Observational science

I confess that I am an experiment chauvinist – I look down on studies that are purely observational, studies that don’t manipulate anything. Where does my prejudice come from? One factor is that as a perceptual and cognitive psychologist, when I do science, I’m usually interested in the causes, or underlying mechanisms, of a phenomenon. For the phenomena that I’m interested in, typically one can easily do a controlled experiment that allows one to infer a cause of the phenomenon.

For many aspects of the universe that humans are interested in understanding, experiments are often not feasible, and sometimes wouldn’t even be appropriate to achieve the sort of knowledge researchers are after. Below, for a class I teach called “Good science, bad science”, I tried to get beyond my provincial experiment-centrism to explain to students the value of studies that make observations but don’t manipulate anything.

Most sciences advance through a combination of observational and experimental studies, often done by different researchers. For example, in medicine, treatments for diseases are usually best tested with experiments, for example with half of a group of patients randomly assigned to one treatment and half assigned to another. However, observational studies, where the researchers don’t actually manipulate anything, can also be critically important to advancing knowledge.

Decades of study of health records found that people who exercise more have less heart disease. Because this was an observational study, however, the lower heart disease rates in those who exercise a lot might have been due to confounding factors. Perhaps only people who start out without chronic diseases are able to exercise much, or perhaps people who live in rural areas with cleaner air are more likely to do outdoor activities, which often involve exercise. So it might have been that the reason for the lower incidence of heart disease is due to breathing cleaner air, not due to getting more exercise.

An experiment in which a random half of the study participants are assigned to exercise, and the other half don’t, helped resolve the debate, because the random assignment ensures that, on average, there will will be no confounding difference between the groups, such as living in a place with cleaner air. However, doing experiments with people is often both more difficult than only observing them, and also much more expensive. If everything goes well (e.g., those assigned to the exercise group actually do the exercises, and those assigned to the other group don’t), one may be able to safely conclude that exercise reduces the chance of heart disease. There are problems, however, of generalizing this to the real world, where very few may actually exercise as intensively, as frequently, or in the same way as those who followed the exercise protocol of the experiment.

Often, neither observational studies nor experiments fully answer a research question by themselves, but when they both point to the same conclusion, we can justifiably be very confident in that conclusion.

Some fields of research, such as astronomy, are almost entirely observational. For many thousands of years, people have speculated about what causes the motion of the stars and planets. Various hypotheses were invented, hypotheses which could never be tested with experiments, because people were never able to change the movements of astral bodies. However, by amassing a very large set of observations, people made progress by revising their theories so that they could explain more and more of the observations.

 Tycho Brahe’s observatory, which also extended underground. Image: public domain.

Johannes Kepler was uncompromising in his quest to explain the precise observations of the movements of the planets that had been made by Tycho Brahe. In his dogged attempts to fit the data, Kepler came up with the idea that the planets followed elliptical orbits. This explained Brahe’s observations better than the circular-orbits version of heliocentrism, contributing to heliocentrism’s eventual triumph.

Johannes Kepler (1571—1630). Image: public domain.

In biology, ideas about the origins of plants and animals came about almost entirely through considering observations. From the meticulous records of a long line of European naturalists, Darwin knew of many thousands of observations regarding various plants and animals. When combined with his own observations during the voyage of the Beagle, including in then-remote (to Europeans) places like Australia, Darwin formulated his theory of “descent with modification”, now known simply as “the theory of evolution”.

An illustration by G.R. Waterhouse of a native rat that Darwin and he caught in southwest Australia and documented for European science. Image public domain.

The concept of reproducibility and replication, a focus of this class, can be more complicated for observational sciences than for the experimental sciences. If subsequent researchers wanted to confirm that Australia had a rat species that really looked the way that Waterhouse and Darwin had illustrated, they could go to southwest Australia and set out a trap with cheese as Darwin had done, but even if they put the trap in exactly the same location, they were unlikely to end up with the exact same rat in their trap and as the local population of those rats may have shifted locations, so they might not catch any. Because the world is always changing, it can be hard to know whether a difference in observations should cast much doubt on a previous study.

Sometimes one can build replication into the initial effort to make observations. For example, when an important event is predicted to occur in astronomy, researchers arrange for multiple telescopes around the globe to collect observations near-simultaneously. That way, if one telescope yields different results than the others, the researchers will know that they should investigate whether it was functioning correctly before trusting its observations.

