia’s Cauldron (2014) is just old enough to be prescient and a great place to start for anyone interested in learning more about the complex South China Sea region.

The End of the World Is Just Beginning by Peter Zeihan

Zeihan is a self-professed geopolitical strategist and bestselling author. He writes in an easy-to-read bordering on flippant style that mask a barrage of data that will challenge your preconceptions on economics, geography, security and great power competition. While I didn’t love the style or agree with all of Zeihan’s conclusions, I have spent more time thinking about this book than any other I have read in the past year.

Oil and War: How the Deadly Struggle for Fuel in WWII Meant Victory or Defeat by Robert Goralski and Russell W. Freeburg

After having reread this book for a class at the Naval Postgraduate School, I am again recommending it to everyone I can. Originally written in the 1980s, it is not ground breaking historical research (Adam Tooze’s magisterial Wages of Destruction would be a better bet for that), but it makes abundantly clear the importance of energy, particularly oil, to military operations. Russian logistical incompetence during the initial stage of their invasion of Ukraine make clear how relevant Oil & War remains, and a reprint from Marine Corps University means you can download it for free.

Magdalena: River of Dreams, a Story of Colombia by Wade Davis

After spending the last three years living and working in Colombia, this is one of the best books about the country that I have read. It comes from an unusual source, Wade Davis is a Canadian who fell in love with the country as a student, but sometimes it takes an outside to truly understand and convey the essence of a place. The book is really an explanation of modern Colombia with the narrative following the Magdalena River from its source in Central Colombia to the Caribbean – passing not only through the stunning landscape of Colombia and it’s rich history, but also all of the strife, conflict, and tragedy that have shaped the country over the last 500 years.

To Be Read:

Adriatic: A Concert of Civilizations at the End of the Modern Age by Robert Kaplan

Adriatic is Kaplan’s most recent book (2022) and it is part travelogue and part memoir, with a healthy dose of Kaplan’s reminisces about the region. After enjoying several of his other books like Balkan Ghosts, Asia’s Cauldron, and Monsoon, I can’t wait to tear into his newest work and I’m stoked that it’s centered around a body of water.

Victory at Sea: Naval Power and the Transformation of the Global Order in World War II by Paul Kennedy

Victory at Sea is one of those books that I’ve heard so much about but have not been able to read yet. I just picked up a copy and I’ve already take some time to look at the beautiful illustrations by Ian Marshall. If you want a teaser or a recap, we did a great episode with Dr. Kennedy about his book for Sea Control 378.

Jared Samuelson
Sea Control Executive Producer

Adrift: The Curious Tale of LEGO Lost at Sea by Tracey Williams

My wife started laughing the instant I took this book out of its packaging: “This is literally all of your interests in a single book.” She was correct and you can listen to the podcast we did with Tracey, Sea Control 340, is great. It’s as much a scrapbook as it is a book, including beautiful maritime art, pictures of Tracey’s own finds, and poetry. There are also informative sections on the long-term impact of plastic on our oceans. 

On Wide Seas by Claude Berube

Dr. Berube is one of the most vocal CIMSEC supporters and a phenomenal Sea Control guest, but that’s not why his book is here. He’s used the book to produce a study of the U.S. Navy in the 1830s, a period overshadowed by the War of 1812 and American Civil War. There’s a particular focus on Andrew Jackson’s relationship with the Navy, technical developments and the intellectual growth of the Navy’s officer corps.

Underwriters of the United States: How Insurance Shaped the American Founding by Hannah Farber

“I went looking for adventure, and instead I found insurance,” was how Dr. Hannah Farber explained her research for this book when she joined us on Sea Control 380. The extent to which marine insurance impacts international trade and economic relationships has become more obvious as a result of the invasion of Ukraine and subsequent negotiations over Black Sea grain, but before that it played a critical role in the birth of the United States.

Cats in the Navy by Scot Christenson

You’re going to approach this book expecting a lot of pictures of cats on ships, and you won’t be disappointed. But amongst all the stills of cats lounging in adorable hammocks, there’s a lot of information packed in: the reason cats started going to sea, cats as a recruiting tool, superstitions, and more. Coming to a Sea Control episode near you!

