Arno Reuser

Important bit translated from a rather comprehensive report on the CNI risk landscape by the Netherlands' National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism: 'The shortage of personnel with technical expertise can lead to critical infrastructure providers being unable to recruit sufficient qualified personnel ... long-term problems can arise if there is insufficient technical knowledge to operate and maintain these systems. Human intervention is especially necessary in the event of an incident to mitigate disruptions in automated processes ... The increasing complexity and interdependencies within systems also require specific knowledge and expertise ... looming threat that could lead to the resilience of vital infrastructure not being maintained'. https://lnkd.in/gXuKJtwV

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The digital battleground isn’t approaching the Netherlands, it’s already here. Staying ahead of advanced cyber threats requires tailored intelligence, solid preparation, and strong partnerships. Events like the upcoming NATO Summit can serve as flashpoints for cyber activity. Let this be a timely reminder to assess and strengthen your organisation’s cyber resilience.

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It's always helpful when new Russian threat actors groups are identified. A joint publication of the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service ( Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst - AIVD) and the Military Intelligence and Security Service (Ministerie van Defensie -MIVD ) recently identified Laundry Bear. - https://lnkd.in/g-yAYNFc. Laundry Bear has been responsible for conducting cyber operations against Western governments since 2024, with a specific interest in the armed forces, governments, defense suppliers, social organizations, and digital service providers. Microsoft has dubbed this group Void Blizzard- https://lnkd.in/gVrmPeFq

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In its annual public report, the Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service (Militaire Inlichtingen en Veiligheidienst or MIVD) reported that Russian state-sponsored hackers have attacked Dutch critical infrastructure in 2024 and 2025. While the impact of the attacks was described as “minimal,” the report concluded the 2024 critical infrastructure attack appeared to be “the first time that a group like this has carried out a cyber sabotage attack against such a control system in the Netherlands.” In addition, cyberattacks on European and NATO targets increased in 2024 with the apparent goal of “gaining a digital position within critical infrastructure in order to sabotage it at a later time.” The MIVD report noted that the Netherlands has provided Ukraine with intelligence, including warnings that “Russia uses vulnerabilities in applications on mobile phones to determine the locations of Ukrainian soldiers and military equipment, in order to then attack them kinetically.” The MIVD also attributed a “whole of society” character to Russian hacking operations involving entities “from private companies to the highest levels of the Russian government.”

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Protecting press freedoms starts with protecting those who deliver them.  In today’s media landscape, journalists and broadcasters face unprecedented levels of hostile and adverse targeting. From organised criminal groups to politically motivated actors and online extremists, the pressure on newsroom, field teams and investigative journalists has never been higher — and traditional safety training simply isn’t enough. We use our government-level protective surveillance expertise to help media organisations recognise, disrupt, prevent and evade the kinds of targeting that can escalate into harassment, intimidation, physical attacks, abduction risk, or compromise of sensitive investigations. We delivered this programme recently to a major national broadcaster. Their Head of Global Security described it as “one of the best, and best-received courses we’ve had all year.” Participants, none of which had any previous knowledge of covert tactics, left with genuine confidence in their ability to passively detect and evade a broad spectrum of threats — from hostile reconnaissance and follow-home risks to coordinated targeting, digital-to-physical crossover behaviour and stalking. The result? The request for additional courses for more of their teams, recognising the value of this training in an environment where risks are evolving fast. Our protective surveillance specialists deliver practical, intelligence-led prevention training designed specifically for: 🎥 Broadcast crews 📰 Investigative journalists 🎙️ Reporters and correspondents 📡 Field teams and technical staff 📍 Newsrooms operating in high-risk or sensitive environments This two day course goes beyond traditional awareness training, integrating covert methodologies drawn from covert intelligence and investigation disciplines, taught by practitioners with real world operational experience.    The outcome is simple: Journalists don’t just feel safer — they are safer. They gain the ability to identify threats sooner, make informed decisions, and protect themselves, their families, their colleagues, and the integrity of their work. In a sector where the stakes are high and adversaries are increasingly sophisticated, prevention isn’t optional — it’s operational necessity. If your organisation is looking to strengthen its protective posture, we’re ready to support you. https://lnkd.in/em_HhDWW #Journalism #Broadcasting #Media #Press #Newsroom #InvestigativeJournalism #OperationalSecurity #NewsMedia #BroadcastSecurity #SafetyTraining