An executive summary of science’s replication crisis

To evaluate and build on previous findings, a researcher sometimes needs to know exactly what was done before.

Computational reproducibility is the ability to take the raw data from a study and re-analyze it to reproduce the final results, including the statistics.

Empirical reproducibility is demonstrated when, if the study is done again by another team, the critical results reported by the original are found again.

Poor computational reproducibility

Economics Reinhart and Rogoff, two respected Harvard economists, reported in a 2010 paper that growth slows when a country’s debt rises to more than 90% of GDP. Austerity backers in the UK and elsewhere invoked this many times. A postgrad failed to replicate the result, and Reinhart and Rogoff sent him their Excel file. They had unwittingly failed to select the entire list of countries as input to one of their formulas. Fixing this diminished the reported effect, and using a variant of the original method yielded the opposite result than that used to justify billions of dollars’ worth of national budget decisions.

A systematic study found that only about 55% of studies could be reproduced, and that’s only counting studies for which the raw data were available (Vilhuber, 2018).

Cancer biology The Reproducibility Project: Cancer Biology found that for 0% of 51 papers could a full replication protocol be designed with no input from the authors (Errington, 2019).

Not sharing data or analysis code is common. Ioannidis and colleagues (2009) could only reproduce about 2 out of 18 microarray-based gene-expression studies, mostly due to lack of complete data sharing.

Artificial intelligence (machine learning) A survey of reinforcement learning papers found only about 50% included code, and in a study of publications associated with neural net recommender systems, only 40% were found to be reproducible (Barber, 2019).

Poor empirical reproducibility

Wet-lab biology.  Amgen researchers were shocked when they were only able to replicate 11% of 53 landmark studies in oncology and hematology (Begley and Ellis, 2012).

“I explained that we re-did their experiment 50 times and never got their result. He said they’d done it six times and got this result once, but put it in the paper because it made the best story.” Begley

A Bayer team reported that ~25% of published preclinical studies could be validated to the point at which projects could continue (Prinz et al., 2011). Due to poor computational reproducibility and methods sharing, the most careful effort so far (Errington, 2013), of 50 high-impact cancer biology studies, decided only 18 could be fully attempted, and has finished only 14, of which 9 are partial or full successes.

From Maki Naro’s 2016 cartoon.

Social sciences

62% of 21 social science experiments published in Science and Nature between 2010 and 2015 replicated, using samples on average five times bigger than the original studies to increase statistical power (Camerer et al., 2018).

61% of 18 laboratory economics experiments successfully replicated (Camerer et al., 2016).

39% of 100 experimental and correlational psychology studies replicated (Nosek et al.,, 2015).

53% of 51 other psychology studies (Klein et al., 2018; Ebersole et al., 2016; Klein et al. 2014) and ~50% of 176 other psychology studies (Boyce et al., 2023)

Medicine

Trials: Data for >50% never made available, ~50% of outcomes not reported, author’s data lost at ~7%/year (Devito et al, 2020)

I list six of the causes of this sad state of affairs in another post.

References

Barber, G. (n.d.). Artificial Intelligence Confronts a “Reproducibility” Crisis. Wired. Retrieved January 23, 2020, from https://www.wired.com/story/artificial-intelligence-confronts-reproducibility-crisis/

Begley, C. G., & Ellis, L. M. (2012). Raise standards for preclinical cancer research. Nature, 483(7391), 531–533.

Boyce, V., Mathur, M., & Frank, M. C. (2023). Eleven years of student replication projects provide evidence on the correlates of replicability in psychology. PsyArXiv. https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/dpyn6

Bush, M., Holcombe, A. O., Wintle, B. C., Fidler, F., & Vazire, S. (2019). Real problem, wrong solution: Why the Nationals shouldn’t politicise the science replication crisis. The Conversation. http://theconversation.com/real-problem-wrong-solution-why-the-nationals-shouldnt-politicise-the-science-replication-crisis-124076

Camerer, C. F., et al.,  (2018). Evaluating the replicability of social science experiments in Nature and Science between 2010 and 2015. Nature Human Behaviour, 2(9), 637–644. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-018-0399-z

