Pentesting & Red Teaming Services. We secure your internal environments and external perimeter, and help you reach compliance goals.
External link for RasterSec
Tallinn, EE
RasterSec reposted this
A bit late but our team at Digilol and RasterSec made it back to Europe from Monerotopia 2026 in Mexico City. Huge thanks to the #Monerotopia team and Monero Talk for the invite and the chance to present something cool. #XMR was spent on souvenirs, plenty of connections were made, and we're already looking forward to the next one. #Monero #Cybersecurity #Privacy #InfoSec
RasterSec reposted this
On our way to FOSDEM 2026 in Brussels. For the next couple days we are open for IRL connection building.
We found a critical issue within Revolut and were awarded a bounty 😎 👉 Engage us for a security assessment https://www.rastersec.com/
We at RasterSec just scored a reward on Intigriti, check my profile: https://lnkd.in/dPudxUAT And this critical finding places me at the top of their leaderboard. Thanks to the Revolut security team for being responsive and resolving this issue quickly.
We found an important issue in Cloud Software Group (Citrix). It was patched and a bounty was awarded to us. We want to thank their security team for their swift response on HackerOne. https://lnkd.in/eT9k8YiG
RasterSec reposted this
You can find our investigation into Coupongogo: Remote-Controlled Crypto Stealer Targeting Developers on GitHub here: https://lnkd.in/dxDv7mhh The extension currently has 5000+ active users across Firefox and Chrome browsers.
I got an email today that really made my day: "Hi İrem Kuyucu, I recently came across your repository shady on GitHub — truly awesome! With 34 followers and 21 stars, your work is clearly admired." Finally someone appreciates my Monero ransomware implementation! He even built a browser extension called "Coupongogo" and wanted me to try it. Then I looked at the code. Turns out my new "fan" wasn't impressed by my coding skills. He was scouting for his next victim. The extension is remote-controlled malware operated from Chinese servers (oversea[dot]mimixiaoke[dot]com). Right now it steals shopping data and injects affiliate links. But buried in the code? Pre-configured targeting for 18+ cryptocurrency exchanges. Here's what happens when they flip the switch: The extension starts monitoring your Coinbase, Binance, or Kraken sessions in real-time. When you initiate a withdrawal, it can inject fake confirmation dialogs that look identical to the exchange's real UI. When you paste a destination wallet address, it can use the clipboardWrite permission to silently swap it with the attacker's address. When you enter a withdrawal amount, it logs that data and sends it to their server. The *://*/* permission means they can do this on ANY website, not just the exchanges they've pre-configured. Nice try "Laplas"! But complimenting my ransomware project while trying to get me to install a crypto stealer is delusional 💀
You can find our investigation into Coupongogo: Remote-Controlled Crypto Stealer Targeting Developers on GitHub here: https://lnkd.in/dxDv7mhh The extension currently has 5000+ active users across Firefox and Chrome browsers.
I got an email today that really made my day: "Hi İrem Kuyucu, I recently came across your repository shady on GitHub — truly awesome! With 34 followers and 21 stars, your work is clearly admired." Finally someone appreciates my Monero ransomware implementation! He even built a browser extension called "Coupongogo" and wanted me to try it. Then I looked at the code. Turns out my new "fan" wasn't impressed by my coding skills. He was scouting for his next victim. The extension is remote-controlled malware operated from Chinese servers (oversea[dot]mimixiaoke[dot]com). Right now it steals shopping data and injects affiliate links. But buried in the code? Pre-configured targeting for 18+ cryptocurrency exchanges. Here's what happens when they flip the switch: The extension starts monitoring your Coinbase, Binance, or Kraken sessions in real-time. When you initiate a withdrawal, it can inject fake confirmation dialogs that look identical to the exchange's real UI. When you paste a destination wallet address, it can use the clipboardWrite permission to silently swap it with the attacker's address. When you enter a withdrawal amount, it logs that data and sends it to their server. The *://*/* permission means they can do this on ANY website, not just the exchanges they've pre-configured. Nice try "Laplas"! But complimenting my ransomware project while trying to get me to install a crypto stealer is delusional 💀
We found an important security issue in Verily, an Alphabet Inc. company, which has been patched and a bounty was awarded to us. We want to thank their security team for their swift response on HackerOne. https://lnkd.in/dcaVsy3F
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