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The Polistratics : INTELL-WATCH | Issue 2 is live. This week we’ve added far more detail, identifying specific weapon systems, their deployment zones, and likely next moves using the best available open-source intelligence. We’re still tweaking the format—it’s very much in beta, but already a big step forward. A huge thank-you to the Polistratics team for their outstanding work and to our team of experts, many of whom served for years within NATO militaries, for combining open-source intelligence with real operational expertise to deliver the best possible brief. Your feedback is always welcome. Read the full report below.

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Essential OSINT tools for journalists investigating air pollution. Tracking real-time air pollution, identifying pollution sources, identifying the polluters, tracking air pollution over time: https://lnkd.in/dpXqhE67

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At 𝐓𝐞𝐜𝐡 𝐌𝐚𝐫𝐤𝐞𝐭 2025, Pieter-Jaap Aalbersberg, the Netherlands’ National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security, brought the room to a thoughtful silence. His keynote—“𝐁𝐮𝐢𝐥𝐝𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐫𝐞𝐬𝐢𝐥𝐢𝐞𝐧𝐜𝐞 𝐢𝐧 𝐚 𝐭𝐢𝐦𝐞 𝐨𝐟 𝐡𝐲𝐛𝐫𝐢𝐝 𝐭𝐡𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐭𝐬”—wasn’t about fear. It was about foresight. With a clear-eyed view of today’s complex threat landscape, he showed how resilience will not and cannot wait for a crisis. It must be designed into systems, strategies, and society. From hybrid threats to cybercrime, the message was both sobering and empowering: 𝐬𝐞𝐜𝐮𝐫𝐢𝐭𝐲 𝐢𝐬𝐧’𝐭 𝐚 𝐟𝐢𝐧𝐢𝐬𝐡 𝐥𝐢𝐧𝐞—𝐢𝐭’𝐬 𝐚 𝐬𝐡𝐚𝐫𝐞𝐝 𝐦𝐢𝐧𝐝𝐬𝐞𝐭. And in this interconnected world, our ability to stay ready depends on how well we work together. A powerful closing keynote to a day defined by vision and shared action. 

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“Capacity & Resilience in Modern Policing” 🔑 Capacity starts with clarity. Intelligence-led policing once promised proactive crime prevention, but it faltered when intelligence became siloed and unevaluated. Reviving Intelligence Led Policing means re‑defining outputs strategic assessments, problem profiles, target profiles with clear ownership. 👉 Capacity grows when intelligence is actionable, not abstract. #CapacityBuilding #OrganisationalResilience #ResilientLeadership #StrategicCapacity #GoldenThread

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The Hidden Psychology of Leading Across Generations in Intelligence & Law Enforcement In today’s world, your team might span four generations. That’s a strength—but only if you know how to unlock it. Too often, we reduce people to stereotypes: • “Boomers resist change.” • “Gen X doesn’t care.” • “Millennials always need feedback.” • “Gen Z can’t focus.” Here’s the reality: • Boomers value purpose and legacy. • Gen X thrives on autonomy and efficiency. • Millennials want growth tied to impact. • Gen Z demands authenticity, wellbeing, and inclusion. In intelligence, investigations, and law enforcement—where trust and precision are everything—understanding these dynamics isn’t “HR fluff.” It’s operational readiness. Teams that bridge these generational gaps move faster, think sharper, and execute with unity. The real takeaway? Stop trying to manage generations. Start leading humans. 👉 I’d love to hear from my network: What’s one generational stereotype you’ve seen proven wrong in your career? #Leadership #Investigations #Intelligence #LawEnforcement #GenerationalLeadership #McAfeeInstitute