Camerer, C. F. et al. Evaluating replicability of laboratory experiments in economics. Science 351, 1433–1436 (2016). DOI: 10.1126/science.aaf0918

DeVito, N. J., Bacon, S., & Goldacre, B. (2020). Compliance with legal requirement to report clinical trial results on ClinicalTrials.gov: A cohort study. The Lancet, 0(0). https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(19)33220-9

Ferrari Dacrema, Maurizio; Cremonesi, Paolo; Jannach, Dietmar (2019). “Are We Really Making Much Progress? A Worrying Analysis of Recent Neural Recommendation Approaches”. Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Recommender Systems. ACM: 101–109. doi:10.1145/3298689.3347058. hdl:11311/1108996.

Ebersole, C. R. Et al. (2016). Many Labs 3: Evaluating participant pool quality across the academic semester via replication. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 67, 68–82. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2015.10.012

Errington, T. (2019) https://twitter.com/fidlerfm/status/1169723956665806848

Errington, T. M., Iorns, E., Gunn, W., Tan, F. E., Lomax, J., & Nosek, B. A. (2014). An open investigation of the reproducibility of cancer biology research. ELife, 3, e04333. https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.04333

Errington, T. (2013). https://osf.io/e81xl/wiki/home/

Glasziou, P., et al. (2014). Reducing waste from incomplete or unusable reports of biomedical research. The Lancet, 383(9913), 267–276. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(13)62228-X

Ioannidis, J. P. A., Allison, D. B., et al. (2009). Repeatability of published microarray gene expression analyses. Nature Genetics, 41(2), 149–155. https://doi.org/10.1038/ng.295

Klein, R. A., et al. (2018). Many Labs 2: Investigating Variation in Replicability Across Samples and Settings. Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science, 1(4), 443–490. https://doi.org/10.1177/2515245918810225

Klein, R. A., et al. (2014). Investigating Variation in Replicability. Social Psychology, 45(3), 142–152. https://doi.org/10.1027/1864-9335/a000178

Nosek, B. A., Aarts, A. A., Anderson, C. J., Anderson, J. E., Kappes, H. B., & Collaboration, O. S. (2015). Estimating the reproducibility of psychological science. Science, 349(6251), aac4716–aac4716.

Prinz, F., Schlange, T. & Asadullah, K. Nature Rev. Drug Discov. 10, 712 (2011).

Vilhuber, L. (2018). Reproducibility and Replicability in Economics https://www.nap.edu/resource/25303/Reproducibility%20in%20Economics.pdf

The Replication Crisis: the Six P’s

In a clever bit of rhetoric, Professor Dorothy Bishop came up with “the four horsemen of irreproducibility“: publication bias, low statistical power, p-hacking, and HARKing. In an attempt at more complete coverage of the causes of the replication crisis, here I’m expanding on Dorothy’s four horsemen by adding two more causes, and using different wording. This gives me six P’s of the replication crisis! Not super-catchy, but I think this is useful.

1. For me, P-hacking was always the first thing that came to mind as a reason that many published results don’t replicate. Ideally, when there is nothing to be found in a comparison (such as no real difference between two groups), with the p=0.05 criterion used in many sciences, only 5% of studies will yield a false positive result. However, researchers hoping for a result will try all sorts of analyses to get the p-value to be less than .05, partly because that makes the result much easier to publish. This is p-hacking, and it can greatly elevate the rate of false positives in the literature.

Substantial proportions of psychologists, criminologists, applied linguists and other sorts of researchers admit to p-hacking. Nevertheless, p-hacking may be responsible for only a minority of the failures to successfully replicate previous results. Three of the other p’s below also contribute to the rate of false positives, and while researchers have tried, it’s very hard to sort out their relative importance.

2. Prevarication, which means lying, unfortunately is responsible for some proportion of the positive but false results in the literature. How important is it? Well, that’s very difficult to estimate. Within a psychology laboratory, it is possible to arrange things so that one can measure the rate at which people lie, for example to win additional money in a study, so that helps, but some of the most famous researchers to do so have, well, lied about their findings. And we know that fraudsters work in many research areas, not just dishonesty research. In some areas of human endeavor, regular audits are conducted – but not in science.