Working Boats – An Inside Look at Ten Amazing Watercraft by Tom Crestodina

A spectacular addition to any children’s book collection. Incredible detailed artwork by the author and great explanations for all sorts of shipboard gear. If you’ve ever struggled to explain to a younger relative what it’s like to go to sea, this book will help start a conversation with some immersive visual aids. 

To Be Read:

Forging Wargamers: A Framework for Professional Military Education Edited by Sebastian Bae

Sebastian is going to read this and shoot me a note written with the tone a disappointed grandfather would use when addressing his grandson who broke a garage window. I will get to it and it looks excellent! One other great benefit to this book: because it’s published by Marine Corps University Press, it’s free! Click that hyperlink. The whole thing is there! Sebastian has been a repeat guest on the Sea Control podcast.

Marie Williams
Sea Control Associate Producer

The Constitution of Knowledge by Jonathan Rauch

This book is about the epistemic crisis in our public life. “How we know what we know.” How our shared social knowledge matters. And how our institutions matter. Writing in clear, easy prose, Rauch makes a strong case for both defending democracy and not losing touch with reality (it never works out well, he writes). I came away feeling armed, at least in my mind, for modern information warfare. 

Dmitry Filipoff
Director of Online Content

Dying to Learn: Wartime Lessons from the Western Front by Michael Hunzeker

Wartime learning and adaptation is a convoluted but necessary business. Militaries need to do their absolute best to properly understand and adapt to future war in peacetime, but many concepts and capabilities will break in the naturally unforeseen chaos of conflict. Institutions must be well-designed to translate combat lessons into rapid military reform in the midst of pressing combat operations. Michael Hunzeker’s Dying to Learn is a gripping analysis of wartime learning in WWI and lays out how the various powers on the Western Front adapted their doctrine and their institutions during the course of great power war. Hunzeker assesses the fundamental building blocks of effective force development, including centralized training, decentralized experimentation, and how leaders properly manage these functions. All modern militaries can benefit greatly from these insights and mitigate the extent to which their warfighting methods will collapse in future combat crucibles. Read CIMSEC’s interview with Hunzeker on Dying to Learn here.

The Inheritance: America’s Military After Two Decades of War by Mara Karlin

There are plenty of books on the Global War on Terror, yet few if any have systematically attempted to capture the comprehensive impact these conflicts have had on the U.S. military. After having served in civilian national security roles for five different Secretaries of Defense, Mara Karlin is well-positioned to understand how the military has been deeply affected by the Global War on Terror. Karlin interviewed more than 100 individuals for this book, most of whom served as senior general and flag officers during the Global War on Terror. They offered their candid and deeply personal perspectives on the legacies of this conflict. But The Inheritance reveals much more than the personal psychological scars of these wars, which have considerable policy implications. It highlights the fault lines that have emerged between American society and its military, and the military and its civilian masters, which may pose significant consequences for how America will go to war in the future.

Collin Fox
CIMSEC Senior Editor

Victory at Sea: Naval Power and the Transformation of the Global Order in World War II by Paul Kennedy

The Allure of Battle: A History of How Wars Have Been Won and Lost by Cathal J. Nolan 

Victory at Sea is a brilliant and beautifully illustrated capstone on Kennedy’s classic, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. It traces the rise of the U.S. Navy through the Second World War to unrivaled dominance in the post-war era. The Allure of Battle is a millennium-spanning survey of mostly land wars. Despite their differing scope and focus, both books converge toward a similar compelling thesis: The outcome of war is usually decided by the latent strength and endurance of the belligerents. Novel technologies, innovative tactics, brilliant commanders, and pitched battles are interesting and often exciting, but both books argue persuasively that these factors rarely decide the final outcome of a war. Factors of national power and geography are presented as far more predictive of victory and defeat. Also be sure to check out Sea Control 378 with Dr. Kennedy.