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📢Have you seen #Janes analysis of last week's NATO summit in the Netherlands on 25 June. 🔸NATO leaders agreed to invest 5% of GDP on defence and security by 2035. 🔸They agreed to allocate 3.5% of GDP a year on core defence requirements and 1.5% on protecting critical infrastructure and networks, ensuring civil preparedness and resilience, innovation, and strengthening NATO's defence industrial base. 🔸To meet that goal, total NATO spending would have to rise by USD912 billion to USD2.36 trillion in a decade. Find out more here 👉 https://loom.ly/0ViruSM #NATO #Defence #NATOdefenceBudgets #Security #OSINT #MilitaryIntelligence #SecurityIntelligence #MilitaryData #DefenseIndustry

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The investigative profession has never had more data at its fingertips. The challenge now is finding truth within the noise. My latest article for the The Association of British Investigators explores how professional investigators can master open-source research in an age of misinformation, false positives, and information overload. If you're a professional investigator, check out the ABI to access training, resources, and a network committed to maintaining the highest standards. Article: https://lnkd.in/e-2-eYzd

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'𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗡𝗲𝘁𝗵𝗲𝗿𝗹𝗮𝗻𝗱𝘀 𝗲𝘅𝗽𝗮𝗻𝗱𝘀 𝗶𝘁𝘀 𝗖𝗛𝗠𝗥 𝗳𝗼𝘂𝗻𝗱𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻' Three months ago, Airwars and PAX launched a new digital tool: the Civilian Protection Monitor (CPM). The CPM provides, for the first time, a structured, practical, and verifiable tool for all stakeholders – governments, NGOs, media, academics, and parliaments – to assess and compare national policies on Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response (CHMR). However, the most recent substantial steps toward improvement by the Ministerie van Defensie were not yet reflected in the Dutch score ('Engaged'). This week, the CPM published an update about new Dutch policy improvements and/or aims since February 2025, such as: ✔️ First annual public reporting on completed assessments of civilian harm reports (https://lnkd.in/eZkmnWmS). ✔️ Enhanced transparency for Parliament on the Dutch information position in future military coalitions. ✔️ Aim to add knowledge of CHMR as a required qualification for completing specialist training programs, for instance those for targeteers. ✔️ Additional clarity and transparency on assessment and investigation procedures of civilian harm reports (https://lnkd.in/ecXthVfc). ✔️ Aim for a ‘Letter of Intent’ with partners of the NLD/US led CHMR International Contact Group, containing CHMR-related topics (i.e. a shared policy on ex gratia compensation) on which these countries want to have agreements on before operating together. ⤵️ https://lnkd.in/eiCihvEU

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Today the Telegraaf newspaper published an article about the annual report of the Dutch Intelligence & Security Service (AIVD). One of the most striking findings of the AIVD is the development of highly professional (counter-)intelligence services by criminals - or for criminals. I have asked Claude AI to translate the article into English, because I think it should be read by a wider audience. Silvan Schoonhoven is the journalist. I'll post it in 2 parts because it exceeds the character limit. AIVD Raises Alarm: 'Criminals Have Their Own Professional Intelligence Services to Carry Out Attacks' By Silvan Schoonhoven De Telegraaf, Thursday 24 April 2025 The Hague - Criminals have established "extensive, professional" intelligence services to monitor civil servants, lawyers, politicians and journalists in order to carry out attacks. Hostile states can also employ these criminal espionage services. This warning comes from the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) in its annual report. In its annual report The AIVD warns that criminals now have their own intelligence and investigation services, particularly for carrying out attacks in the drug scene. There are also fears that foreign powers could infiltrate these networks. The criminal spies use surveillance equipment and tracking teams, just like the AIVD itself. The service describes this as a threat to national security. Criminal Investigation Services Comparable to AIVD and MIVD The criminals' own investigative teams are so professional that their capabilities are comparable to those of the AIVD and Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD) themselves, including in terms of technical tools. These criminal intelligence services also target judges, public prosecutors and competing criminals who threaten their operations. They map out the home and work addresses and social networks of their targets. 'Sometimes they extract information from government and corporate databases containing personal data. For this purpose, they bribe employees or put them under pressure.' Also see: AIVD: Iran Appears Responsible for Assassination Attempts, Including in the Netherlands Criminals are extremely shrewd in avoiding official investigation services. 'They try to detect, evade and shake off these services in a professional manner. For example, they scan their surroundings using technical equipment.' Criminal Intelligence Services for Drug Trafficking According to the AIVD, these private intelligence services are particularly important for drug trafficking. The stakes for the enormous drug flows through the Netherlands are high, which is why criminals want to map out any threat to that trade. 1/2