3. Publication bias is the tendency of researchers to only publish findings that they find interesting, that were statistically significant, or that confirmed what they expected based on their theoretical perspective. This has resulted in a colossal distortion of reality in some fields, to favor researchers’ pet theories, and resulted in lots of papers about all sorts of phenomena that may not actually exist. Anecdotally, I have heard about psychology laboratories that used to run a dozen studies every semester and only publish the ones that yielded statistically significant results. For those areas where researchers are always testing for something that truly exists (are there any such fields?), publication bias results in inflated estimates of its size.

4. Low statistical power. Most studies in psychology and neuroscience are underpowered, so even if the hypotheses being investigated are true, the chance that any particular study will yield statistically significant evidence for those hypotheses is small. Thus, researchers are used to studies not working, but to get a publication, they know they need a statistically significant result. This can drive them toward publication bias, as well as p-hacking. It also means that attempts to replicate published results often don’t yield a significant result even when the original result is real, making it difficult to resolve the uncertainty about what is real and what is not.

5. A particularly perverse practice that has developed in many sciences is pretending you predicted the results in advance. Also known as HARKing, this gives readers a much higher confidence in published phenomena and theories that they deserve. Infamously, the psychologist Daryl Bem gave students and fellow researchers the following advice:

There are two possible articles you can write: (1) the article you planned to write when you designed your study or (2) the article that makes the most sense now that you have seen the results. They are rarely the same, and the correct answer is (2).

If one follows this advice, with every study the goalpost is moved to match the interesting aspects of the data, even though pure chance is often the only cause of those interesting findings. It’s practices like this, together with publication bias and p-hacking, that are believed to be responsible for Bem’s apparent discovery that ESP is real, which he published in a prestigious social psychology journal.

6. Even when a scientific result reflects a true phenomenon rather than being spurious, it can be difficult to for subsequent researchers to replicate that result. We already ran into this above with the fact that most published studies have low statistical power. Another factor is poor reporting practices (yes, I’m counting this as another ‘p’!). In their papers, researchers often do not describe their study in enough detail for other researchers to be able to duplicate what was done. For example, the Reproducibility Project: Cancer Biology initially aimed to replicate 193 experiments, but none of the experiments were described in sufficient detail in the original paper to enable the researchers to design protocols to repeat the experiments, and for 32% of the associated papers, the authors never responded to inquiries or declined to share reagents, code, or data.

The six P’s don’t exhaust the reasons for poor reproducibility. Simple errors, for example, are another cause, and such errors are surely committed both by original researchers and by replicating researchers (although replication studies seem to be held to a higher standard by journal editors and reviewers than are original studies).

Many steps have been suggested to improve the dire situation that the 6 P’s (and more) have led to. At the most relevant places for science, however, such as journals and universities, these measures are often ignored or adopted only grudgingly, so there remains a long way to go.

Registered Replication Reports are open for submissions!

Science is broken; let’s fix it. This has been my mantra for some years now, and today we are launching an initiative aimed squarely at one of science’s biggest problems. The problem is called publication bias or the file-drawer problem and it’s resulted in what some have called a replicability crisis.

When researchers do a study and get negative or inconclusive results, those results usually end up in file drawers rather than published. When this is true for studies attempting to replicate already-published findings, we end up with a replicability crisis where people don’t know which published findings can be trusted.

To address the problem, Dan Simons and I are introducing a new article format at the journal Perspectives on Psychological Science (PoPS). The new article format is called Registered Replication Reports (RRR).  The process will begin with a psychological scientist interested in replicating an already-published finding. They will explain to we editors why they think replicating the study would be worthwhile (perhaps it has been widely influential but had few or no published replications). If we agree with them, they will be invited to submit a methods section and analysis plan and submit it to we editors. The submission will be sent to reviewers, preferably the authors of the original article that was proposed to be replicated. These reviewers will be asked to help the replicating authors ensure their method is nearly identical to the original study.  The submission will at that point be accepted or rejected, and the authors will be told to report back when the data comes in.  The methods will also be made public and other laboratories will be invited to join the replication attempt.  All the results will be posted in the end, with a meta-analytic estimate of the effect size combining all the data sets (including the original study’s data if it is available). The Open Science Framework website will be used to post some of this. The press release is here, and the details can be found at the PoPS website.

Professor Daniel J. Simons (University of Illlinois) and I are co-editors for the RRRs.  The chief editor of Perspectives on Psychological Science is Barbara A. Spellman (University of Virginia), and leadership and staff at the Association for Psychological Science, especially Eric Eich and Aime Ballard, have also played an important role (see their press release).

Three features make RRRs very different from the usual way that science gets published:

1. Preregistration of replication study design and analysis plan and statistics to be conducted BEFORE the data is collected.

  • Normally researchers have a disincentive to do replication studies because they usually are difficult to publish. Here we circumvent the usual obstacles to replications by giving researchers a guarantee (provided they meet the conditions agreed during the review process) that their replication will be published, before they do the study.
  • There will be no experimenter degrees of freedom to analyse the data in multiple ways until a significant but likely spurious result is found. This is particularly important for  complex designs or multiple outcome variables, where those degrees of freedom allow one to always achieve a significant result. Not here.

2. Study is sent for review to the original author on the basis of the plan, BEFORE the data come in.

  • Unlike standard replication attempts where the author of the published, replicated study sees it only after the results come in, we will catch the replicated author at an early stage. Many will provide constructive feedback to help perfect the planned protocol so it has the best chance of replicating the already-published target effect.

3. The results will not be presented as a “successful replication” or “failed replication”. Rarely is any one data set definitive by itself, so we will concentrate on making a cumulative estimate of the relevant effect’s size, together with a confidence interval or credibility interval.

  • This will encourage people to make more quantitative theories aimed at predicting a certain effect size, rather than only worrying about whether the null hypothesis can be rejected (as we know, the null hypothesis is almost never true, so can almost always be rejected if one gets enough data).

This initiative is the latest in a long journey for me. Ten years ago, thinking that allowing the posting of comments on published papers would result in flaws and missed connections to come to light much earlier, David Eagleman and I published a letter to that effect in Nature and campaigned (unsuccessfully) for commenting to be allowed on PubMed abstracts.

Since then, we’ve seen that even where comments are allowed, few scientists make them, probably because there is little incentive to do so and doing it would risk antagonising their colleagues. In 2007 I became an academic editor and advisory board member for  PLoS ONE, which poses fewer obstacles to publishing replication studies than do most journals. I’m lucky to have gone along on the ride as PLoS ONE rapidly became the largest journal in the world (I resigned my positions at PLoS ONE to make time for the gig at PoPS). But despite the general success of PLoS ONE, replication studies were still few and far between.

In 2011, Hal Pashler, Bobbie Spellman, Sean Kang and I started PsychFileDrawer, a website for researchers to post notices about replication studies. This has enjoyed some success, but it seems without the carrot of a published journal article, few researchers will upload results, or perhaps even conduct replication studies.

Finally with this Perspectives on Psychological Science initiative, a number of things have come together to overcome the main obstacles to publication studies: fear of antagonising other researchers and the uphill battle required to get the study published. Some other worthy efforts to encourage replication studies are happening at Cortex and BMC Psychology.

If you’re interested in proposing to conduct a replication study for eventual publication, check out the instructions and then drop us a line at replicationseditor @ psychologicalscience.org!

Protect yourself during the replicability crisis of science

Scientists of all sorts increasingly recognize the existence of systemic problems in science, and that as a consequence of these problems we cannot trust the results we read in journal articles. One of the biggest problems is the file-drawer problem. Indeed, it is mostly as a consequence of the file-drawer problem that in many areas most published findings are false.

Consider cancer preclinical bench research, just as an example. The head of Amgen cancer research tried to replicate 53 landmark papers. He could not replicate 47 of the 53 findings.

In experimental psychology, a rash of articles has pointed out the causes of false findings, and a replication project that will dwarf Amgen’s is well underway. The drumbeat of bad news will only get louder.

What will be the consequences for you as an individual scientist? Field-wide reforms will certainly come, partly because of changes in journal and grant funder policies. Some of these reforms will be effective, but they will not arrive fast enough to halt the continued decline of the reputation of many areas.