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The preliminary draft of the Dutch Act on the Modernisation of Pledge and Assignment introduces two significant reforms: enabling deeds of pledge and assignment to be dated entirely digitally, and broadening the scope for the undisclosed pledge and assignment of future receivables. While technical at first sight, these measures could carry substantial commercial and economic implications, particularly for small and medium‑sized enterprises seeking more accessible and efficient financing options. Curious about what the preliminary draft may mean for secured transactions? Read the following blog by Rowan Hamer. https://lnkd.in/eiar4pT6 #fieldfisher #fieldfisheramsterdam #fieldfishernetherlands #security

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How is disinformation created, spread, and amplified — and how can it be effectively countered? 🛡️ The #VIGILANT Disinformation Response Manual, developed by TNO, translates academic insights into practical guidance for law enforcement and public authorities. At its core is the C5 Interaction Model, a framework built around five interconnected elements: ✅Context, ✅Causes, ✅Content, ✅Consequences, ✅Cycle of Amplification. The manual offers actionable tools for identifying threats, assessing societal impact, and selecting the right interventions, from public awareness campaigns and content moderation to targeted police actions. 📎 Read the full manual here: https://lnkd.in/dpiyvpY3

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🆕"The free seas under fire": new evaluation by IOB of Dutch contributions to #maritime #security in the Red Sea out now! In response to Houthi attacks on international merchant and navy ships in the Red Sea area, the Netherlands has contributed to three #military #operations and a #diplomatic #track. The three military operations were: Operation Prosperity Guardian (OPG), EUNAVFOR Aspides, and Operation Poseidon Archer. 🔎IOB researched to what extent the Dutch objectives were achieved and what lessons can be learned for future operations. In summary, the #main #conclusions of the report are: 1️⃣There was a discrepancy between the modest objectives of the Dutch military contributions and the ambitious operational objectives of OPG and Aspides. 2️⃣The objectives of the Dutch military contributions have largely been achieved. Dutch military personnel, policymakers and diplomats were capable and responded flexibly to the changing context. 3️⃣The ambitious operational objectives of OPG and Aspides - restoring or maintaining freedom of navigation and contributing to maritime security - have only been partially achieved. 4️⃣Several factors hampered the effectiveness of OPG and Aspides: 1. Neither operation addressed the root cause of the insecurity—the Houthis’ capacity and intention to attack—and both were limited to protecting merchant ships 2. Too few ships could be deployed in the operations to protect all shipping traffic 3. The EU operation Aspides lacked several preconditions for effective military action (for example a solid command structure and sufficient intelligence). 4️⃣The deployment of naval ships was intended to send a signal to the Houthis and other malicious actors that such violations of freedom of navigation would not be tolerated. This signal, however, did not deter the Houthis from continuing their attacks. 5️⃣Despite the minimal diplomatic momentum and limited Dutch sphere of influence, diplomatic results were achieved; still, peace in Yemen and de-escalation in the region remained elusive during the evaluation period. #Recommendations - based on the above conclusions, five recommendations have been formulated: 👉Discuss in the Article 100 letter to Parliament the (limited) influence on the operational objectives and the feasibility of the operation(s). 👉Within the #EU, strive to develop better capabilities to enable more effective military operations. 👉Continue to invest in more effective defense against #asymmetric #warfare, in which cheap drones and missiles are used. 👉If several international military efforts are active in a conflict that is important to the Netherlands, it can be strategic for the Netherlands to contribute to the various operations. 👉In #diplomacy, respond flexibly to changing political-military momentum. For the full report and summary - written by Paul Westerhof, Bruno Braak, Dr. Trix van Mierlo & Dr. Rens Willems - see the #link in the comments 👇

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