In the interim, more and more results will be viewed with suspicion. This will affect individual scientists directly, including those without sin. There will be:

  • increased suspicion by reviewers and editors of results in submitted manuscripts (“Given the history of results in this area, shouldn’t we require an additional experiment?“)
  • lower evaluation of job applicants for faculty and postdoctoral positions (“I’ve just seen too many unreliable findings in that area“)
  • lower scores for grant applications (“I don’t think they should be building on that paper without more pilot data replicating it“)

These effects will be unevenly distributed. They will often manifest as exaggerations of existing biases. If a senior scientist already had a dim view of social psychology, for example, then the continuing replicability crisis will likely magnify his bias, whereas his view of other fields that the scientist “trusts” will not be as affected by the whiff of scandal, at least for awhile- people have a way of making excuses for themselves and their friends.

But there are some things you can do to protect yourself. These practices will eventually become widespread. But get a head start, and look good by comparison.

  • Preregister your study hypotheses, methods, and analysis plan. If you go on record with your plan before you do the study, this will allay the suspicion that your result is not robust, that you fished around with techniques and statistics until you got a statistically significant result. Journals will increasingly endorse a policy of favoring submitted manuscripts that have preregistered their plan in this way. Although websites set up to take these plans may not yet be available in your field, they are coming, and in the meantime you can post something on your own website, on FigShare perhaps, or in your university publicly accessible e-repository.
  • Post your raw data (where ethically possible), experiment code, and analysis code to the web. This says you’ve got nothing to hide. No dodgy analyses, and you welcome the contributions of others to improve your statistical practices.
  • Post all pilot data, interim results, and everything you do to the web, as the data come in. This is the ultimate in open science. You can link to your “electronic laboratory notebooks” in your grants and papers. Your reviewers will have no excuse to harbor dark thoughts about how your results came about, when they can go through the whole record.

The proponents of open science are sometimes accused of being naifs who don’t understand that secretive practices are necessary to avoid being scooped, or that sweeping inconvenient results under the rug is what you got to get your results into those high impact-factor journals. But the lay of the land has begun to change.

Make way for the cynics! We are about to see people practice open science not out of idealism, but rather out of self interest, as a defensive measure. All to the better of science.

VSS 2012 abstracts, and Open satellite

Below are research presentations I’m involved in for Vision Sciences Society in May. If you’re attending VSS, don’t forget about the Publishing, Open Access, and Open Science satellite which will be Friday at 11am. Let us know your opinion on the issues and what should be discussed here

Splitting attention slows attention: poor temporal resolution in multiple object tracking

Alex O. Holcombe, Wei-Ying Chen

Session Name: Attention: Tracking (Talk session)

Session Date and Time: Sunday, May 13, 2012, 10:45 am – 12:30 pm

Location: Royal Ballroom 4-5

When attention is split into foci at disparate locations, the minimum size of the selection focus at each location is larger than if only one location is targeted (Franconeri, Alvarez, & Enns, 2007)- splitting attention reduces its spatial resolution. Here we tested temporal resolution and speed limits. STIMULUS. Three concentric circular arrays (separated by large distances to avoid spatial interactions between them) of identical discs were centered on fixation. Up to three discs (one from each ring) were designated as targets. The discs orbited fixation at a constant speed, occasionally reversing direction. After the discs stopped, participants were prompted to report the location of one of the targets. DESIGN. Across trials, the speed of the discs and the number in each array was varied, which jointly determined the temporal frequency. For instance, with 9 objects in the array, a speed of 1.1 rps would be 9.9 Hz. RESULTS. With only one target, tracking was not possible above about 9 Hz, far below the limits for perceiving the direction of the motion, and consistent with Verstraten, Cavanagh, & LaBianca (2000).  The data additionally suggest a speed limit, with tracking impossible above 1.8 rps, even when temporal frequency was relatively low. Tracking two targets could only be done at lower speeds (1.4 rps) and lower temporal frequencies (6 Hz). This decrease is approximately that predicted if at high speeds and high temporal frequencies, only a single target could be tracked. Tracking three yielded still lower limits. Little impairment was seen at very slow speeds, suggesting these results were not caused by a reduction in spatial resolution. CONCLUSION.  Splitting attention reduces the speed limits and the temporal frequency limits on tracking. We suggest a parallel processing resource is split among targets, with less resource on a target yielding poorer spatial and temporal precision and slower maximum speed.

A hemisphere-specific attentional resource supports tracking only one fast-moving object.

Wei-Ying Chen & Alex O. Holcombe

Session Name: Attention: Tracking (Talk session)

Session Date and Time: Sunday, May 13, 2012, 10:45 am – 12:30 pm

Location: Royal Ballroom 4-5

Playing a team sport or taking children to the beach involves tracking multiple moving targets. Resource theory asserts that a limited resource is divided among targets, and performance reflects the amount available per target. Holcombe and Chen (2011) validated this with evidence that tracking a fast-moving target depletes the resource. Using slow speeds Alvarez and Cavanagh (2005) found the resource consumed by additional targets is hemisphere-specific. They didn’t test the effect of speed, and here we tested whether speed also depletes a hemisphere-specific resource. To put any speed limit cost in perspective, we modeled a “total depletion” scenario- the speed limit cost if at high speeds one could not track the additional target at all and had to guess one target. Experiment 1 found that the speed limit for tracking two targets in one hemifield was similar to that predicted by total depletion, suggesting that the resource was totally depleted. If the second target was instead placed in the opposite hemifield, little decrement in speed limit occurred. Experiment 2 extended this comparison to tracking two vs. four targets. Compared to the speed limit for tracking two targets in a single hemifield, adding two more targets in the opposite hemifield left the speed limit largely unchanged. However starting with one target in both the left and right hemifields, adding another to each hemifield had a severe cost similar to that of the total depletion model. Both experiments support the theory that an object moving very fast exhausts a hemisphere-specific attentional tracking resource.

Attending to one green item while ignoring another: Costly, but with curious effects of stimulus arrangement

Shih-Yu Lo & Alex O. Holcombe

Session Name: Attention: Features I (Poster session)

Session Date and Time: Monday, May 14, 2012, 8:15 am – 12:15 pm

Location: Vista Ballroom

Splitting attention between targets of different colors is not costly by itself. As we found previously, however, monitoring a target of a particular color makes one more vulnerable to interference by distracters that share the target color. Participants monitored the changing spatial frequencies of two targets of either the same (e.g., red and red) or different colors (e.g., red and green). The changing stimuli disappeared without warning and participants reported the final spatial frequency of one of the targets. In the different-colors condition, a large cost occurs if a green distracter is superposed on the red target in the first location and a red distracter is superposed on the green target in the second location. This likely reflects a difficulty with attending to a color in one location while ignoring it in another. Here we focus on a subsidiary finding regarding perceptual lags. Participants reported spatial frequency values from the past rather than the correct final value, and such lags were greater in the different-colors condition. This “perceptual lag” cost was found when the two stimuli were horizontally arrayed but not, curiously, when they were vertically arrayed. Arrangement was confounded however with processing by separate brain hemispheres (opposite hemifields). In our new study, we unconfounded arrangement and presentation in separate hemifields with a diagonal condition- targets were not horizontally arrayed but were still presented to different hemifields. No significant different-colors lag cost was found in this diagonal arrangement (5 ms) or in the vertical arrangement (86 ms), but the cost (167 ms) was significant in the horizontal arrangement, as in previous experiments. Horizontal arrangement apparently has a special effect apart from the targets being processed by different hemispheres. To speculate, this may reflect sensitivity to bilateral symmetry and its violation when the target colors are different.

Dysmetric saccades to targets moving in predictable but nonlinear trajectories

Reza Azadi, Alex Holcombe, and Jay Edelman

Poster

A saccadic eye movement to a moving object requires taking both the object’s position and velocity into account. While recent studies have demonstrated that saccades can do this quite well for linear trajectories, its ability to do so for stimuli moving in more complex, yet predictable, trajectories is unknown. With objects moving in circular trajectories, we document failures of saccades not only to compensate for target motion, but even to saccade successfully to any location on the object trajectory. While maintaining central fixation, subjects viewed a target moving in a circular trajectory at an eccentricity of 6, 9, or 12 deg for 1-2 sec. The stimulus orbited fixation at a rate of 0.375, 0.75, or 1.5 revolutions/sec. The disappearance of the central fixation point cued the saccade. Quite unexpectedly, the circularly moving stimuli substantially compromised saccade generation. Compared with saccades to non-moving targets, saccades to circularly moving targets at all eccentricities had substantially lower amplitude gains, greater curvature, and longer reaction times. Gains decreased by 20% at 0.375 cycles/sec and more than 50% at 1.5 cycles/sec. Reaction times increased by over 100ms for 1.5 cycles/sec. In contrast, the relationship between peak velocity and amplitude was unchanged. Given the delayed nature of the saccade task, the system ought to have sufficient time to program a reasonable voluntary saccade to some particular location on the trajectory. But, the abnormal gain, curvature, and increased reaction time indicate that something else is going on. The successive visual transients along the target trajectory perhaps engage elements of the reflexive system continually, possibly engaging vector averaging processes and preventing anticipation. These results indicate that motor output can be inextricably bound to sensory input even during a highly voluntary motor act, and thus suggest that current understanding of reflexive vs. voluntary saccades is incomplete.

Speeding the slow flow of science

The transmission of new scientific ideas and knowledge is needlessly slow:

Flow slower Solution
Journal subscription fees Open access mandates
Competition to be first-to-publish motivates secrecy Open Science mandates
Jargon Increase science communication; science blogging
Pressure to publish high quantity means no time for learning from other areas Reform of incentives in academia
Inefficient format of journal articles (e.g. prose) Evidence charts, ?
Long lag time until things are published Peer review post publication, not pre publication
Difficulty publishing fragmentary criticisms Open peer review; incentivize post-publication commenting
Information contained in peer reviewers’ reviews is never published Open peer review or publication of (possibly anonymous) reviews; incentivize online post-publication commenting
Difficulty publishing non-replications Open Science

UPDATE: Daniel Mietchen, in the true spirit of open science, has put up an editable version of this very incomplete table.

Widening the gulf between haves and have-nots: Money fast-tracks journal submissions!

I recently learned that a journal called Obesity Reviews has a “Fast Track Facility”:

A submission fee of $1,000 or £750 for articles up to 9000 words long, or $1500 for articles more than 9,000 words long guarantees peer-review within 10 working days

This is a terrible development for academia. It creates a two-tier system, wherein scientists who are well-funded such as those from rich countries now have an unfair advantage over those who don’t. Science traditionally has been a partial refuge from the injustice of rich vs. poor. Although of course it was never entirely insulated from it, scientific institutions and journals have in the past have tried to treat all authors similarly.

To some, this “Fast Track Facility” may seem similar to the system of open-access journals where authors pay a fee to have their article published if it passes peer review. At least in the case of PLoS ONE (the open-access journal I am an editor for), however, this is very different because PLoS ONE waives the fee for authors who cannot pay. Authors who cannot pay are treated the same as authors who can pay. The “Fast Track Facility” policy of Obesity Reviews violates this fundamental principle of fairness.

UPDATE: Help write and sign on to a protest letter

finally, Australian Research Council supports open access

Previously, the Australian Research Council (ARC) expressly forbade use of grant funds to pay publication charges. This prevented many of us from publishing in open-access journals, as they generally charge a fee.

Fortunately, the newly-revised funding rules change that, and instead strongly encourage open access, via journals and via depositing one’s research in an institutional repository.

5.2.2 Publication and dissemination of Project outputs and outreach activity costs

may be supported at up to two (2) per cent of total ARC funding awarded to

the Project.  The ARC strongly encourages publication in publicly accessible

outlets and the depositing of data and any publications arising from a

Project in an appropriate subject and/or institutional repository.

 

13.3.2 The Final Report must justify why any publications from a Project have

not been deposited in appropriate repositories within 12 months of

publication. The Final Report must outline how data arising from the

Project has been made publicly accessible where appropriate.

Hooray!

If you have ideas of how this should be made stronger for future years, let me know and maybe we can sign a letter to the ARC together. It would be good to move towards a mandate, as suggested by the people of open access week.

Hauser and Baby Einstein cases further call for open science

A new article in the New York Times regarding the allegations against Marc Hauser illustrate how difficult it is to determine whether one is guilty of scientific fraud. A main problem is that record-keeping standards are so lax.

This is another reason why open science is important. Open science involves releasing original data and analyses, which is much easier if you have been keeping good records along the way. So it pushes one to keep better records.

In a more ironic twist regarding open science (via my colleague Bart), the maker of Baby Einstein videos (maligned in some scientific papers claiming to show that his products provided no benefits to children) has filed a court complaint asking the university to release the original data. A very one-sided press release claims that the university has balked and stalled repeatedly, which if true is shameful. Norms need to shift in science to make release of original data a commonplace, not something that’s disputed.